Subject: [quicwg/base-drafts] Restore other state after a spoofed migration (#3229)

From: Martin Thomson <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2019 21:31:48 -0800

This is really just an observation, because there is no real way we can
insist on people doing this sort of thing, but being aware of the
performance implication of spoofed migrations might motivate solutions.

Closes #2311.
You can view, comment on, or merge this pull request online at:

  https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3229

-- Commit Summary --

  * Restore other state after a spoofed migration

-- File Changes --

    M draft-ietf-quic-transport.md (5)

-- Patch Links --

https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3229.patch
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3229.diff

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From: Marten Seemann <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2019 21:35:13 -0800

marten-seemann approved this pull request.

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From: Eric Kinnear <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 03:00:32 -0800

erickinnear approved this pull request.

As long as this doesn't lead to confusion (for example: we recently tightened up the MUST around resetting state) for folks when reading this, I think it's really valuable to actually state this in the draft rather than hint at it throughout -- looks good!

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From: ianswett <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:32:48 -0800

ianswett commented on this pull request.

> @@ -1979,7 +1979,10 @@ to verify the peer's ownership of the unvalidated address.
 An endpoint MAY send data to an unvalidated peer address, but it MUST protect
 against potential attacks as described in {{address-spoofing}} and
 {{on-path-spoofing}}.  An endpoint MAY skip validation of a peer address if that
-address has been seen recently.
+address has been seen recently.  In particular, if an endpoint returns to a
+previously-validated path after detecting some form of spurious migration,
+skipping address validation and restoring loss detection and congestion state
+can reduce the performance impact of the attack.

The way I think about this is that the old address validation and congestion state are maintained until the new address is validated.  ie: In my thinking, the responder never left the original path.

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From: Martin Thomson <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:46:42 -0800

martinthomson commented on this pull request.

Yeah, that's harder to write down, I think.

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