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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 16:36:45 +0200
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Subject: [pkix] Legacy practices, again.
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Bonjour,

I was digging into RFC5652 about SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier today.
Found section 10.1.2, which says that a signature algorithm can be RSA,
DSA, DSA with SHA1, ECDSA, ECDSA with SHA256.
Found myself looking at RFC3370, which says that rsaEncryption is a valid
SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier.
Later read PKCS#1v1.5 (the 1993 version) which confirms that rsaEncryption
is valid for a signature algorithm.

Then went up looking at CAdES (the RFC5126 version) and saw that it wasn't
clearer, presenting RSA and DSA in digital signature algorithms and
presenting only the *with-SHA1 schema and OID.
Went up again and looked at ETSI TS 119312 (which is referenced by ETSI EN
3191x2 standards for eIDAS), which properly defines signature suites
combining a digest function, a public key algorithm, and a padding scheme,
but has specified in its normative Annex A.1 that
SignerInfo.digestAlgorithm would refer to a hash function and
SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm should refer to a public key algorithm (RSA,
DSA, ECDSA).

And today, a CMS with a SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm using the
rsaEncryption OID is still valid. Despite the fact that this OID doesn't
design a signature suite, and is also used for a public key and a key
encryption key algorithm. Because of some stuff written in 1993 and still
referenced today.

Sad.

-- 
Erwann.

--001a11410fec4a074e0537ad8c4d
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonjour,<div><br></div><div>I was digging into RFC5652 abo=
ut SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier today.</div><div>Found section 10.1.2, whic=
h says that a signature algorithm can be RSA, DSA, DSA with SHA1, ECDSA, EC=
DSA with SHA256.</div><div>Found myself looking at RFC3370, which says that=
 rsaEncryption is a valid SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier.</div><div>Later rea=
d PKCS#1v1.5 (the 1993 version) which confirms that rsaEncryption is valid =
for a signature algorithm.<br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div><div>Then went u=
p looking at CAdES (the RFC5126 version) and saw that it wasn&#39;t clearer=
, presenting RSA and DSA in digital signature algorithms and presenting onl=
y the *with-SHA1 schema and OID.</div><div>Went up again and looked at ETSI=
 TS 119312 (which is referenced by ETSI EN 3191x2 standards for eIDAS), whi=
ch properly defines signature suites combining a digest function, a public =
key algorithm, and a padding scheme, but has specified in its normative Ann=
ex A.1 that SignerInfo.digestAlgorithm would refer to a hash function and S=
ignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm should refer to a public key algorithm (RSA, D=
SA, ECDSA).</div><div><br></div><div>And today, a CMS with a SignerInfo.sig=
natureAlgorithm using the rsaEncryption OID is still valid. Despite the fac=
t that this OID doesn&#39;t design a signature suite, and is also used for =
a public key and a key encryption key algorithm. Because of some stuff writ=
ten in 1993 and still referenced today.</div><div><br></div><div>Sad.</div>=
<div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmai=
l_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div>

--001a11410fec4a074e0537ad8c4d--


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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2016 17:33:19 +0200
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Subject: [pkix] About RFC4985, SRVName
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--001a114112be1be7f70537eab020
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Bonjour,

I think it's the right list for this topic.

There is an attempt to allow SRVNames in public X.509 certificates as
defined by CABForum. This would follow RFC4985.
However, the NameConstraints matching rules as written in section 4 doesn't
allow for an empty SRVName restriction; the SRVName has a SIZE(1..MAX)
constraint, and the text doesn't deal with both service name and DNS name
missing. Having this "fully permitted" constraint may seem stupid, but it's
the only way to completely forbid SRVNames, by using such constraint in the
excludedSubtrees portion of the NC extension.

What is the proper way to solve this issue? Suppress the size constraint on
the SRVName element in section 2? Modify section 4 to allow the single '.'
character (U+002E) to represent both service and DNS names missing?

-- 
Erwann.

--001a114112be1be7f70537eab020
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonjour,<div><br></div><div>I think it&#39;s the right lis=
t for this topic.</div><div><br></div><div>There is an attempt to allow SRV=
Names in public X.509 certificates as defined by CABForum. This would follo=
w RFC4985.</div><div>However, the NameConstraints matching rules as written=
 in section 4 doesn&#39;t allow for an empty SRVName restriction; the SRVNa=
me has a SIZE(1..MAX) constraint, and the text doesn&#39;t deal with both s=
ervice name and DNS name missing. Having this &quot;fully permitted&quot; c=
onstraint may seem stupid, but it&#39;s the only way to completely forbid S=
RVNames, by using such constraint in the excludedSubtrees portion of the NC=
 extension.</div><div><br></div><div>What is the proper way to solve this i=
ssue? Suppress the size constraint on the SRVName element in section 2? Mod=
ify section 4 to allow the single &#39;.&#39; character (U+002E) to represe=
nt both service and DNS names missing?<br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <=
br><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann=
.</div>
</div></div>

--001a114112be1be7f70537eab020--


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From: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>, "<pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 11:24:21 +1000
Thread-Topic: [pkix] About RFC4985, SRVName
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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2016 11:43:25 +0200
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Subject: Re: [pkix] About RFC4985, SRVName
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Almost. Anyway, it's not a nice solution. This is the equivalent of
allowing a CA to produce bogus certificates in the hope that they will be
rejected by another validation layer.

The "invalid" TLD seems to not be requested anymore at the root DNS
servers; this wasn't the case a few years ago.
That doesn't mean this TLD isn't requested at all (on delegating or caching
name servers), as we see that another TLD listed in RFC6761 is still
requested up to root DNS servers (localhost), and that the reserved "local"
TLD (RFC6762) is also requested at the root level.

And the "invalid" service name, while not registered at IANA, is also not
reserved, and can then still be defined and used at a local level.

2016-07-19 3:24 GMT+02:00 Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>:

> Permitting only a non-existent service name (eg =E2=80=9C_invalid=E2=80=
=9D) almost gives
> you what you need. Include the =E2=80=9Cinvalid=E2=80=9D domain name for =
good measure [RFC
> 6761 Special-Use Domain Names].
>
>
>
> NameConstraintsSyntax:{
>
>   permittedSubtrees {
>
>     {
>
>       base otherName:{
>
>         type-id id-on-dnsSRV,
>
>         value SRVName:"_invalid.invalid"
>
>       }
>
>     }
>
>   }
>
> }
>
>
>
> --
>
> James Manger
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Erwann Abalea
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 19 July 2016 1:33 AM
> *To:* <pkix@ietf.org> <pkix@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* [pkix] About RFC4985, SRVName
>
>
>
> Bonjour,
>
>
>
> I think it's the right list for this topic.
>
>
>
> There is an attempt to allow SRVNames in public X.509 certificates as
> defined by CABForum. This would follow RFC4985.
>
> However, the NameConstraints matching rules as written in section 4
> doesn't allow for an empty SRVName restriction; the SRVName has a
> SIZE(1..MAX) constraint, and the text doesn't deal with both service name
> and DNS name missing. Having this "fully permitted" constraint may seem
> stupid, but it's the only way to completely forbid SRVNames, by using suc=
h
> constraint in the excludedSubtrees portion of the NC extension.
>
>
>
> What is the proper way to solve this issue? Suppress the size constraint
> on the SRVName element in section 2? Modify section 4 to allow the single
> '.' character (U+002E) to represent both service and DNS names missing?
>
>
>
> --
>
> Erwann.
>



--=20
Erwann.

--001a1142bc6672458d05380e0887
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Almost. Anyway, it&#39;s not a nice solution. This is the =
equivalent of allowing a CA to produce bogus certificates in the hope that =
they will be rejected by another validation layer.<div><br></div><div>The &=
quot;invalid&quot; TLD seems to not be requested anymore at the root DNS se=
rvers; this wasn&#39;t the case a few years ago.</div><div>That doesn&#39;t=
 mean this TLD isn&#39;t requested at all (on delegating or caching name se=
rvers), as we see that another TLD listed in RFC6761 is still requested up =
to root DNS servers (localhost), and that the reserved &quot;local&quot; TL=
D (RFC6762) is also requested at the root level.<div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">And the &quot;invalid&quot; service na=
me, while not registered at IANA, is also not reserved, and can then still =
be defined and used at a local level.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote">2016-07-19 3:24 GMT+02:00 Manger, James <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com" target=3D"_=
blank">James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-AU" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">Permitting only a non-existent service=
 name (eg =E2=80=9C_invalid=E2=80=9D) almost gives you what you need. Inclu=
de the =E2=80=9Cinvalid=E2=80=9D domain name for good measure [RFC 6761 Spe=
cial-Use Domain Names].<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;colo=
r:#1f497d"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f4=
97d">NameConstraintsSyntax:{<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif=
;color:#1f497d">=C2=A0 permittedSubtrees {<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&qu=
ot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 {<u></u><u></u></span></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 base o=
therName:{<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 type-id id-on-dnsSRV,<u></u><u><=
/u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-f=
amily:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 value SRVName:&quot;_invalid.invalid&quot;<u></u><u><=
/u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-f=
amily:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#=
1f497d">=C2=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f49=
7d">}<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.=
0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">--<u></u><u><=
/u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-f=
amily:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d">James Manger<u></u><u><=
/u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-f=
amily:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></s=
pan></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;=
font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"E=
N-US" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif"=
> pkix [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">p=
kix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Erwann Abalea<br><b>Sent:</b>=
 Tuesday, 19 July 2016 1:33 AM<br><b>To:</b> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@iet=
f.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@i=
etf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] =
About RFC4985, SRVName<u></u><u></u></span></p><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Bonjour,<u></u><u>=
</u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal">I think it&#39;s the right list for this topic.<u></u><u=
></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal">There is an attempt to allow SRVNames in public X=
.509 certificates as defined by CABForum. This would follow RFC4985.<u></u>=
<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">However, the NameConstraints m=
atching rules as written in section 4 doesn&#39;t allow for an empty SRVNam=
e restriction; the SRVName has a SIZE(1..MAX) constraint, and the text does=
n&#39;t deal with both service name and DNS name missing. Having this &quot=
;fully permitted&quot; constraint may seem stupid, but it&#39;s the only wa=
y to completely forbid SRVNames, by using such constraint in the excludedSu=
btrees portion of the NC extension.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">What =
is the proper way to solve this issue? Suppress the size constraint on the =
SRVName element in section 2? Modify section 4 to allow the single &#39;.&#=
39; character (U+002E) to represent both service and DNS names missing?<br =
clear=3D"all"><u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u=
></u></p></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal">Erwann.<u></u><u></u></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></=
div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dat=
a-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div></div>

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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] About RFC4985, SRVName
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The use of =E2=80=9C_=E2=80=9D as the service name would probably meet =
your use case.

=20

Jim

=20

=20

From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Erwann Abalea
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2016 11:43 AM
To: Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Cc: <pkix@ietf.org> <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] About RFC4985, SRVName

=20

Almost. Anyway, it's not a nice solution. This is the equivalent of =
allowing a CA to produce bogus certificates in the hope that they will =
be rejected by another validation layer.

=20

The "invalid" TLD seems to not be requested anymore at the root DNS =
servers; this wasn't the case a few years ago.

That doesn't mean this TLD isn't requested at all (on delegating or =
caching name servers), as we see that another TLD listed in RFC6761 is =
still requested up to root DNS servers (localhost), and that the =
reserved "local" TLD (RFC6762) is also requested at the root level.

=20

And the "invalid" service name, while not registered at IANA, is also =
not reserved, and can then still be defined and used at a local level.

=20

2016-07-19 3:24 GMT+02:00 Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com =
<mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> >:

Permitting only a non-existent service name (eg =
=E2=80=9C_invalid=E2=80=9D) almost gives you what you need. Include the =
=E2=80=9Cinvalid=E2=80=9D domain name for good measure [RFC 6761 =
Special-Use Domain Names].

=20

NameConstraintsSyntax:{

  permittedSubtrees {

    {

      base otherName:{

        type-id id-on-dnsSRV,

        value SRVName:"_invalid.invalid"

      }

    }

  }

}

=20

--

James Manger

=20

=20

From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> =
] On Behalf Of Erwann Abalea
Sent: Tuesday, 19 July 2016 1:33 AM
To: <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org> > <pkix@ietf.org =
<mailto:pkix@ietf.org> >
Subject: [pkix] About RFC4985, SRVName

=20

Bonjour,

=20

I think it's the right list for this topic.

=20

There is an attempt to allow SRVNames in public X.509 certificates as =
defined by CABForum. This would follow RFC4985.

However, the NameConstraints matching rules as written in section 4 =
doesn't allow for an empty SRVName restriction; the SRVName has a =
SIZE(1..MAX) constraint, and the text doesn't deal with both service =
name and DNS name missing. Having this "fully permitted" constraint may =
seem stupid, but it's the only way to completely forbid SRVNames, by =
using such constraint in the excludedSubtrees portion of the NC =
extension.

=20

What is the proper way to solve this issue? Suppress the size constraint =
on the SRVName element in section 2? Modify section 4 to allow the =
single '.' character (U+002E) to represent both service and DNS names =
missing?


=20

--=20

Erwann.





=20

--=20

Erwann.


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<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>The use of =
=E2=80=9C_=E2=80=9D as the service name would probably meet your use =
case.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>Jim<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue =
1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span><=
/b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> =
pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Erwann =
Abalea<br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, July 20, 2016 11:43 AM<br><b>To:</b> =
Manger, James &lt;James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> =
&lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt; &lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: =
[pkix] About RFC4985, SRVName<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Almost. =
Anyway, it's not a nice solution. This is the equivalent of allowing a =
CA to produce bogus certificates in the hope that they will be rejected =
by another validation layer.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>The &quot;invalid&quot; TLD seems to not be requested =
anymore at the root DNS servers; this wasn't the case a few years =
ago.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>That doesn't mean =
this TLD isn't requested at all (on delegating or caching name servers), =
as we see that another TLD listed in RFC6761 is still requested up to =
root DNS servers (localhost), and that the reserved &quot;local&quot; =
TLD (RFC6762) is also requested at the root level.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>And the &quot;invalid&quot; service name, while not =
registered at IANA, is also not reserved, and can then still be defined =
and used at a local level.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>2016-07-19 3:24 GMT+02:00 Manger, James &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com" =
target=3D"_blank">James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt;:<o:p></o:p></p>=
<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC =
1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>Permitting only a non-existent service name (eg =
=E2=80=9C_invalid=E2=80=9D) almost gives you what you need. Include the =
=E2=80=9Cinvalid=E2=80=9D domain name for good measure [RFC 6761 =
Special-Use Domain Names].</span><span =
lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>NameConstraintsSyntax:{</span><span =
lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp; permittedSubtrees {</span><span =
lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; base otherName:{</span><span =
lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; type-id =
id-on-dnsSRV,</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; value =
SRVName:&quot;_invalid.invalid&quot;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><span =
lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp; }</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>}</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>--</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>James Manger</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'=
>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span><=
/b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> =
pkix [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Erwann =
Abalea<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, 19 July 2016 1:33 AM<br><b>To:</b> =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt; &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] About =
RFC4985, SRVName</span><span =
lang=3DEN-AU><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>Bonjour,<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>I think it's the right list for this =
topic.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>There is an attempt to allow SRVNames in public X.509 =
certificates as defined by CABForum. This would follow =
RFC4985.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>However, the NameConstraints matching rules as written in =
section 4 doesn't allow for an empty SRVName restriction; the SRVName =
has a SIZE(1..MAX) constraint, and the text doesn't deal with both =
service name and DNS name missing. Having this &quot;fully =
permitted&quot; constraint may seem stupid, but it's the only way to =
completely forbid SRVNames, by using such constraint in the =
excludedSubtrees portion of the NC =
extension.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>What is the proper way to solve this issue? Suppress the =
size constraint on the SRVName element in section 2? Modify section 4 to =
allow the single '.' character (U+002E) to represent both service and =
DNS names missing?<br clear=3Dall><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>-- <o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
lang=3DEN-AU>Erwann.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></div></div><=
/div></div></blockquote></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br><br =
clear=3Dall><o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal>-- =
<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Erwann.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></d=
iv></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_0098_01D1E280.32771010--


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From: Security Developer <security.developer22@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 11:28:03 +0500
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Subject: [pkix] Use case of nameRelativeToCRLIssuer
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--001a1149a1789f313205381f6bdf
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Dear All,

CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint

   DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        distributionPoint       [0]     DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
        reasons                 [1]     ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
        cRLIssuer               [2]     GeneralNames OPTIONAL }

   DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
        fullName                [0]     GeneralNames,
        nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1]     RelativeDistinguishedName }

Could any body please explain the use case when
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer should be used? Thanks

--001a1149a1789f313205381f6bdf
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<div dir="ltr"><pre>Dear All,<br><br>CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint

   DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        distributionPoint       [0]     DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
        reasons                 [1]     ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
        cRLIssuer               [2]     GeneralNames OPTIONAL }

   DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
        fullName                [0]     GeneralNames,
        nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1]     RelativeDistinguishedName }<br><br></pre><pre>Could any body please explain the use case when nameRelativeToCRLIssuer should be used? Thanks</pre></div>

--001a1149a1789f313205381f6bdf--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Use case of nameRelativeToCRLIssuer
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X.509 (2012) says:

 The nameRelativeToCRLIssuer  component can be used only if the CRL =
distribution point is assigned a
distinguished name that is directly subordinate to the distinguished =
name of the CRL issuer. In this case, the
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer  component conveys the relative distinguished =
name with respect to the CRL issuer
distinguished name.

Basically to get the DN where you can find the CRL, you combine the CRL =
issuer=E2=80=99s DN and append the nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The point is =
to search the Directory for that full DN to get the associated =
certificateRevocationList (2.5.4.39) attribute (Clause 11.2.4 of X.509).

Does anyone implement this in practice? Maybe, with LDAP. Someone posted =
to Server Fault asking for this exact thing, although they didn=E2=80=99t =
say it was to be used with LDAP: =
<http://serverfault.com/questions/764667/how-to-add-namerelativetocrlissue=
r-to-crl-using-openssl>.

Sean

> On Jul 20, 2016, at 11:28 PM, Security Developer =
<security.developer22@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Dear All,
>=20
> CRLDistributionPoints ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF =
DistributionPoint
>=20
>    DistributionPoint ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>         distributionPoint       [0]     DistributionPointName =
OPTIONAL,
>         reasons                 [1]     ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
>         cRLIssuer               [2]     GeneralNames OPTIONAL }
>=20
>    DistributionPointName ::=3D CHOICE {
>         fullName                [0]     GeneralNames,
>         nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1]     RelativeDistinguishedName }
>=20
> Could any body please explain the use case when =
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer should be used? Thanks


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">X.509 (2012) says:<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-size: 10px; line-height: =
normal; font-family: Times;" class=3D"">&nbsp;The <span =
style=3D"font-size: 9px; line-height: normal; font-family: Courier;" =
class=3D"">nameRelativeToCRLIssuer&nbsp;</span> component can be used =
only if the CRL distribution point is assigned a</div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0px; font-size: 10px; line-height: normal; font-family: =
Times;" class=3D"">distinguished name that is directly subordinate to =
the distinguished name of the CRL issuer. In this case, the</div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0px; font-size: 10px; line-height: normal; font-family: =
Times;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 9px; line-height: normal; =
font-family: Courier;" class=3D"">nameRelativeToCRLIssuer&nbsp;</span> =
component conveys the relative distinguished name with respect to the =
CRL issuer</div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-size: 10px; line-height: =
normal; font-family: Times;" class=3D"">distinguished =
name.</div></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Basically to get the DN where you can find the CRL, you =
combine the CRL issuer=E2=80=99s DN and append the =
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The point is to search the Directory for that =
full DN to get the associated&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-family: Courier; =
font-size: 9px;" =
class=3D"">certificateRevocationList</span>&nbsp;(2.5.4.39) attribute =
(Clause 11.2.4 of X.509).</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Does anyone implement this in practice? Maybe, with LDAP. =
Someone posted to Server Fault asking for this exact thing, although =
they didn=E2=80=99t say it was to be used with LDAP: &lt;<a =
href=3D"http://serverfault.com/questions/764667/how-to-add-namerelativetoc=
rlissuer-to-crl-using-openssl" =
class=3D"">http://serverfault.com/questions/764667/how-to-add-namerelative=
tocrlissuer-to-crl-using-openssl</a>&gt;.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Sean</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Jul 20, 2016, at 11:28 PM, Security Developer &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:security.developer22@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">security.developer22@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><pre class=3D"">Dear All,<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">CRLDistributionPoints ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF =
DistributionPoint

   DistributionPoint ::=3D SEQUENCE {
        distributionPoint       [0]     DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
        reasons                 [1]     ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
        cRLIssuer               [2]     GeneralNames OPTIONAL }

   DistributionPointName ::=3D CHOICE {
        fullName                [0]     GeneralNames,
        nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1]     RelativeDistinguishedName }<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></pre><pre class=3D"">Could any body please =
explain the use case when nameRelativeToCRLIssuer should be used? =
Thanks</pre></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_B5FBA5DF-02DC-43D7-8B45-7C885AEF1192--


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Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 19:51:09 +0500
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Subject: [pkix] Issuing Distribution Point extension understanding
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Dear All,

Could any body please explain the Issuing Distribution Point extension in
CRL? Thanks

As per RFC 5280, the description seems bit cryptic to me.

Regards,

--001a1140343032bb17053876ea77
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<div dir="ltr"><div><div><div>Dear All,<br><br></div>Could any body please explain the Issuing Distribution Point extension in CRL? Thanks<br><br></div>As per RFC 5280, the description seems bit cryptic to me.<br><br></div>Regards,<br></div>

--001a1140343032bb17053876ea77--


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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 17:22:30 +0200
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Issuing Distribution Point extension understanding
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Bonjour,

This extension allows the CRL issuer (generally the CA) to declare that the
given CRL is of a limited scope, i.e. that this CRL only covers a subset of
all the certificates covered by the CRL issuer.

If this extension is not present, then the CRL provides a revocation status
for all the certificates under the CRL issuer's responsibility.

The certificates covered by the CRL issuer can be segmented by User/CA
certificate types, by revocation reasons, or by distribution point (which
will be present in the CRLDP extension of those certificates).

2016-07-25 16:51 GMT+02:00 Security Developer <
security.developer22@gmail.com>:

> Dear All,
>
> Could any body please explain the Issuing Distribution Point extension in
> CRL? Thanks
>
> As per RFC 5280, the description seems bit cryptic to me.
>
> Regards,
>

-- 
Erwann.

--001a1140211e5d97890538775a02
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonjour,<div><br></div><div>This extension allows the CRL =
issuer (generally the CA) to declare that the given CRL is of a limited sco=
pe, i.e. that this CRL only covers a subset of all the certificates covered=
 by the CRL issuer.</div><div><br></div><div>If this extension is not prese=
nt, then the CRL provides a revocation status for all the certificates unde=
r the CRL issuer&#39;s responsibility.</div><div><br></div><div>The certifi=
cates covered by the CRL issuer can be segmented by User/CA certificate typ=
es, by revocation reasons, or by distribution point (which will be present =
in the CRLDP extension of those certificates).<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2016-07-25 16:51 GMT+02:00 Security Developer =
<span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:security.developer22@gmail.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">security.developer22@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>Dear All,<br><br></div=
>Could any body please explain the Issuing Distribution Point extension in =
CRL? Thanks<br><br></div>As per RFC 5280, the description seems bit cryptic=
 to me.<br><br></div>Regards,</div></blockquote></div><div><br></div>-- <br=
><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.<=
/div>
</div></div></div>

--001a1140211e5d97890538775a02--


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From: daniel bryan <danbryan80@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2016 15:39:35 +0000
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Subject: [pkix] Algorithms in OCSP response
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Hello, I am trying to get a feel for what algorithms in the OCSP response
an OCSP service provider should be able to influence.  Can anyone inform me
if I am misunderstanding any of these statements below?

It's seems the hashing algorithm directly under Certificate ID in the
response, is dynamically chosen based on the hashing algorithm in the OCSP
request. (for example, if the request uses -sha512, the hash alg will
always be sha512)
Also, it seems like Signature Algorithm is chosen based on the Signature
algorithm of the CA who issued the cert in question*. *However, my
understanding is that this algorithm is allowed to be explicitly chosen by
the OCSP service provider, and does not have to follow the algorithm of the
issuing CA. I have pasted an modified example of a request and response
that I am trying to infer knowledge from
*. *


*Example Request:* openssl ocsp -no_nonce -CAfile trusted_cas/mycas.pem
-issuer issuser_cas/myissuer.pem -*sha512* -serial 0x02 -url
http://myresponder.com:8080 -resp_text
*Example OCSP response:*



















*OCSP Response Data:    OCSP Response Status: successful (0x0)    Response
Type: Basic OCSP Response    Version: 1 (0x0)    Responder Id: C = XX, CN =
Responder    Produced At: Jul 26 14:39:36 2016 GMT    Responses:
Certificate ID:      Hash Algorithm: sha512      Issuer Name Hash:
DDEEB63482BF2A3D64EFC2FE18AD8FD638C9E0DC8193C749619DBD0A30972573E2746B\F27047FBAAB7C6313342674FFC073739D98D82B4CF903E9755726E7579
Issuer Key Hash:
B41DE0663D1ACB30F533750F820FC9902E33B979385AB5856B9E7F6F9F7611DCB3FB759DBF\F76260CFE17CB1EF79FC31C1789F612D4F58216125ED5B445C4CC3
Serial Number: 02    Cert Status: good    This Update: Jul 26 14:39:36 2016
GMT    Next Update: Aug  5 14:39:36 2016 GMT    Signature Algorithm:
sha384WithRSAEncryption*

* <obfuscated>*




*      Response Verify OK0x02: good    This Update: Jul 26 14:39:36 2016
GMT    Next Update: Aug  5 14:39:36 2016 GMT*

--001a114164aac7ef4b05388bb5f5
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>Hello, I am trying to get a feel for what algori=
thms in the OCSP response an OCSP service provider should be able to influe=
nce.=C2=A0 Can anyone inform me if I am misunderstanding any of these state=
ments below?<br><br></div><div>It&#39;s seems the hashing algorithm directl=
y under Certificate ID in the response, is dynamically chosen based on the =
hashing algorithm in the OCSP request. (for example, if the request uses -s=
ha512, the hash alg will always be sha512)<br></div><div>Also, it seems lik=
e Signature Algorithm is chosen based on the Signature algorithm of the CA =
who issued the cert in question<b>. </b>However, my understanding is that t=
his algorithm is allowed to be explicitly chosen by the OCSP service provid=
er, and does not have to follow the algorithm of the issuing CA.<b> </b>I h=
ave pasted an modified example of a request and response that I am trying t=
o infer knowledge from<b>. <br></b></div><div><b><br></b></div><div><b><br>=
Example Request:</b> openssl ocsp -no_nonce -CAfile trusted_cas/mycas.pem -=
issuer issuser_cas/myissuer.pem -<b>sha512</b> -serial 0x02 -url <a href=3D=
"http://myresponder.com:8080">http://myresponder.com:8080</a> -resp_text<br=
></div><b>Example OCSP response:</b><br><i>OCSP Response Data:<br>=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0 OCSP Response Status: successful (0x0)<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Resp=
onse Type: Basic OCSP Response<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Version: 1 (0x0)<br>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Responder Id: C =3D XX, CN =3D Responder<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 Produced At: Jul 26 14:39:36 2016 GMT<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Response=
s:<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Certificate ID:<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0<=
span style=3D"color:rgb(204,0,0)"><b> Hash Algorithm: sha512</b></span><br>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Issuer Name Hash: DDEEB63482BF2A3D64EFC2FE18=
AD8FD638C9E0DC8193C749619DBD0A30972573E2746B\<br>F27047FBAAB7C6313342674FFC=
073739D98D82B4CF903E9755726E7579<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Issuer K=
ey Hash: B41DE0663D1ACB30F533750F820FC9902E33B979385AB5856B9E7F6F9F7611DCB3=
FB759DBF\<br>F76260CFE17CB1EF79FC31C1789F612D4F58216125ED5B445C4CC3<br>=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Serial Number: 02<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Cert St=
atus: good<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This Update: Jul 26 14:39:36 2016 GMT<br>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Next Update: Aug=C2=A0 5 14:39:36 2016 GMT<br><br>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0 Signature Algorithm: <span style=3D"color:rgb(255,0,0)"><b>sha=
384WithRSAEncryption</b></span><br></i></div><i><b>=C2=A0&lt;obfuscated&gt;=
</b><br></i><div><i>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 <br>Response Verify OK<b=
r>0x02: good<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0This Update: Jul 26 14:39:36 2016 GMT<br=
>=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0Next Update: Aug=C2=A0 5 14:39:36 2016 GMT</i><br></div=
></div>

--001a114164aac7ef4b05388bb5f5--


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From: daniel bryan <danbryan80@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2016 16:11:04 +0000
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Subject: [pkix] Revocation publishing lifecycle
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--001a113cfb4e3ef3910538a04496
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Hello, Should a CA provide a CRL for it's entire lifetime?

For example, CA1 is good for 4 years, and the first year it issues 1 year
certs and provides revocation status via CRLs. Year 2, CA1 stops issuing,
and a new issuing CA2 is stood up. Year 3, all the certificates from CA1
have expired.

Should CA1 make revocation data available until CA1 expires, so that users
can be informed of the revocation status of expired certificates. (EG:
opening an old email from a revoked user).

Thanks,

--Dan

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>Hello, Should a CA provide a CRL for it&#39;s en=
tire lifetime? <br><br>For example, CA1 is good for 4 years, and the first =
year it issues 1 year certs and provides revocation status via CRLs. Year 2=
, CA1 stops issuing, and a new issuing CA2 is stood up. Year 3, all the cer=
tificates from CA1 have expired. <br><br>Should CA1 make revocation data av=
ailable until CA1 expires, so that users can be informed of the revocation =
status of expired certificates. (EG: opening an old email from a revoked us=
er).<br><br></div>Thanks,<br><br></div>--Dan<br></div>

--001a113cfb4e3ef3910538a04496--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Revocation publishing lifecycle
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I'd say it SHOULD, in the RFC2119 way.
But really, it's usage dependent.

If the certificates issued by CA1 are web-server certs, a client will
receive an expired certificate. Looking at RFC5280 section 6.1, the
condition (d) is not satisfied because the "time in question" is "right
now". It therefore doesn't care if the CRL is also expired.

If the certificates issued by CA1 are signing certs, and you're validating
a signed object with a timestamp (that you have validated, trusted, etc),
then you need to have a CRL with a nextUpdate later than the current time
(not the time expressed in the timestamp) or without a nextUpdate, and
check if the certificate was valid at the date expressed in the timestamp.
This can fail if you don't have a valid CRL, and you may have a non
conclusive answer if the CA doesn't notify you that the CRL includes
expired certificates (either by local policy, or by inclusion of the
expiredCertsOnCRL extension).

And of course, if the CA is asked to follow
constraints/requirements/policies, those may express that the CA MUST have
a valid CRL for its entire lifetime (and even after).

2016-07-27 18:11 GMT+02:00 daniel bryan <danbryan80@gmail.com>:

> Hello, Should a CA provide a CRL for it's entire lifetime?
>
> For example, CA1 is good for 4 years, and the first year it issues 1 year
> certs and provides revocation status via CRLs. Year 2, CA1 stops issuing,
> and a new issuing CA2 is stood up. Year 3, all the certificates from CA1
> have expired.
>
> Should CA1 make revocation data available until CA1 expires, so that users
> can be informed of the revocation status of expired certificates. (EG:
> opening an old email from a revoked user).
>
> Thanks,
>
> --Dan
>



-- 
Erwann.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I&#39;d say it SHOULD, in the RFC2119 way.</div><div>=
But really, it&#39;s usage dependent.<br></div><div><br></div><div>If the c=
ertificates issued by CA1 are web-server certs, a client will receive an ex=
pired certificate. Looking at RFC5280 section 6.1, the condition (d) is not=
 satisfied because the &quot;time in question&quot; is &quot;right now&quot=
;. It therefore doesn&#39;t care if the CRL is also expired.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>If the certificates issued by CA1 are signing certs, and you&#39=
;re validating a signed object with a timestamp (that you have validated, t=
rusted, etc), then you need to have a CRL with a nextUpdate later than the =
current time (not the time expressed in the timestamp) or without a nextUpd=
ate, and check if the certificate was valid at the date expressed in the ti=
mestamp. This can fail if you don&#39;t have a valid CRL, and you may have =
a non conclusive answer if the CA doesn&#39;t notify you that the CRL inclu=
des expired certificates (either by local policy, or by inclusion of the ex=
piredCertsOnCRL extension).</div><div><br></div><div>And of course, if the =
CA is asked to follow constraints/requirements/policies, those may express =
that the CA MUST have a valid CRL for its entire lifetime (and even after).=
<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2016-07-27 18=
:11 GMT+02:00 daniel bryan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:danbryan=
80@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">danbryan80@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>Hello, Should a CA p=
rovide a CRL for it&#39;s entire lifetime? <br><br>For example, CA1 is good=
 for 4 years, and the first year it issues 1 year certs and provides revoca=
tion status via CRLs. Year 2, CA1 stops issuing, and a new issuing CA2 is s=
tood up. Year 3, all the certificates from CA1 have expired. <br><br>Should=
 CA1 make revocation data available until CA1 expires, so that users can be=
 informed of the revocation status of expired certificates. (EG: opening an=
 old email from a revoked user).<br><br></div>Thanks,<br><br></div>--Dan<br=
></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div></div>

--001a1142b4924090870538a0b70f--


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To: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2016 20:16:11 +0200 (CEST)
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Legacy practices, again.
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Erwann,

You seem to have missed the historic origin of CMS in PKCS#7 v1.5.
The SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm element was originally born as
SignerInfo.digestEncryptionAlgorithm, and the digest algorithm for
the signature is originally specified seperately by the element
SignerInfo.digestAlgorithm

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-9.2

and digestEncryptionAlgorithm is specified to contain rsaEncryption

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-6.4

and this convention (permission) was retained in CMS for backwards
compatibility and historic reasons to refer to the PKCS#1-v1.5
signature transform.


For DSA signatures (which are very rare anyway), the idea of a
"digest encryption" does not compute, so a naked DSA or naked ECDSA
are rather unusual and might result in interoperability problems
when used in CMS SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm.

-Martin





Erwann Abalea wrote:
> 
> I was digging into RFC5652 about SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier today.
> Found section 10.1.2, which says that a signature algorithm can be RSA,
> DSA, DSA with SHA1, ECDSA, ECDSA with SHA256.
> Found myself looking at RFC3370, which says that rsaEncryption is a valid
> SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier.
> Later read PKCS#1v1.5 (the 1993 version) which confirms that rsaEncryption
> is valid for a signature algorithm.
> 
> Then went up looking at CAdES (the RFC5126 version) and saw that it wasn't
> clearer, presenting RSA and DSA in digital signature algorithms and
> presenting only the *with-SHA1 schema and OID.
> Went up again and looked at ETSI TS 119312 (which is referenced by ETSI EN
> 3191x2 standards for eIDAS), which properly defines signature suites
> combining a digest function, a public key algorithm, and a padding scheme,
> but has specified in its normative Annex A.1 that
> SignerInfo.digestAlgorithm would refer to a hash function and
> SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm should refer to a public key algorithm (RSA,
> DSA, ECDSA).
> 
> And today, a CMS with a SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm using the
> rsaEncryption OID is still valid. Despite the fact that this OID doesn't
> design a signature suite, and is also used for a public key and a key
> encryption key algorithm. Because of some stuff written in 1993 and still
> referenced today.
> 
> Sad.
> 
> -- 
> Erwann.

> _______________________________________________
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