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To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Cc: "<pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Next edition of X.509
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Peter Bowen wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 23, 2016 at 4:24 PM, Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>> On 23/01/16 23:58, Peter Bowen wrote:
>>> Until it is clear that using
>>> EKU in the way I described in covered by X.509, it is not possible to
>>> have a strict profile (e.g. PKIX) include it in the profile.
>>
>> I don't know what you mean by that, can you elaborate?
>>
>> My guess is that almost nobody does new implementations of X.509
>> code nowadays, and those that might would go to 5280 and not the
>> latest version of X.509, but I'd be very interested if either of
>> those assumptions is wrong.

You guess is a pretty accurate description of the installed base, Stephen.  :)


> 
> 5280 clearly states that "This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate
> and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the
> Internet."  I'm assuming (possibly incorrectly) that a profile is a
> subset.  It add restrictions but anything that is compliant to the
> profile is also compliant to the more general spec.

Peter, you're misreading rfc5280.  PKIX (rfc5280) is *NOT* a profile
of X.509v3 in general, but of X.509v3 08/2005 in particular.

When I asked PKIX CRL processing to adopt a fix for a defect that 
exists in X.509v3 08/2005, but has already been fixed in X.509v3 11/2008,
I faced pretty violent opposition from folks on the IETF PKIX mailing list
(likely because it would make behaviour of some of the installed base
 non-compliant if a certain approach to CRL validation would be changed
 (fixed) retroactively (no matter how obvious the defect is in 08/2005).

So adding a recursive EKU processing into certificate path validation
of X.509v3 xx/201x will have exactly *NO* relevance for the behaviour
of "PKIX-compliant" implementations.


Whether or not some PKIX implementations of the installed base
reject certificates that are not "properly EKU chained" is an entirely
different question.  PKIX implementation are allowed to reject
certificates for all kinds of local policy issues.

The reason why I believe this is an extremely dumb idea, is because
it completely breaks the original concept behind EKU.  Instead, it
hugely impairs new apps to define new EKUs (because this now requires
rolling CA certificates).  It doesn't provide any security benefits,
but it does create additional pricing models for public CAs for
issuing subCA certificates to organizations.


-Martin


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From: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: EKU for intermediate certificates
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Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Hello.

I hope the following definition should be changed.

>4.2.1.12.  Extended Key Usage
>
>   This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified
>   public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>   purposes indicated in the key usage extension.  In general, this
>   extension will appear only in end entity certificates.


Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:

P9:
Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA certif=
icate which uses a
combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to =
limit the scope within which the
Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate C=
A Certificates.

P34:
** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity certific=
ates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
(4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to further =
protect relying parties until the
use of the extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers w=
hose software is used by a
substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.

P38-39:
For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically Constrained, =
the certificate MUST include an
Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages that =
the Subordinate CA Certificate is
authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId =
MUST NOT appear within this
extension.

Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the next RFC =
should reflect this notation, I think.
This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of influe=
nce when end-entity certificates are
unwillingly issued by attacks etc.


Please see below:
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf


Regards,
Koichi Sugimoto.

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Hell=
o.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">I ho=
pe the following definition should be changed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;=
4.2.1.12.&nbsp; Extended Key Usage<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the ce=
rtified<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basi=
c<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; purposes indicated in the key usage extension.&nbsp; In genera=
l, this<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; extension will appear only in end entity certificates.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Now =
CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">P9:<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospa=
ce:none"><b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quo=
t;Cambria-Bold&quot;,serif">Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certific=
ate:
</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Cambria&quot;,serif">A Subordinate CA certificate which uses a<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospa=
ce:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;C=
ambria&quot;,serif">combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Con=
straint settings to limit the scope within which the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Cambria&quot;,serif">Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subs=
criber or additional Subordinate CA Certificates.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">P34:=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospa=
ce:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;C=
ambria&quot;,serif">** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within=
 end entity certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospa=
ce:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;C=
ambria&quot;,serif">(4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the e=
xtension to further protect relying parties until the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospa=
ce:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;C=
ambria&quot;,serif">use of the extension is consistent between Application =
Software Suppliers whose software is used by a<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Cambria&quot;,serif">substantial portion of Relying Parties wo=
rldwide.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">P38-=
39:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospa=
ce:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;C=
ambria&quot;,serif">For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Techn=
ically Constrained, the certificate MUST include an<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Cambria&quot;,serif">Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specif=
ying all extended key usages that the Subordinate CA Certificate is<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospa=
ce:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;C=
ambria&quot;,serif">authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKe=
yUsage KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Cambria&quot;,serif">extension.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" sty=
le=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Majo=
r browsers already support this specification, therefore, the next RFC shou=
ld reflect this notation, I think.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">This=
 notation is very important because we can restrict the range of influence =
when end-entity certificates are<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">unwi=
llingly issued by attacks etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Plea=
se see below:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">https://cabforum.org/wp-content=
/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Koichi Sugimoto.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2016 08:13:37 -0500
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a compliant
validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used? Allowing a toggle
probably beats simply changing the semantics of the extension for all cases.

From:  pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto
<koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
Date:  Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
To:  "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates

> Hello.
>  
> I hope the following definition should be changed.
>  
>> >4.2.1.12.  Extended Key Usage
>> > 
>> >   This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified
>> >   public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>> >   purposes indicated in the key usage extension.  In general, this
>> >   extension will appear only in end entity certificates.
>  
>  
> Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:
>  
> P9:
> Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA
> certificate which uses a
> combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to
> limit the scope within which the
> Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA
> Certificates.
>  
> P34:
> ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity
> certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
> (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to further
> protect relying parties until the
> use of the extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers
> whose software is used by a
> substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.
>  
> P38-39:
> For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically Constrained, the
> certificate MUST include an
> Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages that the
> Subordinate CA Certificate is
> authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId
> MUST NOT appear within this
> extension.
>  
> Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the next RFC
> should reflect this notation, I think.
> This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of influence
> when end-entity certificates are
> unwillingly issued by attacks etc.
>  
>  
> Please see below:
> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf
>  
>  
> Regards,
> Koichi Sugimoto.
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><div>in the CAB Forum concept, if =
there any mechanism to indicate to a compliant validation engine that 5280 E=
KU semantics ought be used? Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing=
 the semantics of the extension for all cases.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><sp=
an id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt=
; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: med=
ium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER=
-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span =
style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces=
@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com=
</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Thursday, February =
4, 2016 at 8:08 AM<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> "<a href=3D"m=
ailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">p=
kix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> [pki=
x] EKU for intermediate certificates<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D=
"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PA=
DDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml"=
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omml" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type=
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<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026">
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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--><div lang=3D"JA" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954=
F72" style=3D"text-justify-trim:punctuation"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Hello.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"fo=
nt-size:10.0pt">I hope the following definition should be changed.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"=
font-size:10.0pt">&gt;4.2.1.12.&nbsp; Extended Key Usage<o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;<o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; This extension indicates one or more purposes f=
or which the certified<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D=
"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; public key may be used, in=
 addition to or in place of the basic<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; purposes in=
dicated in the key usage extension.&nbsp; In general, this<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; extension will appear only in end entity certificates.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"fo=
nt-size:10.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D=
"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Exten=
ded Key Usage as:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-U=
S" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">P9:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospace:none"><b><=
span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria-Bold, serif;"=
>Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate:
</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria,=
 serif;">A Subordinate CA certificate which uses a<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospace:none"><s=
pan lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria, serif;">combi=
nation of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to limit =
the scope within which the<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span l=
ang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria, serif;">Subordinat=
e CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA Certifica=
tes.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></p=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:1=
0.0pt">P34:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"te=
xt-align:left;text-autospace:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt=
; font-family: Cambria, serif;">** Generally Extended Key Usage will only ap=
pear within end entity certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280<o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autos=
pace:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria, =
serif;">(4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to f=
urther protect relying parties until the<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospace:none"><span lang=3D"=
EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria, serif;">use of the exte=
nsion is consistent between Application Software Suppliers whose software is=
 used by a<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" styl=
e=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria, serif;">substantial portion of Rel=
ying Parties worldwide.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o=
:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size=
:10.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">P38-39:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left;text-autospace:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria, serif;">For a Subordinate CA C=
ertificate to be considered Technically Constrained, the certificate MUST in=
clude an<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D=
"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Cambria, serif;">Extended Key Usage (EKU) ext=
ension specifying all extended key usages that the Subordinate CA Certificat=
e is<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-alig=
n:left;text-autospace:none"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-=
family: Cambria, serif;">authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtend=
edKeyUsage KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Ca=
mbria, serif;">extension.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">=
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-si=
ze:10.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-U=
S" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Major browsers already support this specificatio=
n, therefore, the next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">=
This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of influen=
ce when end-entity certificates are<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">unwillingly issued by attacks =
etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"fon=
t-size:10.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"=
EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Please see below:<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><a href=3D"https://cabforu=
m.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf">https://cabforum.org=
/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><s=
pan lang=3D"EN-US">Koichi Sugimoto.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3537418422_8826228--



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From: "Santosh Chokhani" <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>
To: "'Carl Wallace'" <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>, "'Koichi Sugimoto'" <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
References: <D2D8B816.4B461%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
In-Reply-To: <D2D8B816.4B461%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 10:56:46 -0500
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak up), =
the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of constraint =
on the certification path mandatory.

=20

They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the =
CA.

=20

I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the path, =
however this is a significant change to the semantics of the extension =
and path validation engine.=20

=20

From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM
To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates

=20

in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a =
compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used? =
Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of the =
extension for all cases.=20

=20

From: pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> > on =
behalf of Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com =
<mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com> >
Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
To: "pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org> " <pkix@ietf.org =
<mailto:pkix@ietf.org> >
Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates

=20

Hello.

=20

I hope the following definition should be changed.

=20

>4.2.1.12.  Extended Key Usage

>=20

>   This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the =
certified

>   public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic

>   purposes indicated in the key usage extension.  In general, this

>   extension will appear only in end entity certificates.

=20

=20

Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:

=20

P9:

Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA =
certificate which uses a

combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings =
to limit the scope within which the

Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional =
Subordinate CA Certificates.

=20

P34:

** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity =
certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280

(4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to =
further protect relying parties until the

use of the extension is consistent between Application Software =
Suppliers whose software is used by a

substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.

=20

P38-39:

For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically =
Constrained, the certificate MUST include an

Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages =
that the Subordinate CA Certificate is

authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage =
KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this

extension.

=20

Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the next =
RFC should reflect this notation, I think.

This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of =
influence when end-entity certificates are

unwillingly issued by attacks etc.

=20

=20

Please see below:

https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf

=20

=20

Regards,

Koichi Sugimoto.

_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list =
pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>  =
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix=20


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link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72" =
style=3D'text-justify-trim:punctuation'><div class=3DWordSection1><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak up), =
the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of constraint =
on the certification path mandatory.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the =
CA.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the =
path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the =
extension and path validation engine. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></a></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft =
style=3D'text-align:left'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span><=
/b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> =
pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Carl =
Wallace<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM<br><b>To:</b> =
Koichi Sugimoto &lt;koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> =
pkix@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate =
certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
align=3Dleft style=3D'text-align:left'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'>in the CAB Forum =
concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a compliant validation =
engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used? Allowing a toggle probably =
beats simply changing the semantics of the extension for all =
cases.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/span></p></div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'>F=
rom: </span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'>p=
kix &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on =
behalf of Koichi Sugimoto &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign=
.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 =
AM<br><b>To: </b>&quot;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: =
</b>[pkix] EKU for intermediate =
certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid =
#B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-right:0in' =
id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>Hello.</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>I hope =
the following definition should be changed.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&gt;4.2.1.=
12.&nbsp; Extended Key Usage</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&gt;&nbsp;=
</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&gt;&nbsp;=
&nbsp; This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the =
certified</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&gt;&nbsp;=
&nbsp; public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the =
basic</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&gt;&nbsp;=
&nbsp; purposes indicated in the key usage extension.&nbsp; In general, =
this</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&gt;&nbsp;=
&nbsp; extension will appear only in end entity =
certificates.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>Now CABF =
(CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>P9:</span>=
<span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft =
style=3D'text-align:left;text-autospace:none'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Cambria-Bold;color:black;mso-fareas=
t-language:JA'>Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: =
</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>A Subordinate CA certificate which uses a</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft =
style=3D'text-align:left;text-autospace:none'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name =
Constraint settings to limit the scope within which the</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or =
additional Subordinate CA Certificates.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>P34:</span=
><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft =
style=3D'text-align:left;text-autospace:none'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear =
within end entity certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft =
style=3D'text-align:left;text-autospace:none'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>(4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the =
extension to further protect relying parties until the</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft =
style=3D'text-align:left;text-autospace:none'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>use of the extension is consistent between Application =
Software Suppliers whose software is used by a</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>substantial portion of Relying Parties =
worldwide.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>P38-39:</s=
pan><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft =
style=3D'text-align:left;text-autospace:none'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered =
Technically Constrained, the certificate MUST include an</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all =
extended key usages that the Subordinate CA Certificate is</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft =
style=3D'text-align:left;text-autospace:none'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>authorized to issue certificates for. The =
anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cambria",serif;color:black;mso-far=
east-language:JA'>extension.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>Major =
browsers already support this specification, therefore, the next RFC =
should reflect this notation, I think.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>This =
notation is very important because we can restrict the range of =
influence when end-entity certificates are</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>unwillingl=
y issued by attacks etc.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;</sp=
an><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>Please =
see below:</span><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'><a =
href=3D"https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2=
.pdf">https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.p=
df</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>Regards,<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black;mso-fareast-language:JA'>Koichi =
Sugimoto.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
align=3Dleft style=3D'text-align:left'><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'>__________________=
_____________________________ pkix mailing list <a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/pkix</a> =
<o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote></div></body></html>
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Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 09:17:04 -0800
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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>
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Cc: "<pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities.  It
does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.

That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation
libraries do enforce such constraints.  This includes Microsoft and
Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox,
and Chrome/Opera on Windows.

Thanks,
Peter

On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani
<santosh.chokhani@gmail.com> wrote:
> According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak up), the
> intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of constraint on the
> certification path mandatory.
>
>
>
> They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the CA.
>
>
>
> I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the path,
> however this is a significant change to the semantics of the extension and
> path validation engine.
>
>
>
> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM
> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>
>
>
> in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a compliant
> validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used? Allowing a toggle
> probably beats simply changing the semantics of the extension for all cases.
>
>
>
> From: pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto
> <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
> Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
> To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
> Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>
>
>
> Hello.
>
>
>
> I hope the following definition should be changed.
>
>
>
>>4.2.1.12.  Extended Key Usage
>
>>
>
>>   This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified
>
>>   public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>
>>   purposes indicated in the key usage extension.  In general, this
>
>>   extension will appear only in end entity certificates.
>
>
>
>
>
> Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:
>
>
>
> P9:
>
> Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA
> certificate which uses a
>
> combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to
> limit the scope within which the
>
> Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA
> Certificates.
>
>
>
> P34:
>
> ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity
> certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
>
> (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to further
> protect relying parties until the
>
> use of the extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers
> whose software is used by a
>
> substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.
>
>
>
> P38-39:
>
> For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically Constrained,
> the certificate MUST include an
>
> Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages that
> the Subordinate CA Certificate is
>
> authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId
> MUST NOT appear within this
>
> extension.
>
>
>
> Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the next RFC
> should reflect this notation, I think.
>
> This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of
> influence when end-entity certificates are
>
> unwillingly issued by attacks etc.
>
>
>
>
>
> Please see below:
>
> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf
>
>
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Koichi Sugimoto.
>
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>


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Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2016 13:00:29 -0500
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>, Santosh Chokhani <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <D2D8FB5B.4B529%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:

>The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities.  It
>does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.

Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for
EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely on
folklore to know which implementations do what.

>
>That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation
>libraries do enforce such constraints.  This includes Microsoft and
>Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox,
>and Chrome/Opera on Windows.
>
>Thanks,
>Peter
>
>On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani
><santosh.chokhani@gmail.com> wrote:
>> According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak up),
>>the
>> intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of constraint on
>>the
>> certification path mandatory.
>>
>>
>>
>> They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the
>>CA.
>>
>>
>>
>> I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the path,
>> however this is a significant change to the semantics of the extension
>>and
>> path validation engine.
>>
>>
>>
>> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
>> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM
>> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
>> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>
>>
>>
>> in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a
>>compliant
>> validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used? Allowing a
>>toggle
>> probably beats simply changing the semantics of the extension for all
>>cases.
>>
>>
>>
>> From: pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto
>> <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
>> Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
>> To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
>> Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>
>>
>>
>> Hello.
>>
>>
>>
>> I hope the following definition should be changed.
>>
>>
>>
>>>4.2.1.12.  Extended Key Usage
>>
>>>
>>
>>>   This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified
>>
>>>   public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>>
>>>   purposes indicated in the key usage extension.  In general, this
>>
>>>   extension will appear only in end entity certificates.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:
>>
>>
>>
>> P9:
>>
>> Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA
>> certificate which uses a
>>
>> combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings
>>to
>> limit the scope within which the
>>
>> Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional
>>Subordinate CA
>> Certificates.
>>
>>
>>
>> P34:
>>
>> ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity
>> certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
>>
>> (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to
>>further
>> protect relying parties until the
>>
>> use of the extension is consistent between Application Software
>>Suppliers
>> whose software is used by a
>>
>> substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.
>>
>>
>>
>> P38-39:
>>
>> For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically
>>Constrained,
>> the certificate MUST include an
>>
>> Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages
>>that
>> the Subordinate CA Certificate is
>>
>> authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage
>>KeyPurposeId
>> MUST NOT appear within this
>>
>> extension.
>>
>>
>>
>> Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the next
>>RFC
>> should reflect this notation, I think.
>>
>> This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of
>> influence when end-entity certificates are
>>
>> unwillingly issued by attacks etc.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please see below:
>>
>> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>
>> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>



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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 10:00 AM, Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> wrote:
>
> On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities.  It
>>does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.
>
> Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for
> EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely on
> folklore to know which implementations do what.

If you are writing your own path validation code, I don't see why not.
You are welcome to code however you want.

Thanks,
Peter


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Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2016 13:19:46 -0500
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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That rather misses the point, no? But you know that.

On 2/4/16, 1:11 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 10:00 AM, Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
>wrote:
>>
>> On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities.  It
>>>does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.
>>
>> Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for
>> EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely
>>on
>> folklore to know which implementations do what.
>
>If you are writing your own path validation code, I don't see why not.
>You are welcome to code however you want.
>
>Thanks,
>Peter



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Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 11:01:56 -0800
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To: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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I'm not sure what other kind of flag would work.  I guess you could
have something like the version field with:

flag EkuFlag DEFAULT unspecified

EkuFlag ::=  INTEGER  {  unspecified(0), direct(1), indirect(2)  }

Where direct means the EKU applies to use of the public key in the CA
certificate and indirect applies to use of the public keys down the
chain.

On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 10:19 AM, Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> wrote:
> That rather misses the point, no? But you know that.
>
> On 2/4/16, 1:11 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 10:00 AM, Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
>>wrote:
>>>
>>> On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities.  It
>>>>does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.
>>>
>>> Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for
>>> EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely
>>>on
>>> folklore to know which implementations do what.
>>
>>If you are writing your own path validation code, I don't see why not.
>>You are welcome to code however you want.
>>
>>Thanks,
>>Peter
>
>


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Subject: [pkix] Support for email address internationalization in RFC5280 certificates
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PKIX community,

We've observed a limitation for specifying internationalized email
addresses as the local part which is restricted to essentially ASCII.  That
is subject or issuer email addresses which should be stored as
subject-alt-name or issuer-alt-name rfc822Name and are encoded as
IA5String.  This is despite the internationalization in email usage as
specified by internationalization of email headers in RFC6532 allowing
Unicode in To, From, etc fields and becoming fairly commonplace.  RFC5280
already specifies internationalization of the domain but lacks any
specification for the local-part.  We propose a brief draft to specify an
encoding of email UTF-8 local part to base64.  This described in:
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt
One goal of that draft is to be compatible with existing PKI practices such
as path constraints with email address as this draft refines the existing
rfc822Name rather than specifies a new location for email addresses.

There are some other alternatives that probably should be mentioned for
discussion.  Instead of base64, another possibility is percent encoding as
done in RFC3987.  Our proposal is likely to be more compact and easier to
identify, but would welcome feedback.  Another direction is to specify a
SAN/IAN otherName compatible with Unicode for internationalized email.  A.
Melnikov specified this in an earlier draft
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-pkix-eai-addresses-00.txt>.

Another thing to consider is whether there are other RFC5280 types that
need updating for internationalization.  Please consider looking into
uniformResourceIdentifier
as well.

-Wei

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<div dir="ltr">PKIX community,<div><br></div><div>We&#39;ve observed a limitation for specifying internationalized email addresses as the local part which is restricted to essentially ASCII.  That is subject or issuer email addresses which should be stored as subject-alt-name or issuer-alt-name rfc822Name and are encoded as IA5String.  This is despite the internationalization in email usage as specified by internationalization of email headers in RFC6532 allowing Unicode in To, From, etc fields and becoming fairly commonplace.  RFC5280 already specifies internationalization of the domain but lacks any specification for the local-part.  We propose a brief draft to specify an encoding of email UTF-8 local part to base64.  This described in:</div><div><a href="http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt</a><br></div><div>One goal of that draft is to be compatible with existing PKI practices such as path constraints with<!--
--> email address as this draft refines the existing rfc822Name rather than specifies a new location for email addresses.</div><div><br></div><div>There are some other alternatives that probably should be mentioned for discussion.  Instead of base64, another possibility is percent encoding as done in RFC3987.  Our proposal is likely to be more compact and easier to identify, but would welcome feedback.  Another direction is to specify a SAN/IAN otherName compatible with Unicode for internationalized email.  A. Melnikov specified this in an earlier <a href="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-pkix-eai-addresses-00.txt">draft</a>.</div><div><br></div><div>Another thing to consider is whether there are other RFC5280 types that need updating for internationalization.  Please consider looking into <span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">uniformResourceIdentifier as well.</span></div><div><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"><br></span></div><!--
--><div><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">-Wei</span></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div>

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To: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Next edition of X.509
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Hi Erik,

I would like to point out that internationalized email addresses are not
well supported in the existing documentation by the ITU X.509 as well as
IETF RFCs as email addresses are specified as GeneralNames rfc822Name which
are encoded with IA5String.  While domain labels have been
internationalized via punycoding in RFC5280, I'm not sure if this is
reflected in the ITU X.509 documentation.  Moreover Unicode email
local-part as discussed in RFC6532 is not handled by either the ITU X.509
or RFCs.  How to handle that is probably served better by a separate
discussion thread, which I've sent out an initial post to pkix@ietf.org.  A
similar issue likely exists with uniformResourceIdentifier type as well.
Perhaps its worth looking if there are others?

-Wei

On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 3:38 AM, Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu> wrote:

> Hi Stephen,
>
> I will collect any comment on any list. The goal is to get the best
> technical specification.
>
> Regards,
>
> Erik
>
> -----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
> Fra: Stephen Farrell [mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie]
> Sendt: 07 December 2015 11:45
> Til: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>; Directory list <
> x500standard@freelists.org>; PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
> Cc: WG15@iectc57.org
> Emne: Re: [pkix] Next edition of X.509
>
>
> Thank you Erik! Do I understand correctly that comments from this list
> that you get before February are useful and that sending comments to the
> pkix list works well enough for you?
>
> If so, great, and I'd ask folks who care about RFC5280 or other PKIX RFCs
> to please review this to check for any glitches that might affect interop
> should new code be written based on the ISO doc. I'm sure other comments
> are also welcome,
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
> On 07/12/15 10:33, Erik Andersen wrote:
> > In preparation for the next edition of X.509 (the 2016 edition), I
> > have forwarded to the ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 two documents for three months
> ballots:
> >
> >
> >
> > These two documents may be found as:
> >
> >
> >
> > 1.       http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/x509-pdam-
> amd2.pdf,
> > which is the 3rd PDAM text for an amendment to X.509.
> >
> > 2.       http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor2.pdf,
> which a
> > second draft technical corrigendum. This technical corrigendum is
> > based on a set of defects reports, which include the justification for
> > the changes. The Defect reports may be found on
> > http://www.x500standard.com/index.php?n=Ig.DefectReports.
> >
> >
> >
> > An early corrigendum has been approved within ISO and ITU-T and may be
> > found
> > as: http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.pdf.
> >
> >
> >
> > These three documents together with the seventh edition will provide
> > the input to the next edition of X.509. The different
> > X.recommendations, including X.509, may be found at
> > http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e. This edition of X.509 is freely
> available in the PDF version.
> >
> >
> >
> > Those involved in  ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 can, of course, submit ballot
> > comments on the two documents out for ballot. Others, which may have
> > comments on the these document, may post them on the lists and after
> > consolidation and consensus, they may be issued as ITU-T comments.
> >
> >
> >
> > It is important to check whether any of the suggested changes affects
> > running codes. If that is a case, it is a mistake.
> >
> >
> >
> > The intension behind the changes has been:
> >
> > 1.       A better separation between public-key certificates and
> attribute
> > certificates.
> >
> > 2.       Use of a consistent terminology.
> >
> > 3.       Use of a consistent editing style in accordance with the ITU-T
> > editing guidelines..
> >
> > 4.       A new PKI component called trust broker assists a relying party
> > validating a public-key certificate is included.
> >
> > 5.       IEC TC57 WG15 has identified a requirement for a feature first
> > called whitelist but now the term is authorization and validation list
> > is used. A proposal for such a feature is included in the amendment.
> >
> > The main goal has been to position X.509 for new challenges, such
> > smart grid security and security for Internet of Things with battery
> > driven devices, very short messages (can we put a 257 octets signature
> > on a few octets message?) , short reaction time requirements, many
> > millions of entities, etc. This is all very different from Web-based
> systems.
> >
> > Kind regards,
> >
> > Erik
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > pkix mailing list
> > pkix@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>

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<div dir="ltr">Hi Erik,<div><br></div><div>I would like to point out that internationalized email addresses are not well supported in the existing documentation by the ITU X.509 as well as IETF RFCs as email addresses are specified as GeneralNames rfc822Name which are encoded with IA5String.  While domain labels have been internationalized via punycoding in RFC5280, I&#39;m not sure if this is reflected in the ITU X.509 documentation.  Moreover Unicode email local-part as discussed in RFC6532 is not handled by either the ITU X.509 or RFCs.  How to handle that is probably served better by a separate discussion thread, which I&#39;ve sent out an initial post to <a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>.  A similar issue likely exists with <span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">uniformResourceIdentifier type as well.  Perhaps its worth looking if there are others?</span></div><div><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px"><br></span></div><div><!--
--><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">-Wei</span></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 3:38 AM, Erik Andersen <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:era@x500.eu" target="_blank">era@x500.eu</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Stephen,<br>
<br>
I will collect any comment on any list. The goal is to get the best technical specification.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Erik<br>
<br>
-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----<br>
Fra: Stephen Farrell [mailto:<a href="mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.<wbr>tcd.ie</a>]<br>
Sendt: 07 December 2015 11:45<br>
Til: Erik Andersen &lt;<a href="mailto:era@x500.eu">era@x500.eu</a>&gt;; Directory list &lt;<a href="mailto:x500standard@freelists.org">x500standard@freelists.org</a>&gt;; PKIX &lt;<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
Cc: <a href="mailto:WG15@iectc57.org">WG15@iectc57.org</a><br>
Emne: Re: [pkix] Next edition of X.509<br>
<div class="CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><div class="CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><br>
<br>
Thank you Erik! Do I understand correctly that comments from this list that you get before February are useful and that sending comments to the pkix list works well enough for you?<br>
<br>
If so, great, and I&#39;d ask folks who care about RFC5280 or other PKIX RFCs to please review this to check for any glitches that might affect interop should new code be written based on the ISO doc. I&#39;m sure other comments are also welcome,<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
On 07/12/15 10:33, Erik Andersen wrote:<br>
&gt; In preparation for the next edition of X.509 (the 2016 edition), I<br>
&gt; have forwarded to the ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 two documents for three months ballots:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; These two documents may be found as:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1.       <a href="http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/x509-pdam-amd2.pdf" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.x500standard.com/<wbr>uploads/extensions/x509-pdam-<wbr>amd2.pdf</a>,<br>
&gt; which is the 3rd PDAM text for an amendment to X.509.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2.       <a href="http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor2.pdf" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.x500standard.com/<wbr>uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor2.pdf</a>, which a<br>
&gt; second draft technical corrigendum. This technical corrigendum is<br>
&gt; based on a set of defects reports, which include the justification for<br>
&gt; the changes. The Defect reports may be found on<br>
&gt; <a href="http://www.x500standard.com/index.php?n=Ig.DefectReports" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.x500standard.com/<wbr>index.php?n=Ig.DefectReports</a>.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; An early corrigendum has been approved within ISO and ITU-T and may be<br>
&gt; found<br>
&gt; as: <a href="http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.pdf" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.x500standard.com/<wbr>uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.pdf</a>.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; These three documents together with the seventh edition will provide<br>
&gt; the input to the next edition of X.509. The different<br>
&gt; X.recommendations, including X.509, may be found at<br>
&gt; <a href="http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-<wbr>X/e</a>. This edition of X.509 is freely available in the PDF version.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Those involved in  ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 can, of course, submit ballot<br>
&gt; comments on the two documents out for ballot. Others, which may have<br>
&gt; comments on the these document, may post them on the lists and after<br>
&gt; consolidation and consensus, they may be issued as ITU-T comments.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It is important to check whether any of the suggested changes affects<br>
&gt; running codes. If that is a case, it is a mistake.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The intension behind the changes has been:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1.       A better separation between public-key certificates and attribute<br>
&gt; certificates.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2.       Use of a consistent terminology.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 3.       Use of a consistent editing style in accordance with the ITU-T<br>
&gt; editing guidelines..<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 4.       A new PKI component called trust broker assists a relying party<br>
&gt; validating a public-key certificate is included.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 5.       IEC TC57 WG15 has identified a requirement for a feature first<br>
&gt; called whitelist but now the term is authorization and validation list<br>
&gt; is used. A proposal for such a feature is included in the amendment.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The main goal has been to position X.509 for new challenges, such<br>
&gt; smart grid security and security for Internet of Things with battery<br>
&gt; driven devices, very short messages (can we put a 257 octets signature<br>
&gt; on a few octets message?) , short reaction time requirements, many<br>
&gt; millions of entities, etc. This is all very different from Web-based  systems.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Kind regards,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Erik<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; pkix mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: "Erik Andersen" <era@x500.eu>
To: "'Wei Chuang'" <weihaw@google.com>
References: <000001d130da$b05884d0$11098e70$@x500.eu>	<5665633F.7070906@cs.tcd.ie>	<000401d130e3$bdf08120$39d18360$@x500.eu> <CAAFsWK2gdg_dSbThMG6nADBnijkE0bHhZM6xdokxK_CDvkfVEQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Next edition of X.509
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Hi Wei,

=20

A technical corrigendum to the seventh edition of X.509 provides an =
update to X.509 that adds internationalized DNS (Item 5 of =
http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.pdf). This =
technical corrigendum has been finally approved within ISO and ITU-T and =
is in principle part of the seventh edition of X.509. It will be =
integrated into the next edition of X.509 to be completed by the end of =
this year.

=20

We have also introduced a DNS attribute type in an approved technical =
corrigendum to X.520  (Item 2 of =
http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X520-Ed7-Cor1.pdf). The =
intention here is to have short, globally unique distinguished names. =
This reduces size and processing requirements, important in some =
environment.

=20

It is true that we not done something for rfc822 names and the RFC 6532 =
issue. I will put it on my to-do-list, which is rather long. Maybe we =
also need a new attribute type based on rfc822 names for unique and =
short distinguished names.

=20

Kind regards,

=20

Erik

=20

Fra: Wei Chuang [mailto:weihaw@google.com]=20
Sendt: 04 February 2016 20:23
Til: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>; Directory list =
<x500standard@freelists.org>; PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>; WG15@iectc57.org
Emne: Re: [pkix] Next edition of X.509

=20

Hi Erik,

=20

I would like to point out that internationalized email addresses are not =
well supported in the existing documentation by the ITU X.509 as well as =
IETF RFCs as email addresses are specified as GeneralNames rfc822Name =
which are encoded with IA5String.  While domain labels have been =
internationalized via punycoding in RFC5280, I'm not sure if this is =
reflected in the ITU X.509 documentation.  Moreover Unicode email =
local-part as discussed in RFC6532 is not handled by either the ITU =
X.509 or RFCs.  How to handle that is probably served better by a =
separate discussion thread, which I've sent out an initial post to =
pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org> .  A similar issue likely exists =
with uniformResourceIdentifier type as well.  Perhaps its worth looking =
if there are others?

=20

-Wei

=20

On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 3:38 AM, Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu =
<mailto:era@x500.eu> > wrote:

Hi Stephen,

I will collect any comment on any list. The goal is to get the best =
technical specification.

Regards,

Erik

-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
Fra: Stephen Farrell [mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie =
<mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> ]
Sendt: 07 December 2015 11:45
Til: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu <mailto:era@x500.eu> >; Directory list =
<x500standard@freelists.org <mailto:x500standard@freelists.org> >; PKIX =
<pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org> >
Cc: WG15@iectc57.org <mailto:WG15@iectc57.org>=20
Emne: Re: [pkix] Next edition of X.509



Thank you Erik! Do I understand correctly that comments from this list =
that you get before February are useful and that sending comments to the =
pkix list works well enough for you?

If so, great, and I'd ask folks who care about RFC5280 or other PKIX =
RFCs to please review this to check for any glitches that might affect =
interop should new code be written based on the ISO doc. I'm sure other =
comments are also welcome,

Cheers,
S.

On 07/12/15 10:33, Erik Andersen wrote:
> In preparation for the next edition of X.509 (the 2016 edition), I
> have forwarded to the ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 two documents for three months =
ballots:
>
>
>
> These two documents may be found as:
>
>
>
> 1.       =
http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/x509-pdam-amd2.pdf,
> which is the 3rd PDAM text for an amendment to X.509.
>
> 2.       http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor2.pdf, =
which a
> second draft technical corrigendum. This technical corrigendum is
> based on a set of defects reports, which include the justification for
> the changes. The Defect reports may be found on
> http://www.x500standard.com/index.php?n=3DIg.DefectReports.
>
>
>
> An early corrigendum has been approved within ISO and ITU-T and may be
> found
> as: http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.pdf.
>
>
>
> These three documents together with the seventh edition will provide
> the input to the next edition of X.509. The different
> X.recommendations, including X.509, may be found at
> http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e. This edition of X.509 is freely =
available in the PDF version.
>
>
>
> Those involved in  ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 can, of course, submit ballot
> comments on the two documents out for ballot. Others, which may have
> comments on the these document, may post them on the lists and after
> consolidation and consensus, they may be issued as ITU-T comments.
>
>
>
> It is important to check whether any of the suggested changes affects
> running codes. If that is a case, it is a mistake.
>
>
>
> The intension behind the changes has been:
>
> 1.       A better separation between public-key certificates and =
attribute
> certificates.
>
> 2.       Use of a consistent terminology.
>
> 3.       Use of a consistent editing style in accordance with the =
ITU-T
> editing guidelines..
>
> 4.       A new PKI component called trust broker assists a relying =
party
> validating a public-key certificate is included.
>
> 5.       IEC TC57 WG15 has identified a requirement for a feature =
first
> called whitelist but now the term is authorization and validation list
> is used. A proposal for such a feature is included in the amendment.
>
> The main goal has been to position X.509 for new challenges, such
> smart grid security and security for Internet of Things with battery
> driven devices, very short messages (can we put a 257 octets signature
> on a few octets message?) , short reaction time requirements, many
> millions of entities, etc. This is all very different from Web-based  =
systems.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Erik
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>=20
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>=20
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

=20


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style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Hi Wei,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
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class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>A technical corrigendum to the seventh =
edition of X.509 provides an update to X.509 that adds internationalized =
DNS (Item 5 of <a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.pdf">http:/=
/www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.pdf</a>). This technical =
corrigendum has been finally approved within ISO and ITU-T and is in =
principle part of the seventh edition of X.509. It will be integrated =
into the next edition of X.509 to be completed by the end of this =
year.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>We have also introduced a DNS attribute type =
in an approved technical corrigendum to X.520 =C2=A0(Item 2 of <a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X520-Ed7-Cor1.pdf">http:/=
/www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X520-Ed7-Cor1.pdf</a>). The intention =
here is to have short, globally unique distinguished names. This reduces =
size and processing requirements, important in some =
environment.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>It is true that we not done something for =
rfc822 names and the RFC 6532 issue. I will put it on my to-do-list, =
which is rather long. Maybe we also need a new attribute type based on =
rfc822 names for unique and short distinguished =
names.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Kind regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Erik<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>Fra:</span></=
b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> Wei =
Chuang [mailto:weihaw@google.com] <br><b>Sendt:</b> 04 February 2016 =
20:23<br><b>Til:</b> Erik Andersen &lt;era@x5</span><span lang=3DDA =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>00.eu&gt;<br>=
<b>Cc:</b> Stephen Farrell &lt;stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie&gt;; Directory =
list &lt;x500standard@freelists.org&gt;; PKIX &lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;; =
WG15@iectc57.org<br><b>Emne:</b> Re: [pkix] Next edition of =
X.509<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi =
Erik,<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
would like to point out that internationalized email addresses are not =
well supported in the existing documentation by the ITU X.509 as well as =
IETF RFCs as email addresses are specified as GeneralNames rfc822Name =
which are encoded with IA5String.&nbsp; While domain labels have been =
internationalized via punycoding in RFC5280, I'm not sure if this is =
reflected in the ITU X.509 documentation.&nbsp; Moreover Unicode email =
local-part as discussed in RFC6532&nbsp;is not handled by either the ITU =
X.509 or RFCs.&nbsp; How to handle that is probably served better by a =
separate discussion thread, which I've sent out an initial post to <a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>.&nbsp; A similar issue =
likely exists with&nbsp;<span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black'>uniformResourceIdentifier type as =
well.&nbsp; Perhaps its worth looking if there are =
others?</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black'>-Wei</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 3:38 AM, Erik Andersen &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:era@x500.eu" target=3D"_blank">era@x500.eu</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid =
#CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi =
Stephen,<br><br>I will collect any comment on any list. The goal is to =
get the best technical =
specification.<br><br>Regards,<br><br>Erik<br><br>-----Oprindelig =
meddelelse-----<br>Fra: Stephen Farrell [mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>]<=
br>Sendt: 07 December 2015 11:45<br>Til: Erik Andersen &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:era@x500.eu">era@x500.eu</a>&gt;; Directory list &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:x500standard@freelists.org">x500standard@freelists.org</a>=
&gt;; PKIX &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>Cc: <a =
href=3D"mailto:WG15@iectc57.org">WG15@iectc57.org</a><br>Emne: Re: =
[pkix] Next edition of X.509<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br><br>Thank you Erik! Do I understand correctly that =
comments from this list that you get before February are useful and that =
sending comments to the pkix list works well enough for you?<br><br>If =
so, great, and I'd ask folks who care about RFC5280 or other PKIX RFCs =
to please review this to check for any glitches that might affect =
interop should new code be written based on the ISO doc. I'm sure other =
comments are also welcome,<br><br>Cheers,<br>S.<br><br>On 07/12/15 =
10:33, Erik Andersen wrote:<br>&gt; In preparation for the next edition =
of X.509 (the 2016 edition), I<br>&gt; have forwarded to the ISO/IEC =
JTC1/SC6 two documents for three months =
ballots:<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; These two documents may be =
found as:<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; 1.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/x509-pdam-amd2.pdf=
" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/x509-pda=
m-amd2.pdf</a>,<br>&gt; which is the 3rd PDAM text for an amendment to =
X.509.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; 2.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor2.pdf" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor2.p=
df</a>, which a<br>&gt; second draft technical corrigendum. This =
technical corrigendum is<br>&gt; based on a set of defects reports, =
which include the justification for<br>&gt; the changes. The Defect =
reports may be found on<br>&gt; <a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/index.php?n=3DIg.DefectReports" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.x500standard.com/index.php?n=3DIg.DefectRepo=
rts</a>.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; An early corrigendum has been =
approved within ISO and ITU-T and may be<br>&gt; found<br>&gt; as: <a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.pdf" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/dtc/X509-Ed7-Cor1.p=
df</a>.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; These three documents together =
with the seventh edition will provide<br>&gt; the input to the next =
edition of X.509. The different<br>&gt; X.recommendations, including =
X.509, may be found at<br>&gt; <a =
href=3D"http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e</a>. This edition of =
X.509 is freely available in the PDF =
version.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; Those involved in&nbsp; ISO/IEC =
JTC1/SC6 can, of course, submit ballot<br>&gt; comments on the two =
documents out for ballot. Others, which may have<br>&gt; comments on the =
these document, may post them on the lists and after<br>&gt; =
consolidation and consensus, they may be issued as ITU-T =
comments.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; It is important to check =
whether any of the suggested changes affects<br>&gt; running codes. If =
that is a case, it is a mistake.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; The =
intension behind the changes has been:<br>&gt;<br>&gt; 1.&nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp;A better separation between public-key certificates and =
attribute<br>&gt; certificates.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; 2.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp;Use of a consistent terminology.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; 3.&nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp;Use of a consistent editing style in accordance with the =
ITU-T<br>&gt; editing guidelines..<br>&gt;<br>&gt; 4.&nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp;A new PKI component called trust broker assists a relying =
party<br>&gt; validating a public-key certificate is =
included.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; 5.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;IEC TC57 WG15 has =
identified a requirement for a feature first<br>&gt; called whitelist =
but now the term is authorization and validation list<br>&gt; is used. A =
proposal for such a feature is included in the =
amendment.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; The main goal has been to position X.509 for =
new challenges, such<br>&gt; smart grid security and security for =
Internet of Things with battery<br>&gt; driven devices, very short =
messages (can we put a 257 octets signature<br>&gt; on a few octets =
message?) , short reaction time requirements, many<br>&gt; millions of =
entities, etc. This is all very different from Web-based&nbsp; =
systems.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; Kind regards,<br>&gt;<br>&gt; =
Erik<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&=
gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; =
_______________________________________________<br>&gt; pkix mailing =
list<br>&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; =
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>&gt;<=
br><br>_______________________________________________<br>pkix mailing =
list<br><a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><o:p></o:=
p></p></div></div></blockquote></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_0001_01D15FFA.C235E630--


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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
To: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Next edition of X.509
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On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu> wrote:
> In preparation for the next edition of X.509 (the 2016 edition), I have
> forwarded to the ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 two documents for three months ballots...

I sincerely hope the IETF stops pretending Proxying and Interception
are the same thing as Server Authentication.

One risk model does not fit everyone. I think its dangerous to
sacrifice everyone's security for the benefit of a few. And consider,
its not all US Financial, where losses are passed onto share holders.
In some parts of the world, people can be tortured and die because of
the decisions made by the IETF.

Jeff


From nobody Fri Feb  5 03:56:35 2016
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Subject: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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Hiya,

We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are
writing that define new certificate extensions or that
want to update/modify PKIX specs.

Do folks think it is now time to form a working group
to process those?

If no, please say why.

If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other
scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement
and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine
to say "I think we should work on topic <foo>" but it is
*much* better if you can point at a draft you've written
about <foo> and say that you or someone is implementing
that and that it'll get deployed.)

If you think this requires face to face discussion at
IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.
We still have a couple of weeks before the BoF deadline
and if a short session is needed that can be arranged.
Note though that there is no need to have such a BoF
session to form a WG, if everything is clear already.

FWIW, my impression is that we do seem to have a handful
of drafts where folks seem willing to do the work and
where the work might be (or has been) implemented. So
if there's enough interest, I'd be supportive of forming
a (hopefully:-) short-lived, tightly scoped, WG to handle
that work.

Cheers,
S.


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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, pkix@ietf.org
References: <56B48DED.5080202@cs.tcd.ie> <56B48E7D.30309@cs.tcd.ie>
From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] [saag] Fwd: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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Hi Stephen, and thanks for this note.  Please see below:

On 2/5/16 12:58 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
> Hiya,
>
> We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are
> writing that define new certificate extensions or that
> want to update/modify PKIX specs.
>
> Do folks think it is now time to form a working group
> to process those?
>
> If no, please say why.
>
> If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other
> scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement
> and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine
> to say "I think we should work on topic <foo>" but it is
> *much* better if you can point at a draft you've written
> about <foo> and say that you or someone is implementing
> that and that it'll get deployed.)

I've written draft-lear-ietf-pkix-mud-extension-00.txt that talks about
something called a manufacturer usage description.  The idea is to
provide a means for local networks to retrieve recommendations from
manufacturers on what sort of access their devices should have.  This
extension is intended for use in the context of IEEE 802.1AR.

It definitely could use a good set of eyes on it.  We are currently in
the lab with the concept now.
>
> If you think this requires face to face discussion at
> IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.

I am personally okay with any approach to move forward, whether that's a
WG, doing something AD-sponsored, or something else.  I'm hoping that as
non-critical constraints go this one is not particularly controversial.=20
If a working group is the best way, I would just ask that this draft be
included in scope ;-)

Eliot


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are
> writing that define new certificate extensions or that
> want to update/modify PKIX specs.
>
> Do folks think it is now time to form a working group
> to process those?
>

Yes.


>
> If no, please say why.
>
> If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other
> scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement
> and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine
> to say "I think we should work on topic <foo>" but it is
> *much* better if you can point at a draft you've written
> about <foo> and say that you or someone is implementing
> that and that it'll get deployed.)
>

We are interested in specifying internationalization support for the email
address local-part, and we've written a draft for that:
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt
We're aware of at least one other prior draft on this topic.

Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the discrepancy
between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive (and is
acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some email
providers have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We don't
have a draft for this topic but could write something up.


> If you think this requires face to face discussion at
> IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.
> We still have a couple of weeks before the BoF deadline
> and if a short session is needed that can be arranged.
> Note though that there is no need to have such a BoF
> session to form a WG, if everything is clear already.
>
> FWIW, my impression is that we do seem to have a handful
> of drafts where folks seem willing to do the work and
> where the work might be (or has been) implemented. So
> if there's enough interest, I'd be supportive of forming
> a (hopefully:-) short-lived, tightly scoped, WG to handle
> that work.
>

+1

That would be much appreciated.

-Wei


> Cheers,
> S.
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are<br>
writing that define new certificate extensions or that<br>
want to update/modify PKIX specs.<br>
<br>
Do folks think it is now time to form a working group<br>
to process those?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
If no, please say why.<br>
<br>
If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other<br>
scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement<br>
and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine<br>
to say &quot;I think we should work on topic &lt;foo&gt;&quot; but it is<br>
*much* better if you can point at a draft you&#39;ve written<br>
about &lt;foo&gt; and say that you or someone is implementing<br>
that and that it&#39;ll get deployed.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We are interested in specifying internationalization support for the email address local-part, and we&#39;ve written a draft for that:</div><div><a href="http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt" style="font-size:12.8px">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-<wbr>lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt</a><br></div><div>We&#39;re aware of at least one other prior draft on this topic.</div><div><br></div><div>Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the discrepancy between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive (and is acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some email providers have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We don&#39;t have a draft for this topic but could write something up.</div><div><br></div><!--
--><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
If you think this requires face to face discussion at<br>
IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.<br>
We still have a couple of weeks before the BoF deadline<br>
and if a short session is needed that can be arranged.<br>
Note though that there is no need to have such a BoF<br>
session to form a WG, if everything is clear already.<br>
<br>
FWIW, my impression is that we do seem to have a handful<br>
of drafts where folks seem willing to do the work and<br>
where the work might be (or has been) implemented. So<br>
if there&#39;s enough interest, I&#39;d be supportive of forming<br>
a (hopefully:-) short-lived, tightly scoped, WG to handle<br>
that work.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>+1</div><div> </div><div>That would be much appreciated.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" rel="noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Strings in certificates
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On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:

> Sean,
>
> Thanks for providing your thoughts.
>
> On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 2:25 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> > My two cents …
> >
> > On Jan 18, 2016, at 22:10, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> In writing certlint (https://github.com/awslabs/certlint), I ran
> >> across several items related to strings in certificates that are
> >> slightly unclear.  I’m hoping that someone might be able to help
> >> clarify a few things:
> >>
> >>
> >> 1) TeletexString, BMPString, and UniversalString types of
> DirectoryStrings
> >>
> >> RFC 5280 says CAs should not use TeletexString, BMPString, and
> >> UniversalString types for DirectoryStrings.  As early as 1999 (RFC
> >> 2459) these were flagged as deprecated.
> >>
> >> Is there anything that has moved these to SHALL NOT/MUST NOT or are we
> >> still at SHOULD NOT?
> >
> > I’d love to hear that CAs haven’t generated these string types for the
> last decade ….
>
> You won't hear that from me.  I've seen hundreds (if not thousands) of
> certificates issued in the last week that use these string types.
>
> >> 2) VisibleString and BMPString types of DisplayText
> >>
> >> RFC 5280 says:
> >>      Conforming CAs SHOULD use the
> >>      UTF8String encoding for explicitText, but MAY use IA5String.
> >>      Conforming CAs MUST NOT encode explicitText as VisibleString or
> >>      BMPString.
> >>
> >> However the organization field of noticeref also uses DisplayText.  Do
> >> the same rules apply?
> >
> > I remember something about this … ah yeah @ IETF 74:
> > https://ietf.org/proceedings/74/slides/pkix-3.pdf
> >
> > I think it was just meant to apply to explicitText because that’s what
> was seen in the wild given the following statement in s4.2.1.4:
> > "Conforming CAs SHOULD NOT use the noticeRef option.”
>
> Yes, I was pointed to RFC 6818 which changed this rule.
>
> >> 3) Unicode normalization
> >>
> >> A number of fields in certificates can take unicode strings.  Is there
> >> any specification as to how (or if) they should be normalized?
> >
> > I thought there were references in s7 of RFC 5280 (and some tweaks in s5
> of RFC 6818).  There’s also some additional information in RFC 6125.  In a
> perfect world, the output of precis (https://datatracker.ietf.org/
> wg/precis/documents/) would be adopted the world over.  I’m not going to
> hold my breath though.
>
> I don't see anything there that specifies a specific normalization
> form for storage, except for the one thing about explicitText.  I'll
> assuming anything (including mixed) is good.
>

Just piling on.  May be I'm misreading those two section (s7 of RFC5280 and
s5 of RFC6818), while there's IDN support, there's no mention of handling
Unicode in email address rfc822Name local-part or URL uniformResourceIdentifier
path or query parts.  It seems like an important loophole that should be
fixed.  Would folks here be willing to help in standardizing some in
certificate encoding for these types?

thanks,
-Wei


>
> Thanks,
> Peter
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Peter Bowen <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">Sean,<br>
<br>
Thanks for providing your thoughts.<br>
<span class="gmail-"><br>
On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 2:25 PM, Sean Turner &lt;<a href="mailto:sean@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; My two cents …<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 18, 2016, at 22:10, Peter Bowen &lt;<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; In writing certlint (<a href="https://github.com/awslabs/certlint" rel="noreferrer">https://github.com/awslabs/<wbr>certlint</a>), I ran<br>
&gt;&gt; across several items related to strings in certificates that are<br>
&gt;&gt; slightly unclear.  I’m hoping that someone might be able to help<br>
&gt;&gt; clarify a few things:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; 1) TeletexString, BMPString, and UniversalString types of DirectoryStrings<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; RFC 5280 says CAs should not use TeletexString, BMPString, and<br>
&gt;&gt; UniversalString types for DirectoryStrings.  As early as 1999 (RFC<br>
&gt;&gt; 2459) these were flagged as deprecated.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Is there anything that has moved these to SHALL NOT/MUST NOT or are we<br>
&gt;&gt; still at SHOULD NOT?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I’d love to hear that CAs haven’t generated these string types for the last decade ….<br>
<br>
</span>You won&#39;t hear that from me.  I&#39;ve seen hundreds (if not thousands) of<br>
certificates issued in the last week that use these string types.<br>
<span class="gmail-"><br>
&gt;&gt; 2) VisibleString and BMPString types of DisplayText<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; RFC 5280 says:<br>
&gt;&gt;      Conforming CAs SHOULD use the<br>
&gt;&gt;      UTF8String encoding for explicitText, but MAY use IA5String.<br>
&gt;&gt;      Conforming CAs MUST NOT encode explicitText as VisibleString or<br>
&gt;&gt;      BMPString.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; However the organization field of noticeref also uses DisplayText.  Do<br>
&gt;&gt; the same rules apply?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I remember something about this … ah yeah @ IETF 74:<br>
&gt; <a href="https://ietf.org/proceedings/74/slides/pkix-3.pdf" rel="noreferrer">https://ietf.org/proceedings/<wbr>74/slides/pkix-3.pdf</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I think it was just meant to apply to explicitText because that’s what was seen in the wild given the following statement in s4.2.1.4:<br>
&gt; &quot;Conforming CAs SHOULD NOT use the noticeRef option.”<br>
<br>
</span>Yes, I was pointed to RFC 6818 which changed this rule.<br>
<span class="gmail-"><br>
&gt;&gt; 3) Unicode normalization<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; A number of fields in certificates can take unicode strings.  Is there<br>
&gt;&gt; any specification as to how (or if) they should be normalized?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I thought there were references in s7 of RFC 5280 (and some tweaks in s5 of RFC 6818).  There’s also some additional information in RFC 6125.  In a perfect world, the output of precis (<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/precis/documents/" rel="noreferrer">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>wg/precis/documents/</a>) would be adopted the world over.  I’m not going to hold my breath though.<br>
<br>
</span>I don&#39;t see anything there that specifies a specific normalization<br>
form for storage, except for the one thing about explicitText.  I&#39;ll<br>
assuming anything (including mixed) is good.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Just piling on.  May be I&#39;m misreading those two section (s7 of RFC5280 and s5 of RFC6818), while there&#39;s IDN support, there&#39;s no mention of handling Unicode in email address rfc822Name local-part or URL <span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:12.8px;white-space:pre-wrap">uniformResourceIdentifier path or query</span> parts.  It seems like an important loophole that should be fixed.  Would folks here be willing to help in standardizing some in certificate encoding for these types?</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>-Wei</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Peter<br>
<div class="gmail-CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><div class="gmail-CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" rel="noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [pkix] Strings in certificates
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On Feb 5, 2016, at 6:10 PM, Wei Chuang wrote:

> >> 3) Unicode normalization
> >>
> >> A number of fields in certificates can take unicode strings.  Is =
there
> >> any specification as to how (or if) they should be normalized?
> >
> > I thought there were references in s7 of RFC 5280 (and some tweaks =
in s5 of RFC 6818).  There=92s also some additional information in RFC =
6125.  In a perfect world, the output of precis =
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/precis/documents/) would be adopted the =
world over.  I=92m not going to hold my breath though.
>=20
> I don't see anything there that specifies a specific normalization
> form for storage, except for the one thing about explicitText.  I'll
> assuming anything (including mixed) is good.
>=20
> Just piling on.  May be I'm misreading those two section (s7 of =
RFC5280 and s5 of RFC6818), while there's IDN support, there's no =
mention of handling Unicode in email address rfc822Name local-part or =
URL uniformResourceIdentifier path or query parts.  It seems like an =
important loophole that should be fixed.  Would folks here be willing to =
help in standardizing some in certificate encoding for these types?

I'm willing to help with a clarifications document.  I do not need to =
revisit the decisions recorded in every section of RFC 5280 all over =
again.

Russ




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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><br><div><div>On Feb 5, 2016, at 6:10 PM, Wei Chuang wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
font-family: Helvetica; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: =
auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; font-size: medium; "><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; =
margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; =
border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-style: solid; =
padding-left: 1ex; "><span class=3D"gmail-">&gt;&gt; 3) Unicode =
normalization<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; A number of fields in certificates =
can take unicode strings.&nbsp; Is there<br>&gt;&gt; any specification =
as to how (or if) they should be normalized?<br>&gt;<br>&gt; I thought =
there were references in s7 of RFC 5280 (and some tweaks in s5 of RFC =
6818).&nbsp; There=92s also some additional information in RFC =
6125.&nbsp; In a perfect world, the output of precis (<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/precis/documents/" =
rel=3D"noreferrer">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>wg/precis/documents/<=
/a>) would be adopted the world over.&nbsp; I=92m not going to hold my =
breath though.<br><br></span>I don't see anything there that specifies a =
specific normalization<br>form for storage, except for the one thing =
about explicitText.&nbsp; I'll<br>assuming anything (including mixed) is =
good.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Just piling on.&nbsp; May be =
I'm misreading those two section (s7 of RFC5280 and s5 of RFC6818), =
while there's IDN support, there's no mention of handling Unicode in =
email address rfc822Name local-part or URL&nbsp;<span style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 12.8px; white-space: pre-wrap; =
">uniformResourceIdentifier path or query</span>&nbsp;parts.&nbsp; It =
seems like an important loophole that should be fixed.&nbsp; Would folks =
here be willing to help in standardizing some in certificate encoding =
for these types?</div></span></blockquote></div><br><div>I'm willing to =
help with a clarifications document. &nbsp;I do not need to revisit the =
decisions recorded in every section of RFC 5280 all over =
again.</div><div><br></div><div>Russ</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><d=
iv><br></div></body></html>=

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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
To: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Support for email address internationalization in RFC5280 certificates
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On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:
> PKIX community,
>
> We've observed a limitation for specifying internationalized email addresses
> as the local part which is restricted to essentially ASCII.  That is subject
> or issuer email addresses which should be stored as subject-alt-name or
> issuer-alt-name rfc822Name and are encoded as IA5String.  This is despite
> the internationalization in email usage as specified by internationalization
> of email headers in RFC6532 allowing Unicode in To, From, etc fields and
> becoming fairly commonplace.  RFC5280 already specifies internationalization
> of the domain but lacks any specification for the local-part.  We propose a
> brief draft to specify an encoding of email UTF-8 local part to base64.
> This described in:
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt
> One goal of that draft is to be compatible with existing PKI practices such
> as path constraints with email address as this draft refines the existing
> rfc822Name rather than specifies a new location for email addresses.
>
> There are some other alternatives that probably should be mentioned for
> discussion.  Instead of base64, another possibility is percent encoding as
> done in RFC3987.  Our proposal is likely to be more compact and easier to
> identify, but would welcome feedback.  Another direction is to specify a
> SAN/IAN otherName compatible with Unicode for internationalized email.  A.
> Melnikov specified this in an earlier draft.

One thing to note is that rfc822Name is confusingly named.  RFC5280
defines it as

  a "Mailbox" as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC2821]

2821 has been obsoleted by 5321.  So the proper reference for adding
Internationalized Email addresses is probably RFC6531.

That being said, did you consider the approach of redefining
rfc822Name as being of type Rfc822Name and defining Rfc822Name as

Rfc822Name ::= CHOICE {
  ia5string IA5String,
  utf8string UTF8String
}

If it is required that the domain-part only consist of A-labels even
when using the utf8string choice, then all existing name constraints
will still work.

The obvious tradeoff here is potential incompatibility.  Systems that
use ASN.1 grammar (as opposed to blind encoding parsing) may reject
certificates with UTF8String for rfc822Name type GeneralNames.

Thanks,
Peter


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Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2016 23:23:54 -0800
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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> Hiya,
>>
>> We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are
>> writing that define new certificate extensions or that
>> want to update/modify PKIX specs.
>>
>> Do folks think it is now time to form a working group
>> to process those?
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>>
>> If no, please say why.
>>
>> If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other
>> scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement
>> and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine
>> to say "I think we should work on topic <foo>" but it is
>> *much* better if you can point at a draft you've written
>> about <foo> and say that you or someone is implementing
>> that and that it'll get deployed.)
>>
>
> We are interested in specifying internationalization support for the email
> address local-part, and we've written a draft for that:
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt
> We're aware of at least one other prior draft on this topic.
>

Mentioned else where but also updating Unicode in query and path parts of
the URL in uniformResourceIdentifier should also be considered for in scope
of the WG.  Would definitely need help here with a draft as I'm not as
familiar with URL precedence as with email.

-Wei


> Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the
> discrepancy between mail providers treating email addresses as case
> insensitive (and is acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.
> Moreover some email providers have other complicated normalization rules
> e.g. Gmail.  We don't have a draft for this topic but could write something
> up.
>
>
>> If you think this requires face to face discussion at
>> IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.
>> We still have a couple of weeks before the BoF deadline
>> and if a short session is needed that can be arranged.
>> Note though that there is no need to have such a BoF
>> session to form a WG, if everything is clear already.
>>
>> FWIW, my impression is that we do seem to have a handful
>> of drafts where folks seem willing to do the work and
>> where the work might be (or has been) implemented. So
>> if there's enough interest, I'd be supportive of forming
>> a (hopefully:-) short-lived, tightly scoped, WG to handle
>> that work.
>>
>
> +1
>
> That would be much appreciated.
>
> -Wei
>
>
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>
>

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Wei Chuang <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:weihaw@google.com">weihaw@google.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><span class="gmail-">On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br></span><span class="gmail-"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are<br>
writing that define new certificate extensions or that<br>
want to update/modify PKIX specs.<br>
<br>
Do folks think it is now time to form a working group<br>
to process those?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Yes.</div><span class="gmail-"><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
If no, please say why.<br>
<br>
If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other<br>
scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement<br>
and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine<br>
to say &quot;I think we should work on topic &lt;foo&gt;&quot; but it is<br>
*much* better if you can point at a draft you&#39;ve written<br>
about &lt;foo&gt; and say that you or someone is implementing<br>
that and that it&#39;ll get deployed.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>We are interested in specifying internationalization support for the email address local-part, and we&#39;ve written a draft for that:</div><div><a href="http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt" style="font-size:12.8px">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-l<wbr>baudoin-iemax-02.txt</a><br></div><div>We&#39;re aware of at least one other prior draft on this topic.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Mentioned else where but also updating Unicode in query and path parts of the URL in uniformResourceIdentifier should also be considered for in scope of the WG.  Would definitely need help here with a draft as I&#39;m not as familiar with URL precedence as with email.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><!--
--><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the discrepancy between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive (and is acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some email providers have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We don&#39;t have a draft for this topic but could write something up.</div><span class="gmail-"><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
If you think this requires face to face discussion at<br>
IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.<br>
We still have a couple of weeks before the BoF deadline<br>
and if a short session is needed that can be arranged.<br>
Note though that there is no need to have such a BoF<br>
session to form a WG, if everything is clear already.<br>
<br>
FWIW, my impression is that we do seem to have a handful<br>
of drafts where folks seem willing to do the work and<br>
where the work might be (or has been) implemented. So<br>
if there&#39;s enough interest, I&#39;d be supportive of forming<br>
a (hopefully:-) short-lived, tightly scoped, WG to handle<br>
that work.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>+1</div><div> </div><div>That would be much appreciated.</div><span class="gmail-CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><font color="#888888"><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div></font></span><span class="gmail-"><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" rel="noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/pkix</a><br>
</blockquote></span></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:40 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

>
> On Feb 5, 2016, at 6:10 PM, Wei Chuang wrote:
>
> >> 3) Unicode normalization
>> >>
>> >> A number of fields in certificates can take unicode strings.  Is there
>> >> any specification as to how (or if) they should be normalized?
>> >
>> > I thought there were references in s7 of RFC 5280 (and some tweaks in
>> s5 of RFC 6818).  There’s also some additional information in RFC 6125.  In
>> a perfect world, the output of precis (https://datatracker.ietf.org/
>> wg/precis/documents/) would be adopted the world over.  I’m not going to
>> hold my breath though.
>>
>> I don't see anything there that specifies a specific normalization
>> form for storage, except for the one thing about explicitText.  I'll
>> assuming anything (including mixed) is good.
>>
>
> Just piling on.  May be I'm misreading those two section (s7 of RFC5280
> and s5 of RFC6818), while there's IDN support, there's no mention of
> handling Unicode in email address rfc822Name local-part or URL uniformResourceIdentifier
> path or query parts.  It seems like an important loophole that should be
> fixed.  Would folks here be willing to help in standardizing some in
> certificate encoding for these types?
>
>
> I'm willing to help with a clarifications document.
>

That sounds like a good approach.

-Wei


> I do not need to revisit the decisions recorded in every section of RFC
> 5280 all over again.
>
> Russ
>
>
>
>

--047d7bdc15b48f172e052b14de7e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:40 PM, Russ Housley <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" target="_blank">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><span class=""><br><div><div>On Feb 5, 2016, at 6:10 PM, Wei Chuang wrote:</div><br class="354065055Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><span class="354065055Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse:separate;font-family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;font-size:medium"><!--
--><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class="354065055gmail-">&gt;&gt; 3) Unicode normalization<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; A number of fields in certificates can take unicode strings.  Is there<br>&gt;&gt; any specification as to how (or if) they should be normalized?<br>&gt;<br>&gt; I thought there were references in s7 of RFC 5280 (and some tweaks in s5 of RFC 6818).  There’s also some additional information in RFC 6125.  In a perfect world, the output of precis (<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/precis/documents/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>wg/precis/documents/</a>) would be adopted the world over.  I’m not going to hold my breath though.<br><br></span>I don&#39;t see anything there that specifies a specific normalization<br>form for storage, except <!--
-->for the one thing about explicitText.  I&#39;ll<br>assuming anything (including mixed) is good.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Just piling on.  May be I&#39;m misreading those two section (s7 of RFC5280 and s5 of RFC6818), while there&#39;s IDN support, there&#39;s no mention of handling Unicode in email address rfc822Name local-part or URL <span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:12.8px;white-space:pre-wrap">uniformResourceIdentifier path or query</span> parts.  It seems like an important loophole that should be fixed.  Would folks here be willing to help in standardizing some in certificate encoding for these types?</div></span></blockquote></div><br></span><div>I&#39;m willing to help with a clarifications document.  </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That sounds like a good approach.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><!--
--><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div>I do not need to revisit the decisions recorded in every section of RFC 5280 all over again.</div><span class="CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><font color="#888888"><div><br></div><div>Russ</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></font></span></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--047d7bdc15b48f172e052b14de7e--


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] FW: New Version Notification for draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00.txt
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Well, it still is "after IETF94" I guess, but with apologies
to the authors for dropping this ball...

I've given this a read and have a question and a comment:

Question:

3.1: There are many OTP schemes in real use, and some CA might
someday support >1 - why don't you need a mechanism-id or
similar? (And section 5 here even calls out two different
schemes that are documented in RFCs.) If you tell me that you
think this isn't really needed (and if nobody else argues
for it, that'll be fine but I wanted to ask.)

Comment:

intro: Editorial suggestion: maybe list the existing uses of
the field in a numbered list and refer back to that when
necessary. I think that might help the reader to keep the
different uses clear as they read.

Once the authors have responded to the question above, I'll
start IETF LC for this one.

Cheers,
S.

PS: This was one of the drafts that prompted me to ask about
forming a new wg, but since I'd already said I'd AD sponsor
this on the list back in October, in fairness to the authors,
I'm gonna just go ahead for this one while we see how the
new-wg discussion pans out.

On 16/10/15 16:53, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> So on the basis of a little positive feedback and it being
> fairly obvious I'll AD sponsor this one. I'll be working
> with the authors on that and an IETF LC should ensue in the
> not too distant (maybe just after IETF94). I'll send a mail
> here when that starts.
> 
> Cheers,
> S.
> 
> On 30/09/15 11:47, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>
>> Folks,
>>
>> Carl and Max have asked me to AD sponsor this draft. Since it
>> seems like it's almost a bug fix, I'll probably go ahead and
>> do that if there are no significant objections here in the next
>> couple of weeks (say by Oct 15).
>>
>> So if you care about EST, please take a look (it's only 8 pages)
>> and say what you think.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Stephen.
>>
>> On 04/08/15 12:34, Carl Wallace wrote:
>>> The draft referenced below may be of interest to some on this list. It
>>> defines some new OIDs to disambiguate existing EST challengePassword
>>> attribute usage from PKCS #9/legacy usage and defines a new OID to convey
>>> a one-time password as an additional value or alternative to the
>>> tls-unique mechanism defined in EST.
>>>
>>> On 8/3/15, 2:35 PM, "internet-drafts@ietf.org" <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> A new version of I-D, draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00.txt
>>>> has been successfully submitted by Carl Wallace and posted to the
>>>> IETF repository.
>>>>
>>>> Name:		draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge
>>>> Revision:	00
>>>> Title:		Alternative Challenge Password Attributes for Enrollment over
>>>> Secure Transport
>>>> Document date:	2015-08-03
>>>> Group:		Individual Submission
>>>> Pages:		9
>>>> URL:            
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00.tx
>>>> t
>>>> Status:         
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge/
>>>> Htmlized:       
>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Abstract:
>>>>   This document defines a set of new Certificate Signing Request
>>>>   attributes for use with the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)
>>>>   protocol.  These attributes provide disambiguation of the existing
>>>>   overloaded uses for the PKCS #9 challengePassword attribute.  Uses
>>>>   include the original certificate revocation password, common
>>>>   authentication password uses, and EST defined linking of transport
>>>>   security identity.
>>>>
>>>>                  
>>>>        
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>>> submission
>>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>>
>>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
> 
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> 


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Date: Sat, 06 Feb 2016 10:19:41 -0500
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] FW: New Version Notification for draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00.txt
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Subject: Re: [pkix] FW: New Version Notification for draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00.txt
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On 2/6/16, 7:40 AM, "pkix on behalf of Stephen Farrell"
<pkix-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:

>
>Well, it still is "after IETF94" I guess, but with apologies
>to the authors for dropping this ball...
>
>I've given this a read and have a question and a comment:
>
>Question:
>
>3.1: There are many OTP schemes in real use, and some CA might
>someday support >1 - why don't you need a mechanism-id or
>similar? (And section 5 here even calls out two different
>schemes that are documented in RFCs.) If you tell me that you
>think this isn't really needed (and if nobody else argues
>for it, that'll be fine but I wanted to ask.)

I don't think it's really needed. Even with a mechanism ID for either of
those referenced RFCs, context may dictate validator behavior in ways not
reflected by a mechanism ID. Tying OTP generator/validator behavior to
this attribute would be a big increase in scope. Were a mechanism ID ever
needed, it could be added as a peer attribute without requiring change to
a widely used structure.

>
>Comment:
>
>intro: Editorial suggestion: maybe list the existing uses of
>the field in a numbered list and refer back to that when
>necessary. I think that might help the reader to keep the
>different uses clear as they read.

Can this be handled as a last call comment?

>
>Once the authors have responded to the question above, I'll
>start IETF LC for this one.
>
>Cheers,
>S.
>
>PS: This was one of the drafts that prompted me to ask about
>forming a new wg, but since I'd already said I'd AD sponsor
>this on the list back in October, in fairness to the authors,
>I'm gonna just go ahead for this one while we see how the
>new-wg discussion pans out.
>
>On 16/10/15 16:53, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> 
>> So on the basis of a little positive feedback and it being
>> fairly obvious I'll AD sponsor this one. I'll be working
>> with the authors on that and an IETF LC should ensue in the
>> not too distant (maybe just after IETF94). I'll send a mail
>> here when that starts.
>> 
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>> 
>> On 30/09/15 11:47, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>>
>>> Folks,
>>>
>>> Carl and Max have asked me to AD sponsor this draft. Since it
>>> seems like it's almost a bug fix, I'll probably go ahead and
>>> do that if there are no significant objections here in the next
>>> couple of weeks (say by Oct 15).
>>>
>>> So if you care about EST, please take a look (it's only 8 pages)
>>> and say what you think.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Stephen.
>>>
>>> On 04/08/15 12:34, Carl Wallace wrote:
>>>> The draft referenced below may be of interest to some on this list. It
>>>> defines some new OIDs to disambiguate existing EST challengePassword
>>>> attribute usage from PKCS #9/legacy usage and defines a new OID to
>>>>convey
>>>> a one-time password as an additional value or alternative to the
>>>> tls-unique mechanism defined in EST.
>>>>
>>>> On 8/3/15, 2:35 PM, "internet-drafts@ietf.org"
>>>><internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A new version of I-D, draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00.txt
>>>>> has been successfully submitted by Carl Wallace and posted to the
>>>>> IETF repository.
>>>>>
>>>>> Name:		draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge
>>>>> Revision:	00
>>>>> Title:		Alternative Challenge Password Attributes for Enrollment over
>>>>> Secure Transport
>>>>> Document date:	2015-08-03
>>>>> Group:		Individual Submission
>>>>> Pages:		9
>>>>> URL:         
>>>>> 
>>>>>https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-0
>>>>>0.tx
>>>>> t
>>>>> Status:      
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge/
>>>>> Htmlized:    
>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Abstract:
>>>>>   This document defines a set of new Certificate Signing Request
>>>>>   attributes for use with the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)
>>>>>   protocol.  These attributes provide disambiguation of the existing
>>>>>   overloaded uses for the PKCS #9 challengePassword attribute.  Uses
>>>>>   include the original certificate revocation password, common
>>>>>   authentication password uses, and EST defined linking of transport
>>>>>   security identity.
>>>>>
>>>>>              
>>>>>        
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>>>> submission
>>>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>>>
>>>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> 
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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From: =?big5?B?pP2k5aW/?= <wcwang@cht.com.tw>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2016 15:53:54 +0000
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">The original definition of the EKU fie=
ld in the X.509 standard is to indicates one or more purposes for which the=
 certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of</span><br s=
tyle=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">the basic purposes indicated in the ke=
y usage extension field. The EKU filed should be used in the same fashion as=
 the Key Usage Extension was used.</span><br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;"=
>
<br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">Indeed, the EKU field will generally a=
ppear only in end entity certificates. That does not means this field can no=
t appear in CA certificates. However, if this field appeared in a CA certifi=
cate, I think it should be interpreted
 as to indicates the purpose for which the CA key may be used (similar to th=
e case where the crlSign key usage bit is specified in the Key Usage Extensi=
on) rather than as a 'constraint'.</span><br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;"=
>
<br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">For example, if some organization defi=
ne a key purpose OID, say id-kp-doSomeThing and the key purpose OID appears=
 in a CA certificate, it should mean that the CA key can be used to do some=
 thing.</span><br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">It was unfortunately that some impleme=
ntations misinterpreted the meaning of an EKU extension in a CA certificate.=
 In their fashion of using the EKU extension as a 'constraint', if id-kp-doS=
omeThing appears in a CA certificate,
 it means that the CA key can be used to sign certificates of which associat=
ed subject keys can be used to do some thing. This obviously twist the origi=
nal definition of the EKU field.</span><br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">The earliest implementation that treat=
ed an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint' I had been aware o=
f is Microsoft Crypto API (CAPI). As a result, certificate management softwa=
re in Microsoft Windows Server
 and Microsoft IE all treated an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'con=
straint'. Unfortunately, some CA vendors believed that Microsoft's treating=
 an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint' is a correct interpr=
etation or because they had no
 choice but to follow Micorsoft's interpretation because in that time Micros=
oft IE dominated the market and they want their certificates to be compatibl=
e with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately that other browser vendors al=
so followed the wrong interpretation
 and treated an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint'. In the=
 end, that was why there were many browser vendors and CA vendors voted to a=
dd text such as &quot;For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Tech=
nically Constrained,&nbsp; the certificate
 MUST include an Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended=
 key usages that the Subordinate CA Certificate is authorized to issue certi=
ficates for&quot; in the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.</span><br s=
tyle=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">I think it is a bad idea to twist the=
 original definition of the EKU field. If the CA/Browser Forum want to use t=
he EKU extension to specify a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue certific=
ates for, the correct way is to
 define a new key purpose OID rather than adopt the existing PKIX&nbsp; key=
 purpose OIDs which are defined to be used in end-entity certificates. For e=
xample, it the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to specify tha=
t a Subordinate CA is authorized to
 issue TLS/SSL certificates, the correct way is to define an CA/Browser key=
 purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForServerAuth. It is not correct if we us=
e the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordinate CA certificate to specify that t=
he Subordinate CA is authorized
 to issue TLS/SSL certificates. According to the the original definition of=
 the EKU field in the X.509 standard, that actually means that the the Subor=
dinate CA's key can be used for TLS/SSL server authentication.</span><br sty=
le=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<br style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">Best Regards,</span><br style=3D"font-=
size: 14.6667px;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 14.6667px;">Wen-Cheng Wang</span><br>
<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: pkix [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto [koichi.sugi=
moto@globalsign.com]<br>
Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM<br>
To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani<br>
Cc: &lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
Hello sirs,<br>
<br>
I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.<br>
Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation, but the=
 user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft library.<br>
Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.<br>
Even OpenSSL has.<br>
I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.<br>
If so, why RFC does not change the specification?<br>
<br>
As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:<br>
&quot;In general, this extension will appear only in end entity certificates=
.&quot;<br>
Can we change this paragraph like:<br>
&quot;If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ...&quot;?<br>
We should think about which is better for the future interoperability, I thi=
nk.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Carl Wallace [mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com]<br>
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM<br>
To: Peter Bowen &lt;pzbowen@gmail.com&gt;; Santosh Chokhani &lt;santosh.chok=
hani@gmail.com&gt;<br>
Cc: Koichi Sugimoto &lt;koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com&gt;; &lt;pkix@ietf.or=
g&gt; &lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
<br>
On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, &quot;Peter Bowen&quot; &lt;pzbowen@gmail.com&gt; wrote=
:<br>
<br>
&gt;The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. It<br=
>
&gt;does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.<br>
<br>
Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for EKU=
 semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely on folkl=
ore to know which implementations do what.<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation<br>
&gt;libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and<br>
&gt;Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox, and<=
br>
&gt;Chrome/Opera on Windows.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;Thanks,<br>
&gt;Peter<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani<br>
&gt;&lt;santosh.chokhani@gmail.com&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak<=
br>
&gt;&gt;up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of<br=
>
&gt;&gt;constraint on the certification path mandatory.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on t=
he<br>
&gt;&gt;CA.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the<=
br>
&gt;&gt;path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;extension and path validation engine.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace=
<br>
&gt;&gt; Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM<br>
&gt;&gt; To: Koichi Sugimoto &lt;koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Cc: pkix@ietf.org<br>
&gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of th=
e<br>
&gt;&gt;extension for all cases.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; From: pkix &lt;pkix-bounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Koichi Sugimo=
to<br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM<br>
&gt;&gt; To: &quot;pkix@ietf.org&quot; &lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Hello.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I hope the following definition should be changed.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; certified<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic=
<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this=
<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; extension will appear only in end entity certificates.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; P9:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate C=
A<br>
&gt;&gt; certificate which uses a<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint<br>
&gt;&gt;settings to limit the scope within which the<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional<br>
&gt;&gt;Subordinate CA Certificates.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; P34:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity<=
br>
&gt;&gt; certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to<=
br>
&gt;&gt;further protect relying parties until the<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; use of the extension is consistent between Application Software<br>
&gt;&gt;Suppliers whose software is used by a<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; P38-39:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically<br>
&gt;&gt;Constrained, the certificate MUST include an<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usag=
es<br>
&gt;&gt;that the Subordinate CA Certificate is<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage<br>
&gt;&gt;KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; extension.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; This notation is very important because we can restrict the range o=
f<br>
&gt;&gt; influence when end-entity certificates are<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; unwillingly issued by attacks etc.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Please see below:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.p=
df<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; pkix mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; pkix@ietf.org<br>
&gt;&gt; https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix<br>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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Hi,

> On 5 Feb 2016, at 22:32, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.i=
e> wrote:
>>=20
>> Hiya,
>>=20
>> We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are
>> writing that define new certificate extensions or that
>> want to update/modify PKIX specs.
>>=20
>> Do folks think it is now time to form a working group
>> to process those?
>=20
> Yes.

+1
>=20
>>=20
>> If no, please say why.
>>=20
>> If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other
>> scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement
>> and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine
>> to say "I think we should work on topic <foo>" but it is
>> *much* better if you can point at a draft you've written
>> about <foo> and say that you or someone is implementing
>> that and that it'll get deployed.)
>=20
> We are interested in specifying internationalization support for the email=
 address local-part, and we've written a draft for that:
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt
> We're aware of at least one other prior draft on this topic.

Indeed:

https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-pkix-eai-addresses-00.txt

I don't mind which approach is used, as long as the problem is solved.

> Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the discrepanc=
y between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive (and i=
s acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some email p=
roviders have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We don't ha=
ve a draft for this topic but could write something up.

Are you thinking about expressing normalization rules in certificates or som=
ewhere else (e.g. in DNS or SMTP)?

>> If you think this requires face to face discussion at
>> IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.
>> We still have a couple of weeks before the BoF deadline
>> and if a short session is needed that can be arranged.

This might be a good idea.

>> Note though that there is no need to have such a BoF
>> session to form a WG, if everything is clear already.
>>=20
>> FWIW, my impression is that we do seem to have a handful
>> of drafts where folks seem willing to do the work and
>> where the work might be (or has been) implemented. So
>> if there's enough interest, I'd be supportive of forming
>> a (hopefully:-) short-lived, tightly scoped, WG to handle
>> that work.
>=20
> +1
> =20
> That would be much appreciated.
>=20
> -Wei
>=20
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div>Hi,</div><div><br>On 5 Feb 2016, at 22=
:32, Wei Chuang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:weihaw@google.com">weihaw@google.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3=
:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farr=
ell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:=
1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:=
1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are<br>
writing that define new certificate extensions or that<br>
want to update/modify PKIX specs.<br>
<br>
Do folks think it is now time to form a working group<br>
to process those?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes.</div></div></div>=
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>+1<br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:sol=
id;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
If no, please say why.<br>
<br>
If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other<br>
scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement<br>
and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine<br>
to say "I think we should work on topic &lt;foo&gt;" but it is<br>
*much* better if you can point at a draft you've written<br>
about &lt;foo&gt; and say that you or someone is implementing<br>
that and that it'll get deployed.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We ar=
e interested in specifying internationalization support for the email addres=
s local-part, and we've written a draft for that:</div><div><a href=3D"http:=
//www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt" style=3D"font-size:12.8px">ht=
tp://www.ietf.org/id/draft-<wbr>lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt</a><br></div><div>We'r=
e aware of at least one other prior draft on this topic.</div></div></div></=
div></blockquote><div><br></div>Indeed:<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https:=
//www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-pkix-eai-addresses-00.txt">https://www.=
ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-pkix-eai-addresses-00.txt</a></div><div><br><=
/div><div>I don't mind which approach is used, as long as the problem is sol=
ved.</div><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Another related but distinct ar=
ea of work would be handling the discrepancy between mail providers treating=
 email addresses as case insensitive (and is acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is=
 required by RFC5280.&nbsp; Moreover some email providers have other complic=
ated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.&nbsp; We don't have a draft for this to=
pic but could write something up.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><=
br></div>Are you thinking about expressing normalization rules in certificat=
es or somewhere else (e.g. in DNS or SMTP)?</div><div><br><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
If you think this requires face to face discussion at<br>
IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.<br>
We still have a couple of weeks before the BoF deadline<br>
and if a short session is needed that can be arranged.<br></blockquote></div=
></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>This might be a good idea.</div><di=
v><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);=
border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
Note though that there is no need to have such a BoF<br>
session to form a WG, if everything is clear already.<br>
<br>
FWIW, my impression is that we do seem to have a handful<br>
of drafts where folks seem willing to do the work and<br>
where the work might be (or has been) implemented. So<br>
if there's enough interest, I'd be supportive of forming<br>
a (hopefully:-) short-lived, tightly scoped, WG to handle<br>
that work.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>+1</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div=
>That would be much appreciated.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div><br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:so=
lid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" rel=3D"noreferrer">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><span>__________________________=
_____________________</span><br><span>pkix mailing list</span><br><span><a h=
ref=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listi=
nfo/pkix</a></span><br></div></blockquote></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Sat Feb  6 09:18:25 2016
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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
To: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the discrepancy
> between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive (and is
> acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some email
> providers have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We don't
> have a draft for this topic but could write something up.

I'm not clear how this is related to 5280.  5321 says that the domain
is case insensitive but the local-part is case sensitive (with the
special exception of "postmaster").

So the following are all different addresses:

PZBowen@example.com
pzbowen@example.com
PzBowen@example.com
PZBOWEN@example.com

Some email providers may choose to deliver all of those to the same
user, but that is a local policy issue not something that belongs in a
RFC.

Some email providers may also apply other rules, for example
determining the local user by removing anything that comes after a "-"
or "+" character in the local-part, but again this is all local
policy.

Thanks,
Peter


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On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 4:46 PM, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:
> > PKIX community,
> >
> > We've observed a limitation for specifying internationalized email
> addresses
> > as the local part which is restricted to essentially ASCII.  That is
> subject
> > or issuer email addresses which should be stored as subject-alt-name or
> > issuer-alt-name rfc822Name and are encoded as IA5String.  This is despite
> > the internationalization in email usage as specified by
> internationalization
> > of email headers in RFC6532 allowing Unicode in To, From, etc fields and
> > becoming fairly commonplace.  RFC5280 already specifies
> internationalization
> > of the domain but lacks any specification for the local-part.  We
> propose a
> > brief draft to specify an encoding of email UTF-8 local part to base64.
> > This described in:
> > http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt
> > One goal of that draft is to be compatible with existing PKI practices
> such
> > as path constraints with email address as this draft refines the existing
> > rfc822Name rather than specifies a new location for email addresses.
> >
> > There are some other alternatives that probably should be mentioned for
> > discussion.  Instead of base64, another possibility is percent encoding
> as
> > done in RFC3987.  Our proposal is likely to be more compact and easier to
> > identify, but would welcome feedback.  Another direction is to specify a
> > SAN/IAN otherName compatible with Unicode for internationalized email.
> A.
> > Melnikov specified this in an earlier draft.
>
>
Thanks for pointing this out, and reinforcing the point about the confusion


> One thing to note is that rfc822Name is confusingly named.  RFC5280
> defines it as
>
>   a "Mailbox" as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC2821]
>
> 2821 has been obsoleted by 5321.  So the proper reference for adding
> Internationalized Email addresses is probably RFC6531.
>

I pointed out the counter part RFC6532 internalized headers
whereas RFC6531 is the update for the SMTP protocol.  We certainly agree
about the issue.


>
> That being said, did you consider the approach of redefining
> rfc822Name as being of type Rfc822Name and defining Rfc822Name as
>
> Rfc822Name ::= CHOICE {
>   ia5string IA5String,
>   utf8string UTF8String
> }
>

This particular approach, no.  Using a new type has been explored by A.
Melnikov in his draft-ietf-pkix-eai-addresses-00 draft.  As you point out
it has the possibility of incompatibility but has advantages like
compactness and simpler implementation.  Our approach tries to retrofit
UTF-8 into rfc822Name through encoding to lessen compatibility issues but
how important that is depends on input the community.  Our perspective is
that we just want standardization and quite happy to move forward with any
reasonable approach.


>
> If it is required that the domain-part only consist of A-labels even
> when using the utf8string choice, then all existing name constraints
> will still work.
>
> The obvious tradeoff here is potential incompatibility.  Systems that
> use ASN.1 grammar (as opposed to blind encoding parsing) may reject
> certificates with UTF8String for rfc822Name type GeneralNames.
>
> Thanks,
> Peter
>

Thanks!
-Wei

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 4:46 PM, Peter Bowen <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class="gmail-gmail-">On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 11:05 AM, Wei Chuang &lt;<a href="mailto:weihaw@google.com">weihaw@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; PKIX community,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; We&#39;ve observed a limitation for specifying internationalized email addresses<br>
&gt; as the local part which is restricted to essentially ASCII.  That is subject<br>
&gt; or issuer email addresses which should be stored as subject-alt-name or<br>
&gt; issuer-alt-name rfc822Name and are encoded as IA5String.  This is despite<br>
&gt; the internationalization in email usage as specified by internationalization<br>
&gt; of email headers in RFC6532 allowing Unicode in To, From, etc fields and<br>
&gt; becoming fairly commonplace.  RFC5280 already specifies internationalization<br>
&gt; of the domain but lacks any specification for the local-part.  We propose a<br>
&gt; brief draft to specify an encoding of email UTF-8 local part to base64.<br>
&gt; This described in:<br>
&gt; <a href="http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt" rel="noreferrer">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-<wbr>lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt</a><br>
&gt; One goal of that draft is to be compatible with existing PKI practices such<br>
&gt; as path constraints with email address as this draft refines the existing<br>
&gt; rfc822Name rather than specifies a new location for email addresses.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There are some other alternatives that probably should be mentioned for<br>
&gt; discussion.  Instead of base64, another possibility is percent encoding as<br>
&gt; done in RFC3987.  Our proposal is likely to be more compact and easier to<br>
&gt; identify, but would welcome feedback.  Another direction is to specify a<br>
&gt; SAN/IAN otherName compatible with Unicode for internationalized email.  A.<br>
&gt; Melnikov specified this in an earlier draft.<br>
<br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks for pointing this out, and reinforcing the point about the confusion</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class="gmail-gmail-">
</span>One thing to note is that rfc822Name is confusingly named.  RFC5280<br>
defines it as<br>
<br>
  a &quot;Mailbox&quot; as defined in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC2821]<br>
<br>
2821 has been obsoleted by 5321.  So the proper reference for adding<br>
Internationalized Email addresses is probably RFC6531.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I pointed out the counter part RFC6532 internalized headers whereas RFC6531 is the update for the SMTP protocol.  We certainly agree about the issue.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
That being said, did you consider the approach of redefining<br>
rfc822Name as being of type Rfc822Name and defining Rfc822Name as<br>
<br>
Rfc822Name ::= CHOICE {<br>
  ia5string IA5String,<br>
  utf8string UTF8String<br>
}<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This particular approach, no.  Using a new type has been explored by A. Melnikov in his draft-ietf-pkix-eai-addresses-00 draft.  As you point out it has the possibility of incompatibility but has advantages like compactness and simpler implementation.  Our approach tries to retrofit UTF-8 into rfc822Name through encoding to lessen compatibility issues but how important that is depends on input the community.  Our perspective is that we just want standardization and quite happy to move forward with any reasonable approach.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
If it is required that the domain-part only consist of A-labels even<br>
when using the utf8string choice, then all existing name constraints<br>
will still work.<br>
<br>
The obvious tradeoff here is potential incompatibility.  Systems that<br>
use ASN.1 grammar (as opposed to blind encoding parsing) may reject<br>
certificates with UTF8String for rfc822Name type GeneralNames.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Peter<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks!</div><div>-Wei </div></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 9:18 AM, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <
> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> > Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the
> discrepancy
> > between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive (and
> is
> > acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some email
> > providers have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We
> don't
> > have a draft for this topic but could write something up.
>
> I'm not clear how this is related to 5280.  5321 says that the domain
> is case insensitive but the local-part is case sensitive (with the
> special exception of "postmaster").
>

I believe there RFC5321 in the context of mail delivery, says SMTP must
preserve the case for interoperability.  However in the same RFC5321 in
Section 2.3.11 interpretation of the email address is left to the
end-points.  Quoting: "Consequently, and due to a long history of problems
when intermediate hosts have attempted to optimize transport by modifying
them, the local-part MUST be interpreted and assigned semantics only by the
host specified in the domain part of the address." In section 4.1.2. it is
more explicit, and says "While the above definition for Local-part is
relatively permissive, for maximum interoperability, a host that expects to
receive mail SHOULD avoid defining mailboxes where the Local-part requires
(or uses) the Quoted-string form or where the Local-part is case-sensitive."

>
> So the following are all different addresses:
>
> PZBowen@example.com
> pzbowen@example.com
> PzBowen@example.com
> PZBOWEN@example.com


> Some email providers may choose to deliver all of those to the same
> user, but that is a local policy issue not something that belongs in a
> RFC.
>

Unless it breaks interoperability, and prevents deployment of RFC5280,
which is problematic as I think we all agree PKI provides significant
improvement in security.


>
> Some email providers may also apply other rules, for example
> determining the local user by removing anything that comes after a "-"
> or "+" character in the local-part, but again this is all local
> policy.
>

Agreed that's another thorny problem too.


>
> Thanks,
> Peter
>

The IETF community has a history of reconciling specification to deployment
practices (e.g. email and the X821 and X822 RFCs).  I'm hoping that in this
case, the PKIX community can find a solution to this too.

-Wei

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 9:18 AM, Peter Bowen <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class="gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-">On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Wei Chuang &lt;<a href="mailto:weihaw@google.com">weihaw@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</span><span class="gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-">&gt; On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href="mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</span><span class="gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-">&gt; Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the discrepancy<br>
&gt; between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive (and is<br>
&gt; acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some email<br>
&gt; providers have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We don&#39;t<br>
&gt; have a draft for this topic but could write something up.<br>
<br>
</span>I&#39;m not clear how this is related to 5280.  5321 says that the domain<br>
is case insensitive but the local-part is case sensitive (with the<br>
special exception of &quot;postmaster&quot;).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I believe there RFC5321 in the context of mail delivery, says SMTP must preserve the case for interoperability.  However in the same RFC5321 in Section 2.3.11 interpretation of the email address is left to the end-points.  Quoting: &quot;<span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">Consequently, and due to a long history of problems when intermediate hosts have attempted to </span><span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">optimize transport by modifying them, the local-part MUST be</span><span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"> interpreted and assigned semantics only by the host specified in the</span><span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"> domain part of the address.&quot;  In section 4.1.2. it is <!--
-->more explicit, and says &quot;</span><font color="#000000" face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><span style="white-space:pre-wrap">While the above definition for Local-part is relatively permissive, for maximum interoperability, a host that expects to receive mail SHOULD avoid defining mailboxes where the Local-part requires (or uses) the Quoted-string form or where the Local-part is case-sensitive.&quot;</span></font></div></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
So the following are all different addresses:<br>
<br>
<a href="mailto:PZBowen@example.com">PZBowen@example.com</a><br>
<a href="mailto:pzbowen@example.com">pzbowen@example.com</a><br>
<a href="mailto:PzBowen@example.com">PzBowen@example.com</a><br>
<a href="mailto:PZBOWEN@example.com">PZBOWEN@example.com</a> </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Some email providers may choose to deliver all of those to the same<br>
user, but that is a local policy issue not something that belongs in a<br>
RFC.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Unless it breaks interoperability, and prevents deployment of RFC5280, which is problematic as I think we all agree PKI provides significant improvement in security.   </div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Some email providers may also apply other rules, for example<br>
determining the local user by removing anything that comes after a &quot;-&quot;<br>
or &quot;+&quot; character in the local-part, but again this is all local<br>
policy.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Agreed that&#39;s another thorny problem too.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Peter<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The IETF community has a history of reconciling specification to deployment practices (e.g. email and the X821 and X822 RFCs).  I&#39;m hoping that in this case, the PKIX community can find a solution to this too.  <br></div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div></div><br></div></div>

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On Sun, Feb 7, 2016 at 9:04 AM, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 9:18 AM, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:
>> > On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell <
>> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>> > Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the
>> discrepancy
>> > between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive
>> (and is
>> > acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some
>> email
>> > providers have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We
>> don't
>> > have a draft for this topic but could write something up.
>>
>> I'm not clear how this is related to 5280.  5321 says that the domain
>> is case insensitive but the local-part is case sensitive (with the
>> special exception of "postmaster").
>>
>
> I believe there RFC5321 in the context of mail delivery, says SMTP must
> preserve the case for interoperability.  However in the same RFC5321 in
> Section 2.3.11 interpretation of the email address is left to the
> end-points.  Quoting: "Consequently, and due to a long history of
> problems when intermediate hosts have attempted to optimize transport by
> modifying them, the local-part MUST be interpreted and assigned semantics
> only by the host specified in the domain part of the address." In section
> 4.1.2. it is more explicit, and says "While the above definition for
> Local-part is relatively permissive, for maximum interoperability, a host
> that expects to receive mail SHOULD avoid defining mailboxes where the
> Local-part requires (or uses) the Quoted-string form or where the
> Local-part is case-sensitive."
>
>>
>> So the following are all different addresses:
>>
>> PZBowen@example.com
>> pzbowen@example.com
>> PzBowen@example.com
>> PZBOWEN@example.com
>
>
Its probably also worth calling out what some of the alternatives are for
implementers using existing RFC.  One of which would be to issue multiple
rfc822Name SANs for each possible combination but this would increase
significantly the certificate storage cost and validation time.  As noted
below, it isn't just case, but also potentially '+' or '-' and other
practices.  Another would be to issue a certificate for each address usage,
though there deployment issues.

-Wei


>
>> Some email providers may choose to deliver all of those to the same
>> user, but that is a local policy issue not something that belongs in a
>> RFC.
>>
>
> Unless it breaks interoperability, and prevents deployment of RFC5280,
> which is problematic as I think we all agree PKI provides significant
> improvement in security.
>
>
>>
>> Some email providers may also apply other rules, for example
>> determining the local user by removing anything that comes after a "-"
>> or "+" character in the local-part, but again this is all local
>> policy.
>>
>
> Agreed that's another thorny problem too.
>
>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Peter
>>
>
> The IETF community has a history of reconciling specification to
> deployment practices (e.g. email and the X821 and X822 RFCs).  I'm hoping
> that in this case, the PKIX community can find a solution to this too.
>
> -Wei
>
>

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Feb 7, 2016 at 9:04 AM, Wei Chuang <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:weihaw@google.com" target="_blank">weihaw@google.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><span class="">On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 9:18 AM, Peter Bowen <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target="_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class="-910769633gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-">On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Wei Chuang &lt;<a href="mailto:weihaw@google.com" target="_blank">weihaw@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</span><span class="-910769633gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-">&gt; On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 3:56 AM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href="mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target="_blank">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</span><span class="-910769633gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-gmail-">&gt; Another related but distinct area of work would be handling the discrepancy<br>
&gt; between mail providers treating email addresses as case insensitive (and is<br>
&gt; acknowledged in RFC5321) yet is required by RFC5280.  Moreover some email<br>
&gt; providers have other complicated normalization rules e.g. Gmail.  We don&#39;t<br>
&gt; have a draft for this topic but could write something up.<br>
<br>
</span>I&#39;m not clear how this is related to 5280.  5321 says that the domain<br>
is case insensitive but the local-part is case sensitive (with the<br>
special exception of &quot;postmaster&quot;).<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>I believe there RFC5321 in the context of mail delivery, says SMTP must preserve the case for interoperability.  However in the same RFC5321 in Section 2.3.11 interpretation of the email address is left to the end-points.  Quoting: &quot;<span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">Consequently, and due to a long history of problems when intermediate hosts have attempted to </span><span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">optimize transport by modifying them, the local-part MUST be</span><span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"> interpreted and assigned semantics only by the host specified in the</span><span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"> domain part of the address.&quot;  In section 4.1.2. <!--
-->it is more explicit, and says &quot;</span><font color="#000000" face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><span style="white-space:pre-wrap">While the above definition for Local-part is relatively permissive, for maximum interoperability, a host that expects to receive mail SHOULD avoid defining mailboxes where the Local-part requires (or uses) the Quoted-string form or where the Local-part is case-sensitive.&quot;</span></font></div></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><span class=""><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
So the following are all different addresses:<br>
<br>
<a href="mailto:PZBowen@example.com" target="_blank">PZBowen@example.com</a><br>
<a href="mailto:pzbowen@example.com" target="_blank">pzbowen@example.com</a><br>
<a href="mailto:PzBowen@example.com" target="_blank">PzBowen@example.com</a><br>
<a href="mailto:PZBOWEN@example.com" target="_blank">PZBOWEN@example.com</a> </blockquote></span></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Its probably also worth calling out what some of the alternatives are for implementers using existing RFC.  One of which would be to issue multiple rfc822Name SANs for each possible combination but this would increase significantly the certificate storage cost and validation time.  As noted below, it isn&#39;t just case, but also potentially &#39;+&#39; or &#39;-&#39; and other practices.  Another would be to issue a certificate for each address usage, though there deployment issues.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><span class=""><!--
--><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Some email providers may choose to deliver all of those to the same<br>
user, but that is a local policy issue not something that belongs in a<br>
RFC.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Unless it breaks interoperability, and prevents deployment of RFC5280, which is problematic as I think we all agree PKI provides significant improvement in security.   </div><span class=""><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Some email providers may also apply other rules, for example<br>
determining the local user by removing anything that comes after a &quot;-&quot;<br>
or &quot;+&quot; character in the local-part, but again this is all local<br>
policy.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Agreed that&#39;s another thorny problem too.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Peter<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The IETF community has a history of reconciling specification to deployment practices (e.g. email and the X821 and X822 RFCs).  I&#39;m hoping that in this case, the PKIX community can find a solution to this too.  <span class="CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><font color="#888888"><br></font></span></div><span class="CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><font color="#888888"><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div></font></span></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a113fd3e2b23f40052b31eb13--


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<draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-04.txt>

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From nobody Mon Feb  8 05:17:31 2016
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On 06/02/16 15:19, Carl Wallace wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/6/16, 7:40 AM, "pkix on behalf of Stephen Farrell"
> <pkix-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> 
>>
>> Well, it still is "after IETF94" I guess, but with apologies
>> to the authors for dropping this ball...
>>
>> I've given this a read and have a question and a comment:
>>
>> Question:
>>
>> 3.1: There are many OTP schemes in real use, and some CA might
>> someday support >1 - why don't you need a mechanism-id or
>> similar? (And section 5 here even calls out two different
>> schemes that are documented in RFCs.) If you tell me that you
>> think this isn't really needed (and if nobody else argues
>> for it, that'll be fine but I wanted to ask.)
> 
> I don't think it's really needed. Even with a mechanism ID for either of
> those referenced RFCs, context may dictate validator behavior in ways not
> reflected by a mechanism ID. Tying OTP generator/validator behavior to
> this attribute would be a big increase in scope. Were a mechanism ID ever
> needed, it could be added as a peer attribute without requiring change to
> a widely used structure.

Fair enough.

> 
>>
>> Comment:
>>
>> intro: Editorial suggestion: maybe list the existing uses of
>> the field in a numbered list and refer back to that when
>> necessary. I think that might help the reader to keep the
>> different uses clear as they read.
> 
> Can this be handled as a last call comment?

Absolutely, it's just a nit really.

> 
>>
>> Once the authors have responded to the question above, I'll
>> start IETF LC for this one.

I've asked for IETF LC now, you should see the message in a
while,

Cheers,
S.


>>
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>>
>> PS: This was one of the drafts that prompted me to ask about
>> forming a new wg, but since I'd already said I'd AD sponsor
>> this on the list back in October, in fairness to the authors,
>> I'm gonna just go ahead for this one while we see how the
>> new-wg discussion pans out.
>>
>> On 16/10/15 16:53, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>>
>>> So on the basis of a little positive feedback and it being
>>> fairly obvious I'll AD sponsor this one. I'll be working
>>> with the authors on that and an IETF LC should ensue in the
>>> not too distant (maybe just after IETF94). I'll send a mail
>>> here when that starts.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> S.
>>>
>>> On 30/09/15 11:47, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Folks,
>>>>
>>>> Carl and Max have asked me to AD sponsor this draft. Since it
>>>> seems like it's almost a bug fix, I'll probably go ahead and
>>>> do that if there are no significant objections here in the next
>>>> couple of weeks (say by Oct 15).
>>>>
>>>> So if you care about EST, please take a look (it's only 8 pages)
>>>> and say what you think.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Stephen.
>>>>
>>>> On 04/08/15 12:34, Carl Wallace wrote:
>>>>> The draft referenced below may be of interest to some on this list. It
>>>>> defines some new OIDs to disambiguate existing EST challengePassword
>>>>> attribute usage from PKCS #9/legacy usage and defines a new OID to
>>>>> convey
>>>>> a one-time password as an additional value or alternative to the
>>>>> tls-unique mechanism defined in EST.
>>>>>
>>>>> On 8/3/15, 2:35 PM, "internet-drafts@ietf.org"
>>>>> <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A new version of I-D, draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00.txt
>>>>>> has been successfully submitted by Carl Wallace and posted to the
>>>>>> IETF repository.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Name:		draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge
>>>>>> Revision:	00
>>>>>> Title:		Alternative Challenge Password Attributes for Enrollment over
>>>>>> Secure Transport
>>>>>> Document date:	2015-08-03
>>>>>> Group:		Individual Submission
>>>>>> Pages:		9
>>>>>> URL:         
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-0
>>>>>> 0.tx
>>>>>> t
>>>>>> Status:      
>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge/
>>>>>> Htmlized:    
>>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-00
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Abstract:
>>>>>>   This document defines a set of new Certificate Signing Request
>>>>>>   attributes for use with the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)
>>>>>>   protocol.  These attributes provide disambiguation of the existing
>>>>>>   overloaded uses for the PKCS #9 challengePassword attribute.  Uses
>>>>>>   include the original certificate revocation password, common
>>>>>>   authentication password uses, and EST defined linking of transport
>>>>>>   security identity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>              
>>>>>>        
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>>>>> submission
>>>>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> 
> 
> 


From nobody Mon Feb  8 06:25:06 2016
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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From nobody Mon Feb  8 06:39:05 2016
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From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2016 06:39:04 -0800
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-04.txt> (Alternative Challenge Password Attributes for Enrollment over Secure Transport) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
the following document:
- 'Alternative Challenge Password Attributes for Enrollment over Secure
   Transport'
  <draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-04.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2016-03-07. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document defines a set of new Certificate Signing Request
   attributes for use with the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)
   protocol.  These attributes provide disambiguation of the existing
   overloaded uses for the PKCS #9 challengePassword attribute.  Uses
   include the original certificate revocation password, common
   authentication password uses, and EST-defined linking of transport
   security identity.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.



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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Umm..<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
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family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
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family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
I think we have to provide some solution towards this problem.<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
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family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
I propose 2 solutions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
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mily:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA"><s=
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</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0=
pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-langu=
age:JA">Change the definition of EKU<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:18.0pt;mso-para-margin-l=
eft:0gd;text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1">
<![if !supportLists]><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fa=
mily:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA"><s=
pan style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">2)<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New R=
oman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0=
pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-langu=
age:JA">Define a new extension and provide a way for transitioning to this =
new scheme.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
If we cannot change the original definition, then, 2) will be a solution.<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
Anyway, we need a standard solution to restrict key usages of end-entity ce=
rtificates.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
For example,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
define an new extension =A1=B0keyConstraints=A1=B1.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
id-ce-keyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D&nbsp; { id-ce xx }<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
&nbsp;&nbsp; KeyConstraintsSyntax ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurpos=
eId<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
&nbsp;&nbsp; KeyPurposeId ::=3D OBJECT IDENTIFIER<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
The format is similar to extendedKeyUsages.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
This extension may appear in CA certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
This extension will work as nested EKU scheme as follows.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
Let {C(1),C(2),=A1=AD,C(n)} be a set of certificate in certification path, =
where =A1=AEC(1)=A1=AF means the trust anchor and =A1=AEC(n)=A1=AF means
 the end-entity certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
Then,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
C(i) means the i-th certificate in the certification path.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
K(i) means the set of KeyPurposeId in the certificate C(i), especially, K(n=
) means existing EKU set in the end-entity certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
CALCULATE APPLICABLE EKU:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
X::=3D{}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
For i::=3D2 to n do {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
If C(i) has keyConstraints extension and all C(j) (j&lt;i) does not have ke=
yConstraints extension, then, X::=3DK(i).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
X::=3DX AND K(i)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
Finally we can calculate the applicable EKU as =A1=B0X=A1=B1.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
How do you think of this?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
This notation has nothing to do with CABF. I am neutral.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
Koichi Sugimoto.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:JA">=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0mm =
0mm 0mm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;fo=
nt-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast-language:JA">From:</sp=
an></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast-language:JA"> pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@i=
etf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b></span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-lang=
uage:JA">=CD=F5=CE=C4=D5=FD</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:1=
1.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast-language:JA"><=
br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, February 7, 2016 12:54 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> pkix@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The =
original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard is to indicates =
one or more purposes for which the certified public key may be used, in add=
ition to or in place of<br>
the basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. The EKU file=
d should be used in the same fashion as the Key Usage Extension was used.<b=
r>
<br>
Indeed, the EKU field will generally appear only in end entity certificates=
. That does not means this field can not appear in CA certificates. However=
, if this field appeared in a CA certificate, I think it should be interpre=
ted as to indicates the purpose
 for which the CA key may be used (similar to the case where the crlSign ke=
y usage bit is specified in the Key Usage Extension) rather than as a 'cons=
traint'.<br>
<br>
For example, if some organization define a key purpose OID, say id-kp-doSom=
eThing and the key purpose OID appears in a CA certificate, it should mean =
that the CA key can be used to do some thing.<br>
<br>
It was unfortunately that some implementations misinterpreted the meaning o=
f an EKU extension in a CA certificate. In their fashion of using the EKU e=
xtension as a 'constraint', if id-kp-doSomeThing appears in a CA certificat=
e, it means that the CA key can
 be used to sign certificates of which associated subject keys can be used =
to do some thing. This obviously twist the original definition of the EKU f=
ield.<br>
<br>
The earliest implementation that treated an EKU extension in a CA certifica=
te as a 'constraint' I had been aware of is Microsoft Crypto API (CAPI). As=
 a result, certificate management software in Microsoft Windows Server and =
Microsoft IE all treated an EKU
 extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint'. Unfortunately, some CA ve=
ndors believed that Microsoft's treating an EKU extension in a CA certifica=
te as a 'constraint' is a correct interpretation or because they had no cho=
ice but to follow Micorsoft's interpretation
 because in that time Microsoft IE dominated the market and they want their=
 certificates to be compatible with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately=
 that other browser vendors also followed the wrong interpretation and trea=
ted an EKU extension in a CA certificate
 as a 'constraint'. In the end, that was why there were many browser vendor=
s and CA vendors voted to add text such as &quot;For a Subordinate CA Certi=
ficate to be considered Technically Constrained,&nbsp; the certificate MUST=
 include an Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension
 specifying all extended key usages that the Subordinate CA Certificate is =
authorized to issue certificates for&quot; in the CA/Browser Forum Baseline=
 Requirements.<br>
<br>
I think it is a bad idea to twist the original definition of the EKU field.=
 If the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to specify a Subordi=
nate CA is authorized to issue certificates for, the correct way is to defi=
ne a new key purpose OID rather
 than adopt the existing PKIX&nbsp; key purpose OIDs which are defined to b=
e used in end-entity certificates. For example, it the CA/Browser Forum wan=
t to use the EKU extension to specify that a Subordinate CA is authorized t=
o issue TLS/SSL certificates, the correct
 way is to define an CA/Browser key purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForSe=
rverAuth. It is not correct if we use the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordi=
nate CA certificate to specify that the Subordinate CA is authorized to iss=
ue TLS/SSL certificates. According
 to the the original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard, tha=
t actually means that the the Subordinate CA's key can be used for TLS/SSL =
server authentication.<br>
<br>
Best Regards,<br>
Wen-Cheng Wang</span><span lang=3D"EN-US"><br>
<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: pkix [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto [koichi.sug=
imoto@globalsign.com]<br>
Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM<br>
To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani<br>
Cc: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
Hello sirs,<br>
<br>
I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.<br>
Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation, but th=
e user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft library.<br=
>
Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.<br>
Even OpenSSL has.<br>
I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.<br>
If so, why RFC does not change the specification?<br>
<br>
As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:<br>
&quot;In general, this extension will appear only in end entity certificate=
s.&quot;<br>
Can we change this paragraph like:<br>
&quot;If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ...&quot;?<br=
>
We should think about which is better for the future interoperability, I th=
ink.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Carl Wallace [<a href=3D"mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com">mailto:car=
l@redhoundsoftware.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM<br>
To: Peter Bowen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">pzbowen@gmail.com<=
/a>&gt;; Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com"=
>santosh.chokhani@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
Cc: Koichi Sugimoto &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com">k=
oichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a>&gt;; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org"=
>pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</=
a>&gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
<br>
On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, &quot;Peter Bowen&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@=
gmail.com">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt;The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. It<b=
r>
&gt;does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.<br>
<br>
Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for EK=
U semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely on fol=
klore to know which implementations do what.<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation<br>
&gt;libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and<br>
&gt;Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox, and=
<br>
&gt;Chrome/Opera on Windows.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;Thanks,<br>
&gt;Peter<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani<br>
&gt;&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com">santosh.chokhani@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak=
<br>
&gt;&gt;up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;constraint on the certification path mandatory.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on =
the<br>
&gt;&gt;CA.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the=
<br>
&gt;&gt;path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the<=
br>
&gt;&gt;extension and path validation engine.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; From: pkix [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-b=
ounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace<br>
&gt;&gt; Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM<br>
&gt;&gt; To: Koichi Sugimoto &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsi=
gn.com">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a<=
br>
&gt;&gt;compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?<=
br>
&gt;&gt;Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of t=
he<br>
&gt;&gt;extension for all cases.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; From: pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounc=
es@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto<br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com">koichi.sugim=
oto@globalsign.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM<br>
&gt;&gt; To: &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&quot;=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Hello.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I hope the following definition should be changed.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt; certified<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basi=
c<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, thi=
s<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; extension will appear only in end entity certificates.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; P9:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate =
CA<br>
&gt;&gt; certificate which uses a<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint<br>
&gt;&gt;settings to limit the scope within which the<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional<br>
&gt;&gt;Subordinate CA Certificates.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; P34:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity=
<br>
&gt;&gt; certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to=
<br>
&gt;&gt;further protect relying parties until the<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; use of the extension is consistent between Application Software<br=
>
&gt;&gt;Suppliers whose software is used by a<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; P38-39:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically<br>
&gt;&gt;Constrained, the certificate MUST include an<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usa=
ges<br>
&gt;&gt;that the Subordinate CA Certificate is<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage<br>
&gt;&gt;KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; extension.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the<=
br>
&gt;&gt;next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; This notation is very important because we can restrict the range =
of<br>
&gt;&gt; influence when end-entity certificates are<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; unwillingly issued by attacks etc.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Please see below:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Foru=
m-BR-1.3.2.pdf">
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf</a><b=
r>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list<=
br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a href=3D"http=
s://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; pkix mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www=
.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
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From nobody Tue Feb  9 01:18:59 2016
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To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>, =?UTF-8?B?546L5paH5q2j?= <wcwang@cht.com.tw>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 09:18:51 +0000
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Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/pkix/9aEtuBO0NFEXb1qsfAjbEiH0bl4>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Just wondering...

On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:
> 1)     Change the definition of EKU

Do we have an existence proof that there is s/w deployed for
which such a change in definition would be a problem? I may
have missed that earlier in the thread but wanted to check.

Thanks,
S.


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From: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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The Certificate Policies extension can be used to restrict "the purposes 
for which the certificate may be used".  That's really what "nested EKU" 
is trying to achieve, isn't it?

So I wonder if, rather than define a completely new extension, we could 
just use the existing policy extensions: Certificate Policies, Policy 
Constraints, Inhibit anyPolicy and Policy Mappings.

Perhaps it would make sense to (re)use the RFC5280 EKU OIDs as Policy 
OIDs, and set some rules for when requireExplicitPolicy must be set.

(BTW, have I just reinvented Microsoft's "Application Policies" 
extension? ;-) )

On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:
> Umm..
>
> I think we have to provide some solution towards this problem.
>
> I propose 2 solutions.
>
> 1)Change the definition of EKU
>
> 2)Define a new extension and provide a way for transitioning to this new
> scheme.
>
> If we cannot change the original definition, then, 2) will be a solution.
>
> Anyway, we need a standard solution to restrict key usages of end-entity
> certificates.
>
> For example,
>
> define an new extension “keyConstraints”.
>
> id-ce-keyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce xx }
>
>     KeyConstraintsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
>
>     KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
>
> The format is similar to extendedKeyUsages.
>
> This extension may appear in CA certificates.
>
> This extension will work as nested EKU scheme as follows.
>
> Let {C(1),C(2),…,C(n)} be a set of certificate in certification path,
> where ‘C(1)’ means the trust anchor and ‘C(n)’ means the end-entity
> certificate.
>
> Then,
>
> C(i) means the i-th certificate in the certification path.
>
> K(i) means the set of KeyPurposeId in the certificate C(i), especially,
> K(n) means existing EKU set in the end-entity certificate.
>
> CALCULATE APPLICABLE EKU:
>
> X::={}
>
> For i::=2 to n do {
>
> If C(i) has keyConstraints extension and all C(j) (j<i) does not have
> keyConstraints extension, then, X::=K(i).
>
> X::=X AND K(i)
>
> }
>
> Finally we can calculate the applicable EKU as “X”.
>
> How do you think of this?
>
> This notation has nothing to do with CABF. I am neutral.
>
> Regards,
>
> Koichi Sugimoto.
>
> *From:*pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *王文正
> *Sent:* Sunday, February 7, 2016 12:54 AM
> *To:* pkix@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>
> The original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard is to
> indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may be
> used, in addition to or in place of
> the basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. The EKU
> filed should be used in the same fashion as the Key Usage Extension was
> used.
>
> Indeed, the EKU field will generally appear only in end entity
> certificates. That does not means this field can not appear in CA
> certificates. However, if this field appeared in a CA certificate, I
> think it should be interpreted as to indicates the purpose for which the
> CA key may be used (similar to the case where the crlSign key usage bit
> is specified in the Key Usage Extension) rather than as a 'constraint'.
>
> For example, if some organization define a key purpose OID, say
> id-kp-doSomeThing and the key purpose OID appears in a CA certificate,
> it should mean that the CA key can be used to do some thing.
>
> It was unfortunately that some implementations misinterpreted the
> meaning of an EKU extension in a CA certificate. In their fashion of
> using the EKU extension as a 'constraint', if id-kp-doSomeThing appears
> in a CA certificate, it means that the CA key can be used to sign
> certificates of which associated subject keys can be used to do some
> thing. This obviously twist the original definition of the EKU field.
>
> The earliest implementation that treated an EKU extension in a CA
> certificate as a 'constraint' I had been aware of is Microsoft Crypto
> API (CAPI). As a result, certificate management software in Microsoft
> Windows Server and Microsoft IE all treated an EKU extension in a CA
> certificate as a 'constraint'. Unfortunately, some CA vendors believed
> that Microsoft's treating an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a
> 'constraint' is a correct interpretation or because they had no choice
> but to follow Micorsoft's interpretation because in that time Microsoft
> IE dominated the market and they want their certificates to be
> compatible with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately that other
> browser vendors also followed the wrong interpretation and treated an
> EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint'. In the end, that
> was why there were many browser vendors and CA vendors voted to add text
> such as "For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically
> Constrained,  the certificate MUST include an Extended Key Usage (EKU)
> extension specifying all extended key usages that the Subordinate CA
> Certificate is authorized to issue certificates for" in the CA/Browser
> Forum Baseline Requirements.
>
> I think it is a bad idea to twist the original definition of the EKU
> field. If the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to specify
> a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue certificates for, the correct
> way is to define a new key purpose OID rather than adopt the existing
> PKIX  key purpose OIDs which are defined to be used in end-entity
> certificates. For example, it the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU
> extension to specify that a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue
> TLS/SSL certificates, the correct way is to define an CA/Browser key
> purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForServerAuth. It is not correct if we
> use the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordinate CA certificate to specify
> that the Subordinate CA is authorized to issue TLS/SSL certificates.
> According to the the original definition of the EKU field in the X.509
> standard, that actually means that the the Subordinate CA's key can be
> used for TLS/SSL server authentication.
>
> Best Regards,
> Wen-Cheng Wang
>
> ________________________________________
> From: pkix [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto
> [koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com]
> Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM
> To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani
> Cc: <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>
> Hello sirs,
>
> I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.
> Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation, but
> the user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft library.
> Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.
> Even OpenSSL has.
> I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.
> If so, why RFC does not change the specification?
>
> As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:
> "In general, this extension will appear only in end entity certificates."
> Can we change this paragraph like:
> "If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ..."?
> We should think about which is better for the future interoperability, I
> think.
>
> Regards,
> Koichi Sugimoto.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Carl Wallace [mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com]
> Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM
> To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>>; Santosh
> Chokhani <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>>
> Cc: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com
> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>; <pkix@ietf.org
> <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>> <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>
>
> On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com
> <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>>The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. It
>>does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.
>
> Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for
> EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely
> on folklore to know which implementations do what.
>
>>
>>That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation
>>libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and
>>Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox, and
>>Chrome/Opera on Windows.
>>
>>Thanks,
>>Peter
>>
>>On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani
>><santosh.chokhani@gmail.com <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak
>>>up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of
>>>constraint on the certification path mandatory.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the
>>>CA.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the
>>>path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the
>>>extension and path validation engine.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
>>> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM
>>> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>
>>> Cc:pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a
>>>compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?
>>>Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of the
>>>extension for all cases.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From: pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of
> Koichi Sugimoto
>>> <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>
>>> Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
>>> To: "pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>> Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hello.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I hope the following definition should be changed.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
>>>> certified
>>>
>>>> public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>>>
>>>> purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this
>>>
>>>> extension will appear only in end entity certificates.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> P9:
>>>
>>> Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA
>>> certificate which uses a
>>>
>>> combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint
>>>settings to limit the scope within which the
>>>
>>> Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional
>>>Subordinate CA Certificates.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> P34:
>>>
>>> ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity
>>> certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
>>>
>>> (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to
>>>further protect relying parties until the
>>>
>>> use of the extension is consistent between Application Software
>>>Suppliers whose software is used by a
>>>
>>> substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> P38-39:
>>>
>>> For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically
>>>Constrained, the certificate MUST include an
>>>
>>> Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages
>>>that the Subordinate CA Certificate is
>>>
>>> authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage
>>>KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this
>>>
>>> extension.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the
>>>next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.
>>>
>>> This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of
>>> influence when end-entity certificates are
>>>
>>> unwillingly issued by attacks etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Please see below:
>>>
>>>https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
>>>pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>>pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
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-- 
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From: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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On 09/02/16 11:07, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:
> Hello Rob,
>
> Unfortunately CABF Baseline Requirements already specified this "nested EKU" scheme.
> And also several implementations support nested EKU..
>
> How can we cope with that?

Koichi,

My last post simply suggested a possible alternative to your "2)Define a 
new extension..." proposal, which also doesn't "cope with" the 
prevalence of the "nested EKU" scheme.  The point I was trying to make 
was: Why define a new extension if there's an existing extension (or set 
of extensions) that can already do the job?

I agree that the prevalence of the "nested EKU" scheme cannot be ignored.

A few years ago I tried to convince Mozilla to _not_ adopt the "nested 
EKU" scheme.  I was unsuccessful.  Microsoft already did "nested EKU", 
and that made it a defacto standard that Mozilla wanted to follow.  And 
then CABForum followed Mozilla.

The ship has already sailed.  For better or worse, "nested EKU" is here 
to stay.

> Regards,
> Koichi Sugimoto.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Rob Stradling [mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 9, 2016 7:40 PM
> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>; 王文正 <wcwang@cht.com.tw>; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>
> The Certificate Policies extension can be used to restrict "the purposes for which the certificate may be used".  That's really what "nested EKU"
> is trying to achieve, isn't it?
>
> So I wonder if, rather than define a completely new extension, we could just use the existing policy extensions: Certificate Policies, Policy Constraints, Inhibit anyPolicy and Policy Mappings.
>
> Perhaps it would make sense to (re)use the RFC5280 EKU OIDs as Policy OIDs, and set some rules for when requireExplicitPolicy must be set.
>
> (BTW, have I just reinvented Microsoft's "Application Policies"
> extension? ;-) )
>
> On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:
>> Umm..
>>
>> I think we have to provide some solution towards this problem.
>>
>> I propose 2 solutions.
>>
>> 1)Change the definition of EKU
>>
>> 2)Define a new extension and provide a way for transitioning to this
>> new scheme.
>>
>> If we cannot change the original definition, then, 2) will be a solution.
>>
>> Anyway, we need a standard solution to restrict key usages of
>> end-entity certificates.
>>
>> For example,
>>
>> define an new extension “keyConstraints”.
>>
>> id-ce-keyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce xx }
>>
>>      KeyConstraintsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
>>
>>      KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
>>
>> The format is similar to extendedKeyUsages.
>>
>> This extension may appear in CA certificates.
>>
>> This extension will work as nested EKU scheme as follows.
>>
>> Let {C(1),C(2),…,C(n)} be a set of certificate in certification path,
>> where ‘C(1)’ means the trust anchor and ‘C(n)’ means the end-entity
>> certificate.
>>
>> Then,
>>
>> C(i) means the i-th certificate in the certification path.
>>
>> K(i) means the set of KeyPurposeId in the certificate C(i),
>> especially,
>> K(n) means existing EKU set in the end-entity certificate.
>>
>> CALCULATE APPLICABLE EKU:
>>
>> X::={}
>>
>> For i::=2 to n do {
>>
>> If C(i) has keyConstraints extension and all C(j) (j<i) does not have
>> keyConstraints extension, then, X::=K(i).
>>
>> X::=X AND K(i)
>>
>> }
>>
>> Finally we can calculate the applicable EKU as “X”.
>>
>> How do you think of this?
>>
>> This notation has nothing to do with CABF. I am neutral.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>
>> *From:*pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *王文正
>> *Sent:* Sunday, February 7, 2016 12:54 AM
>> *To:* pkix@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>
>> The original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard is to
>> indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may
>> be used, in addition to or in place of the basic purposes indicated in
>> the key usage extension field. The EKU filed should be used in the
>> same fashion as the Key Usage Extension was used.
>>
>> Indeed, the EKU field will generally appear only in end entity
>> certificates. That does not means this field can not appear in CA
>> certificates. However, if this field appeared in a CA certificate, I
>> think it should be interpreted as to indicates the purpose for which
>> the CA key may be used (similar to the case where the crlSign key
>> usage bit is specified in the Key Usage Extension) rather than as a 'constraint'.
>>
>> For example, if some organization define a key purpose OID, say
>> id-kp-doSomeThing and the key purpose OID appears in a CA certificate,
>> it should mean that the CA key can be used to do some thing.
>>
>> It was unfortunately that some implementations misinterpreted the
>> meaning of an EKU extension in a CA certificate. In their fashion of
>> using the EKU extension as a 'constraint', if id-kp-doSomeThing
>> appears in a CA certificate, it means that the CA key can be used to
>> sign certificates of which associated subject keys can be used to do
>> some thing. This obviously twist the original definition of the EKU field.
>>
>> The earliest implementation that treated an EKU extension in a CA
>> certificate as a 'constraint' I had been aware of is Microsoft Crypto
>> API (CAPI). As a result, certificate management software in Microsoft
>> Windows Server and Microsoft IE all treated an EKU extension in a CA
>> certificate as a 'constraint'. Unfortunately, some CA vendors believed
>> that Microsoft's treating an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a
>> 'constraint' is a correct interpretation or because they had no choice
>> but to follow Micorsoft's interpretation because in that time
>> Microsoft IE dominated the market and they want their certificates to
>> be compatible with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately that other
>> browser vendors also followed the wrong interpretation and treated an
>> EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint'. In the end, that
>> was why there were many browser vendors and CA vendors voted to add
>> text such as "For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered
>> Technically Constrained,  the certificate MUST include an Extended Key
>> Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages that the
>> Subordinate CA Certificate is authorized to issue certificates for" in
>> the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.
>>
>> I think it is a bad idea to twist the original definition of the EKU
>> field. If the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to
>> specify a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue certificates for, the
>> correct way is to define a new key purpose OID rather than adopt the
>> existing PKIX  key purpose OIDs which are defined to be used in
>> end-entity certificates. For example, it the CA/Browser Forum want to
>> use the EKU extension to specify that a Subordinate CA is authorized
>> to issue TLS/SSL certificates, the correct way is to define an
>> CA/Browser key purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForServerAuth. It is
>> not correct if we use the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordinate CA
>> certificate to specify that the Subordinate CA is authorized to issue TLS/SSL certificates.
>> According to the the original definition of the EKU field in the X.509
>> standard, that actually means that the the Subordinate CA's key can be
>> used for TLS/SSL server authentication.
>>
>> Best Regards,
>> Wen-Cheng Wang
>>
>> ________________________________________
>> From: pkix [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto
>> [koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com]
>> Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM
>> To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani
>> Cc: <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>
>> Hello sirs,
>>
>> I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.
>> Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation,
>> but the user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft library.
>> Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.
>> Even OpenSSL has.
>> I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.
>> If so, why RFC does not change the specification?
>>
>> As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:
>> "In general, this extension will appear only in end entity certificates."
>> Can we change this paragraph like:
>> "If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ..."?
>> We should think about which is better for the future interoperability,
>> I think.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Carl Wallace [mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com]
>> Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM
>> To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>>;
>> Santosh Chokhani <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com
>> <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>>
>> Cc: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com
>> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>; <pkix@ietf.org
>> <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>> <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>
>>
>> On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com
>> <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>> The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. It
>>> does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.
>>
>> Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow
>> for EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will
>> rely on folklore to know which implementations do what.
>>
>>>
>>> That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation
>>> libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and
>>> Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox,
>>> and Chrome/Opera on Windows.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Peter
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani
>>> <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>> According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak
>>>> up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of
>>>> constraint on the certification path mandatory.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on
>>>> the CA.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the
>>>> path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the
>>>> extension and path validation engine.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
>>>> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM
>>>> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com
>>>> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>
>>>> Cc:pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a
>>>> compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?
>>>> Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of the
>>>> extension for all cases.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> From: pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org>> on
>>>> behalf of
>> Koichi Sugimoto
>>>> <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com
>>>> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>
>>>> Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
>>>> To: "pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org
>>>> <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>>> Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hello.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I hope the following definition should be changed.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
>>>>> certified
>>>>
>>>>> public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>>>>
>>>>> purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this
>>>>
>>>>> extension will appear only in end entity certificates.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> P9:
>>>>
>>>> Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA
>>>> certificate which uses a
>>>>
>>>> combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint
>>>> settings to limit the scope within which the
>>>>
>>>> Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional
>>>> Subordinate CA Certificates.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> P34:
>>>>
>>>> ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity
>>>> certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
>>>>
>>>> (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to
>>>> further protect relying parties until the
>>>>
>>>> use of the extension is consistent between Application Software
>>>> Suppliers whose software is used by a
>>>>
>>>> substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> P38-39:
>>>>
>>>> For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically
>>>> Constrained, the certificate MUST include an
>>>>
>>>> Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key
>>>> usages that the Subordinate CA Certificate is
>>>>
>>>> authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage
>>>> KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this
>>>>
>>>> extension.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the
>>>> next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.
>>>>
>>>> This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of
>>>> influence when end-entity certificates are
>>>>
>>>> unwillingly issued by attacks etc.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Please see below:
>>>>
>>>> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>
>>
>>
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Date: Tue, 09 Feb 2016 06:46:27 -0500
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>, =?UTF-8?B?546L5paH5q2j?= <wcwang@cht.com.tw>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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On 2/9/16, 4:18 AM, "pkix on behalf of Stephen Farrell"
<pkix-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:

>
>Just wondering...
>
>On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:
>> 1)     Change the definition of EKU
>
>Do we have an existence proof that there is s/w deployed for
>which such a change in definition would be a problem? I may
>have missed that earlier in the thread but wanted to check.

Yes there is code that does not implement the nested EKU scheme and yes
there are infrastructures that do not implemented the nested EKU scheme.
Hence my suggestion last week (and years ago I think) that we define a way
to select between the semantics in a validation implementation (IMO) to
try to unwind this situation.

Has CAB Forum ever defined the processing semantics in a spec? It's hard
to know the extent of the potential problem without one.


>
>Thanks,
>S.
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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--001a114a6996911775052b56a1d2
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Enfin.

That's exactly what the CertificatePolicies is here for.

At CABF level, just require that the different OIDs 2.23.140.1.1,
2.23.140.1.2.1, 2.23.140.1.2.2 are found in the valid_policy_tree returned
by the normalized path validation algorithm when verifying a certificate.

No need to invent a new extension or change the validation algorithm.

2016-02-09 11:39 GMT+01:00 Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>:

> The Certificate Policies extension can be used to restrict "the purposes
> for which the certificate may be used".  That's really what "nested EKU" =
is
> trying to achieve, isn't it?
>
> So I wonder if, rather than define a completely new extension, we could
> just use the existing policy extensions: Certificate Policies, Policy
> Constraints, Inhibit anyPolicy and Policy Mappings.
>
> Perhaps it would make sense to (re)use the RFC5280 EKU OIDs as Policy
> OIDs, and set some rules for when requireExplicitPolicy must be set.
>
> (BTW, have I just reinvented Microsoft's "Application Policies" extension=
?
> ;-) )
>
> On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:
>
>> Umm..
>>
>> I think we have to provide some solution towards this problem.
>>
>> I propose 2 solutions.
>>
>> 1)Change the definition of EKU
>>
>> 2)Define a new extension and provide a way for transitioning to this new
>>
>> scheme.
>>
>> If we cannot change the original definition, then, 2) will be a solution=
.
>>
>> Anyway, we need a standard solution to restrict key usages of end-entity
>> certificates.
>>
>> For example,
>>
>> define an new extension =E2=80=9CkeyConstraints=E2=80=9D.
>>
>> id-ce-keyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D  { id-ce xx }
>>
>>     KeyConstraintsSyntax ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
>>
>>     KeyPurposeId ::=3D OBJECT IDENTIFIER
>>
>> The format is similar to extendedKeyUsages.
>>
>> This extension may appear in CA certificates.
>>
>> This extension will work as nested EKU scheme as follows.
>>
>> Let {C(1),C(2),=E2=80=A6,C(n)} be a set of certificate in certification =
path,
>> where =E2=80=98C(1)=E2=80=99 means the trust anchor and =E2=80=98C(n)=E2=
=80=99 means the end-entity
>> certificate.
>>
>> Then,
>>
>> C(i) means the i-th certificate in the certification path.
>>
>> K(i) means the set of KeyPurposeId in the certificate C(i), especially,
>> K(n) means existing EKU set in the end-entity certificate.
>>
>> CALCULATE APPLICABLE EKU:
>>
>> X::=3D{}
>>
>> For i::=3D2 to n do {
>>
>> If C(i) has keyConstraints extension and all C(j) (j<i) does not have
>> keyConstraints extension, then, X::=3DK(i).
>>
>> X::=3DX AND K(i)
>>
>> }
>>
>> Finally we can calculate the applicable EKU as =E2=80=9CX=E2=80=9D.
>>
>> How do you think of this?
>>
>> This notation has nothing to do with CABF. I am neutral.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>
>> *From:*pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *=E7=8E=8B=E6=
=96=87=E6=AD=A3
>> *Sent:* Sunday, February 7, 2016 12:54 AM
>> *To:* pkix@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>
>>
>> The original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard is to
>> indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may be
>> used, in addition to or in place of
>> the basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. The EKU
>> filed should be used in the same fashion as the Key Usage Extension was
>> used.
>>
>> Indeed, the EKU field will generally appear only in end entity
>> certificates. That does not means this field can not appear in CA
>> certificates. However, if this field appeared in a CA certificate, I
>> think it should be interpreted as to indicates the purpose for which the
>> CA key may be used (similar to the case where the crlSign key usage bit
>> is specified in the Key Usage Extension) rather than as a 'constraint'.
>>
>> For example, if some organization define a key purpose OID, say
>> id-kp-doSomeThing and the key purpose OID appears in a CA certificate,
>> it should mean that the CA key can be used to do some thing.
>>
>> It was unfortunately that some implementations misinterpreted the
>> meaning of an EKU extension in a CA certificate. In their fashion of
>> using the EKU extension as a 'constraint', if id-kp-doSomeThing appears
>> in a CA certificate, it means that the CA key can be used to sign
>> certificates of which associated subject keys can be used to do some
>> thing. This obviously twist the original definition of the EKU field.
>>
>> The earliest implementation that treated an EKU extension in a CA
>> certificate as a 'constraint' I had been aware of is Microsoft Crypto
>> API (CAPI). As a result, certificate management software in Microsoft
>> Windows Server and Microsoft IE all treated an EKU extension in a CA
>> certificate as a 'constraint'. Unfortunately, some CA vendors believed
>> that Microsoft's treating an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a
>> 'constraint' is a correct interpretation or because they had no choice
>> but to follow Micorsoft's interpretation because in that time Microsoft
>> IE dominated the market and they want their certificates to be
>> compatible with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately that other
>> browser vendors also followed the wrong interpretation and treated an
>> EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint'. In the end, that
>> was why there were many browser vendors and CA vendors voted to add text
>> such as "For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically
>> Constrained,  the certificate MUST include an Extended Key Usage (EKU)
>> extension specifying all extended key usages that the Subordinate CA
>> Certificate is authorized to issue certificates for" in the CA/Browser
>> Forum Baseline Requirements.
>>
>> I think it is a bad idea to twist the original definition of the EKU
>> field. If the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to specify
>> a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue certificates for, the correct
>> way is to define a new key purpose OID rather than adopt the existing
>> PKIX  key purpose OIDs which are defined to be used in end-entity
>> certificates. For example, it the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU
>> extension to specify that a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue
>> TLS/SSL certificates, the correct way is to define an CA/Browser key
>> purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForServerAuth. It is not correct if we
>> use the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordinate CA certificate to specify
>> that the Subordinate CA is authorized to issue TLS/SSL certificates.
>> According to the the original definition of the EKU field in the X.509
>> standard, that actually means that the the Subordinate CA's key can be
>> used for TLS/SSL server authentication.
>>
>> Best Regards,
>> Wen-Cheng Wang
>>
>> ________________________________________
>> From: pkix [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto
>> [koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com]
>> Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM
>> To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani
>> Cc: <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>
>> Hello sirs,
>>
>> I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.
>> Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation, but
>> the user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft librar=
y.
>> Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.
>> Even OpenSSL has.
>> I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.
>> If so, why RFC does not change the specification?
>>
>> As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:
>> "In general, this extension will appear only in end entity certificates.=
"
>> Can we change this paragraph like:
>> "If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ..."?
>> We should think about which is better for the future interoperability, I
>> think.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Carl Wallace [mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com]
>> Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM
>> To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>>; Santosh
>> Chokhani <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>=
>
>> Cc: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com
>> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>; <pkix@ietf.org
>> <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>> <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>
>>
>> On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com
>> <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. It
>>> does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.
>>>
>>
>> Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for
>> EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely
>> on folklore to know which implementations do what.
>>
>>
>>> That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation
>>> libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and
>>> Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox, and
>>> Chrome/Opera on Windows.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Peter
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani
>>> <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak
>>>> up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of
>>>> constraint on the certification path mandatory.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the
>>>> CA.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the
>>>> path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the
>>>> extension and path validation engine.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
>>>> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM
>>>> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com <mailto:
>>>> koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>
>>>> Cc:pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a
>>>> compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?
>>>> Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of the
>>>> extension for all cases.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> From: pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org>> on
>>>> behalf of
>>>>
>>> Koichi Sugimoto
>>
>>> <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>=
>
>>>> Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
>>>> To: "pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:
>>>> pkix@ietf.org>>
>>>>
>>>> Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hello.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I hope the following definition should be changed.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
>>>>> certified
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> extension will appear only in end entity certificates.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> P9:
>>>>
>>>> Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA
>>>> certificate which uses a
>>>>
>>>> combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint
>>>> settings to limit the scope within which the
>>>>
>>>> Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional
>>>> Subordinate CA Certificates.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> P34:
>>>>
>>>> ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity
>>>> certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
>>>>
>>>> (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to
>>>> further protect relying parties until the
>>>>
>>>> use of the extension is consistent between Application Software
>>>> Suppliers whose software is used by a
>>>>
>>>> substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> P38-39:
>>>>
>>>> For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically
>>>> Constrained, the certificate MUST include an
>>>>
>>>> Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages
>>>> that the Subordinate CA Certificate is
>>>>
>>>> authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage
>>>> KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this
>>>>
>>>> extension.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the
>>>> next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.
>>>>
>>>> This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of
>>>> influence when end-entity certificates are
>>>>
>>>> unwillingly issued by attacks etc.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Please see below:
>>>>
>>>> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>
>>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> *
>>
>> **=E6=9C=AC=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=B6=E5=8F=AF=E8=83=BD=E5=8C=85=E5=90=AB=E4=B8=
=AD=E8=8F=AF=E9=9B=BB=E4=BF=A1=E8=82=A1=E4=BB=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=99=90=E5=85=AC=
=E5=8F=B8=E6=A9=9F=E5=AF=86=E8=B3=87=E8=A8=8A**,**=E9=9D=9E=E6=8C=87=E5=AE=
=9A=E4=B9=8B=E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E8=80=85**,**=E8=AB=8B=E5=8B=BF
>> =E8=92=90=E9=9B=86=E3=80=81=E8=99=95=E7=90=86=E6=88=96=E5=88=A9=E7=94=A8=
=E6=9C=AC=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=B6=E5=85=A7=E5=AE=B9**,**=E4=B8=A6=E8=AB=8B=E9=8A=
=B7=E6=AF=80=E6=AD=A4=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=B6**. **=E5=A6=82=E7=82=BA=E6=8C=87=E5=
=AE=9A=E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E8=80=85**,**=E6=87=89
>> =E7=A2=BA=E5=AF=A6=E4=BF=9D=E8=AD=B7=E9=83=B5=E4=BB=B6=E4=B8=AD=E6=9C=AC=
=E5=85=AC=E5=8F=B8=E4=B9=8B=E7=87=9F=E6=A5=AD=E6=A9=9F=E5=AF=86=E5=8F=8A=E5=
=80=8B=E4=BA=BA=E8=B3=87=E6=96=99**,**=E4=B8=8D=E5=BE=97=E4=BB=BB=E6=84=8F=
=E5=82=B3=E4=BD=88=E6=88=96=E6=8F=AD=E9=9C=B2**,**=E4=B8=A6=E6=87=89
>> =E8=87=AA=E8=A1=8C=E7=A2=BA=E8=AA=8D=E6=9C=AC=E9=83=B5=E4=BB=B6=E4=B9=8B=
=E9=99=84=E6=AA=94=E8=88=87=E8=B6=85=E9=80=A3=E7=B5=90=E4=B9=8B=E5=AE=89=E5=
=85=A8=E6=80=A7**,**=E4=BB=A5=E5=85=B1=E5=90=8C=E5=96=84=E7=9B=A1=E8=B3=87=
=E8=A8=8A=E5=AE=89=E5=85=A8=E8=88=87=E5=80=8B=E8=B3=87=E4=BF=9D=E8=AD=B7=E8=
=B2=AC
>> =E4=BB=BB**.
>> Please be advised that this email message (including any attachments)
>> contains confidential information and may be legally privileged. If you
>> are not the intended recipient, please destroy this message and all
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>>
>>
> --
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
> Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
> www.comodo.com
>
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--=20
Erwann.

--001a114a6996911775052b56a1d2
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Enfin.<div><br></div><div>That&#39;s exactly what the Cert=
ificatePolicies is here for.</div><div><br></div><div>At CABF level, just r=
equire that the different OIDs 2.23.140.1.1, 2.23.140.1.2.1, 2.23.140.1.2.2=
 are found in the valid_policy_tree returned by the normalized path validat=
ion algorithm when verifying a certificate.</div><div><br></div><div>No nee=
d to invent a new extension or change the validation algorithm.</div><div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2016-02-09 11:39 G=
MT+01:00 Rob Stradling <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rob.stradlin=
g@comodo.com" target=3D"_blank">rob.stradling@comodo.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">The Certificate Policies extension can be u=
sed to restrict &quot;the purposes for which the certificate may be used&qu=
ot;.=C2=A0 That&#39;s really what &quot;nested EKU&quot; is trying to achie=
ve, isn&#39;t it?<br>
<br>
So I wonder if, rather than define a completely new extension, we could jus=
t use the existing policy extensions: Certificate Policies, Policy Constrai=
nts, Inhibit anyPolicy and Policy Mappings.<br>
<br>
Perhaps it would make sense to (re)use the RFC5280 EKU OIDs as Policy OIDs,=
 and set some rules for when requireExplicitPolicy must be set.<br>
<br>
(BTW, have I just reinvented Microsoft&#39;s &quot;Application Policies&quo=
t; extension? ;-) )<span class=3D""><br>
<br>
On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:<br>
</span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
Umm..<br>
<br>
I think we have to provide some solution towards this problem.<br>
<br>
I propose 2 solutions.<br>
<br>
1)Change the definition of EKU<br>
<br></span>
2)Define a new extension and provide a way for transitioning to this new<di=
v><div class=3D"h5"><br>
scheme.<br>
<br>
If we cannot change the original definition, then, 2) will be a solution.<b=
r>
<br>
Anyway, we need a standard solution to restrict key usages of end-entity<br=
>
certificates.<br>
<br>
For example,<br>
<br>
define an new extension =E2=80=9CkeyConstraints=E2=80=9D.<br>
<br>
id-ce-keyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D=C2=A0 { id-ce xx }<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 KeyConstraintsSyntax ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurpo=
seId<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 KeyPurposeId ::=3D OBJECT IDENTIFIER<br>
<br>
The format is similar to extendedKeyUsages.<br>
<br>
This extension may appear in CA certificates.<br>
<br>
This extension will work as nested EKU scheme as follows.<br>
<br>
Let {C(1),C(2),=E2=80=A6,C(n)} be a set of certificate in certification pat=
h,<br>
where =E2=80=98C(1)=E2=80=99 means the trust anchor and =E2=80=98C(n)=E2=80=
=99 means the end-entity<br>
certificate.<br>
<br>
Then,<br>
<br>
C(i) means the i-th certificate in the certification path.<br>
<br>
K(i) means the set of KeyPurposeId in the certificate C(i), especially,<br>
K(n) means existing EKU set in the end-entity certificate.<br>
<br>
CALCULATE APPLICABLE EKU:<br>
<br>
X::=3D{}<br>
<br>
For i::=3D2 to n do {<br>
<br>
If C(i) has keyConstraints extension and all C(j) (j&lt;i) does not have<br=
>
keyConstraints extension, then, X::=3DK(i).<br>
<br>
X::=3DX AND K(i)<br>
<br>
}<br>
<br>
Finally we can calculate the applicable EKU as =E2=80=9CX=E2=80=9D.<br>
<br>
How do you think of this?<br>
<br>
This notation has nothing to do with CABF. I am neutral.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
<br></div></div>
*From:*pkix [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] *On Behalf Of *=E7=8E=8B=E6=96=87=E6=AD=A3<b=
r>
*Sent:* Sunday, February 7, 2016 12:54 AM<br>
*To:* <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><=
br>
*Subject:* Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<div><div class=3D"h=
5"><br>
<br>
The original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard is to<br>
indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may be<br=
>
used, in addition to or in place of<br>
the basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. The EKU<br>
filed should be used in the same fashion as the Key Usage Extension was<br>
used.<br>
<br>
Indeed, the EKU field will generally appear only in end entity<br>
certificates. That does not means this field can not appear in CA<br>
certificates. However, if this field appeared in a CA certificate, I<br>
think it should be interpreted as to indicates the purpose for which the<br=
>
CA key may be used (similar to the case where the crlSign key usage bit<br>
is specified in the Key Usage Extension) rather than as a &#39;constraint&#=
39;.<br>
<br>
For example, if some organization define a key purpose OID, say<br>
id-kp-doSomeThing and the key purpose OID appears in a CA certificate,<br>
it should mean that the CA key can be used to do some thing.<br>
<br>
It was unfortunately that some implementations misinterpreted the<br>
meaning of an EKU extension in a CA certificate. In their fashion of<br>
using the EKU extension as a &#39;constraint&#39;, if id-kp-doSomeThing app=
ears<br>
in a CA certificate, it means that the CA key can be used to sign<br>
certificates of which associated subject keys can be used to do some<br>
thing. This obviously twist the original definition of the EKU field.<br>
<br>
The earliest implementation that treated an EKU extension in a CA<br>
certificate as a &#39;constraint&#39; I had been aware of is Microsoft Cryp=
to<br>
API (CAPI). As a result, certificate management software in Microsoft<br>
Windows Server and Microsoft IE all treated an EKU extension in a CA<br>
certificate as a &#39;constraint&#39;. Unfortunately, some CA vendors belie=
ved<br>
that Microsoft&#39;s treating an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a<br>
&#39;constraint&#39; is a correct interpretation or because they had no cho=
ice<br>
but to follow Micorsoft&#39;s interpretation because in that time Microsoft=
<br>
IE dominated the market and they want their certificates to be<br>
compatible with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately that other<br>
browser vendors also followed the wrong interpretation and treated an<br>
EKU extension in a CA certificate as a &#39;constraint&#39;. In the end, th=
at<br>
was why there were many browser vendors and CA vendors voted to add text<br=
>
such as &quot;For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically=
<br>
Constrained,=C2=A0 the certificate MUST include an Extended Key Usage (EKU)=
<br>
extension specifying all extended key usages that the Subordinate CA<br>
Certificate is authorized to issue certificates for&quot; in the CA/Browser=
<br>
Forum Baseline Requirements.<br>
<br>
I think it is a bad idea to twist the original definition of the EKU<br>
field. If the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to specify<br>
a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue certificates for, the correct<br>
way is to define a new key purpose OID rather than adopt the existing<br>
PKIX=C2=A0 key purpose OIDs which are defined to be used in end-entity<br>
certificates. For example, it the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU<br>
extension to specify that a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue<br>
TLS/SSL certificates, the correct way is to define an CA/Browser key<br>
purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForServerAuth. It is not correct if we<br=
>
use the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordinate CA certificate to specify<br>
that the Subordinate CA is authorized to issue TLS/SSL certificates.<br>
According to the the original definition of the EKU field in the X.509<br>
standard, that actually means that the the Subordinate CA&#39;s key can be<=
br>
used for TLS/SSL server authentication.<br>
<br>
Best Regards,<br>
Wen-Cheng Wang<br>
<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: pkix [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix=
-bounces@ietf.org</a>] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto<br>
[<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" target=3D"_blank">koichi=
.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM<br>
To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani<br></div></div>
Cc: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a=
> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt;&gt;<span class=3D""><br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
Hello sirs,<br>
<br>
I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.<br>
Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation, but<br=
>
the user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft library.<=
br>
Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.<br>
Even OpenSSL has.<br>
I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.<br>
If so, why RFC does not change the specification?<br>
<br>
As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:<br>
&quot;In general, this extension will appear only in end entity certificate=
s.&quot;<br>
Can we change this paragraph like:<br>
&quot;If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ...&quot;?<br=
>
We should think about which is better for the future interoperability, I<br=
>
think.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Carl Wallace [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">carl@redhoundsoftware.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM<br></span><span class=3D"">
To: Peter Bowen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">=
pzbowen@gmail.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;&gt;; Santosh<br>
Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank=
">santosh.chokhani@gmail.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokh=
ani@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">santosh.chokhani@gmail.com</a>&gt;&gt;<br>
Cc: Koichi Sugimoto &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a><br></span><span class=
=3D"">
&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a>&gt;&gt;; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@=
ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org=
</a>&gt;&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ie=
tf.org</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pk=
ix@ietf.org</a>&gt;&gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
<br>
On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, &quot;Peter Bowen&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@=
gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a><br></span><span class=3D=
"">
&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">pzbowen@g=
mail.com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. It<br>
does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for<br=
>
EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely<br>
on folklore to know which implementations do what.<br>
<br>
</span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
<br>
That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation<br>
libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and<br>
Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox, and<br>
Chrome/Opera on Windows.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Peter<br>
<br>
On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani<br></span>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">santosh=
.chokhani@gmail.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail=
.com" target=3D"_blank">santosh.chokhani@gmail.com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak<br>
up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of<br>
constraint on the certification path mandatory.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the<br>
CA.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the<br>
path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the<br>
extension and path validation engine.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
From: pkix [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blan=
k">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace<br>
Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM<br></span>
To: Koichi Sugimoto &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"m=
ailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" target=3D"_blank">koichi.sugimoto@glo=
balsign.com</a>&gt;&gt;<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cc%3Apkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cc:pkix@ietf.org</a=
> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt;<span class=3D""><br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a<br>
compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?<br>
Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of the<br>
extension for all cases.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br></span>
From: pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">p=
kix-bounces@ietf.org</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org=
" target=3D"_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt;&gt; on behalf of<br>
</blockquote></blockquote>
Koichi Sugimoto<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" target=3D"_blank">koi=
chi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimot=
o@globalsign.com" target=3D"_blank">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a>&gt;&=
gt;<span class=3D""><br>
Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM<br></span>
To: &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org<=
/a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf=
.org</a>&gt;&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">p=
kix@ietf.org</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;&gt;<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Hello.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
I hope the following definition should be changed.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the<br>
certified<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
extension will appear only in end entity certificates.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
P9:<br>
<br>
Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA<br>
certificate which uses a<br>
<br>
combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint<br>
settings to limit the scope within which the<br>
<br>
Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional<br>
Subordinate CA Certificates.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
P34:<br>
<br>
** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity<br>
certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280<br>
<br>
(4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to<br>
further protect relying parties until the<br>
<br>
use of the extension is consistent between Application Software<br>
Suppliers whose software is used by a<br>
<br>
substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
P38-39:<br>
<br>
For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically<br>
Constrained, the certificate MUST include an<br>
<br>
Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages<br>
that the Subordinate CA Certificate is<br>
<br>
authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage<br>
KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this<br>
<br>
extension.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the<br>
next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.<br>
<br>
This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of<br>
influence when end-entity certificates are<br>
<br>
unwillingly issued by attacks etc.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Please see below:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.=
2.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://cabforum.org/wp-content=
/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list<br>
</div></div><a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.or=
g</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ie=
tf.org</a>&gt;<br>
</blockquote></blockquote>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
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<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
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<br>
-- <br>
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Senior Research &amp; Development Scientist<br>
COMODO - Creating Trust Online<br>
Office Tel: <a href=3D"tel:%2B44.%280%291274.730505" value=3D"+441274730505=
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<br>
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Registered Office:<br>
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<div class=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div></div>

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On Mon, Feb 8, 2016 at 6:24 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>
wrote:

> > I believe there RFC5321 in the context of mail delivery, says SMTP must
> > preserve the case for interoperability.
>
> OK, so this is a long-running topic that periodically raises its head.
>
> An MTA and MUA must preserve the local-part case of any address it handles
> because there's no way to signal how a non-local MTA or MUA will handle
> different casings.  The SHOULD clause in 4.1.2 is a good recommendation for
> interoperability, but the installed base of MTA/MUA have behaviors
> consistent with the MUST in 2.3.11.  For the vast, vast VAST, VAAAAAST
> majority of email, this isn't a problem.  Sending & receiving MUAs work,
> and intervening MTA get mail where it needs to go.
>
> A problem appears only in S/MIME processing.  S/MIME requires that the
> address be encoded in the cert, but which version?  Should it be
> FOO@bar.com or foo@bar.com or fOO@bar.com or fOo@bar.com or Foo@bar.com
> or ...?  In the end it doesn't matter; an MUA that has case semantics *as
> allowed by 5321* will eventually flag such some S/MIME messages as a
> problem.
>
> How would you put a fix in 5280?  You could, say, require that all
> rfc822Names be lcased, but that doesn't change how mail is handled, and you
> *will* end up with MUAs mishandling message security (e.g., by conflating
> two distinct users as one, violating confidentiality about 25% the time and
> causing inability to read enveloped messages another 25% of the time--not a
> good outcome).
>

Thank you for writing that up, as that really motivates the problem.


>
> You could encode a flag into an extension that defines the match semantics
> for rfc822Names--but certificates are issued separately from MUA and MTA
> deployments.  What happens when you encode one semantic rule into the certs
> and then later replace the MUA that uses a different semantic rule?
>

A possibility is that the cert or rather the rfc822Names SAN is already
tied to a domain, and the rules of that domain would apply.


>
> OTOH, you could attempt to fix email by defining the local-part semantics
> fully and eliminate the option.  But there's a large installed software
> base that both do and don't treat case as distinct, and *no* incentive to
> fix  it--email *works,* and S/MIME is a tiny, tiny, TINY (did I say
> TIIIIINNNNNYYYYYYYYY) fraction of the total.
>

Yeah but that small population of S/MIME users do really care.  And if we
want to expand the population that could use S/MIME beyond that tiny
population of aficionados, then things like this need to be fixed.


>
> A good alternative is to have implementation considerations for S/MIME
> MUAs, such that local-part semantics can be defined as needed, or provide
> indicators to the user as to what's going on.
>
> Guess what?  RFC 5750 already has that recommendation (Sec 3, para 5):
>
> """
>    Sending agents SHOULD make the address in the From or Sender header
>    in a mail message match an Internet mail address in the signer's
>    certificate.  Receiving agents MUST check that the address in the
>    From or Sender header of a mail message matches an Internet mail
>    address, if present, in the signer's certificate, if mail addresses
>    are present in the certificate.  A receiving agent SHOULD provide
>    some explicit alternate processing of the message if this comparison
>    fails, which may be to display a message that shows the recipient the
>    addresses in the certificate or other certificate details.
> """
>
>
Yeah but it's a cop out to UI/UX and is confusing to the user.  When the
users sees a mail that the signature validation failed, they'll assume the
worse when it really was just a mismatching cert name vs FROM/SENDER due to
case or the '+'/'-'.  If the user hasn't already given up on that MUA, very
quickly the user will start discounting what the message signature
validation result means which I think is not what we want.

The fact that any given MUA doesn't implement this option is a complaint to
> take up with that particular vendor (*cough*Apple*cough*).  Microsoft
> Outlook users on Windows should Google "SupressNameChecks" [sic].
>
> ;)
>
> -- T
>

-Wei

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 8, 2016 at 6:24 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:tmiller@mitre.org" target="_blank">tmiller@mitre.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class="">&gt; I believe there RFC5321 in the context of mail delivery, says SMTP must<br>
&gt; preserve the case for interoperability.<br>
<br>
</span>OK, so this is a long-running topic that periodically raises its head.<br>
<br>
An MTA and MUA must preserve the local-part case of any address it handles because there&#39;s no way to signal how a non-local MTA or MUA will handle different casings.  The SHOULD clause in 4.1.2 is a good recommendation for interoperability, but the installed base of MTA/MUA have behaviors consistent with the MUST in 2.3.11.  For the vast, vast VAST, VAAAAAST majority of email, this isn&#39;t a problem.  Sending &amp; receiving MUAs work, and intervening MTA get mail where it needs to go.<br>
<br>
A problem appears only in S/MIME processing.  S/MIME requires that the address be encoded in the cert, but which version?  Should it be <a href="mailto:FOO@bar.com">FOO@bar.com</a> or <a href="mailto:foo@bar.com">foo@bar.com</a> or <a href="mailto:fOO@bar.com">fOO@bar.com</a> or <a href="mailto:fOo@bar.com">fOo@bar.com</a> or <a href="mailto:Foo@bar.com">Foo@bar.com</a> or ...?  In the end it doesn&#39;t matter; an MUA that has case semantics *as allowed by 5321* will eventually flag such some S/MIME messages as a problem.<br>
<br>
How would you put a fix in 5280?  You could, say, require that all rfc822Names be lcased, but that doesn&#39;t change how mail is handled, and you *will* end up with MUAs mishandling message security (e.g., by conflating two distinct users as one, violating confidentiality about 25% the time and causing inability to read enveloped messages another 25% of the time--not a good outcome).<br></blockquote><div> </div><div>Thank you for writing that up, as that really motivates the problem.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
You could encode a flag into an extension that defines the match semantics for rfc822Names--but certificates are issued separately from MUA and MTA deployments.  What happens when you encode one semantic rule into the certs and then later replace the MUA that uses a different semantic rule?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>A possibility is that the cert or rather the rfc822Names SAN is already tied to a domain, and the rules of that domain would apply.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
OTOH, you could attempt to fix email by defining the local-part semantics fully and eliminate the option.  But there&#39;s a large installed software base that both do and don&#39;t treat case as distinct, and *no* incentive to fix  it--email *works,* and S/MIME is a tiny, tiny, TINY (did I say TIIIIINNNNNYYYYYYYYY) fraction of the total.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yeah but that small population of S/MIME users do really care.  And if we want to expand the population that could use S/MIME beyond that tiny population of aficionados, then things like this need to be fixed.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
A good alternative is to have implementation considerations for S/MIME MUAs, such that local-part semantics can be defined as needed, or provide indicators to the user as to what&#39;s going on.<br>
<br>
Guess what?  RFC 5750 already has that recommendation (Sec 3, para 5):<br>
<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
   Sending agents SHOULD make the address in the From or Sender header<br>
   in a mail message match an Internet mail address in the signer&#39;s<br>
   certificate.  Receiving agents MUST check that the address in the<br>
   From or Sender header of a mail message matches an Internet mail<br>
   address, if present, in the signer&#39;s certificate, if mail addresses<br>
   are present in the certificate.  A receiving agent SHOULD provide<br>
   some explicit alternate processing of the message if this comparison<br>
   fails, which may be to display a message that shows the recipient the<br>
   addresses in the certificate or other certificate details.<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yeah but it&#39;s a cop out to UI/UX and is confusing to the user.  When the users sees a mail that the signature validation failed, they&#39;ll assume the worse when it really was just a mismatching cert name vs FROM/SENDER due to case or the &#39;+&#39;/&#39;-&#39;.  If the user hasn&#39;t already given up on that MUA, very quickly the user will start discounting what the message signature validation result means which I think is not what we want.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
The fact that any given MUA doesn&#39;t implement this option is a complaint to take up with that particular vendor (*cough*Apple*cough*).  Microsoft Outlook users on Windows should Google &quot;SupressNameChecks&quot; [sic].<br>
<br>
;)<br>
<span class="CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><font color="#888888"><br>
-- T<br></font></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>-Wei </div></div><br></div></div>

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On 2/8/16 3:24 PM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> The fact that any given MUA doesn't implement this option is a
> complaint to take up with that particular vendor
> (*cough*Apple*cough*). Microsoft Outlook users on Windows should
> Google "SupressNameChecks" [sic]. ;)

And to go one further, if they don't implement that advice, what makes
us think they'll implement any other advice?

Eliot



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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 6:04 AM, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 2/8/16 3:24 PM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> > The fact that any given MUA doesn't implement this option is a
> > complaint to take up with that particular vendor
> > (*cough*Apple*cough*). Microsoft Outlook users on Windows should
> > Google "SupressNameChecks" [sic]. ;)
>
> And to go one further, if they don't implement that advice, what makes
> us think they'll implement any other advice?
>
> Eliot
>
>
>
A specification allows a starting point for a conversation amongst the
implementers, and between the implementers and the CAs. Without one, well
as its been pointed out, adoption of S/MIME has been poor.  In another
thread on the IETF mailing list, folks are lamenting that there hasn't been
much progress with email encryption.  Well issues like this lack of
specification which leads to poor user experience with encrypted emails are
some of the root causes.

-Wei

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 6:04 AM, Eliot Lear <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:lear@cisco.com">lear@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class="gmail-"><br>
<br>
On 2/8/16 3:24 PM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:<br>
&gt; The fact that any given MUA doesn&#39;t implement this option is a<br>
&gt; complaint to take up with that particular vendor<br>
&gt; (*cough*Apple*cough*). Microsoft Outlook users on Windows should<br>
&gt; Google &quot;SupressNameChecks&quot; [sic]. ;)<br>
<br>
</span>And to go one further, if they don&#39;t implement that advice, what makes<br>
us think they&#39;ll implement any other advice?<br>
<span class="gmail-CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><font color="#888888"><br>
Eliot<br>
<br>
<br></font></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>A specification allows a starting point for a conversation amongst the implementers, and between the implementers and the CAs. Without one, well as its been pointed out, adoption of S/MIME has been poor.  In another thread on the IETF mailing list, folks are lamenting that there hasn&#39;t been much progress with email encryption.  Well issues like this lack of specification which leads to poor user experience with encrypted emails are some of the root causes.</div></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">-Wei</div></div>

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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 6:37 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>
wrote:

> > A possibility is that the cert or rather the rfc822Names SAN is already
> tied to a
> > domain, and the rules of that domain would apply.
>
> There are no "rules for the domain."  My own domain uses just about every
> MUA under the sun (I know people using *pine*, fergadsake), each of which
> has a unique S/MIME cert matching semantics.
>
> > Yeah but that small population of S/MIME users do really care.  And if we
> > want to expand the population that could use S/MIME beyond that tiny
> > population of aficionados, then things like this need to be fixed.
>
> They care, but they don't matter.  Yes, it's easy to get implementations
> into OSS projects, but only if you contribute code.  Commercial software
> requires a business case.  The US DoD had to fight with MS for a couple
> years to get SupressNameChecks implemented in Outlook/Win, and it *still*
> isn't implemented right in OWA nor is it in Outlook/Mac.
>
> > Yeah but it's a cop out to UI/UX and is confusing to the user.  When the
> users
> > sees a mail that the signature validation failed, they'll assume the
> worse
> > when it really was just a mismatching cert name vs FROM/SENDER due to
> > case or the '+'/'-'.  If the user hasn't already given up on that MUA,
> very
> > quickly the user will start discounting what the message signature
> validation
> > result means which I think is not what we want.
>
> First, it's not a cop out if it's the only viable way to make it work.
>
> Second, S/MIME itself is "confusing to the user."  That's well documented
> in the numerous "Johnny" papers.
>
> Third, UI/UX is an implementation issue not a standards issue.
> Outlook/Win, frex., does not display a failed signature check when
> SupressNameChecks is enabled; instead it displays the signature as valid
> but explicitly displays the signer's rfc822Name in the message address
> block.  This works and experience in the field backs it up.  An application
> that supports alternative processing when a name match fails (IAW RFC 3750)
> but still shows a failed signature in the UI is bugged and needs fixing.
>
> This thread should move to smime@ietf.org; this is not a PKIX issue.
> Cert matching semantics in email does not need changes to existing
> certificate formats or extensions.
>

Alright.  I think we'll agree that this part of the conversation is
starting to rathole (though I very much appreciate the anecdotes you've
provided above).  I just was trying to point out an area of potential work
for a working group with regards to letter casing and as pointed out later
'+' and '-' suffixes in email SAN causing RFC5280 validation problems.  It
sounds like I'm just one of many that have asked about this.

-Wei

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 6:37 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:tmiller@mitre.org" target="_blank">tmiller@mitre.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class="">&gt; A possibility is that the cert or rather the rfc822Names SAN is already tied to a<br>
&gt; domain, and the rules of that domain would apply.<br>
<br>
</span>There are no &quot;rules for the domain.&quot;  My own domain uses just about every MUA under the sun (I know people using *pine*, fergadsake), each of which has a unique S/MIME cert matching semantics.<br>
<span class=""><br>
&gt; Yeah but that small population of S/MIME users do really care.  And if we<br>
&gt; want to expand the population that could use S/MIME beyond that tiny<br>
&gt; population of aficionados, then things like this need to be fixed.<br>
<br>
</span>They care, but they don&#39;t matter.  Yes, it&#39;s easy to get implementations into OSS projects, but only if you contribute code.  Commercial software requires a business case.  The US DoD had to fight with MS for a couple years to get SupressNameChecks implemented in Outlook/Win, and it *still* isn&#39;t implemented right in OWA nor is it in Outlook/Mac.<br>
<span class=""><br>
&gt; Yeah but it&#39;s a cop out to UI/UX and is confusing to the user.  When the users<br>
&gt; sees a mail that the signature validation failed, they&#39;ll assume the worse<br>
&gt; when it really was just a mismatching cert name vs FROM/SENDER due to<br>
&gt; case or the &#39;+&#39;/&#39;-&#39;.  If the user hasn&#39;t already given up on that MUA, very<br>
&gt; quickly the user will start discounting what the message signature validation<br>
&gt; result means which I think is not what we want.<br>
<br>
</span>First, it&#39;s not a cop out if it&#39;s the only viable way to make it work.<br>
<br>
Second, S/MIME itself is &quot;confusing to the user.&quot;  That&#39;s well documented in the numerous &quot;Johnny&quot; papers.<br>
<br>
Third, UI/UX is an implementation issue not a standards issue.  Outlook/Win, frex., does not display a failed signature check when SupressNameChecks is enabled; instead it displays the signature as valid but explicitly displays the signer&#39;s rfc822Name in the message address block.  This works and experience in the field backs it up.  An application that supports alternative processing when a name match fails (IAW RFC 3750) but still shows a failed signature in the UI is bugged and needs fixing.<br>
<br>
This thread should move to <a href="mailto:smime@ietf.org">smime@ietf.org</a>; this is not a PKIX issue.  Cert matching semantics in email does not need changes to existing certificate formats or extensions.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Alright.  I think we&#39;ll agree that this part of the conversation is starting to rathole (though I very much appreciate the anecdotes you&#39;ve provided above).  I just was trying to point out an area of potential work for a working group with regards to letter casing and as pointed out later &#39;+&#39; and &#39;-&#39; suffixes in email SAN causing RFC5280 validation problems.  It sounds like I&#39;m just one of many that have asked about this.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div></div></div></div>

--047d7bf0c28efa8bf2052b581563--


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Regarding EKU and path validation, this isn't a new question. See:
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg06821.html
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg06803.html
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg06757.html
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg06726.html

And some good answers:
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg06785.html
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg06781.html

This topic is coming back from the attic :)


2016-02-09 14:52 GMT+01:00 Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>:

> Enfin.
>
> That's exactly what the CertificatePolicies is here for.
>
> At CABF level, just require that the different OIDs 2.23.140.1.1,
> 2.23.140.1.2.1, 2.23.140.1.2.2 are found in the valid_policy_tree returne=
d
> by the normalized path validation algorithm when verifying a certificate.
>
> No need to invent a new extension or change the validation algorithm.
>
> 2016-02-09 11:39 GMT+01:00 Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>:
>
>> The Certificate Policies extension can be used to restrict "the purposes
>> for which the certificate may be used".  That's really what "nested EKU"=
 is
>> trying to achieve, isn't it?
>>
>> So I wonder if, rather than define a completely new extension, we could
>> just use the existing policy extensions: Certificate Policies, Policy
>> Constraints, Inhibit anyPolicy and Policy Mappings.
>>
>> Perhaps it would make sense to (re)use the RFC5280 EKU OIDs as Policy
>> OIDs, and set some rules for when requireExplicitPolicy must be set.
>>
>> (BTW, have I just reinvented Microsoft's "Application Policies"
>> extension? ;-) )
>>
>> On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:
>>
>>> Umm..
>>>
>>> I think we have to provide some solution towards this problem.
>>>
>>> I propose 2 solutions.
>>>
>>> 1)Change the definition of EKU
>>>
>>> 2)Define a new extension and provide a way for transitioning to this ne=
w
>>>
>>> scheme.
>>>
>>> If we cannot change the original definition, then, 2) will be a solutio=
n.
>>>
>>> Anyway, we need a standard solution to restrict key usages of end-entit=
y
>>> certificates.
>>>
>>> For example,
>>>
>>> define an new extension =E2=80=9CkeyConstraints=E2=80=9D.
>>>
>>> id-ce-keyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D  { id-ce xx }
>>>
>>>     KeyConstraintsSyntax ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
>>>
>>>     KeyPurposeId ::=3D OBJECT IDENTIFIER
>>>
>>> The format is similar to extendedKeyUsages.
>>>
>>> This extension may appear in CA certificates.
>>>
>>> This extension will work as nested EKU scheme as follows.
>>>
>>> Let {C(1),C(2),=E2=80=A6,C(n)} be a set of certificate in certification=
 path,
>>> where =E2=80=98C(1)=E2=80=99 means the trust anchor and =E2=80=98C(n)=
=E2=80=99 means the end-entity
>>> certificate.
>>>
>>> Then,
>>>
>>> C(i) means the i-th certificate in the certification path.
>>>
>>> K(i) means the set of KeyPurposeId in the certificate C(i), especially,
>>> K(n) means existing EKU set in the end-entity certificate.
>>>
>>> CALCULATE APPLICABLE EKU:
>>>
>>> X::=3D{}
>>>
>>> For i::=3D2 to n do {
>>>
>>> If C(i) has keyConstraints extension and all C(j) (j<i) does not have
>>> keyConstraints extension, then, X::=3DK(i).
>>>
>>> X::=3DX AND K(i)
>>>
>>> }
>>>
>>> Finally we can calculate the applicable EKU as =E2=80=9CX=E2=80=9D.
>>>
>>> How do you think of this?
>>>
>>> This notation has nothing to do with CABF. I am neutral.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>>
>>> *From:*pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *=E7=8E=8B=E6=
=96=87=E6=AD=A3
>>> *Sent:* Sunday, February 7, 2016 12:54 AM
>>> *To:* pkix@ietf.org
>>> *Subject:* Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>
>>>
>>> The original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard is to
>>> indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may b=
e
>>> used, in addition to or in place of
>>> the basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. The EKU
>>> filed should be used in the same fashion as the Key Usage Extension was
>>> used.
>>>
>>> Indeed, the EKU field will generally appear only in end entity
>>> certificates. That does not means this field can not appear in CA
>>> certificates. However, if this field appeared in a CA certificate, I
>>> think it should be interpreted as to indicates the purpose for which th=
e
>>> CA key may be used (similar to the case where the crlSign key usage bit
>>> is specified in the Key Usage Extension) rather than as a 'constraint'.
>>>
>>> For example, if some organization define a key purpose OID, say
>>> id-kp-doSomeThing and the key purpose OID appears in a CA certificate,
>>> it should mean that the CA key can be used to do some thing.
>>>
>>> It was unfortunately that some implementations misinterpreted the
>>> meaning of an EKU extension in a CA certificate. In their fashion of
>>> using the EKU extension as a 'constraint', if id-kp-doSomeThing appears
>>> in a CA certificate, it means that the CA key can be used to sign
>>> certificates of which associated subject keys can be used to do some
>>> thing. This obviously twist the original definition of the EKU field.
>>>
>>> The earliest implementation that treated an EKU extension in a CA
>>> certificate as a 'constraint' I had been aware of is Microsoft Crypto
>>> API (CAPI). As a result, certificate management software in Microsoft
>>> Windows Server and Microsoft IE all treated an EKU extension in a CA
>>> certificate as a 'constraint'. Unfortunately, some CA vendors believed
>>> that Microsoft's treating an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a
>>> 'constraint' is a correct interpretation or because they had no choice
>>> but to follow Micorsoft's interpretation because in that time Microsoft
>>> IE dominated the market and they want their certificates to be
>>> compatible with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately that other
>>> browser vendors also followed the wrong interpretation and treated an
>>> EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint'. In the end, that
>>> was why there were many browser vendors and CA vendors voted to add tex=
t
>>> such as "For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically
>>> Constrained,  the certificate MUST include an Extended Key Usage (EKU)
>>> extension specifying all extended key usages that the Subordinate CA
>>> Certificate is authorized to issue certificates for" in the CA/Browser
>>> Forum Baseline Requirements.
>>>
>>> I think it is a bad idea to twist the original definition of the EKU
>>> field. If the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to specify
>>> a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue certificates for, the correct
>>> way is to define a new key purpose OID rather than adopt the existing
>>> PKIX  key purpose OIDs which are defined to be used in end-entity
>>> certificates. For example, it the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU
>>> extension to specify that a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue
>>> TLS/SSL certificates, the correct way is to define an CA/Browser key
>>> purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForServerAuth. It is not correct if w=
e
>>> use the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordinate CA certificate to specify
>>> that the Subordinate CA is authorized to issue TLS/SSL certificates.
>>> According to the the original definition of the EKU field in the X.509
>>> standard, that actually means that the the Subordinate CA's key can be
>>> used for TLS/SSL server authentication.
>>>
>>> Best Regards,
>>> Wen-Cheng Wang
>>>
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: pkix [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto
>>> [koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com]
>>> Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM
>>> To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani
>>> Cc: <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>
>>> Hello sirs,
>>>
>>> I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.
>>> Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation, bu=
t
>>> the user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft
>>> library.
>>> Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.
>>> Even OpenSSL has.
>>> I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.
>>> If so, why RFC does not change the specification?
>>>
>>> As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:
>>> "In general, this extension will appear only in end entity certificates=
."
>>> Can we change this paragraph like:
>>> "If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ..."?
>>> We should think about which is better for the future interoperability, =
I
>>> think.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Carl Wallace [mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com]
>>> Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM
>>> To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>>; Santosh
>>> Chokhani <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com
>>> >>
>>> Cc: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com
>>> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>; <pkix@ietf.org
>>> <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>> <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com
>>> <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. It
>>>> does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow fo=
r
>>> EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely
>>> on folklore to know which implementations do what.
>>>
>>>
>>>> That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation
>>>> libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and
>>>> Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox, an=
d
>>>> Chrome/Opera on Windows.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Peter
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani
>>>> <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>> wrote=
:
>>>>
>>>>> According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak
>>>>> up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of
>>>>> constraint on the certification path mandatory.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the
>>>>> CA.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the
>>>>> path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the
>>>>> extension and path validation engine.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM
>>>>> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com <mailto:
>>>>> koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>
>>>>> Cc:pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a
>>>>> compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?
>>>>> Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of the
>>>>> extension for all cases.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org>> on
>>>>> behalf of
>>>>>
>>>> Koichi Sugimoto
>>>
>>>> <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com
>>>>> >>
>>>>> Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
>>>>> To: "pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:
>>>>> pkix@ietf.org>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hello.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I hope the following definition should be changed.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
>>>>>> certified
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> extension will appear only in end entity certificates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> P9:
>>>>>
>>>>> Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA
>>>>> certificate which uses a
>>>>>
>>>>> combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint
>>>>> settings to limit the scope within which the
>>>>>
>>>>> Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional
>>>>> Subordinate CA Certificates.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> P34:
>>>>>
>>>>> ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity
>>>>> certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
>>>>>
>>>>> (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to
>>>>> further protect relying parties until the
>>>>>
>>>>> use of the extension is consistent between Application Software
>>>>> Suppliers whose software is used by a
>>>>>
>>>>> substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> P38-39:
>>>>>
>>>>> For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically
>>>>> Constrained, the certificate MUST include an
>>>>>
>>>>> Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages
>>>>> that the Subordinate CA Certificate is
>>>>>
>>>>> authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage
>>>>> KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this
>>>>>
>>>>> extension.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the
>>>>> next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.
>>>>>
>>>>> This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of
>>>>> influence when end-entity certificates are
>>>>>
>>>>> unwillingly issued by attacks etc.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Please see below:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>


--=20
Erwann.

--001a1147b3b0ebcce0052b5abf0a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Regarding EKU and path validation, this isn&#39;t a new qu=
estion. See:<div><div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix=
/current/msg06821.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/=
msg06821.html</a></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/pkix/current/msg06803.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/cu=
rrent/msg06803.html</a></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-arch=
ive/web/pkix/current/msg06757.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/p=
kix/current/msg06757.html</a></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mai=
l-archive/web/pkix/current/msg06726.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive=
/web/pkix/current/msg06726.html</a></div></div><div><br></div><div>And some=
 good answers:</div><div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/p=
kix/current/msg06785.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/curre=
nt/msg06785.html</a></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive=
/web/pkix/current/msg06781.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix=
/current/msg06781.html</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>This topic is comin=
g back from the attic :)</div><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2016-02-09 14:52 GMT+01:00 Erwann Abalea <span =
dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:eabalea@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">eaba=
lea@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"ltr">Enfin.<div><br></div><div>That&#39;s exactly what the CertificatePoli=
cies is here for.</div><div><br></div><div>At CABF level, just require that=
 the different OIDs 2.23.140.1.1, 2.23.140.1.2.1, 2.23.140.1.2.2 are found =
in the valid_policy_tree returned by the normalized path validation algorit=
hm when verifying a certificate.</div><div><br></div><div>No need to invent=
 a new extension or change the validation algorithm.</div><div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><div><div class=3D"h5"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2016=
-02-09 11:39 GMT+01:00 Rob Stradling <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:rob.stradling@comodo.com" target=3D"_blank">rob.stradling@comodo.com</a>&=
gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">The Certificate Policies exte=
nsion can be used to restrict &quot;the purposes for which the certificate =
may be used&quot;.=C2=A0 That&#39;s really what &quot;nested EKU&quot; is t=
rying to achieve, isn&#39;t it?<br>
<br>
So I wonder if, rather than define a completely new extension, we could jus=
t use the existing policy extensions: Certificate Policies, Policy Constrai=
nts, Inhibit anyPolicy and Policy Mappings.<br>
<br>
Perhaps it would make sense to (re)use the RFC5280 EKU OIDs as Policy OIDs,=
 and set some rules for when requireExplicitPolicy must be set.<br>
<br>
(BTW, have I just reinvented Microsoft&#39;s &quot;Application Policies&quo=
t; extension? ;-) )<span><br>
<br>
On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:<br>
</span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>
Umm..<br>
<br>
I think we have to provide some solution towards this problem.<br>
<br>
I propose 2 solutions.<br>
<br>
1)Change the definition of EKU<br>
<br></span>
2)Define a new extension and provide a way for transitioning to this new<di=
v><div><br>
scheme.<br>
<br>
If we cannot change the original definition, then, 2) will be a solution.<b=
r>
<br>
Anyway, we need a standard solution to restrict key usages of end-entity<br=
>
certificates.<br>
<br>
For example,<br>
<br>
define an new extension =E2=80=9CkeyConstraints=E2=80=9D.<br>
<br>
id-ce-keyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D=C2=A0 { id-ce xx }<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 KeyConstraintsSyntax ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurpo=
seId<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 KeyPurposeId ::=3D OBJECT IDENTIFIER<br>
<br>
The format is similar to extendedKeyUsages.<br>
<br>
This extension may appear in CA certificates.<br>
<br>
This extension will work as nested EKU scheme as follows.<br>
<br>
Let {C(1),C(2),=E2=80=A6,C(n)} be a set of certificate in certification pat=
h,<br>
where =E2=80=98C(1)=E2=80=99 means the trust anchor and =E2=80=98C(n)=E2=80=
=99 means the end-entity<br>
certificate.<br>
<br>
Then,<br>
<br>
C(i) means the i-th certificate in the certification path.<br>
<br>
K(i) means the set of KeyPurposeId in the certificate C(i), especially,<br>
K(n) means existing EKU set in the end-entity certificate.<br>
<br>
CALCULATE APPLICABLE EKU:<br>
<br>
X::=3D{}<br>
<br>
For i::=3D2 to n do {<br>
<br>
If C(i) has keyConstraints extension and all C(j) (j&lt;i) does not have<br=
>
keyConstraints extension, then, X::=3DK(i).<br>
<br>
X::=3DX AND K(i)<br>
<br>
}<br>
<br>
Finally we can calculate the applicable EKU as =E2=80=9CX=E2=80=9D.<br>
<br>
How do you think of this?<br>
<br>
This notation has nothing to do with CABF. I am neutral.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
<br></div></div>
*From:*pkix [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] *On Behalf Of *=E7=8E=8B=E6=96=87=E6=AD=A3<b=
r>
*Sent:* Sunday, February 7, 2016 12:54 AM<br>
*To:* <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><=
br>
*Subject:* Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<div><div><br>
<br>
The original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard is to<br>
indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may be<br=
>
used, in addition to or in place of<br>
the basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. The EKU<br>
filed should be used in the same fashion as the Key Usage Extension was<br>
used.<br>
<br>
Indeed, the EKU field will generally appear only in end entity<br>
certificates. That does not means this field can not appear in CA<br>
certificates. However, if this field appeared in a CA certificate, I<br>
think it should be interpreted as to indicates the purpose for which the<br=
>
CA key may be used (similar to the case where the crlSign key usage bit<br>
is specified in the Key Usage Extension) rather than as a &#39;constraint&#=
39;.<br>
<br>
For example, if some organization define a key purpose OID, say<br>
id-kp-doSomeThing and the key purpose OID appears in a CA certificate,<br>
it should mean that the CA key can be used to do some thing.<br>
<br>
It was unfortunately that some implementations misinterpreted the<br>
meaning of an EKU extension in a CA certificate. In their fashion of<br>
using the EKU extension as a &#39;constraint&#39;, if id-kp-doSomeThing app=
ears<br>
in a CA certificate, it means that the CA key can be used to sign<br>
certificates of which associated subject keys can be used to do some<br>
thing. This obviously twist the original definition of the EKU field.<br>
<br>
The earliest implementation that treated an EKU extension in a CA<br>
certificate as a &#39;constraint&#39; I had been aware of is Microsoft Cryp=
to<br>
API (CAPI). As a result, certificate management software in Microsoft<br>
Windows Server and Microsoft IE all treated an EKU extension in a CA<br>
certificate as a &#39;constraint&#39;. Unfortunately, some CA vendors belie=
ved<br>
that Microsoft&#39;s treating an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a<br>
&#39;constraint&#39; is a correct interpretation or because they had no cho=
ice<br>
but to follow Micorsoft&#39;s interpretation because in that time Microsoft=
<br>
IE dominated the market and they want their certificates to be<br>
compatible with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately that other<br>
browser vendors also followed the wrong interpretation and treated an<br>
EKU extension in a CA certificate as a &#39;constraint&#39;. In the end, th=
at<br>
was why there were many browser vendors and CA vendors voted to add text<br=
>
such as &quot;For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically=
<br>
Constrained,=C2=A0 the certificate MUST include an Extended Key Usage (EKU)=
<br>
extension specifying all extended key usages that the Subordinate CA<br>
Certificate is authorized to issue certificates for&quot; in the CA/Browser=
<br>
Forum Baseline Requirements.<br>
<br>
I think it is a bad idea to twist the original definition of the EKU<br>
field. If the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to specify<br>
a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue certificates for, the correct<br>
way is to define a new key purpose OID rather than adopt the existing<br>
PKIX=C2=A0 key purpose OIDs which are defined to be used in end-entity<br>
certificates. For example, it the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU<br>
extension to specify that a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue<br>
TLS/SSL certificates, the correct way is to define an CA/Browser key<br>
purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForServerAuth. It is not correct if we<br=
>
use the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordinate CA certificate to specify<br>
that the Subordinate CA is authorized to issue TLS/SSL certificates.<br>
According to the the original definition of the EKU field in the X.509<br>
standard, that actually means that the the Subordinate CA&#39;s key can be<=
br>
used for TLS/SSL server authentication.<br>
<br>
Best Regards,<br>
Wen-Cheng Wang<br>
<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: pkix [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix=
-bounces@ietf.org</a>] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto<br>
[<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" target=3D"_blank">koichi=
.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM<br>
To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani<br></div></div>
Cc: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a=
> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt;&gt;<span><br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
Hello sirs,<br>
<br>
I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.<br>
Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation, but<br=
>
the user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft library.<=
br>
Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.<br>
Even OpenSSL has.<br>
I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.<br>
If so, why RFC does not change the specification?<br>
<br>
As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:<br>
&quot;In general, this extension will appear only in end entity certificate=
s.&quot;<br>
Can we change this paragraph like:<br>
&quot;If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ...&quot;?<br=
>
We should think about which is better for the future interoperability, I<br=
>
think.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Carl Wallace [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">carl@redhoundsoftware.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM<br></span><span>
To: Peter Bowen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">=
pzbowen@gmail.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;&gt;; Santosh<br>
Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank=
">santosh.chokhani@gmail.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokh=
ani@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">santosh.chokhani@gmail.com</a>&gt;&gt;<br>
Cc: Koichi Sugimoto &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a><br></span><span>
&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a>&gt;&gt;; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@=
ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org=
</a>&gt;&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ie=
tf.org</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pk=
ix@ietf.org</a>&gt;&gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
<br>
On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, &quot;Peter Bowen&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@=
gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a><br></span><span>
&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">pzbowen@g=
mail.com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. It<br>
does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow for<br=
>
EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will rely<br>
on folklore to know which implementations do what.<br>
<br>
</span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>
<br>
That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation<br>
libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and<br>
Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox, and<br>
Chrome/Opera on Windows.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Peter<br>
<br>
On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani<br></span>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">santosh=
.chokhani@gmail.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail=
.com" target=3D"_blank">santosh.chokhani@gmail.com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>
According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak<br>
up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of<br>
constraint on the certification path mandatory.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on the<br>
CA.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the<br>
path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the<br>
extension and path validation engine.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
From: pkix [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blan=
k">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace<br>
Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM<br></span>
To: Koichi Sugimoto &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"m=
ailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" target=3D"_blank">koichi.sugimoto@glo=
balsign.com</a>&gt;&gt;<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cc%3Apkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cc:pkix@ietf.org</a=
> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt;<span><br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a<br>
compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?<br>
Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of the<br>
extension for all cases.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br></span>
From: pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">p=
kix-bounces@ietf.org</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org=
" target=3D"_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt;&gt; on behalf of<br>
</blockquote></blockquote>
Koichi Sugimoto<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com" target=3D"_blank">koi=
chi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:koichi.sugimot=
o@globalsign.com" target=3D"_blank">koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com</a>&gt;&=
gt;<span><br>
Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM<br></span>
To: &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org<=
/a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf=
.org</a>&gt;&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">p=
kix@ietf.org</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;&gt;<div><br>
Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Hello.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
I hope the following definition should be changed.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the<br>
certified<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
extension will appear only in end entity certificates.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
P9:<br>
<br>
Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA<br>
certificate which uses a<br>
<br>
combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint<br>
settings to limit the scope within which the<br>
<br>
Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional<br>
Subordinate CA Certificates.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
P34:<br>
<br>
** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity<br>
certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280<br>
<br>
(4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to<br>
further protect relying parties until the<br>
<br>
use of the extension is consistent between Application Software<br>
Suppliers whose software is used by a<br>
<br>
substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
P38-39:<br>
<br>
For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically<br>
Constrained, the certificate MUST include an<br>
<br>
Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages<br>
that the Subordinate CA Certificate is<br>
<br>
authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage<br>
KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this<br>
<br>
extension.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the<br>
next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.<br>
<br>
This notation is very important because we can restrict the range of<br>
influence when end-entity certificates are<br>
<br>
unwillingly issued by attacks etc.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Please see below:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.=
2.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://cabforum.org/wp-content=
/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Koichi Sugimoto.<br>
<br><br></div></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></div></d=
iv></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div>

--001a1147b3b0ebcce0052b5abf0a--


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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Hiya,

On 09/02/16 15:52, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> I think if there's work to be done it's work that would have to revive S/MIME. 

Just because we have had pkix and smime WGs in the past does not mean
that we need to organise that way in future. Note that I'm not arguing
against the main conclusion above, but only against the "would have to."

Cheers,
S.

PS: FWIW - if I ruled the world the only new e2e email security WG I'd
want would be the grand unification (or replacement) of PGP/SMIME WG.
But I don't rule the world, so that's not the plan :-)



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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 3:00 PM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
> Hiya,
>
> On 09/02/16 15:52, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
>> I think if there's work to be done it's work that would have to revive S/MIME.
>
> Just because we have had pkix and smime WGs in the past does not mean
> that we need to organise that way in future. Note that I'm not arguing
> against the main conclusion above, but only against the "would have to."

I think one group looking at both would be ideal. Most of the work
that hasn't been done already tends to be of the 'making X work with
Y' type.

The biggest problem in S/MIME right now is how do you tell potential
senders what they should do. And your communication channel is
limited to the contents of the cert.

Cryptographic protocols need a maintenance WG. But there isn't really
enough work for two full WGs and each WG is load on the secretariat,
chairs, everything. So joining the two seems to make perfect sense to
me. On top of that, if it is one WG that cuts the risk of a meeting
clash during IETFs.

The technical work Russ has proposed is needed for S/MIME is probably
not enough for a full WG either. But it is WG type work.


> PS: FWIW - if I ruled the world the only new e2e email security WG I'd
> want would be the grand unification (or replacement) of PGP/SMIME WG.
> But I don't rule the world, so that's not the plan :-)

Accepted but noting your weasel word 'only'.

Since I am working on precisely that problem, I know that any
deployment will have to be phased and have a transition plan for
OpenPGP and for S/MIME. And it will have to meet all the use cases of
both. So having WGs that can interact with the successor protocol is a
positive as far as I am concerned.


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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From nobody Tue Feb  9 15:39:08 2016
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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It is very unfortunate that the CABF has chosen to change the semantics =
of the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension.  This extension was never =
intended to impact path validation.

If we were being asked how a root CA could impose EKU constraints on =
subordinates, I would have suggested a very different mechanism.  We =
have name constraints and policy constraints that offer design patterns.

So, how do we cope with the existing implementations and maximize =
interoperability?

Russ

On Feb 9, 2016, at 6:07 AM, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:

> Hello Rob,
>=20
> Unfortunately CABF Baseline Requirements already specified this =
"nested EKU" scheme.
> And also several implementations support nested EKU..
>=20
> How can we cope with that?
>=20
>=20
> Regards,
> Koichi Sugimoto.
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Rob Stradling [mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com]=20
> Sent: Tuesday, February 9, 2016 7:40 PM
> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>; =E7=8E=8B=E6=96=87=
=E6=AD=A3 <wcwang@cht.com.tw>; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>=20
> The Certificate Policies extension can be used to restrict "the =
purposes for which the certificate may be used".  That's really what =
"nested EKU"=20
> is trying to achieve, isn't it?
>=20
> So I wonder if, rather than define a completely new extension, we =
could just use the existing policy extensions: Certificate Policies, =
Policy Constraints, Inhibit anyPolicy and Policy Mappings.
>=20
> Perhaps it would make sense to (re)use the RFC5280 EKU OIDs as Policy =
OIDs, and set some rules for when requireExplicitPolicy must be set.
>=20
> (BTW, have I just reinvented Microsoft's "Application Policies"=20
> extension? ;-) )
>=20
> On 09/02/16 09:10, Koichi Sugimoto wrote:
>> Umm..
>>=20
>> I think we have to provide some solution towards this problem.
>>=20
>> I propose 2 solutions.
>>=20
>> 1)Change the definition of EKU
>>=20
>> 2)Define a new extension and provide a way for transitioning to this=20=

>> new scheme.
>>=20
>> If we cannot change the original definition, then, 2) will be a =
solution.
>>=20
>> Anyway, we need a standard solution to restrict key usages of=20
>> end-entity certificates.
>>=20
>> For example,
>>=20
>> define an new extension =E2=80=9CkeyConstraints=E2=80=9D.
>>=20
>> id-ce-keyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D  { id-ce xx }
>>=20
>>    KeyConstraintsSyntax ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
>>=20
>>    KeyPurposeId ::=3D OBJECT IDENTIFIER
>>=20
>> The format is similar to extendedKeyUsages.
>>=20
>> This extension may appear in CA certificates.
>>=20
>> This extension will work as nested EKU scheme as follows.
>>=20
>> Let {C(1),C(2),=E2=80=A6,C(n)} be a set of certificate in =
certification path,=20
>> where =E2=80=98C(1)=E2=80=99 means the trust anchor and =E2=80=98C(n)=E2=
=80=99 means the end-entity=20
>> certificate.
>>=20
>> Then,
>>=20
>> C(i) means the i-th certificate in the certification path.
>>=20
>> K(i) means the set of KeyPurposeId in the certificate C(i),=20
>> especially,
>> K(n) means existing EKU set in the end-entity certificate.
>>=20
>> CALCULATE APPLICABLE EKU:
>>=20
>> X::=3D{}
>>=20
>> For i::=3D2 to n do {
>>=20
>> If C(i) has keyConstraints extension and all C(j) (j<i) does not have=20=

>> keyConstraints extension, then, X::=3DK(i).
>>=20
>> X::=3DX AND K(i)
>>=20
>> }
>>=20
>> Finally we can calculate the applicable EKU as =E2=80=9CX=E2=80=9D.
>>=20
>> How do you think of this?
>>=20
>> This notation has nothing to do with CABF. I am neutral.
>>=20
>> Regards,
>>=20
>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>=20
>> *From:*pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *=E7=8E=8B=E6=96=
=87=E6=AD=A3
>> *Sent:* Sunday, February 7, 2016 12:54 AM
>> *To:* pkix@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>=20
>> The original definition of the EKU field in the X.509 standard is to=20=

>> indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may=20=

>> be used, in addition to or in place of the basic purposes indicated =
in=20
>> the key usage extension field. The EKU filed should be used in the=20
>> same fashion as the Key Usage Extension was used.
>>=20
>> Indeed, the EKU field will generally appear only in end entity=20
>> certificates. That does not means this field can not appear in CA=20
>> certificates. However, if this field appeared in a CA certificate, I=20=

>> think it should be interpreted as to indicates the purpose for which=20=

>> the CA key may be used (similar to the case where the crlSign key=20
>> usage bit is specified in the Key Usage Extension) rather than as a =
'constraint'.
>>=20
>> For example, if some organization define a key purpose OID, say=20
>> id-kp-doSomeThing and the key purpose OID appears in a CA =
certificate,=20
>> it should mean that the CA key can be used to do some thing.
>>=20
>> It was unfortunately that some implementations misinterpreted the=20
>> meaning of an EKU extension in a CA certificate. In their fashion of=20=

>> using the EKU extension as a 'constraint', if id-kp-doSomeThing=20
>> appears in a CA certificate, it means that the CA key can be used to=20=

>> sign certificates of which associated subject keys can be used to do=20=

>> some thing. This obviously twist the original definition of the EKU =
field.
>>=20
>> The earliest implementation that treated an EKU extension in a CA=20
>> certificate as a 'constraint' I had been aware of is Microsoft Crypto=20=

>> API (CAPI). As a result, certificate management software in Microsoft=20=

>> Windows Server and Microsoft IE all treated an EKU extension in a CA=20=

>> certificate as a 'constraint'. Unfortunately, some CA vendors =
believed=20
>> that Microsoft's treating an EKU extension in a CA certificate as a=20=

>> 'constraint' is a correct interpretation or because they had no =
choice=20
>> but to follow Micorsoft's interpretation because in that time=20
>> Microsoft IE dominated the market and they want their certificates to=20=

>> be compatible with Microsoft IE. It was even unfortunately that other=20=

>> browser vendors also followed the wrong interpretation and treated an=20=

>> EKU extension in a CA certificate as a 'constraint'. In the end, that=20=

>> was why there were many browser vendors and CA vendors voted to add=20=

>> text such as "For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered=20
>> Technically Constrained,  the certificate MUST include an Extended =
Key=20
>> Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key usages that the=20
>> Subordinate CA Certificate is authorized to issue certificates for" =
in=20
>> the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.
>>=20
>> I think it is a bad idea to twist the original definition of the EKU=20=

>> field. If the CA/Browser Forum want to use the EKU extension to=20
>> specify a Subordinate CA is authorized to issue certificates for, the=20=

>> correct way is to define a new key purpose OID rather than adopt the=20=

>> existing PKIX  key purpose OIDs which are defined to be used in=20
>> end-entity certificates. For example, it the CA/Browser Forum want to=20=

>> use the EKU extension to specify that a Subordinate CA is authorized=20=

>> to issue TLS/SSL certificates, the correct way is to define an=20
>> CA/Browser key purse OID, say id-cabf-kp-signCertForServerAuth. It is=20=

>> not correct if we use the id-kp-serverAuth OID in a Subordinate CA=20
>> certificate to specify that the Subordinate CA is authorized to issue =
TLS/SSL certificates.
>> According to the the original definition of the EKU field in the =
X.509=20
>> standard, that actually means that the the Subordinate CA's key can =
be=20
>> used for TLS/SSL server authentication.
>>=20
>> Best Regards,
>> Wen-Cheng Wang
>>=20
>> ________________________________________
>> From: pkix [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Koichi Sugimoto=20
>> [koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com]
>> Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:02 PM
>> To: Carl Wallace; Peter Bowen; Santosh Chokhani
>> Cc: <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>=20
>> Hello sirs,
>>=20
>> I have been facing this interoperability problem for many years.
>> Around 10 years ago, I found BIG-IP had this kind of implementation,=20=

>> but the user support said this implementation was come from Microsoft =
library.
>> Then, now, all major browsers have this implementation.
>> Even OpenSSL has.
>> I think this implementation is almost de facto standard.
>> If so, why RFC does not change the specification?
>>=20
>> As for intermediate CA certificates, RFC 5280 says:
>> "In general, this extension will appear only in end entity =
certificates."
>> Can we change this paragraph like:
>> "If this extension appears in intermediate certificates, ..."?
>> We should think about which is better for the future =
interoperability,=20
>> I think.
>>=20
>> Regards,
>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Carl Wallace [mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com]
>> Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 3:00 AM
>> To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>>;=20
>> Santosh Chokhani <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com=20
>> <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>>
>> Cc: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com=20
>> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>; <pkix@ietf.org=20
>> <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>> <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 2/4/16, 12:17 PM, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com=20
>> <mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>=20
>>> The CA/Browser Forum sets standards for Certification Authorities. =
It=20
>>> does not set requirements on implementers of path validation.
>>=20
>> Does this mean there would be no issue with defining a flag to allow=20=

>> for EKU semantics to be selected, since we now have two? Else we will=20=

>> rely on folklore to know which implementations do what.
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> That being said, many current web browsers and OS path validation=20
>>> libraries do enforce such constraints. This includes Microsoft and=20=

>>> Mozilla libraries, which underpin Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox,=20=

>>> and Chrome/Opera on Windows.
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>> Peter
>>>=20
>>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Santosh Chokhani=20
>>> <santosh.chokhani@gmail.com <mailto:santosh.chokhani@gmail.com>> =
wrote:
>>>> According the authors of the CABF criteria (I hope they will speak=20=

>>>> up), the intent of the language is not to make the enforcement of=20=

>>>> constraint on the certification path mandatory.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> They simply want the issuer to indicate limitations it imposes on=20=

>>>> the CA.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> I am generally sympathetic to enforcement of the constraint on the=20=

>>>> path, however this is a significant change to the semantics of the=20=

>>>> extension and path validation engine.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
>>>> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:14 AM
>>>> To: Koichi Sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com=20
>>>> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>
>>>> Cc:pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> in the CAB Forum concept, if there any mechanism to indicate to a=20=

>>>> compliant validation engine that 5280 EKU semantics ought be used?
>>>> Allowing a toggle probably beats simply changing the semantics of =
the=20
>>>> extension for all cases.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> From: pkix <pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org>> =
on=20
>>>> behalf of
>> Koichi Sugimoto
>>>> <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com=20
>>>> <mailto:koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com>>
>>>> Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:08 AM
>>>> To: "pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org=20
>>>> <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>>> Subject: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Hello.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> I hope the following definition should be changed.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>> 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>> This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the=20
>>>>> certified
>>>>=20
>>>>> public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
>>>>=20
>>>>> purposes indicated in the key usage extension. In general, this
>>>>=20
>>>>> extension will appear only in end entity certificates.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Now CABF (CA Browser Forum) specified Extended Key Usage as:
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> P9:
>>>>=20
>>>> Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate =
CA=20
>>>> certificate which uses a
>>>>=20
>>>> combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint=20
>>>> settings to limit the scope within which the
>>>>=20
>>>> Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional=20
>>>> Subordinate CA Certificates.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> P34:
>>>>=20
>>>> ** Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity=20=

>>>> certificates (as highlighted in RFC 5280
>>>>=20
>>>> (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY include the extension to=20=

>>>> further protect relying parties until the
>>>>=20
>>>> use of the extension is consistent between Application Software=20
>>>> Suppliers whose software is used by a
>>>>=20
>>>> substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> P38-39:
>>>>=20
>>>> For a Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered Technically=20
>>>> Constrained, the certificate MUST include an
>>>>=20
>>>> Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension specifying all extended key=20
>>>> usages that the Subordinate CA Certificate is
>>>>=20
>>>> authorized to issue certificates for. The anyExtendedKeyUsage=20
>>>> KeyPurposeId MUST NOT appear within this
>>>>=20
>>>> extension.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Major browsers already support this specification, therefore, the=20=

>>>> next RFC should reflect this notation, I think.
>>>>=20
>>>> This notation is very important because we can restrict the range =
of=20
>>>> influence when end-entity certificates are
>>>>=20
>>>> unwillingly issued by attacks etc.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Please see below:
>>>>=20
>>>> =
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.3.2.pdf
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Regards,
>>>>=20
>>>> Koichi Sugimoto.
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list=20=

>>>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> *
>>=20
>> =
**=E6=9C=AC=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=B6=E5=8F=AF=E8=83=BD=E5=8C=85=E5=90=AB=E4=B8=AD=
=E8=8F=AF=E9=9B=BB=E4=BF=A1=E8=82=A1=E4=BB=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=99=90=E5=85=AC=E5=
=8F=B8=E6=A9=9F=E5=AF=86=E8=B3=87=E8=A8=8A**,**=E9=9D=9E=E6=8C=87=E5=AE=9A=
=E4=B9=8B=E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E8=80=85**,**=E8=AB=8B=E5=8B=BF
>> =E8=92=90=E9=9B=86=E3=80=81=E8=99=95=E7=90=86=E6=88=96=E5=88=A9=E7=94=A8=
=E6=9C=AC=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=B6=E5=85=A7=E5=AE=B9**,**=E4=B8=A6=E8=AB=8B=E9=8A=
=B7=E6=AF=80=E6=AD=A4=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=B6**. =
**=E5=A6=82=E7=82=BA=E6=8C=87=E5=AE=9A=E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E8=80=85**,**=E6=87=
=89
>> =
=E7=A2=BA=E5=AF=A6=E4=BF=9D=E8=AD=B7=E9=83=B5=E4=BB=B6=E4=B8=AD=E6=9C=AC=E5=
=85=AC=E5=8F=B8=E4=B9=8B=E7=87=9F=E6=A5=AD=E6=A9=9F=E5=AF=86=E5=8F=8A=E5=80=
=8B=E4=BA=BA=E8=B3=87=E6=96=99**,**=E4=B8=8D=E5=BE=97=E4=BB=BB=E6=84=8F=E5=
=82=B3=E4=BD=88=E6=88=96=E6=8F=AD=E9=9C=B2**,**=E4=B8=A6=E6=87=89
>> =
=E8=87=AA=E8=A1=8C=E7=A2=BA=E8=AA=8D=E6=9C=AC=E9=83=B5=E4=BB=B6=E4=B9=8B=E9=
=99=84=E6=AA=94=E8=88=87=E8=B6=85=E9=80=A3=E7=B5=90=E4=B9=8B=E5=AE=89=E5=85=
=A8=E6=80=A7**,**=E4=BB=A5=E5=85=B1=E5=90=8C=E5=96=84=E7=9B=A1=E8=B3=87=E8=
=A8=8A=E5=AE=89=E5=85=A8=E8=88=87=E5=80=8B=E8=B3=87=E4=BF=9D=E8=AD=B7=E8=B2=
=AC
>> =E4=BB=BB**.
>> Please be advised that this email message (including any attachments)=20=

>> contains confidential information and may be legally privileged. If=20=

>> you are not the intended recipient, please destroy this message and=20=

>> all attachments from your system and do not further collect, process,=20=

>> or use them. Chunghwa Telecom and all its subsidiaries and associated=20=

>> companies shall not be liable for the improper or incomplete=20
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>> delay in its receipt or damage to your system. If you are the =
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>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>=20
>=20
> --
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
> Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
> www.comodo.com
>=20
> COMODO CA Limited, Registered in England No. 04058690 Registered =
Office:
>   3rd Floor, 26 Office Village, Exchange Quay,
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> This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and =
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From nobody Tue Feb  9 18:00:57 2016
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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Russ,

On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 3:38 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> It is very unfortunate that the CABF has chosen to change the semantics of the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension.  This extension was never intended to impact path validation.

This timeline is a little wrong.  The CABF only documented this
semantic after all the browsers had already set it.  I believe that
Microsoft's implementation has followed the EKU-as-constraint semantic
since ca. 2001, Mozilla had it as part of their policy since 2011, and
OpenSSL implemented EKU-as-constraint in 1999.  I don't have dates for
Apple, but I believe they implement the same semantic.

> If we were being asked how a root CA could impose EKU constraints on subordinates, I would have suggested a very different mechanism.  We have name constraints and policy constraints that offer design patterns.
>
> So, how do we cope with the existing implementations and maximize interoperability?

This is the key question.  We know there is reliance on the
EKU-as-constraint semantic.  Is there reliance on the
EKU-as-CA-key-purpose semantic?

Thanks,
Peter


From nobody Tue Feb  9 18:12:25 2016
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EKU for intermediate certificates
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On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 6:00 PM, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:
> Russ,
>
> On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 3:38 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>> It is very unfortunate that the CABF has chosen to change the semantics of the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension.  This extension was never intended to impact path validation.
>
> This timeline is a little wrong.  The CABF only documented this
> semantic after all the browsers had already set it.  I believe that
> Microsoft's implementation has followed the EKU-as-constraint semantic
> since ca. 2001, Mozilla had it as part of their policy since 2011, and
> OpenSSL implemented EKU-as-constraint in 1999.  I don't have dates for
> Apple, but I believe they implement the same semantic.

And now I realize that I missed Erwann's excellent email where he
points out that both Microsoft and Netscape had the EKU-as-constraint
implemented by November 2000.  I would posit that, more than 15 years
later, maybe it is time to document what has clearly been
independently implemented in an inter-operable manner many times.

>> If we were being asked how a root CA could impose EKU constraints on subordinates, I would have suggested a very different mechanism.  We have name constraints and policy constraints that offer design patterns.
>>
>> So, how do we cope with the existing implementations and maximize interoperability?
>
> This is the key question.  We know there is reliance on the
> EKU-as-constraint semantic.  Is there reliance on the
> EKU-as-CA-key-purpose semantic?
>
> Thanks,
> Peter


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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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--94eb2c076a6af5c016052b6bcc21
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On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> On 09/02/16 15:52, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> > I think if there's work to be done it's work that would have to revive
> S/MIME.
>
> Just because we have had pkix and smime WGs in the past does not mean
> that we need to organise that way in future. Note that I'm not arguing
> against the main conclusion above, but only against the "would have to."
>

Just wanted to put in an opinion that we (as in the co-authors of
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt) think there's work to
be done with S/MIME as well and a +1 for reviving a WG.  It could help
solve issues like the previously mentioned key discovery problem, header
privacy and maintenance updates.  We're less certain of what that WG
structure ought to be but certainly supportive either way.

-Wei


>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
> PS: FWIW - if I ruled the world the only new e2e email security WG I'd
> want would be the grand unification (or replacement) of PGP/SMIME WG.
> But I don't rule the world, so that's not the plan :-)
>
>
>

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Stephen Farrell <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<span class="gmail-"><br>
On 09/02/16 15:52, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:<br>
&gt; I think if there&#39;s work to be done it&#39;s work that would have to revive S/MIME.<br>
<br>
</span>Just because we have had pkix and smime WGs in the past does not mean<br>
that we need to organise that way in future. Note that I&#39;m not arguing<br>
against the main conclusion above, but only against the &quot;would have to.&quot;<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Just wanted to put in an opinion that we (as in the co-authors of <a href="http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lbaudoin-iemax-02.txt" style="font-size:12.8px">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-l<wbr>baudoin-iemax-02.txt</a>) think there&#39;s work to be done with S/MIME as well and a +1 for reviving a WG.  It could help solve issues like the previously mentioned key discovery problem, header privacy and maintenance updates.  We&#39;re less certain of what that WG structure ought to be but certainly supportive either way.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
PS: FWIW - if I ruled the world the only new e2e email security WG I&#39;d<br>
want would be the grand unification (or replacement) of PGP/SMIME WG.<br>
But I don&#39;t rule the world, so that&#39;s not the plan :-)<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c076a6af5c016052b6bcc21--


From nobody Wed Feb 10 07:47:05 2016
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From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Subject: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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I don't think using a signed attribute in the CMS is a good idea for two 
reasons:

1) The matching rules would need to be based on the host domain's rules 
(e.g., does it consider Example1@... and example1@... to refer to the 
same mailbox). It is not the sender's MUA that matters.

2) If a host domain treats the local part as case sensitive (e.g., 
Example1 and example1 refer to different mailboxes), it shouldn't be 
possible for the sender to get the recipient to perform a case 
insensitive match.

So, it seems to me that if an attribute is to be created to include in 
an email to indicate to the recipient the rules the sender's domain's 
name matching semantics, it should be an attribute that is created and 
signed by the domain, not the individual sender.

Could DKIM be used for this?

Dave

On 02/09/2016 10:52 AM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
>> Alright.  I think we'll agree that this part of the conversation is starting to
>> rathole (though I very much appreciate the anecdotes you've provided
>> above).  I just was trying to point out an area of potential work for a working
>> group with regards to letter casing and as pointed out later '+' and '-' suffixes
>> in email SAN causing RFC5280 validation problems.  It sounds like I'm just one
>> of many that have asked about this.
> I think if there's work to be done it's work that would have to revive S/MIME.  For example, an S/MIME signature could flag name matching semantics, e.g. by adding a new attribute BOOLEAN for case-sensitivity and including it in SignerInfo as a signed attribute in CMS, along with a processing spec in Cert Handling.
>
> Nothing in that touches a cert.
>
> -- T
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>


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To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
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From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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On 2/10/16 4:46 PM, David A. Cooper wrote:
>
> Could DKIM be used for this?

Are you proposing that local parts go into the DNS or that DNS be used
as a signaling mechanism as to whether local parts are case sensitive?

Eliot


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To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 11:35:40 -0500
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">No. The following appeared in the body
      of the email that you just sent:<br>
      <blockquote><tt>DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256;
          c=relaxed/simple;</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt>  d=cisco.com; <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:i=@cisco.com">i=@cisco.com</a>; l=1169; q=dns/txt;
          s=iport;</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt>  t=1455120414; x=1456330014;</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt>  h=subject:to:references:cc:from:message-id:date:</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt>   mime-version:in-reply-to;</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt>  bh=ek/ye425aJM8CS9AGNRcr750NuBltwGL4xXur0BHO7U=;</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt> 
          b=GQWh7w1KuT0aK18aTnJIwNOfdpi9IcqrKs7reiA0y4UJQ7dLfRQwb19X</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt>  
          WX/qctUW2HAF081jJzJYH6H9J44JrcR6CpYhukLiBcM+ndYxbgKHZZgsX</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt>  
          blg2bVMAkoNMF/RK/OGYKRmXCrk7LLP2DimVWXmbeZtpcGxjUafaxsXXD</tt><tt><br>
        </tt><tt>   U=;</tt><br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      I not a DKIM expert, but my guess is that the "h=..." field is
      indicating that the above signature covers the subject, to,
      references, cc, from, message-id, data, mime-version, and
      in-reply-to fields in the email's header.<br>
      <br>
      I was just wondering whether a new field could be added to the
      email headers that specifies the mail server's email address
      matching rules, and have this header be covered by the DKIM
      signature.<br>
      <br>
      As I understand it, the public key needed to verify the signature
      above is found in DNS, but I wasn't suggesting adding anything new
      to DNS, just to the headers of email messages.<br>
      <br>
      Dave<br>
      <br>
      On 02/10/2016 11:06 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:56BB601B.2090100@cisco.com" type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">On 2/10/16 4:46 PM, David A. Cooper wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">Could DKIM be used for this?
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">Are you proposing that local parts go into the DNS or that DNS be used
as a signaling mechanism as to whether local parts are case sensitive?

Eliot

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 02/10/2016 10:46 AM, David A. Cooper
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:56BB5B52.2050209@nist.gov" type="cite">I don't
      think using a signed attribute in the CMS is a good idea for two
      reasons: <br>
      <br>
      1) The matching rules would need to be based on the host domain's
      rules (e.g., does it consider Example1@... and example1@... to
      refer to the same mailbox). It is not the sender's MUA that
      matters. <br>
      <br>
      2) If a host domain treats the local part as case sensitive (e.g.,
      Example1 and example1 refer to different mailboxes), it shouldn't
      be possible for the sender to get the recipient to perform a case
      insensitive match. <br>
      <br>
      So, it seems to me that if an attribute is to be created to
      include in an email to indicate to the recipient the rules the
      sender's domain's name matching semantics, it should be an
      attribute that is created and signed by the domain, not the
      individual sender. <br>
      <br>
      Could DKIM be used for this? <br>
      <br>
      Dave <br>
      <br>
      On 02/09/2016 10:52 AM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote: <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">Alright.  I think we'll agree that this
          part of the conversation is starting to
          <br>
          rathole (though I very much appreciate the anecdotes you've
          provided
          <br>
          above).  I just was trying to point out an area of potential
          work for a working
          <br>
          group with regards to letter casing and as pointed out later
          '+' and '-' suffixes
          <br>
          in email SAN causing RFC5280 validation problems.  It sounds
          like I'm just one
          <br>
          of many that have asked about this.
          <br>
        </blockquote>
        I think if there's work to be done it's work that would have to
        revive S/MIME.  For example, an S/MIME signature could flag name
        matching semantics, e.g. by adding a new attribute BOOLEAN for
        case-sensitivity and including it in SignerInfo as a signed
        attribute in CMS, along with a processing spec in Cert Handling.
        <br>
        <br>
        Nothing in that touches a cert.
        <br>
        <br>
        -- T
        <br>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>


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To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
References: <56B48DED.5080202@cs.tcd.ie> <CAAFsWK2czHNii6xS-Lh86y3cz6NGvUvnCdmg4hEMMYMHgvP+fg@mail.gmail.com> <CAK6vND86rUCjjgBo4TY1SxFjO9zP+MkzjUvkq+cU0anJ+V5XCQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAAFsWK1e+DAX-vU1nOHNSOzqJoS5xbxUgj33L-RRuLqach7KJA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09200956B7904ED36ADA415FAED50@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3LhGR2TKP76RkODJWKJOqgk1NuQAChotxJ7KZFzN9uWQ@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB0920DA200EF775BE1DCB078DAED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3QO2XcWxgqpoWKGhZATVoqbQ76wp2xqdTRPFx+0YutgA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09206DE87A94BEBC353E8D69AED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <56BB5B52.2050209@nist.gov> <56BB601B.2090100@cisco.com> <56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov>
From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 18:16:17 +0100
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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Hi David,

On 2/10/16 5:35 PM, David A. Cooper wrote:
> No. The following appeared in the body of the email that you just sent:=

>
>     DKIM-Signature: v=3D1; a=3Drsa-sha256; c=3Drelaxed/simple;
>       d=3Dcisco.com; i=3D@cisco.com; l=3D1169; q=3Ddns/txt; s=3Diport;
>       t=3D1455120414; x=3D1456330014;
>       h=3Dsubject:to:references:cc:from:message-id:date:
>        mime-version:in-reply-to;
>       bh=3Dek/ye425aJM8CS9AGNRcr750NuBltwGL4xXur0BHO7U=3D;
>       b=3DGQWh7w1KuT0aK18aTnJIwNOfdpi9IcqrKs7reiA0y4UJQ7dLfRQwb19X
>        WX/qctUW2HAF081jJzJYH6H9J44JrcR6CpYhukLiBcM+ndYxbgKHZZgsX
>        blg2bVMAkoNMF/RK/OGYKRmXCrk7LLP2DimVWXmbeZtpcGxjUafaxsXXD
>        U=3D;
>
>
> I not a DKIM expert, but my guess is that the "h=3D..." field is
> indicating that the above signature covers the subject, to,
> references, cc, from, message-id, data, mime-version, and in-reply-to
> fields in the email's header.

Correct.
>
> I was just wondering whether a new field could be added to the email
> headers that specifies the mail server's email address matching rules,
> and have this header be covered by the DKIM signature.

Ah!  The only issue is that a DKIM signature is that of the domain owner
"e.g., cisco.com" whereas the certificate is bound to an individual.=20
Thus the trust models do not perfectly align.  And so one has to look at
whether there are attacks that can be effected by such a header
insertion (I haven't).


Eliot


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    <meta content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" http-equiv=3D"Content-Ty=
pe">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Hi David,<br>
    <br>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 2/10/16 5:35 PM, David A. Cooper
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov" type=3D"cite">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Du=
tf-8">
      <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">No. The following appeared in the
        body of the email that you just sent:<br>
        <blockquote><tt>DKIM-Signature: v=3D1; a=3Drsa-sha256;
            c=3Drelaxed/simple;</tt><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0 d=3Dcisco.com; <a moz-do-not-send=3D"true"
              class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
              href=3D"mailto:i=3D@cisco.com">i=3D@cisco.com</a>; l=3D1169=
;
            q=3Ddns/txt; s=3Diport;</tt><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0 t=3D1455120414; x=3D1456330014;</tt><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0 h=3Dsubject:to:references:cc:from:message-id:da=
te:</tt><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0=C2=A0 mime-version:in-reply-to;</tt><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0 bh=3Dek/ye425aJM8CS9AGNRcr750NuBltwGL4xXur0BHO7=
U=3D;</tt><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0
            b=3DGQWh7w1KuT0aK18aTnJIwNOfdpi9IcqrKs7reiA0y4UJQ7dLfRQwb19X<=
/tt><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0=C2=A0
            WX/qctUW2HAF081jJzJYH6H9J44JrcR6CpYhukLiBcM+ndYxbgKHZZgsX</tt=
><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0=C2=A0
            blg2bVMAkoNMF/RK/OGYKRmXCrk7LLP2DimVWXmbeZtpcGxjUafaxsXXD</tt=
><tt><br>
          </tt><tt>=C2=A0=C2=A0 U=3D;</tt><br>
        </blockquote>
        <br>
        I not a DKIM expert, but my guess is that the "h=3D..." field is
        indicating that the above signature covers the subject, to,
        references, cc, from, message-id, data, mime-version, and
        in-reply-to fields in the email's header.<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Correct.<br>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov" type=3D"cite">
      <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"> <br>
        I was just wondering whether a new field could be added to the
        email headers that specifies the mail server's email address
        matching rules, and have this header be covered by the DKIM
        signature.<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Ah!=C2=A0 The only issue is that a DKIM signature is that of the doma=
in
    owner "e.g., cisco.com" whereas the certificate is bound to an
    individual.=C2=A0 Thus the trust models do not perfectly align.=C2=A0=
 And so
    one has to look at whether there are attacks that can be effected by
    such a header insertion (I haven't).<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    Eliot<br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From nobody Wed Feb 10 10:22:44 2016
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To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
References: <56B48DED.5080202@cs.tcd.ie> <CAAFsWK2czHNii6xS-Lh86y3cz6NGvUvnCdmg4hEMMYMHgvP+fg@mail.gmail.com> <CAK6vND86rUCjjgBo4TY1SxFjO9zP+MkzjUvkq+cU0anJ+V5XCQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAAFsWK1e+DAX-vU1nOHNSOzqJoS5xbxUgj33L-RRuLqach7KJA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09200956B7904ED36ADA415FAED50@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3LhGR2TKP76RkODJWKJOqgk1NuQAChotxJ7KZFzN9uWQ@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB0920DA200EF775BE1DCB078DAED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3QO2XcWxgqpoWKGhZATVoqbQ76wp2xqdTRPFx+0YutgA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09206DE87A94BEBC353E8D69AED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <56BB5B52.2050209@nist.gov> <56BB601B.2090100@cisco.com> <56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov> <56BB7061.6090508@cisco.com>
From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
Message-ID: <56BB7FE4.20308@nist.gov>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 13:22:28 -0500
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Cc: pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">I don't understand the issue. The
      purpose of the attribute would be for the domain owner to indicate
      to others whether it treats the local part of email addresses as
      case sensitive or case insensitive. So it would be the domain
      owner providing information about itself.<br>
      <br>
      Yes, the recipient would be using the information provided by the
      domain owner in the header to determine how to compare the email
      address in the "From" line with the email address in the
      certificate, but I don't think it matters that the information
      comes from different sources. The domain owner is authoritative
      for the matching rules it uses, and if the CA puts the wrong email
      address in the certificate, then that is already a problem. The
      recipient knowing the domain owner's email address matching rules
      doesn't make that worse.<br>
      <br>
      Dave<br>
      <br>
      On 02/10/2016 12:16 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:56BB7061.6090508@cisco.com" type="cite">
      <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
      Hi David,<br>
      <br>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/10/16 5:35 PM, David A. Cooper
        wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote cite="mid:56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov" type="cite">
        <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
          charset=utf-8">
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix">No. The following appeared in the
          body of the email that you just sent:<br>
          <blockquote><tt>DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256;
              c=relaxed/simple;</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt>  d=cisco.com; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
                href="mailto:i=@cisco.com">i=@cisco.com</a>; l=1169;
              q=dns/txt; s=iport;</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt>  t=1455120414; x=1456330014;</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt>  h=subject:to:references:cc:from:message-id:date:</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt>   mime-version:in-reply-to;</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt>  bh=ek/ye425aJM8CS9AGNRcr750NuBltwGL4xXur0BHO7U=;</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt> 
              b=GQWh7w1KuT0aK18aTnJIwNOfdpi9IcqrKs7reiA0y4UJQ7dLfRQwb19X</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt>  
              WX/qctUW2HAF081jJzJYH6H9J44JrcR6CpYhukLiBcM+ndYxbgKHZZgsX</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt>  
              blg2bVMAkoNMF/RK/OGYKRmXCrk7LLP2DimVWXmbeZtpcGxjUafaxsXXD</tt><tt><br>
            </tt><tt>   U=;</tt><br>
          </blockquote>
          <br>
          I not a DKIM expert, but my guess is that the "h=..." field is
          indicating that the above signature covers the subject, to,
          references, cc, from, message-id, data, mime-version, and
          in-reply-to fields in the email's header.<br>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Correct.<br>
      <blockquote cite="mid:56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov" type="cite">
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix"> <br>
          I was just wondering whether a new field could be added to the
          email headers that specifies the mail server's email address
          matching rules, and have this header be covered by the DKIM
          signature.<br>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Ah!  The only issue is that a DKIM signature is that of the domain
      owner "e.g., cisco.com" whereas the certificate is bound to an
      individual.  Thus the trust models do not perfectly align.  And so
      one has to look at whether there are attacks that can be effected
      by such a header insertion (I haven't).<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      Eliot<br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 18:49:03 +0000
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
Thread-Topic: Email address matching rules (was Re: [pkix] Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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> 1) The matching rules would need to be based on the host domain's rules
> (e.g., does it consider Example1@... and example1@... to refer to the sam=
e
> mailbox). It is not the sender's MUA that matters.

The domain doesn't set squat.  The domain owner may have a mail system that=
's case sensitive or case insensitive, but it doesn't matter because mail s=
ervers don't process S/MIME messages.  Only MUAs (which include webmail ser=
vices) process S/MIME. =20

-- T


From nobody Wed Feb 10 11:05:47 2016
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To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <56B48DED.5080202@cs.tcd.ie> <CAAFsWK2czHNii6xS-Lh86y3cz6NGvUvnCdmg4hEMMYMHgvP+fg@mail.gmail.com> <CAK6vND86rUCjjgBo4TY1SxFjO9zP+MkzjUvkq+cU0anJ+V5XCQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAAFsWK1e+DAX-vU1nOHNSOzqJoS5xbxUgj33L-RRuLqach7KJA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09200956B7904ED36ADA415FAED50@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3LhGR2TKP76RkODJWKJOqgk1NuQAChotxJ7KZFzN9uWQ@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB0920DA200EF775BE1DCB078DAED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3QO2XcWxgqpoWKGhZATVoqbQ76wp2xqdTRPFx+0YutgA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09206DE87A94BEBC353E8D69AED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <56BB5B52.2050209@nist.gov> <56BB601B.2090100@cisco.com> <56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov> <56BB7061.6090508@cisco.com> <56BB7FE4.20308@nist.gov> <BY1PR09MB0920D368E652DE8DA6238A28AED70@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com>
From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
Message-ID: <56BB89F4.6020406@nist.gov>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 14:05:24 -0500
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server 
(or actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) 
that decides that "david.cooper@nist.gov" and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" 
refer to the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and 
it will be delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do 
so.  Neither my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.

If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of 
"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" and a certificate with a subjectAltName of 
"david.cooper@nist.gov," they want to know whether 
"david.cooper@nist.gov" and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" refer to the same 
mailbox, and the answer to that has everything to do with the NIST mail 
server and has nothing whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.

On 02/10/2016 01:49 PM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
>> I don't understand the issue. The purpose of the attribute would be for the
>> domain owner to indicate to others whether it treats the local part of email
>> addresses as case sensitive or case insensitive. So it would be the domain
>> owner providing information about itself.
> Stop.  There is no domain policy.  Name matching is a *per MUA* issue.  An organization may choose to deploy a common MUA--and may even enforce its use--but that won't work for any shared service models (e.g., Gmail).
>
> -- T
>


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Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 11:43:54 -0800
Message-ID: <CAK6vND_CpYGo-DCux9zHtfwUSAT=JTa05=C4U89Spc1CkB0YqA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Cc: pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper <david.cooper@nist.gov> wrote:
> In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server (or
> actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that
> decides that "david.cooper@nist.gov" and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" refer to
> the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be
> delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither
> my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.
>
> If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of
> "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" and a certificate with a subjectAltName of
> "david.cooper@nist.gov," they want to know whether "david.cooper@nist.gov"
> and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" refer to the same mailbox, and the answer to
> that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing
> whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.

This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from
here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which may
not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.

A few examples:
- pz.bowen@gmail.com, pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com, and
PZBOWEN@gmail.com all deliver to the same mailbox.
- The same is true for pzb@amazon.com and pzb@amzn.com.
- m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com, anonmouse@mailinator.com and
anonmouse@suremail.info also all deliver to the same mailbox.

However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people
knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously
the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?

Thanks,
Peter


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To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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Some mail systems do case folding, but others do not.  RFC 822 says that =
the left-hand side is case sensitive.

Russ


On Feb 10, 2016, at 2:05 PM, David A. Cooper wrote:

> In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail =
server (or actually the server of service provider that handles mail for =
NIST) that decides that "david.cooper@nist.gov" and =
"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" refer to the same mailbox. You can send an email =
to either address and it will be delivered to the same mailbox because =
the server choses to do so.  Neither my nor your choice of mail client =
has any effect on that.
>=20
> If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of =
"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" and a certificate with a subjectAltName of =
"david.cooper@nist.gov," they want to know whether =
"david.cooper@nist.gov" and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" refer to the same =
mailbox, and the answer to that has everything to do with the NIST mail =
server and has nothing whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.
>=20
> On 02/10/2016 01:49 PM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
>>> I don't understand the issue. The purpose of the attribute would be =
for the
>>> domain owner to indicate to others whether it treats the local part =
of email
>>> addresses as case sensitive or case insensitive. So it would be the =
domain
>>> owner providing information about itself.
>> Stop.  There is no domain policy.  Name matching is a *per MUA* =
issue.  An organization may choose to deploy a common MUA--and may even =
enforce its use--but that won't work for any shared service models =
(e.g., Gmail).
>>=20
>> -- T
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
References: <56B48DED.5080202@cs.tcd.ie> <CAAFsWK2czHNii6xS-Lh86y3cz6NGvUvnCdmg4hEMMYMHgvP+fg@mail.gmail.com> <CAK6vND86rUCjjgBo4TY1SxFjO9zP+MkzjUvkq+cU0anJ+V5XCQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAAFsWK1e+DAX-vU1nOHNSOzqJoS5xbxUgj33L-RRuLqach7KJA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09200956B7904ED36ADA415FAED50@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3LhGR2TKP76RkODJWKJOqgk1NuQAChotxJ7KZFzN9uWQ@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB0920DA200EF775BE1DCB078DAED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3QO2XcWxgqpoWKGhZATVoqbQ76wp2xqdTRPFx+0YutgA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09206DE87A94BEBC353E8D69AED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <56BB5B52.2050209@nist.gov> <56BB601B.2090100@cisco.com> <56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov> <56BB7061.6090508@cisco.com> <56BB7FE4.20308@nist.gov> <BY1PR09MB0920D368E652DE8DA6238A28AED70@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <56BB89F4.6020406@nist.gov> <CAK6vND_CpYGo-DCux9zHtfwUSAT=JTa05=C4U89Spc1CkB0YqA@mail.gmail.com>
From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">I agree that that what I'm suggesting
      couldn't be used to indicate all of the email addresses that
      resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to the NIST mail server
      treating the local part as case insensitive, there are other
      aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper'.<br>
      <br>
      This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:<br>
      <blockquote>Two email addresses are considered to match if:<br>
        <br>
          1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND<br>
        <br>
          2)  the host-part of each name matches using a
        case-insensitive ASCII comparison.<br>
      </blockquote>
      whereas RFC 5321 says:<br>
      <blockquote>The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case
        sensitive. Therefore, SMTP implementations MUST take care to
        preserve the case of mailbox local-parts.  <span
          style="background-color:#ff6;">In particular, for some hosts,
          the user "smith" is different from the user "Smith". However,
          exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox local-parts impedes
          interoperability and is discouraged.</span>  Mailbox domains
        follow normal DNS rules and are hence not case sensitive.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case
      sensitive manner, and there is no way at the moment for the
      recipient of a signed email (or the sender of an encrypted email)
      to know whether the sender's host (or recipient's host) treats the
      local-parts in a case sensitive manner, RFC 5280 takes the
      conservative approach and requires matching to be performed in a
      case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP
      implementation to preserve case).<br>
      <br>
      It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most
      hosts treat local-parts are case insensitive and it is not
      uncommon for there to be a case mismatch between the "From" line
      and the email address in the certificate. Most email clients deal
      with this by ignoring RFC 5280 and performing a case insensitive
      match, which isn't a problem in the vast majority of cases in
      which the host corresponding to the email address treats the
      local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the case
      of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my
      mail client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a
      "From" line of <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:smith@example.com">"smith@example.com"</a> to be signed using a
      certificate with a subjectAltName of <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:Smith@example.com">"Smith@example.com"</a> if
      <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:smith@example.com">smith@example.com</a> and <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Smith@example.com">Smith@example.com</a> are different users).<br>
      <br>
      So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was
      a way for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host
      treats the local-parts of email addresses in its domain in a case
      sensitive or case insensitive manner, so that the S/MIME client
      can know whether it can safely perform a case insensitive match of
      "From" line and certificate contents or if it should perform a
      case sensitive match.<br>
      <br>
      I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information
      to S/MIME clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that
      it is worthwhile to make such information available.<br>
      <br>
      Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all
      of a hosts mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case
      insensitive manner) could only be handled by including multiple
      email addresses in the certificate (e.g., <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pzb@amazon.com">pzb@amazon.com</a> and
      <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com">pzb@amzn.com</a>).<br>
      <br>
      Dave<br>
      <br>
      On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAK6vND_CpYGo-DCux9zHtfwUSAT=JTa05=C4U89Spc1CkB0YqA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov">&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;</a> wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server (or
actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that
decides that <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov">"david.cooper@nist.gov"</a> and <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov">"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"</a> refer to
the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be
delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither
my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.

If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov">"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"</a> and a certificate with a subjectAltName of
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov,">"david.cooper@nist.gov,"</a> they want to know whether <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov">"david.cooper@nist.gov"</a>
and <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov">"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"</a> refer to the same mailbox, and the answer to
that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing
whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from
here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which may
not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.

A few examples:
- <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pz.bowen@gmail.com">pz.bowen@gmail.com</a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com">pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com</a>, and
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:PZBOWEN@gmail.com">PZBOWEN@gmail.com</a> all deliver to the same mailbox.
- The same is true for <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pzb@amazon.com">pzb@amazon.com</a> and <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com">pzb@amzn.com</a>.
- <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com">m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com</a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:anonmouse@mailinator.com">anonmouse@mailinator.com</a> and
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:anonmouse@suremail.info">anonmouse@suremail.info</a> also all deliver to the same mailbox.

However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people
knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously
the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?

Thanks,
Peter

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
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To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
References: <56B48DED.5080202@cs.tcd.ie> <CAAFsWK2czHNii6xS-Lh86y3cz6NGvUvnCdmg4hEMMYMHgvP+fg@mail.gmail.com> <CAK6vND86rUCjjgBo4TY1SxFjO9zP+MkzjUvkq+cU0anJ+V5XCQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAAFsWK1e+DAX-vU1nOHNSOzqJoS5xbxUgj33L-RRuLqach7KJA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09200956B7904ED36ADA415FAED50@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3LhGR2TKP76RkODJWKJOqgk1NuQAChotxJ7KZFzN9uWQ@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB0920DA200EF775BE1DCB078DAED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <CAAFsWK3QO2XcWxgqpoWKGhZATVoqbQ76wp2xqdTRPFx+0YutgA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR09MB09206DE87A94BEBC353E8D69AED60@BY1PR09MB0920.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <56BB5B52.2050209@nist.gov> <56BB601B.2090100@cisco.com> <56BB66DC.1080402@nist.gov> <56BB7061.6090508@cisco.com> <56BB7FE4.20308@nist.gov>
From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
Message-ID: <56BBA83A.5080809@cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 22:14:34 +0100
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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Hi David,

On 2/10/16 7:22 PM, David A. Cooper wrote:
> I don't understand the issue. The purpose of the attribute would be
> for the domain owner to indicate to others whether it treats the local
> part of email addresses as case sensitive or case insensitive. So it
> would be the domain owner providing information about itself.
>
> Yes, the recipient would be using the information provided by the
> domain owner in the header to determine how to compare the email
> address in the "From" line with the email address in the certificate,
> but I don't think it matters that the information comes from different
> sources. The domain owner is authoritative for the matching rules it
> uses, and if the CA puts the wrong email address in the certificate,
> then that is already a problem. The recipient knowing the domain
> owner's email address matching rules doesn't make that worse.

I would suggest simply that this analysis be formalized a bit, with all
the actors reviewed, including the sender (MUA), CA, MSA, and then the
recipient.

Also, keep in mind that there are limits to using DKIM in that
signatures are fragile, especially in the face of mailing lists.

On the other hand, I would note that in this area perfect may be the
enemy of good and if we can make things better for some or perhaps many
with little or no cost, then why not do so?

Eliot


--------------010608060901050907030102
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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" http-equiv=3D"Content-Ty=
pe">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Hi David,<br>
    <br>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 2/10/16 7:22 PM, David A. Cooper
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:56BB7FE4.20308@nist.gov" type=3D"cite">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Du=
tf-8">
      <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">I don't understand the issue. The
        purpose of the attribute would be for the domain owner to
        indicate to others whether it treats the local part of email
        addresses as case sensitive or case insensitive. So it would be
        the domain owner providing information about itself.<br>
        <br>
        Yes, the recipient would be using the information provided by
        the domain owner in the header to determine how to compare the
        email address in the "From" line with the email address in the
        certificate, but I don't think it matters that the information
        comes from different sources. The domain owner is authoritative
        for the matching rules it uses, and if the CA puts the wrong
        email address in the certificate, then that is already a
        problem. The recipient knowing the domain owner's email address
        matching rules doesn't make that worse.<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I would suggest simply that this analysis be formalized a bit, with
    all the actors reviewed, including the sender (MUA), CA, MSA, and
    then the recipient.<br>
    <br>
    Also, keep in mind that there are limits to using DKIM in that
    signatures are fragile, especially in the face of mailing lists.<br>
    <br>
    On the other hand, I would note that in this area perfect may be the
    enemy of good and if we can make things better for some or perhaps
    many with little or no cost, then why not do so?<br>
    <br>
    Eliot<br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
From: "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2016 21:19:35 -0500
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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        David:

        Does it make sense to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses=20
with a matching rule followed by a UTF8String?  There could be different=20
matching rules for different character sets, and a matching rule for=20
"case-insensitive IA5, ignore anything from percent to at".  As Russ=20
pointed out, it's the domain's MTA that matters in interpreting email=20
addresses as destinations, not the MUA, so the matching rule for each=20
domain is well-defined.
        Of course, matching rules are open-ended, and the set required for =

full conformance would need to be defined.

Tom Gindin
P.S.    The above suggestion is mine, and not that of my employer.



From:   "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
To:     Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Cc:     pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   02/10/2016 03:30 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it=20
time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
Sent by:        "pkix" <pkix-bounces@ietf.org>



I agree that that what I'm suggesting couldn't be used to indicate all of=20
the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to the=20
NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive, there are=20
other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper'.

This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:
Two email addresses are considered to match if:

  1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND

  2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive ASCII=20
comparison.
whereas RFC 5321 says:
The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive. Therefore,=20
SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of mailbox=20
local-parts.  In particular, for some hosts, the user "smith" is different =

from the user "Smith". However, exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox =

local-parts impedes interoperability and is discouraged.  Mailbox domains=20
follow normal DNS rules and are hence not case sensitive.

Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive=20
manner, and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed=20
email (or the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's=20
host (or recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive=20
manner, RFC 5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to=20
be performed in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP=20
implementation to preserve case).

It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts treat=20
local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be a=20
case mismatch between the "From" line and the email address in the=20
certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280 and=20
performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the vast=20
majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address=20
treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the=20
case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail=20
client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a "From" line of =

"smith@example.com" to be signed using a certificate with a subjectAltName =

of "Smith@example.com" if smith@example.com and Smith@example.com are=20
different users).

So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a way=20
for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the=20
local-parts of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case=20
insensitive manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can=20
safely perform a case insensitive match of "From" line and certificate=20
contents or if it should perform a case sensitive match.

I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to=20
S/MIME clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is=20
worthwhile to make such information available.

Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a=20
hosts mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive=20
manner) could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the =

certificate (e.g., pzb@amazon.com and pzb@amzn.com).

Dave

On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:
On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper <david.cooper@nist.gov>=20
wrote:

In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server=20
(or
actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that
decides that "david.cooper@nist.gov" and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" refer to
the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be
delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither
my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.

If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of
"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" and a certificate with a subjectAltName of
"david.cooper@nist.gov," they want to know whether "david.cooper@nist.gov"
and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" refer to the same mailbox, and the answer to
that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing
whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.


This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from
here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which may
not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.

A few examples:
- pz.bowen@gmail.com, pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com, and
PZBOWEN@gmail.com all deliver to the same mailbox.
- The same is true for pzb@amazon.com and pzb@amzn.com.
- m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com, anonmouse@mailinator.com and
anonmouse@suremail.info also all deliver to the same mailbox.

However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people
knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously
the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?

Thanks,
Peter


=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix





--=_alternative 000CC74985257F59_=
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

<tt><font size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; David:</font></tt><br><br><t=
t><font size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Does it make sense
to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses with a matching rule followed
by a UTF8String? &nbsp;There could be different matching rules for different
character sets, and a matching rule for &quot;case-insensitive IA5, ignore
anything from percent to at&quot;. &nbsp;As Russ pointed out, it's the
domain's MTA that matters in interpreting email addresses as destinations,
not the MUA, so the matching rule for each domain is well-defined.</font></=
tt><br><tt><font size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Of course, matching
rules are open-ended, and the set required for full conformance would need
to be defined.</font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D2><br>Tom Gindin<br>P.S. &nb=
sp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The above suggestion is mine, and
not that of my employer.</font></tt><br><br><br><br><font size=3D1 color=3D=
#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">From: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&quot;David A. Cooper&quot;
&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;</font><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=
=3D"sans-serif">To: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Peter Bowen &lt;pzbowen@gma=
il.com&gt;</font><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Cc:=
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix &lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;<=
/font><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Date: &nbsp; &=
nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">02/10/2016 03:30 PM</font><=
br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Subject: &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Email
address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or simila=
r)
wg?)</font><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Sent by: =
&nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&quot;pkix&quot;
&lt;pkix-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</font><br><hr noshade><br><br><br><font size=
=3D3>I agree that that what I'm suggesting couldn't be used
to indicate all of the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox.
In addition to the NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensi=
tive,
there are other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper=
'.<br><br>This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:</font><br><fon=
t size=3D3>Two email addresses are considered to match if:<br><br>&nbsp; 1)=
&nbsp; the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND<br><br>&nbsp; 2)&=
nbsp; the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive
ASCII comparison.</font><br><font size=3D3>whereas RFC 5321 says:</font><br=
><font size=3D3>The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensiti=
ve.
Therefore, SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of
mailbox local-parts.&nbsp;&nbsp;In particular, for some hosts, the user
&quot;smith&quot; is different from the user &quot;Smith&quot;. However,
exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox local-parts impedes interoperabi=
lity
and is discouraged.&nbsp; Mailbox domains follow normal DNS rules and are
hence not case sensitive.</font><br><font size=3D3><br>Since hosts are allo=
wed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive manner,
and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed email (or
the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's host (or
recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive manner, RFC
5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to be performed
in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP implementation
to preserve case).<br><br>It has been pointed out that this creates problem=
s since most hosts treat
local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be
a case mismatch between the &quot;From&quot; line and the email address
in the certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280
and performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the vast
majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a &quot;From&quot;
line of </font><a href=3Dmailto:smith@example.com><font size=3D3 color=3Dbl=
ue><u>&quot;smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font size=3D3>to be sign=
ed using a certificate with a subjectAltName of </font><a href=3Dmailto:Smi=
th@example.com><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;Smith@example.com&quot;=
</u></font></a><font size=3D3>if </font><a href=3Dmailto:smith@example.com>=
<font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size=
=3D3>and </font><a href=3Dmailto:Smith@example.com><font size=3D3 color=3Db=
lue><u>Smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size=3D3>are different users).=
<br><br>So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a=
 way
for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the local-p=
arts
of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case insensitive
manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can safely perform
a case insensitive match of &quot;From&quot; line and certificate contents
or if it should perform a case sensitive match.<br><br>I was merely suggest=
ing a possible way to convey that information to S/MIME
clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is worthwhile
to make such information available.<br><br>Anything beyond simple, generic =
matching rules that apply to all of a hosts
mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive manner)
could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the certific=
ate
(e.g., </font><a href=3Dmailto:pzb@amazon.com><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><=
u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></a><font size=3D3>and </font><a href=3Dmailto:p=
zb@amzn.com><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></a><font=
 size=3D3>).<br><br>Dave<br><br>On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:<=
/font><br><tt><font size=3D3>On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Coo=
per
</font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:david.cooper@nist.gov><tt><font size=3D3 color=
=3Dblue><u>&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=
=3D3>wrote:<br></font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D3>In what way is name match=
ing a per MUA issue? It is
the NIST mail server (or<br>actually the server of service provider that ha=
ndles mail for NIST) that<br>decides that </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:davi=
d.cooper@nist.gov><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;david.cooper@nis=
t.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>and </font></tt><a href=
=3Dmailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;DA=
VID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>refer to<br=
>the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be<b=
r>delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so. &nbsp;N=
either<br>my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.<br><br>=
If someone receives a signed email with a &quot;From&quot; line of<br></fon=
t></tt><a href=3Dmailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dbl=
ue><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=
=3D3>and a certificate with a subjectAltName of<br></font></tt><a href=3D"m=
ailto:david.cooper@nist.gov,"><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;davi=
d.cooper@nist.gov,&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>they want to=
 know whether </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:david.cooper@nist.gov><tt><font =
size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt><=
/a><tt><font size=3D3><br>and </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:DAVID.COOPER@nis=
t.gov><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;<=
/u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>refer to the same mailbox, and the an=
swer to<br>that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has noth=
ing<br>whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.<br></font></tt><br><tt><=
font size=3D3><br>This is only the simplest case. &nbsp;Things get a lot mo=
re complex from<br>here. &nbsp;A single mailbox may have infinite addresses=
, many of which
may<br>not be discoverable. &nbsp;Some providers use this as a privacy feat=
ures.<br><br>A few examples:<br>- </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:pz.bowen@gma=
il.com><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pz.bowen@gmail.com</u></font></tt=
></a><tt><font size=3D3>,
</font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com"><tt><font size=3D=
3 color=3Dblue><u>pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font s=
ize=3D3>,
and<br></font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:PZBOWEN@gmail.com><tt><font size=3D3 co=
lor=3Dblue><u>PZBOWEN@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>all d=
eliver to the same mailbox.<br>- The same is true for </font></tt><a href=
=3Dmailto:pzb@amazon.com><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pzb@amazon.com<=
/u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>and </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:pzb@=
amzn.com><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></tt></a=
><tt><font size=3D3>.<br>- </font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:m8r-cfbmf1@veryrea=
lemail.com"><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com=
</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>,
</font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:anonmouse@mailinator.com><tt><font size=3D3 co=
lor=3Dblue><u>anonmouse@mailinator.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D=
3>and<br></font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:anonmouse@suremail.info><tt><font siz=
e=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>anonmouse@suremail.info</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D3>also all deliver to the same mailbox.<br><br>However this points o=
ut a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people<br>knowing that m8r-cfbm1 an=
d anonmouse are the same person. &nbsp;Obviously<br>the mailbox provider kn=
ows, but why should a sender know?<br><br>Thanks,<br>Peter<br><br></font></=
tt><br><tt><font size=3D2>=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>pkix mailing list<br>pkix@ietf.org<br></font></tt><a =
href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font size=3D2>https:=
//www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D2><br>=
</font></tt><br><br><BR>
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Subject: [pkix] MUD Draft - was Re: [saag] Fwd: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?
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        I think the MUD syntax part of your draft's section 2 would be=20
more typical in PKIX, and no less clear, if it looked like this:
The MUD URI is a non-critical Certificate extension that points
 to an on-line Manufacturer Usage Description concerning the certificate=20
subject.  This extension contains a single Uniform Resource Identifier=20
(URI).  Internationalized Resource Identifiers must be represented as=20
URI's in the way described in RFC 5280, section 7.4.  The semantics of the =

URI are defined in [I-D.lear-ietf-netmod-mud].
=20
   id-pe-mudURI OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { id-pe TBD }



   MudURISyntax ::=3D { IA5String }


Tom Gindin
P.S.    The opinions above are mine, and not necessarily those of my=20
employer



From:   Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
To:     Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, pkix@ietf.org
Date:   02/05/2016 07:17 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] [saag] Fwd: Is it time for a pkix extensions=20
(or similar) wg?
Sent by:        "pkix" <pkix-bounces@ietf.org>



Hi Stephen, and thanks for this note.  Please see below:

On 2/5/16 12:58 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
> Hiya,
>
> We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks are
> writing that define new certificate extensions or that
> want to update/modify PKIX specs.
>
> Do folks think it is now time to form a working group
> to process those?
>
> If no, please say why.
>
> If yes, please say what draft(s) and propose any other
> scoping. If you know of people who are or would implement
> and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine
> to say "I think we should work on topic <foo>" but it is
> *much* better if you can point at a draft you've written
> about <foo> and say that you or someone is implementing
> that and that it'll get deployed.)

I've written draft-lear-ietf-pkix-mud-extension-00.txt that talks about
something called a manufacturer usage description.  The idea is to
provide a means for local networks to retrieve recommendations from
manufacturers on what sort of access their devices should have.  This
extension is intended for use in the context of IEEE 802.1AR.

It definitely could use a good set of eyes on it.  We are currently in
the lab with the concept now.
>
> If you think this requires face to face discussion at
> IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) please say that too.

I am personally okay with any approach to move forward, whether that's a
WG, doing something AD-sponsored, or something else.  I'm hoping that as
non-critical constraints go this one is not particularly controversial.=20
If a working group is the best way, I would just ask that this draft be
included in scope ;-)

Eliot

[attachment "signature.asc" deleted by Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM]=20
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=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix





--=_alternative 000DFA1085257F5A_=
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

<tt><font size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; I think the MUD syntax
part of your draft's section 2 would be more typical in PKIX, and no less
clear, if it looked like this:</font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D2>The MUD UR=
I is a non-critical Certificate extension
that points
 to an on-line Manufacturer Usage Description concerning the certificate
subject. &nbsp;This extension contains a single Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI). &nbsp;Internationalized Resource Identifiers must be represented
as URI's in the way described in RFC 5280, section 7.4. &nbsp;The semantics
of the URI are defined in [I-D.lear-ietf-netmod-mud].</font></tt><br><tt><f=
ont size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; </font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D2=
>&nbsp; &nbsp;id-pe-mudURI OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
id-pe TBD }
</font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D2></font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D2>&nbsp=
; &nbsp;MudURISyntax ::=3D { IA5String }
<br><br>Tom Gindin<br>P.S. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The opinions above ar=
e mine, and
not necessarily those of my employer</font></tt><br><br><br><br><font size=
=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">From: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Eliot Lear &lt;lear@cisco.c=
om&gt;</font><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">To: &nb=
sp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Stephen Farrell &lt;stephen=
.farrell@cs.tcd.ie&gt;,
pkix@ietf.org</font><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">=
Date: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">02/05/2016 07:17 AM</font><=
br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Subject: &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Re: [pkix] [saag]
Fwd: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?</font><br><font size=
=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Sent by: &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&quot;pkix&quot;
&lt;pkix-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</font><br><hr noshade><br><br><br><tt><font s=
ize=3D2>Hi Stephen, and thanks for this note. &nbsp;Please
see below:<br><br>On 2/5/16 12:58 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:<br>&gt;<br>&gt=
; Hiya,<br>&gt;<br>&gt; We seem to be seeing a number of drafts that folks =
are<br>&gt; writing that define new certificate extensions or that<br>&gt; =
want to update/modify PKIX specs.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; Do folks think it is now =
time to form a working group<br>&gt; to process those?<br>&gt;<br>&gt; If n=
o, please say why.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; If yes, please say what draft(s) and pro=
pose any other<br>&gt; scoping. If you know of people who are or would impl=
ement<br>&gt; and deploy, that is very useful information. (It is fine<br>&=
gt; to say &quot;I think we should work on topic &lt;foo&gt;&quot; but
it is<br>&gt; *much* better if you can point at a draft you've written<br>&=
gt; about &lt;foo&gt; and say that you or someone is implementing<br>&gt; t=
hat and that it'll get deployed.)<br><br>I've written draft-lear-ietf-pkix-=
mud-extension-00.txt that talks about<br>something called a manufacturer us=
age description. &nbsp;The idea is to<br>provide a means for local networks=
 to retrieve recommendations from<br>manufacturers on what sort of access t=
heir devices should have. &nbsp;This<br>extension is intended for use in th=
e context of IEEE 802.1AR.<br><br>It definitely could use a good set of eye=
s on it. &nbsp;We are currently
in<br>the lab with the concept now.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; If you think this requi=
res face to face discussion at<br>&gt; IETF95 (e.g. to tease out scope) ple=
ase say that too.<br><br>I am personally okay with any approach to move for=
ward, whether that's
a<br>WG, doing something AD-sponsored, or something else. &nbsp;I'm hoping =
that
as<br>non-critical constraints go this one is not particularly controversia=
l.
<br>If a working group is the best way, I would just ask that this draft be=
<br>included in scope ;-)<br><br>Eliot<br><br>[attachment &quot;signature.a=
sc&quot; deleted by Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM]
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>pkix =
mailing list<br>pkix@ietf.org<br></font></tt><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font size=3D2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/list=
info/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D2><br></font></tt><br><br><BR>
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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but wonder if a simple
case matching rule adequately covers all possible casing possibilities for
foreign
languages.  An example I'm told is lower case German 'ß' <-> may become
'SS' but also 'ẞ' and this interepretation has been recently changing as
well.
I just wanted to put out probably the another solution which is some sort
of limited
regular expression language.  This adds a fair amount of complexity, and the
main justification would be that it could better support international
alphabets
have more complicated letter casing situations than IA5 that we're familiar
with
and some of these may be difficult to anticipate.  Regular expression could
better support also the '+' and '-' scenarios as well.

Eliot: Here's a first cut at an analysis of these naming features:

Parties:
Alice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.
Bob: Message recipient of the signed message
Casey: CA authority
Eve: wants to spoof Alice's identity else using past email.
Franklin: wants to spoof Alice's identity by creating a spoofable
certificate
with the CA Casey.
Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice

Actions
1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR
2) Alice emails Bob a signed message
3) Bob validates Alice's signature
4) Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in reply

Attacks
1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by replaying her
signed email to Bob from
Eve's account.  Eve takes advantage of ambiguity afforded by the new email
naming
scheme either because the specification or the encoded name is overly broad
compared
to the domain practices.
2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting a subject name to
allow
spoofing Alice's identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity in the new
naming scheme
to get past whatever ownership check that Casey does on Franklin's account
but unlike Eve
can craft whatever signed message is convenient to Franklin.  Franklin can
then send
this message to Bob who will validate message as coming from spoofed Alice.
2b) Even with existing validation practices Bob might be confused about two
separate
users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the same email address,
which Franklin
could take advantage of.
2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode homograph
characters e.g.
ascii 'c' with cryllic 'с'.  This is an issue with supporting
internationalized local-parts email
addresses.
3) Mallory wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice.
Most likely
Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create a spoofed
certificate.  When Bob replies
and uses the certificate to communicate privately with spoofed Alice,
Mallory will receive the
reply.  Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and then re-encrypt and
forwards for Alice.

Some mitigations
1) Exact naming that allows for no ambiguity
2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguity
3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alice's domain to prevent
attack in 2a).
Casey could also apply checks to prevent unicode homograph attacks in case
2c).
4) Bob's provider could use exact naming rules provided in the certificate
to develop
Spam/Phishing models as its now possible to know who exactly Alice is or
isn't.  Attempts to
spoof Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.

thanks,
-Wei

On Sat, Feb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>         David:
>
>         Does it make sense to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses
> with a matching rule followed by a UTF8String?  There could be different
> matching rules for different character sets, and a matching rule for
> "case-insensitive IA5, ignore anything from percent to at".  As Russ
> pointed out, it's the domain's MTA that matters in interpreting email
> addresses as destinations, not the MUA, so the matching rule for each
> domain is well-defined.
>         Of course, matching rules are open-ended, and the set required for
> full conformance would need to be defined.
>
> Tom Gindin
> P.S.        The above suggestion is mine, and not that of my employer.
>
>
>
> From:        "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
> To:        Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
> Cc:        pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
> Date:        02/10/2016 03:30 PM
> Subject:        Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it
> time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
> Sent by:        "pkix" <pkix-bounces@ietf.org>
> ------------------------------
>
>
>
> I agree that that what I'm suggesting couldn't be used to indicate all of
> the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to the
> NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive, there are
> other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper'.
>
> This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:
> Two email addresses are considered to match if:
>
>   1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND
>
>   2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive ASCII
> comparison.
> whereas RFC 5321 says:
> The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive. Therefore,
> SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of mailbox
> local-parts.  In particular, for some hosts, the user "smith" is different
> from the user "Smith". However, exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox
> local-parts impedes interoperability and is discouraged.  Mailbox domains
> follow normal DNS rules and are hence not case sensitive.
>
> Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive
> manner, and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed
> email (or the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's
> host (or recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive
> manner, RFC 5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to
> be performed in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP
> implementation to preserve case).
>
> It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts treat
> local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be a
> case mismatch between the "From" line and the email address in the
> certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280 and
> performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the vast
> majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
> treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
> case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
> client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a "From" line of
> *"smith@example.com"* <smith@example.com>to be signed using a certificate
> with a subjectAltName of *"Smith@example.com"* <Smith@example.com>if
> *smith@example.com* <smith@example.com>and *Smith@example.com*
> <Smith@example.com>are different users).
>
> So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a way
> for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the
> local-parts of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case
> insensitive manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can
> safely perform a case insensitive match of "From" line and certificate
> contents or if it should perform a case sensitive match.
>
> I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to
> S/MIME clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is
> worthwhile to make such information available.
>
> Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a
> hosts mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive
> manner) could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the
> certificate (e.g., *pzb@amazon.com* <pzb@amazon.com>and *pzb@amzn.com*
> <pzb@amzn.com>).
>
> Dave
>
> On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper
> *<david.cooper@nist.gov>* <david.cooper@nist.gov>wrote:
>
> In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server
> (or
> actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that
> decides that *"david.cooper@nist.gov"* <david.cooper@nist.gov>and
> *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>refer to
> the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be
> delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither
> my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.
>
> If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of
> *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>and a certificate with a
> subjectAltName of
> *"david.cooper@nist.gov,"* <david.cooper@nist.gov,>they want to know
> whether *"david.cooper@nist.gov"* <david.cooper@nist.gov>
> and *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>refer to the same
> mailbox, and the answer to
> that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing
> whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.
>
>
> This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from
> here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which may
> not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.
>
> A few examples:
> - *pz.bowen@gmail.com* <pz.bowen@gmail.com>, *pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com*
> <pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com>, and
> *PZBOWEN@gmail.com* <PZBOWEN@gmail.com>all deliver to the same mailbox.
> - The same is true for *pzb@amazon.com* <pzb@amazon.com>and *pzb@amzn.com*
> <pzb@amzn.com>.
> - *m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com* <m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com>,
> *anonmouse@mailinator.com* <anonmouse@mailinator.com>and
> *anonmouse@suremail.info* <anonmouse@suremail.info>also all deliver to
> the same mailbox.
>
> However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people
> knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously
> the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?
>
> Thanks,
> Peter
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
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>

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<div dir="ltr"><div>Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but wonder if a simple</div><div>case matching rule adequately covers all possible casing possibilities for foreign</div><div>languages.  An example I&#39;m told is lower case German &#39;ß&#39; &lt;-&gt; may become</div><div>&#39;SS&#39; but also &#39;ẞ&#39; and this interepretation has been recently changing as well.</div><div>I just wanted to put out probably the another solution which is some sort of limited</div><div>regular expression language.  This adds a fair amount of complexity, and the</div><div>main justification would be that it could better support international alphabets</div><div>have more complicated letter casing situations than IA5 that we&#39;re familiar with</div><div>and some of these may be difficult to anticipate.  Regular expression could</div><div>better support also the &#39;+&#39; and &#39;-&#39; scenarios as well.</div><div><br></div><div>Eliot: Here&#39;s a first cut at an <!--
-->analysis of these naming features:</div><div><br></div><div>Parties:</div><div>Alice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.</div><div>Bob: Message recipient of the signed message</div><div>Casey: CA authority</div><div>Eve: wants to spoof Alice&#39;s identity else using past email.</div><div>Franklin: wants to spoof Alice&#39;s identity by creating a spoofable certificate</div><div>with the CA Casey.</div><div>Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice</div><div><br></div><div>Actions</div><div>1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR</div><div>2) Alice emails Bob a signed message</div><div>3) Bob validates Alice&#39;s signature</div><div>4) Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in reply</div><div><br></div><div>Attacks</div><div>1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by replaying her signed email to Bob from</div><div>Eve&#39;s account.  Eve takes advantage of ambiguity afforded by the new email naming</div><div>scheme <!--
-->either because the specification or the encoded name is overly broad compared</div><div>to the domain practices.</div><div>2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting a subject name to allow</div><div>spoofing Alice&#39;s identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity in the new naming scheme</div><div>to get past whatever ownership check that Casey does on Franklin&#39;s account but unlike Eve</div><div>can craft whatever signed message is convenient to Franklin.  Franklin can then send</div><div>this message to Bob who will validate message as coming from spoofed Alice.</div><div>2b) Even with existing validation practices Bob might be confused about two separate</div><div>users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the same email address, which Franklin</div><div>could take advantage of.</div><div>2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode homograph characters e.g.</div><div>ascii &#39;c&#39; with cryllic &#39;с&#39;.  This is an issue with<!--
--> supporting internationalized local-parts email</div><div>addresses.</div><div>3) Mallory wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice.  Most likely</div><div>Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create a spoofed certificate.  When Bob replies </div><div>and uses the certificate to communicate privately with spoofed Alice, Mallory will receive the</div><div>reply.  Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and then re-encrypt and forwards for Alice.</div><div><br></div><div>Some mitigations</div><div>1) Exact naming that allows for no ambiguity</div><div>2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguity</div><div>3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alice&#39;s domain to prevent attack in 2a).</div><div>Casey could also apply checks to prevent unicode homograph attacks in case 2c).</div><div>4) Bob&#39;s provider could use exact naming rules provided in the certificate to develop</div><div>Spam/Phishing models as its now possible to know who <!--
-->exactly Alice is or isn&#39;t.  Attempts to</div><div>spoof Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>-Wei</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Feb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com" target="_blank">tgindin@us.ibm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><tt><font size="2">        David:</font></tt><br><br><tt><font size="2">        Does it make sense
to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses with a matching rule followed
by a UTF8String?  There could be different matching rules for different
character sets, and a matching rule for &quot;case-insensitive IA5, ignore
anything from percent to at&quot;.  As Russ pointed out, it&#39;s the
domain&#39;s MTA that matters in interpreting email addresses as destinations,
not the MUA, so the matching rule for each domain is well-defined.</font></tt><br><tt><font size="2">        Of course, matching
rules are open-ended, and the set required for full conformance would need
to be defined.</font></tt><br><tt><font size="2"><br>Tom Gindin<br>P.S.        The above suggestion is mine, and
not that of my employer.</font></tt><br><br><br><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">From:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&quot;David A. Cooper&quot;
&lt;<a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank">david.cooper@nist.gov</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">To:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Peter Bowen &lt;<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target="_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Cc:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">pkix &lt;<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Date:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">02/10/2016 03:30 PM</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Subject:    
   </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Email
address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar)
wg?)</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Sent by:    
   </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&quot;pkix&quot;
&lt;<a href="mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt;</font><br><hr noshade><span class=""><br><br><br><font size="3">I agree that that what I&#39;m suggesting couldn&#39;t be used
to indicate all of the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox.
In addition to the NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive,
there are other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than &#39;david.cooper&#39;.<br><br>This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:</font><br><font size="3">Two email addresses are considered to match if:<br><br>  1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND<br><br>  2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive
ASCII comparison.</font><br><font size="3">whereas RFC 5321 says:</font><br><font size="3">The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive.
Therefore, SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of
mailbox local-parts.  In particular, for some hosts, the user
&quot;smith&quot; is different from the user &quot;Smith&quot;. However,
exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox local-parts impedes interoperability
and is discouraged.  Mailbox domains follow normal DNS rules and are
hence not case sensitive.</font><br></span><font size="3"><span class=""><br>Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive manner,
and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed email (or
the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender&#39;s host (or
recipient&#39;s host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive manner, RFC
5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to be performed
in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP implementation
to preserve case).<br><br></span>It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts treat
local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be
a case mismatch between the &quot;From&quot; line and the email address
in the certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280
and performing a case insensitive match, which isn&#39;t a problem in the vast
majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
client shouldn&#39;t consider it acceptable for an email with a &quot;From&quot;
line of </font><a href="mailto:smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font size="3">to be signed using a certificate with a subjectAltName of </font><a href="mailto:Smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;Smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font size="3">if </font><a href="mailto:smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size="3">and </font><a href="mailto:Smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>Smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size="3">are different users).<span class=""><br><br>So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a way
for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the local-parts
of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case insensitive
manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can safely perform
a case insensitive match of &quot;From&quot; line and certificate contents
or if it should perform a case sensitive match.<br><br>I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to S/MIME
clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is worthwhile
to make such information available.<br><br></span>Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a hosts
mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive manner)
could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the certificate
(e.g., </font><a href="mailto:pzb@amazon.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></a><font size="3">and </font><a href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></a><font size="3">).<span class=""><br><br>Dave<br><br>On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:</span></font><span class=""><br><tt><font size="3">On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper
</font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">wrote:<br></font></tt><br><tt><font size="3">In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is
the NIST mail server (or<br>actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that<br>decides that </font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and </font></tt><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">refer to<br>the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be<br>delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither<br>my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.<br><br>If someone receives a signed email with a &quot;From&quot; line of<br></font></tt><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and a certificate with a subjectAltName of<br><!--
--></font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov," target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov,&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">they want to know whether </font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3"><br>and </font></tt><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">refer to the same mailbox, and the answer to<br>that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing<br>whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.<br></font></tt><br><tt><font size="3"><br>This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from<br>here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which
may<br>not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.<br><br>A few examples:<br>- </font></tt><a href="mailto:pz.bowen@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pz.bowen@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
</font></tt><a href="mailto:pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
and<br></font></tt></span><a href="mailto:PZBOWEN@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>PZBOWEN@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">all deliver to the same mailbox.<span class=""><br>- The same is true for </span></font></tt><a href="mailto:pzb@amazon.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and </font></tt><a href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">.<br>- </font></tt><a href="mailto:m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
</font></tt><a href="mailto:anonmouse@mailinator.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>anonmouse@mailinator.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and<br></font></tt><a href="mailto:anonmouse@suremail.info" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>anonmouse@suremail.info</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">also all deliver to the same mailbox.<span class=""><br><br>However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people<br>knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously<br>the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?<br><br>Thanks,<br>Peter<br><br></span></font></tt><div class="CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><div class="CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><br><tt><font size="2">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>pkix mailing list<br><a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br></font></tt><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target="_blank"><tt><font size="2">https://<!--
-->www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><font size="2"><br></font></tt><br><br><br></div></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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It seems like we are coming to the conclusion that Section 7 of RFC 5280 =
no longer correct.

Russ


On Feb 20, 2016, at 12:52 AM, Wei Chuang wrote:

> Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but wonder if a =
simple
> case matching rule adequately covers all possible casing possibilities =
for foreign
> languages.  An example I'm told is lower case German '=C3=9F' <-> may =
become
> 'SS' but also '=E1=BA=9E' and this interepretation has been recently =
changing as well.
> I just wanted to put out probably the another solution which is some =
sort of limited
> regular expression language.  This adds a fair amount of complexity, =
and the
> main justification would be that it could better support international =
alphabets
> have more complicated letter casing situations than IA5 that we're =
familiar with
> and some of these may be difficult to anticipate.  Regular expression =
could
> better support also the '+' and '-' scenarios as well.
>=20
> Eliot: Here's a first cut at an analysis of these naming features:
>=20
> Parties:
> Alice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.
> Bob: Message recipient of the signed message
> Casey: CA authority
> Eve: wants to spoof Alice's identity else using past email.
> Franklin: wants to spoof Alice's identity by creating a spoofable =
certificate
> with the CA Casey.
> Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice
>=20
> Actions
> 1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR
> 2) Alice emails Bob a signed message
> 3) Bob validates Alice's signature
> 4) Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in reply
>=20
> Attacks
> 1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by replaying her =
signed email to Bob from
> Eve's account.  Eve takes advantage of ambiguity afforded by the new =
email naming
> sch eme either because the specification or the encoded name is overly =
broad compared
> to the domain practices.
> 2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting a subject =
name to allow
> spoofing Alice's identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity in the =
new naming scheme
> to get past whatever ownership check that Casey does on Franklin's =
account but unlike Eve
> can craft whatever signed message is convenient to Franklin.  Franklin =
can then send
> this message to Bob who will validate message as coming from spoofed =
Alice.
> 2b) Even with existing validation practices Bob might be confused =
about two separate
> users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the same email address, =
which Franklin
> could take advantage of.
> 2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode homograph =
characters e.g.
> ascii 'c' with cryllic '=D1=81'.  This is an issue with supporting =
internationalized local-parts email
> addresses.
> 3) Mallory wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and =
Alice.  Most likely
> Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create a spoofed =
certificate.  When Bob replies=20
> and uses the certificate to communicate privately with spoofed Alice, =
Mallory will receive the
> reply.  Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and then re-encrypt =
and forwards for Alice.
>=20
> Some mitigations
> 1) Exact naming that allows for no ambiguity
> 2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguity
> 3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alice's domain to prevent =
attack in 2a).
> Casey could also apply checks to prevent unicode homograph attacks in =
case 2c).
> 4) Bob's provider could use exact naming rules provided in the =
certificate to develop
> Spam/Phishing models as its now possible to know who exactly Alice is =
or isn't.  Attempts to
> spoof Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.
>=20
> thanks,
> -Wei
>=20
> On Sat, Feb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> =
wrote:
>         David:
>=20
>         Does it make sense to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses =
with a matching rule followed by a UTF8String?  There could be different =
matching rules for different character sets, and a matching rule for =
"case-insensitive IA5, ignore anything from percent to at".  As Russ =
pointed out, it's the domain's MTA that matters in interpreting email =
addresses as destinations, not the MUA, so the matching rule for each =
domain is well-defined.
>         Of course, matching rules are open-ended, and the set required =
for full conformance would need to be defined.
>=20
> Tom Gindin
> P.S.        The above suggestion is mine, and not that of my employer.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> From:        "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
> To:        Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
> Cc:        pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
> Date:        02/10/2016 03:30 PM
> Subject:        Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it =
time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
> Sent by:        "pkix" <pkix-bounces@ietf.org>
>=20
>=20
>=20
> I agree that that what I'm suggesting couldn't be used to indicate all =
of the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to =
the NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive, there =
are other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper'.
>=20
> This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:
> Two email addresses are considered to match if:
>=20
>   1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND
>=20
>   2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive =
ASCII comparison.
> whereas RFC 5321 says:
> The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive. =
Therefore, SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of =
mailbox local-parts.  In particular, for some hosts, the user "smith" is =
different from the user "Smith". However, exploiting the case =
sensitivity of mailbox local-parts impedes interoperability and is =
discouraged.  Mailbox domains follow normal DNS rules and are hence not =
case sensitive.
>=20
> Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive =
manner, and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed =
email (or the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's =
host (or recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive =
manner, RFC 5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching =
to be performed in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires =
SMTP implementation to preserve case).
>=20
> It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts =
treat local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there =
to be a case mismatch between the "From" line and the email address in =
the certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280 =
and performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the =
vast majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email =
address treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would =
be in the case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive =
manner (my mail client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email =
with a "From" line of "smith@example.com"to be signed using a =
certificate with a subjectAltName of "Smith@example.com"if =
smith@example.comand Smith@example.comare different users).
>=20
> So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a =
way for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the =
local-parts of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case =
insensitive manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can =
safely perform a case insensitive match of "From" line and certificate =
contents or if it should perform a case sensitive match.
>=20
> I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to =
S/MIME clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is =
worthwhile to make such information available.
>=20
> Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a =
hosts mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive =
manner) could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in =
the certificate (e.g., pzb@amazon.comand pzb@amzn.com).
>=20
> Dave
>=20
> On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper =
<david.cooper@nist.gov>wrote:
>=20
> In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail =
server (or
> actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) =
that
> decides that "david.cooper@nist.gov"and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"refer =
to
> the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will =
be
> delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  =
Neither
> my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.
>=20
> If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of
> "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"and a certificate with a subjectAltName of
> "david.cooper@nist.gov,"they want to know whether =
"david.cooper@nist.gov"
> and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"refer to the same mailbox, and the answer =
to
> that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing
> whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.
>=20
>=20
> This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from
> here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which may
> not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.
>=20
> A few examples:
> - pz.bowen@gmail.com, pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com, and
> PZBOWEN@gmail.comall deliver to the same mailbox.
> - The same is true for pzb@amazon.comand pzb@amzn.com.
> - m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com, anonmouse@mailinator.comand
> anonmouse@suremail.infoalso all deliver to the same mailbox.
>=20
> However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people
> knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously
> the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?
>=20
> Thanks,
> Peter
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https ://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


--Apple-Mail-80-1049476715
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">It =
seems like we are coming to the conclusion that Section 7 of RFC 5280 no =
longer =
correct.<div><br></div><div>Russ<br><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On =
Feb 20, 2016, at 12:52 AM, Wei Chuang wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div>Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but =
wonder if a simple</div><div>case matching rule adequately covers all =
possible casing possibilities for foreign</div><div>languages.&nbsp; An =
example I'm told is lower case German '=C3=9F' &lt;-&gt; may =
become</div><div>'SS' but also '=E1=BA=9E' and this interepretation has =
been recently changing as well.</div><div>I just wanted to put out =
probably the another solution which is some sort of =
limited</div><div>regular expression language.&nbsp; This adds a fair =
amount of complexity, and the</div><div>main justification would be that =
it could better support international alphabets</div><div>have more =
complicated letter casing situations than IA5 that we're familiar =
with</div><div>and some of these may be difficult to anticipate.&nbsp; =
Regular expression could</div><div>better support also the '+' and '-' =
scenarios as well.</div><div><br></div><div>Eliot: Here's a first cut at=20=

 an <!--
-->analysis of these naming =
features:</div><div><br></div><div>Parties:</div><div>Alice: Wants to =
send a signed message to Bob.</div><div>Bob: Message recipient of the =
signed message</div><div>Casey: CA authority</div><div>Eve: wants to =
spoof Alice's identity else using past email.</div><div>Franklin: wants =
to spoof Alice's identity by creating a spoofable =
certificate</div><div>with the CA Casey.</div><div>Mallory: wants to =
MitM the private communication between Bob and =
Alice</div><div><br></div><div>Actions</div><div>1) Alice obtain =
certificate from CA Casey using a CSR</div><div>2) Alice emails Bob a =
signed message</div><div>3) Bob validates Alice's signature</div><div>4) =
Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in =
reply</div><div><br></div><div>Attacks</div><div>1a) Eve performs a =
replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by replaying her signed email to Bob =
from</div><div>Eve's account.&nbsp; Eve takes advantage of ambiguity =
afforded by the new email naming</div><div>sch
 eme <!--
-->either because the specification or the encoded name is overly broad =
compared</div><div>to the domain practices.</div><div>2a) Franklin =
obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting a subject name to =
allow</div><div>spoofing Alice's identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses =
ambuiguity in the new naming scheme</div><div>to get past whatever =
ownership check that Casey does on Franklin's account but unlike =
Eve</div><div>can craft whatever signed message is convenient to =
Franklin.&nbsp; Franklin can then send</div><div>this message to Bob who =
will validate message as coming from spoofed Alice.</div><div>2b) Even =
with existing validation practices Bob might be confused about two =
separate</div><div>users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the =
same email address, which Franklin</div><div>could take advantage =
of.</div><div>2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode =
homograph characters e.g.</div><div>ascii 'c' with cryllic '=D1=81'.&nbsp;=
 This is an issue=20
 with<!--
--> supporting internationalized local-parts =
email</div><div>addresses.</div><div>3) Mallory wants to MitM the =
private communication between Bob and Alice.&nbsp; Most =
likely</div><div>Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create a =
spoofed certificate.&nbsp; When Bob replies&nbsp;</div><div>and uses the =
certificate to communicate privately with spoofed Alice, Mallory will =
receive the</div><div>reply.&nbsp; Maloory decrypts and reads the =
message, and then re-encrypt and forwards for =
Alice.</div><div><br></div><div>Some mitigations</div><div>1) Exact =
naming that allows for no ambiguity</div><div>2) Simple rules to prevent =
or limit ambiguity</div><div>3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of =
Alice's domain to prevent attack in 2a).</div><div>Casey could also =
apply checks to prevent unicode homograph attacks in case =
2c).</div><div>4) Bob's provider could use exact naming rules provided =
in the certificate to develop</div><div>Spam/Phishing models as its now =
possible to know who
  <!--
-->exactly Alice is or isn't.&nbsp; Attempts to</div><div>spoof Alice =
will be labeled and treated as =
Phish.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>-Wei</div></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat, Feb 13, =
2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com" =
target=3D"_blank">tgindin@us.ibm.com</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><tt><font =
size=3D"2">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
David:</font></tt><br><br><tt><font size=3D"2">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; Does it make sense
to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses with a matching rule =
followed
by a UTF8String?&nbsp; There could be different matching rules for =
different
character sets, and a matching rule for "case-insensitive IA5, ignore
anything from percent to at".&nbsp; As Russ pointed out, it's the
domain's MTA that matters in interpreting email addresses as =
destinations,
not the MUA, so the matching rule for each domain is =
well-defined.</font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D"2">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; Of course, matching
rules are open-ended, and the set required for full conformance would =
need
to be defined.</font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D"2"><br>Tom =
Gindin<br>P.S. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The above suggestion is mine, =
and
not that of my employer.</font></tt><br><br><br><br><font size=3D"1" =
color=3D"#5f5f5f" face=3D"sans-serif">From: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D"1" face=3D"sans-serif">"David A. Cooper"
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" =
target=3D"_blank">david.cooper@nist.gov</a>&gt;</font><br><font size=3D"1"=
 color=3D"#5f5f5f" face=3D"sans-serif">To: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D"1" face=3D"sans-serif">Peter Bowen &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;</font><br><font size=3D"1" =
color=3D"#5f5f5f" face=3D"sans-serif">Cc: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D"1" face=3D"sans-serif">pkix &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;</font><br><font size=3D"1" =
color=3D"#5f5f5f" face=3D"sans-serif">Date: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D"1" face=3D"sans-serif">02/10/2016 03:30 =
PM</font><br><font size=3D"1" color=3D"#5f5f5f" =
face=3D"sans-serif">Subject: &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D"1" face=3D"sans-serif">Re: [pkix] =
Email
address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or =
similar)
wg?)</font><br><font size=3D"1" color=3D"#5f5f5f" face=3D"sans-serif">Sent=
 by: &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D"1" face=3D"sans-serif">"pkix"
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt;</font><br><hr =
noshade=3D""><span class=3D""><br><br><br><font size=3D"3">I agree that =
that what I'm suggesting couldn't be used
to indicate all of the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox.
In addition to the NIST mail server treating the local part as case =
insensitive,
there are other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than =
'david.cooper'.<br><br>This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 =
says:</font><br><font size=3D"3">Two email addresses are considered to =
match if:<br><br>&nbsp; 1)&nbsp; the local-part of each name is an exact =
match, AND<br><br>&nbsp; 2)&nbsp; the host-part of each name matches =
using a case-insensitive
ASCII comparison.</font><br><font size=3D"3">whereas RFC 5321 =
says:</font><br><font size=3D"3">The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE =
treated as case sensitive.
Therefore, SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of
mailbox local-parts.&nbsp;&nbsp;In particular, for some hosts, the user
"smith" is different from the user "Smith". However,
exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox local-parts impedes =
interoperability
and is discouraged.&nbsp; Mailbox domains follow normal DNS rules and =
are
hence not case sensitive.</font><br></span><font size=3D"3"><span =
class=3D""><br>Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a =
case sensitive manner,
and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed email =
(or
the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's host (or
recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive manner, RFC
5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to be =
performed
in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP =
implementation
to preserve case).<br><br></span>It has been pointed out that this =
creates problems since most hosts treat
local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be
a case mismatch between the "From" line and the email address
in the certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC =
5280
and performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the =
vast
majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a "From"
line of </font><a href=3D"mailto:smith@example.com" =
target=3D"_blank"><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>"smith@example.com"</u></font></a><font size=3D"3">to =
be signed using a certificate with a subjectAltName of </font><a =
href=3D"mailto:Smith@example.com" target=3D"_blank"><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>"Smith@example.com"</u></font></a><font size=3D"3">if =
</font><a href=3D"mailto:smith@example.com" target=3D"_blank"><font =
size=3D"3" color=3D"blue"><u>smith@example.com</u></font></a><font =
size=3D"3">and </font><a href=3D"mailto:Smith@example.com" =
target=3D"_blank"><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>Smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size=3D"3">are =
different users).<span class=3D""><br><br>So, some people have suggested =
that it would be nice if there was a way
for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the =
local-parts
of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case insensitive
manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can safely perform
a case insensitive match of "From" line and certificate contents
or if it should perform a case sensitive match.<br><br>I was merely =
suggesting a possible way to convey that information to S/MIME
clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is worthwhile
to make such information available.<br><br></span>Anything beyond =
simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a hosts
mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive =
manner)
could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the =
certificate
(e.g., </font><a href=3D"mailto:pzb@amazon.com" target=3D"_blank"><font =
size=3D"3" color=3D"blue"><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></a><font =
size=3D"3">and </font><a href=3D"mailto:pzb@amzn.com" =
target=3D"_blank"><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></a><font size=3D"3">).<span =
class=3D""><br><br>Dave<br><br>On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen =
wrote:</span></font><span class=3D""><br><tt><font size=3D"3">On Wed, =
Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper
</font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;</u></font></tt></a><tt><fo=
nt size=3D"3">wrote:<br></font></tt><br><tt><font size=3D"3">In what way =
is name matching a per MUA issue? It is
the NIST mail server (or<br>actually the server of service provider that =
handles mail for NIST) that<br>decides that </font></tt><a =
href=3D"mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target=3D"_blank"><tt><font =
size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>"david.cooper@nist.gov"</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">and </font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">refer to<br>the same mailbox. You can send an email to either =
address and it will be<br>delivered to the same mailbox because the =
server choses to do so.&nbsp; Neither<br>my nor your choice of mail =
client has any effect on that.<br><br>If someone receives a signed email =
with a "From" line of<br></font></tt><a =
href=3D"mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target=3D"_blank"><tt><font =
size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">and a certificate with a subjectAltName of<br><!--
--></font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov," =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>"david.cooper@nist.gov,"</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">they want to know whether </font></tt><a =
href=3D"mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target=3D"_blank"><tt><font =
size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>"david.cooper@nist.gov"</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3"><br>and </font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">refer to the same mailbox, and the answer to<br>that has =
everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing<br>whatsoever =
to do with anyone choice of MUA.<br></font></tt><br><tt><font =
size=3D"3"><br>This is only the simplest case.&nbsp; Things get a lot =
more complex from<br>here.&nbsp; A single mailbox may have infinite =
addresses, many of which
may<br>not be discoverable.&nbsp; Some providers use this as a privacy =
features.<br><br>A few examples:<br>- </font></tt><a =
href=3D"mailto:pz.bowen@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>pz.bowen@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">,
</font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">,
and<br></font></tt></span><a href=3D"mailto:PZBOWEN@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>PZBOWEN@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">all deliver to the same mailbox.<span class=3D""><br>- The =
same is true for </span></font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:pzb@amazon.com" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">and </font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:pzb@amzn.com" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">.<br>- </font></tt><a =
href=3D"mailto:m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com" target=3D"_blank"><tt><font =
size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><fon=
t size=3D"3">,
</font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:anonmouse@mailinator.com" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>anonmouse@mailinator.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">and<br></font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:anonmouse@suremail.info" =
target=3D"_blank"><tt><font size=3D"3" =
color=3D"blue"><u>anonmouse@suremail.info</u></font></tt></a><tt><font =
size=3D"3">also all deliver to the same mailbox.<span =
class=3D""><br><br>However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may =
not want people<br>knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same =
person.&nbsp; Obviously<br>the mailbox provider knows, but why should a =
sender know?<br><br>Thanks,<br>Peter<br><br></span></font></tt><div =
class=3D"CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><div =
class=3D"CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><br><tt><font =
size=3D"2">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>pkix =
mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br></font></tt><a =
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To: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
From: "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
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Cc: pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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=1B$)C        Wei:

        I am NOT proposing that only matching rules that apply to all=20
known languages be used, since it may well not be feasible for such rules=20
to be written and implemented.  Likewise, I am not proposing that=20
parameterized matching rules be used (and a regular expression is a quite=20
open-ended parameter).  This is particularly the case since the matching=20
rule has to be included in the certificate, and minor upgrades to a=20
regular expression can't be made during the lifetime of the certificate.=20
The German character you mentioned is not part of IA5 or ASCII, although=20
it's part of Latin-1.
        It doesn't seem like a critical issue whether an email matching=20
rule for Latin alphabet addresses maps Devanagari or Oriya digits to ASCII =

ones or not, although it certainly matters when the email address is in=20
those scripts.  I may be thought biased, because I did propose the=20
"collapse hyphens and ignore case" rule for account identifiers during the =

development of RFC 4043, which was rejected on the grounds that although=20
that rule made sense for a few major scripts it had no equivalent outside=20
them.

Tom Gindin, CISSP




From:   Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
Cc:     "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   02/20/2016 12:52 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it=20
time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)



Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but wonder if a simple
case matching rule adequately covers all possible casing possibilities for =

foreign
languages.  An example I'm told is lower case German '=0E),=0F' <-> may bec=
ome
'SS' but also '?' and this interepretation has been recently changing as=20
well.
I just wanted to put out probably the another solution which is some sort=20
of limited
regular expression language.  This adds a fair amount of complexity, and=20
the
main justification would be that it could better support international=20
alphabets
have more complicated letter casing situations than IA5 that we're=20
familiar with
and some of these may be difficult to anticipate.  Regular expression=20
could
better support also the '+' and '-' scenarios as well.

Eliot: Here's a first cut at! an analysis of these naming features:

Parties:
Alice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.
Bob: Message recipient of the signed message
Casey: CA authority
Eve: wants to spoof Alice's identity else using past email.
Franklin: wants to spoof Alice's identity by creating a spoofable=20
certificate
with the CA Casey.
Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice

Actions
1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR
2) Alice emails Bob a signed message
3) Bob validates Alice's signature
4) Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in reply

Attacks
1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by replaying her=20
signed email to Bob from
Eve's account.  Eve takes advantage of ambiguity afforded by the new email =

naming
sc! heme either because the specification or the encoded name is overly=20
broad compared
to the domain practices.
2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting a subject name=20
to allow
spoofing Alice's identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity in the new=20
naming scheme
to get past whatever ownership check that Casey does on Franklin's account =

but unlike Eve
can craft whatever signed message is convenient to Franklin.  Franklin can =

then send
this message to Bob who will validate message as coming from spoofed=20
Alice.
2b) Even with existing validation practices Bob might be confused about=20
two separate
users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the same email address,=20
which Franklin
could take advantage of.
2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode homograph=20
characters e.g.
ascii 'c' with cryllic '=0E,c=0F'.  This is an issue! with supporting=20
internationalized local-parts email
addresses.
3) Mallory wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice.  =

Most likely
Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create a spoofed=20
certificate.  When Bob replies=20
and uses the certificate to communicate privately with spoofed Alice,=20
Mallory will receive the
reply.  Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and then re-encrypt and=20
forwards for Alice.

Some mitigations
1) Exact naming that allows for no ambiguity
2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguity
3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alice's domain to prevent=20
attack in 2a).
Casey could also apply checks to prevent unicode homograph attacks in case =

2c).
4) Bob's provider could use exact naming rules provided in the certificate =

to develop
Spam/Phishing models as its now possible to know wh! o exactly Alice is or =

isn't.  Attempts to
spoof Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.

thanks,
-Wei

On Sat, Feb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:
        David:

        Does it make sense to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses=20
with a matching rule followed by a UTF8String?  There could be different=20
matching rules for different character sets, and a matching rule for=20
"case-insensitive IA5, ignore anything from percent to at".  As Russ=20
pointed out, it's the domain's MTA that matters in interpreting email=20
addresses as destinations, not the MUA, so the matching rule for each=20
domain is well-defined.
        Of course, matching rules are open-ended, and the set required for =

full conformance would need to be defined.

Tom Gindin
P.S.        The above suggestion is mine, and not that of my employer.



From:        "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
To:        Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Cc:        pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:        02/10/2016 03:30 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it=20
time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
Sent by:        "pkix" <pkix-bounces@ietf.org>



I agree that that what I'm suggesting couldn't be used to indicate all of=20
the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to the=20
NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive, there are=20
other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper'.

This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:
Two email addresses are considered to match if:

  1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND

  2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive ASCII=20
comparison.
whereas RFC 5321 says:
The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive. Therefore,=20
SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of mailbox=20
local-parts.  In particular, for some hosts, the user "smith" is different =

from the user "Smith". However, exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox =

local-parts impedes interoperability and is discouraged.  Mailbox domains=20
follow normal DNS rules and are hence not case sensitive.

Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive=20
manner, and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed=20
email (or the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's=20
host (or recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive=20
manner, RFC 5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to=20
be performed in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP=20
implementation to preserve case).

It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts treat=20
local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be a=20
case mismatch between the "From" line and the email address in the=20
certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280 and=20
performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the vast=20
majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address=20
treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the=20
case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail=20
client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a "From" line of =

"smith@example.com"to be signed using a certificate with a subjectAltName=20
of "Smith@example.com"if smith@example.comand Smith@example.comare=20
different users).

So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a way=20
for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the=20
local-parts of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case=20
insensitive manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can=20
safely perform a case insensitive match of "From" line and certificate=20
contents or if it should perform a case sensitive match.

I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to=20
S/MIME clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is=20
worthwhile to make such information available.

Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a=20
hosts mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive=20
manner) could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the =

certificate (e.g., pzb@amazon.comand pzb@amzn.com).

Dave

On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:
On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper <david.cooper@nist.gov>
wrote:

In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server=20
(or
actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that
decides that "david.cooper@nist.gov"and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"refer to
the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be
delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither
my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.

If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of
"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"and a certificate with a subjectAltName of
"david.cooper@nist.gov,"they want to know whether "david.cooper@nist.gov"
and "DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"refer to the same mailbox, and the answer to
that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing
whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.


This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from
here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which may
not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.

A few examples:
- pz.bowen@gmail.com, pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com, and
PZBOWEN@gmail.comall deliver to the same mailbox.
- The same is true for pzb@amazon.comand pzb@amzn.com.
- m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com, anonmouse@mailinator.comand
anonmouse@suremail.infoalso all deliver to the same mailbox.

However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people
knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously
the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?

Thanks,
Peter


=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
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<tt><font size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Wei:</font></tt><br><br><tt>=
<font size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; I am NOT proposing
that only matching rules that apply to all known languages be used, since
it may well not be feasible for such rules to be written and implemented.
&nbsp;Likewise, I am not proposing that parameterized matching rules be
used (and a regular expression is a quite open-ended parameter). &nbsp;This
is particularly the case since the matching rule has to be included in
the certificate, and minor upgrades to a regular expression can't be made
during the lifetime of the certificate. &nbsp;The German character you
mentioned is not part of IA5 or ASCII, although it's part of Latin-1.</font=
></tt><br><tt><font size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; It doesn't seem
like a critical issue whether an email matching rule for Latin alphabet
addresses maps Devanagari or Oriya digits to ASCII ones or not, although
it certainly matters when the email address is in those scripts. &nbsp;I
may be thought biased, because I did propose the &quot;collapse hyphens
and ignore case&quot; rule for account identifiers during the development
of RFC 4043, which was rejected on the grounds that although that rule
made sense for a few major scripts it had no equivalent outside them.</font=
></tt><br><tt><font size=3D2><br>Tom Gindin, CISSP<br></font></tt><br><br><=
br><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">From: &nbsp; &nbs=
p; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Wei Chuang &lt;weihaw@googl=
e.com&gt;</font><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">To: =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS,
Eliot Lear &lt;lear@cisco.com&gt;</font><br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f =
face=3D"sans-serif">Cc: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&quot;David A. Cooper&quot;
&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;, pkix &lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;</font><br><font s=
ize=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Date: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">02/20/2016 12:52 AM</font><=
br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Subject: &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Email
address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or simila=
r)
wg?)</font><br><hr noshade><br><br><br><font size=3D3>Tom: I agree with the=
 approach to use OTHER-NAMES but
wonder if a simple</font><br><font size=3D3>case matching rule adequately c=
overs all possible casing
possibilities for foreign</font><br><font size=3D3>languages.&nbsp; An exam=
ple I'm told is lower case German
'=DF' &lt;-&gt; may become</font><br><font size=3D3>'SS' but also '&#7838;'=
 and this interepretation has been
recently changing as well.</font><br><font size=3D3>I just wanted to put ou=
t probably the another solution
which is some sort of limited</font><br><font size=3D3>regular expression l=
anguage.&nbsp; This adds a fair amount
of complexity, and the</font><br><font size=3D3>main justification would be=
 that it could better support
international alphabets</font><br><font size=3D3>have more complicated lett=
er casing situations than IA5
that we're familiar with</font><br><font size=3D3>and some of these may be =
difficult to anticipate.&nbsp;
Regular expression could</font><br><font size=3D3>better support also the '=
+' and '-' scenarios as well.</font><br><br><font size=3D3>Eliot: Here's a =
first cut at! an analysis of these naming
features:</font><br><br><font size=3D3>Parties:</font><br><font size=3D3>Al=
ice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.</font><br><font size=3D3>Bob: M=
essage recipient of the signed message</font><br><font size=3D3>Casey: CA a=
uthority</font><br><font size=3D3>Eve: wants to spoof Alice's identity else=
 using past email.</font><br><font size=3D3>Franklin: wants to spoof Alice'=
s identity by creating
a spoofable certificate</font><br><font size=3D3>with the CA Casey.</font><=
br><font size=3D3>Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between
Bob and Alice</font><br><br><font size=3D3>Actions</font><br><font size=3D3=
>1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR</font><br><font size=
=3D3>2) Alice emails Bob a signed message</font><br><font size=3D3>3) Bob v=
alidates Alice's signature</font><br><font size=3D3>4) Bob emails Alice an =
encrypted message in reply</font><br><br><font size=3D3>Attacks</font><br><=
font size=3D3>1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by
replaying her signed email to Bob from</font><br><font size=3D3>Eve's accou=
nt.&nbsp; Eve takes advantage of ambiguity
afforded by the new email naming</font><br><font size=3D3>sc! heme either b=
ecause the specification or the encoded
name is overly broad compared</font><br><font size=3D3>to the domain practi=
ces.</font><br><font size=3D3>2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Ca=
sey crafting
a subject name to allow</font><br><font size=3D3>spoofing Alice's identity.=
 Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity
in the new naming scheme</font><br><font size=3D3>to get past whatever owne=
rship check that Casey does on
Franklin's account but unlike Eve</font><br><font size=3D3>can craft whatev=
er signed message is convenient to Franklin.&nbsp;
Franklin can then send</font><br><font size=3D3>this message to Bob who wil=
l validate message as coming
from spoofed Alice.</font><br><font size=3D3>2b) Even with existing validat=
ion practices Bob might
be confused about two separate</font><br><font size=3D3>users i.e. alice vs=
 Alice and believe they are the same
email address, which Franklin</font><br><font size=3D3>could take advantage=
 of.</font><br><font size=3D3>2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by =
using unicode
homograph characters e.g.</font><br><font size=3D3>ascii 'c' with cryllic '=
&#1089;'.&nbsp; This is an issue! with
supporting internationalized local-parts email</font><br><font size=3D3>add=
resses.</font><br><font size=3D3>3) Mallory wants to MitM the private commu=
nication between
Bob and Alice.&nbsp; Most likely</font><br><font size=3D3>Mallory uses the =
same technique as Franklin to create
a spoofed certificate.&nbsp; When Bob replies&nbsp;</font><br><font size=3D=
3>and uses the certificate to communicate privately with
spoofed Alice, Mallory will receive the</font><br><font size=3D3>reply.&nbs=
p; Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and
then re-encrypt and forwards for Alice.</font><br><br><font size=3D3>Some m=
itigations</font><br><font size=3D3>1) Exact naming that allows for no ambi=
guity</font><br><font size=3D3>2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguit=
y</font><br><font size=3D3>3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alic=
e's domain
to prevent attack in 2a).</font><br><font size=3D3>Casey could also apply c=
hecks to prevent unicode homograph
attacks in case 2c).</font><br><font size=3D3>4) Bob's provider could use e=
xact naming rules provided
in the certificate to develop</font><br><font size=3D3>Spam/Phishing models=
 as its now possible to know wh! o
exactly Alice is or isn't.&nbsp; Attempts to</font><br><font size=3D3>spoof=
 Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.</font><br><br><font size=3D3>t=
hanks,</font><br><font size=3D3>-Wei</font><br><br><font size=3D3>On Sat, F=
eb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin &lt;</font><a href=3Dmailto:tgindin@us.i=
bm.com target=3D=5Fblank><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>tgindin@us.ibm.com<=
/u></font></a><font size=3D3>&gt;
wrote:</font><br><tt><font size=3D2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; David:</fon=
t></tt><font size=3D3><br></font><tt><font size=3D2><br>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp=
; &nbsp; Does it make sense to define an OTHER-NAME
for email addresses with a matching rule followed by a UTF8String?&nbsp;
There could be different matching rules for different character sets, and
a matching rule for &quot;case-insensitive IA5, ignore anything from percent
to at&quot;.&nbsp; As Russ pointed out, it's the domain's MTA that matters
in interpreting email addresses as destinations, not the MUA, so the matchi=
ng
rule for each domain is well-defined.<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Of cou=
rse, matching rules are open-ended, and
the set required for full conformance would need to be defined.<br><br>Tom =
Gindin<br>P.S. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The above suggestion is mine, and=
 not that
of my employer.</font></tt><font size=3D3><br><br><br></font><font size=3D1=
 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif"><br>From: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<=
/font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&quot;David
A. Cooper&quot; &lt;</font><a href=3Dmailto:david.cooper@nist.gov target=3D=
=5Fblank><font size=3D1 color=3Dblue face=3D"sans-serif"><u>david.cooper@ni=
st.gov</u></font></a><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&gt;</font><font si=
ze=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif"><br>To: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nb=
sp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Peter
Bowen &lt;</font><a href=3Dmailto:pzbowen@gmail.com target=3D=5Fblank><font=
 size=3D1 color=3Dblue face=3D"sans-serif"><u>pzbowen@gmail.com</u></font><=
/a><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&gt;</font><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f=
5f5f face=3D"sans-serif"><br>Cc: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font si=
ze=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix
&lt;</font><a href=3Dmailto:pkix@ietf.org target=3D=5Fblank><font size=3D1 =
color=3Dblue face=3D"sans-serif"><u>pkix@ietf.org</u></font></a><font size=
=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&gt;</font><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"=
sans-serif"><br>Date: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=
=3D"sans-serif">02/10/2016
03:30 PM</font><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif"><br>Subje=
ct: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Re:
[pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensio=
ns
(or similar) wg?)</font><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">=
<br>Sent by: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-=
serif">&quot;pkix&quot;
&lt;</font><a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D=5Fblank><font=
 size=3D1 color=3Dblue face=3D"sans-serif"><u>pkix-bounces@ietf.org</u></fo=
nt></a><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&gt;</font><font size=3D3><br></f=
ont><hr noshade><font size=3D3><br><br><br>I agree that that what I'm sugge=
sting couldn't be used to indicate all
of the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to
the NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive, there
are other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper'.<br>=
<br>This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:<br>Two email address=
es are considered to match if:<br><br>&nbsp; 1)&nbsp; the local-part of eac=
h name is an exact match, AND<br><br>&nbsp; 2)&nbsp; the host-part of each =
name matches using a case-insensitive
ASCII comparison.<br>whereas RFC 5321 says:<br>The local-part of a mailbox =
MUST BE treated as case sensitive. Therefore,
SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of mailbox local-p=
arts.&nbsp;&nbsp;In
particular, for some hosts, the user &quot;smith&quot; is different from
the user &quot;Smith&quot;. However, exploiting the case sensitivity of
mailbox local-parts impedes interoperability and is discouraged.&nbsp;
Mailbox domains follow normal DNS rules and are hence not case sensitive.<b=
r><br>Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive =
manner,
and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed email (or
the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's host (or
recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive manner, RFC
5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to be performed
in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP implementation
to preserve case).<br><br>It has been pointed out that this creates problem=
s since most hosts treat
local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be
a case mismatch between the &quot;From&quot; line and the email address
in the certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280
and performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the vast
majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a &quot;From&quot;
line of </font><a href=3Dmailto:smith@example.com target=3D=5Fblank><font s=
ize=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font s=
ize=3D3>to
be signed using a certificate with a subjectAltName of </font><a href=3Dmai=
lto:Smith@example.com target=3D=5Fblank><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quo=
t;Smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font size=3D3>if
</font><a href=3Dmailto:smith@example.com target=3D=5Fblank><font size=3D3 =
color=3Dblue><u>smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size=3D3>and
</font><a href=3Dmailto:Smith@example.com target=3D=5Fblank><font size=3D3 =
color=3Dblue><u>Smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size=3D3>are
different users).<br><br>So, some people have suggested that it would be ni=
ce if there was a way
for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the local-p=
arts
of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case insensitive
manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can safely perform
a case insensitive match of &quot;From&quot; line and certificate contents
or if it should perform a case sensitive match.<br><br>I was merely suggest=
ing a possible way to convey that information to S/MIME
clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is worthwhile
to make such information available.<br><br>Anything beyond simple, generic =
matching rules that apply to all of a hosts
mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive manner)
could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the certific=
ate
(e.g., </font><a href=3Dmailto:pzb@amazon.com target=3D=5Fblank><font size=
=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></a><font size=3D3>and
</font><a href=3Dmailto:pzb@amzn.com target=3D=5Fblank><font size=3D3 color=
=3Dblue><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></a><font size=3D3>).<br><br>Dave<br><br>=
On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:</font><tt><font size=3D3><br>On =
Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto=
:david.cooper@nist.gov target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u=
>&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>wrote:=
</font></tt><font size=3D3><br></font><tt><font size=3D3><br>In what way is=
 name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server
(or<br>actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) =
that<br>decides that </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:david.cooper@nist.gov tar=
get=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.g=
ov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>and
</font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov target=3D=5Fblank><tt><f=
ont size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></=
tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>refer
to<br>the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will=
 be<br>delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.&nb=
sp;
Neither<br>my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.<br><br=
>If someone receives a signed email with a &quot;From&quot; line of</font><=
/tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u><br></u></font><a href=3Dmailto:DAVID.CO=
OPER@nist.gov target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;DA=
VID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>and
a certificate with a subjectAltName of</font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:david.c=
ooper@nist.gov," target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot=
;david.cooper@nist.gov,&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>they
want to know whether </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:david.cooper@nist.gov tar=
get=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.g=
ov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3><br>and </font></tt><a href=
=3Dmailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=
=3Dblue><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font s=
ize=3D3>refer
to the same mailbox, and the answer to<br>that has everything to do with th=
e NIST mail server and has nothing<br>whatsoever to do with anyone choice o=
f MUA.</font></tt><font size=3D3><br></font><tt><font size=3D3><br><br>This=
 is only the simplest case.&nbsp; Things get a lot more complex from<br>her=
e.&nbsp; A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which
may<br>not be discoverable.&nbsp; Some providers use this as a privacy feat=
ures.<br><br>A few examples:<br>- </font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:pz.bowen@gma=
il.com target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pz.bowen@gmail.=
com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>,
</font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com" target=3D=5Fblank=
><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com</u></font></=
tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>,
and</font></tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u><br></u></font><a href=3Dmail=
to:PZBOWEN@gmail.com target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>P=
ZBOWEN@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>all
deliver to the same mailbox.<br>- The same is true for </font></tt><a href=
=3Dmailto:pzb@amazon.com target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue>=
<u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>and
</font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:pzb@amzn.com target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=
=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>.<b=
r>- </font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com" target=3D=
=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com</u=
></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D3>,
</font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:anonmouse@mailinator.com target=3D=5Fblank><tt=
><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>anonmouse@mailinator.com</u></font></tt></a=
><tt><font size=3D3>and</font></tt><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u><br></u><=
/font><a href=3Dmailto:anonmouse@suremail.info target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font =
size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>anonmouse@suremail.info</u></font></tt></a><tt><fo=
nt size=3D3>also
all deliver to the same mailbox.<br><br>However this points out a real priv=
acyrisk -- I may not want people<br>knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse ar=
e the same person.&nbsp; Obviously<br>the mailbox provider knows, but why s=
hould a sender know?<br><br>Thanks,<br>Peter<br></font></tt><br><tt><font s=
ize=3D2><br>=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F<br>pkix mailing list</font></tt><tt><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue><u><br>=
</u></font></tt><a href=3Dmailto:pkix@ietf.org target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font =
size=3D2 color=3Dblue><u>pkix@ietf.org</u></font></tt></a><font size=3D3 co=
lor=3Dblue><u><br></u></font><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinf=
o/pkix target=3D=5Fblank><tt><font size=3D2 color=3Dblue><u>http!
s://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</u></font></tt></a><font size=3D3><b=
r><br><br></font><br><font size=3D3><br>=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>pkix mailing list</font><font size=3D3=
 color=3Dblue><u><br></u></font><a href=3Dmailto:pkix@ietf.org><font size=
=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>pkix@ietf.org</u></font></a><font size=3D3 color=3Dblu=
e><u><br></u></font><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix ta=
rget=3D=5Fblank><font size=3D3 color=3Dblue><u>https://www.ietf.org/mailman=
/listinfo/pkix</u></font></a><font size=3D3><br></font><br><br><br><BR>
--=_alternative 000D1B7285257F61_=--


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From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2016 05:51:06 +0100
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Subject: [pkix] JSON Signatures for Financial Messaging
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A minute whitepaper.

https://cyberphone.github.io/openkeystore/resources/docs/jsonsignatures.html

JSON tools will (hopefully) be upgraded to accommodate this mode of operation:
http://bugs.java.com/bugdatabase/view_bug.do?bug_id=8149075
https://github.com/cyberphone/jsondotnet
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/14135#issuecomment-177265555
https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=71473
https://github.com/simplejson/simplejson/issues/133#issuecomment-177272525
https://github.com/Microsoft/ChakraCore/issues/149

Rationale:
If you specify/declare/parse properties A,B,C it is not particularly logical if they are serialized as C,B,A.

The update allows you to create "Crypto Safe" (hashable) JSON objects.  This is a new JSON feature.

Anders


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From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Elwyn Davies <elwynd@dial.pipex.com>, General area reviewing team <gen-art@ietf.org>, <draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge.all@ietf.org>
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I made all of the suggested changes except one as noted below.

On 2/17/16, 1:55 PM, "Elwyn Davies" <elwynd@dial.pipex.com> wrote:

><snip>
>
>s1, para 2: It would be useful to provide a reference for Certificate
>Signing Requests, as well as clarifying that CSR is the relevant acronym
>- one possibility might be "Certificate Signing Request (CSR; See, for
>example, CertificationRequestInfo in [RFC2986])".

I think all that was missing here was placing (CSR) following the first
use of Certificate Signing Request. In context, EST is the relevant spec.
I added (CSR) after the first use of Certificate Signing Request in the
first paragraph and replaced the second use of Certificate Signing Request
with CSR in the second paragraph to tie these references together. The
first two paragraphs now read:

PKCS (Public-Key Cryptography Standards) #9 [RFC2985] defined a
   challengePassword attribute that has been overloaded by modern
   protocol usage with the appropriate interpretation being provided by
   context rather than OID definition.  PKCS #9 defines the
   challengePassword attribute as "a password by which an entity may
   request certificate revocation".  The parsing and embedding of this
   attribute within Certificate Signing Requests is well supported by
   common PKI tool sets, but many work-flows leverage this supported
   field as a one-time password for authentication.  For example this is
   codified in many Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP)
   implementations as indicated by [I-D.gutmann-scep].  Continuing this
   trend, Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] defines an
   additional semantic for the challengePassword attribute in Section
   3.5, in order to provide a linking of the Certificate Signing Request
   (CSR) to the secure transport.

   Where the context of the protocol operation fully defined the proper
   semantic, and when only one use was required at a time, the
   overloading of this field did not cause difficulties.  Implementation
   experience with EST has shown this to be a limitation though.  There
   are plausible use cases where it is valuable to use either of the
   existing methods separately or in concert.  For example an EST server
   might require the client to authenticate itself using the existing
   client X.509 certificate, the user's username and password and to
   include a one-time password within the CSR all while maintaining
   identity linking to bind the CSR to the secure transport.  The
   overloading of a single attribute type should not be the limiting
   factor for administrators attempting to meet their security
   requirements.


>
><snip>



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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 3:40 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> It seems like we are coming to the conclusion that Section 7 of RFC 5280
> no longer correct.
>

Agreed it would be very helpful to update internationalization support for
RFC5280 particularly for email addresses.

-Wei


> Russ
>
>
> On Feb 20, 2016, at 12:52 AM, Wei Chuang wrote:
>
> Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but wonder if a simple
> case matching rule adequately covers all possible casing possibilities for
> foreign
> languages.  An example I'm told is lower case German 'ß' <-> may become
> 'SS' but also 'ẞ' and this interepretation has been recently changing as
> well.
> I just wanted to put out probably the another solution which is some sort
> of limited
> regular expression language.  This adds a fair amount of complexity, and
> the
> main justification would be that it could better support international
> alphabets
> have more complicated letter casing situations than IA5 that we're
> familiar with
> and some of these may be difficult to anticipate.  Regular expression could
> better support also the '+' and '-' scenarios as well.
>
> Eliot: Here's a first cut at an analysis of these naming features:
>
> Parties:
> Alice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.
> Bob: Message recipient of the signed message
> Casey: CA authority
> Eve: wants to spoof Alice's identity else using past email.
> Franklin: wants to spoof Alice's identity by creating a spoofable
> certificate
> with the CA Casey.
> Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice
>
> Actions
> 1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR
> 2) Alice emails Bob a signed message
> 3) Bob validates Alice's signature
> 4) Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in reply
>
> Attacks
> 1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by replaying her
> signed email to Bob from
> Eve's account.  Eve takes advantage of ambiguity afforded by the new email
> naming
> sch eme either because the specification or the encoded name is overly
> broad compared
> to the domain practices.
> 2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting a subject name
> to allow
> spoofing Alice's identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity in the new
> naming scheme
> to get past whatever ownership check that Casey does on Franklin's account
> but unlike Eve
> can craft whatever signed message is convenient to Franklin.  Franklin can
> then send
> this message to Bob who will validate message as coming from spoofed Alice.
> 2b) Even with existing validation practices Bob might be confused about
> two separate
> users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the same email address,
> which Franklin
> could take advantage of.
> 2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode homograph
> characters e.g.
> ascii 'c' with cryllic 'с'.  This is an issue with supporting
> internationalized local-parts email
> addresses.
> 3) Mallory wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice.
> Most likely
> Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create a spoofed
> certificate.  When Bob replies
> and uses the certificate to communicate privately with spoofed Alice,
> Mallory will receive the
> reply.  Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and then re-encrypt and
> forwards for Alice.
>
> Some mitigations
> 1) Exact naming that allows for no ambiguity
> 2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguity
> 3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alice's domain to prevent
> attack in 2a).
> Casey could also apply checks to prevent unicode homograph attacks in case
> 2c).
> 4) Bob's provider could use exact naming rules provided in the certificate
> to develop
> Spam/Phishing models as its now possible to know who exactly Alice is or
> isn't.  Attempts to
> spoof Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.
>
> thanks,
> -Wei
>
> On Sat, Feb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:
>
>>         David:
>>
>>         Does it make sense to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses
>> with a matching rule followed by a UTF8String?  There could be different
>> matching rules for different character sets, and a matching rule for
>> "case-insensitive IA5, ignore anything from percent to at".  As Russ
>> pointed out, it's the domain's MTA that matters in interpreting email
>> addresses as destinations, not the MUA, so the matching rule for each
>> domain is well-defined.
>>         Of course, matching rules are open-ended, and the set required
>> for full conformance would need to be defined.
>>
>> Tom Gindin
>> P.S.        The above suggestion is mine, and not that of my employer.
>>
>>
>>
>> From:        "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
>> To:        Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
>> Cc:        pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
>> Date:        02/10/2016 03:30 PM
>> Subject:        Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it
>> time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
>> Sent by:        "pkix" <pkix-bounces@ietf.org>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>> I agree that that what I'm suggesting couldn't be used to indicate all of
>> the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to the
>> NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive, there are
>> other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper'.
>>
>> This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:
>> Two email addresses are considered to match if:
>>
>>   1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND
>>
>>   2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive ASCII
>> comparison.
>> whereas RFC 5321 says:
>> The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive. Therefore,
>> SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of mailbox
>> local-parts.  In particular, for some hosts, the user "smith" is different
>> from the user "Smith". However, exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox
>> local-parts impedes interoperability and is discouraged.  Mailbox domains
>> follow normal DNS rules and are hence not case sensitive.
>>
>> Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive
>> manner, and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed
>> email (or the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's
>> host (or recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive
>> manner, RFC 5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to
>> be performed in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP
>> implementation to preserve case).
>>
>> It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts treat
>> local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be a
>> case mismatch between the "From" line and the email address in the
>> certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280 and
>> performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the vast
>> majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
>> treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
>> case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
>> client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a "From" line of
>> *"smith@example.com"* <smith@example.com>to be signed using a
>> certificate with a subjectAltName of *"Smith@example.com"*
>> <Smith@example.com>if *smith@example.com* <smith@example.com>and
>> *Smith@example.com* <Smith@example.com>are different users).
>>
>> So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a way
>> for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the
>> local-parts of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case
>> insensitive manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can
>> safely perform a case insensitive match of "From" line and certificate
>> contents or if it should perform a case sensitive match.
>>
>> I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to
>> S/MIME clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is
>> worthwhile to make such information available.
>>
>> Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a
>> hosts mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive
>> manner) could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the
>> certificate (e.g., *pzb@amazon.com* <pzb@amazon.com>and *pzb@amzn.com*
>> <pzb@amzn.com>).
>>
>> Dave
>>
>> On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:
>> On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper
>> *<david.cooper@nist.gov>* <david.cooper@nist.gov>wrote:
>>
>> In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server
>> (or
>> actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that
>> decides that *"david.cooper@nist.gov"* <david.cooper@nist.gov>and
>> *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>refer to
>> the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be
>> delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither
>> my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.
>>
>> If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of
>> *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>and a certificate with
>> a subjectAltName of
>> *"david.cooper@nist.gov,"* <david.cooper@nist.gov,>they want to know
>> whether *"david.cooper@nist.gov"* <david.cooper@nist.gov>
>> and *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>refer to the same
>> mailbox, and the answer to
>> that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing
>> whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.
>>
>>
>> This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from
>> here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which may
>> not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.
>>
>> A few examples:
>> - *pz.bowen@gmail.com* <pz.bowen@gmail.com>, *pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com*
>> <pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com>, and
>> *PZBOWEN@gmail.com* <PZBOWEN@gmail.com>all deliver to the same mailbox.
>> - The same is true for *pzb@amazon.com* <pzb@amazon.com>and
>> *pzb@amzn.com* <pzb@amzn.com>.
>> - *m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com* <m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com>,
>> *anonmouse@mailinator.com* <anonmouse@mailinator.com>and
>> *anonmouse@suremail.info* <anonmouse@suremail.info>also all deliver to
>> the same mailbox.
>>
>> However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people
>> knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously
>> the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Peter
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https ://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
>

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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 3:40 PM, Russ Housley <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" target="_blank">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word">It seems like we are coming to the conclusion that Section 7 of RFC 5280 no longer correct.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Agreed it would be very helpful to update internationalization support for RFC5280 particularly for email addresses.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><br></div><div>Russ<br><div><br></div><div><br><div><div><div class="CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><div>On Feb 20, 2016, at 12:52 AM, Wei Chuang wrote:</div><!--
--><br class="1575505153Apple-interchange-newline"></div></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div><div class="CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><div>Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but wonder if a simple</div><div>case matching rule adequately covers all possible casing possibilities for foreign</div><div>languages.  An example I&#39;m told is lower case German &#39;ß&#39; &lt;-&gt; may become</div><div>&#39;SS&#39; but also &#39;ẞ&#39; and this interepretation has been recently changing as well.</div><div>I just wanted to put out probably the another solution which is some sort of limited</div><div>regular expression language.  This adds a fair amount of complexity, and the</div><div>main justification would be that it could better support international alphabets</div><div>have more complicated letter casing situations than IA5 that we&#39;re familiar with</div><div>and some of these may be difficult to anticipate.  Regular expression could</div><div>better <!--
-->support also the &#39;+&#39; and &#39;-&#39; scenarios as well.</div><div><br></div><div>Eliot: Here&#39;s a first cut at 
 an analysis of these naming features:</div><div><br></div><div>Parties:</div><div>Alice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.</div><div>Bob: Message recipient of the signed message</div><div>Casey: CA authority</div><div>Eve: wants to spoof Alice&#39;s identity else using past email.</div><div>Franklin: wants to spoof Alice&#39;s identity by creating a spoofable certificate</div><div>with the CA Casey.</div><div>Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice</div><div><br></div><div>Actions</div><div>1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR</div><div>2) Alice emails Bob a signed message</div><div>3) Bob validates Alice&#39;s signature</div><div>4) Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in reply</div><div><br></div><div>Attacks</div><div>1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by replaying her signed email to Bob from</div><div>Eve&#39;s account.  Eve takes advantage of ambiguity afforded by the new email naming</div></div><!--
--></div><div>sch
 eme either because the specification or the encoded name is overly broad compared</div><div><div class="CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><div>to the domain practices.</div><div>2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting a subject name to allow</div><div>spoofing Alice&#39;s identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity in the new naming scheme</div><div>to get past whatever ownership check that Casey does on Franklin&#39;s account but unlike Eve</div><div>can craft whatever signed message is convenient to Franklin.  Franklin can then send</div><div>this message to Bob who will validate message as coming from spoofed Alice.</div><div>2b) Even with existing validation practices Bob might be confused about two separate</div><div>users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the same email address, which Franklin</div><div>could take advantage of.</div><div>2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode homograph characters e.g.</div><div>ascii &#39;c&#39; with <!--
-->cryllic &#39;с&#39;.  This is an issue 
 with supporting internationalized local-parts email</div><div>addresses.</div><div>3) Mallory wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice.  Most likely</div><div>Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create a spoofed certificate.  When Bob replies </div><div>and uses the certificate to communicate privately with spoofed Alice, Mallory will receive the</div><div>reply.  Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and then re-encrypt and forwards for Alice.</div><div><br></div><div>Some mitigations</div><div>1) Exact naming that allows for no ambiguity</div><div>2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguity</div><div>3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alice&#39;s domain to prevent attack in 2a).</div><div>Casey could also apply checks to prevent unicode homograph attacks in case 2c).</div><div>4) Bob&#39;s provider could use exact naming rules provided in the certificate to develop</div><div>Spam/Phishing models as its now possible to know who
  exactly Alice is or isn&#39;t.  Attempts to</div><div>spoof Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>-Wei</div></div></div></div><div><div class="CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Feb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com" target="_blank">tgindin@us.ibm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><tt><font size="2">        David:</font></tt><br><br><tt><font size="2">        Does it make sense
to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses with a matching rule followed
by a UTF8String?  There could be different matching rules for different
character sets, and a matching rule for &quot;case-insensitive IA5, ignore
anything from percent to at&quot;.  As Russ pointed out, it&#39;s the
domain&#39;s MTA that matters in interpreting email addresses as destinations,
not the MUA, so the matching rule for each domain is well-defined.</font></tt><br><tt><font size="2">        Of course, matching
rules are open-ended, and the set required for full conformance would need
to be defined.</font></tt><br><tt><font size="2"><br>Tom Gindin<br>P.S.        The above suggestion is mine, and
not that of my employer.</font></tt><br><br><br><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">From:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&quot;David A. Cooper&quot;
&lt;<a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank">david.cooper@nist.gov</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">To:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Peter Bowen &lt;<a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target="_blank">pzbowen@gmail.com</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Cc:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">pkix &lt;<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Date:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">02/10/2016 03:30 PM</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Subject:    
   </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Email
address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar)
wg?)</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Sent by:    
   </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&quot;pkix&quot;
&lt;<a href="mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt;</font><br><hr noshade><span><br><br><br><font size="3">I agree that that what I&#39;m suggesting couldn&#39;t be used
to indicate all of the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox.
In addition to the NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive,
there are other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than &#39;david.cooper&#39;.<br><br>This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:</font><br><font size="3">Two email addresses are considered to match if:<br><br>  1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND<br><br>  2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive
ASCII comparison.</font><br><font size="3">whereas RFC 5321 says:</font><br><font size="3">The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive.
Therefore, SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of
mailbox local-parts.  In particular, for some hosts, the user
&quot;smith&quot; is different from the user &quot;Smith&quot;. However,
exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox local-parts impedes interoperability
and is discouraged.  Mailbox domains follow normal DNS rules and are
hence not case sensitive.</font><br></span><font size="3"><span><br>Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive manner,
and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed email (or
the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender&#39;s host (or
recipient&#39;s host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive manner, RFC
5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to be performed
in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP implementation
to preserve case).<br><br></span>It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts treat
local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be
a case mismatch between the &quot;From&quot; line and the email address
in the certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280
and performing a case insensitive match, which isn&#39;t a problem in the vast
majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
client shouldn&#39;t consider it acceptable for an email with a &quot;From&quot;
line of </font><a href="mailto:smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font size="3">to be signed using a certificate with a subjectAltName of </font><a href="mailto:Smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;Smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font size="3">if </font><a href="mailto:smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size="3">and </font><a href="mailto:Smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>Smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size="3">are different users).<span><br><br>So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a way
for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the local-parts
of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case insensitive
manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can safely perform
a case insensitive match of &quot;From&quot; line and certificate contents
or if it should perform a case sensitive match.<br><br>I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to S/MIME
clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is worthwhile
to make such information available.<br><br></span>Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a hosts
mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive manner)
could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the certificate
(e.g., </font><a href="mailto:pzb@amazon.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></a><font size="3">and </font><a href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></a><font size="3">).<span><br><br>Dave<br><br>On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:</span></font><span><br><tt><font size="3">On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper
</font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">wrote:<br></font></tt><br><tt><font size="3">In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is
the NIST mail server (or<br>actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that<br>decides that </font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and </font></tt><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">refer to<br>the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be<br>delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither<br>my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.<br><br>If someone receives a signed email with a &quot;From&quot; line of<br></font></tt><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and a certificate with a subjectAltName of<br><!--
--></font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov," target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov,&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">they want to know whether </font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3"><br>and </font></tt><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">refer to the same mailbox, and the answer to<br>that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing<br>whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.<br></font></tt><br><tt><font size="3"><br>This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from<br>here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which
may<br>not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.<br><br>A few examples:<br>- </font></tt><a href="mailto:pz.bowen@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pz.bowen@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
</font></tt><a href="mailto:pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
and<br></font></tt></span><a href="mailto:PZBOWEN@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>PZBOWEN@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">all deliver to the same mailbox.<span><br>- The same is true for </span></font></tt><a href="mailto:pzb@amazon.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and </font></tt><a href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">.<br>- </font></tt><a href="mailto:m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
</font></tt><a href="mailto:anonmouse@mailinator.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>anonmouse@mailinator.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and<br></font></tt><a href="mailto:anonmouse@suremail.info" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>anonmouse@suremail.info</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">also all deliver to the same mailbox.<span><br><br>However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people<br>knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously<br>the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?<br><br>Thanks,<br>Peter<br><br></span></font></tt><div class="1575505153CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><div class="1575505153CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><br><tt><font size="2">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>pkix mailing list<br><a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br></font></tt><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target="_blank"><tt><!--
--><font size="2">https
 ://www.ietf.org/mailman/listin<wbr>fo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><font size="2"><br></font></tt><br><br><br></div></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/pkix</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>pkix mailing list<br><a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</a><br></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
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On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>         Wei:
>
>         I am NOT proposing that only matching rules that apply to all
> known languages be used, since it may well not be feasible for such rules
> to be written and implemented.  Likewise, I am not proposing that
> parameterized matching rules be used (and a regular expression is a quite
> open-ended parameter).  This is particularly the case since the matching
> rule has to be included in the certificate, and minor upgrades to a regular
> expression can't be made during the lifetime of the certificate.  The
> German character you mentioned is not part of IA5 or ASCII, although it's
> part of Latin-1.


Understood.  I should have pointed out earlier that I believe what you
propose will work for the majority of cases, and I'm not sure how
significant these types of corner cases are though they will exist.


>
>         It doesn't seem like a critical issue whether an email matching
> rule for Latin alphabet addresses maps Devanagari or Oriya digits to ASCII
> ones or not, although it certainly matters when the email address is in
> those scripts.  I may be thought biased, because I did propose the
> "collapse hyphens and ignore case" rule for account identifiers during the
> development of RFC 4043, which was rejected on the grounds that although
> that rule made sense for a few major scripts it had no equivalent outside
> them.
>
>
Thanks for pointing that out.

-Wei


> Tom Gindin, CISSP
>
>
>
>
> From:        Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
> To:        Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
> Cc:        "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
> Date:        02/20/2016 12:52 AM
> Subject:        Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it
> time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
> ------------------------------
>
>
>
> Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but wonder if a simple
> case matching rule adequately covers all possible casing possibilities for
> foreign
> languages.  An example I'm told is lower case German 'ß' <-> may become
> 'SS' but also 'ẞ' and this interepretation has been recently changing as
> well.
> I just wanted to put out probably the another solution which is some sort
> of limited
> regular expression language.  This adds a fair amount of complexity, and
> the
> main justification would be that it could better support international
> alphabets
> have more complicated letter casing situations than IA5 that we're
> familiar with
> and some of these may be difficult to anticipate.  Regular expression could
> better support also the '+' and '-' scenarios as well.
>
> Eliot: Here's a first cut at! an analysis of these naming features:
>
> Parties:
> Alice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.
> Bob: Message recipient of the signed message
> Casey: CA authority
> Eve: wants to spoof Alice's identity else using past email.
> Franklin: wants to spoof Alice's identity by creating a spoofable
> certificate
> with the CA Casey.
> Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice
>
> Actions
> 1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR
> 2) Alice emails Bob a signed message
> 3) Bob validates Alice's signature
> 4) Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in reply
>
> Attacks
> 1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by replaying her
> signed email to Bob from
> Eve's account.  Eve takes advantage of ambiguity afforded by the new email
> naming
> sc! heme either because the specification or the encoded name is overly
> broad compared
> to the domain practices.
> 2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting a subject name
> to allow
> spoofing Alice's identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity in the new
> naming scheme
> to get past whatever ownership check that Casey does on Franklin's account
> but unlike Eve
> can craft whatever signed message is convenient to Franklin.  Franklin can
> then send
> this message to Bob who will validate message as coming from spoofed Alice.
> 2b) Even with existing validation practices Bob might be confused about
> two separate
> users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the same email address,
> which Franklin
> could take advantage of.
> 2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode homograph
> characters e.g.
> ascii 'c' with cryllic 'с'.  This is an issue! with supporting
> internationalized local-parts email
> addresses.
> 3) Mallory wants to MitM the private communication between Bob and Alice.
> Most likely
> Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create a spoofed
> certificate.  When Bob replies
> and uses the certificate to communicate privately with spoofed Alice,
> Mallory will receive the
> reply.  Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and then re-encrypt and
> forwards for Alice.
>
> Some mitigations
> 1) Exact naming that allows for no ambiguity
> 2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguity
> 3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alice's domain to prevent
> attack in 2a).
> Casey could also apply checks to prevent unicode homograph attacks in case
> 2c).
> 4) Bob's provider could use exact naming rules provided in the certificate
> to develop
> Spam/Phishing models as its now possible to know wh! o exactly Alice is or
> isn't.  Attempts to
>
> spoof Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.
>
> thanks,
> -Wei
>
> On Sat, Feb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin <*tgindin@us.ibm.com*
> <tgindin@us.ibm.com>> wrote:
>         David:
>
>         Does it make sense to define an OTHER-NAME for email addresses
> with a matching rule followed by a UTF8String?  There could be different
> matching rules for different character sets, and a matching rule for
> "case-insensitive IA5, ignore anything from percent to at".  As Russ
> pointed out, it's the domain's MTA that matters in interpreting email
> addresses as destinations, not the MUA, so the matching rule for each
> domain is well-defined.
>         Of course, matching rules are open-ended, and the set required for
> full conformance would need to be defined.
>
> Tom Gindin
> P.S.        The above suggestion is mine, and not that of my employer.
>
>
>
> From:        "David A. Cooper" <*david.cooper@nist.gov*
> <david.cooper@nist.gov>>
> To:        Peter Bowen <*pzbowen@gmail.com* <pzbowen@gmail.com>>
> Cc:        pkix <*pkix@ietf.org* <pkix@ietf.org>>
> Date:        02/10/2016 03:30 PM
> Subject:        Re: [pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it
> time for a pkix extensions (or similar) wg?)
> Sent by:        "pkix" <*pkix-bounces@ietf.org* <pkix-bounces@ietf.org>>
> ------------------------------
>
>
>
> I agree that that what I'm suggesting couldn't be used to indicate all of
> the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to the
> NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive, there are
> other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than 'david.cooper'.
>
> This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:
> Two email addresses are considered to match if:
>
>   1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND
>
>   2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive ASCII
> comparison.
> whereas RFC 5321 says:
> The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive. Therefore,
> SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of mailbox
> local-parts.  In particular, for some hosts, the user "smith" is different
> from the user "Smith". However, exploiting the case sensitivity of mailbox
> local-parts impedes interoperability and is discouraged.  Mailbox domains
> follow normal DNS rules and are hence not case sensitive.
>
> Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive
> manner, and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed
> email (or the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender's
> host (or recipient's host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive
> manner, RFC 5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to
> be performed in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP
> implementation to preserve case).
>
> It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts treat
> local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be a
> case mismatch between the "From" line and the email address in the
> certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280 and
> performing a case insensitive match, which isn't a problem in the vast
> majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
> treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
> case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
> client shouldn't consider it acceptable for an email with a "From" line of
> *"smith@example.com"* <smith@example.com>to be signed using a certificate
> with a subjectAltName of *"Smith@example.com"* <Smith@example.com>if
> *smith@example.com* <smith@example.com>and *Smith@example.com*
> <Smith@example.com>are different users).
>
> So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a way
> for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the
> local-parts of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case
> insensitive manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can
> safely perform a case insensitive match of "From" line and certificate
> contents or if it should perform a case sensitive match.
>
> I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to
> S/MIME clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is
> worthwhile to make such information available.
>
> Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a
> hosts mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive
> manner) could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the
> certificate (e.g., *pzb@amazon.com* <pzb@amazon.com>and *pzb@amzn.com*
> <pzb@amzn.com>).
>
> Dave
>
> On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper
> *<david.cooper@nist.gov>* <david.cooper@nist.gov>wrote:
>
> In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server
> (or
> actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that
> decides that *"david.cooper@nist.gov"* <david.cooper@nist.gov>and
> *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>refer to
> the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be
> delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so.  Neither
> my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.
>
> If someone receives a signed email with a "From" line of
> *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>and a certificate with a
> subjectAltName of*"david.cooper@nist.gov,"* <david.cooper@nist.gov,>they
> want to know whether *"david.cooper@nist.gov"* <david.cooper@nist.gov>
> and *"DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov"* <DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov>refer to the same
> mailbox, and the answer to
> that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing
> whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.
>
>
> This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from
> here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which may
> not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.
>
> A few examples:
> - *pz.bowen@gmail.com* <pz.bowen@gmail.com>, *pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com*
> <pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com>, and
> *PZBOWEN@gmail.com* <PZBOWEN@gmail.com>all deliver to the same mailbox.
> - The same is true for *pzb@amazon.com* <pzb@amazon.com>and *pzb@amzn.com*
> <pzb@amzn.com>.
> - *m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com* <m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com>,
> *anonmouse@mailinator.com* <anonmouse@mailinator.com>and
> *anonmouse@suremail.info* <anonmouse@suremail.info>also all deliver to
> the same mailbox.
>
> However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people
> knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously
> the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?
>
> Thanks,
> Peter
>
>
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>
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<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Tom Gindin <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com" target="_blank">tgindin@us.ibm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><tt><font size="2">        Wei:</font></tt><br><br><tt><font size="2">        I am NOT proposing
that only matching rules that apply to all known languages be used, since
it may well not be feasible for such rules to be written and implemented.
 Likewise, I am not proposing that parameterized matching rules be
used (and a regular expression is a quite open-ended parameter).  This
is particularly the case since the matching rule has to be included in
the certificate, and minor upgrades to a regular expression can&#39;t be made
during the lifetime of the certificate.  The German character you
mentioned is not part of IA5 or ASCII, although it&#39;s part of Latin-1.</font></tt></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Understood.  I should have pointed out earlier that I believe what you propose will work for the majority of cases, and I&#39;m not sure how significant these types of corner cases are though they will exist.  </div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br><tt><font size="2">        It doesn&#39;t seem
like a critical issue whether an email matching rule for Latin alphabet
addresses maps Devanagari or Oriya digits to ASCII ones or not, although
it certainly matters when the email address is in those scripts.  I
may be thought biased, because I did propose the &quot;collapse hyphens
and ignore case&quot; rule for account identifiers during the development
of RFC 4043, which was rejected on the grounds that although that rule
made sense for a few major scripts it had no equivalent outside them.</font></tt><br><tt><font size="2"><br></font></tt></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks for pointing that out.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><tt><font size="2">Tom Gindin, CISSP<br></font></tt><br><br><br><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">From:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Wei Chuang &lt;<a href="mailto:weihaw@google.com" target="_blank">weihaw@google.com</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">To:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS,
Eliot Lear &lt;<a href="mailto:lear@cisco.com" target="_blank">lear@cisco.com</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Cc:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&quot;David A. Cooper&quot;
&lt;<a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank">david.cooper@nist.gov</a>&gt;, pkix &lt;<a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;</font><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Date:      
 </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">02/20/2016 12:52 AM</font><span class=""><br><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif">Subject:    
   </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Email
address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions (or similar)
wg?)</font><br></span><hr noshade><span class=""><br><br><br><font size="3">Tom: I agree with the approach to use OTHER-NAMES but
wonder if a simple</font><br><font size="3">case matching rule adequately covers all possible casing
possibilities for foreign</font><br><font size="3">languages.  An example I&#39;m told is lower case German
&#39;ß&#39; &lt;-&gt; may become</font><br><font size="3">&#39;SS&#39; but also &#39;ẞ&#39; and this interepretation has been
recently changing as well.</font><br><font size="3">I just wanted to put out probably the another solution
which is some sort of limited</font><br><font size="3">regular expression language.  This adds a fair amount
of complexity, and the</font><br><font size="3">main justification would be that it could better support
international alphabets</font><br><font size="3">have more complicated letter casing situations than IA5
that we&#39;re familiar with</font><br><font size="3">and some of these may be difficult to anticipate. 
Regular expression could</font><br><font size="3">better support also the &#39;+&#39; and &#39;-&#39; scenarios as well.</font><br><br></span><font size="3">Eliot: Here&#39;s a first cut at! an analysis of these naming
features:</font><span class=""><br><br><font size="3">Parties:</font><br><font size="3">Alice: Wants to send a signed message to Bob.</font><br><font size="3">Bob: Message recipient of the signed message</font><br><font size="3">Casey: CA authority</font><br><font size="3">Eve: wants to spoof Alice&#39;s identity else using past email.</font><br><font size="3">Franklin: wants to spoof Alice&#39;s identity by creating
a spoofable certificate</font><br><font size="3">with the CA Casey.</font><br><font size="3">Mallory: wants to MitM the private communication between
Bob and Alice</font><br><br><font size="3">Actions</font><br><font size="3">1) Alice obtain certificate from CA Casey using a CSR</font><br><font size="3">2) Alice emails Bob a signed message</font><br><font size="3">3) Bob validates Alice&#39;s signature</font><br><font size="3">4) Bob emails Alice an encrypted message in reply</font><br><br><font size="3">Attacks</font><br><font size="3">1a) Eve performs a replay attack i.e. spoofing Alice by
replaying her signed email to Bob from</font><br><font size="3">Eve&#39;s account.  Eve takes advantage of ambiguity
afforded by the new email naming</font><br></span><font size="3">sc! heme either because the specification or the encoded
name is overly broad compared</font><span class=""><br><font size="3">to the domain practices.</font><br><font size="3">2a) Franklin obtains a certificate from CA Casey crafting
a subject name to allow</font><br><font size="3">spoofing Alice&#39;s identity. Like Eve, Franklin uses ambuiguity
in the new naming scheme</font><br><font size="3">to get past whatever ownership check that Casey does on
Franklin&#39;s account but unlike Eve</font><br><font size="3">can craft whatever signed message is convenient to Franklin. 
Franklin can then send</font><br><font size="3">this message to Bob who will validate message as coming
from spoofed Alice.</font><br><font size="3">2b) Even with existing validation practices Bob might
be confused about two separate</font><br><font size="3">users i.e. alice vs Alice and believe they are the same
email address, which Franklin</font><br><font size="3">could take advantage of.</font><br><font size="3">2c) Similar confusion may be accomplished by using unicode
homograph characters e.g.</font><br></span><font size="3">ascii &#39;c&#39; with cryllic &#39;с&#39;.  This is an issue! with
supporting internationalized local-parts email</font><span class=""><br><font size="3">addresses.</font><br><font size="3">3) Mallory wants to MitM the private communication between
Bob and Alice.  Most likely</font><br><font size="3">Mallory uses the same technique as Franklin to create
a spoofed certificate.  When Bob replies </font><br><font size="3">and uses the certificate to communicate privately with
spoofed Alice, Mallory will receive the</font><br><font size="3">reply.  Maloory decrypts and reads the message, and
then re-encrypt and forwards for Alice.</font><br><br><font size="3">Some mitigations</font><br><font size="3">1) Exact naming that allows for no ambiguity</font><br><font size="3">2) Simple rules to prevent or limit ambiguity</font><br><font size="3">3) CA Casey knows the exact naming rules of Alice&#39;s domain
to prevent attack in 2a).</font><br><font size="3">Casey could also apply checks to prevent unicode homograph
attacks in case 2c).</font><br><font size="3">4) Bob&#39;s provider could use exact naming rules provided
in the certificate to develop</font><br></span><font size="3">Spam/Phishing models as its now possible to know wh! o
exactly Alice is or isn&#39;t.  Attempts to</font><div><div class="CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><br><font size="3">spoof Alice will be labeled and treated as Phish.</font><br><br><font size="3">thanks,</font><br><font size="3">-Wei</font><br><br><font size="3">On Sat, Feb 13, 2016 at 6:19 PM, Tom Gindin &lt;</font><a href="mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>tgindin@us.ibm.com</u></font></a><font size="3">&gt;
wrote:</font><br><tt><font size="2">        David:</font></tt><font size="3"><br></font><tt><font size="2"><br>        Does it make sense to define an OTHER-NAME
for email addresses with a matching rule followed by a UTF8String? 
There could be different matching rules for different character sets, and
a matching rule for &quot;case-insensitive IA5, ignore anything from percent
to at&quot;.  As Russ pointed out, it&#39;s the domain&#39;s MTA that matters
in interpreting email addresses as destinations, not the MUA, so the matching
rule for each domain is well-defined.<br>        Of course, matching rules are open-ended, and
the set required for full conformance would need to be defined.<br><br>Tom Gindin<br>P.S.        The above suggestion is mine, and not that
of my employer.</font></tt><font size="3"><br><br><br></font><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif"><br>From:        </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&quot;David
A. Cooper&quot; &lt;</font><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><font size="1" color="blue" face="sans-serif"><u>david.cooper@nist.gov</u></font></a><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&gt;</font><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif"><br>To:        </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Peter
Bowen &lt;</font><a href="mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com" target="_blank"><font size="1" color="blue" face="sans-serif"><u>pzbowen@gmail.com</u></font></a><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&gt;</font><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif"><br>Cc:        </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">pkix
&lt;</font><a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank"><font size="1" color="blue" face="sans-serif"><u>pkix@ietf.org</u></font></a><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&gt;</font><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif"><br>Date:        </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">02/10/2016
03:30 PM</font><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif"><br>Subject:        </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">Re:
[pkix] Email address matching rules (was Re: Is it time for a pkix extensions
(or similar) wg?)</font><font size="1" color="#5f5f5f" face="sans-serif"><br>Sent by:        </font><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&quot;pkix&quot;
&lt;</font><a href="mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target="_blank"><font size="1" color="blue" face="sans-serif"><u>pkix-bounces@ietf.org</u></font></a><font size="1" face="sans-serif">&gt;</font><font size="3"><br></font><hr noshade><font size="3"><br><br><br>I agree that that what I&#39;m suggesting couldn&#39;t be used to indicate all
of the email addresses that resolve to the same mailbox. In addition to
the NIST mail server treating the local part as case insensitive, there
are other aliases that resolve to my mailbox other than &#39;david.cooper&#39;.<br><br>This whole conversation arose since RFC 5280 says:<br>Two email addresses are considered to match if:<br><br>  1)  the local-part of each name is an exact match, AND<br><br>  2)  the host-part of each name matches using a case-insensitive
ASCII comparison.<br>whereas RFC 5321 says:<br>The local-part of a mailbox MUST BE treated as case sensitive. Therefore,
SMTP implementations MUST take care to preserve the case of mailbox local-parts.  In
particular, for some hosts, the user &quot;smith&quot; is different from
the user &quot;Smith&quot;. However, exploiting the case sensitivity of
mailbox local-parts impedes interoperability and is discouraged. 
Mailbox domains follow normal DNS rules and are hence not case sensitive.<br><br>Since hosts are allowed to treat the local-parts in a case sensitive manner,
and there is no way at the moment for the recipient of a signed email (or
the sender of an encrypted email) to know whether the sender&#39;s host (or
recipient&#39;s host) treats the local-parts in a case sensitive manner, RFC
5280 takes the conservative approach and requires matching to be performed
in a case sensitive manner (just as RFC 5321 requires SMTP implementation
to preserve case).<br><br>It has been pointed out that this creates problems since most hosts treat
local-parts are case insensitive and it is not uncommon for there to be
a case mismatch between the &quot;From&quot; line and the email address
in the certificate. Most email clients deal with this by ignoring RFC 5280
and performing a case insensitive match, which isn&#39;t a problem in the vast
majority of cases in which the host corresponding to the email address
treats the local-parts in a case insensitive manner, but would be in the
case of hosts that treat local-parts in a case sensitive manner (my mail
client shouldn&#39;t consider it acceptable for an email with a &quot;From&quot;
line of </font><a href="mailto:smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font size="3">to
be signed using a certificate with a subjectAltName of </font><a href="mailto:Smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;Smith@example.com&quot;</u></font></a><font size="3">if
</font><a href="mailto:smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size="3">and
</font><a href="mailto:Smith@example.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>Smith@example.com</u></font></a><font size="3">are
different users).<br><br>So, some people have suggested that it would be nice if there was a way
for S/MIME clients to be able to discover whether a host treats the local-parts
of email addresses in its domain in a case sensitive or case insensitive
manner, so that the S/MIME client can know whether it can safely perform
a case insensitive match of &quot;From&quot; line and certificate contents
or if it should perform a case sensitive match.<br><br>I was merely suggesting a possible way to convey that information to S/MIME
clients in a secure manner, if there is agreement that it is worthwhile
to make such information available.<br><br>Anything beyond simple, generic matching rules that apply to all of a hosts
mailboxes (e.g., the host treats local-parts in a case insensitive manner)
could only be handled by including multiple email addresses in the certificate
(e.g., </font><a href="mailto:pzb@amazon.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></a><font size="3">and
</font><a href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></a><font size="3">).<br><br>Dave<br><br>On 02/10/2016 02:43 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:</font><tt><font size="3"><br>On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 11:05 AM, David A. Cooper </font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&lt;david.cooper@nist.gov&gt;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">wrote:</font></tt><font size="3"><br></font><tt><font size="3"><br>In what way is name matching a per MUA issue? It is the NIST mail server
(or<br>actually the server of service provider that handles mail for NIST) that<br>decides that </font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and
</font></tt><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">refer
to<br>the same mailbox. You can send an email to either address and it will be<br>delivered to the same mailbox because the server choses to do so. 
Neither<br>my nor your choice of mail client has any effect on that.<br><br>If someone receives a signed email with a &quot;From&quot; line of</font></tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u><br></u></font><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and
a certificate with a subjectAltName of</font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov," target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov,&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">they
want to know whether </font></tt><a href="mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;david.cooper@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3"><br>and </font></tt><a href="mailto:DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>&quot;DAVID.COOPER@nist.gov&quot;</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">refer
to the same mailbox, and the answer to<br>that has everything to do with the NIST mail server and has nothing<br>whatsoever to do with anyone choice of MUA.</font></tt><font size="3"><br></font><tt><font size="3"><br><br>This is only the simplest case.  Things get a lot more complex from<br>here.  A single mailbox may have infinite addresses, many of which
may<br>not be discoverable.  Some providers use this as a privacy features.<br><br>A few examples:<br>- </font></tt><a href="mailto:pz.bowen@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pz.bowen@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
</font></tt><a href="mailto:pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzbowe.n+foo.bar@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
and</font></tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u><br></u></font><a href="mailto:PZBOWEN@gmail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>PZBOWEN@gmail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">all
deliver to the same mailbox.<br>- The same is true for </font></tt><a href="mailto:pzb@amazon.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amazon.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and
</font></tt><a href="mailto:pzb@amzn.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pzb@amzn.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">.<br>- </font></tt><a href="mailto:m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>m8r-cfbmf1@veryrealemail.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">,
</font></tt><a href="mailto:anonmouse@mailinator.com" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>anonmouse@mailinator.com</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">and</font></tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u><br></u></font><a href="mailto:anonmouse@suremail.info" target="_blank"><tt><font size="3" color="blue"><u>anonmouse@suremail.info</u></font></tt></a><tt><font size="3">also
all deliver to the same mailbox.<br><br>However this points out a real privacyrisk -- I may not want people<br>knowing that m8r-cfbm1 and anonmouse are the same person.  Obviously<br>the mailbox provider knows, but why should a sender know?<br><br>Thanks,<br>Peter<br></font></tt><br><tt><font size="2"><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>pkix mailing list</font></tt><tt><font size="2" color="blue"><u><br></u></font></tt><a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank"><tt><font size="2" color="blue"><u>pkix@ietf.org</u></font></tt></a><font size="3" color="blue"><u><br></u></font></div></div><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target="_blank"><tt><font size="2" color="blue"><u>http!
s://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</u></font></tt></a><div class="CSS_CV_TRIMMABLE_"><div class="CSS_CV_ELIDED_TEXT_"><font size="3"><br><br><br></font><br><font size="3"><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>pkix mailing list</font><font size="3" color="blue"><u><br></u></font><a href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>pkix@ietf.org</u></font></a><font size="3" color="blue"><u><br></u></font><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target="_blank"><font size="3" color="blue"><u>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pkix</u></font></a><font size="3"><br></font><br><br><br><br></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--089e013a0c1e5b1dc3052c607834--


From nobody Fri Feb 26 09:27:41 2016
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To: General area reviewing team <gen-art@ietf.org>, draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge.all@ietf.org
From: Elwyn Davies <elwynd@dial.pipex.com>
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Subject: [pkix] Gen-art LC review of draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-04
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at

<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge-04.txt
Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
Review Date: 2016/02/17
IETF LC End Date: 2016/03/07
IESG Telechat date: (if known) -

Summary: Almost ready.  There is one very minor issue and a number of 
nits. IDNITS identifies a downref (RFC 5912) but this is already in the 
downref registry (re RFC 5913) so no further action is needed, I believe.

Major issues:
None.

Minor issues:
s4, last sentence:
> EST clients that include the
>     "estIdentityLinking" attribute SHOULD NOT also include the
>     "challengePassword" attribute.
I think this ought to be MUST NOT.  In any case, the behaviour of EST 
servers that receive a request with both challengePassword and 
estIdentityLinking defined should be more carefully specified. 
Similarly, I assume that the EST server should not respond to a 
/csrattrs request by specifying both of these attributes

Nits/editorial comments:
Abstract: s/PKCS #9 challengePassword attribute/challengePassword 
attribute defined in PKCS (Public-Key Cryptography Standards) #9 (RFC 2985)/

s1: s/PKCS/PKCS (Public-Key Cryptography Standards)/

s1: s/One-Time Password/one-time password/ (two places)

s1, para 1: Good to associate the acronym EST with its expansion here as 
well as in abstract: s/Enrollment over Secure Transport/Enrollment over 
Secure Transport (EST)/

s1: Expand SCEP on first (only) use (Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol)

s1: Need to expand TLS on first use (apparently not a well-known 
acronym!  However HTTP is.)

s1, para 2: It would be useful to provide a reference for Certificate 
Signing Requests, as well as clarifying that CSR is the relevant acronym 
- one possibility might be "Certificate Signing Request (CSR; See, for 
example, CertificationRequestInfo in [RFC2986])".

s1, last para: s/is not intended to/are not intended to/

s3.1: s/upper bound/maximum length/ seems clearer to me.

s3.1, para 1: s/of the values/of the value/

s3.2, section title: Shouldn't this section be titled either:
      Alternative to PKCS #9 Challenge Password Attribute
or
      Revocation Challenge Attribute
?

s3.2, para 1, sentence 2: s/revocation Challenge/revocationChallenge/

s4: A reference for the definition of /csrattrs would be useful. Suggest:
OLD:
in the /csrattrs.
NEW:
in the HTTP control URI path /csrattrs (see Sections 3.2.2 and 4.5 of 
[RFC7030]).

s5: I fear that you ought to provide the full titles of RFC 4226 and RFC 
6238 to expand HOTP and TOTP ( or just omit the acronyms, since they are 
in the reference expansions.)

s6: Probably ought to reference RFC 7107 as the registry defining RFC  
(it isn't referenced otherwise).

s6: Ought to have an RFC editor note to replace the TBDx references in 
s3 and Appendix A.

s7: IMO RFC 2985 and RFC 7030 are normative.  RFC 7107 could also be 
considered normative.

s7.2: AFAICS RFC 7299 is not referenced.

Non-issue:
s7.1: IDNITS complains that RFC 5912 is a downref.  However, RFC 5912 is 
already in the downref registry (re RFC 5913) and so should not need 
further downref approval I believe.


From nobody Fri Feb 26 09:27:43 2016
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From: Rick Casarez <rick.casarez@gmail.com>
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--001a114e541c9742ae052c494a0c
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Hello,

I have reviewed this document as part of the Operational directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
These comments were written with the intent of improving the operational
aspects of the IETF drafts. Comments that are not addressed in last call
may be included in AD reviews during the IESG review. Document editors and
WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call
comments.

My overall view of the document is 'Ready with nits' for publication.

Editorial:

Section 1 - 1st paragraph / Section 3.1 OTP
There are no RFC references for OTP in these sections even though you had
them for other sections. They are listed in Section 5 though. I recommend
adding the same references in Section 5 to the two sections mentioning OTP
(1/3.1).

-------------------
Cheers, Rick

--001a114e541c9742ae052c494a0c
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div><div>Hello,<br><br></div>I have review=
ed this document as part of the Operational directorate&#39;s ongoing effor=
t to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments =
were written with the intent of improving the operational aspects of the IE=
TF drafts. Comments that are not addressed in last call may be included in =
AD reviews during the IESG review. Document editors and WG chairs should tr=
eat these comments just like any other last call comments.<br><br></div><sp=
an lang=3D"EN-US">My overall view of the document is &#39;Ready with nits&#=
39; for publication.</span><br><br></div>Editorial:<br><br></div>Section 1 =
- 1st paragraph / Section 3.1 OTP<br></div>There are no RFC references for =
OTP in these sections even though you had them for other sections. They are=
 listed in Section 5 though. I recommend adding the same references in Sect=
ion 5 to the two sections mentioning OTP (1/3.1).<br><br clear=3D"all"><div=
><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_signature"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">-------------------<br>Cheers, Rick<br>=
</div></div></div></div></div>
</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>

--001a114e541c9742ae052c494a0c--


From nobody Fri Feb 26 09:27:45 2016
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Hi, Carl.

Thanks for the response.

Pending the publication of an updated draft, if you have a snapshot of 
the updated version, I am happy to run my eye over the changes. I would 
be particularly interested to have a look at what you propose for the 
last sentence of s4.

As regards the CSR stuff below, trivially, there is a previous instance 
of Certificate Signing Request(s)  on line 7.  More importantly, I had a 
look at the EST draft and it doesn't seem to define a CSR but talks 
immediately about CSR attributes (possibly an oversight there).  Looking 
at Wikipedia (OK, that is a dangerous pursuit ;-) ), I am told that CSR 
and Certification Request are equivalent terms but definitions of the 
actual term CSR in standards documents are few and far between, to the 
extent that I couldn't see one in the various Google responses.  OTOH 
Certification Request is defined in the Security Glossary (RFC 4949).  I 
think it would be worth noting the equivalence of the terms and pointing 
to one or both of RFC 4949 and PKCS #10 - RFC 2986.

Regards,
Elwyn

On 22/02/2016 13:12, Carl Wallace wrote:
> I made all of the suggested changes except one as noted below.
>
> On 2/17/16, 1:55 PM, "Elwyn Davies" <elwynd@dial.pipex.com> wrote:
>
>> <snip>
>>
>> s1, para 2: It would be useful to provide a reference for Certificate
>> Signing Requests, as well as clarifying that CSR is the relevant acronym
>> - one possibility might be "Certificate Signing Request (CSR; See, for
>> example, CertificationRequestInfo in [RFC2986])".
> I think all that was missing here was placing (CSR) following the first
> use of Certificate Signing Request. In context, EST is the relevant spec.
> I added (CSR) after the first use of Certificate Signing Request in the
> first paragraph and replaced the second use of Certificate Signing Request
> with CSR in the second paragraph to tie these references together. The
> first two paragraphs now read:
>
> PKCS (Public-Key Cryptography Standards) #9 [RFC2985] defined a
>     challengePassword attribute that has been overloaded by modern
>     protocol usage with the appropriate interpretation being provided by
>     context rather than OID definition.  PKCS #9 defines the
>     challengePassword attribute as "a password by which an entity may
>     request certificate revocation".  The parsing and embedding of this
>     attribute within Certificate Signing Requests is well supported by
>     common PKI tool sets, but many work-flows leverage this supported
>     field as a one-time password for authentication.  For example this is
>     codified in many Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP)
>     implementations as indicated by [I-D.gutmann-scep].  Continuing this
>     trend, Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] defines an
>     additional semantic for the challengePassword attribute in Section
>     3.5, in order to provide a linking of the Certificate Signing Request
>     (CSR) to the secure transport.
>
>     Where the context of the protocol operation fully defined the proper
>     semantic, and when only one use was required at a time, the
>     overloading of this field did not cause difficulties.  Implementation
>     experience with EST has shown this to be a limitation though.  There
>     are plausible use cases where it is valuable to use either of the
>     existing methods separately or in concert.  For example an EST server
>     might require the client to authenticate itself using the existing
>     client X.509 certificate, the user's username and password and to
>     include a one-time password within the CSR all while maintaining
>     identity linking to bind the CSR to the secure transport.  The
>     overloading of a single attribute type should not be the limiting
>     factor for administrators attempting to meet their security
>     requirements.
>
>
>> <snip>
>


From nobody Mon Feb 29 15:08:50 2016
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  Hi,

  RFC 7030 says in 4.5.2 that "If an EST server requires the linking
of identity and POP information (see Section 3.5), it MUST include
the challengePassword OID in the CSR Attributes Response." Now if
a server wants to use the disambiguated estIdentityLinking OID
instead it will be forced to include both in its CSR Attrs response
which might cause a client to violate the SHOULD NOT in section 4
of this draft through simply trying to comply with the server's
request. I suggest having this draft modify RFC 7030 and remove that
"MUST" if the server sends the estIdentityLinking OID in its CSR
Attrs response.

  Also, why does it say "The EST server MAY indicate any or all of
these [attributes] in the /csrattrs"? Servers don't (won't) just
include random junk in a CSR Attrs response, they use the CSR Attrs
response to tell the client how to construct the CSR. If it wants to
use any of these new attributes this should, at least, be a SHOULD.
Using the description in RFC 2119, there may be valid reasons for
an EST server not to indicate these attributes in a CSR Attrs response
this but the full implications of this (i.e. the CA possibly rejecting
certificate signing requests that it would've otherwise not rejected)
must be understood. In other words, SHOULD.

  Otherwise, looks good! I'll implement this as soon as the OIDs
get assigned.

  regards,

  Dan.




From nobody Mon Feb 29 17:38:46 2016
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From: "Max Pritikin (pritikin)" <pritikin@cisco.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
Thread-Topic: review of draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge
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Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 01:38:32 +0000
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Subject: Re: [pkix] review of draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge
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