
From nobody Fri Aug 27 11:50:37 2021
Return-Path: <ietf-secretariat@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: ppm@ietf.org
Delivered-To: ppm@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4BA5C3A0060; Fri, 27 Aug 2021 11:50:24 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: IETF Secretariat <ietf-secretariat@ietf.org>
To: "IETF Announcement List" <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: ppm@ietf.org, ekr@rtfm.com, caw@heapingbits.net
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 7.36.0
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Message-ID: <163009022421.31949.13435147885375623535@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2021 11:50:24 -0700
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ppm/u6dhu6zyMyT2aGGAdWDJWtZBPyQ>
Subject: [Ppm] New Non-WG Mailing List: ppm -- Privacy Preserving Measurement technologies
X-BeenThere: ppm@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Privacy Preserving Measurement technologies <ppm.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ppm>, <mailto:ppm-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ppm/>
List-Post: <mailto:ppm@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ppm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ppm>, <mailto:ppm-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2021 18:50:25 -0000

A new IETF non-working group email list has been created.

List address: ppm@ietf.org	
Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ppm/
To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ppm

Purpose:

There are many situations in which it is desirable to take measurements 
of data which people consider sensitive. In these cases, the entity 
taking the measurement is usually not interested in people's individual 
responses but rather in aggregated data but conventional methods require 
collecting individual responses and then aggregating them, thus 
representing a threat to user privacy and rendering many such 
measurements difficult and impractical. This mailing list is for 
discussions of technologies for collecting aggregate data without 
revealing any individual user's data.

The IETF Area to which the list belongs: SEC

For additional information, please contact the list administrators.


From nobody Fri Aug 27 18:59:14 2021
Return-Path: <ekr@rtfm.com>
X-Original-To: ppm@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ppm@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 74B463A2652 for <ppm@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 27 Aug 2021 18:59:12 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.896
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.896 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ALDFNJvL_rG5 for <ppm@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 27 Aug 2021 18:59:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-io1-xd30.google.com (mail-io1-xd30.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d30]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 564E83A2650 for <ppm@ietf.org>; Fri, 27 Aug 2021 18:59:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-io1-xd30.google.com with SMTP id n24so11301482ion.10 for <ppm@ietf.org>; Fri, 27 Aug 2021 18:59:06 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=RXFsPhJ1PwVt9sxdGjqedcwprSdAcjJ9ai4e1q0aVfI=; b=yOMWQGj5is5VIbmHQ36/8WaYFaXTKvmi/mggoLTvTT/+0bIt7ornx6myE4HsHchkkS 9lMJi3RHzXnF/EoqlwSodE34+x1Ikx6GlYAFzzTnpP9vCg0AspaUQ8CQPbPb57Ro9sQN +wHyrfM74nD8dmC+0JVywFf4c5XVoie6AUbisOq4FLbX07/K7zWZiMLX3iBTnYaZiMZT k0kZbjhTZicLugqt+SuyKCcKugiWJfRYW5wknQSo4R1N/Ay2G4CicRToQUIxNnxKJ2VH HtzEWfPjJtgWix4EU54++nBLQu6/knqyCD8lqnnmStgO4m8KLcHJMB6wN9SZVSbP9I1K OENg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=RXFsPhJ1PwVt9sxdGjqedcwprSdAcjJ9ai4e1q0aVfI=; b=U7Rm0EbZ7B/WMexnbCIarzETnCj+1fsoOrLMUHgLpaEw8haOaxm4WKHDgaLAdEr7Qn nBVdQTe4qEqs7wUBpARjPDdP4XnYugVLjVz+KsNfYduuB+U71ykrmqhH/A9hJdGl1OI4 syQZ67IKadlDGmtP5p/TbrL+lUAMRp+m+iL+LUXkuI964GAWWD1DR598K44I451U3t3g s5Fs2gWpEMXuZijnqVwyB6yVQAm5yL+WCmbSIckwCIot5P6KIuszqT0TgHDt1QKewmKk muDBVP/WKtwdoXWlEH8djYLdz4rXTEqexR4pi2TpJCwC42Kx8BA13pFxkjxf7aNCfVjR EOMw==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531dgyh226RQiG18Xj3gFHylwcm0LrAIdtIHuUnPlKWyeZ9LI53f kTyRjoRKa7hELsBJC3joelzyAZ0kD3Q8+M67L6mLNbNjw3hVIGcF
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJynkPZ0pXzguK9eJVIeDbmTdvYlH2FWh3yZiRvhHIBxDez8HM4eM02UtS+llhYa2AoTsuAKpGlMXvwHMYT0P4s=
X-Received: by 2002:a5e:c609:: with SMTP id f9mr9288814iok.127.1630115944121;  Fri, 27 Aug 2021 18:59:04 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2021 18:58:28 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBMUaNPAudRUJ_=Eh4ciwD6x2_MfurERKe2TNu9eHBpPuQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: ppm@ietf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000cad85305ca94f14b"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ppm/pT07Qjy3qpFJWsv_iuZLQW4g4mw>
Subject: [Ppm] Background
X-BeenThere: ppm@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Privacy Preserving Measurement technologies <ppm.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ppm>, <mailto:ppm-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ppm/>
List-Post: <mailto:ppm@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ppm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ppm>, <mailto:ppm-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 28 Aug 2021 01:59:13 -0000

--000000000000cad85305ca94f14b
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Welcome to PPM,

Hi folks, welcome to the PPM list. I just wanted to send out
a bit of introduction/background.

There are a lot of cases where one wants to take measurements of
values that are sensitive individually but not in aggregate, and the
person/entity taking the measurement doesn't care about people's
individual values. These cases include both technical measurements as
well as non-technical ones, for instance:

- Medical status of various kinds
- Financial status
- Web sites that don't render properly or cause an error of
  some kind

Historically, the options for taking this kind of measurement were
fairly limited: in a few cases the person taking the measurement could
credibly convince people their data would be kept confidential and in
others you could use Randomized Response or similar techniques such as
RAPPOR. You could also sometimes send anonymous reports over some sort
of proxy network like Tor or Apple's Private Relay. However, there are
a lot of situations where these options don't work well.

In the past few years, cryptographic techniques have emerged that
allow for efficient measurement of aggregates without requiring trust
in a single party. The basic idea is that there are two independent
servers and the client takes their reported value and divides it up
into 2 or more secret shares, sending one to each server. The servers
then independently aggregate (e.g., add up) the reports and then
exchange the aggregates to get the final value. Because each server
only has a share, as long as at least one server is trustworthy, the
user's value is never revealed [Technical Note: each share also comes
with a zero-knowledge proof of validity which prevents clients from
reporting values which would invalidate the result.  For instance, we
might allow clients to report that they had incomes up to 10^9 but not
10^100th. This lines up with other surveying techniques which attempt
to prevent plainly invalid responses but still allow people to lie.]

The available techniques [CB17][BBCGI21] allow for a variety of
aggregation tasks, including:

- Sum/Mean/geometric mean
- Other statistics such as variance that can be computed by
  addition of values
- Histograms
- Finding the most common strings out of a collection of client-submitted
  values ("heavy hitters")

There have already been two prototype deployments of one of these
techniques (Prio), one by Mozilla and the other by Apple, Google,
ISRG, NCI, and MITRE, so we have some evidence they can be deployed at
scale. There's already a fair amount of interest in these technologies
and ISRG has already announced that they plan to offer a public
Prio service https://www.abetterinternet.org/post/introducing-prio-services/
.

We're looking to standardize these technologies for Privacy Preserving
Measurement. The idea would be to have a protocol in IETF that
described the networking pieces and then work in CFRG to define the
crypto pieces. A draft of the protocol can be found at:
https://abetterinternet.github.io/prio-documents/draft-ppm-protocol.html
The CFRG pieces are still in development.

We've asked for a BOF at IETF 112:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bofreq-privacy-preserving-measurement/

Happy to answer any questions people might have.

-Ekr

[CB17] Corrigan-Gibbs and Boneh, "Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable
Computation of Aggregate Statistics"
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi17/nsdi17-corrigan-gibbs.pdf

[BBCGI21] Boneh, Boyle, Corrigan-Bibbs, Gilboa, Ishai, "Lightweight
Techniques for Private Heavy Hitters", https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/017

--000000000000cad85305ca94f14b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Welcome to PPM,<br><br>Hi folks, welcome to the PPM list. =
I just wanted to send out<br>a bit of introduction/background.<br><br>There=
 are a lot of cases where one wants to take measurements of<br>values that =
are sensitive individually but not in aggregate, and the<br>person/entity t=
aking the measurement doesn&#39;t care about people&#39;s<br>individual val=
ues. These cases include both technical measurements as<br>well as non-tech=
nical ones, for instance:<br><br>- Medical status of various kinds<br>- Fin=
ancial status<br>- Web sites that don&#39;t render properly or cause an err=
or of<br>=C2=A0 some kind<br><br>Historically, the options for taking this =
kind of measurement were<br>fairly limited: in a few cases the person takin=
g the measurement could<br>credibly convince people their data would be kep=
t confidential and in<br>others you could use Randomized Response or simila=
r techniques such as<br>RAPPOR. You could also sometimes send anonymous rep=
orts over some sort<br>of proxy network like Tor or Apple&#39;s Private Rel=
ay. However, there are<br>a lot of situations where these options don&#39;t=
 work well.<br><br>In the past few years, cryptographic techniques have eme=
rged that<br>allow for efficient measurement of aggregates without requirin=
g trust<br>in a single party. The basic idea is that there are two independ=
ent<br>servers and the client takes their reported value and divides it up<=
br>into 2 or more secret shares, sending one to each server. The servers<br=
>then independently aggregate (e.g., add up) the reports and then<br>exchan=
ge the aggregates to get the final value. Because each server<br>only has a=
 share, as long as at least one server is trustworthy, the<br>user&#39;s va=
lue is never revealed [Technical Note: each share also comes<br>with a zero=
-knowledge proof of validity which prevents clients from<br>reporting value=
s which would invalidate the result.=C2=A0 For instance, we<br>might allow =
clients to report that they had incomes up to 10^9 but not<br>10^100th. Thi=
s lines up with other surveying techniques which attempt<br>to prevent plai=
nly invalid responses but still allow people to lie.]<br><br>The available =
techniques [CB17][BBCGI21] allow for a variety of<br>aggregation tasks, inc=
luding:<br><br>- Sum/Mean/geometric mean<br>- Other statistics such as vari=
ance that can be computed by<br>=C2=A0 addition of values<br>- Histograms<b=
r>- Finding the most common strings out of a collection of client-submitted=
<br>=C2=A0 values (&quot;heavy hitters&quot;)<br><br>There have already bee=
n two prototype deployments of one of these<br>techniques (Prio), one by Mo=
zilla and the other by Apple, Google,<br>ISRG, NCI, and MITRE, so we have s=
ome evidence they can be deployed at<br>scale. There&#39;s already a fair a=
mount of interest in these technologies<br>and ISRG has already announced t=
hat they plan to offer a public<br>Prio service <a href=3D"https://www.abet=
terinternet.org/post/introducing-prio-services/">https://www.abetterinterne=
t.org/post/introducing-prio-services/</a>.<br><br>We&#39;re looking to stan=
dardize these technologies for Privacy Preserving<br>Measurement. The idea =
would be to have a protocol in IETF that<br>described the networking pieces=
 and then work in CFRG to define the<br>crypto pieces. A draft of the proto=
col can be found at:<br><a href=3D"https://abetterinternet.github.io/prio-d=
ocuments/draft-ppm-protocol.html">https://abetterinternet.github.io/prio-do=
cuments/draft-ppm-protocol.html</a><br>The CFRG pieces are still in develop=
ment.<br><br>We&#39;ve asked for a BOF at IETF 112:<br><a href=3D"https://d=
atatracker.ietf.org/doc/bofreq-privacy-preserving-measurement/">https://dat=
atracker.ietf.org/doc/bofreq-privacy-preserving-measurement/</a><br><br>Hap=
py to answer any questions people might have.<br><br>-Ekr<br><br>[CB17] Cor=
rigan-Gibbs and Boneh, &quot;Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable<br>Computa=
tion of Aggregate Statistics&quot;<br><a href=3D"https://www.usenix.org/sys=
tem/files/conference/nsdi17/nsdi17-corrigan-gibbs.pdf">https://www.usenix.o=
rg/system/files/conference/nsdi17/nsdi17-corrigan-gibbs.pdf</a><br><br>[BBC=
GI21] Boneh, Boyle, Corrigan-Bibbs, Gilboa, Ishai, &quot;Lightweight<br>Tec=
hniques for Private Heavy Hitters&quot;, <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org=
/2021/017">https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/017</a><br><br><br></div>

--000000000000cad85305ca94f14b--

