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From: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
To: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
CC: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 16:04:24 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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+AD4- I recommend reading Practical Principles for Computer Security, Butle=
r Lampson, Microsoft Research, January, 2007 +AFs-4+AF0-

I have seen this document before, and it is quite informative and definitel=
y described several concepts that have been used in FIDO/Authentication wor=
k.  What specific aspects of terminology from this document are you recomme=
nding we leverage?  For instance I found concepts that could be useful for =
attestation, but I did not find a specific description of an attester, appr=
aiser, or target measurement.  Also, if concepts from the Lampson doc were =
leveraged for the RAts architecture doc then why is this not mentioned in t=
he references?

For instance, I tried to see if an attester can be considered a +IBw-token =
source+IB0- (Sec. 5.2) but in reading this section I do not believe that wa=
s the intention of the author.  I tried to see if the +IBw-speaks-for engin=
e+IB0- (Sec. 5.3) can encompass the role of the entity that measures a targ=
et, but I believe author was intending this engine to also fulfil the role =
of a verifier (token consumer +IBw-The job of the speaks-for engine is to d=
erive conclusions about what principals are trusted, starting from claims a=
nd adding information derived from tokens+IB0-).

+AD4- At some point consistency is a hobgoblin.

To complete the Thoreau quote then, I hope you are not saying I am a +IBw-l=
ittle mind+IB0-.  I don+IBk-t believe what I was suggesting was to slavishl=
y adhere to previously-published definitions of attester, target of measure=
ment, etc.  What I was suggesting was to start with commonly-accepted defin=
itions, justify why they may need to be modified, and come up with a termin=
ology suitable for the working group.  It seems that much of this discussio=
n starts with the assumption that there are no commonly-accepted definition=
s for the terms used in the architecture document.

+AD4-The most important objective of terminology for RATS WG (IMHO) is to b=
e able to not talk past one another. After that, we can agree on whatever i=
ndustry term is most appropriate.

I don+IBk-t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology based on=
 what I+IBk-ve observed.  I just think it is not constructive when we assum=
e a clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions from scratch=
.

-Giri

From: Smith, Ned
Sent: Saturday, August 31, 2019 6:02 PM
To: Ira McDonald +ADs- Giridhar Mandyam
Cc: Laurence Lundblade +ADs- rats+AEA-ietf.org
Subject: Re: +AFs-Rats+AF0- attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the=
 term +ACI-attester+ACI- instead of root of trust)

I recommend reading Practical Principles for Computer Security, Butler Lamp=
son, Microsoft Research, January, 2007 +AFs-4+AF0-
This is very relevant to attestation and introduces useful terminology, muc=
h of which aligns with the goals of attestation architecture.
It predates some of the references given below.
At some point consistency is a hobgoblin. The most important objective of t=
erminology for RATS WG (IMHO) is to be able to not talk past one another. A=
fter that, we can agree on whatever industry term is most appropriate.

Specific responses to Laurence+IBk-s remarks are inline below prefaced with=
 +AFs-nms+AF0-.
-Ned
+AFs-4+AF0- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/practical-=
principles-for-computer-security/
On 8/30/19, 14:21 PM, +ACI-Ira McDonald+ACI- +ADw-blueroofmusic+AEA-gmail.c=
om+ADw-mailto:blueroofmusic+AEA-gmail.com+AD4APg- wrote:

Hi,

+-1 to Girii's comments and suggestions.  Reinventing terminology
(the curse of the computer industry) leads to automatic cognitive
disconnects and confusion and benefits no one.

Cheers,
- Ira

Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
IETF Designated Expert - IPP +ACY- Printer MIB
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
mailto: blueroofmusic+AEA-gmail.com+ADw-mailto:blueroofmusic+AEA-gmail.com+=
AD4-
PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434


On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 3:58 PM Giridhar Mandyam +ADw-mandyam+AEA-qti.qualc=
omm.com+ADw-mailto:mandyam+AEA-qti.qualcomm.com+AD4APg- wrote:
I am not sure why we are trying to re-define terms that have already been d=
efined in the literature.  In my review on the -01 version of the architect=
ure doc +AFs-1+AF0-, I cited a couple of papers where terminology had been =
addressed +AFs-2+AF0--+AFs-3+AF0-.  I wonder if the RATS architecture edito=
rs did a complete literature review prior to the creation of this document,=
 and if so whether they can provide a justification as to why they rejected=
 previous approaches to defining attestation terminology and architecture.
In particular, +AFs-2+AF0- has the following text:
+IBw-Terminology. An appraiser is a party, generally a computer on a networ=
k, making a decision about some other party or parties. A target is a party=
 about which an appraiser needs to make such a decision.+IB0-
+IBw-Terminology. Attestation is the activity of making a claim to an appra=
iser about the properties of a target by supplying evidence which supports =
that claim. An attester is a party performing this activity. An appraiser's=
 decision-making process based on attested information is appraisal.+IB0-
+IBw-Terminology. To measure a target means to collect evidence about it th=
rough direct and local observation of it.+IB0-
+AFs-1+AF0- https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/9iIrnD9YixKCuwOGKtvG=
ZIzd+AF8-bU.

+AFs-2+AF0- Coker, George et al.  +ACI-Principles of Remote Attestation.+AC=
I-  International Journal on Information Security.  Vol. 10.  No .2.  2011.=
  pp. 63-81.  Available at http://web.cs.wpi.edu/+AH4-guttman/pubs/remote+A=
F8-attest.pdf.

+AFs-3+AF0- J. Guttman et al.  +ACIAIg-Attestation:  Evidence and Trust+ACI=
-.  MITRE Technical Report MTR080072.  March 2008. https://www.mitre.org/si=
tes/default/files/pdf/07+AF8-0186.pdf.



-Giri Mandyam
From: RATS +ADw-rats-bounces+AEA-ietf.org+ADw-mailto:rats-bounces+AEA-ietf.=
org+AD4APg- On Behalf Of Laurence Lundblade
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2019 12:36 PM
To: Smith, Ned +ADw-ned.smith+AEA-intel.com+ADw-mailto:ned.smith+AEA-intel.=
com+AD4APg-
Cc: rats+AEA-ietf.org+ADw-mailto:rats+AEA-ietf.org+AD4-
Subject: +AFs-Rats+AF0- attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the ter=
m +ACI-attester+ACI- instead of root of trust)

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.
Changed the subject as I want to reorient the discussion a bit. Apologies i=
f this is all obvious to you.
When measurements are being performed there is the subsystem that is doing =
the reporting / measuring and the subsystem that is being measured. +AFs-nm=
s+AF0- +-1
I think the attester is the subsystem that is doing the reporting. It gener=
ates and formats the claims, has the signing key and does the signing. +AFs=
-nms+AF0- +-1
I am calling the subsystem that is being measured the measurement target. I=
 am proposing that the attester measures the measurement target in RATS arc=
hitecture.
+AFs-nms+AF0- The semantics of +IBg-attester measures the measurement targe=
t+IBk- seems correct to me. Based on the definitions I+IBk-ve seen for +IBw=
-entity+IB0- it seems correct to say a +IBg-measurement target+IBk- is an e=
ntity. It seems correct to say the +IBg-attester is an entity+IBk- too. But=
 they are different entities. Since an entity can be lots of things and we =
need to disambiguate what is relevant to attestation, the architecture intr=
oduced the idea of role names. We chose +IBg-attester+IBk-, +IBg-verifier+I=
Bk-, +IBg-relying party+IBk- and +IBg-asserter+IBk-. There are many possibl=
e alternative synonymous or nearly synonymous choices to be found in an Eng=
lish dictionary and in computer security literature. The role names are jus=
t place holder names for now, IMO. If RATS WG prefers using different strin=
gs then these then some alternatives can be proposed. I+IBk-m OK using thes=
e for now as place holders that allow the group to discuss RATS roles seman=
tics.
Going back to measurement target, I don+IBk-t think +IBg-measurement target=
+IBk- conceptually would be a RATS role since it is being acted upon rather=
 than doing something.
Note: Butler Lampson+IBk-s paper +AFs-4+AF0- uses +IBg-Principal+IBk- to na=
me entities that can +IBg-say+IBk- something  (e.g. +IBw-X+IB0-) or can +IB=
g-speak-for+IBk- another Principal. Using Lampson+IBk-s terminology, the se=
mantic is +IBw-the Principal named +IBg-Attester+IBk- measures the Object n=
amed +IBg-Measurement target+IBk-.+IB0- Since the goal of the architecture =
is to provide a meta model for attestation behavior, it makes sense to use =
place holder names +IBg-Attester+IBk- and +IBg-Measurement Target+IBk- rath=
er than actual instance names. BTW: Lampson clarifies that Objects are also=
 Principals because of the identity property. This allows anything to say w=
hat it is. I.e. X says X. Ultimately +IBg-measurement target+IBk- is just a=
 placeholder name for an Object that is +IBw-the target of a measurement op=
eration+IB0-. Maybe the RATS WG is happier with a different string than +IB=
w-measurement target+IB0-, but we should have some alternative suggestions =
first (so long as they don+IBk-t change intended semantics).
For the measurement to be of best value, there must be isolation between th=
e attester and the measurement target. For example the attester doing the m=
easurement should be a TEE, TPM or such. The measurement target is usually =
the HLOS like Linux or Windows.
+AFs-nms+AF0- +-1. I think it is obvious that the Attester, though isolated=
 from the Measurement Target (MT) is nevertheless able to observe it.
The point of measurement is so that attacks against the measurement target =
can be detected. If there is no isolation, the attacker that succeeds again=
st the measurement target is likely to be go on to affect the attester and =
then the evidence (e.g. measurement claims in an EAT token) can be manipula=
ted.
+AFs-nms+AF0- +-1
In some architectures the manufacturer of the attester will be different th=
an the manufacturer of the measurement target. For example a TPM is made by=
 a TPM chip vendor. A TEE is made by a SoC vendor. These are different than=
 the HLOS vendor, the vendor of Windows, Linux or the router+IBk-s OS.
+AFs-nms+AF0- +-1
The verifier role primarily needs two thing to successfully verify measurem=
ent evidence.

1)      They need the public key to verify the signature generated by the a=
ttester and to know that the key is trusted and probably some implied claim=
s.
+AFs-nms+AF0- Verifier needs to trust Attester. The trust path can be model=
ed using Lampson. See Figure 4 in +AFs-4+AF0- as it seems pretty close to d=
escribing how this works for your example involving both keys and implied c=
laims.

  1.  They need the reference values for what is being measured. For exampl=
e, the expected values for Linux kernel 5.x on x86 or such.
+AFs-nms+AF0- Verifier also needs to trust that +IBw-Asserters+IB0- who cla=
im that their assertions are +IBg-golden+IBk- or +IBg-known good+IBk- or +I=
Bg-reference+IBk- values. This is another conversation the Verifier has tha=
t needs a trust path as exemplified in +AFs-4+AF0-, figurer 4.
I think 1) and 2) are likely to come from different manufacturers and there=
by might be depicted as separate roles in the architecture.
+AFs-nms+AF0- I disagree that RATS roles need to change because the entitie=
s performing the role differs. It is a case of multiple entities performing=
 the same function (that produces the same class of output).

1)      requires the out-of-band trust role. A RATS system without 1) (abov=
e?) is not very secure and not something we want to put in our architecture=
.
+AFs-nms+AF0- The idea that +IBg-an entity is more secure than X+IBk- is ac=
tually a determination a Relying Party should make. Attestation should supp=
ly it with information that allows the evaluation to take place.

  1.  requires the reference-value supplier role. Some RATS systems will ha=
ve 2) (above?) and some will not. You can have a RATS system without 2). An=
droid Key Store and FIDO+IBk-s use of attestation are examples.
+AFs-nms+AF0- Currently, the RATS architecture is using +IBg-Asserter+IBk-.=
 Though in past revisions it was +IBg-Claimant+IBk-. Neither of these seem =
perfect. Although, it seems the majority of cases where Assertions from Ass=
erters will be supply chain entities, there are cases (e.g. virtualized env=
ironments) where non-supply-chain entities take on the Asserter role. It wo=
uld be great if RATS WG could find single word role names as this makes tal=
king about them easier and reduces the need for acronyms.
The verifier has to have a trust relationship with both the manufacturer of=
 the attester and the manufacture of the HLOS.
+AFs-nms+AF0- I don+IBk-t recall what HLOS means (expands to).
Or perhaps I should call these two the attestion asserter and the reference=
-value asserter. (I prefer manufacturer because +IBw-asserter+IB0- is too c=
lose to +IBw-attester+IB0-, is fairly abstract and has some confusion aroun=
d it for me).
+AFs-nms+AF0- Are you suggesting +IBg-Supplier+IBk-? Some have suggested +I=
Bg-Endorser+IBk-.
LL



On Aug 23, 2019, at 12:53 PM, Smith, Ned +ADw-ned.smith+AEA-intel.com+ADw-m=
ailto:ned.smith+AEA-intel.com+AD4APg- wrote:

+AFs-snip+AF0-

I think the out-of-band trust role is much more important than the referenc=
e-value-supplying role.
+AFs-nms+AF0- I may not understand what you mean by these terms +IBw-out-of=
-band trust role+IB0- and +IBw-reference-value-supplying role+IB0-. General=
ly, they appear to fit in the +IBw-Asserter role+IB0- side of the diagram H=
enk displayed at 105 session +ACM-2.

You can have real attestation without reference values. For example, most c=
laims can be implicit. The entity has secure boot and can be assumed to per=
form correctly. Maybe the only claim is location.
+AFs-nms+AF0- I agree the Verifier role needs to somehow know which claims =
/ assertions of trustworthiness apply to the Attester and that not all clai=
ms must be conveyed as Evidence. A definition of implicit attestation might=
 suggest all assertions of trustworthiness could be conveyed via an out-of-=
band channel (where out-of-band refers to a conveyance that isn+IBk-t the o=
ne carrying Evidence). Recall, that the RATS WG deemed definition of Assert=
er / Assertions out of scope for now. Of course the architecture can talk a=
bout them. Hence, it is in scope to say that Evidence could be as simple as=
 a Nonce claim and a Verifier could conclude that the Nonce +- OOB claims +=
AD0- effective claim set. More concretely, the Evidence claims set (E) +- (=
union) the Assertions claims set (A) +AD0- effectiVe claims set (V).
I+IBk-m not sure if you are also suggesting that implicit could mean someth=
ing other than explicitly described Assertions. For example, Asserter and V=
erifier could meet at a coffee shop and agree that whenever a certificate p=
ath resolves to the trust anchor for the Asserter that claims set (S) also =
can be inferred. Hence, V +AD0- (S +- A +- E). The charter limitation impli=
es we can define drafts that define E for the Attester and Verifier roles a=
nd S and A for the Verifier role only and not how Verifier obtains (S, A).

If you don+IBk-t have the +AFs-1+AF0- out-of-band trust, the measurements a=
re worthless, so the architecture is incomplete if it just has a role that =
provides reference values.
                                +AFs-nms+AF0- Right. The architecture shoul=
d assume that role entities have valid credentials (e.g. certificates +- pr=
ivate key) and that the Verifier can resolve that it trusts the role entiti=
es+IBk- credentials (somehow). If +IBg-out-of-band+IBk- +AFs-1+AF0- means A=
sserter(s) then their Assertions (measurements) are expected to be their +I=
Bw-provable assertions+IB0AOw- where provable means signed by the Asserter+=
IBk-s credential key.
+AFs-nms+AF0- We might want to qualify +IBw-Assertions+IB0- as +IBw-Provabl=
e Assertions+IB0- in the architecture to make it clear that there is a way =
for the Verifier to accept them without blindly trusting an assertion given=
 to it. This would also qualify it in terms of an ISO/IEC terminology that =
defines Assertion as +IBg-a statement that is not necessarily provable+IBk-=
.
                                +AFs-nms+AF0- We could have a discussion ab=
out the veracity of Asserter(s)+IBk- credentials. But I think it ends up be=
ing a recursion of the RATS architecture. This isn+IBk-t an interesting rat=
 hole (pun intended), except for being convinced that the recursion termina=
tes. For example, with some sort of trust anchor provisioning protocol or m=
anual process (see +AFs-snip+AF0-).

I hope we can get to a clear architecture with all of this laid out. I thin=
k it will help cut through a lot of confused conversations.
+AFs-nms+AF0- +-1

LL

+AF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF=
8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXwBfAF8AXw-
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ol
	+AHs-margin-bottom:0in+ADsAfQ-
ul
	+AHs-margin-bottom:0in+ADsAfQ-
--+AD4-
+ADw-/style+AD4APAAh---+AFs-if gte mso 9+AF0APgA8-xml+AD4-
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l+AD4-
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+ADw-/head+AD4-
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ACIAPg-
+ADw-div class+AD0AIg-WordSection1+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgAm-gt+ADs- I recommend reading +ADw-u+A=
D4-Practical Principles for Computer Security+ADw-/u+AD4-, Butler Lampson, =
Microsoft Research, January, 2007 +AFs-4+AF0APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+A=
D4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-I have seen this document before, and =
it is quite informative and definitely described several concepts that have=
 been used in FIDO/Authentication work.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- What specific aspects=
 of terminology from this document are you recommending we leverage?+ACY-nb=
sp+ADs-
 For instance I found concepts that could be useful for attestation, but I =
did not find a specific description of an attester, appraiser, or target me=
asurement.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- Also, if concepts from the Lampson doc were levera=
ged for the RAts architecture doc then why is
 this not mentioned in the references?+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-For instance, I tried to see if an att=
ester can be considered a +IBw-token source+IB0- (Sec. 5.2) but in reading =
this section I do not believe that was the intention of the author.+ACY-nbs=
p+ADs- I tried to see if the +IBw-speaks-for engine+IB0- (Sec. 5.3) can enc=
ompass
 the role of the entity that measures a target, but I believe author was in=
tending this engine to also fulfil the role of a verifier (token consumer +=
IBw-The job of the speaks-for engine is to derive conclusions about what pr=
incipals are trusted, starting from
 claims and adding information derived from tokens+IB0-).+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o=
:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgAm-gt+ADs- At some point consistency is=
 a hobgoblin. +ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-To complete the Thoreau quote then, I =
hope you are not saying I am a +IBw-little mind+IB0-.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- I don+I=
Bk-t believe what I was suggesting was to slavishly adhere to previously-pu=
blished definitions of attester, target of measurement, etc.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- =
What I was
 suggesting was to start with commonly-accepted definitions, justify why th=
ey may need to be modified, and come up with a terminology suitable for the=
 working group.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- It seems that much of this discussion starts =
with the assumption that there are no commonly-accepted
 definitions for the terms used in the architecture document.+ACY-nbsp+ADs-=
 +ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgAm-gt+ADs-The most important objective =
of terminology for RATS WG (IMHO) is to be able to not talk past one anothe=
r. After that, we can agree on whatever industry term is most appropriate.
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-I don+IBk-t think anyone is arguing ab=
out the need for terminology based on what I+IBk-ve observed.+ACY-nbsp+ADs-=
 I just think it is not constructive when we assume a clean slate for all t=
erms, and try to build up definitions from scratch.+ACY-nbsp+ADs-
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg--Giri+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD=
4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-border:none+ADs-border-top:solid +ACM-E1E1E1 1.0pt+AD=
s-padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-b+AD4-From:+ADw-/b+AD4- Smith, Ned +=
ADw-br+AD4-
+ADw-b+AD4-Sent:+ADw-/b+AD4- Saturday, August 31, 2019 6:02 PM+ADw-br+AD4-
+ADw-b+AD4-To:+ADw-/b+AD4- Ira McDonald +ADs- Giridhar Mandyam +ADw-br+AD4-
+ADw-b+AD4-Cc:+ADw-/b+AD4- Laurence Lundblade +ADs- rats+AEA-ietf.org+ADw-b=
r+AD4-
+ADw-b+AD4-Subject:+ADw-/b+AD4- Re: +AFs-Rats+AF0- attester vs measurement =
target (was Re: Use the term +ACY-quot+ADs-attester+ACY-quot+ADs- instead o=
f root of trust)+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-o:p+AD4AJg-nbsp+ADsAPA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-I recommend reading +ADw-u+AD4-Practic=
al Principles for Computer Security+ADw-/u+AD4-, Butler Lampson, Microsoft =
Research, January, 2007 +AFs-4+AF0APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-This is very relevant to attestation a=
nd introduces useful terminology, much of which aligns with the goals of at=
testation architecture.
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-It predates some of the references giv=
en below. +ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-At some point consistency is a hobgobl=
in. The most important objective of terminology for RATS WG (IMHO) is to be=
 able to not talk past one another. After that, we can agree on whatever in=
dustry term is most appropriate.
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgAm-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPg-Specific responses to Laurence+IBk-s r=
emarks are inline below prefaced with +AFs-nms+AF0-.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD=
4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-span lang+AD0AIg-NO-BOK+ACIAPg--Ned+=
ADw-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACIAPgA8-span lang+AD0AIg-NO-BOK+ACIAPgBb-4+A=
F0- +ADw-a href+AD0AIg-https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication=
/practical-principles-for-computer-security/+ACIAPg-
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/practical-principles-f=
or-computer-security/+ADw-/a+AD4-
+ADw-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-On =
8/30/19, 14:21 PM, +ACY-quot+ADs-Ira McDonald+ACY-quot+ADs- +ACY-lt+ADsAPA-=
a href+AD0AIg-mailto:blueroofmusic+AEA-gmail.com+ACIAPg-blueroofmusic+AEA-g=
mail.com+ADw-/a+AD4AJg-gt+ADs- wrote:+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPgAm-n=
bsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-Hi,=
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPgAm-n=
bsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPgAmAC=
M-43+ADs-1 to Girii's comments and suggestions.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- Reinventing t=
erminology+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-(th=
e curse of the computer industry) leads to automatic cognitive+ADw-o:p+AD4A=
PA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-dis=
connects and confusion and benefits no one.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+A=
D4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPgAm-n=
bsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-Che=
ers,+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-- I=
ra+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPgAm-n=
bsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-Ira=
 McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)+ADw-br+AD4-
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+=
AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-Co-=
Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:0in+ADs-=
margin-right:0in+ADs-margin-bottom:
12.0pt+ADs-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG+ADw-br+AD4-
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group+ADw-br+AD4-
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG+ADw-br+AD4-
IETF Designated Expert - IPP +ACY-amp+ADs- Printer MIB+ADw-br+AD4-
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc+ADw-br+AD4-
+ADw-a href+AD0AIg-http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic+ACI- target+A=
D0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPgA8-span style+AD0AIg-color:+ACM-3333FF+ACIAPg-http://si=
tes.google.com/site/blueroofmusic+ADw-/span+AD4APA-/a+AD4APA-br+AD4-
+ADw-a href+AD0AIg-http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc+ACI- target+AD=
0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPgA8-span style+AD0AIg-color:+ACM-6600CC+ACIAPg-http://sit=
es.google.com/site/highnorthinc+ADw-/span+AD4APA-/a+AD4APA-br+AD4-
mailto: +ADw-a href+AD0AIg-mailto:blueroofmusic+AEA-gmail.com+ACI- target+A=
D0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPg-blueroofmusic+AEA-gmail.com+ADw-/a+AD4APA-br+AD4-
PO Box 221+ACY-nbsp+ADs- Grand Marais, MI 49839+ACY-nbsp+ADs- 906-494-2434+=
ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPgAm-n=
bsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPgAm-n=
bsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-On =
Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 3:58 PM Giridhar Mandyam +ACY-lt+ADsAPA-a href+AD0AIg-=
mailto:mandyam+AEA-qti.qualcomm.com+ACIAPg-mandyam+AEA-qti.qualcomm.com+ADw=
-/a+AD4AJg-gt+ADs- wrote:+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-blockquote style+AD0AIg-border:none+ADs-border-left:solid +ACM-CCCCCC =
1.0pt+ADs-padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt+ADs-
margin-left:4.8pt+ADs-margin-top:5.0pt+ADs-margin-right:0in+ADs-margin-bott=
om:5.0pt+ACIAPg-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:47.55pt+ACIAPg-
I am not sure why we are trying to re-define terms that have already been d=
efined in the literature.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- In my review on the -01 version of =
the architecture doc +AFs-1+AF0-, I cited a couple of papers where terminol=
ogy had been addressed +AFs-2+AF0--+AFs-3+AF0-.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- I wonder if t=
he RATS
 architecture editors did a complete literature review prior to the creatio=
n of this document, and if so whether they can provide a justification as t=
o why they rejected previous approaches to defining attestation terminology=
 and architecture.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:47.55pt+ACIAPg-
In particular, +AFs-2+AF0- has the following text:+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4A=
PA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:47.55pt+ACIAPg-
+IBwAPA-b+AD4-Terminology+ADw-/b+AD4-. +ADw-i+AD4-An +ADw-b+AD4-appraiser+A=
Dw-/b+AD4- is a party, generally a computer on a network, making a decision=
 about some other party or parties. A
+ADw-b+AD4-target+ADw-/b+AD4- is a party about which an appraiser needs to =
make such a decision+ADw-/i+AD4-.+IB0APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:47.55pt+ACIAPg-
+IBwAPA-b+AD4-Terminology+ADw-/b+AD4-. +ADw-b+AD4APA-i+AD4-Attestation+ADw-=
/i+AD4APA-/b+AD4APA-i+AD4- is the activity of making a claim to an appraise=
r about the properties of a target by supplying evidence which supports tha=
t claim. An
+ADw-b+AD4-attester+ADw-/b+AD4- is a party performing this activity. An app=
raiser's decision-making process based on attested information is
+ADw-b+AD4-appraisal+ADw-/b+AD4APA-/i+AD4-.+IB0APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/=
p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:47.55pt+ACIAPg-
+IBwAPA-b+AD4-Terminology+ADw-/b+AD4-. +ADw-i+AD4-To +ADw-b+AD4-measure+ADw=
-/b+AD4- a target means to collect evidence about it through direct and loc=
al observation of it+ADw-/i+AD4-.+IB0APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+AFs-1+AF0- +ADw-a href+AD0AIg-https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/9=
iIrnD9YixKCuwOGKtvGZIzd+AF8-bU+ACI- target+AD0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPg-
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/9iIrnD9YixKCuwOGKtvGZIzd+AF8-bU+=
ADw-/a+AD4-.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-pre style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ADs-background:white+ADs-background-=
position-x:0+ACUAOw-
background-position-y:0+ACUAOw-background-attachment:scroll+ACIAPgA8-span s=
tyle+AD0AIg-font-size:
11.0pt+ADs-font-family:+ACY-quot+ADs-Calibri+ACY-quot+ADs-,sans-serif+ADs-c=
olor:black+ACIAPgBb-2+AF0- Coker, George et al.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- +ACY-quot+ADs=
-Principles of Remote Attestation.+ACY-quot+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADs- International =
Journal on Information Security.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- Vol. 10.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- No .2=
.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- 2011.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- pp. 63-81.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- Available at +=
ADw-a href+AD0AIg-http://web.cs.wpi.edu/+AH4-guttman/pubs/remote+AF8-attest=
.pdf+ACI- target+AD0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPg-http://web.cs.wpi.edu/+AH4-guttman/p=
ubs/remote+AF8-attest.pdf+ADw-/a+AD4-. +ADw-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD=
4APA-/pre+AD4-
+ADw-pre style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ADs-background:white+ADs-background-=
position-x:0+ACUAOw-background-position-y:0+ACUAOw-
background-attachment:scroll+ACIAPgA8-span style+AD0AIg-font-family:+ACY-qu=
ot+ADs-Calibri+ACY-quot+ADs-,sans-serif+ADs-
color:black+ACIAPgBb-3+AF0- +ADw-/span+AD4APA-span style+AD0AIg-font-size:1=
1.0pt+ADs-font-family:+ACY-quot+ADs-Calibri+ACY-quot+ADs-,sans-serif+ADs-
color:+ACM-212529+ACIAPg-J. Guttman et al.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- +ACY-quot+ADsAJg-q=
uot+ADs-Attestation:+ACY-nbsp+ADs- Evidence and Trust+ACY-quot+ADs-.+ACY-nb=
sp+ADs- MITRE Technical Report MTR080072.+ACY-nbsp+ADs- March 2008. +ADw-a =
href+AD0AIg-https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07+AF8-0186.pdf+A=
CI- target+AD0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPg-https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/=
pdf/07+AF8-0186.pdf+ADw-/a+AD4-. +ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-/span+AD4APA-span style+A=
D0AIg-font-size:9.0pt+ADs-font-family:Consolas+ADs-color:+ACM-212529+ACIAPg=
Am-nbsp+ADsAPA-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/pre+AD4-
+ADw-pre style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ADs-background:white+ADs-background-=
position-x:0+ACUAOw-background-position-y:0+ACUAOw-
background-attachment:scroll+ACIAPgA8-span style+AD0AIg-font-size:11.0pt+AD=
s-font-family:+ACY-quot+ADs-Calibri+ACY-quot+ADs-,sans-serif+ADs-
color:+ACM-2F5597+ACIAPgAm-nbsp+ADsAPA-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-=
/pre+AD4-
+ADw-pre style+AD0AIg-margin-left:47.55pt+ADs-
background:white+ADs-background-position-x:0+ACUAOw-background-position-y:0=
+ACUAOw-background-attachment:
scroll+ACIAPgA8-span style+AD0AIg-font-size:11.0pt+ADs-font-family:+ACY-quo=
t+ADs-Calibri+ACY-quot+ADs-,sans-serif+ADs-
color:+ACM-2F5597+ACIAPg--Giri Mandyam+ADw-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4=
APA-/pre+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-border:none+ADs-border-top:solid windowtext 1.0pt+ADs=
-padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in+ADs-
border-color:currentcolor currentcolor+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:47.55pt+ACIAPg-
+ADw-b+AD4-From:+ADw-/b+AD4- RATS +ACY-lt+ADsAPA-a href+AD0AIg-mailto:rats-=
bounces+AEA-ietf.org+ACI- target+AD0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPg-rats-bounces+AEA-iet=
f.org+ADw-/a+AD4AJg-gt+ADs-
+ADw-b+AD4-On Behalf Of +ADw-/b+AD4-Laurence Lundblade+ADw-br+AD4-
+ADw-b+AD4-Sent:+ADw-/b+AD4- Friday, August 30, 2019 12:36 PM+ADw-br+AD4-
+ADw-b+AD4-To:+ADw-/b+AD4- Smith, Ned +ACY-lt+ADsAPA-a href+AD0AIg-mailto:n=
ed.smith+AEA-intel.com+ACI- target+AD0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPg-ned.smith+AEA-inte=
l.com+ADw-/a+AD4AJg-gt+ADsAPA-br+AD4-
+ADw-b+AD4-Cc:+ADw-/b+AD4- +ADw-a href+AD0AIg-mailto:rats+AEA-ietf.org+ACI-=
 target+AD0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPg-rats+AEA-ietf.org+ADw-/a+AD4APA-br+AD4-
+ADw-b+AD4-Subject:+ADw-/b+AD4- +AFs-Rats+AF0- attester vs measurement targ=
et (was Re: Use the term +ACY-quot+ADs-attester+ACY-quot+ADs- instead of ro=
ot of trust)+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-p style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPgA8-strong+AD4APA-span style+AD0A=
Ig-font-size:8.5pt+ADs-font-family:
+ACY-quot+ADs-Arial+ACY-quot+ADs-,sans-serif+ADs-color:black+ADs-background=
:+ACM-FFEB9C+ACIAPg-CAUTION+ADw-/span+AD4APA-/strong+AD4APA-span style+AD0A=
Ig-font-size:8.5pt+ADs-font-family:+ACY-quot+ADs-Arial+ACY-quot+ADs-,sans-s=
erif+ADs-color:black+ADs-background:
+ACM-FFEB9C+ACIAPg-: This email
 originated from outside of the organization.+ADw-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4APA-/=
o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-Changed the subject as I want to reorien=
t the discussion a bit. Apologies if this is all obvious to you.+ACY-nbsp+A=
DsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-When measurements are being performed th=
ere is the subsystem that is doing the reporting / measuring and the subsys=
tem that is being measured.+ACY-nbsp+ADsAWw-nms+AF0- +ACYAIw-43+ADs-1+ADw-o=
:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-I think the attester+ACY-nbsp+ADs-is the=
 subsystem that is doing the reporting. It generates and formats the claims=
, has the signing key and does the signing. +AFs-nms+AF0- +ACYAIw-43+ADs-1+=
ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-I am calling the subsystem that is being=
 measured the measurement target. I am proposing that the attester measures=
+ACY-nbsp+ADs-the measurement target in RATS architecture.
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- The semantics of +IBg-atteste=
r measures the measurement target+IBk- seems correct to me. Based on the de=
finitions I+IBk-ve seen for +IBw-entity+IB0- it seems correct to say a +IBg=
-measurement target+IBk-
 is an entity. It seems correct to say the +IBg-attester is an entity+IBk- =
too. But they are different entities. Since an entity can be lots of things=
 and we need to disambiguate what is relevant to attestation, the architect=
ure introduced the idea of role names. We
 chose +IBg-attester+IBk-, +IBg-verifier+IBk-, +IBg-relying party+IBk- and =
+IBg-asserter+IBk-. There are many possible alternative synonymous or nearl=
y synonymous choices to be found in an English dictionary and in computer s=
ecurity literature. The role names are just place holder names for
 now, IMO. If RATS WG prefers using different strings then these then some =
alternatives can be proposed. I+IBk-m OK using these for now as place holde=
rs that allow the group to discuss RATS roles semantics.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:=
p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-Going back to measurement target, I don+=
IBk-t think +IBg-measurement target+IBk- conceptually would be a RATS role =
since it is being acted upon rather than doing something. +ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-=
o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-Note: Butler Lampson+IBk-s paper +AFs-4+=
AF0- uses +IBg-Principal+IBk- to name entities that can +IBg-say+IBk- somet=
hing +ACY-nbsp+ADs-(e.g. +IBw-X+IB0-) or can +IBg-speak-for+IBk- another Pr=
incipal. Using Lampson+IBk-s terminology, the semantic
 is +IBw-the Principal named +IBg-Attester+IBk- measures the Object named +=
IBg-Measurement target+IBk-.+IB0- Since the goal of the architecture is to =
provide a meta model for attestation behavior, it makes sense to use place =
holder names +IBg-Attester+IBk- and +IBg-Measurement Target+IBk- rather
 than actual instance names. BTW: Lampson clarifies that Objects are also P=
rincipals because of the identity property. This allows anything to say wha=
t it is. I.e. X says X. Ultimately +IBg-measurement target+IBk- is just a p=
laceholder name for an Object that is +IBw-the
 target of a measurement operation+IB0-. Maybe the RATS WG is happier with =
a different string than +IBw-measurement target+IB0-, but we should have so=
me alternative suggestions first (so long as they don+IBk-t change intended=
 semantics).+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-For the measurement to be of best value,=
 there must be isolation between the attester and the measurement target. F=
or example the attester doing the measurement should be a TEE,
 TPM or such. The measurement target is usually the HLOS like Linux or Wind=
ows.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- +ACYAIw-43+ADs-1. I think it =
is obvious that the Attester, though isolated from the Measurement Target (=
MT) is nevertheless able to observe it.
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-The point of measurement is so that atta=
cks against the measurement target can be detected. If there is no isolatio=
n, the attacker that succeeds against the measurement target is
 likely to be go on to affect the attester and then the evidence (e.g. meas=
urement claims in an EAT token) can be manipulated.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4=
APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- +ACYAIw-43+ADs-1+ADw-o:p+AD4A=
PA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-In some architectures the manufacturer o=
f the attester will be different than the manufacturer of the measurement t=
arget. For example a TPM is made by a TPM chip vendor. A TEE is
 made by a SoC vendor. These are different than the HLOS vendor, the vendor=
 of Windows, Linux or the router+IBk-s OS.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD=
4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- +ACYAIw-43+ADs-1+ADw-o:p+AD4A=
PA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-The verifier role primarily needs two th=
ing to successfully verify measurement evidence.+ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA=
-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoListParagraph+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:a=
uto+ADs-mso-margin-bottom-alt:
auto+ADs-margin-left:47.55pt+ADs-text-indent:-.25in+ADs-mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo2+ACIAPg-
+ADwAIQBb-if +ACE-supportLists+AF0APgA8-span style+AD0AIg-mso-list:Ignore+A=
CIAPg-1)+ADw-span style+AD0AIg-font:7.0pt +ACY-quot+ADs-Times New Roman+ACY=
-quot+ADsAIgA+ACY-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADs-
+ADw-/span+AD4APA-/span+AD4APAAhAFs-endif+AF0APg-They need the public key t=
o verify the signature generated by the attester and to know that the key i=
s trusted and probably some implied claims.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+A=
D4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- Verifier needs to trust Attes=
ter. The trust path can be modeled using Lampson. See Figure 4 in +AFs-4+AF=
0- as it seems pretty close to describing how this works for your example i=
nvolving
 both keys and implied claims. +ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-ol start+AD0AIg-2+ACI- type+AD0AIg-1+ACIAPg-
+ADw-li class+AD0AIg-MsoListParagraph+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:=
auto+ADs-mso-margin-bottom-alt:
     auto+ADs-margin-left:0in+ADs-mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2+ACIAPg-
They need the reference values for what is being measured. For example, the=
 expected values for Linux kernel 5.x on x86 or such.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+A=
D4-
+ADw-/li+AD4APA-/ol+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:4.8pt+ACIAPg-
+AFs-nms+AF0- Verifier also needs to trust that +IBw-Asserters+IB0- who cla=
im that their assertions are +IBg-golden+IBk- or +IBg-known good+IBk- or +I=
Bg-reference+IBk- values. This is another conversation the Verifier has tha=
t needs a trust path as exemplified in +AFs-4+AF0-, figurer 4.+ADw-o:p+AD4A=
PA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-I think 1) and 2) are likely to come fro=
m different manufacturers and thereby might be depicted as separate roles i=
n the architecture.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- I disagree that RATS roles ne=
ed to change because the entities performing the role differs. It is a case=
 of multiple entities performing the same function (that produces the
 same class of output). +ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoListParagraph+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:a=
uto+ADs-mso-margin-bottom-alt:
auto+ADs-margin-left:47.55pt+ADs-text-indent:-.25in+ADs-mso-list:l3 level1 =
lfo5+ACIAPg-
+ADwAIQBb-if +ACE-supportLists+AF0APgA8-span style+AD0AIg-mso-list:Ignore+A=
CIAPg-1)+ADw-span style+AD0AIg-font:7.0pt +ACY-quot+ADs-Times New Roman+ACY=
-quot+ADsAIgA+ACY-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADs-
+ADw-/span+AD4APA-/span+AD4APAAhAFs-endif+AF0APg-requires the out-of-band t=
rust role. A RATS system without 1) (above?) is not very secure and not som=
ething we want to put in our architecture.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD=
4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- The idea that +IBg-an entity =
is more secure than X+IBk- is actually a determination a Relying Party shou=
ld make. Attestation should supply it with information that allows the eval=
uation
 to take place.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-ol start+AD0AIg-2+ACI- type+AD0AIg-1+ACIAPg-
+ADw-li class+AD0AIg-MsoListParagraph+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:=
auto+ADs-mso-margin-bottom-alt:
     auto+ADs-margin-left:0in+ADs-mso-list:l3 level1 lfo5+ACIAPg-
requires the reference-value supplier role. Some RATS systems will have 2) =
(above?) and some will not. You can have a RATS system without 2). Android =
Key Store and FIDO+IBk-s use of attestation are examples.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o=
:p+AD4-
+ADw-/li+AD4APA-/ol+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- Currently, the RATS architect=
ure is using +IBg-Asserter+IBk-. Though in past revisions it was +IBg-Claim=
ant+IBk-. Neither of these seem perfect. Although, it seems the majority of=
 cases where
 Assertions from Asserters will be supply chain entities, there are cases (=
e.g. virtualized environments) where non-supply-chain entities take on the =
Asserter role. It would be great if RATS WG could find single word role nam=
es as this makes talking about them
 easier and reduces the need for acronyms.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD=
4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-The verifier has to have a trust relatio=
nship with both the manufacturer of the attester and the manufacture of the=
 HLOS.
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- I don+IBk-t recall what HLOS =
means (expands to).+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPg-Or perhaps I should call these two the a=
ttestion asserter and the reference-value asserter. (I prefer manufacturer =
because +IBw-asserter+IB0- is too close to +IBw-attester+IB0-, is fairly ab=
stract
 and has some confusion around it for me).+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD=
4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ACIAPgBb-nms+AF0- Are you suggesting +IBg-Suppl=
ier+IBk-? Some have suggested +IBg-Endorser+IBk-.
+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
LL+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-margin-bottom:12.0pt+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-blockquote style+AD0AIg-margin-top:5.0pt+ADs-margin-bottom:5.0pt+ACIAP=
g-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
On Aug 23, 2019, at 12:53 PM, Smith, Ned +ACY-lt+ADsAPA-a href+AD0AIg-mailt=
o:ned.smith+AEA-intel.com+ACI- target+AD0AIgBf-blank+ACIAPg-ned.smith+AEA-i=
ntel.com+ADw-/a+AD4AJg-gt+ADs- wrote:+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+AFs-snip+AF0APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
I think the out-of-band trust role is much more important than the referenc=
e-value-supplying role.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ADs-text-indent:.5in+ACIAPg-
+AFs-nms+AF0- I may not understand what you mean by these terms +IBw-out-of=
-band trust role+IB0- and +IBw-reference-value-supplying role+IB0-. General=
ly, they appear to fit in the +IBw-Asserter role+IB0- side of the diagram H=
enk displayed at 105 session +ACM-2.+ADw-span class+AD0AIg-gmail-m-83603306=
93709964158apple-converted-space+ACIAPgAm-nbsp+ADsAPA-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4A=
PA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ADs-text-indent:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
You can have real attestation without reference values. For example, most c=
laims can be implicit. The entity has secure boot and can be assumed to per=
form correctly. Maybe the only claim is location.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4AP=
A-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ADs-text-indent:.5in+ACIAPg-
+AFs-nms+AF0- I agree the Verifier role needs to somehow know which claims =
/ assertions of trustworthiness apply to the Attester and that not all clai=
ms must be conveyed as Evidence. A definition of implicit attestation might=
 suggest all assertions of trustworthiness
 could be conveyed via an out-of-band channel (where out-of-band refers to =
a conveyance that isn+IBk-t the one carrying Evidence). Recall, that the RA=
TS WG deemed definition of Asserter / Assertions out of scope for now. Of c=
ourse the architecture can talk about
 them. Hence, it is in scope to say that Evidence could be as simple as a N=
once claim and a Verifier could conclude that the Nonce +ACYAIw-43+ADs- OOB=
 claims +AD0- effective claim set. More concretely, the Evidence claims set=
 (E) +ACYAIw-43+ADs- (union) the Assertions claims set (A) +AD0- effectiVe
 claims set (V).+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ADs-text-indent:.5in+ACIAPg-
I+IBk-m not sure if you are also suggesting that implicit could mean someth=
ing other than explicitly described Assertions. For example, Asserter and V=
erifier could meet at a coffee shop and agree that whenever a certificate p=
ath resolves to the trust anchor for
 the Asserter that claims set (S) also can be inferred. Hence, V +AD0- (S +=
ACYAIw-43+ADs- A +ACYAIw-43+ADs- E). The charter limitation implies we can =
define drafts that define E for the Attester and Verifier roles and S and A=
 for the Verifier role only and not how Verifier obtains (S, A).+ADw-span c=
lass+AD0AIg-gmail-m-8360330693709964158apple-converted-space+ACIAPgAm-nbsp+=
ADsAPA-/span+AD4APA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAPA-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
If you don+IBk-t have the +AFs-1+AF0- out-of-band trust, the measurements a=
re worthless, so the architecture is incomplete if it just has a role that =
provides reference values.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJ=
g-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-n=
bsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADs- +ACY-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-n=
bsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp=
+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADs- +AFs-nms+=
AF0- Right. The architecture should assume that role entities have valid cr=
edentials (e.g. certificates +ACYAIw-43+ADs- private key) and that the Veri=
fier can resolve that it trusts the role entities+IBk- credentials (somehow=
). If +IBg-out-of-band+IBk-
 +AFs-1+AF0- means Asserter(s) then their Assertions (measurements) are exp=
ected to be their +IBw-provable assertions+IB0AOw- where provable means sig=
ned by the Asserter+IBk-s credential key.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4=
-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div style+AD0AIg-margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ADs-text-indent:.5in+ACIAPg-
+AFs-nms+AF0- We might want to qualify +IBw-Assertions+IB0- as +IBw-Provabl=
e Assertions+IB0- in the architecture to make it clear that there is a way =
for the Verifier to accept them without blindly trusting an assertion given=
 to it. This would also qualify it in terms of an ISO/IEC
 terminology that defines Assertion as +IBg-a statement that is not necessa=
rily provable+IBk-.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
+ADw-div+AD4-
+ADw-p class+AD0AIg-MsoNormal+ACI- style+AD0AIg-mso-margin-top-alt:auto+ADs=
-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
+ACY-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJ=
g-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-n=
bsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp=
+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+AD=
sAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADs- =
+AFs-nms+AF0- We could have a discussion about the+ADw-span class+AD0AIg-gm=
ail-m-8360330693709964158apple-converted-space+ACIAPgAm-nbsp+ADsAPA-/span+A=
D4APA-i+AD4-veracity+ADw-/i+AD4APA-span class+AD0AIg-gmail-m-83603306937099=
64158apple-converted-space+ACIAPgAm-nbsp+ADsAPA-/span+AD4-of Asserter(s)+IB=
k- credentials.
 But I think it ends up being a recursion of the RATS architecture. This is=
n+IBk-t an interesting rat hole (pun intended), except for being convinced =
that the recursion terminates. For example, with some sort of trust anchor =
provisioning protocol or manual process
 (see +AFs-snip+AF0-).+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-/o:p+AD4APA-/p+AD4-
+ADw-/div+AD4-
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+ACY-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJg-nbsp+ADsAJ=
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A-span class+AD0AIg-gmail-m-8360330693709964158apple-converted-space+ACIAPg=
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-mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto+ADs-
margin-left:.5in+ACIAPg-
I hope we can get to a clear architecture with all of this laid out. I thin=
k it will help cut through a lot of confused conversations.+ADw-o:p+AD4APA-=
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RATS mailing list+ADw-br+AD4-
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--_000_da6b1ac3b67a4c3ab9ed2a2cd0936f06NASANEXM01Cnaqualcommco_--


From nobody Mon Sep  2 09:18:57 2019
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Cc: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
To: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
References: <F31EDAAF-ABA6-4341-89D8-CE116B8AC19C@island-resort.com> <HE1PR0701MB2267E350D17B31CA364B5A108FA90@HE1PR0701MB2267.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com> <3F5C57F7-C75F-4C27-9898-25AF98237DE9@island-resort.com> <10825C3E-81E0-43A9-B529-28E7C501E098@intel.com> <910BEC2B-AA72-4106-9E5E-5DDEC6B9CFED@island-resort.com> <A8D75C7B-EC13-40BD-BB0E-91B41E249351@intel.com> <7F4FC12D-8F77-46BD-A025-C223F670826C@island-resort.com> <DB36880D-0F61-4246-9464-1FE88BBF5FF8@intel.com> <EC5E19D2-3A43-4FCF-A370-AAA9FA3B6E92@island-resort.com> <774847aefd954c00970af8fba8659d5a@NASANEXM01C.na.qualcomm.com> <CAN40gSsUiNGt6DXTSxZDYpRUWG+Fy9Km=SQTJjBzmeLzmEaKuw@mail.gmail.com> <7BE04939-B8F6-43BF-9F04-0B3D5DFB60EC@intel.com> <da6b1ac3b67a4c3ab9ed2a2cd0936f06@NASANEXM01C.na.qualcomm.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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> On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam =
<mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com> wrote:
>=20
> I don=E2=80=99t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology =
based on what I=E2=80=99ve observed.  I just think it is not =
constructive when we assume a clean slate for all terms, and try to =
build up definitions from scratch.=20
>=20


I=E2=80=99d like to:
- re use terminology exactly "as is" when possible
- in some cases re use, but  refine and clarify for our needs
- if neither of those work, use new terminology

LL=

--Apple-Mail=_1994D495-04D4-44CC-9DFF-0FB305B9DD98
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On =
Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com" =
class=3D"">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;" class=3D"">I don=E2=80=99t think anyone is arguing about the need =
for terminology based on what I=E2=80=99ve observed.&nbsp; I just think =
it is not constructive when we assume a clean slate for all terms, and =
try to build up definitions from scratch.&nbsp;<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"></div></blockquote></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I=E2=80=99d like =
to:</div><div class=3D"">- re use terminology exactly "as is" when =
possible</div><div class=3D"">- in some cases re use, but &nbsp;refine =
and clarify for our needs</div><div class=3D"">- if neither of those =
work, use new terminology</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">LL</div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_1994D495-04D4-44CC-9DFF-0FB305B9DD98--


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From: "Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" <ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
CC: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 19:29:47 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/9VqtkY73166xTAJtOT4rghzKxvU>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these terms.

Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.  An attest=
er is something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not so sure of.  Fo=
r example, is a server a measurement target, or is something that stores me=
asurements, like a TPM, a measurement target?

t.

Ian




--

Dr. Ian Oliver

Cybersecurity Research

Distinguished Member of Technical Staff

Nokia Bell Labs

+358 50 483 6237

________________________________
From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
Sent: 02 September 2019 19:18
To: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
Cc: Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com>; Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com=
>; rats@ietf.org <rats@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "a=
ttester" instead of root of trust)


On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com<mail=
to:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>> wrote:

I don=92t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology based on w=
hat I=92ve observed.  I just think it is not constructive when we assume a =
clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions from scratch.


I=92d like to:
- re use terminology exactly "as is" when possible
- in some cases re use, but  refine and clarify for our needs
- if neither of those work, use new terminology

LL

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252">
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<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
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Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these terms. =
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.&nbsp; An a=
ttester is something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not so sure of=
.&nbsp; For example, is a server a measurement target, or is something that=
 stores measurements, like a TPM, a measurement
 target?</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
t.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Ian<br>
</div>
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: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
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<br>
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<br>
</div>
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<div id=3D"divtagdefaultwrapper" dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-size:12pt; color=
:#000000; font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif">
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">-- <br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Dr. Ian Oliver</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Cybersecurity Research<br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Distinguished Member of Technical Staff</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Nokia Bell Labs</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">&#43;358 50 483 6237<br>
</p>
</div>
<div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font style=3D"font-size:11pt" face=
=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Laurence Lundblade =
&lt;lgl@island-resort.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> 02 September 2019 19:18<br>
<b>To:</b> Giridhar Mandyam &lt;mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Smith, Ned &lt;ned.smith@intel.com&gt;; Ira McDonald &lt;blueroo=
fmusic@gmail.com&gt;; rats@ietf.org &lt;rats@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the =
term &quot;attester&quot; instead of root of trust)</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word; line-break:after-white-space=
"><br class=3D"">
<div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com" class=3D"">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&g=
t; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"x_Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-we=
ight:normal; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text=
-transform:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none=
">
I don=92t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology based on w=
hat I=92ve observed.&nbsp; I just think it is not constructive when we assu=
me a clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions from scratc=
h.&nbsp;</div>
<br class=3D"x_Apple-interchange-newline">
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">I=92d like to:</div>
<div class=3D"">- re use terminology exactly &quot;as is&quot; when possibl=
e</div>
<div class=3D"">- in some cases re use, but &nbsp;refine and clarify for ou=
r needs</div>
<div class=3D"">- if neither of those work, use new terminology</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">LL</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From: Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 16:00:09 -0400
Message-ID: <CAN40gSsatgOi4r2P224ZMAZO6YWLD-_onTcS=O+CLcgOsu9TDQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" <ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Cc: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>,  "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/g-_s0dMF1oTwQ8r5rCfA5kKPWek>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Hi Ian,

Measurement Target to me implies something like a Common Criteria
TOE (Target of Evaluation), i.e., the entity that is measured, *not* the
entity that is doing measurement or recording the measurement (such
as a TPM).

Cheers,
- Ira

Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434



On Mon, Sep 2, 2019 at 3:29 PM Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) <
ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com> wrote:

> Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these terms=
.
>
> Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.  An
> attester is something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not so sure
> of.  For example, is a server a measurement target, or is something that
> stores measurements, like a TPM, a measurement target?
>
> t.
>
> Ian
>
>
>
> --
>
> Dr. Ian Oliver
>
> Cybersecurity Research
>
> Distinguished Member of Technical Staff
>
> Nokia Bell Labs
>
> +358 50 483 6237
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
> *Sent:* 02 September 2019 19:18
> *To:* Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
> *Cc:* Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com>; Ira McDonald <
> blueroofmusic@gmail.com>; rats@ietf.org <rats@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the
> term "attester" instead of root of trust)
>
>
> On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
> wrote:
>
> I don=E2=80=99t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology ba=
sed on
> what I=E2=80=99ve observed.  I just think it is not constructive when we =
assume a
> clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions from scratch.
>
>
> I=E2=80=99d like to:
> - re use terminology exactly "as is" when possible
> - in some cases re use, but  refine and clarify for our needs
> - if neither of those work, use new terminology
>
> LL
>

--000000000000052b470591976c67
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Ian,</div><div><br></div><div>Measurement Target t=
o me implies something like a Common Criteria</div><div>TOE (Target of Eval=
uation), i.e., the entity that is measured, *not* the</div><div>entity that=
 is doing measurement or recording the measurement (such</div><div>as a TPM=
).</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>- Ira</div><div><br></div><di=
v><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_s=
ignature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
><div dir=3D"ltr">Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)<br>Co-Chair =
- TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG</div><div>Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Acces=
s Protocol SG<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Chair - Linux Foundation Open Print=
ing WG<br>Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group<br>Co-Chair - IEEE-IS=
TO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG<br>IETF Designated Expert - IPP &amp; =
Printer MIB<br>Blue Roof Music / High North Inc<br><a style=3D"color:rgb(51=
,51,255)" href=3D"http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic" target=3D"_bl=
ank">http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic</a><br><a style=3D"color:rg=
b(102,0,204)" href=3D"http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc" target=3D"=
_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc</a><br>mailto: <a href=3D=
"mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">blueroofmusic@gmail.com<=
/a><br>PO Box 221=C2=A0 Grand Marais, MI 49839=C2=A0 906-494-2434<br><br><d=
iv style=3D"display:inline"></div><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div =
style=3D"display:inline"></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div>=
</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep=
 2, 2019 at 3:29 PM Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ia=
n.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com">ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">




<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these terms. =
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.=C2=A0 An a=
ttester is something that attestst. A measurement target I&#39;m not so sur=
e of.=C2=A0 For example, is a server a measurement target, or is something =
that stores measurements, like a TPM, a measurement
 target?</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
t.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Ian<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_844665309816583829Signature">
<div id=3D"gmail-m_844665309816583829divtagdefaultwrapper" dir=3D"ltr" styl=
e=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-ser=
if">
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px">-- <br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px">Dr. Ian Oliver</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px">Cybersecurity Research<br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px">Distinguished Member of Techn=
ical Staff</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px">Nokia Bell Labs</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px">+358 50 483 6237<br>
</p>
</div>
<div>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_844665309816583829appendonsend"></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%">
<div id=3D"gmail-m_844665309816583829divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font style=
=3D"font-size:11pt" face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:=
</b> Laurence Lundblade &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lgl@island-resort.com" target=
=3D"_blank">lgl@island-resort.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> 02 September 2019 19:18<br>
<b>To:</b> Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com"=
 target=3D"_blank">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Smith, Ned &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ned.smith@intel.com" target=3D"=
_blank">ned.smith@intel.com</a>&gt;; Ira McDonald &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:blu=
eroofmusic@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">blueroofmusic@gmail.com</a>&gt;; <a=
 href=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">rats@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">rats@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the =
term &quot;attester&quot; instead of root of trust)</font>
<div>=C2=A0</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;"><br>
<div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div>On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:man=
dyam@qti.qualcomm.com" target=3D"_blank">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&gt; w=
rote:</div>
<br class=3D"gmail-m_844665309816583829x_Apple-interchange-newline">
<div>
<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whit=
e-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none">
I don=E2=80=99t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology base=
d on what I=E2=80=99ve observed.=C2=A0 I just think it is not constructive =
when we assume a clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions=
 from scratch.=C2=A0</div>
<br class=3D"gmail-m_844665309816583829x_Apple-interchange-newline">
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I=E2=80=99d like to:</div>
<div>- re use terminology exactly &quot;as is&quot; when possible</div>
<div>- in some cases re use, but =C2=A0refine and clarify for our needs</di=
v>
<div>- if neither of those work, use new terminology</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>LL</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>

--000000000000052b470591976c67--


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To: Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
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Thread-Topic: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/Wk9SVTg4g3WAERzKjZ3OiD37lrQ>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Thanks, this makes sense.

Ian


--

Dr. Ian Oliver

Cybersecurity Research

Distinguished Member of Technical Staff

Nokia Bell Labs

+358 50 483 6237

________________________________
From: Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Sent: 02 September 2019 23:00
To: Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) <ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>; Ira Mc=
Donald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Cc: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>; Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@q=
ti.qualcomm.com>; Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com>; rats@ietf.org <rats@iet=
f.org>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "a=
ttester" instead of root of trust)

Hi Ian,

Measurement Target to me implies something like a Common Criteria
TOE (Target of Evaluation), i.e., the entity that is measured, *not* the
entity that is doing measurement or recording the measurement (such
as a TPM).

Cheers,
- Ira

Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com<mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434



On Mon, Sep 2, 2019 at 3:29 PM Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) <ian.oliver@n=
okia-bell-labs.com<mailto:ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>> wrote:
Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these terms.

Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.  An attest=
er is something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not so sure of.  Fo=
r example, is a server a measurement target, or is something that stores me=
asurements, like a TPM, a measurement target?

t.

Ian




--

Dr. Ian Oliver

Cybersecurity Research

Distinguished Member of Technical Staff

Nokia Bell Labs

+358 50 483 6237

________________________________
From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com<mailto:lgl@island-resort.co=
m>>
Sent: 02 September 2019 19:18
To: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com<mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.=
com>>
Cc: Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com<mailto:ned.smith@intel.com>>; Ira McDon=
ald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com<mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com>>; rats@ietf.or=
g<mailto:rats@ietf.org> <rats@ietf.org<mailto:rats@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "a=
ttester" instead of root of trust)


On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com<mail=
to:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>> wrote:

I don=92t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology based on w=
hat I=92ve observed.  I just think it is not constructive when we assume a =
clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions from scratch.


I=92d like to:
- re use terminology exactly "as is" when possible
- in some cases re use, but  refine and clarify for our needs
- if neither of those work, use new terminology

LL

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Thanks, this makes sense.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Ian<br>
</div>
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<br>
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<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">-- <br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Dr. Ian Oliver</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Cybersecurity Research<br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Distinguished Member of Technical Staff</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Nokia Bell Labs</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">&#43;358 50 483 6237<br>
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%" tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Ira McDonald &lt;blue=
roofmusic@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> 02 September 2019 23:00<br>
<b>To:</b> Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) &lt;ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.co=
m&gt;; Ira McDonald &lt;blueroofmusic@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Laurence Lundblade &lt;lgl@island-resort.com&gt;; Giridhar Mandy=
am &lt;mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com&gt;; Smith, Ned &lt;ned.smith@intel.com&gt;=
; rats@ietf.org &lt;rats@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the =
term &quot;attester&quot; instead of root of trust)</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div>Hi Ian,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Measurement Target to me implies something like a Common Criteria</div=
>
<div>TOE (Target of Evaluation), i.e., the entity that is measured, *not* t=
he</div>
<div>entity that is doing measurement or recording the measurement (such</d=
iv>
<div>as a TPM).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Cheers,</div>
<div>- Ira</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"x_gmail_signature">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)<br>
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG</div>
<div>Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG<br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG<br>
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group<br>
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG<br>
IETF Designated Expert - IPP &amp; Printer MIB<br>
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc<br>
<a href=3D"http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic" target=3D"_blank" st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(51,51,255)">http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic</a>=
<br>
<a href=3D"http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc" target=3D"_blank" sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(102,0,204)">http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc</a><b=
r>
mailto: <a href=3D"mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">bluero=
ofmusic@gmail.com</a><br>
PO Box 221&nbsp; Grand Marais, MI 49839&nbsp; 906-494-2434<br>
<br>
<div style=3D"display:inline"></div>
<div style=3D"display:inline"></div>
<div style=3D"display:inline"></div>
<div></div>
<div></div>
<div></div>
<div></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"x_gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"x_gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 2, 2019 at 3:29 PM Oliv=
er, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs=
.com">ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"x_gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these terms. =
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.&nbsp; An a=
ttester is something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not so sure of=
.&nbsp; For example, is a server a measurement target, or is something that=
 stores measurements, like a TPM, a measurement
 target?</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
t.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Ian<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div id=3D"x_gmail-m_844665309816583829Signature">
<div id=3D"x_gmail-m_844665309816583829divtagdefaultwrapper" dir=3D"ltr" st=
yle=3D"font-size:12pt; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans=
-serif">
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">-- <br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">Dr. Ian Oliver</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">Cybersecurity Research<br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">Distinguished Member of Tech=
nical Staff</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">Nokia Bell Labs</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">&#43;358 50 483 6237<br>
</p>
</div>
<div>
<div id=3D"x_gmail-m_844665309816583829appendonsend"></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"x_gmail-m_844665309816583829divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font fac=
e=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" color=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>Fro=
m:</b> Laurence Lundblade &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lgl@island-resort.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">lgl@island-resort.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> 02 September 2019 19:18<br>
<b>To:</b> Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com"=
 target=3D"_blank">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Smith, Ned &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ned.smith@intel.com" target=3D"=
_blank">ned.smith@intel.com</a>&gt;; Ira McDonald &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:blu=
eroofmusic@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">blueroofmusic@gmail.com</a>&gt;;
<a href=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">rats@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">rats@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the =
term &quot;attester&quot; instead of root of trust)</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div style=3D""><br>
<div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div>On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:man=
dyam@qti.qualcomm.com" target=3D"_blank">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&gt; w=
rote:</div>
<br class=3D"x_gmail-m_844665309816583829x_Apple-interchange-newline">
<div>
<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-family:Calibri,=
sans-serif; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:normal=
; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transform:=
none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
I don=92t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology based on w=
hat I=92ve observed.&nbsp; I just think it is not constructive when we assu=
me a clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions from scratc=
h.&nbsp;</div>
<br class=3D"x_gmail-m_844665309816583829x_Apple-interchange-newline">
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I=92d like to:</div>
<div>- re use terminology exactly &quot;as is&quot; when possible</div>
<div>- in some cases re use, but &nbsp;refine and clarify for our needs</di=
v>
<div>- if neither of those work, use new terminology</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>LL</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/hkJV_Fyt1eA4Z3Zrh0ur1F0rzcM>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Hi Ian,

> On Sep 2, 2019, at 12:29 PM, Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) =
<ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com> wrote:
>=20
> Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these =
terms.=20

Yes, we=E2=80=99ve got a ways to go yet. When we=E2=80=99re done (or =
close to it) we=E2=80=99ll have general consensus on the architecture =
document and all the terms in it. Should include references to previous =
definitions.  We=E2=80=99ll be directing comments and filing issues =
directly against a document.

=20
>=20
> Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.=20

Yes, they are very different.

> An attester is something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not =
so sure of.  For example, is a server a measurement target, or is =
something that stores measurements, like a TPM, a measurement target?

The measurement target is what is being measured. Typically it is the SW =
and memory that is being hashed.=20

In something like IMA <https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/> =
or TIMA =
<https://www.engr.ncsu.edu/news/2014/11/19/tima-technology-is-core-to-sams=
ungs-state-of-the-art-knox-platform/> that is measuring Linux with =
TrustZone, Linux is the measurement target. The memory and/or code space =
and/or file space of the Linux OS and often Android is hashed.=20

Some SW running in TrustZone is what is doing the measuring and the =
attesting. It is not the measurement target. TrustZone HW allows SW =
running in TrustZone to access all of Linux, but not vice versa.=20

I tend to shy away from TPM/Windows examples because I don=E2=80=99t =
know it so well, but I would guess the TPM chip is the attester and =
Windows and parts of the boot sequence are the measurement target.

LL



>=20
> t.
>=20
> Ian
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Dr. Ian Oliver
> Cybersecurity Research
> Distinguished Member of Technical Staff
> Nokia Bell Labs
> +358 50 483 6237
>=20
> From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
> Sent: 02 September 2019 19:18
> To: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
> Cc: Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com>; Ira McDonald =
<blueroofmusic@gmail.com>; rats@ietf.org <rats@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the =
term "attester" instead of root of trust)
> =20
>=20
>> On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam =
<mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com <mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>> wrote:
>>=20
>> I don=E2=80=99t think anyone is arguing about the need for =
terminology based on what I=E2=80=99ve observed.  I just think it is not =
constructive when we assume a clean slate for all terms, and try to =
build up definitions from scratch.=20
>>=20
>=20
>=20
> I=E2=80=99d like to:
> - re use terminology exactly "as is" when possible
> - in some cases re use, but  refine and clarify for our needs
> - if neither of those work, use new terminology
>=20
> LL


--Apple-Mail=_A0959959-345A-4FCD-9ACA-B2227A56A709
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi =
Ian,<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Sep 2, 2019, at 12:29 PM, Oliver, Ian =
(Nokia - FI/Espoo) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com" =
class=3D"">ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D"">

<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DWindows-1252" class=3D"">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;" class=3D""> P =
{margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0;} </style>

<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these =
terms. <br class=3D""></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>Yes, we=E2=80=99ve got a ways to go yet. When we=E2=80=99=
re done (or close to it) we=E2=80=99ll have general consensus on the =
architecture document and all the terms in it. Should include references =
to previous definitions. &nbsp;We=E2=80=99ll be directing comments and =
filing issues directly against a document.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>&nbsp;<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: =
12pt;" class=3D"">
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
Measurement target and attester to me are very different =
things.&nbsp;</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Yes, they are very different.</div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, =
Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;" class=3D""> An attester is =
something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not so sure of.&nbsp; =
For example, is a server a measurement target, or is something that =
stores measurements, like a TPM, a measurement
 target?</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>The =
measurement target is what is being measured. Typically it is the SW and =
memory that is being hashed.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>In =
something like&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/" =
class=3D"">IMA</a>&nbsp;or&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.engr.ncsu.edu/news/2014/11/19/tima-technology-is-core-=
to-samsungs-state-of-the-art-knox-platform/" class=3D"">TIMA</a>&nbsp;that=
 is measuring Linux with TrustZone, Linux is the measurement target. The =
memory and/or code space and/or file space of the Linux OS and often =
Android is hashed.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Some SW =
running in TrustZone is what is doing the measuring and the attesting. =
It is not the measurement target. TrustZone HW allows SW running in =
TrustZone to access all of Linux, but not vice =
versa.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>I tend to shy away from =
TPM/Windows examples because I don=E2=80=99t know it so well, but I =
would guess the TPM chip is the attester and Windows and parts of the =
boot sequence are the measurement target.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>LL</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
t.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
Ian<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div id=3D"Signature" class=3D"">
<div id=3D"divtagdefaultwrapper" dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=3D"">-- <br =
class=3D"">
</div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=3D"">Dr. =
Ian Oliver</div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" =
class=3D"">Cybersecurity Research<br class=3D"">
</div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" =
class=3D"">Distinguished Member of Technical Staff</div><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=3D"">Nokia Bell =
Labs</div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" =
class=3D"">+358 50 483 6237<br class=3D"">
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div id=3D"appendonsend" class=3D""></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%" class=3D"">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><font =
style=3D"font-size:11pt" face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">From:</b> Laurence Lundblade &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:lgl@island-resort.com" =
class=3D"">lgl@island-resort.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b> 02 September 2019 19:18<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b> Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com" =
class=3D"">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:</b> Smith, Ned &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ned.smith@intel.com" =
class=3D"">ned.smith@intel.com</a>&gt;; Ira McDonald &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">blueroofmusic@gmail.com</a>&gt;; <a =
href=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" class=3D"">rats@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" class=3D"">rats@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b> Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target =
(was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)</font>
<div class=3D"">&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word; =
line-break:after-white-space"><br class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com" =
class=3D"">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"x_Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; =
font-family:Calibri,sans-serif; font-style:normal; =
font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:normal; letter-spacing:normal; =
text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transform:none; =
white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
I don=E2=80=99t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology =
based on what I=E2=80=99ve observed.&nbsp; I just think it is not =
constructive when we assume a clean slate for all terms, and try to =
build up definitions from scratch.&nbsp;</div>
<br class=3D"x_Apple-interchange-newline">
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">I=E2=80=99d like to:</div>
<div class=3D"">- re use terminology exactly "as is" when possible</div>
<div class=3D"">- in some cases re use, but &nbsp;refine and clarify for =
our needs</div>
<div class=3D"">- if neither of those work, use new terminology</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">LL</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_A0959959-345A-4FCD-9ACA-B2227A56A709--


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From: "Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" <ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
CC: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>, "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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<quote>
The measurement target is what is being measured. Typically it is the SW an=
d memory that is being hashed.

In something like IMA<https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/> or TI=
MA<https://www.engr.ncsu.edu/news/2014/11/19/tima-technology-is-core-to-sam=
sungs-state-of-the-art-knox-platform/> that is measuring Linux with TrustZo=
ne, Linux is the measurement target. The memory and/or code space and/or fi=
le space of the Linux OS and often Android is hashed.

Some SW running in TrustZone is what is doing the measuring and the attesti=
ng. It is not the measurement target. TrustZone HW allows SW running in Tru=
stZone to access all of Linux, but not vice versa.

I tend to shy away from TPM/Windows examples because I don=92t know it so w=
ell, but I would guess the TPM chip is the attester and Windows and parts o=
f the boot sequence are the measurement target.
</quote>

More thinking of this, sticking with the practical x86/TPM example for the =
moment - this generalises to other architectures and situations of course.

The Root of Trust is the code that measures the code that starts the system=
s, the initial read-only part of BIOS (and the measurement code itself). Th=
is code is also the measurement target. The next step is the storage of thi=
s measurement in a secure place, ie a TPM PCR (PCR 0).

After boot/measurement has been completed, the Root of Trust is then the TP=
M itself.

The TPM does not attest anything, but provides a mechanism for delivering a=
n "attestation token" (in this case the TPMS_ATTEST structure) in a secure =
form, ie: signed by the TPM AK.

The attester in an external entity that requests this proof and verifies it=
 against a known good value.

OK, in TPM 1.2 the launch control policy mechanism could perform local atte=
station (not so much used in TPM 2.0) - this could be considered an atteste=
r and verifier, just packaged on the same piece of silicon.

Ian



--

Dr. Ian Oliver

Cybersecurity Research

Distinguished Member of Technical Staff

Nokia Bell Labs

+358 50 483 6237

________________________________
From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
Sent: 03 September 2019 01:40
To: Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) <ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>
Cc: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>; Smith, Ned <ned.smith@inte=
l.com>; Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>; rats@ietf.org <rats@ietf.or=
g>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "a=
ttester" instead of root of trust)

Hi Ian,

On Sep 2, 2019, at 12:29 PM, Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) <ian.oliver@nok=
ia-bell-labs.com<mailto:ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>> wrote:

Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these terms.

Yes, we=92ve got a ways to go yet. When we=92re done (or close to it) we=92=
ll have general consensus on the architecture document and all the terms in=
 it. Should include references to previous definitions.  We=92ll be directi=
ng comments and filing issues directly against a document.



Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.

Yes, they are very different.

An attester is something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not so sur=
e of.  For example, is a server a measurement target, or is something that =
stores measurements, like a TPM, a measurement target?

The measurement target is what is being measured. Typically it is the SW an=
d memory that is being hashed.

In something like IMA<https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/> or TI=
MA<https://www.engr.ncsu.edu/news/2014/11/19/tima-technology-is-core-to-sam=
sungs-state-of-the-art-knox-platform/> that is measuring Linux with TrustZo=
ne, Linux is the measurement target. The memory and/or code space and/or fi=
le space of the Linux OS and often Android is hashed.

Some SW running in TrustZone is what is doing the measuring and the attesti=
ng. It is not the measurement target. TrustZone HW allows SW running in Tru=
stZone to access all of Linux, but not vice versa.

I tend to shy away from TPM/Windows examples because I don=92t know it so w=
ell, but I would guess the TPM chip is the attester and Windows and parts o=
f the boot sequence are the measurement target.

LL




t.

Ian



--
Dr. Ian Oliver
Cybersecurity Research
Distinguished Member of Technical Staff
Nokia Bell Labs
+358 50 483 6237

________________________________
From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com<mailto:lgl@island-resort.co=
m>>
Sent: 02 September 2019 19:18
To: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com<mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.=
com>>
Cc: Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com<mailto:ned.smith@intel.com>>; Ira McDon=
ald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com<mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com>>; rats@ietf.or=
g<mailto:rats@ietf.org> <rats@ietf.org<mailto:rats@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "a=
ttester" instead of root of trust)


On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com<mail=
to:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>> wrote:

I don=92t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology based on w=
hat I=92ve observed.  I just think it is not constructive when we assume a =
clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions from scratch.


I=92d like to:
- re use terminology exactly "as is" when possible
- in some cases re use, but  refine and clarify for our needs
- if neither of those work, use new terminology

LL


--_000_HE1PR0701MB226738C6502453B3F31001668FB90HE1PR0701MB2267_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<div>&lt;quote&gt;<br>
</div>
<div>The measurement target is what is being measured. Typically it is the =
SW and memory that is being hashed.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In something like&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/=
wiki/Home/" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer">IMA</a>&nbsp;or&n=
bsp;<a href=3D"https://www.engr.ncsu.edu/news/2014/11/19/tima-technology-is=
-core-to-samsungs-state-of-the-art-knox-platform/" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D=
"noopener noreferrer">TIMA</a>&nbsp;that
 is measuring Linux with TrustZone, Linux is the measurement target. The me=
mory and/or code space and/or file space of the Linux OS and often Android =
is hashed.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Some SW running in TrustZone is what is doing the measuring and the at=
testing. It is not the measurement target. TrustZone HW allows SW running i=
n TrustZone to access all of Linux, but not vice versa.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I tend to shy away from TPM/Windows examples because I don=92t know it=
 so well, but I would guess the TPM chip is the attester and Windows and pa=
rts of the boot sequence are the measurement target.</div>
<div>&lt;/quote&gt;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>More thinking of this, sticking with the practical x86/TPM example for=
 the moment - this generalises to other architectures and situations of cou=
rse.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The Root of Trust is the code that measures the code that starts the s=
ystems, the initial read-only part of BIOS (and the measurement code itself=
). This code is also the measurement target. The next step is the storage o=
f this measurement in a secure place,
 ie a TPM PCR (PCR 0).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>After boot/measurement has been completed, the Root of Trust is then t=
he TPM itself.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The TPM does not attest anything, but provides a mechanism for deliver=
ing an &quot;attestation token&quot; (in this case the TPMS_ATTEST structur=
e) in a secure form, ie: signed by the TPM AK.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The attester in an external entity that requests this proof and verifi=
es it against a known good value.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>OK, in TPM 1.2 the launch control policy mechanism could perform local=
 attestation (not so much used in TPM 2.0) - this could be considered an at=
tester and verifier, just packaged on the same piece of silicon.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Ian<br>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div id=3D"Signature">
<div id=3D"divtagdefaultwrapper" dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-size:12pt; color=
:#000000; font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif">
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">-- <br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Dr. Ian Oliver</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Cybersecurity Research<br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Distinguished Member of Technical Staff</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Nokia Bell Labs</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">&#43;358 50 483 6237<br>
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%" tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Laurence Lundblade &l=
t;lgl@island-resort.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> 03 September 2019 01:40<br>
<b>To:</b> Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) &lt;ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.co=
m&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Giridhar Mandyam &lt;mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com&gt;; Smith, Ned &l=
t;ned.smith@intel.com&gt;; Ira McDonald &lt;blueroofmusic@gmail.com&gt;; ra=
ts@ietf.org &lt;rats@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the =
term &quot;attester&quot; instead of root of trust)</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word; line-break:after-white-space=
">Hi Ian,<br class=3D"">
<div><br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On Sep 2, 2019, at 12:29 PM, Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo)=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com" class=3D"">ian.olive=
r@nokia-bell-labs.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"x_Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D""><style type=3D"text/css" class=3D"" style=3D"display:none">
<!--
p
	{margin-top:0;
	margin-bottom:0}
-->
</style>
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
Agree, but we can be much more precise in the descriptions of these terms. =
<br class=3D"">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
Yes, we=92ve got a ways to go yet. When we=92re done (or close to it) we=92=
ll have general consensus on the architecture document and all the terms in=
 it. Should include references to previous definitions. &nbsp;We=92ll be di=
recting comments and filing issues directly against
 a document.</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
Measurement target and attester to me are very different things.&nbsp;</div=
>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>Yes, they are very different.</div>
<br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
An attester is something that attestst. A measurement target I'm not so sur=
e of.&nbsp; For example, is a server a measurement target, or is something =
that stores measurements, like a TPM, a measurement target?</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>The measurement target is what is being measured. Typically it is the =
SW and memory that is being hashed.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>In something like&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/=
wiki/Home/" class=3D"">IMA</a>&nbsp;or&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://www.engr.ncs=
u.edu/news/2014/11/19/tima-technology-is-core-to-samsungs-state-of-the-art-=
knox-platform/" class=3D"">TIMA</a>&nbsp;that is measuring Linux
 with TrustZone, Linux is the measurement target. The memory and/or code sp=
ace and/or file space of the Linux OS and often Android is hashed.&nbsp;</d=
iv>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>Some SW running in TrustZone is what is doing the measuring and the at=
testing. It is not the measurement target. TrustZone HW allows SW running i=
n TrustZone to access all of Linux, but not vice versa.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>I tend to shy away from TPM/Windows examples because I don=92t know it=
 so well, but I would guess the TPM chip is the attester and Windows and pa=
rts of the boot sequence are the measurement target.</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>LL</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
t.</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
Ian<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div id=3D"x_Signature" class=3D"">
<div id=3D"x_divtagdefaultwrapper" dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"" style=3D"font-siz=
e:12pt; font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">-- <br class=3D=
"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">Dr. Ian Oliver<=
/div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">Cybersecurity R=
esearch<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">Distinguished M=
ember of Technical Staff</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">Nokia Bell Labs=
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px">&#43;358 50 483=
 6237<br class=3D"">
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div id=3D"x_appendonsend" class=3D""></div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:12pt">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" class=3D"" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"x_divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><font face=3D"Calibri, s=
ans-serif" class=3D"" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b class=3D"">From:</b> Laur=
ence Lundblade &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lgl@island-resort.com" class=3D"">lgl@=
island-resort.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b> 02 September 2019 19:18<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b> Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mandyam@qti.qu=
alcomm.com" class=3D"">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:</b> Smith, Ned &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ned.smith@intel.com"=
 class=3D"">ned.smith@intel.com</a>&gt;; Ira McDonald &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:blueroofmusic@gmail.com" class=3D"">blueroofmusic@gmail.com</a>&gt;;
<a href=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" class=3D"">rats@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" class=3D"">rats@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b> Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was R=
e: Use the term &quot;attester&quot; instead of root of trust)</font>
<div class=3D"">&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word; line-break:after-white-space=
"><br class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On Sep 2, 2019, at 9:04 AM, Giridhar Mandyam &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com" class=3D"">mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com</a>&g=
t; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"x_x_Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-we=
ight:normal; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text=
-transform:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none=
">
I don=92t think anyone is arguing about the need for terminology based on w=
hat I=92ve observed.&nbsp; I just think it is not constructive when we assu=
me a clean slate for all terms, and try to build up definitions from scratc=
h.&nbsp;</div>
<br class=3D"x_x_Apple-interchange-newline">
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">I=92d like to:</div>
<div class=3D"">- re use terminology exactly &quot;as is&quot; when possibl=
e</div>
<div class=3D"">- in some cases re use, but &nbsp;refine and clarify for ou=
r needs</div>
<div class=3D"">- if neither of those work, use new terminology</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">LL</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br class=3D"">
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_HE1PR0701MB226738C6502453B3F31001668FB90HE1PR0701MB2267_--


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We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of Trust.=20
I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in the plural
"Roots" form.
As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:

   The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root of Trust =E2=
=80=9CA
   component that performs one or more security-specific functions, such as
   measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or update. It is trus=
ted
   always to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior cannot =
be
   detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. =E2=80=9C=20

{I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as other than =
an
alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.  It's hard to make
my neurons pull up a different meaning.  This is probably something that
every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the term, in order =
to
ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}=20

I have included not just Ned Smith's comments about the term Roots of Trust,
but his survey of the various origins of the term.  I'm sure that this
belongs somewhere else.

That diff is here:
  https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&url2=3D=
https://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-use=
cases.txt

and commit is:
  https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df11ece=
66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12


=2D-=20
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-




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Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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--Apple-Mail=_E655D035-DF6E-4441-AAC6-191BD835550A
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Thanks for writing that out...

> On Sep 3, 2019, at 12:24 AM, Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) =
<ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com> wrote:
>=20
> More thinking of this, sticking with the practical x86/TPM example for =
the moment - this generalises to other architectures and situations of =
course.
>=20
> The Root of Trust is the code that measures the code that starts the =
systems, the initial read-only part of BIOS (and the measurement code =
itself). This code is also the measurement target. The next step is the =
storage of this measurement in a secure place, ie a TPM PCR (PCR 0).
>=20
> After boot/measurement has been completed, the Root of Trust is then =
the TPM itself.
>=20
> The TPM does not attest anything, but provides a mechanism for =
delivering an "attestation token" (in this case the TPMS_ATTEST =
structure) in a secure form, ie: signed by the TPM AK.
>=20
> The attester in an external entity that requests this proof and =
verifies it against a known good value.

That definition of attester seems quite different from the one in =
draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01 =
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01> and =
from the definition I=E2=80=99m advocating. Here=E2=80=99s the main part =
of the definition from draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01 =
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01>

   Attester:  The producer of attestation evidence that has a root of
      trust for reporting (RTR) and implements a conveyance protocol,
      authenticates using an attestation credential, consumes assertions
      about itself and presents it to a consumer of evidence (e.g. a
      relying party or a verifier).  Every output of an attester can be
      appraised via reference values.

By this definition, it seems like the attester is the TPM and boot code =
that is tightly associated with the entity.  Attestation Evidence is =
signed token, TPMS_ATTEST.

The RATS definition of Verifier is:

   Verifier:  The consumer of attestation evidence that has a root of
      trust for verification (RTV), implements conveyance protocols,
      appraises attestation evidence against reference values or
      policies, and makes verification results available to relying
      parties.

So, approximately, RATS Attester =3D=3D TCG RTR and RATS Verifier =3D=3D =
TCG Attester? =20

Seems an unfortunate overlap of terms. Explains some of the confusion we =
encounter. I don=E2=80=99t have any better ideas so far...

LL=

--Apple-Mail=_E655D035-DF6E-4441-AAC6-191BD835550A
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Thanks for writing that out...<br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Sep =
3, 2019, at 12:24 AM, Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com" =
class=3D"">ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, =
Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D"">More thinking of this, sticking with =
the practical x86/TPM example for the moment - this generalises to other =
architectures and situations of course.</div><div style=3D"caret-color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, =
0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: =
16px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D"">The =
Root of Trust is the code that measures the code that starts the =
systems, the initial read-only part of BIOS (and the measurement code =
itself). This code is also the measurement target. The next step is the =
storage of this measurement in a secure place, ie a TPM PCR (PCR =
0).</div><div style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, =
Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D"">After boot/measurement has been =
completed, the Root of Trust is then the TPM itself.</div><div =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, =
Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, =
Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D"">The TPM does not attest anything, but =
provides a mechanism for delivering an "attestation token" (in this case =
the TPMS_ATTEST structure) in a secure form, ie: signed by the TPM =
AK.</div><div style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, =
Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D"">The attester in an external entity =
that requests this proof and verifies it against a known good =
value.</div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>That =
definition of attester seems quite different from the one in&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01" =
style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px;" =
class=3D"">draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01</a>&nbsp;and from the =
definition I=E2=80=99m advocating. Here=E2=80=99s the main part of the =
definition from&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01" =
style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px;" =
class=3D"">draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01</a></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div><pre class=3D"newpage" =
style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px; margin-top: 0px; =
margin-bottom: 0px; break-before: page;">   Attester:  The producer of =
attestation evidence that has a root of
      trust for reporting (RTR) and implements a conveyance protocol,
      authenticates using an attestation credential, consumes assertions
      about itself and presents it to a consumer of evidence (e.g. a
      relying party or a verifier).  Every output of an attester can be
      appraised via reference values.</pre><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">By this definition, it seems like the =
attester is the TPM and boot code that is tightly associated with the =
entity. &nbsp;<i class=3D"">Attestation Evidence</i><span =
style=3D"font-style: normal;" class=3D"">&nbsp;is signed =
token,&nbsp;</span>TPMS_ATTEST.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The RATS definition of Verifier =
is:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><pre =
class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px; margin-top: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; break-before: page;">   Verifier:  The consumer =
of attestation evidence that has a root of
      trust for verification (RTV), implements conveyance protocols,
      appraises attestation evidence against reference values or
      policies, and makes verification results available to relying
      parties.</pre><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div><div>So, <i class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">approximately</b></i>, RATS Attester =3D=3D TCG RTR and RATS =
Verifier =3D=3D TCG Attester? &nbsp;</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Seems an unfortunate overlap of terms. Explains =
some of the confusion we encounter. I don=E2=80=99t have any better =
ideas so far...</div></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div>LL</body></html>=

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From: "Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" <ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
CC: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>, "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/5LdWvtuiNqY3kQ9OfYgmnXEA8aY>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "attester" instead of root of trust)
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I agree with that assertion. Just to add to the confusion, the role of some=
 elements does change over time.

For example, one boot is complete on an x86 architecture, the TPM itself is=
 now the root of trust and the measurement code in the BIOS does not take a=
ny more part in the process, thus the TPM is now the root-of-trust for repo=
rting.

It is the "for reporting" that seems to be key here and I don't think these=
 additional terms have been listed yet?

I agree with the Attestation Evidence being the TPMS_ATTEST structure/token=
.

The RATS definition verifier is interesting, as in the TPM case we have two=
 possibilities.


  1.  use of LCPs, where the TPM itself is both ROT for reporting and ROT f=
or verification
  2.  use of external ROT for verification (attestation server possibly?) a=
nd the TPM is the ROT for reporting.

t.

Ian


--

Dr. Ian Oliver

Cybersecurity Research

Distinguished Member of Technical Staff

Nokia Bell Labs

+358 50 483 6237

________________________________
From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
Sent: 08 September 2019 21:33
To: Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) <ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>
Cc: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>; Smith, Ned <ned.smith@inte=
l.com>; Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>; rats@ietf.org <rats@ietf.or=
g>
Subject: Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the term "a=
ttester" instead of root of trust)

Thanks for writing that out...

On Sep 3, 2019, at 12:24 AM, Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) <ian.oliver@nok=
ia-bell-labs.com<mailto:ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com>> wrote:

More thinking of this, sticking with the practical x86/TPM example for the =
moment - this generalises to other architectures and situations of course.

The Root of Trust is the code that measures the code that starts the system=
s, the initial read-only part of BIOS (and the measurement code itself). Th=
is code is also the measurement target. The next step is the storage of thi=
s measurement in a secure place, ie a TPM PCR (PCR 0).

After boot/measurement has been completed, the Root of Trust is then the TP=
M itself.

The TPM does not attest anything, but provides a mechanism for delivering a=
n "attestation token" (in this case the TPMS_ATTEST structure) in a secure =
form, ie: signed by the TPM AK.

The attester in an external entity that requests this proof and verifies it=
 against a known good value.

That definition of attester seems quite different from the one in draft-bir=
kholz-rats-architecture-01<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-=
architecture-01> and from the definition I=92m advocating. Here=92s the mai=
n part of the definition from draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01<https://t=
ools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01>


   Attester:  The producer of attestation evidence that has a root of
      trust for reporting (RTR) and implements a conveyance protocol,
      authenticates using an attestation credential, consumes assertions
      about itself and presents it to a consumer of evidence (e.g. a
      relying party or a verifier).  Every output of an attester can be
      appraised via reference values.

By this definition, it seems like the attester is the TPM and boot code tha=
t is tightly associated with the entity.  Attestation Evidence is signed to=
ken, TPMS_ATTEST.

The RATS definition of Verifier is:


   Verifier:  The consumer of attestation evidence that has a root of
      trust for verification (RTV), implements conveyance protocols,
      appraises attestation evidence against reference values or
      policies, and makes verification results available to relying
      parties.

So, approximately, RATS Attester =3D=3D TCG RTR and RATS Verifier =3D=3D TC=
G Attester?

Seems an unfortunate overlap of terms. Explains some of the confusion we en=
counter. I don=92t have any better ideas so far...

LL

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<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
I agree with that assertion. Just to add to the confusion, the role of some=
 elements does change over time.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
For example, one boot is complete on an x86 architecture, the TPM itself is=
 now the root of trust and the measurement code in the BIOS does not take a=
ny more part in the process, thus the TPM is now the root-of-trust for repo=
rting.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
It is the &quot;for reporting&quot; that seems to be key here and I don't t=
hink these additional terms have been listed yet?</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
I agree with the Attestation Evidence being the TPMS_ATTEST structure/token=
.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
The RATS definition verifier is interesting, as in the TPM case we have two=
 possibilities.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
<ol>
<li>use of LCPs, where the TPM itself is both ROT for reporting and ROT for=
 verification</li><li>use of external ROT for verification (attestation ser=
ver possibly?) and the TPM is the ROT for reporting.</li></ol>
<div>t.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Ian<br>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div id=3D"Signature">
<div id=3D"divtagdefaultwrapper" dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-size: 12pt; colo=
r: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif;">
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">-- <br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Dr. Ian Oliver</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Cybersecurity Research<br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Distinguished Member of Technical Staff</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">Nokia Bell Labs</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;margin-top:0; margin-bottom=
:0">&#43;358 50 483 6237<br>
</p>
</div>
<div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display: inline-block; width: 98%;" data-ogsc=
=3D"">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" data=
-ogsc=3D"" face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Laur=
ence Lundblade &lt;lgl@island-resort.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> 08 September 2019 21:33<br>
<b>To:</b> Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo) &lt;ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.co=
m&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Giridhar Mandyam &lt;mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com&gt;; Smith, Ned &l=
t;ned.smith@intel.com&gt;; Ira McDonald &lt;blueroofmusic@gmail.com&gt;; ra=
ts@ietf.org &lt;rats@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Rats] attester vs measurement target (was Re: Use the =
term &quot;attester&quot; instead of root of trust)</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word; line-break:after-white-space=
">Thanks for writing that out...<br class=3D"">
<div><br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On Sep 3, 2019, at 12:24 AM, Oliver, Ian (Nokia - FI/Espoo)=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com" class=3D"" style=3D"=
" data-ogsc=3D"">ian.oliver@nokia-bell-labs.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"x_Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
More thinking of this, sticking with the practical x86/TPM example for the =
moment - this generalises to other architectures and situations of course.<=
/div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
The Root of Trust is the code that measures the code that starts the system=
s, the initial read-only part of BIOS (and the measurement code itself). Th=
is code is also the measurement target. The next step is the storage of thi=
s measurement in a secure place,
 ie a TPM PCR (PCR 0).</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
After boot/measurement has been completed, the Root of Trust is then the TP=
M itself.</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
The TPM does not attest anything, but provides a mechanism for delivering a=
n &quot;attestation token&quot; (in this case the TPMS_ATTEST structure) in=
 a secure form, ie: signed by the TPM AK.</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; fo=
nt-size:16px; font-style:normal; font-variant-caps:normal; font-weight:norm=
al; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:start; text-indent:0px; text-transfor=
m:none; white-space:normal; word-spacing:0px; text-decoration:none">
The attester in an external entity that requests this proof and verifies it=
 against a known good value.</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>That definition of attester seems quite different from the one in&nbsp=
;<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01=
" class=3D"" style=3D"font-size: 13.3333px;" data-ogsc=3D"">draft-birkholz-=
rats-architecture-01</a>&nbsp;and from the definition
 I=92m advocating. Here=92s the main part of the definition from&nbsp;<a hr=
ef=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-01" clas=
s=3D"" style=3D"font-size: 13.3333px;" data-ogsc=3D"">draft-birkholz-rats-a=
rchitecture-01</a></div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>
<pre class=3D"x_newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.333333015441895px; margin-to=
p:0px; margin-bottom:0px; break-before:page">   Attester:  The producer of =
attestation evidence that has a root of=0A=
      trust for reporting (RTR) and implements a conveyance protocol,=0A=
      authenticates using an attestation credential, consumes assertions=0A=
      about itself and presents it to a consumer of evidence (e.g. a=0A=
      relying party or a verifier).  Every output of an attester can be=0A=
      appraised via reference values.</pre>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">By this definition, it seems like the attester is the TPM a=
nd boot code that is tightly associated with the entity. &nbsp;<i class=3D"=
">Attestation Evidence</i><span class=3D"" style=3D"font-style:normal">&nbs=
p;is signed token,&nbsp;</span>TPMS_ATTEST.</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">The RATS definition of Verifier is:</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<pre class=3D"x_newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.333333015441895px; margin-to=
p:0px; margin-bottom:0px; break-before:page">   Verifier:  The consumer of =
attestation evidence that has a root of=0A=
      trust for verification (RTV), implements conveyance protocols,=0A=
      appraises attestation evidence against reference values or=0A=
      policies, and makes verification results available to relying=0A=
      parties.</pre>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>So, <i class=3D""><b class=3D"">approximately</b></i>, RATS Attester =
=3D=3D TCG RTR and RATS Verifier =3D=3D TCG Attester? &nbsp;</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>Seems an unfortunate overlap of terms. Explains some of the confusion =
we encounter. I don=92t have any better ideas so far...</div>
</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
LL</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From nobody Mon Sep  9 13:56:19 2019
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Appreciate you wading into this with something written and concrete.

As a thought experiment consider adding this to our RATS definition:

A root of trust may also be a simple unsecured user mode application, =
like an Android, Windows or Linux application that trust has been placed =
in by a particular attestation system. It is provisioned with a signing =
key or such and other capabilities so as to be able to produce =
attestation evidence (e.g. signed tokens).  The application may or may =
not be signed or authenticated.

In a sense, the usual definition of root of trust applies in that it is =
something that is unconditionally trusted. In another sense, this is at =
odds with the usual conception as it is not anchored in HW or to any =
kind of system or boot SW.

I assuming this addition is too much at odds with the convention usage =
and there is no support for RATS adopting this definition. This is one =
of the main reasons I am asking we not use the term normatively.

LL


> On Sep 8, 2019, at 6:23 AM, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> =
wrote:
>=20
>=20
> We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of Trust.=20=

> I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in the =
plural
> "Roots" form.
> As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:
>=20
>   The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root of Trust =
=E2=80=9CA
>   component that performs one or more security-specific functions, =
such as
>   measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or update. It is =
trusted
>   always to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior =
cannot be
>   detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. =E2=80=9C=20=

>=20
> {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as other =
than an
> alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.  It's hard =
to make
> my neurons pull up a different meaning.  This is probably something =
that
> every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the term, in =
order to
> ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}=20
>=20
> I have included not just Ned Smith's comments about the term Roots of =
Trust,
> but his survey of the various origins of the term.  I'm sure that this
> belongs somewhere else.
>=20
> That diff is here:
>  =
https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&url2=3Dh=
ttps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-use=
cases.txt
>=20
> and commit is:
>  =
https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df11ece6=
6e3c95f85d141a639d440e12
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Appreciate you wading into this with something written and =
concrete.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">As a =
thought experiment consider adding this to our RATS =
definition:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
style=3D"margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">A root of trust may also be a simple unsecured user mode =
application, like an Android, Windows or Linux application that trust =
has been placed in by a particular attestation system. It is provisioned =
with a signing key or such and other capabilities so as to be able to =
produce attestation evidence (e.g. signed tokens). &nbsp;The application =
may or may not be signed or authenticated.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In a sense, the usual definition of =
root of trust applies in that it is something that is unconditionally =
trusted. In another sense, this is at odds with the usual conception as =
it is not anchored in HW or to any kind of system or boot SW.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></blockquote>I assuming this addition is =
too much at odds with the convention usage and there is no support for =
RATS adopting this definition. This is one of the main reasons I am =
asking we not use the term normatively.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">LL<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Sep 8, 2019, at 6:23 AM, Michael Richardson &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca" =
class=3D"">mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of =
Trust. <br class=3D"">I continue to have difficulty with the term. =
Particularly in the plural<br class=3D"">"Roots" form.<br class=3D"">As =
I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;The TCG Glossary also offers a =
general definition for Root of Trust =E2=80=9CA<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;component that performs one or more security-specific =
functions, such as<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;measurement, storage, =
reporting, verification, and/or update. It is trusted<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;always to behave in the expected manner, because its =
misbehavior cannot be<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;detected (such as by =
measurement) under normal operation. =E2=80=9C <br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">{I personally find it very difficult to understand the words =
as other than an<br class=3D"">alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is =
something else. &nbsp;It's hard to make<br class=3D"">my neurons pull up =
a different meaning. &nbsp;This is probably something that<br =
class=3D"">every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the =
term, in order to<br class=3D"">ease the impedence mis-match with IETF =
readers as we get reviews} <br class=3D""><br class=3D"">I have included =
not just Ned Smith's comments about the term Roots of Trust,<br =
class=3D"">but his survey of the various origins of the term. &nbsp;I'm =
sure that this<br class=3D"">belongs somewhere else.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">That diff is here:<br class=3D""> &nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&=
amp;url2=3Dhttps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richard=
son-rats-usecases.txt" =
class=3D"">https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-=
04&amp;url2=3Dhttps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-rich=
ardson-rats-usecases.txt</a><br class=3D""><br class=3D"">and commit =
is:<br class=3D""> &nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0=
df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12" =
class=3D"">https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e=
8c0df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12</a><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">-- <br class=3D"">Michael Richardson &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca" =
class=3D"">mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca</a>&gt;, Sandelman Software Works<br =
class=3D""> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br=
 class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">RATS mailing list<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" class=3D"">RATS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_6155099C-7334-48AF-B15D-5787A09AFFA6--


From nobody Mon Sep  9 15:49:03 2019
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From: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
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Hi all,

wrt the topic of "roots of trust", on the list a very visible concern 
was highlighted: "the definition [of RoT] defines what they are -not- 
and not what it actually -are-". And I am inclined to agree with that.

My initial and unpolished proposal is this:

"If" we use the spectrum of meanings what "roots of trust" are in RATS, 
we probably have to do two things:

1.) We maybe should highlight that "Roots of Trust" are a demarcation 
line. There are system components or system components characteristics 
(aka "Claims" that are composed into "Evidence" about "Trustworthiness") 
that an Attester cannot create Evidence about only by itself. It is the 
"rock bottom" that an Attester cannot attest to (because, quoting: 
"their misbehavior cannot be detected"). While that being very true, it 
seems not to be enough of a reason to just exclude them conceptually.

Hence, the only established procedure to "deal" with these roots of 
trust is a third's party endorsement. The consumer of attestation 
results is at its own liberty to put trust into these third party's 
endorsements - or not.

It is an optional Claim Set, typically provided in the form of 
Endorsement Certificates (but there surely are other ways). And these 
methods might simply not be available to an Attester. And if that i that 
case that MUST not be a blocker, especially wrt to the RATS architecture.

I.e. in RATS these Claims about RoT (Endorsements) should be purely 
optional. The architecture should allow to include them. But by any 
means, there should not be prescriptive or a normative MUSTs to provide 
them.

If an Attester is able to provide or refer to such an endorsements of a 
system components capabilities, it should be able to do so. If an 
Attester is not able to provide such third party endorsements, that 
should not be a blocker to conducts RATS. The benefit of having the 
option to provide them is to fuel a framework about "levels of 
confidence" that most likely is out of scope of IETF definitions, but 
would enable other entities to fill that gap in.

2.) I am proposing that the RATS WG puts some effort in defining what 
"roots of trust" actually do (and not only what they cannot do). That 
would help to create an understanding what they actually mean - a lot. 
And - I think that is important - that might not have to be part of the 
architecture document. Maybe it is an Appendix of it, maybe it is an 
informational draft that complements the architecture document, or this 
content goes alongside with solutions drafts. We don't know yet, I think.

TL;DR

Roots of Trust are relevant. But their upcoming definition and use 
should not stop us from progressing essential corner stone drafts, today.

My understanding is that some use cases really require them, and other 
use cases don't. Neither am I inclined to include them in the 
architecture draft and over-complicate elegant solutions, such as EAT, 
nor am I inclined to exclude them and thereby inhibit established 
solution, such as RIV.

There is some middle ground here, I think. My proposal is to neither 
disregard the system components an Attester is not able to create 
Evidence for by itself, nor to mandate that an Attester can only create 
believable Evidence, if RoT are available. Both options should be 
enabled by the RATS architecture, I think.

Viele Grüße,

Henk


On 09.09.19 22:56, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
> Appreciate you wading into this with something written and concrete.
> 
> As a thought experiment consider adding this to our RATS definition:
> 
>     A root of trust may also be a simple unsecured user mode
>     application, like an Android, Windows or Linux application that
>     trust has been placed in by a particular attestation system. It is
>     provisioned with a signing key or such and other capabilities so as
>     to be able to produce attestation evidence (e.g. signed tokens).
>       The application may or may not be signed or authenticated.
> 
>     In a sense, the usual definition of root of trust applies in that it
>     is something that is unconditionally trusted. In another sense, this
>     is at odds with the usual conception as it is not anchored in HW or
>     to any kind of system or boot SW.
> 
> I assuming this addition is too much at odds with the convention usage 
> and there is no support for RATS adopting this definition. This is one 
> of the main reasons I am asking we not use the term normatively.
> 
> LL
> 
> 
>> On Sep 8, 2019, at 6:23 AM, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca 
>> <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of Trust.
>> I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in the plural
>> "Roots" form.
>> As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:
>>
>>   The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root of Trust “A
>>   component that performs one or more security-specific functions, such as
>>   measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or update. It is 
>> trusted
>>   always to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior 
>> cannot be
>>   detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. “
>>
>> {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as other 
>> than an
>> alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.  It's hard 
>> to make
>> my neurons pull up a different meaning.  This is probably something that
>> every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the term, in 
>> order to
>> ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}
>>
>> I have included not just Ned Smith's comments about the term Roots of 
>> Trust,
>> but his survey of the various origins of the term.  I'm sure that this
>> belongs somewhere else.
>>
>> That diff is here:
>> https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&url2=https://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-usecases.txt
>>
>> and commit is:
>> https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca 
>> <mailto:mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>>, Sandelman Software Works
>> -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> RATS mailing list
>> RATS@ietf.org <mailto:RATS@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> 


From nobody Mon Sep  9 16:20:19 2019
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References: <4155.1567948986@dooku.sandelman.ca> <64BD12AA-951A-468A-9F08-D442054605AD@island-resort.com> <de6ff852-062d-805d-3eed-10aca60502b2@sit.fraunhofer.de>
In-Reply-To: <de6ff852-062d-805d-3eed-10aca60502b2@sit.fraunhofer.de>
From: Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2019 19:20:02 -0400
Message-ID: <CAN40gStH5jUCJeVggREr3ABoFw7K97F=KtoJOSR_X+LWNLB+JA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Cc: rats@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/tjs9tJsGcNPmJcYbRy60MzKHyns>
Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Hi,

Chiming in here.

The TCG is neither the originator of the term "Root of Trust", nor a
particularly good source for RoT definitions.

One might look at this US NIST project on Roots of Trust:

https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications

And especially this SP800-164 document:

https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-164/draft

Cheers,
- Ira

Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434



On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 6:49 PM Henk Birkholz <
henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> wrt the topic of "roots of trust", on the list a very visible concern
> was highlighted: "the definition [of RoT] defines what they are -not-
> and not what it actually -are-". And I am inclined to agree with that.
>
> My initial and unpolished proposal is this:
>
> "If" we use the spectrum of meanings what "roots of trust" are in RATS,
> we probably have to do two things:
>
> 1.) We maybe should highlight that "Roots of Trust" are a demarcation
> line. There are system components or system components characteristics
> (aka "Claims" that are composed into "Evidence" about "Trustworthiness")
> that an Attester cannot create Evidence about only by itself. It is the
> "rock bottom" that an Attester cannot attest to (because, quoting:
> "their misbehavior cannot be detected"). While that being very true, it
> seems not to be enough of a reason to just exclude them conceptually.
>
> Hence, the only established procedure to "deal" with these roots of
> trust is a third's party endorsement. The consumer of attestation
> results is at its own liberty to put trust into these third party's
> endorsements - or not.
>
> It is an optional Claim Set, typically provided in the form of
> Endorsement Certificates (but there surely are other ways). And these
> methods might simply not be available to an Attester. And if that i that
> case that MUST not be a blocker, especially wrt to the RATS architecture.
>
> I.e. in RATS these Claims about RoT (Endorsements) should be purely
> optional. The architecture should allow to include them. But by any
> means, there should not be prescriptive or a normative MUSTs to provide
> them.
>
> If an Attester is able to provide or refer to such an endorsements of a
> system components capabilities, it should be able to do so. If an
> Attester is not able to provide such third party endorsements, that
> should not be a blocker to conducts RATS. The benefit of having the
> option to provide them is to fuel a framework about "levels of
> confidence" that most likely is out of scope of IETF definitions, but
> would enable other entities to fill that gap in.
>
> 2.) I am proposing that the RATS WG puts some effort in defining what
> "roots of trust" actually do (and not only what they cannot do). That
> would help to create an understanding what they actually mean - a lot.
> And - I think that is important - that might not have to be part of the
> architecture document. Maybe it is an Appendix of it, maybe it is an
> informational draft that complements the architecture document, or this
> content goes alongside with solutions drafts. We don't know yet, I think.
>
> TL;DR
>
> Roots of Trust are relevant. But their upcoming definition and use
> should not stop us from progressing essential corner stone drafts, today.
>
> My understanding is that some use cases really require them, and other
> use cases don't. Neither am I inclined to include them in the
> architecture draft and over-complicate elegant solutions, such as EAT,
> nor am I inclined to exclude them and thereby inhibit established
> solution, such as RIV.
>
> There is some middle ground here, I think. My proposal is to neither
> disregard the system components an Attester is not able to create
> Evidence for by itself, nor to mandate that an Attester can only create
> believable Evidence, if RoT are available. Both options should be
> enabled by the RATS architecture, I think.
>
> Viele Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe,
>
> Henk
>
>
> On 09.09.19 22:56, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
> > Appreciate you wading into this with something written and concrete.
> >
> > As a thought experiment consider adding this to our RATS definition:
> >
> >     A root of trust may also be a simple unsecured user mode
> >     application, like an Android, Windows or Linux application that
> >     trust has been placed in by a particular attestation system. It is
> >     provisioned with a signing key or such and other capabilities so as
> >     to be able to produce attestation evidence (e.g. signed tokens).
> >       The application may or may not be signed or authenticated.
> >
> >     In a sense, the usual definition of root of trust applies in that i=
t
> >     is something that is unconditionally trusted. In another sense, thi=
s
> >     is at odds with the usual conception as it is not anchored in HW or
> >     to any kind of system or boot SW.
> >
> > I assuming this addition is too much at odds with the convention usage
> > and there is no support for RATS adopting this definition. This is one
> > of the main reasons I am asking we not use the term normatively.
> >
> > LL
> >
> >
> >> On Sep 8, 2019, at 6:23 AM, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
> >> <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of Trust.
> >> I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in the plura=
l
> >> "Roots" form.
> >> As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:
> >>
> >>   The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root of Trust =
=E2=80=9CA
> >>   component that performs one or more security-specific functions, suc=
h
> as
> >>   measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or update. It is
> >> trusted
> >>   always to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior
> >> cannot be
> >>   detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. =E2=80=9C
> >>
> >> {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as other
> >> than an
> >> alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.  It's hard
> >> to make
> >> my neurons pull up a different meaning.  This is probably something th=
at
> >> every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the term, in
> >> order to
> >> ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}
> >>
> >> I have included not just Ned Smith's comments about the term Roots of
> >> Trust,
> >> but his survey of the various origins of the term.  I'm sure that this
> >> belongs somewhere else.
> >>
> >> That diff is here:
> >>
> https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&url2=3D=
https://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-use=
cases.txt
> >>
> >> and commit is:
> >>
> https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df11ece=
66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca
> >> <mailto:mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>>, Sandelman Software Works
> >> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> RATS mailing list
> >> RATS@ietf.org <mailto:RATS@ietf.org>
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > RATS mailing list
> > RATS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>Chiming in here.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>The TCG is neither the originator of the term &quot;Root =
of Trust&quot;, nor a</div><div>particularly good source for RoT definition=
s.</div><div><br></div><div>One might look at this US NIST project on Roots=
 of Trust:</div><div><br></div><div> <a href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/Proje=
cts/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications">https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Ha=
rdware-Roots-of-Trust/publications</a></div><div><br></div><div>And especia=
lly this SP800-164 document:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://cs=
rc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-164/draft">https://csrc.nist.gov/pub=
lications/detail/sp/800-164/draft</a></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div=
><div>- Ira</div><div><br></div><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_s=
ignature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Ira McDonald (Musician=
 / Software Architect)<br>Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG</div=
><div>Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG<br>Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer =
Working Group<br>Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG<br>=
IETF Designated Expert - IPP &amp; Printer MIB<br>Blue Roof Music / High No=
rth Inc<br><a style=3D"color:rgb(51,51,255)" href=3D"http://sites.google.co=
m/site/blueroofmusic" target=3D"_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/bluero=
ofmusic</a><br><a style=3D"color:rgb(102,0,204)" href=3D"http://sites.googl=
e.com/site/highnorthinc" target=3D"_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/hig=
hnorthinc</a><br>mailto: <a href=3D"mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank">blueroofmusic@gmail.com</a><br>PO Box 221=C2=A0 Grand Marais, M=
I 49839=C2=A0 906-494-2434<br><br><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div =
style=3D"display:inline"></div><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div></d=
iv><div></div><div></div><div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></d=
iv></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"l=
tr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 6:49 PM Henk Birkholz &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de">henk.birkholz@sit.fraunho=
fer.de</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
wrt the topic of &quot;roots of trust&quot;, on the list a very visible con=
cern <br>
was highlighted: &quot;the definition [of RoT] defines what they are -not- =
<br>
and not what it actually -are-&quot;. And I am inclined to agree with that.=
<br>
<br>
My initial and unpolished proposal is this:<br>
<br>
&quot;If&quot; we use the spectrum of meanings what &quot;roots of trust&qu=
ot; are in RATS, <br>
we probably have to do two things:<br>
<br>
1.) We maybe should highlight that &quot;Roots of Trust&quot; are a demarca=
tion <br>
line. There are system components or system components characteristics <br>
(aka &quot;Claims&quot; that are composed into &quot;Evidence&quot; about &=
quot;Trustworthiness&quot;) <br>
that an Attester cannot create Evidence about only by itself. It is the <br=
>
&quot;rock bottom&quot; that an Attester cannot attest to (because, quoting=
: <br>
&quot;their misbehavior cannot be detected&quot;). While that being very tr=
ue, it <br>
seems not to be enough of a reason to just exclude them conceptually.<br>
<br>
Hence, the only established procedure to &quot;deal&quot; with these roots =
of <br>
trust is a third&#39;s party endorsement. The consumer of attestation <br>
results is at its own liberty to put trust into these third party&#39;s <br=
>
endorsements - or not.<br>
<br>
It is an optional Claim Set, typically provided in the form of <br>
Endorsement Certificates (but there surely are other ways). And these <br>
methods might simply not be available to an Attester. And if that i that <b=
r>
case that MUST not be a blocker, especially wrt to the RATS architecture.<b=
r>
<br>
I.e. in RATS these Claims about RoT (Endorsements) should be purely <br>
optional. The architecture should allow to include them. But by any <br>
means, there should not be prescriptive or a normative MUSTs to provide <br=
>
them.<br>
<br>
If an Attester is able to provide or refer to such an endorsements of a <br=
>
system components capabilities, it should be able to do so. If an <br>
Attester is not able to provide such third party endorsements, that <br>
should not be a blocker to conducts RATS. The benefit of having the <br>
option to provide them is to fuel a framework about &quot;levels of <br>
confidence&quot; that most likely is out of scope of IETF definitions, but =
<br>
would enable other entities to fill that gap in.<br>
<br>
2.) I am proposing that the RATS WG puts some effort in defining what <br>
&quot;roots of trust&quot; actually do (and not only what they cannot do). =
That <br>
would help to create an understanding what they actually mean - a lot. <br>
And - I think that is important - that might not have to be part of the <br=
>
architecture document. Maybe it is an Appendix of it, maybe it is an <br>
informational draft that complements the architecture document, or this <br=
>
content goes alongside with solutions drafts. We don&#39;t know yet, I thin=
k.<br>
<br>
TL;DR<br>
<br>
Roots of Trust are relevant. But their upcoming definition and use <br>
should not stop us from progressing essential corner stone drafts, today.<b=
r>
<br>
My understanding is that some use cases really require them, and other <br>
use cases don&#39;t. Neither am I inclined to include them in the <br>
architecture draft and over-complicate elegant solutions, such as EAT, <br>
nor am I inclined to exclude them and thereby inhibit established <br>
solution, such as RIV.<br>
<br>
There is some middle ground here, I think. My proposal is to neither <br>
disregard the system components an Attester is not able to create <br>
Evidence for by itself, nor to mandate that an Attester can only create <br=
>
believable Evidence, if RoT are available. Both options should be <br>
enabled by the RATS architecture, I think.<br>
<br>
Viele Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe,<br>
<br>
Henk<br>
<br>
<br>
On 09.09.19 22:56, Laurence Lundblade wrote:<br>
&gt; Appreciate you wading into this with something written and concrete.<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt; As a thought experiment consider adding this to our RATS definition:<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0A root of trust may also be a simple unsecured user=
 mode<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0application, like an Android, Windows or Linux appl=
ication that<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0trust has been placed in by a particular attestatio=
n system. It is<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0provisioned with a signing key or such and other ca=
pabilities so as<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0to be able to produce attestation evidence (e.g. si=
gned tokens).<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The application may or may not be signed or =
authenticated.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0In a sense, the usual definition of root of trust a=
pplies in that it<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0is something that is unconditionally trusted. In an=
other sense, this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0is at odds with the usual conception as it is not a=
nchored in HW or<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0to any kind of system or boot SW.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I assuming this addition is too much at odds with the convention usage=
 <br>
&gt; and there is no support for RATS adopting this definition. This is one=
 <br>
&gt; of the main reasons I am asking we not use the term normatively.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; LL<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On Sep 8, 2019, at 6:23 AM, Michael Richardson &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:mcr%2Bietf@sandelman.ca" target=3D"_blank">mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</a> <br=
>
&gt;&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:mcr%2Bietf@sandelman.ca" target=3D"_b=
lank">mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of Trus=
t.<br>
&gt;&gt; I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in the p=
lural<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;Roots&quot; form.<br>
&gt;&gt; As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text=
:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for =
Root of Trust =E2=80=9CA<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0component that performs one or more security-specific =
functions, such as<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or =
update. It is <br>
&gt;&gt; trusted<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0always to behave in the expected manner, because its m=
isbehavior <br>
&gt;&gt; cannot be<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0detected (such as by measurement) under normal operati=
on. =E2=80=9C<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as ot=
her <br>
&gt;&gt; than an<br>
&gt;&gt; alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.=C2=A0 It=
&#39;s hard <br>
&gt;&gt; to make<br>
&gt;&gt; my neurons pull up a different meaning.=C2=A0 This is probably som=
ething that<br>
&gt;&gt; every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the term, =
in <br>
&gt;&gt; order to<br>
&gt;&gt; ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}<=
br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I have included not just Ned Smith&#39;s comments about the term R=
oots of <br>
&gt;&gt; Trust,<br>
&gt;&gt; but his survey of the various origins of the term.=C2=A0 I&#39;m s=
ure that this<br>
&gt;&gt; belongs somewhere else.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; That diff is here:<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-u=
secases-04&amp;url2=3Dhttps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/dra=
ft-richardson-rats-usecases.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https=
://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&amp;url2=3Dhtt=
ps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-usecas=
es.txt</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; and commit is:<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/comm=
it/7386e8c0df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df=
11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; -- <br>
&gt;&gt; Michael Richardson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mcr%2BIETF@sandelman.ca" =
target=3D"_blank">mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca</a> <br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:mcr%2BIETF@sandelman.ca" target=3D"_b=
lank">mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca</a>&gt;&gt;, Sandelman Software Works<br>
&gt;&gt; -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; RATS mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.org</=
a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.=
org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a><br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; RATS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.org</a><b=
r>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a><br>
&gt; <br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
RATS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2019 19:40:00 -0400
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To: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Hi,

SP800-164 contains this rather informative definition for RoTs:

Roots of Trust (RoTs). RoTs are security primitives composed of hardware,
firmware and/or software that provide a set of trusted, security-critical
functions. They must always behave in an expected manner because their
misbehavior cannot be detected. As such, RoTs need to be secured by their
design. Hardware RoTs are preferred over software RoTs due to their
immutability, smaller attack surface, and more reliable behavior.

Notice that both hardware and software RoTs are addressed, with a rationale
for the preference for hardware RoTs.

If the term RoT continues to cause heartburn in RATS, then we might just us=
e
the generic "Trust Anchor" which is widely used to encompass both hardware
and software RoTs in a number of SDOs.

Cheers,
- Ira

Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434



On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 7:20 PM Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com> wrote=
:

> Hi,
>
> Chiming in here.
>
> The TCG is neither the originator of the term "Root of Trust", nor a
> particularly good source for RoT definitions.
>
> One might look at this US NIST project on Roots of Trust:
>
> https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications
>
> And especially this SP800-164 document:
>
> https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-164/draft
>
> Cheers,
> - Ira
>
> Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
> Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
> Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
> Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
> Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
> Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
> IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
> Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
> http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
> http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
> mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
> PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434
>
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 6:49 PM Henk Birkholz <
> henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de> wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> wrt the topic of "roots of trust", on the list a very visible concern
>> was highlighted: "the definition [of RoT] defines what they are -not-
>> and not what it actually -are-". And I am inclined to agree with that.
>>
>> My initial and unpolished proposal is this:
>>
>> "If" we use the spectrum of meanings what "roots of trust" are in RATS,
>> we probably have to do two things:
>>
>> 1.) We maybe should highlight that "Roots of Trust" are a demarcation
>> line. There are system components or system components characteristics
>> (aka "Claims" that are composed into "Evidence" about "Trustworthiness")
>> that an Attester cannot create Evidence about only by itself. It is the
>> "rock bottom" that an Attester cannot attest to (because, quoting:
>> "their misbehavior cannot be detected"). While that being very true, it
>> seems not to be enough of a reason to just exclude them conceptually.
>>
>> Hence, the only established procedure to "deal" with these roots of
>> trust is a third's party endorsement. The consumer of attestation
>> results is at its own liberty to put trust into these third party's
>> endorsements - or not.
>>
>> It is an optional Claim Set, typically provided in the form of
>> Endorsement Certificates (but there surely are other ways). And these
>> methods might simply not be available to an Attester. And if that i that
>> case that MUST not be a blocker, especially wrt to the RATS architecture=
.
>>
>> I.e. in RATS these Claims about RoT (Endorsements) should be purely
>> optional. The architecture should allow to include them. But by any
>> means, there should not be prescriptive or a normative MUSTs to provide
>> them.
>>
>> If an Attester is able to provide or refer to such an endorsements of a
>> system components capabilities, it should be able to do so. If an
>> Attester is not able to provide such third party endorsements, that
>> should not be a blocker to conducts RATS. The benefit of having the
>> option to provide them is to fuel a framework about "levels of
>> confidence" that most likely is out of scope of IETF definitions, but
>> would enable other entities to fill that gap in.
>>
>> 2.) I am proposing that the RATS WG puts some effort in defining what
>> "roots of trust" actually do (and not only what they cannot do). That
>> would help to create an understanding what they actually mean - a lot.
>> And - I think that is important - that might not have to be part of the
>> architecture document. Maybe it is an Appendix of it, maybe it is an
>> informational draft that complements the architecture document, or this
>> content goes alongside with solutions drafts. We don't know yet, I think=
.
>>
>> TL;DR
>>
>> Roots of Trust are relevant. But their upcoming definition and use
>> should not stop us from progressing essential corner stone drafts, today=
.
>>
>> My understanding is that some use cases really require them, and other
>> use cases don't. Neither am I inclined to include them in the
>> architecture draft and over-complicate elegant solutions, such as EAT,
>> nor am I inclined to exclude them and thereby inhibit established
>> solution, such as RIV.
>>
>> There is some middle ground here, I think. My proposal is to neither
>> disregard the system components an Attester is not able to create
>> Evidence for by itself, nor to mandate that an Attester can only create
>> believable Evidence, if RoT are available. Both options should be
>> enabled by the RATS architecture, I think.
>>
>> Viele Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe,
>>
>> Henk
>>
>>
>> On 09.09.19 22:56, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>> > Appreciate you wading into this with something written and concrete.
>> >
>> > As a thought experiment consider adding this to our RATS definition:
>> >
>> >     A root of trust may also be a simple unsecured user mode
>> >     application, like an Android, Windows or Linux application that
>> >     trust has been placed in by a particular attestation system. It is
>> >     provisioned with a signing key or such and other capabilities so a=
s
>> >     to be able to produce attestation evidence (e.g. signed tokens).
>> >       The application may or may not be signed or authenticated.
>> >
>> >     In a sense, the usual definition of root of trust applies in that =
it
>> >     is something that is unconditionally trusted. In another sense, th=
is
>> >     is at odds with the usual conception as it is not anchored in HW o=
r
>> >     to any kind of system or boot SW.
>> >
>> > I assuming this addition is too much at odds with the convention usage
>> > and there is no support for RATS adopting this definition. This is one
>> > of the main reasons I am asking we not use the term normatively.
>> >
>> > LL
>> >
>> >
>> >> On Sep 8, 2019, at 6:23 AM, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
>> >> <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of Trust.
>> >> I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in the plur=
al
>> >> "Roots" form.
>> >> As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:
>> >>
>> >>   The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root of Trust
>> =E2=80=9CA
>> >>   component that performs one or more security-specific functions,
>> such as
>> >>   measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or update. It is
>> >> trusted
>> >>   always to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior
>> >> cannot be
>> >>   detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. =E2=80=9C
>> >>
>> >> {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as other
>> >> than an
>> >> alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.  It's hard
>> >> to make
>> >> my neurons pull up a different meaning.  This is probably something
>> that
>> >> every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the term, in
>> >> order to
>> >> ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}
>> >>
>> >> I have included not just Ned Smith's comments about the term Roots of
>> >> Trust,
>> >> but his survey of the various origins of the term.  I'm sure that thi=
s
>> >> belongs somewhere else.
>> >>
>> >> That diff is here:
>> >>
>> https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&url2=
=3Dhttps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-=
usecases.txt
>> >>
>> >> and commit is:
>> >>
>> https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df11ec=
e66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca
>> >> <mailto:mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>>, Sandelman Software Works
>> >> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> RATS mailing list
>> >> RATS@ietf.org <mailto:RATS@ietf.org>
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>> >
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > RATS mailing list
>> > RATS@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>> >
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> RATS mailing list
>> RATS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>>
>

--00000000000020b1200592274ff1
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>SP800-164 contains this =
rather informative definition for RoTs:</div><div><br></div><div>
<span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif">Roots of Trust (RoTs).</=
span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif"> RoTs</span><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif"> are security primitives compos=
ed of hardware, firmware and/or </span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font=
-family:serif">software </span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:=
serif">that provide</span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif=
"> a set of trusted</span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif=
">, security</span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif">-crit=
ical </span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif">functions.</=
span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif"> They must always b=
ehave in an </span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif">expec=
ted manner because their misbehavior cannot be detected.</span><span style=
=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif"> As such, RoTs need to be secured <=
/span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif">by their design.  =
Hardware </span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif">RoTs</sp=
an><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif"> are preferred over s=
oftware RoTs</span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif"> due =
to </span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif">their immutabi=
lity, </span><span style=3D"font-size:18.4px;font-family:serif">smaller att=
ack surface, and more reliable behavior.</span><span style=3D"font-size:18.=
4px;font-family:serif"></span> <br></div><div><br></div><div>Notice that bo=
th hardware and software RoTs are addressed, with a rationale</div><div>for=
 the preference for hardware RoTs.</div><div><br></div><div>If the term RoT=
 continues to cause heartburn in RATS, then we might just use</div><div>the=
 generic &quot;Trust Anchor&quot; which is widely used to encompass both ha=
rdware</div><div>and software RoTs in a number of SDOs.</div><div><br></div=
><div>Cheers,</div><div>- Ira</div><div><br></div><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Ira =
McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)<br>Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility=
 Solutions WG</div><div>Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG<br></div=
><div dir=3D"ltr">Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG<br>Secretary - =
IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group<br>Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printi=
ng Protocol WG<br>IETF Designated Expert - IPP &amp; Printer MIB<br>Blue Ro=
of Music / High North Inc<br><a style=3D"color:rgb(51,51,255)" href=3D"http=
://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic" target=3D"_blank">http://sites.goog=
le.com/site/blueroofmusic</a><br><a style=3D"color:rgb(102,0,204)" href=3D"=
http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc" target=3D"_blank">http://sites.g=
oogle.com/site/highnorthinc</a><br>mailto: <a href=3D"mailto:blueroofmusic@=
gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">blueroofmusic@gmail.com</a><br>PO Box 221=C2=
=A0 Grand Marais, MI 49839=C2=A0 906-494-2434<br><br><div style=3D"display:=
inline"></div><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div style=3D"display:inl=
ine"></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div></div></div></div></=
div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 7:20 PM =
Ira McDonald &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com">blueroofmusic@g=
mail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>Chiming in here.=
</div><div><br></div><div>The TCG is neither the originator of the term &qu=
ot;Root of Trust&quot;, nor a</div><div>particularly good source for RoT de=
finitions.</div><div><br></div><div>One might look at this US NIST project =
on Roots of Trust:</div><div><br></div><div> <a href=3D"https://csrc.nist.g=
ov/Projects/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications</a></div><div>=
<br></div><div>And especially this SP800-164 document:</div><div><br></div>=
<div><a href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-164/draft"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-164/dra=
ft</a></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>- Ira</div><div><br></div=
><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail-m_7135961803918354964gmail_signa=
ture"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)<br>Co-Chair - TC=
G Trusted Mobility Solutions WG</div><div>Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Pr=
otocol SG<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing =
WG<br>Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group<br>Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO P=
WG Internet Printing Protocol WG<br>IETF Designated Expert - IPP &amp; Prin=
ter MIB<br>Blue Roof Music / High North Inc<br><a style=3D"color:rgb(51,51,=
255)" href=3D"http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic" target=3D"_blank"=
>http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic</a><br><a style=3D"color:rgb(10=
2,0,204)" href=3D"http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc" target=3D"_bla=
nk">http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc</a><br>mailto: <a href=3D"mai=
lto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">blueroofmusic@gmail.com</a><=
br>PO Box 221=C2=A0 Grand Marais, MI 49839=C2=A0 906-494-2434<br><br><div s=
tyle=3D"display:inline"></div><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div styl=
e=3D"display:inline"></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div></di=
v></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 9, =
2019 at 6:49 PM Henk Birkholz &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:henk.birkholz@sit.fraun=
hofer.de" target=3D"_blank">henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
wrt the topic of &quot;roots of trust&quot;, on the list a very visible con=
cern <br>
was highlighted: &quot;the definition [of RoT] defines what they are -not- =
<br>
and not what it actually -are-&quot;. And I am inclined to agree with that.=
<br>
<br>
My initial and unpolished proposal is this:<br>
<br>
&quot;If&quot; we use the spectrum of meanings what &quot;roots of trust&qu=
ot; are in RATS, <br>
we probably have to do two things:<br>
<br>
1.) We maybe should highlight that &quot;Roots of Trust&quot; are a demarca=
tion <br>
line. There are system components or system components characteristics <br>
(aka &quot;Claims&quot; that are composed into &quot;Evidence&quot; about &=
quot;Trustworthiness&quot;) <br>
that an Attester cannot create Evidence about only by itself. It is the <br=
>
&quot;rock bottom&quot; that an Attester cannot attest to (because, quoting=
: <br>
&quot;their misbehavior cannot be detected&quot;). While that being very tr=
ue, it <br>
seems not to be enough of a reason to just exclude them conceptually.<br>
<br>
Hence, the only established procedure to &quot;deal&quot; with these roots =
of <br>
trust is a third&#39;s party endorsement. The consumer of attestation <br>
results is at its own liberty to put trust into these third party&#39;s <br=
>
endorsements - or not.<br>
<br>
It is an optional Claim Set, typically provided in the form of <br>
Endorsement Certificates (but there surely are other ways). And these <br>
methods might simply not be available to an Attester. And if that i that <b=
r>
case that MUST not be a blocker, especially wrt to the RATS architecture.<b=
r>
<br>
I.e. in RATS these Claims about RoT (Endorsements) should be purely <br>
optional. The architecture should allow to include them. But by any <br>
means, there should not be prescriptive or a normative MUSTs to provide <br=
>
them.<br>
<br>
If an Attester is able to provide or refer to such an endorsements of a <br=
>
system components capabilities, it should be able to do so. If an <br>
Attester is not able to provide such third party endorsements, that <br>
should not be a blocker to conducts RATS. The benefit of having the <br>
option to provide them is to fuel a framework about &quot;levels of <br>
confidence&quot; that most likely is out of scope of IETF definitions, but =
<br>
would enable other entities to fill that gap in.<br>
<br>
2.) I am proposing that the RATS WG puts some effort in defining what <br>
&quot;roots of trust&quot; actually do (and not only what they cannot do). =
That <br>
would help to create an understanding what they actually mean - a lot. <br>
And - I think that is important - that might not have to be part of the <br=
>
architecture document. Maybe it is an Appendix of it, maybe it is an <br>
informational draft that complements the architecture document, or this <br=
>
content goes alongside with solutions drafts. We don&#39;t know yet, I thin=
k.<br>
<br>
TL;DR<br>
<br>
Roots of Trust are relevant. But their upcoming definition and use <br>
should not stop us from progressing essential corner stone drafts, today.<b=
r>
<br>
My understanding is that some use cases really require them, and other <br>
use cases don&#39;t. Neither am I inclined to include them in the <br>
architecture draft and over-complicate elegant solutions, such as EAT, <br>
nor am I inclined to exclude them and thereby inhibit established <br>
solution, such as RIV.<br>
<br>
There is some middle ground here, I think. My proposal is to neither <br>
disregard the system components an Attester is not able to create <br>
Evidence for by itself, nor to mandate that an Attester can only create <br=
>
believable Evidence, if RoT are available. Both options should be <br>
enabled by the RATS architecture, I think.<br>
<br>
Viele Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe,<br>
<br>
Henk<br>
<br>
<br>
On 09.09.19 22:56, Laurence Lundblade wrote:<br>
&gt; Appreciate you wading into this with something written and concrete.<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt; As a thought experiment consider adding this to our RATS definition:<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0A root of trust may also be a simple unsecured user=
 mode<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0application, like an Android, Windows or Linux appl=
ication that<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0trust has been placed in by a particular attestatio=
n system. It is<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0provisioned with a signing key or such and other ca=
pabilities so as<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0to be able to produce attestation evidence (e.g. si=
gned tokens).<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The application may or may not be signed or =
authenticated.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0In a sense, the usual definition of root of trust a=
pplies in that it<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0is something that is unconditionally trusted. In an=
other sense, this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0is at odds with the usual conception as it is not a=
nchored in HW or<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0to any kind of system or boot SW.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I assuming this addition is too much at odds with the convention usage=
 <br>
&gt; and there is no support for RATS adopting this definition. This is one=
 <br>
&gt; of the main reasons I am asking we not use the term normatively.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; LL<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On Sep 8, 2019, at 6:23 AM, Michael Richardson &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:mcr%2Bietf@sandelman.ca" target=3D"_blank">mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</a> <br=
>
&gt;&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:mcr%2Bietf@sandelman.ca" target=3D"_b=
lank">mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of Trus=
t.<br>
&gt;&gt; I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in the p=
lural<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;Roots&quot; form.<br>
&gt;&gt; As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text=
:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for =
Root of Trust =E2=80=9CA<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0component that performs one or more security-specific =
functions, such as<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or =
update. It is <br>
&gt;&gt; trusted<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0always to behave in the expected manner, because its m=
isbehavior <br>
&gt;&gt; cannot be<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0detected (such as by measurement) under normal operati=
on. =E2=80=9C<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as ot=
her <br>
&gt;&gt; than an<br>
&gt;&gt; alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.=C2=A0 It=
&#39;s hard <br>
&gt;&gt; to make<br>
&gt;&gt; my neurons pull up a different meaning.=C2=A0 This is probably som=
ething that<br>
&gt;&gt; every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the term, =
in <br>
&gt;&gt; order to<br>
&gt;&gt; ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}<=
br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I have included not just Ned Smith&#39;s comments about the term R=
oots of <br>
&gt;&gt; Trust,<br>
&gt;&gt; but his survey of the various origins of the term.=C2=A0 I&#39;m s=
ure that this<br>
&gt;&gt; belongs somewhere else.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; That diff is here:<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-u=
secases-04&amp;url2=3Dhttps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/dra=
ft-richardson-rats-usecases.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https=
://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&amp;url2=3Dhtt=
ps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-usecas=
es.txt</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; and commit is:<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/comm=
it/7386e8c0df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df=
11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; -- <br>
&gt;&gt; Michael Richardson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mcr%2BIETF@sandelman.ca" =
target=3D"_blank">mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca</a> <br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:mcr%2BIETF@sandelman.ca" target=3D"_b=
lank">mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca</a>&gt;&gt;, Sandelman Software Works<br>
&gt;&gt; -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; RATS mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.org</=
a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.=
org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a><br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; RATS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.org</a><b=
r>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a><br>
&gt; <br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
RATS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000020b1200592274ff1--


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From: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
To: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>, "teep@ietf.org" <teep@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Virtual Interim Sept 10 7-8:30am PST
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--=-=-=
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I have read through this document, and it is now the publically available r=
eference
on the TCG work for the use-case document.  I have sent some edits directly
to the authors.

I like the use of the term "Remote Integrity Verification".
I'm not too crazy about "RIV" as a TLA in a field with way too many TLAs
already though, but okay.

I found this text difficult:

         * Platform Identity refers to the mechanism assuring the
        attestation verifier (typically a network administrator)
        that the equipment on their network can be reliably identified,
        and that its manufacturer is certified by a trusted authority.

}        This certification provides the verifier with assurance that
}        the Root of Trust elements of the device were verified by the
}        manufacturer before the device was shipped.

I'm not sure if the device is actually identified to the verifier (network =
admin).
Or that there is a *meta* claim that the device could be identified.

Is this a claim that a claim was made, but the contents of the claim is not
revealed for privacy reasons?  If that is the intent, then can we be more
explicit?  (And that's actually a new use case).
If that's not the intent, then perhaps the passive language that is confusi=
ng
could be changed.


>   o  Processor Sleep Modes: Embedded equipment typically does not
>      "sleep", so sleep and hibernate modes are not considered.

why is this a consideration?
lots of embedded systems go into low power mode all the time.

re: 2.4.1: DevID Alternatives.

I don't find the use of LDevID to be a credible solution here.
It seems that LDevID have to get installed manually, via some privacy
preserving mechanism.  Privacy preserving against who?  The person or
entity that installs the LDevID surely gets to learn the identity
of the device.   I don't think we can do zero-touch provisioning
without the IDevID.

I would like this section to clarify the privacy threat here.

>   The TCG TPM 2.0 Keys
>   document [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0] also outlines procedures for
>   creating Local Attestation Keys and Local Device IDs (LDevIDs) rooted
>   in the manufacturer's IDevID as a check to reduce the chances that
>   counterfeit devices are installed in the network.

[Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0] <-- seems to be a draft, and so probably not publi=
c?

>   whether the measured hashes are "the right ones" or not.

up to now, you've carefully said "measurements", rather than measured hashe=
s.
Do you want to stick with measurement, or was there a reason to change?

>   Quotes from a TPM can provide evidence of the state of a device at
>   the time the quote was requested, but to make sense of the quote in
>   most cases an event log of what software modules contributed which
>   values to the quote during startup must also be provided.  The log

As I understand it, the problem of the multi-process (and multi-processor)
boot is that the hash values arrive in non-deterministic orders, and so
would contribute to a straight sequential hash differently.
Why aren't the different contributions either just listed, or just filled
into a table with a canonical order?   I'm sure you have thought of this,
so there must be something I don't understand about why this solution
can't work.

If one expects ten processes, A->J to be running, have a table that
is ten items long.  If one needs to be sure that there are no other process=
es
running, then some measurement of a canonicalized process table seems to
be in order. That would omit the PID for instance, or canonicalize the
PID into some abstract namespace if relationships between processes were al=
so
important.








=2D-=20
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-




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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] regarding rats-network-device-attestation
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Subject: Re: [Rats] regarding rats-network-device-attestation
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Michael,
  Thanks for reviewing the doc!
  I'll go over the comments with Jessica and start on a revision.
/guy



Juniper Business Use Only

-----Original Message-----
From: RATS <rats-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Michael Richardson
Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2019 7:05 AM
To: rats@ietf.org
Subject: [Rats] regarding rats-network-device-attestation


I have read through this document, and it is now the publically available r=
eference on the TCG work for the use-case document.  I have sent some edits=
 directly to the authors.

I like the use of the term "Remote Integrity Verification".
I'm not too crazy about "RIV" as a TLA in a field with way too many TLAs al=
ready though, but okay.

I found this text difficult:

         * Platform Identity refers to the mechanism assuring the
        attestation verifier (typically a network administrator)
        that the equipment on their network can be reliably identified,
        and that its manufacturer is certified by a trusted authority.

}        This certification provides the verifier with assurance that
}        the Root of Trust elements of the device were verified by the
}        manufacturer before the device was shipped.

I'm not sure if the device is actually identified to the verifier (network =
admin).
Or that there is a *meta* claim that the device could be identified.

Is this a claim that a claim was made, but the contents of the claim is not=
 revealed for privacy reasons?  If that is the intent, then can we be more =
explicit?  (And that's actually a new use case).
If that's not the intent, then perhaps the passive language that is confusi=
ng could be changed.


>   o  Processor Sleep Modes: Embedded equipment typically does not
>      "sleep", so sleep and hibernate modes are not considered.

why is this a consideration?
lots of embedded systems go into low power mode all the time.

re: 2.4.1: DevID Alternatives.

I don't find the use of LDevID to be a credible solution here.
It seems that LDevID have to get installed manually, via some privacy prese=
rving mechanism.  Privacy preserving against who?  The person or entity tha=
t installs the LDevID surely gets to learn the identity
of the device.   I don't think we can do zero-touch provisioning
without the IDevID.

I would like this section to clarify the privacy threat here.

>   The TCG TPM 2.0 Keys
>   document [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0] also outlines procedures for
>   creating Local Attestation Keys and Local Device IDs (LDevIDs) rooted
>   in the manufacturer's IDevID as a check to reduce the chances that
>   counterfeit devices are installed in the network.

[Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0] <-- seems to be a draft, and so probably not publi=
c?

>   whether the measured hashes are "the right ones" or not.

up to now, you've carefully said "measurements", rather than measured hashe=
s.
Do you want to stick with measurement, or was there a reason to change?

>   Quotes from a TPM can provide evidence of the state of a device at
>   the time the quote was requested, but to make sense of the quote in
>   most cases an event log of what software modules contributed which
>   values to the quote during startup must also be provided.  The log

As I understand it, the problem of the multi-process (and multi-processor) =
boot is that the hash values arrive in non-deterministic orders, and so wou=
ld contribute to a straight sequential hash differently.
Why aren't the different contributions either just listed, or just filled
into a table with a canonical order?   I'm sure you have thought of this,
so there must be something I don't understand about why this solution can't=
 work.

If one expects ten processes, A->J to be running, have a table that is ten =
items long.  If one needs to be sure that there are no other processes runn=
ing, then some measurement of a canonicalized process table seems to be in =
order. That would omit the PID for instance, or canonicalize the PID into s=
ome abstract namespace if relationships between processes were also importa=
nt.








--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works  -=3D =
IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-



From nobody Tue Sep 10 06:12:48 2019
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Hi all,

we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and 
represents the state of the current discussion and the material 
presented at the last IETF meeting.

The current Editor's version can be found here:

> https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture.html

We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.

TL;DR
Below you can find a list of essential changes & a list of action items 
still to be addressed.


This version of the RATS Architecture document:

* does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust 
Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role 
_is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely 
on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this 
document),

* does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as 
"Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),

* provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS 
Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:

> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf

* introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the 
trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection 
characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other 
entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined 
levels of confidence metrics,

* is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of 
"trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,

* simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to 
have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri 
and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why 
they may need to be modified,

* differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the 
Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an 
Attester,

* uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence, 
Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept 
is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?). 
(Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information 
model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a 
key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and 
not mandated by an information model), and

* analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of 
Attestation Assertions.


For future versions the authors intent:

* to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary 
diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS 
Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified 
mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),

* to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas. 
(the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that 
direction),

* still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for 
them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a 
base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they 
actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon 
and Thomas,

* to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation, 
addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the 
(un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain 
points of time, or, another example given, addressing the 
differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an 
Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,

* to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by 
Ian,

* to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the 
RATS Architecture draft, and

* to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in 
order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of 
key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this 
will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).


Viele Grüße,

Henk







From nobody Tue Sep 10 09:28:40 2019
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From: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
To: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
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From: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 23:23:53 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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From nobody Tue Sep 10 17:28:32 2019
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References: <4155.1567948986@dooku.sandelman.ca> <91BE5953-1EB8-4FEB-9F20-3C6FCB448302@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <91BE5953-1EB8-4FEB-9F20-3C6FCB448302@intel.com>
From: Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 20:28:14 -0400
Message-ID: <CAN40gStjcnOoxbKLBokfTGs3wD1rBBT+dXvvDN=aTvukePc+CA@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000007595f505923c1997"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/4md4VVwcrsebx1c2jU6bLPetiq8>
Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Hi,

FWIW, the various SAE vehicle security committees commonly use "Trust
Anchor"
(rather than "RoT") to encompass the entire spectrum of RoTs, *as well as*
the
X.509 CA style trust anchor.  There's an entire SAE vehicle security
committee
titled SAE Trust Anchors and Authentication.  In addition, the SAE J3101
spec,
soon to be published, is titled Requirements for Hardware-Protected Securit=
y
for Ground Vehicle Applications and abstracts primitives and functions from
any
of the automotive HSM-like components - it *always* uses the term "Hardware
Trust Anchor" rather than "Hardware RoT".  It explicitly avoids the
anti-definition
that misbehavior of a "Hardware Trust Anchor" cannot be detected.

Cheers,
- Ira



Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434



On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 7:24 PM Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com> wrote:

> The term "Trust Anchor" seems to connote a public key, public key
> certificate or something related primarily to termination of a certificat=
e
> path validation. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5914.
>
> The root_of_trust term as used by
> https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications seems
> to refer to a computing environment that performs a well-defined security
> related function. The environment doesn't necessarily need to have a key
> associated with it - unless its function requires a key or trust anchor.
> For example:
>         - Attestation requires signing of evidence, hence it requires a
> key.
>         - Verification of signatures requires a Trust Anchor / public key=
.
>         - A RATS Verifier produces Attestation Results, hence must have a
> signing key in addition to Trust Anchor(s).
>
> The TCG uses the term "roots" of trust because there are several separabl=
e
> functions included in a TPM. It can store measurements and keys hence it =
is
> a "storage" RoT. It can sign evidence hence it is a "reporting" RoT - aka
> attestation RoT. A TPM can also verify signatures hence it is a
> Verification RoT.
>
> A RoT is more than just functions. A TPM is a library of security
> functions that are intended to be implemented in a trustworthy environmen=
t.
> However, there are software TPM libraries that can run in a variety of
> environments - some of which wouldn't normally be thought of as
> "trustworthy".
>
> Glossaries defining root of trust seem to consistently acknowledge the
> distinguishing factor for root-of-trust as "misbehavior cannot be
> detected". To protect root-of-trust functions from simple attacks,
> implementers often harden them by implementing them in immutable hardware=
.
> But the property of non-detectable misbehavior existed before the hardeni=
ng
> was applied.
>
> RATS Attestation architecture should promote minimizing the surface area
> of Root-of-Trust functions IMO. Nevertheless, it seems there will always =
be
> some function r() for which there is no function f'() that can detect
> misbehavior. Nevertheless, there may be a function f() where misbehavior
> can be detected by f'(), but not of r().  Hence, f'(f(r())) means f'() ca=
n
> detect misbehavior of f() but not of r(). Therefore, r() is a root of tru=
st.
>
> Maybe an attestation construction looks something like this:
>          f'''(f''(f'(f(r())))) where a prime (') denotes attestation
> function(s) that can detect misbehavior of enclosed functions. Since the
> inner-most functions f() contains r() and where no f'() exists to detect
> its misbehavior, r() is a root-of-trust. In theory, there could be many
> layers of functionality that are attestable. For example, the TEEP
> architecture allows fan-out and nesting of Trusted Agents in the same
> platform.
>
> That doesn't however mean r() must remain anonymous, r() can be given a
> name and can be subject to manufacturing process controls. Typically,
> something like the tuple (mfg, product ID, version, S/N) can be used to
> manually track r(). But that is the best anyone can do.
>
> In the case of TPM, the root of trust for reporting a() includes a key
> called the "endorsement key" that is only used for tracking purposes.
> Nevertheless, the verifier must trust a() to implement the endorsement ke=
y
> and tracking functionality correctly. Maybe it is circular logic, but a()
> still fits the definition of a root-of-trust.
>
> Trusted boot is another use case for a root of trust. The idea of trusted
> boot is there is a function b() that is trusted to load another function
> b'(). Misbehavior on the part of b() could result in loading a malicious
> function m() instead of b'(). Before b'() loads, b() measures b'() into a
> storage root s(). A trusted boot construction might look like this:
> b(b'(b''(b'''(...)))). Since there is no function x() that loads b().
> Therefore, b() is a root-of-trust.
>
> Note: that if b() doesn't have some function f'() such that f'(b())
> exists, then b() cannot be attested - but it is still a root-of-trust.
>
> The TCG anticipated b() but didn't standardize it. It also assumed there
> was a trusted function that combined b() with a TPM storage root of trust
> s(). TCG presumed f(b(), s()) would exist even if they didn't standardize
> f() and b(). There was no attestation function for f(b(), s()) either,
> other than using supply chain entity endorsements (e.g. attribute certs) =
of
> platform constructions containing f(b(), s()). TCG used attribute
> certificates to link the TPM endorsement key in a() to other platform
> components such as b(). E.g.:
>         TCG Trusted Platform =3D  f(b(b'(b''(...))), TPM(s(), a())); if t=
he
> TPM implements the attestation function f'() for b'(b''(b'''(...))).
>         Then the construction: R =3D f(b(), TPM(s(), a())) are the
> roots-of-trust upon which the attestation function in the TPM depends.
>         E.g. f'() =3D  a(s(b'(b''(b'''(...))))) --> R; where "-->" denote=
s
> root-of-trust dependency.
>
> Another form of root-of-trust is a Verifier. I began this thread talking
> about trust anchor terminology. A Verifier function v() contains a trust
> anchor TA that v() uses to terminate cert path validation. Possibly, v()
> relies on a TA provisioning function p(), such as RFC5934 that helps v()
> determine which TA to use. In this case, v() contains p() e.g. v(p()); bu=
t
> it may be the case that there is no attestation function for p() such tha=
t
> f'(p()) does not exist. It may also be the case that no f'(v()) exists
> either. Hence, both v() and p() are roots of trust.
>
> However, if f'(p()) did exist, and no f'(v()) existed, then v() is still =
a
> root-of-trust, but the trusted surface area in v() is minimized by f'(p()=
).
>
> Those familiar with TPM, trusted boot and the ecosystem around it, may us=
e
> the term 'roots of trust' as a way to talk about the above complexity
> without going into the details as I have done here.
>
> RATS scope is essentially definition of f'() but it should acknowledge
> roots of trust functions even if we refer to them by some other name.
>
> -Ned
>
> =EF=BB=BFOn 9/8/19, 6:22 AM, "RATS on behalf of Michael Richardson" <
> rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
>
>
>     We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of Trust.
>     I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in the plur=
al
>     "Roots" form.
>     As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:
>
>        The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root of Trus=
t
> =E2=80=9CA
>        component that performs one or more security-specific functions,
> such as
>        measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or update. It i=
s
> trusted
>        always to behave in the expected manner, because its misbehavior
> cannot be
>        detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. =E2=80=
=9C
>
>     {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as other
> than an
>     alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.  It's hard
> to make
>     my neurons pull up a different meaning.  This is probably something
> that
>     every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the term, in
> order to
>     ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}
>
>     I have included not just Ned Smith's comments about the term Roots of
> Trust,
>     but his survey of the various origins of the term.  I'm sure that thi=
s
>     belongs somewhere else.
>
>     That diff is here:
>
> https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&url2=3D=
https://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-use=
cases.txt
>
>     and commit is:
>
> https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df11ece=
66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12
>
>
>     --
>     Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
>      -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>FWIW, the various SAE ve=
hicle security committees commonly use &quot;Trust Anchor&quot;</div><div>(=
rather than &quot;RoT&quot;) to encompass the entire spectrum of RoTs, *as =
well as* the <br></div><div>X.509 CA style trust anchor.=C2=A0 There&#39;s =
an entire SAE vehicle security committee</div><div>titled SAE Trust Anchors=
 and Authentication.=C2=A0 In addition, the SAE J3101 spec,</div><div>soon =
to be published, is titled Requirements for Hardware-Protected Security</di=
v><div>for Ground Vehicle Applications and abstracts primitives and functio=
ns from any</div><div>of the automotive HSM-like components - it *always* u=
ses the term &quot;Hardware</div><div>Trust Anchor&quot; rather than &quot;=
Hardware RoT&quot;.=C2=A0 It explicitly avoids the anti-definition</div><di=
v>that misbehavior of a &quot;Hardware Trust Anchor&quot; cannot be detecte=
d.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>- Ira</div><div><br></div><di=
v><br></div><div><br></div><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signat=
ure" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Ira McDonald (Musician / So=
ftware Architect)<br>Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG</div><div=
>Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Chair=
 - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG<br>Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Worki=
ng Group<br>Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG<br>IETF =
Designated Expert - IPP &amp; Printer MIB<br>Blue Roof Music / High North I=
nc<br><a style=3D"color:rgb(51,51,255)" href=3D"http://sites.google.com/sit=
e/blueroofmusic" target=3D"_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmus=
ic</a><br><a style=3D"color:rgb(102,0,204)" href=3D"http://sites.google.com=
/site/highnorthinc" target=3D"_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/highnort=
hinc</a><br>mailto: <a href=3D"mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com" target=3D"_b=
lank">blueroofmusic@gmail.com</a><br>PO Box 221=C2=A0 Grand Marais, MI 4983=
9=C2=A0 906-494-2434<br><br><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div style=
=3D"display:inline"></div><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div></div><d=
iv></div><div></div><div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></=
div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" c=
lass=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 7:24 PM Smith, Ned &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:ned.smith@intel.com">ned.smith@intel.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The term &quot;Trust Anc=
hor&quot; seems to connote a public key, public key certificate or somethin=
g related primarily to termination of a certificate path validation. <a hre=
f=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5914" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5914</a>. <br>
<br>
The root_of_trust term as used by <a href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects=
/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"=
>https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications</a> se=
ems to refer to a computing environment that performs a well-defined securi=
ty related function. The environment doesn&#39;t necessarily need to have a=
 key associated with it - unless its function requires a key or trust ancho=
r. For example: <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 - Attestation requires signing of evidence, hen=
ce it requires a key. <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 - Verification of signatures requires a Trust A=
nchor / public key. <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 - A RATS Verifier produces Attestation Results,=
 hence must have a signing key in addition to Trust Anchor(s). <br>
<br>
The TCG uses the term &quot;roots&quot; of trust because there are several =
separable functions included in a TPM. It can store measurements and keys h=
ence it is a &quot;storage&quot; RoT. It can sign evidence hence it is a &q=
uot;reporting&quot; RoT - aka attestation RoT. A TPM can also verify signat=
ures hence it is a Verification RoT. <br>
<br>
A RoT is more than just functions. A TPM is a library of security functions=
 that are intended to be implemented in a trustworthy environment. However,=
 there are software TPM libraries that can run in a variety of environments=
 - some of which wouldn&#39;t normally be thought of as &quot;trustworthy&q=
uot;. <br>
<br>
Glossaries defining root of trust seem to consistently acknowledge the dist=
inguishing factor for root-of-trust as &quot;misbehavior cannot be detected=
&quot;. To protect root-of-trust functions from simple attacks, implementer=
s often harden them by implementing them in immutable hardware. But the pro=
perty of non-detectable misbehavior existed before the hardening was applie=
d.<br>
<br>
RATS Attestation architecture should promote minimizing the surface area of=
 Root-of-Trust functions IMO. Nevertheless, it seems there will always be s=
ome function r() for which there is no function f&#39;() that can detect mi=
sbehavior. Nevertheless, there may be a function f() where misbehavior can =
be detected by f&#39;(), but not of r().=C2=A0 Hence, f&#39;(f(r())) means =
f&#39;() can detect misbehavior of f() but not of r(). Therefore, r() is a =
root of trust.<br>
<br>
Maybe an attestation construction looks something like this:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0f&#39;&#39;&#39;(f&#39;&#39;(f&#39;(f(r()=
)))) where a prime (&#39;) denotes attestation function(s) that can detect =
misbehavior of enclosed functions. Since the inner-most functions f() conta=
ins r() and where no f&#39;() exists to detect its misbehavior, r() is a ro=
ot-of-trust. In theory, there could be many layers of functionality that ar=
e attestable. For example, the TEEP architecture allows fan-out and nesting=
 of Trusted Agents in the same platform.<br>
<br>
That doesn&#39;t however mean r() must remain anonymous, r() can be given a=
 name and can be subject to manufacturing process controls. Typically, some=
thing like the tuple (mfg, product ID, version, S/N) can be used to manuall=
y track r(). But that is the best anyone can do. <br>
<br>
In the case of TPM, the root of trust for reporting a() includes a key call=
ed the &quot;endorsement key&quot; that is only used for tracking purposes.=
 Nevertheless, the verifier must trust a() to implement the endorsement key=
 and tracking functionality correctly. Maybe it is circular logic, but a() =
still fits the definition of a root-of-trust.<br>
<br>
Trusted boot is another use case for a root of trust. The idea of trusted b=
oot is there is a function b() that is trusted to load another function b&#=
39;(). Misbehavior on the part of b() could result in loading a malicious f=
unction m() instead of b&#39;(). Before b&#39;() loads, b() measures b&#39;=
() into a storage root s(). A trusted boot construction might look like thi=
s: b(b&#39;(b&#39;&#39;(b&#39;&#39;&#39;(...)))). Since there is no functio=
n x() that loads b(). Therefore, b() is a root-of-trust. <br>
<br>
Note: that if b() doesn&#39;t have some function f&#39;() such that f&#39;(=
b()) exists, then b() cannot be attested - but it is still a root-of-trust.=
 <br>
<br>
The TCG anticipated b() but didn&#39;t standardize it. It also assumed ther=
e was a trusted function that combined b() with a TPM storage root of trust=
 s(). TCG presumed f(b(), s()) would exist even if they didn&#39;t standard=
ize f() and b(). There was no attestation function for f(b(), s()) either, =
other than using supply chain entity endorsements (e.g. attribute certs) of=
 platform constructions containing f(b(), s()). TCG used attribute certific=
ates to link the TPM endorsement key in a() to other platform components su=
ch as b(). E.g.:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 TCG Trusted Platform =3D=C2=A0 f(b(b&#39;(b&#39=
;&#39;(...))), TPM(s(), a())); if the TPM implements the attestation functi=
on f&#39;() for b&#39;(b&#39;&#39;(b&#39;&#39;&#39;(...))). <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Then the construction: R =3D f(b(), TPM(s(), a(=
))) are the roots-of-trust upon which the attestation function in the TPM d=
epends. <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 E.g. f&#39;() =3D=C2=A0 a(s(b&#39;(b&#39;&#39;(=
b&#39;&#39;&#39;(...))))) --&gt; R; where &quot;--&gt;&quot; denotes root-o=
f-trust dependency. <br>
<br>
Another form of root-of-trust is a Verifier. I began this thread talking ab=
out trust anchor terminology. A Verifier function v() contains a trust anch=
or TA that v() uses to terminate cert path validation. Possibly, v() relies=
 on a TA provisioning function p(), such as RFC5934 that helps v() determin=
e which TA to use. In this case, v() contains p() e.g. v(p()); but it may b=
e the case that there is no attestation function for p() such that f&#39;(p=
()) does not exist. It may also be the case that no f&#39;(v()) exists eith=
er. Hence, both v() and p() are roots of trust. <br>
<br>
However, if f&#39;(p()) did exist, and no f&#39;(v()) existed, then v() is =
still a root-of-trust, but the trusted surface area in v() is minimized by =
f&#39;(p()). <br>
<br>
Those familiar with TPM, trusted boot and the ecosystem around it, may use =
the term &#39;roots of trust&#39; as a way to talk about the above complexi=
ty without going into the details as I have done here.<br>
<br>
RATS scope is essentially definition of f&#39;() but it should acknowledge =
roots of trust functions even if we refer to them by some other name.<br>
<br>
-Ned<br>
<br>
=EF=BB=BFOn 9/8/19, 6:22 AM, &quot;RATS on behalf of Michael Richardson&quo=
t; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">rats-boun=
ces@ietf.org</a> on behalf of <a href=3D"mailto:mcr%2Bietf@sandelman.ca" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of=
 Trust. <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in =
the plural<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;Roots&quot; form.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of=
 text:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The TCG Glossary also offers a general definitio=
n for Root of Trust =E2=80=9CA<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0component that performs one or more security-spe=
cific functions, such as<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0measurement, storage, reporting, verification, a=
nd/or update. It is trusted<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0always to behave in the expected manner, because=
 its misbehavior cannot be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0detected (such as by measurement) under normal o=
peration. =E2=80=9C <br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words =
as other than an<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.=C2=
=A0 It&#39;s hard to make<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 my neurons pull up a different meaning.=C2=A0 This is probabl=
y something that<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the t=
erm, in order to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get revi=
ews} <br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 I have included not just Ned Smith&#39;s comments about the t=
erm Roots of Trust,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 but his survey of the various origins of the term.=C2=A0 I&#3=
9;m sure that this<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 belongs somewhere else.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 That diff is here:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richa=
rdson-rats-usecases-04&amp;url2=3Dhttps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-=
usecases/draft-richardson-rats-usecases.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&am=
p;url2=3Dhttps://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson=
-rats-usecases.txt</a><br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 and commit is:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-u=
secases/commit/7386e8c0df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commi=
t/7386e8c0df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12</a><br>
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Michael Richardson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mcr%2BIETF@sandelman=
.ca" target=3D"_blank">mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca</a>&gt;, Sandelman Software Wo=
rks<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-<br>
<br>
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From nobody Wed Sep 11 02:30:57 2019
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To: <rats@ietf.org>, "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Hi Ira & Ned,
hi all,

TL;DR
While I understand the point of the SAE, there a number of good reasons 
not to mimic their decision here, I think.


while I see, acknowledge, and understand (to some extent) the confusion 
about TA & ROT, reiterating and adding to the confusion is a prominent 
reason why people are actually starting to become reluctant to use these 
terms at all. Down to the notion that "includes a root of trust" 
sometimes is already believed to be just a marketing term.

And that is a big problem with direct impact on security considerations 
and threat models.

At least Trust Anchor is well defined in RFC4949 and is also used in 
TEEP (although "TA" means something else there, but TEEP is dealing with 
that successfully) based on the definition in RFC4949.

Now that TEEP and RATS start to align in some capacity, I would strongly 
recommend to simply stick with the established IETF term Trust Anchor 
from RFC4949 and its corresponding use in I-D.ietf-teep-architecture.

Which leaves us with "the other confusing term" that Ned once called 
"the-entity-whose-misbehavior-cannot-be-detected".  The important point 
here is that the output of an Attester in the form of Claims that 
compose Evidence can only go so far while staying believable.  At some 
point you hit rock bottom and you cannot create believable evidence 
anymore, because there are no more turtles that go all the way down.  At 
that point an Attester cannot create believable evidence about its most 
fundamental system components and requires an external Endorsement that 
speaks on behalf of these system components.

And that is the point where Roots of Trust come into play. If you do not 
have them - that is absolutely compliant with RATS. But I'd also like to 
quote Kathleen here:

> Why would I want a device with no root of trust?  Plausible deniability perhaps? Lower cost?
> Why would I want to sell such a device?  I probably wouldn't and this could spur on higher level of assurance and remake of devices without this capability depending on the target market for a device.

And now - comes the the really tricky part: these Endorsements that come 
alongside with Roots of Trusts - those typically have Trust Anchors.

And I think that is one of the major sources of confusion (but maybe it 
is not, due to the fact that I am under the personal believe not to be 
confused here...).

On the one hand, it is okay to not have or use a Root of Trust in any 
way and not to bother with them at all in a solution I-D.

On the other hand, not using an endorsed root of trust always has a 
significant impact on the "level of assurance" (which is called "level 
of confidence" in the architecture at the moment, but that is not 
important now) and thereby on the confidence in the veracity of Claims 
in Evidence.

In summary, there are fundamental factors to take into account, if you 
want to decide whether to talk about the use a RoTs - or not, including:

* market impact,
* effective assurance of protection levels, and
* the inevitable fact that at some point an Attester hits a demarcation 
line beyond which it cannot attest to one of its system components 
anymore - and starts to depend on external endorsements about these 
system components.


Viele Grüße,

Henk

p.s. I really, really hope that I did not add to the confusion!

p.p.s. I'd also like to try to create an EAT flavor now that is an 
"Endorsement EAT" signed by a TA, I think.


On 11.09.19 02:28, Ira McDonald wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> FWIW, the various SAE vehicle security committees commonly use "Trust 
> Anchor"
> (rather than "RoT") to encompass the entire spectrum of RoTs, *as well 
> as* the
> X.509 CA style trust anchor.  There's an entire SAE vehicle security 
> committee
> titled SAE Trust Anchors and Authentication.  In addition, the SAE J3101 
> spec,
> soon to be published, is titled Requirements for Hardware-Protected Security
> for Ground Vehicle Applications and abstracts primitives and functions 
> from any
> of the automotive HSM-like components - it *always* uses the term "Hardware
> Trust Anchor" rather than "Hardware RoT".  It explicitly avoids the 
> anti-definition
> that misbehavior of a "Hardware Trust Anchor" cannot be detected.
> 
> Cheers,
> - Ira
> 
> 
> 
> Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
> Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
> Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
> Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
> Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
> Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
> IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
> Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
> http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
> http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
> mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com <mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
> PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 7:24 PM Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com 
> <mailto:ned.smith@intel.com>> wrote:
> 
>     The term "Trust Anchor" seems to connote a public key, public key
>     certificate or something related primarily to termination of a
>     certificate path validation. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5914.
> 
>     The root_of_trust term as used by
>     https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications
>     seems to refer to a computing environment that performs a
>     well-defined security related function. The environment doesn't
>     necessarily need to have a key associated with it - unless its
>     function requires a key or trust anchor. For example:
>              - Attestation requires signing of evidence, hence it
>     requires a key.
>              - Verification of signatures requires a Trust Anchor /
>     public key.
>              - A RATS Verifier produces Attestation Results, hence must
>     have a signing key in addition to Trust Anchor(s).
> 
>     The TCG uses the term "roots" of trust because there are several
>     separable functions included in a TPM. It can store measurements and
>     keys hence it is a "storage" RoT. It can sign evidence hence it is a
>     "reporting" RoT - aka attestation RoT. A TPM can also verify
>     signatures hence it is a Verification RoT.
> 
>     A RoT is more than just functions. A TPM is a library of security
>     functions that are intended to be implemented in a trustworthy
>     environment. However, there are software TPM libraries that can run
>     in a variety of environments - some of which wouldn't normally be
>     thought of as "trustworthy".
> 
>     Glossaries defining root of trust seem to consistently acknowledge
>     the distinguishing factor for root-of-trust as "misbehavior cannot
>     be detected". To protect root-of-trust functions from simple
>     attacks, implementers often harden them by implementing them in
>     immutable hardware. But the property of non-detectable misbehavior
>     existed before the hardening was applied.
> 
>     RATS Attestation architecture should promote minimizing the surface
>     area of Root-of-Trust functions IMO. Nevertheless, it seems there
>     will always be some function r() for which there is no function f'()
>     that can detect misbehavior. Nevertheless, there may be a function
>     f() where misbehavior can be detected by f'(), but not of r(). 
>     Hence, f'(f(r())) means f'() can detect misbehavior of f() but not
>     of r(). Therefore, r() is a root of trust.
> 
>     Maybe an attestation construction looks something like this:
>               f'''(f''(f'(f(r())))) where a prime (') denotes
>     attestation function(s) that can detect misbehavior of enclosed
>     functions. Since the inner-most functions f() contains r() and where
>     no f'() exists to detect its misbehavior, r() is a root-of-trust. In
>     theory, there could be many layers of functionality that are
>     attestable. For example, the TEEP architecture allows fan-out and
>     nesting of Trusted Agents in the same platform.
> 
>     That doesn't however mean r() must remain anonymous, r() can be
>     given a name and can be subject to manufacturing process controls.
>     Typically, something like the tuple (mfg, product ID, version, S/N)
>     can be used to manually track r(). But that is the best anyone can do.
> 
>     In the case of TPM, the root of trust for reporting a() includes a
>     key called the "endorsement key" that is only used for tracking
>     purposes. Nevertheless, the verifier must trust a() to implement the
>     endorsement key and tracking functionality correctly. Maybe it is
>     circular logic, but a() still fits the definition of a root-of-trust.
> 
>     Trusted boot is another use case for a root of trust. The idea of
>     trusted boot is there is a function b() that is trusted to load
>     another function b'(). Misbehavior on the part of b() could result
>     in loading a malicious function m() instead of b'(). Before b'()
>     loads, b() measures b'() into a storage root s(). A trusted boot
>     construction might look like this: b(b'(b''(b'''(...)))). Since
>     there is no function x() that loads b(). Therefore, b() is a
>     root-of-trust.
> 
>     Note: that if b() doesn't have some function f'() such that f'(b())
>     exists, then b() cannot be attested - but it is still a root-of-trust.
> 
>     The TCG anticipated b() but didn't standardize it. It also assumed
>     there was a trusted function that combined b() with a TPM storage
>     root of trust s(). TCG presumed f(b(), s()) would exist even if they
>     didn't standardize f() and b(). There was no attestation function
>     for f(b(), s()) either, other than using supply chain entity
>     endorsements (e.g. attribute certs) of platform constructions
>     containing f(b(), s()). TCG used attribute certificates to link the
>     TPM endorsement key in a() to other platform components such as b().
>     E.g.:
>              TCG Trusted Platform =  f(b(b'(b''(...))), TPM(s(), a()));
>     if the TPM implements the attestation function f'() for
>     b'(b''(b'''(...))).
>              Then the construction: R = f(b(), TPM(s(), a())) are the
>     roots-of-trust upon which the attestation function in the TPM depends.
>              E.g. f'() =  a(s(b'(b''(b'''(...))))) --> R; where "-->"
>     denotes root-of-trust dependency.
> 
>     Another form of root-of-trust is a Verifier. I began this thread
>     talking about trust anchor terminology. A Verifier function v()
>     contains a trust anchor TA that v() uses to terminate cert path
>     validation. Possibly, v() relies on a TA provisioning function p(),
>     such as RFC5934 that helps v() determine which TA to use. In this
>     case, v() contains p() e.g. v(p()); but it may be the case that
>     there is no attestation function for p() such that f'(p()) does not
>     exist. It may also be the case that no f'(v()) exists either. Hence,
>     both v() and p() are roots of trust.
> 
>     However, if f'(p()) did exist, and no f'(v()) existed, then v() is
>     still a root-of-trust, but the trusted surface area in v() is
>     minimized by f'(p()).
> 
>     Those familiar with TPM, trusted boot and the ecosystem around it,
>     may use the term 'roots of trust' as a way to talk about the above
>     complexity without going into the details as I have done here.
> 
>     RATS scope is essentially definition of f'() but it should
>     acknowledge roots of trust functions even if we refer to them by
>     some other name.
> 
>     -Ned
> 
>     ﻿On 9/8/19, 6:22 AM, "RATS on behalf of Michael Richardson"
>     <rats-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of
>     mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca <mailto:mcr%2Bietf@sandelman.ca>> wrote:
> 
> 
>          We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of
>     Trust.
>          I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in
>     the plural
>          "Roots" form.
>          As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:
> 
>             The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root
>     of Trust “A
>             component that performs one or more security-specific
>     functions, such as
>             measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or
>     update. It is trusted
>             always to behave in the expected manner, because its
>     misbehavior cannot be
>             detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. “
> 
>          {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as
>     other than an
>          alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.  It's
>     hard to make
>          my neurons pull up a different meaning.  This is probably
>     something that
>          every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the
>     term, in order to
>          ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}
> 
>          I have included not just Ned Smith's comments about the term
>     Roots of Trust,
>          but his survey of the various origins of the term.  I'm sure
>     that this
>          belongs somewhere else.
> 
>          That diff is here:
>     https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&url2=https://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-usecases.txt
> 
>          and commit is:
>     https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12
> 
> 
>          --
>          Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca
>     <mailto:mcr%2BIETF@sandelman..ca>>, Sandelman Software Works
>           -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>     _______________________________________________
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>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> 
> 
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From: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>
To: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
CC: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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From: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Thank you Ned for rephrasing my hastily added afterthought. That is 
exactly what I meant.

On 11.09.19 18:41, Smith, Ned wrote:
> Henk commented:
> "    p.p.s. I'd also like to try to create an EAT flavor now that is an
>      "Endorsement EAT" signed by a TA, I think."
> 
> I assume Henk meant to say that the "Endorsement EAT" is a claim set that is signed by a supply-chain-entity and is trusted by a Verifier because the Verifier maintains the supply-chain-entity's Trust Anchor (TA).
> 
> -Ned
> 
> ﻿On 9/11/19, 2:31 AM, "RATS on behalf of Henk Birkholz" <rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de> wrote:
> 
>      Hi Ira & Ned,
>      hi all,
>      
>      TL;DR
>      While I understand the point of the SAE, there a number of good reasons
>      not to mimic their decision here, I think.
>      
>      
>      while I see, acknowledge, and understand (to some extent) the confusion
>      about TA & ROT, reiterating and adding to the confusion is a prominent
>      reason why people are actually starting to become reluctant to use these
>      terms at all. Down to the notion that "includes a root of trust"
>      sometimes is already believed to be just a marketing term.
>      
>      And that is a big problem with direct impact on security considerations
>      and threat models.
>      
>      At least Trust Anchor is well defined in RFC4949 and is also used in
>      TEEP (although "TA" means something else there, but TEEP is dealing with
>      that successfully) based on the definition in RFC4949.
>      
>      Now that TEEP and RATS start to align in some capacity, I would strongly
>      recommend to simply stick with the established IETF term Trust Anchor
>      from RFC4949 and its corresponding use in I-D.ietf-teep-architecture.
>      
>      Which leaves us with "the other confusing term" that Ned once called
>      "the-entity-whose-misbehavior-cannot-be-detected".  The important point
>      here is that the output of an Attester in the form of Claims that
>      compose Evidence can only go so far while staying believable.  At some
>      point you hit rock bottom and you cannot create believable evidence
>      anymore, because there are no more turtles that go all the way down.  At
>      that point an Attester cannot create believable evidence about its most
>      fundamental system components and requires an external Endorsement that
>      speaks on behalf of these system components.
>      
>      And that is the point where Roots of Trust come into play. If you do not
>      have them - that is absolutely compliant with RATS. But I'd also like to
>      quote Kathleen here:
>      
>      > Why would I want a device with no root of trust?  Plausible deniability perhaps? Lower cost?
>      > Why would I want to sell such a device?  I probably wouldn't and this could spur on higher level of assurance and remake of devices without this capability depending on the target market for a device.
>      
>      And now - comes the the really tricky part: these Endorsements that come
>      alongside with Roots of Trusts - those typically have Trust Anchors.
>      
>      And I think that is one of the major sources of confusion (but maybe it
>      is not, due to the fact that I am under the personal believe not to be
>      confused here...).
>      
>      On the one hand, it is okay to not have or use a Root of Trust in any
>      way and not to bother with them at all in a solution I-D.
>      
>      On the other hand, not using an endorsed root of trust always has a
>      significant impact on the "level of assurance" (which is called "level
>      of confidence" in the architecture at the moment, but that is not
>      important now) and thereby on the confidence in the veracity of Claims
>      in Evidence.
>      
>      In summary, there are fundamental factors to take into account, if you
>      want to decide whether to talk about the use a RoTs - or not, including:
>      
>      * market impact,
>      * effective assurance of protection levels, and
>      * the inevitable fact that at some point an Attester hits a demarcation
>      line beyond which it cannot attest to one of its system components
>      anymore - and starts to depend on external endorsements about these
>      system components.
>      
>      
>      Viele Grüße,
>      
>      Henk
>      
>      p.s. I really, really hope that I did not add to the confusion!
>      
>      p.p.s. I'd also like to try to create an EAT flavor now that is an
>      "Endorsement EAT" signed by a TA, I think.
>      
>      
>      On 11.09.19 02:28, Ira McDonald wrote:
>      > Hi,
>      >
>      > FWIW, the various SAE vehicle security committees commonly use "Trust
>      > Anchor"
>      > (rather than "RoT") to encompass the entire spectrum of RoTs, *as well
>      > as* the
>      > X.509 CA style trust anchor.  There's an entire SAE vehicle security
>      > committee
>      > titled SAE Trust Anchors and Authentication.  In addition, the SAE J3101
>      > spec,
>      > soon to be published, is titled Requirements for Hardware-Protected Security
>      > for Ground Vehicle Applications and abstracts primitives and functions
>      > from any
>      > of the automotive HSM-like components - it *always* uses the term "Hardware
>      > Trust Anchor" rather than "Hardware RoT".  It explicitly avoids the
>      > anti-definition
>      > that misbehavior of a "Hardware Trust Anchor" cannot be detected.
>      >
>      > Cheers,
>      > - Ira
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      > Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
>      > Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
>      > Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
>      > Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
>      > Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
>      > Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
>      > IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
>      > Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
>      > http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
>      > http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
>      > mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com <mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
>      > PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      > On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 7:24 PM Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com
>      > <mailto:ned.smith@intel.com>> wrote:
>      >
>      >     The term "Trust Anchor" seems to connote a public key, public key
>      >     certificate or something related primarily to termination of a
>      >     certificate path validation. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5914.
>      >
>      >     The root_of_trust term as used by
>      >     https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hardware-Roots-of-Trust/publications
>      >     seems to refer to a computing environment that performs a
>      >     well-defined security related function. The environment doesn't
>      >     necessarily need to have a key associated with it - unless its
>      >     function requires a key or trust anchor. For example:
>      >              - Attestation requires signing of evidence, hence it
>      >     requires a key.
>      >              - Verification of signatures requires a Trust Anchor /
>      >     public key.
>      >              - A RATS Verifier produces Attestation Results, hence must
>      >     have a signing key in addition to Trust Anchor(s).
>      >
>      >     The TCG uses the term "roots" of trust because there are several
>      >     separable functions included in a TPM. It can store measurements and
>      >     keys hence it is a "storage" RoT. It can sign evidence hence it is a
>      >     "reporting" RoT - aka attestation RoT. A TPM can also verify
>      >     signatures hence it is a Verification RoT.
>      >
>      >     A RoT is more than just functions. A TPM is a library of security
>      >     functions that are intended to be implemented in a trustworthy
>      >     environment. However, there are software TPM libraries that can run
>      >     in a variety of environments - some of which wouldn't normally be
>      >     thought of as "trustworthy".
>      >
>      >     Glossaries defining root of trust seem to consistently acknowledge
>      >     the distinguishing factor for root-of-trust as "misbehavior cannot
>      >     be detected". To protect root-of-trust functions from simple
>      >     attacks, implementers often harden them by implementing them in
>      >     immutable hardware. But the property of non-detectable misbehavior
>      >     existed before the hardening was applied.
>      >
>      >     RATS Attestation architecture should promote minimizing the surface
>      >     area of Root-of-Trust functions IMO. Nevertheless, it seems there
>      >     will always be some function r() for which there is no function f'()
>      >     that can detect misbehavior. Nevertheless, there may be a function
>      >     f() where misbehavior can be detected by f'(), but not of r().
>      >     Hence, f'(f(r())) means f'() can detect misbehavior of f() but not
>      >     of r(). Therefore, r() is a root of trust.
>      >
>      >     Maybe an attestation construction looks something like this:
>      >               f'''(f''(f'(f(r())))) where a prime (') denotes
>      >     attestation function(s) that can detect misbehavior of enclosed
>      >     functions. Since the inner-most functions f() contains r() and where
>      >     no f'() exists to detect its misbehavior, r() is a root-of-trust. In
>      >     theory, there could be many layers of functionality that are
>      >     attestable. For example, the TEEP architecture allows fan-out and
>      >     nesting of Trusted Agents in the same platform.
>      >
>      >     That doesn't however mean r() must remain anonymous, r() can be
>      >     given a name and can be subject to manufacturing process controls.
>      >     Typically, something like the tuple (mfg, product ID, version, S/N)
>      >     can be used to manually track r(). But that is the best anyone can do.
>      >
>      >     In the case of TPM, the root of trust for reporting a() includes a
>      >     key called the "endorsement key" that is only used for tracking
>      >     purposes. Nevertheless, the verifier must trust a() to implement the
>      >     endorsement key and tracking functionality correctly. Maybe it is
>      >     circular logic, but a() still fits the definition of a root-of-trust.
>      >
>      >     Trusted boot is another use case for a root of trust. The idea of
>      >     trusted boot is there is a function b() that is trusted to load
>      >     another function b'(). Misbehavior on the part of b() could result
>      >     in loading a malicious function m() instead of b'(). Before b'()
>      >     loads, b() measures b'() into a storage root s(). A trusted boot
>      >     construction might look like this: b(b'(b''(b'''(...)))). Since
>      >     there is no function x() that loads b(). Therefore, b() is a
>      >     root-of-trust.
>      >
>      >     Note: that if b() doesn't have some function f'() such that f'(b())
>      >     exists, then b() cannot be attested - but it is still a root-of-trust.
>      >
>      >     The TCG anticipated b() but didn't standardize it. It also assumed
>      >     there was a trusted function that combined b() with a TPM storage
>      >     root of trust s(). TCG presumed f(b(), s()) would exist even if they
>      >     didn't standardize f() and b(). There was no attestation function
>      >     for f(b(), s()) either, other than using supply chain entity
>      >     endorsements (e.g. attribute certs) of platform constructions
>      >     containing f(b(), s()). TCG used attribute certificates to link the
>      >     TPM endorsement key in a() to other platform components such as b().
>      >     E.g.:
>      >              TCG Trusted Platform =  f(b(b'(b''(...))), TPM(s(), a()));
>      >     if the TPM implements the attestation function f'() for
>      >     b'(b''(b'''(...))).
>      >              Then the construction: R = f(b(), TPM(s(), a())) are the
>      >     roots-of-trust upon which the attestation function in the TPM depends.
>      >              E.g. f'() =  a(s(b'(b''(b'''(...))))) --> R; where "-->"
>      >     denotes root-of-trust dependency.
>      >
>      >     Another form of root-of-trust is a Verifier. I began this thread
>      >     talking about trust anchor terminology. A Verifier function v()
>      >     contains a trust anchor TA that v() uses to terminate cert path
>      >     validation. Possibly, v() relies on a TA provisioning function p(),
>      >     such as RFC5934 that helps v() determine which TA to use. In this
>      >     case, v() contains p() e.g. v(p()); but it may be the case that
>      >     there is no attestation function for p() such that f'(p()) does not
>      >     exist. It may also be the case that no f'(v()) exists either. Hence,
>      >     both v() and p() are roots of trust.
>      >
>      >     However, if f'(p()) did exist, and no f'(v()) existed, then v() is
>      >     still a root-of-trust, but the trusted surface area in v() is
>      >     minimized by f'(p()).
>      >
>      >     Those familiar with TPM, trusted boot and the ecosystem around it,
>      >     may use the term 'roots of trust' as a way to talk about the above
>      >     complexity without going into the details as I have done here.
>      >
>      >     RATS scope is essentially definition of f'() but it should
>      >     acknowledge roots of trust functions even if we refer to them by
>      >     some other name.
>      >
>      >     -Ned
>      >
>      >     On 9/8/19, 6:22 AM, "RATS on behalf of Michael Richardson"
>      >     <rats-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of
>      >     mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca <mailto:mcr%2Bietf@sandelman.ca>> wrote:
>      >
>      >
>      >          We seem to have regular email disputes on terms like Roots of
>      >     Trust.
>      >          I continue to have difficulty with the term. Particularly in
>      >     the plural
>      >          "Roots" form.
>      >          As I process edits to the use case document, I got a bunch of text:
>      >
>      >             The TCG Glossary also offers a general definition for Root
>      >     of Trust “A
>      >             component that performs one or more security-specific
>      >     functions, such as
>      >             measurement, storage, reporting, verification, and/or
>      >     update. It is trusted
>      >             always to behave in the expected manner, because its
>      >     misbehavior cannot be
>      >             detected (such as by measurement) under normal operation. “
>      >
>      >          {I personally find it very difficult to understand the words as
>      >     other than an
>      >          alias for Trust Anchor, yet it clearly is something else.  It's
>      >     hard to make
>      >          my neurons pull up a different meaning.  This is probably
>      >     something that
>      >          every RATS document should say clearly upon first using the
>      >     term, in order to
>      >          ease the impedence mis-match with IETF readers as we get reviews}
>      >
>      >          I have included not just Ned Smith's comments about the term
>      >     Roots of Trust,
>      >          but his survey of the various origins of the term.  I'm sure
>      >     that this
>      >          belongs somewhere else.
>      >
>      >          That diff is here:
>      >     https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-richardson-rats-usecases-04&url2=https://ietf-rats-wg.github.io/ietf-rats-usecases/draft-richardson-rats-usecases.txt
>      >
>      >          and commit is:
>      >     https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/ietf-rats-usecases/commit/7386e8c0df11ece66e3c95f85d141a639d440e12
>      >
>      >
>      >          --
>      >          Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca
>      >     <mailto:mcr%2BIETF@sandelman..ca>>, Sandelman Software Works
>      >           -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      >     _______________________________________________
>      >     RATS mailing list
>      >     RATS@ietf.org <mailto:RATS@ietf.org>
>      >     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>      >
>      >
>      > _______________________________________________
>      > RATS mailing list
>      > RATS@ietf.org
>      > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>      >
>      
>      _______________________________________________
>      RATS mailing list
>      RATS@ietf.org
>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>      
> 


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A new version of I-D, draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-02.txt
has been successfully submitted by Henk Birkholz and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-birkholz-rats-architecture
Revision:	02
Title:		Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture
Document date:	2019-09-12
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		14
URL: 
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-02.txt
Status: 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/
Htmlized: 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-02
Htmlized: 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture
Diff: 
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-02

Abstract:
    The Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture facilitates
    interoperability of attestation mechanisms by defining a set of
    participant roles and interactions that reveal information about the
    trustworthiness attributes of an attester's computing environment.
    By making trustworthiness attributes explicit, they can be evaluated
    dynamically and within an operational context where risk mitigation
    depends on having a more complete understanding of the possible
    vulnerabilities germane to the attester's environment.

 


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Comments: In-reply-to Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com> message dated "Mon, 09 Sep 2019 19:40:00 -0400."
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Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com> wrote:
    > If the term RoT continues to cause heartburn in RATS, then we might
    > just use the generic "Trust Anchor" which is widely used to encompass
    > both hardware and software RoTs in a number of SDOs.

No, that's exactly what I don't want to do!

A trust anchor is a thing you have in your system (such as your browser),
that let's you validate other certificates.  While in abstract concept it
shares many properties with a RoT, it's a very different thing to people
who don't live and breath attestation.

A reason I don't like the term RoT (not the definition, btw), is because in
some languages the order of the words doesn't matter.  So a Trusted Root
(Certificate), might be easily confused with a Root of Trust!
{It's taken me six months to get this into my head right, and at the Linux
Plumber's Conference, I watched several others fail to deal with the issue}

As I understand it, the RoT is the component which is forced measure itself,
because there exists no other component.  The trust is "Immaculate".
If I could replace RoT with another term, I'd use "Birth of Trust" or
"Immaculate Trust" or something like that.

I'M NOT PROPOSING TO CHANGE THE TERM.
I'm just airing dirty laundry, to explain that we need to be clearer about
this somewhere.


The only reason the use case document cares, is because I think it is
important for the use cases to be clear if they require the Third Party
Attestation of the RoT Claim in order to operate.

Some use cases do not, as their dependancy is upon a higher level
attestation, or the device has been attested to use Secure Boot=20
rather than Trusted Boot.

=2D-=20
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-




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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 18:47:59 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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+1, though maybe say 'Used to verify a signature, possibly on a
certificate'. This is consistent with the 5914 (or 6024) definition: "A
trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented by a public key and
associated data.  The public key is used to verify digital signatures, and
the associated data is used to constrain the types of information or
actions for which the trust anchor is authoritative."

On 9/12/19, 6:31 PM, "RATS on behalf of Salz, Rich" <rats-bounces@ietf.org
on behalf of rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and "trust
>root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>	- Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>	- Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>	- Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of
>band" of the application itself
> 
>
>_______________________________________________
>RATS mailing list
>RATS@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats



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From: "Shwetha Bhandari (shwethab)" <shwethab@cisco.com>
To: Puru Kulkarni <puruk=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [Rats] Comments on YANG Module for Basic Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation Procedures
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Comments on YANG Module for Basic Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation Procedures
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
CC: "Thomas C. Schmidt" <t.schmidt@haw-hamburg.de>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Tutorial and Hackathon
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--_000_VI1PR08MB5360684C13DF845CECB3EBCCFAB30VI1PR08MB5360eurp_
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I posted this email to the TEEP and SUIT lists and I received a suggestion =
to also include RATS in the hackathon/tutorial effort.
After thinking for a little while I believe that's actually not such a bad =
idea given that the low level code on a microcontroller will contain the at=
testation functionality. To combine SUIT and RATS on a v8-M TrustZone devic=
e, for example, would allow us to prototype a complete solution (and luckil=
y there is also some code we can make use of).

So, if someone of you is interested in this hackathon/tutorial effort descr=
ibed below (date early next year) please drop me an email.

Ciao
Hannes

From: TEEP <teep-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
Sent: Dienstag, 13. August 2019 10:24
To: teep@ietf.org; suit@ietf.org
Cc: Thomas C. Schmidt <t.schmidt@haw-hamburg.de>
Subject: [Teep] Tutorial and Hackathon

Hi all,

at the Montreal meeting we briefly talked about the idea of organizing a tu=
torial followed by a hackathon for SUIT and TEEP.
A few discussions later we came up with the following story.

Thomas Schmidt (HAW Hamburg) offered to host the event in Berlin. As a date=
 around Jan/Feb 2020 looks more realistic to prepare all the necessary mate=
rial. The idea was to create a virtual machine with the development environ=
ment pre-installed and to make it available to the interested participants =
well in advance so that we don't have to waste time with tool/IDE problems.=
 This virtual machine image would primarily be used for embedded developmen=
t. For the TEEP story a separate setup will be needed to support TrustZone/=
SGX-based devices (since the development environments are different). The v=
irtual machine setup for embedded development would be tailored to a specif=
ic embedded hardware and we haven't decided yet what hardware to use. The S=
UIT hackathon demo boards used in earlier IETF Hackathons may be an reasona=
ble choice. Thoughts are nevertheless welcome. At the tutorial we would get=
 participants up to speed on the most recent protocol/manifest format and t=
he already written tools (e.g., the Python tool to create a manifest) so th=
at time at the hackathon is spent as productive as possible.

We thought it makes sense to cover both SUIT and TEEP in a single event bec=
ause both groups plan to the manifest format and some of the use cases over=
lap.

Russ suggested to conclude the event with a virtual interim meeting (maybe =
an hour long) to discuss the lessons learned.

As you can see, the event is focused on hands-on work and hence we will not=
 offer remote participation possibilities. If you are not interested in wri=
ting code this event is likely not very useful for you.

We need your feedback:


  *   Would you like to participate in such an event?
  *   In case you know already, what topic would you like to explore at the=
 event?
  *   Is the Jan/Feb 2020 timeframe good for you?
  *   Is your interest in TEEP, SUIT, or both?
  *   Do you have additional suggestions for getting most out of this event=
?

Ciao
Hannes

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I posted this email to the TEEP and SUIT lists and I=
 received a suggestion to also include RATS in the hackathon/tutorial effor=
t.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">After thinking for a little while I believe that&#82=
17;s actually not such a bad idea given that the low level code on a microc=
ontroller will contain the attestation functionality. To combine SUIT and R=
ATS on a v8-M TrustZone device, for example,
 would allow us to prototype a complete solution (and luckily there is also=
 some code we can make use of).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So, if someone of you is interested in this hackatho=
n/tutorial effort described below (date early next year) please drop me an =
email.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span lang=3D"EN-US">From:</span></b><span lang=
=3D"EN-US"> TEEP &lt;teep-bounces@ietf.org&gt;
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Hannes Tschofenig<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Dienstag, 13. August 2019 10:24<br>
<b>To:</b> teep@ietf.org; suit@ietf.org<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Thomas C. Schmidt &lt;t.schmidt@haw-hamburg.de&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [Teep] Tutorial and Hackathon<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi all, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">at the Montreal meeting we briefly talked about the =
idea of organizing a tutorial followed by a hackathon for SUIT and TEEP.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">A few discussions later we came up with the followin=
g story.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thomas Schmidt (<span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Verdana&quot;,sans-serif;color:black;background:white">HAW Ham=
burg) offered to host the event in Berlin. As a date around Jan/</span>Feb =
2020 looks more realistic to prepare all the necessary
 material. The idea was to create a virtual machine with the development en=
vironment pre-installed and to make it available to the interested particip=
ants well in advance so that we don&#8217;t have to waste time with tool/ID=
E problems. This virtual machine image
 would primarily be used for embedded development. For the TEEP story a sep=
arate setup will be needed to support TrustZone/SGX-based devices (since th=
e development environments are different). The virtual machine setup for em=
bedded development would be tailored
 to a specific embedded hardware and we haven&#8217;t decided yet what hard=
ware to use. The SUIT hackathon demo boards used in earlier IETF Hackathons=
 may be an reasonable choice. Thoughts are nevertheless welcome. At the tut=
orial we would get participants up to
 speed on the most recent protocol/manifest format and the already written =
tools (e.g., the Python tool to create a manifest) so that time at the hack=
athon is spent as productive as possible.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We thought it makes sense to cover both SUIT and TEE=
P in a single event because both groups plan to the manifest format and som=
e of the use cases overlap.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Russ suggested to conclude the event with a virtual =
interim meeting (maybe an hour long) to discuss the lessons learned.<o:p></=
o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As you can see, the event is focused on hands-on wor=
k and hence we will not offer remote participation possibilities. If you ar=
e not interested in writing code this event is likely not very useful for y=
ou.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We need your feedback: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0cm" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo3">Would you like to participate in such an event?
<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0cm;mso=
-list:l0 level1 lfo3">In case you know already, what topic would you like t=
o explore at the event?<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=
=3D"margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3">Is the Jan/Feb 2020 timeframe =
good for you?<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin=
-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3">Is your interest in TEEP, SUIT, or both?=
<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0cm;mso=
-list:l0 level1 lfo3">Do you have additional suggestions for getting most o=
ut of this event?
<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any=
 attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not th=
e intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not discl=
ose the contents to any other person,
 use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Th=
ank you.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</body>
</html>

--_000_VI1PR08MB5360684C13DF845CECB3EBCCFAB30VI1PR08MB5360eurp_--


From nobody Fri Sep 13 12:52:19 2019
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From: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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I don't know what a trust root is, but a trust anchor does not reside on 
the Attester (with respect to the evidence that is created) while a root 
of trust does. That is kind of one of the primitives why they are 
differentiated. Specific comments in-line:

On 13.09.19 00:31, Salz, Rich wrote:
> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and "trust root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
> 	- Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful

Well, if the entities certificates and the entities openssl software 
components are the same thing (because they both are pieces of data), 
then I think I would agree here. If it is relevant to the workflow that 
one is an executable that resides somewhere and one is a document that 
can be presented, I am more inclined to differentiate the entities TA 
from the entity ROT, too. I am aware that the analogy is a bit clunky 
and someone can surely can come up with a better one.

> 	- Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature

Some roots of trusts do that, other roots of trust don't do that (e.g. 
doing the opposite: an RTR for creating the signatures, digests, or 
evidence). So that cannot be a common denominator either, I think.

> 	- Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of band" of the application itself

That in fact is indisputable and probably the reason why both trust 
anchor and root of trust include the term "trust" :)


In essence, I simply think it is just not that simple - to say "they are 
the same" and then only focus on similarities to bolster that argument.

Viele Grüße,

Henk


>   
> 
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> 


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Subject: Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
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This new architecture doc is starting to work pretty well for me. There =
are still things to work on, but I support adoption of it.

I particularly like the definition of Attester, Verifier, Relying Party, =
Claim and Evidence.

I=E2=80=99m fine with moving the architecture parts in EAT to this =
document.

LL


> On Sep 10, 2019, at 6:12 AM, Henk Birkholz =
<henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de> wrote:
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
> we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and =
represents the state of the current discussion and the material =
presented at the last IETF meeting.
>=20
> The current Editor's version can be found here:
>=20
>> =
https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-birkhol=
z-rats-architecture.html
>=20
> We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.
>=20
> TL;DR
> Below you can find a list of essential changes & a list of action =
items still to be addressed.
>=20
>=20
> This version of the RATS Architecture document:
>=20
> * does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust =
Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role =
_is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely =
on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this =
document),
>=20
> * does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as =
"Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),
>=20
> * provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS =
Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:
>=20
>> =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-r=
ats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-informat=
ion-module-00.pdf
>=20
> * introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the =
trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection =
characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other =
entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined =
levels of confidence metrics,
>=20
> * is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of =
"trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,
>=20
> * simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to =
have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri =
and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why =
they may need to be modified,
>=20
> * differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the =
Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an =
Attester,
>=20
> * uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence, =
Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept =
is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?). =
(Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information =
model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a =
key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and =
not mandated by an information model), and
>=20
> * analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of =
Attestation Assertions.
>=20
>=20
> For future versions the authors intent:
>=20
> * to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary =
diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS =
Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified =
mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),
>=20
> * to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas. =
(the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that =
direction),
>=20
> * still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words =
for them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define =
a base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they =
actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon =
and Thomas,
>=20
> * to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation, =
addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the =
(un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain =
points of time, or, another example given, addressing the =
differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an =
Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,
>=20
> * to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed =
by Ian,
>=20
> * to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into =
the RATS Architecture draft, and
>=20
> * to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in =
order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of =
key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this =
will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).
>=20
>=20
> Viele Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe,
>=20
> Henk
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats


From nobody Sun Sep 15 13:50:20 2019
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and "trust =
root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
> 	- Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
> 	- Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
> 	- Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out =
of band" of the application itself

This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is =
generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust =
involves a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot and =
measure a device. There is usually a boundary around it so that other =
software on the device, like the high-level OS, can=E2=80=99t corrupt =
it. When it is doing reporting as in RATS it will have a private key =
that can do some signing. When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will =
also have a public key to verify the software it loads.

LL



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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Jeremy O'Donoghue <jodonogh@qti.qualcomm.com>, Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
CC: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 08:26:04 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
CC: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <D9A4F66D.EB1C1%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
References: <4155.1567948986@dooku.sandelman.ca> <64BD12AA-951A-468A-9F08-D442054605AD@island-resort.com> <de6ff852-062d-805d-3eed-10aca60502b2@sit.fraunhofer.de> <CAN40gStH5jUCJeVggREr3ABoFw7K97F=KtoJOSR_X+LWNLB+JA@mail.gmail.com> <CAN40gSu13DKkyahHA3_Cbt5j7Gsh=uGh5ic7fS3AvDGP3K1cug@mail.gmail.com> <5276.1568315351@dooku.sandelman.ca> <92137679-7DEA-42AD-B8D1-F3B909C77459@akamai.com> <BAA4C3C3-C98B-4BA7-8C89-A169DD99EF86@island-resort.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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I took Rich's statement to be more from a relying party perspective and
your detail to be more what one might find in a policy describing nature
of the root of trust, which is not that different from how one may
describe a trust anchor/CA in a PKIX context in a policy that describes
how a CA are operated, etc. Two sides of the same coin.

On 9/15/19, 4:50 PM, "RATS on behalf of Laurence Lundblade"
<rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:

>On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and "trust
>>root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>> 	- Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>> 	- Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>> 	- Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of
>>band" of the application itself
>
>This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is
>generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust involves
>a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot and measure a
>device. There is usually a boundary around it so that other software on
>the device, like the high-level OS, can=E2=80=99t corrupt it. When it is doing
>reporting as in RATS it will have a private key that can do some signing.
>When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public key to
>verify the software it loads.
>
>LL
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>RATS mailing list
>RATS@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats



From nobody Mon Sep 16 08:30:59 2019
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Subject: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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I=E2=80=99ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor =
divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn=E2=80=99t =
inconsistency between the two, particularly in how the claims registry =
is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even =
days, of this WG. There=E2=80=99s been some really long email threads =
about it.

Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and =
JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We =
have enough to do, so I=E2=80=99m inclined to live with it.

LL=


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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 11:44:45 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHbuEH4fisaDTKOzEY2ZEfxiVyfZ4wYibdRzQUYxq4i8a8G_WQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 11:30 AM Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
wrote:

> I=E2=80=99ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor diverge=
nces from
> CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn=E2=80=99t inconsistency between the=
 two,
> particularly in how the claims registry is handled. That inconsistency ha=
s
> already consumed many hours, even days, of this WG. There=E2=80=99s been =
some
> really long email threads about it.
>
> Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and JWT
> would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We have
> enough to do, so I=E2=80=99m inclined to live with it.
>

The COSE WG is the one the decided to diverge from lessons learned.  That
WG is open again, so if you'd like to pose this problem somewhere, that
would be the place to do it.  I'm guessing people thought one or the other
would be used, but not both resulting in this issue of inconsistency we are
seeing.

Best regards,
Kathleen


>
> LL
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>


--=20

Best regards,
Kathleen

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 11:30 AM Laur=
ence Lundblade &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lgl@island-resort.com">lgl@island-reso=
rt.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex">I=E2=80=99ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor div=
ergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn=E2=80=99t inconsistency=
 between the two, particularly in how the claims registry is handled. That =
inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even days, of this WG. There=
=E2=80=99s been some really long email threads about it.<br>
<br>
Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and JWT w=
ould have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We have enough=
 to do, so I=E2=80=99m inclined to live with it.<br></blockquote><div><br><=
/div><div>The COSE WG is the one the decided to diverge from lessons learne=
d.=C2=A0 That WG is open again, so if you&#39;d like to pose this problem s=
omewhere, that would be the place to do it.=C2=A0 I&#39;m guessing people t=
hought one or the other would be used, but not both resulting in this issue=
 of inconsistency we are seeing.</div><div><br></div><div>Best regards,</di=
v><div>Kathleen</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddi=
ng-left:1ex">
<br>
LL<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
RATS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">RATS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div>Best regards,</div><di=
v>Kathleen</div></div></div></div>

--000000000000cec4750592ad7d73--


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From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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On 2019-09-16 17:30, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
> I’ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn’t inconsistency between the two, particularly in how the claims registry is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even days, of this WG. There’s been some really long email threads about it.
> 
> Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We have enough to do, so I’m inclined to live with it.

Since everything crypto-wise in the JOSE stack anyway is covered in Base64Url, I don't see why one would bother with JWTs (or JSON at all for that matter) in EAT.

Anders

> 
> LL
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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Hi Kathleen

> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:44 AM, Kathleen Moriarty =
<kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 11:30 AM Laurence Lundblade =
<lgl@island-resort.com <mailto:lgl@island-resort.com>> wrote:
> I=E2=80=99ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor =
divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn=E2=80=99t =
inconsistency between the two, particularly in how the claims registry =
is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even =
days, of this WG. There=E2=80=99s been some really long email threads =
about it.
>=20
> Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and =
JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We =
have enough to do, so I=E2=80=99m inclined to live with it.
>=20
> The COSE WG is the one the decided to diverge from lessons learned.=20

The divergence I=E2=80=99m referring to is for the claims registry. That =
is definitely a CWT / JWT thing. COSE doesn=E2=80=99t have claims.

> That WG is open again, so if you'd like to pose this problem =
somewhere, that would be the place to do it.  I'm guessing people =
thought one or the other would be used, but not both resulting in this =
issue of inconsistency we are seeing.

My personal chosen path is NOT to raise the issue and live with the =
issue. Particularly:
 - The way to do vendor specific non-registered claims is different =
between CWT and JWT
 - All EAT claims are Specification Required. No EAT claims and be just =
Expert Review.

LL



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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi =
Kathleen<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:44 AM, Kathleen =
Moriarty &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 11:30 AM Laurence Lundblade =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lgl@island-resort.com" =
class=3D"">lgl@island-resort.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I=E2=80=99ve been trying to take the =
position to avoid even minor divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish =
there wasn=E2=80=99t inconsistency between the two, particularly in how =
the claims registry is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed =
many hours, even days, of this WG. There=E2=80=99s been some really long =
email threads about it.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and =
JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We =
have enough to do, so I=E2=80=99m inclined to live with it.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">The COSE WG is the one the decided to diverge from lessons =
learned.&nbsp; </div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>The divergence I=E2=80=99m referring to is for the =
claims registry. That is definitely a CWT / JWT thing. COSE doesn=E2=80=99=
t have claims.</div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"">That WG is open again, so if you'd =
like to pose this problem somewhere, that would be the place to do =
it.&nbsp; I'm guessing people thought one or the other would be used, =
but not both resulting in this issue of inconsistency we are =
seeing.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>My personal chosen path is NOT to raise the issue =
and live with the issue. Particularly:</div><div>&nbsp;- The way to do =
vendor specific non-registered claims is different between CWT and =
JWT</div><div>&nbsp;- All EAT claims are Specification Required. No EAT =
claims and be just Expert Review.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>LL</div><div><br class=3D""></div></div><br =
class=3D""></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_E034185F-35FE-49EA-A9B4-8957F9B0F02F--


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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:46 AM, Anders Rundgren =
<anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> On 2019-09-16 17:30, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>> I=E2=80=99ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor =
divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn=E2=80=99t =
inconsistency between the two, particularly in how the claims registry =
is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even =
days, of this WG. There=E2=80=99s been some really long email threads =
about it.
>> Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and =
JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We =
have enough to do, so I=E2=80=99m inclined to live with it.
>=20
> Since everything crypto-wise in the JOSE stack anyway is covered in =
Base64Url, I don't see why one would bother with JWTs (or JSON at all =
for that matter) in EAT.

Pretty sure lots of people want to be able to express claims in JSON. It =
is far more prevalent (so I understand) on the server side than CBOR. I =
think there is consensus in this WG that we will support JSON and CBOR =
(and thus COSE and JOSE) for claims.

LL


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To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
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From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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On 2019-09-16 18:29, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:46 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 2019-09-16 17:30, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>>> I’ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn’t inconsistency between the two, particularly in how the claims registry is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even days, of this WG. There’s been some really long email threads about it.
>>> Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We have enough to do, so I’m inclined to live with it.
>>
>> Since everything crypto-wise in the JOSE stack anyway is covered in Base64Url, I don't see why one would bother with JWTs (or JSON at all for that matter) in EAT.
> 
> Pretty sure lots of people want to be able to express claims in JSON. It is far more prevalent (so I understand) on the server side than CBOR.

Yes, but EAT is (IMO) not comparable to "normal" applications.

> I think there is consensus in this WG that we will support JSON and CBOR (and thus COSE and JOSE) for claims.

Right and it will effectively force server-side software vendors creating TWO versions of everything.
That's the hallmark of design by committee :-)

Anders

> 
> LL
> 


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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
    > I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and "trust
    > root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:

    > - Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
    > - Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
    > - Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of
    > band" of the application itself

That's because the term "root of trust" as used by attestation people are
very confusing.  And it's precisely your confusion that I would like to avoid.

** A root of trust is a piece of code that measures itself, because nothing
** before it can do that. (It might be the first piece of code to run).

While it is true that a trust anchor (in the form of a self-signed
certificate) comes with a similar kind of circular/implicit trust, the
measurement made by the root of trust code can actually be attested to by a
third party, and this is typically done.

The trust anchor used by a relying party to verify this attestation may also
come with implicit trust, the verification of the measurement made by the
root of trust does not.

I think that terms RoT Storage/etc. are even more confusing.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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From: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>
To: "Salz\, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "rats\@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
    > Okay, I=E2=80=99m in the minority about the definition of RoT, thanks=
 for the
    > update.  FYI, this will probably confuse other people coming here from
    > a strong PKIX/TLS background, so please make it very explicit.

Thanks for making my point, that this is going to confuse people.
Particularly since I'm told that some non-english languages do not put a lot
of importance to order of words.

--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh network=
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From: Simon Frost <Simon.Frost@arm.com>
To: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
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Subject: Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
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From nobody Mon Sep 16 10:09:52 2019
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Subject: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com> wrote:
    > FWIW, the various SAE vehicle security committees commonly use "Trust
    > Anchor"
    > (rather than "RoT") to encompass the entire spectrum of RoTs, *as well as*
    > the
    > X.509 CA style trust anchor.  There's an entire SAE vehicle security
    > committee
    > titled SAE Trust Anchors and Authentication.  In addition, the SAE J3101
    > spec,

okay, so if we reference any SAE documents, let's be really specific about
what we mean, and let's not use the SAE documents as reasonable sources of
clear definitions ;-)

If there were some alternate words that we could use for self-measuring code,
then I'd like to use that term ourselves.  I'd rather break down the spectrum
of the terms into it's component "colours".


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
Cc: rats@ietf.org
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Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 19:32:47 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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The W3C apparently came to another conclusion although they target the most JSON-friendly place there is, the Web:
https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#sctn-extension-request-parameters
That is, WebAuthn requires CBOR.


On 2019-09-16 18:35, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> On 2019-09-16 18:29, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:46 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 2019-09-16 17:30, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>>>> I’ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn’t inconsistency between the two, particularly in how the claims registry is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even days, of this WG. There’s been some really long email threads about it.
>>>> Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We have enough to do, so I’m inclined to live with it.
>>>
>>> Since everything crypto-wise in the JOSE stack anyway is covered in Base64Url, I don't see why one would bother with JWTs (or JSON at all for that matter) in EAT.
>>
>> Pretty sure lots of people want to be able to express claims in JSON. It is far more prevalent (so I understand) on the server side than CBOR.
> 
> Yes, but EAT is (IMO) not comparable to "normal" applications.
> 
>> I think there is consensus in this WG that we will support JSON and CBOR (and thus COSE and JOSE) for claims.
> 
> Right and it will effectively force server-side software vendors creating TWO versions of everything.
> That's the hallmark of design by committee :-)
> 
> Anders
> 
>>
>> LL
>>
> 


From nobody Mon Sep 16 10:41:31 2019
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
    > My personal chosen path is NOT to raise the issue and live with the
    > issue. Particularly:
    > - The way to do vendor specific non-registered claims is different
    > between CWT and JWT

I think that's okay.  Vendors that want to private things can cope with this,
or likely are just doing one or the other.

    > - All EAT claims are Specification Required. No EAT claims and be just
    > Expert Review.

I can live with that.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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To: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>, Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
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From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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On 2019-09-16 19:42, Giridhar Mandyam wrote:
> Yes, but that does not mean that JSON support is not required by Webauthn.
> 
> Webauthn allows for the Android SafetyNet attestation format - see https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#android-safetynet-attestation.  And SafetyNet comes in the form of a JSON object:  https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation#compat-check-response.

I would not base a major design decision on a single and rather unusual solution which BTW already is defined.

Anders

> 
> In other words, a Webauthn RP cannot just support CBOR and hope to cover all of the deployed implementations.
> 
> -Giri Mandyam
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: RATS <rats-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Anders Rundgren
> Sent: Monday, September 16, 2019 10:33 AM
> To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
> Cc: rats@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
> 
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> The W3C apparently came to another conclusion although they target the most JSON-friendly place there is, the Web:
> https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#sctn-extension-request-parameters
> That is, WebAuthn requires CBOR.
> 
> 
> On 2019-09-16 18:35, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>> On 2019-09-16 18:29, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:46 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 2019-09-16 17:30, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>>>>> I’ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn’t inconsistency between the two, particularly in how the claims registry is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even days, of this WG. There’s been some really long email threads about it.
>>>>> Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We have enough to do, so I’m inclined to live with it.
>>>>
>>>> Since everything crypto-wise in the JOSE stack anyway is covered in Base64Url, I don't see why one would bother with JWTs (or JSON at all for that matter) in EAT.
>>>
>>> Pretty sure lots of people want to be able to express claims in JSON. It is far more prevalent (so I understand) on the server side than CBOR.
>>
>> Yes, but EAT is (IMO) not comparable to "normal" applications.
>>
>>> I think there is consensus in this WG that we will support JSON and CBOR (and thus COSE and JOSE) for claims.
>>
>> Right and it will effectively force server-side software vendors creating TWO versions of everything.
>> That's the hallmark of design by committee :-)
>>
>> Anders
>>
>>>
>>> LL
>>>
>>
> 
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> 


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From: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>
To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
CC: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
CC: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 18:59:28 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/T0UCaufA4whqxvOn70yb81MNq_I>
Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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   >> - All EAT claims are Specification Required. No EAT claims and be jus=
t
   >> Expert Review.

> I can live with that.


I am not OK with that. For JWTs we have been using an expert review approac=
h and that served the committee well.
We would like to register vendor-specific claims for use within EAT tokens =
and I can hardly see why anyone should have problems with it.
Furthermore, attestation is such a special field that there is no reason to=
 be worried about companies flooding IANA with requests.

Ciao
Hannes

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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From nobody Mon Sep 16 12:24:44 2019
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/dfErh8GO7Ns4oQi3hXcXRSdV1p0>
Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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> On Sep 16, 2019, at 11:59 AM, Hannes Tschofenig =
<Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> wrote:
>=20
>>> - All EAT claims are Specification Required. No EAT claims and be =
just
>>> Expert Review.
>=20
>> I can live with that.
>=20
>=20
> I am not OK with that. For JWTs we have been using an expert review =
approach and that served the committee well.
> We would like to register vendor-specific claims for use within EAT =
tokens and I can hardly see why anyone should have problems with it.
> Furthermore, attestation is such a special field that there is no =
reason to be worried about companies flooding IANA with requests.

JWT doesn=E2=80=99t allow Expert Review. It only allows Specification =
Required.

Even with that there=E2=80=99s plenty of stuff in the JWT registry. Some =
have even called it questionable.


Also, the reason I say all EAT claims must be Specification Required is =
to avoid the divergence between CWT and JWT. I want to avoid =E2=80=9Cwell=
, if you were using CWT then you could use that claim, but since you are =
using JWT, you can=E2=80=99t because it is not defined=E2=80=9D and vice =
versa.

Unless we go out of our way anyone can register a CWT claim under Expert =
Review only. They just can=E2=80=99t register it under JWT until publish =
a Specification so they can get to the Specification Required level.

LL



From nobody Mon Sep 16 17:51:47 2019
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From: "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
To: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>, Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
CC: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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References: <4155.1567948986@dooku.sandelman.ca> <64BD12AA-951A-468A-9F08-D442054605AD@island-resort.com> <de6ff852-062d-805d-3eed-10aca60502b2@sit.fraunhofer.de> <CAN40gStH5jUCJeVggREr3ABoFw7K97F=KtoJOSR_X+LWNLB+JA@mail.gmail.com> <CAN40gSu13DKkyahHA3_Cbt5j7Gsh=uGh5ic7fS3AvDGP3K1cug@mail.gmail.com> <5276.1568315351@dooku.sandelman.ca> <92137679-7DEA-42AD-B8D1-F3B909C77459@akamai.com> <BAA4C3C3-C98B-4BA7-8C89-A169DD99EF86@island-resort.com> <D9A4F66D.EB1C1%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
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From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
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Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 22:18:57 -0400
Cc: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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References: <4155.1567948986@dooku.sandelman.ca> <64BD12AA-951A-468A-9F08-D442054605AD@island-resort.com> <de6ff852-062d-805d-3eed-10aca60502b2@sit.fraunhofer.de> <CAN40gStH5jUCJeVggREr3ABoFw7K97F=KtoJOSR_X+LWNLB+JA@mail.gmail.com> <CAN40gSu13DKkyahHA3_Cbt5j7Gsh=uGh5ic7fS3AvDGP3K1cug@mail.gmail.com> <5276.1568315351@dooku.sandelman.ca> <92137679-7DEA-42AD-B8D1-F3B909C77459@akamai.com> <BAA4C3C3-C98B-4BA7-8C89-A169DD99EF86@island-resort.com> <D9A4F66D.EB1C1%carl@redhoundsoftware.com> <C02846B1344F344EB4FAA6FA7AF481F13E8F7836@dggemm511-mbx.china.huawei.com>
To: "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/heeXnpGTQ5Q3A7nuW8_Rft1GL3Y>
Subject: Re: [Rats] =?utf-8?b?562U5aSNOiAgdXNlIGNhc2UgZG9jdW1lbnQgdXBkYXRl?= =?utf-8?q?s_on_Roots_of_Trust?=
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The definition of a trust anchor does not limit the scope to certificate cha=
ins.=20

> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:51 PM, Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent De=
pt) <frank.xialiang@huawei.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi Carl,
> The other big difference between them is the object they deal with: RoT is=
 for integrity measurement value chain, CA is for certificate chain.
>=20
> Hope it is helpful.
>=20
> B.R.
> Frank
>=20
> -----=E9=82=AE=E4=BB=B6=E5=8E=9F=E4=BB=B6-----
> =E5=8F=91=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org] =E4=BB=A3=
=E8=A1=A8 Carl Wallace
> =E5=8F=91=E9=80=81=E6=97=B6=E9=97=B4: 2019=E5=B9=B49=E6=9C=8816=E6=97=A5 2=
0:26
> =E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>; S=
alz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>
> =E6=8A=84=E9=80=81: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; rats@ietf.=
org
> =E4=B8=BB=E9=A2=98: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust=

>=20
> I took Rich's statement to be more from a relying party perspective and yo=
ur detail to be more what one might find in a policy describing nature of th=
e root of trust, which is not that different from how one may describe a tru=
st anchor/CA in a PKIX context in a policy that describes how a CA are opera=
ted, etc. Two sides of the same coin.
>=20
> On 9/15/19, 4:50 PM, "RATS on behalf of Laurence Lundblade"
> <rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
>=20
>>> On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and=20
>>> "trust root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>>>    - Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>>>    - Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>>>    - Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of=20=

>>> band" of the application itself
>>=20
>> This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is=20
>> generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust=20
>> involves a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot=20
>> and measure a device. There is usually a boundary around it so that=20
>> other software on the device, like the high-level OS, can=E2=80=99t corru=
pt it.=20
>> When it is doing reporting as in RATS it will have a private key that can=
 do some signing.
>> When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public key to=20=

>> verify the software it loads.
>>=20
>> LL
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> RATS mailing list
>> RATS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats


From nobody Mon Sep 16 19:21:52 2019
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From: "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
To: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
CC: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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References: <4155.1567948986@dooku.sandelman.ca> <64BD12AA-951A-468A-9F08-D442054605AD@island-resort.com> <de6ff852-062d-805d-3eed-10aca60502b2@sit.fraunhofer.de> <CAN40gStH5jUCJeVggREr3ABoFw7K97F=KtoJOSR_X+LWNLB+JA@mail.gmail.com> <CAN40gSu13DKkyahHA3_Cbt5j7Gsh=uGh5ic7fS3AvDGP3K1cug@mail.gmail.com> <5276.1568315351@dooku.sandelman.ca> <92137679-7DEA-42AD-B8D1-F3B909C77459@akamai.com> <BAA4C3C3-C98B-4BA7-8C89-A169DD99EF86@island-resort.com> <D9A4F66D.EB1C1%carl@redhoundsoftware.com> <C02846B1344F344EB4FAA6FA7AF481F13E8F7836@dggemm511-mbx.china.huawei.com> <3BB4DD7C-B19B-40D0-B6DD-8976ADE85EDA@redhoundsoftware.com>
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Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 22:36:21 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
CC: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: =?UTF-8?B?562U5aSN?=: =?UTF-8?B?IOetlOWkjQ==?=: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Subject: Re: [Rats] =?UTF-8?B?562U5aSN?=: =?UTF-8?B?IOetlOWkjQ==?=: use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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TAMP messages are an example. But any signature could apply, whether a
public key is a trust anchor or not is not up to the verifier.

On 9/16/19, 10:21 PM, "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)"
<frank.xialiang@huawei.com> wrote:

>Can you give some other examples?
>
>-----=E9=82=AE=E4=BB=B6=E5=8E=9F=E4=BB=B6-----
>=E5=8F=91=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Carl Wallace [mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com]
>=E5=8F=91=E9=80=81=E6=97=B6=E9=97=B4: 2019=E5=B9=B49=E6=9C=8817=E6=97=A5 10:19
>=E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)
><frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
>=E6=8A=84=E9=80=81: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>; Salz, Rich
><rsalz@akamai.com>; Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>;
>rats@ietf.org
>=E4=B8=BB=E9=A2=98: Re: =E7=AD=94=E5=A4=8D: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
>
>The definition of a trust anchor does not limit the scope to certificate
>chains.=20
>
>> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:51 PM, Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent
>>Dept) <frank.xialiang@huawei.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> Hi Carl,
>> The other big difference between them is the object they deal with: RoT
>>is for integrity measurement value chain, CA is for certificate chain.
>>=20
>> Hope it is helpful.
>>=20
>> B.R.
>> Frank
>>=20
>> -----=E9=82=AE=E4=BB=B6=E5=8E=9F=E4=BB=B6-----
>> =E5=8F=91=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org] =E4=BB=A3=E8=A1=A8 Carl Wallace
>> =E5=8F=91=E9=80=81=E6=97=B6=E9=97=B4: 2019=E5=B9=B49=E6=9C=8816=E6=97=A5 20:26
>> =E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>; Salz, Rich
>> <rsalz@akamai.com>
>> =E6=8A=84=E9=80=81: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; rats@ietf.org
>> =E4=B8=BB=E9=A2=98: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
>>=20
>> I took Rich's statement to be more from a relying party perspective and
>>your detail to be more what one might find in a policy describing nature
>>of the root of trust, which is not that different from how one may
>>describe a trust anchor/CA in a PKIX context in a policy that describes
>>how a CA are operated, etc. Two sides of the same coin.
>>=20
>> On 9/15/19, 4:50 PM, "RATS on behalf of Laurence Lundblade"
>> <rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>>> On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and
>>>> "trust root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>>>>    - Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>>>>    - Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>>>>    - Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out
>>>> of band" of the application itself
>>>=20
>>> This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is
>>> generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust
>>> involves a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot
>>> and measure a device. There is usually a boundary around it so that
>>> other software on the device, like the high-level OS, can=E2=80=99t corrupt i=
t.
>>> When it is doing reporting as in RATS it will have a private key that
>>>can do some signing.
>>> When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public key
>>> to verify the software it loads.
>>>=20
>>> LL
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> RATS mailing list
>>> RATS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> RATS mailing list
>> RATS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats



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Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 22:45:10 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
CC: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: =?UTF-8?B?562U5aSN?=: =?UTF-8?B?IOetlOWkjQ==?=: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
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Or more applicable here, many current attestations. Though these are
formatted as certificates.

On 9/16/19, 10:36 PM, "Carl Wallace" <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> wrote:

>TAMP messages are an example. But any signature could apply, whether a
>public key is a trust anchor or not is not up to the verifier.
>
>On 9/16/19, 10:21 PM, "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)"
><frank.xialiang@huawei.com> wrote:
>
>>Can you give some other examples?
>>
>>-----=E9=82=AE=E4=BB=B6=E5=8E=9F=E4=BB=B6-----
>>=E5=8F=91=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Carl Wallace [mailto:carl@redhoundsoftware.com]
>>=E5=8F=91=E9=80=81=E6=97=B6=E9=97=B4: 2019=E5=B9=B49=E6=9C=8817=E6=97=A5 10:19
>>=E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)
>><frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
>>=E6=8A=84=E9=80=81: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>; Salz, Rich
>><rsalz@akamai.com>; Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>;
>>rats@ietf.org
>>=E4=B8=BB=E9=A2=98: Re: =E7=AD=94=E5=A4=8D: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
>>
>>The definition of a trust anchor does not limit the scope to certificate
>>chains.=20
>>
>>> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:51 PM, Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard &
>>>Patent=20
>>>Dept) <frank.xialiang@huawei.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Hi Carl,
>>> The other big difference between them is the object they deal with:
>>>RoT=20
>>>is for integrity measurement value chain, CA is for certificate chain.
>>>=20
>>> Hope it is helpful.
>>>=20
>>> B.R.
>>> Frank
>>>=20
>>> -----=E9=82=AE=E4=BB=B6=E5=8E=9F=E4=BB=B6-----
>>> =E5=8F=91=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org] =E4=BB=A3=E8=A1=A8 Carl Wallace
>>> =E5=8F=91=E9=80=81=E6=97=B6=E9=97=B4: 2019=E5=B9=B49=E6=9C=8816=E6=97=A5 20:26
>>> =E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>; Salz, Rich
>>> <rsalz@akamai.com>
>>> =E6=8A=84=E9=80=81: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; rats@ietf.org
>>> =E4=B8=BB=E9=A2=98: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
>>>=20
>>> I took Rich's statement to be more from a relying party perspective
>>>and=20
>>>your detail to be more what one might find in a policy describing
>>>nature=20
>>>of the root of trust, which is not that different from how one may
>>>describe a trust anchor/CA in a PKIX context in a policy that describes
>>>how a CA are operated, etc. Two sides of the same coin.
>>>=20
>>> On 9/15/19, 4:50 PM, "RATS on behalf of Laurence Lundblade"
>>> <rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>>> On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and
>>>>> "trust root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>>>>>    - Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>>>>>    - Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>>>>>    - Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out
>>>>> of band" of the application itself
>>>>=20
>>>> This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is
>>>> generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust
>>>> involves a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot
>>>> and measure a device. There is usually a boundary around it so that
>>>> other software on the device, like the high-level OS, can=E2=80=99t corrupt
>>>>it.
>>>> When it is doing reporting as in RATS it will have a private key that
>>>>can do some signing.
>>>> When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public key
>>>> to verify the software it loads.
>>>>=20
>>>> LL
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> RATS mailing list
>>>> RATS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> RATS mailing list
>>> RATS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats



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From: "Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
To: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
CC: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 02:54:34 +0000
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To: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>, Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
Cc: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
References: <CDC992AE-B6DB-4BAE-975F-6E2BF9ED2C97@island-resort.com> <b599af98-1d11-cc86-0942-4185135d5c85@gmail.com> <4D0DEE05-C66C-4BCF-B1BA-67203779F35D@island-resort.com> <5945e80b-91b0-95d7-d45e-4393ff9894d9@gmail.com> <163c0d07-aae6-2ae6-98e9-1f8830b3c690@gmail.com> <15afd05323c4465582e4a3b296f73030@NASANEXM01C.na.qualcomm.com> <926e31d3-b7e5-4537-4e8d-4addb0965b6b@gmail.com> <c659df8d688144029e3a027609d405f4@NASANEXM01C.na.qualcomm.com>
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 06:25:00 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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On 2019-09-16 20:28, Giridhar Mandyam wrote:
>> I would not base a major design decision on a single and rather unusual solution which BTW already is defined.
> 
> I understand the sentiment, and we have had this discussion on the mailing list before (e.g. https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/T1OmyXyprQ5ItvBm_9PxZ7LRrmA).  But I don't agree that CBOR should be our sole focus.

I got that.

> I think if we have the opportunity to define interoperable attestation formats for CBOR and JSON,

To solve what problem?  Attestations are not comparable to word processors that typically need to read and write a plethora of document formats.

> it would be a mistake not to take it. 

It is IMO rather a mistake confusing future implementers with technically redundant choices.  Note: for protocols like TEEP it is no big deal using Base64Url encoded attestations either.

> If solutions such as the SafetyNet Attestation follow our lead and evolve to supporting EAT then I think that would be a positive.

Yes, but for application developers, attestations are presumably exposed as APIs and objects making the CBOR/JSON issue limited to implementors.

I leave this thread now and let you continue doing TWO things of everything :-)

Anders


> 
> -Giri
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
> Sent: Monday, September 16, 2019 11:14 AM
> To: Giridhar Mandyam <mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com>; Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
> Cc: rats@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
> 
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> On 2019-09-16 19:42, Giridhar Mandyam wrote:
>> Yes, but that does not mean that JSON support is not required by Webauthn.
>>
>> Webauthn allows for the Android SafetyNet attestation format - see https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#android-safetynet-attestation.  And SafetyNet comes in the form of a JSON object:  https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation#compat-check-response.
> 
> I would not base a major design decision on a single and rather unusual solution which BTW already is defined.
> 
> Anders
> 
>>
>> In other words, a Webauthn RP cannot just support CBOR and hope to cover all of the deployed implementations.
>>
>> -Giri Mandyam
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: RATS <rats-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Anders Rundgren
>> Sent: Monday, September 16, 2019 10:33 AM
>> To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
>> Cc: rats@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
>>
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> The W3C apparently came to another conclusion although they target the most JSON-friendly place there is, the Web:
>> https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#sctn-extension-request-parameters
>> That is, WebAuthn requires CBOR.
>>
>>
>> On 2019-09-16 18:35, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>>> On 2019-09-16 18:29, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:46 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 2019-09-16 17:30, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
>>>>>> I’ve been trying to take the position to avoid even minor divergences from CWT and JWT in EAT. I wish there wasn’t inconsistency between the two, particularly in how the claims registry is handled. That inconsistency has already consumed many hours, even days, of this WG. There’s been some really long email threads about it.
>>>>>> Fixing it only for EAT seems half-baked. Fixing it for all of CWT and JWT would have to go through those WGs. Seems like a lot of work. We have enough to do, so I’m inclined to live with it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Since everything crypto-wise in the JOSE stack anyway is covered in Base64Url, I don't see why one would bother with JWTs (or JSON at all for that matter) in EAT.
>>>>
>>>> Pretty sure lots of people want to be able to express claims in JSON. It is far more prevalent (so I understand) on the server side than CBOR.
>>>
>>> Yes, but EAT is (IMO) not comparable to "normal" applications.
>>>
>>>> I think there is consensus in this WG that we will support JSON and CBOR (and thus COSE and JOSE) for claims.
>>>
>>> Right and it will effectively force server-side software vendors creating TWO versions of everything.
>>> That's the hallmark of design by committee :-)
>>>
>>> Anders
>>>
>>>>
>>>> LL
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> RATS mailing list
>> RATS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>>
> 


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
CC: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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To: Simon Frost <Simon.Frost@arm.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
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From: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
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Hello Simon,

TL;DR
It's just a simplified first example diagram. There is no intent to 
artificially exclude compositions, such as the 'background check' 
composition. Corresponding diagrams will be added again.


We simplified the initial figure to... reduce the risk to overwhelm the 
reader with all the potential composition option and called it "base" 
interaction model diagram.

That said, we will "reintroduce" other and also more complex 
compositions again in future versions - especially the 'background 
model' and the 'multiple relying parties' variant. This is not intended 
to become an artificial exclusion.

The "upper level bureaucracy" in this model (Asserter & Verifier) are 
intended to be "1..n" as depicted in the meeting slide decks about the 
architecture. This was also not included in the base diagram to keep it 
simple, but maybe we should highlight that there are a lot of other ways 
to compose the roles - when we add other composition diagrams.

The goal of this refactoring of the RATS Arch I-D was to clean it up & 
out, so we have an uncluttered starting point to add content via a 
structured process.

The authors will try to update the I-D with additional role composition 
diagrams before the next virtual interim (again, the obvious ones align 
with teep).

Viele Grüße,

Henk


On 16.09.19 19:08, Simon Frost wrote:
> At a first pass through this, I'm concerned that the interaction model (Fig 1 etc) has been restricted to a single pattern, the 'passport' model to use the terminology from the TEEP/RATS  slides. I don't recall this restriction being discussed. Also allowing the 'background check' model allows the relying party to have much greater flexibility on selecting an appropriate verifier. While the origins of Attester and Known Good Values are going to have close alignment, multiple verifiers may exist. A relying party may choose an alternative verifier based upon the approach to appraisal, to the form that the attestation results are presented or due to business model.
> 
> Thanks
> Simon
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
> Sent: 10 September 2019 14:13
> To: rats@ietf.org
> Subject: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and represents the state of the current discussion and the material presented at the last IETF meeting.
> 
> The current Editor's version can be found here:
> 
>> https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir
>> kholz-rats-architecture.html
> 
> We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.
> 
> TL;DR
> Below you can find a list of essential changes & a list of action items still to be addressed.
> 
> 
> This version of the RATS Architecture document:
> 
> * does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust
> Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role
> _is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely
> on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this
> document),
> 
> * does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as
> "Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),
> 
> * provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS
> Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:
> 
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf
> 
> * introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the
> trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection
> characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other
> entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined
> levels of confidence metrics,
> 
> * is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of
> "trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,
> 
> * simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to
> have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri
> and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why
> they may need to be modified,
> 
> * differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the
> Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an
> Attester,
> 
> * uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence,
> Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept
> is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?).
> (Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information
> model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a
> key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and
> not mandated by an information model), and
> 
> * analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of
> Attestation Assertions.
> 
> 
> For future versions the authors intent:
> 
> * to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary
> diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS
> Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified
> mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),
> 
> * to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas.
> (the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that
> direction),
> 
> * still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for
> them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a
> base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they
> actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon
> and Thomas,
> 
> * to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation,
> addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the
> (un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain
> points of time, or, another example given, addressing the
> differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an
> Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,
> 
> * to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by
> Ian,
> 
> * to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the
> RATS Architecture draft, and
> 
> * to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in
> order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of
> key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this
> will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).
> 
> 
> Viele Grüße,
> 
> Henk
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
> 


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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> wrote:
    >>> - All EAT claims are Specification Required. No EAT claims and be just
    >>> Expert Review.

    >> I can live with that.


    > I am not OK with that. For JWTs we have been using an expert review
    > approach and that served the committee well.

I think we are not discussing the same things!
EAT claims that are standards need to be Specification Required, because
that's the "bigger" of the JWT (Specification Required) and CWT requirements.

    > We would like to register vendor-specific claims for use within EAT
    > tokens and I can hardly see why anyone should have problems with it.

Please distinguish between vendor-proprietary claims (private-use) ones from
standards!  You are not talking about the same thing now.

rfc7519 section 4.2 allows for claims based upon Public Names, which means
using a Collision-Resistant Name:

  Collision-Resistant Name
        A name in a namespace that enables names to be allocated in a
        manner such that they are highly unlikely to collide with other
        names.  Examples of collision-resistant namespaces include: Domain
        Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T X.660
        and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique IDentifiers
        (UUIDs) [RFC4122].  When using an administratively
        delegated namespace, the definer of a name needs to take reasonable
        precautions to ensure they are in control of the portion of the
        namespace they use to define the name.

So any vendor-specific claim can be created by any vendor possessing a domain
name, a PEN, or who can run "uuidgen" (on a development system)

RFC8392 provides for: Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use.
But,  Integer values greater than 65535 and strings of length
      greater than 2 are designated as Expert Review.

So it shouldn't be hard for a vendor-specific claim to get a number for CWT.
And within the space of "strings of length greater than 2" would be the
identical string used for JWT, if you like.  Yes, shorter is better.

The point of this thread was that for Standards Track *RATS* WG claims, that
we will have to go with Specification Required, because that's the minimum
common process for CWT and JWT.

--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect   [
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [



--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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To: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
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Hi Frank,

just to reply to your comment on Section 5. The approach of replacing
the first four bytes with the 4 bytes IPv4 address is to counter (some
flavors of) relay attacks. The Attester replaces these 4 bytes with its
IP address and the Verifier in a verification process does the same with
the IP address of the Attester that it sent the attestation request to.
Verification will be successful only if the IP addresses are the same.

Thanks,
Michael

-- 
Fraunhofer SIT
*Michael Eckel*
Cyber Security Researcher
📧 michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de <mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
🕿 +49 6151 869-221 <tel:+496151869221>

Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT
🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security
🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
🌍 sit.fraunhofer.de <https://sit.fraunhofer.de/>

Member of CRISP


Hi Henk, other draft authors,
Thanks for the efforts for largely simplifying this new version, which looks much more clear and understandable.

I have reviewed the draft through and have some comments as below:
Section 1.1
1. should "message digest" be "MAC"?
2. nit. s/A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses trustworthiness Claims/ A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses Reference Claims/
3. the Endorsements definition in Section 4.3.2 seems to be more correct than the one in this section, but still be a little abstract. Is my understanding right: an example of Endorsements is manufacturer's CA?
4. In general, the overlapping exists for the RATS messages' definition in this section and section 4.3.2. Please combine them into one.

Section 3
The last sentence emphasis on the "change". Can you clarify what kind of change it is? The change of the Evidence with time or the change between Evidence and KGV? The former seems to be too narrow, the latter is better.

Section 3.2
Although I can understand, but some contents in it are not straightforward, like: " recursive trustworthiness properties and the need for termination. " and others. I suggest to re-write them using other well-known text such as: trust chain, root of trust, etc.

Section 4.2
1. Freshness is only for replay attack? No any time freshness meaning?
2. for the principle of Identity, do you consider the privacy protection issue: run remote attestation without revealing the device's identity?
3. Some confusing terminologies: does Provenance equal to source authentication? does Veracity equal to integrity protection? Validity seems to be like Freshness, right?

Section 5
I don't get your point why the last four bytes of a challenge nonce are replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its response. Can you clarify?


B.R.
Frank


-----邮件原件-----
发件人: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org] 代表 Henk Birkholz
发送时间: 2019年9月10日 21:13
收件人: rats@ietf.org <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
主题: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document

Hi all,

we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and represents the state of the current discussion and the material presented at the last IETF meeting.

The current Editor's version can be found here:

> https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir
> kholz-rats-architecture.html

We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.

TL;DR
Below you can find a list of essential changes & a list of action items still to be addressed.


This version of the RATS Architecture document:

* does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust 
Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role 
_is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely 
on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this 
document),

* does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as 
"Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),

* provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS 
Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:

> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf

* introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the 
trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection 
characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other 
entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined 
levels of confidence metrics,

* is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of 
"trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,

* simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to 
have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri 
and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why 
they may need to be modified,

* differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the 
Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an 
Attester,

* uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence, 
Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept 
is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?). 
(Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information 
model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a 
key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and 
not mandated by an information model), and

* analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of 
Attestation Assertions.


For future versions the authors intent:

* to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary 
diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS 
Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified 
mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),

* to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas. 
(the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that 
direction),

* still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for 
them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a 
base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they 
actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon 
and Thomas,

* to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation, 
addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the 
(un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain 
points of time, or, another example given, addressing the 
differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an 
Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,

* to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by 
Ian,

* to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the 
RATS Architecture draft, and

* to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in 
order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of 
key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this 
will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).


Viele Grüße,

Henk






_______________________________________________
RATS mailing list
RATS@ietf.org <mailto:RATS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats

  * [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
    <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE>  Henk
    Birkholz
  * Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
    <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA>  Giridhar
    Mandyam
  * Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
    <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms>  Laurence
    Lundblade
  * Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
    <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g>  Simon
    Frost
  * Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
    <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8>  Henk
    Birkholz
  * [Rats] 答复: New RATS Architecture document
    <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU>  Xialiang
    (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)


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<html>
  <head>

    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <p>Hi Frank,</p>
    <p>just to reply to your comment on Section 5. The approach of
      replacing the first four bytes with the 4 bytes IPv4 address is to
      counter (some flavors of) relay attacks. The Attester replaces
      these 4 bytes with its IP address and the Verifier in a
      verification process does the same with the IP address of the
      Attester that it sent the attestation request to. Verification
      will be successful only if the IP addresses are the same.</p>
    <p>Thanks,<br>
      Michael<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <title></title>
      <font face="Arial"> <img moz-do-not-send="false"
          src="cid:part1.B6E9FBC7.1EDADB9D@sit.fraunhofer.de"
          alt="Fraunhofer SIT" width="190" height="52"><br>
        <b>Michael Eckel</b><br>
        Cyber Security Researcher<br>
        📧 <a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de">michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de</a><br>
        🕿 <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:+496151869221">+49 6151
          869-221</a><br>
        <br>
        Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT<br>
        🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security<br>
        🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany<br>
        🌍 <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="https://sit.fraunhofer.de/">sit.fraunhofer.de</a><br>
        <br>
        <img moz-do-not-send="false"
          src="cid:part5.EF13F2F1.9FF9BF82@sit.fraunhofer.de"
          alt="Member of CRISP" width="218" height="47"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div class="moz-signature"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-signature"><br>
      <div id="msg-body"
data-message-url="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU"
        style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(33, 37, 41);
        font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, &quot;Segoe
        UI&quot;, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, Arial, sans-serif,
        &quot;Apple Color Emoji&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Emoji&quot;,
        &quot;Segoe UI Symbol&quot;, &quot;Noto Color Emoji&quot;;
        font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures:
        normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400;
        letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left;
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        widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
        background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-style:
        initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">
        <div class="msg-payload" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
          <pre class="wordwrap" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: SFMono-Regular, Menlo, Monaco, Consolas, &quot;Liberation Mono&quot;, &quot;Courier New&quot;, monospace; font-size: 12.25px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1rem; overflow: auto; display: block; color: rgb(33, 37, 41); white-space: pre-wrap; overflow-wrap: normal; word-break: normal; padding: 0px;">Hi Henk, other draft authors,
Thanks for the efforts for largely simplifying this new version, which looks much more clear and understandable.

I have reviewed the draft through and have some comments as below:
Section 1.1
1. should "message digest" be "MAC"?
2. nit. s/A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses trustworthiness Claims/ A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses Reference Claims/
3. the Endorsements definition in Section 4.3.2 seems to be more correct than the one in this section, but still be a little abstract. Is my understanding right: an example of Endorsements is manufacturer's CA?
4. In general, the overlapping exists for the RATS messages' definition in this section and section 4.3.2. Please combine them into one.

Section 3
The last sentence emphasis on the "change". Can you clarify what kind of change it is? The change of the Evidence with time or the change between Evidence and KGV? The former seems to be too narrow, the latter is better.

Section 3.2
Although I can understand, but some contents in it are not straightforward, like: " recursive trustworthiness properties and the need for termination. " and others. I suggest to re-write them using other well-known text such as: trust chain, root of trust, etc.

Section 4.2
1. Freshness is only for replay attack? No any time freshness meaning?
2. for the principle of Identity, do you consider the privacy protection issue: run remote attestation without revealing the device's identity?
3. Some confusing terminologies: does Provenance equal to source authentication? does Veracity equal to integrity protection? Validity seems to be like Freshness, right?

Section 5
I don't get your point why the last four bytes of a challenge nonce are replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its response. Can you clarify?


B.R.
Frank


-----邮件原件-----
发件人: RATS [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org</a>] 代表 Henk Birkholz
发送时间: 2019年9月10日 21:13
收件人: <a href="mailto:rats@ietf.org" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">rats@ietf.org</a>
主题: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document

Hi all,

we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and represents the state of the current discussion and the material presented at the last IETF meeting.

The current Editor's version can be found here:

&gt; <a href="https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir" rel="nofollow" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir</a>
&gt; kholz-rats-architecture.html

We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.

TL;DR
Below you can find a list of essential changes &amp; a list of action items still to be addressed.


This version of the RATS Architecture document:

* does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust 
Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role 
_is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely 
on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this 
document),

* does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as 
"Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),

* provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS 
Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:

&gt; <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf" rel="nofollow" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf</a>

* introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the 
trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection 
characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other 
entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined 
levels of confidence metrics,

* is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of 
"trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,

* simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to 
have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri 
and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why 
they may need to be modified,

* differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the 
Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an 
Attester,

* uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence, 
Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept 
is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?). 
(Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information 
model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a 
key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and 
not mandated by an information model), and

* analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of 
Attestation Assertions.


For future versions the authors intent:

* to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary 
diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS 
Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified 
mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),

* to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas. 
(the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that 
direction),

* still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for 
them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a 
base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they 
actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon 
and Thomas,

* to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation, 
addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the 
(un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain 
points of time, or, another example given, addressing the 
differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an 
Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,

* to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by 
Ian,

* to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the 
RATS Architecture draft, and

* to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in 
order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of 
key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this 
will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).


Viele Grüße,

Henk






_______________________________________________
RATS mailing list
<a href="mailto:RATS@ietf.org" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">RATS@ietf.org</a>
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href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE"
              style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">[Rats]
              New RATS Architecture document</a>  Henk Birkholz</li>
          <li class="depth-1" style="box-sizing: border-box;
            padding-left: 2em;"><a
href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA"
              style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">Re:
              [Rats] New RATS Architecture document</a>  Giridhar
            Mandyam</li>
          <li class="depth-1" style="box-sizing: border-box;
            padding-left: 2em;"><a
href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms"
              style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">Re:
              [Rats] New RATS Architecture document</a>  Laurence
            Lundblade</li>
          <li class="depth-1" style="box-sizing: border-box;
            padding-left: 2em;"><a
href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g"
              style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">Re:
              [Rats] New RATS Architecture document</a>  Simon Frost</li>
          <li class="depth-2" style="box-sizing: border-box;
            padding-left: 3em;"><a
href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8"
              style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">Re:
              [Rats] New RATS Architecture document</a>  Henk Birkholz</li>
          <li class="depth-1 current-msg" style="box-sizing: border-box;
            background: rgb(244, 245, 245); padding-left: 2em;"><a
href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU"
              style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;">[Rats]
              答复: New RATS Architecture document</a>  Xialiang (Frank,
            Network Standard &amp; Patent Dept)</li>
        </ul>
      </div>
      <font face="Arial"> </font> </div>
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/TLKXbyA_NEdk0qKAuQLAXYoF3GE>
Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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Hi Michael,

As mentioned in a follow-up email, I misread the mail from Laurence. Everyt=
hing is cool.

Ciao
Hannes

-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Sent: Dienstag, 17. September 2019 14:25
To: rats@ietf.org
Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?


Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> wrote:
    >>> - All EAT claims are Specification Required. No EAT claims and be j=
ust
    >>> Expert Review.

    >> I can live with that.


    > I am not OK with that. For JWTs we have been using an expert review
    > approach and that served the committee well.

I think we are not discussing the same things!
EAT claims that are standards need to be Specification Required, because th=
at's the "bigger" of the JWT (Specification Required) and CWT requirements.

    > We would like to register vendor-specific claims for use within EAT
    > tokens and I can hardly see why anyone should have problems with it.

Please distinguish between vendor-proprietary claims (private-use) ones fro=
m standards!  You are not talking about the same thing now.

rfc7519 section 4.2 allows for claims based upon Public Names, which means =
using a Collision-Resistant Name:

  Collision-Resistant Name
        A name in a namespace that enables names to be allocated in a
        manner such that they are highly unlikely to collide with other
        names.  Examples of collision-resistant namespaces include: Domain
        Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T X.660
        and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique IDentifiers
        (UUIDs) [RFC4122].  When using an administratively
        delegated namespace, the definer of a name needs to take reasonable
        precautions to ensure they are in control of the portion of the
        namespace they use to define the name.

So any vendor-specific claim can be created by any vendor possessing a doma=
in name, a PEN, or who can run "uuidgen" (on a development system)

RFC8392 provides for: Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private=
 Use.
But,  Integer values greater than 65535 and strings of length
      greater than 2 are designated as Expert Review.

So it shouldn't be hard for a vendor-specific claim to get a number for CWT=
.
And within the space of "strings of length greater than 2" would be the ide=
ntical string used for JWT, if you like.  Yes, shorter is better.

The point of this thread was that for Standards Track *RATS* WG claims, tha=
t we will have to go with Specification Required, because that's the minimu=
m common process for CWT and JWT.

--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh network=
s [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect =
  [
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails  =
  [



--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works  -=3D =
IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-



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Seems like the IP address should just be a claim on its own rather than =
stuffing it into the nonce. That avoids losing some nonce entropy. The =
IP address might be privacy violating in use cases where as a plain =
nonce is not. So in a privacy sensitive use case you=E2=80=99d want to =
just use the plain nonce and no IP address, so keeping them separate =
seems better.

LL

> On Sep 17, 2019, at 5:31 AM, Michael Eckel =
<michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de> wrote:
>=20
> Hi Frank,
>=20
> just to reply to your comment on Section 5. The approach of replacing =
the first four bytes with the 4 bytes IPv4 address is to counter (some =
flavors of) relay attacks. The Attester replaces these 4 bytes with its =
IP address and the Verifier in a verification process does the same with =
the IP address of the Attester that it sent the attestation request to. =
Verification will be successful only if the IP addresses are the same.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Michael
>=20
> --=20
> <sit.gif>
> Michael Eckel
> Cyber Security Researcher
> =F0=9F=93=A7 michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de =
<x-msg://63/mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
> =F0=9F=95=BF +49 6151 869-221 <tel:+496151869221>
>=20
> Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT
> =F0=9F=8F=AD Cyber-physical Systems Security
> =F0=9F=8F=A0 Rheinstra=C3=9Fe 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
> =F0=9F=8C=8D sit.fraunhofer.de <https://sit.fraunhofer.de/>
>=20
> <crisp.gif>
>=20
>=20
> Hi Henk, other draft authors,
> Thanks for the efforts for largely simplifying this new version, which =
looks much more clear and understandable.
>=20
> I have reviewed the draft through and have some comments as below:
> Section 1.1
> 1. should "message digest" be "MAC"?
> 2. nit. s/A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses =
trustworthiness Claims/ A corresponding attestation provisioning =
workflow uses Reference Claims/
> 3. the Endorsements definition in Section 4.3.2 seems to be more =
correct than the one in this section, but still be a little abstract. Is =
my understanding right: an example of Endorsements is manufacturer's CA?
> 4. In general, the overlapping exists for the RATS messages' =
definition in this section and section 4.3.2. Please combine them into =
one.
>=20
> Section 3
> The last sentence emphasis on the "change". Can you clarify what kind =
of change it is? The change of the Evidence with time or the change =
between Evidence and KGV? The former seems to be too narrow, the latter =
is better.
>=20
> Section 3.2
> Although I can understand, but some contents in it are not =
straightforward, like: " recursive trustworthiness properties and the =
need for termination. " and others. I suggest to re-write them using =
other well-known text such as: trust chain, root of trust, etc.
>=20
> Section 4.2
> 1. Freshness is only for replay attack? No any time freshness meaning?
> 2. for the principle of Identity, do you consider the privacy =
protection issue: run remote attestation without revealing the device's =
identity?
> 3. Some confusing terminologies: does Provenance equal to source =
authentication? does Veracity equal to integrity protection? Validity =
seems to be like Freshness, right?
>=20
> Section 5
> I don't get your point why the last four bytes of a challenge nonce =
are replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its response. =
Can you clarify?
>=20
>=20
> B.R.
> Frank
>=20
>=20
> -----=E9=82=AE=E4=BB=B6=E5=8E=9F=E4=BB=B6-----
> =E5=8F=91=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org =
<mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org>] =E4=BB=A3=E8=A1=A8 Henk Birkholz
> =E5=8F=91=E9=80=81=E6=97=B6=E9=97=B4: 2019=E5=B9=B49=E6=9C=8810=E6=97=A5=
 21:13
> =E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: rats@ietf.org <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
> =E4=B8=BB=E9=A2=98: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
> we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and =
represents the state of the current discussion and the material =
presented at the last IETF meeting.
>=20
> The current Editor's version can be found here:
>=20
> > =
https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir =
<https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir>
> > kholz-rats-architecture.html
>=20
> We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.
>=20
> TL;DR
> Below you can find a list of essential changes & a list of action =
items still to be addressed.
>=20
>=20
> This version of the RATS Architecture document:
>=20
> * does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust=20=

> Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role=20=

> _is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely=20=

> on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this=20
> document),
>=20
> * does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as=20=

> "Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),
>=20
> * provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS=20=

> Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:
>=20
> > =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-r=
ats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-informat=
ion-module-00.pdf =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-=
rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-informa=
tion-module-00.pdf>
>=20
> * introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the=20
> trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection=20=

> characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for =
other=20
> entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined=20=

> levels of confidence metrics,
>=20
> * is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of=20
> "trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,
>=20
> * simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to=20=

> have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri=20=

> and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why=20=

> they may need to be modified,
>=20
> * differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the=20=

> Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an=20=

> Attester,
>=20
> * uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence,=20
> Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" =
concept=20
> is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, =
IIRC?).=20
> (Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information=20=

> model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a=20=

> key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and=20=

> not mandated by an information model), and
>=20
> * analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of=20
> Attestation Assertions.
>=20
>=20
> For future versions the authors intent:
>=20
> * to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary=20=

> diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS=20
> Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a =
unified=20
> mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),
>=20
> * to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas.=20=

> (the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that=20=

> direction),
>=20
> * still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words =
for=20
> them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a=20=

> base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they=20=

> actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, =
Simon=20
> and Thomas,
>=20
> * to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation,=20
> addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the=20
> (un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain=20
> points of time, or, another example given, addressing the=20
> differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an=20
> Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,
>=20
> * to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed =
by=20
> Ian,
>=20
> * to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into =
the=20
> RATS Architecture draft, and
>=20
> * to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in=20=

> order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning =
of=20
> key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - =
this=20
> will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).
>=20
>=20
> Viele Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe,
>=20
> Henk
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org <mailto:RATS@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats>
> [Rats] New RATS Architecture document =
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE> =
 Henk Birkholz
> Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document =
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA> =
 Giridhar Mandyam
> Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document =
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms> =
 Laurence Lundblade
> Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document =
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g> =
 Simon Frost
> Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document =
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8> =
 Henk Birkholz
> [Rats] =E7=AD=94=E5=A4=8D: New RATS Architecture document =
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU> =
 Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats


--Apple-Mail=_9DDD34C5-FEA8-4138-9EC4-9171179F182C
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Seems=
 like the IP address should just be a claim on its own rather than =
stuffing it into the nonce. That avoids losing some nonce entropy. The =
IP address might be privacy violating in use cases where as a plain =
nonce is not. So in a privacy sensitive use case you=E2=80=99d want to =
just use the plain nonce and no IP address, so keeping them separate =
seems better.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">LL<br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Sep 17, 2019, at 5:31 AM, Michael Eckel =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de" =
class=3D"">michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D"">
 =20

    <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8" class=3D"">
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000" class=3D""><p class=3D"">Hi =
Frank,</p><p class=3D"">just to reply to your comment on Section 5. The =
approach of
      replacing the first four bytes with the 4 bytes IPv4 address is to
      counter (some flavors of) relay attacks. The Attester replaces
      these 4 bytes with its IP address and the Verifier in a
      verification process does the same with the IP address of the
      Attester that it sent the attestation request to. Verification
      will be successful only if the IP addresses are the same.</p><p =
class=3D"">Thanks,<br class=3D"">
      Michael<br class=3D"">
    </p>
    <div class=3D"moz-signature">-- <br class=3D"">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8" class=3D"">
      <title class=3D""></title>
      <font face=3D"Arial" class=3D""> <span =
id=3D"cid:part1.B6E9FBC7.1EDADB9D@sit.fraunhofer.de">&lt;sit.gif&gt;</span=
><br class=3D"">
        <b class=3D"">Michael Eckel</b><br class=3D"">
        Cyber Security Researcher<br class=3D"">
        =F0=9F=93=A7 <a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" =
href=3D"x-msg://63/mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de" =
class=3D"">michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de</a><br class=3D"">
        =F0=9F=95=BF <a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" =
href=3D"tel:+496151869221" class=3D"">+49 6151
          869-221</a><br class=3D"">
        <br class=3D"">
        Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT<br =
class=3D"">
        =F0=9F=8F=AD Cyber-physical Systems Security<br class=3D"">
        =F0=9F=8F=A0 Rheinstra=C3=9Fe 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany<br =
class=3D"">
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    <div class=3D"moz-signature"><br class=3D"">
    </div>
    <div class=3D"moz-signature"><br class=3D"">
      <div id=3D"msg-body" =
data-message-url=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4=
FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(33, 37, =
41);
        font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, &quot;Segoe
        UI&quot;, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, Arial, sans-serif,
        &quot;Apple Color Emoji&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Emoji&quot;,
        &quot;Segoe UI Symbol&quot;, &quot;Noto Color Emoji&quot;;
        font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures:
        normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400;
        letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left;
        text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
        widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
        background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-style:
        initial; text-decoration-color: initial;" class=3D"">
        <div class=3D"msg-payload" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box;">
          <pre class=3D"wordwrap" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; =
font-family: SFMono-Regular, Menlo, Monaco, Consolas, &quot;Liberation =
Mono&quot;, &quot;Courier New&quot;, monospace; font-size: 12.25px; =
margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1rem; overflow: auto; display: block; =
color: rgb(33, 37, 41); white-space: pre-wrap; overflow-wrap: normal; =
word-break: normal; padding: 0px;">Hi Henk, other draft authors,
Thanks for the efforts for largely simplifying this new version, which =
looks much more clear and understandable.

I have reviewed the draft through and have some comments as below:
Section 1.1
1. should "message digest" be "MAC"?
2. nit. s/A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses =
trustworthiness Claims/ A corresponding attestation provisioning =
workflow uses Reference Claims/
3. the Endorsements definition in Section 4.3.2 seems to be more correct =
than the one in this section, but still be a little abstract. Is my =
understanding right: an example of Endorsements is manufacturer's CA?
4. In general, the overlapping exists for the RATS messages' definition =
in this section and section 4.3.2. Please combine them into one.

Section 3
The last sentence emphasis on the "change". Can you clarify what kind of =
change it is? The change of the Evidence with time or the change between =
Evidence and KGV? The former seems to be too narrow, the latter is =
better.

Section 3.2
Although I can understand, but some contents in it are not =
straightforward, like: " recursive trustworthiness properties and the =
need for termination. " and others. I suggest to re-write them using =
other well-known text such as: trust chain, root of trust, etc.

Section 4.2
1. Freshness is only for replay attack? No any time freshness meaning?
2. for the principle of Identity, do you consider the privacy protection =
issue: run remote attestation without revealing the device's identity?
3. Some confusing terminologies: does Provenance equal to source =
authentication? does Veracity equal to integrity protection? Validity =
seems to be like Freshness, right?

Section 5
I don't get your point why the last four bytes of a challenge nonce are =
replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its response. Can =
you clarify?


B.R.
Frank


-----=E9=82=AE=E4=BB=B6=E5=8E=9F=E4=BB=B6-----
=E5=8F=91=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: RATS [<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org</a>] =
=E4=BB=A3=E8=A1=A8 Henk Birkholz
=E5=8F=91=E9=80=81=E6=97=B6=E9=97=B4: 2019=E5=B9=B49=E6=9C=8810=E6=97=A5 =
21:13
=E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: <a href=3D"mailto:rats@ietf.org" =
style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183); =
text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">rats@ietf.org</a>
=E4=B8=BB=E9=A2=98: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document

Hi all,

we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and =
represents the state of the current discussion and the material =
presented at the last IETF meeting.

The current Editor's version can be found here:

&gt; <a =
href=3D"https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft=
-bir" rel=3D"nofollow" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, =
122, 183); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/dr=
aft-bir</a>
&gt; kholz-rats-architecture.html

We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.

TL;DR
Below you can find a list of essential changes &amp; a list of action =
items still to be addressed.


This version of the RATS Architecture document:

* does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust=20=

Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role=20=

_is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely=20=

on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this=20
document),

* does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as=20
"Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),

* provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS=20
Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:

&gt; <a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats=
-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-=
information-module-00.pdf" rel=3D"nofollow" style=3D"box-sizing: =
border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183); text-decoration: none; =
background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-r=
ats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-modu=
le-information-module-00.pdf</a>

* introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the=20
trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection=20
characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other=20=

entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined=20
levels of confidence metrics,

* is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of=20
"trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,

* simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to=20
have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri=20
and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why=20
they may need to be modified,

* differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the=20
Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an=20=

Attester,

* uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence,=20
Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept=20=

is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?).=20=

(Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information=20
model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a=20
key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and=20
not mandated by an information model), and

* analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of=20
Attestation Assertions.


For future versions the authors intent:

* to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary=20=

diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS=20
Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified=20=

mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),

* to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas.=20=

(the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that=20
direction),

* still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for=20=

them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a=20
base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they=20=

actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon=20=

and Thomas,

* to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation,=20
addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the=20
(un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain=20
points of time, or, another example given, addressing the=20
differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an=20
Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,

* to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by=20=

Ian,

* to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the=20=

RATS Architecture draft, and

* to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in=20=

order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of=20=

key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this=20=

will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).


Viele Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe,

Henk






_______________________________________________
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</pre>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div id=3D"message-thread" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color:
        rgb(33, 37, 41); font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont,
        &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, Arial,
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        Emoji&quot;; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;
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        text-align: left; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none;
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        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255,
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        initial;" class=3D"">
        <ul class=3D"thread-snippet" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box;
          margin-top: 30px; margin-bottom: 1rem; font-family: Menlo,
          Monaco, Consolas, &quot;Courier New&quot;, monospace;
          font-size: 13px; list-style-type: none; padding-left: 0px;">
          <li class=3D"depth-0" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box;"><a =
href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1U=
VBvE" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">[Rats]
              New RATS Architecture document</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Henk =
Birkholz</li>
          <li class=3D"depth-1" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box;
            padding-left: 2em;"><a =
href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZ=
fwaA" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">Re:
              [Rats] New RATS Architecture =
document</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Giridhar
            Mandyam</li>
          <li class=3D"depth-1" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box;
            padding-left: 2em;"><a =
href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H=
85Ms" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">Re:
              [Rats] New RATS Architecture =
document</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Laurence
            Lundblade</li>
          <li class=3D"depth-1" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box;
            padding-left: 2em;"><a =
href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQk=
uk1g" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">Re:
              [Rats] New RATS Architecture document</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Simon =
Frost</li>
          <li class=3D"depth-2" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box;
            padding-left: 3em;"><a =
href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9i=
leW8" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">Re:
              [Rats] New RATS Architecture document</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Henk =
Birkholz</li>
          <li class=3D"depth-1 current-msg" style=3D"box-sizing: =
border-box;
            background: rgb(244, 245, 245); padding-left: 2em;"><a =
href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0=
_ZBU" style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(51, 122, 183);
              text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent;" =
class=3D"">[Rats]
              =E7=AD=94=E5=A4=8D: New RATS Architecture =
document</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Xialiang (Frank,
            Network Standard &amp; Patent Dept)</li>
        </ul>
      </div>
      <font face=3D"Arial" class=3D""> </font> </div>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">RATS =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:RATS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">RATS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div></body></html>=

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Hi Frank,

you are totally right in terms of replay attacks. I was talking about
reLay attacks (e.g. Asokan attack), not about rePLay attacks.

Open CIT (https://github.com/opencit) for example is doing that, too.

Best regards,
Michael

Fraunhofer SIT
*Michael Eckel*
Cyber Security Researcher
📧 michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de <mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
🕿 +49 6151 869-221 <tel:+496151869221>

Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT
🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security
🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
🌍 sit.fraunhofer.de <https://sit.fraunhofer.de/>

Member of CRISP

On 18.09.19 04:21, Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept) wrote:
> But the nonce itself without IP  address can protect against replay attack already. Right?
> I understand this method is just for verifying the same Attester address, right? The Attester authentication can do the same job too.
>
> In summary, I don’t see very clear benefit for this method.
>
>
> This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by phone or email immediately and delete it!
>
> 发件人: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org] 代表 Michael Eckel
> 发送时间: 2019年9月17日 20:31
> 收件人: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
> 抄送: rats@ietf.org
> 主题: Re: [Rats] 答复: New RATS Architecture document
>
>
> Hi Frank,
>
> just to reply to your comment on Section 5. The approach of replacing the first four bytes with the 4 bytes IPv4 address is to counter (some flavors of) relay attacks. The Attester replaces these 4 bytes with its IP address and the Verifier in a verification process does the same with the IP address of the Attester that it sent the attestation request to. Verification will be successful only if the IP addresses are the same.
>
> Thanks,
> Michael
> --
> [Fraunhofer SIT]
> Michael Eckel
> Cyber Security Researcher
> 📧 michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de<mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
> 🕿 +49 6151 869-221<tel:+496151869221>
>
> Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT
> 🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security
> 🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
> 🌍 sit.fraunhofer.de<https://sit.fraunhofer.de/>
>
> [Member of CRISP]
>
>
>
> Hi Henk, other draft authors,
>
> Thanks for the efforts for largely simplifying this new version, which looks much more clear and understandable.
>
>
>
> I have reviewed the draft through and have some comments as below:
>
> Section 1.1
>
> 1. should "message digest" be "MAC"?
>
> 2. nit. s/A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses trustworthiness Claims/ A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses Reference Claims/
>
> 3. the Endorsements definition in Section 4.3.2 seems to be more correct than the one in this section, but still be a little abstract. Is my understanding right: an example of Endorsements is manufacturer's CA?
>
> 4. In general, the overlapping exists for the RATS messages' definition in this section and section 4.3.2. Please combine them into one.
>
>
>
> Section 3
>
> The last sentence emphasis on the "change". Can you clarify what kind of change it is? The change of the Evidence with time or the change between Evidence and KGV? The former seems to be too narrow, the latter is better.
>
>
>
> Section 3.2
>
> Although I can understand, but some contents in it are not straightforward, like: " recursive trustworthiness properties and the need for termination. " and others. I suggest to re-write them using other well-known text such as: trust chain, root of trust, etc.
>
>
>
> Section 4.2
>
> 1. Freshness is only for replay attack? No any time freshness meaning?
>
> 2. for the principle of Identity, do you consider the privacy protection issue: run remote attestation without revealing the device's identity?
>
> 3. Some confusing terminologies: does Provenance equal to source authentication? does Veracity equal to integrity protection? Validity seems to be like Freshness, right?
>
>
>
> Section 5
>
> I don't get your point why the last four bytes of a challenge nonce are replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its response. Can you clarify?
>
>
>
>
>
> B.R.
>
> Frank
>
>
>
>
>
> -----邮件原件-----
>
> 发件人: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org] 代表 Henk Birkholz
>
> 发送时间: 2019年9月10日 21:13
>
> 收件人: rats@ietf.org<mailto:rats@ietf.org>
>
> 主题: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
>
>
>
> Hi all,
>
>
>
> we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and represents the state of the current discussion and the material presented at the last IETF meeting.
>
>
>
> The current Editor's version can be found here:
>
>
>
>> https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir
>> kholz-rats-architecture.html
>
>
> We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.
>
>
>
> TL;DR
>
> Below you can find a list of essential changes & a list of action items still to be addressed.
>
>
>
>
>
> This version of the RATS Architecture document:
>
>
>
> * does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust
>
> Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role
>
> _is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely
>
> on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this
>
> document),
>
>
>
> * does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as
>
> "Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),
>
>
>
> * provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS
>
> Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:
>
>
>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf
>
>
> * introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the
>
> trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection
>
> characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other
>
> entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined
>
> levels of confidence metrics,
>
>
>
> * is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of
>
> "trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,
>
>
>
> * simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to
>
> have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri
>
> and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why
>
> they may need to be modified,
>
>
>
> * differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the
>
> Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an
>
> Attester,
>
>
>
> * uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence,
>
> Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept
>
> is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?).
>
> (Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information
>
> model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a
>
> key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and
>
> not mandated by an information model), and
>
>
>
> * analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of
>
> Attestation Assertions.
>
>
>
>
>
> For future versions the authors intent:
>
>
>
> * to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary
>
> diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS
>
> Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified
>
> mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),
>
>
>
> * to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas.
>
> (the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that
>
> direction),
>
>
>
> * still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for
>
> them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a
>
> base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they
>
> actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon
>
> and Thomas,
>
>
>
> * to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation,
>
> addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the
>
> (un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain
>
> points of time, or, another example given, addressing the
>
> differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an
>
> Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,
>
>
>
> * to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by
>
> Ian,
>
>
>
> * to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the
>
> RATS Architecture draft, and
>
>
>
> * to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in
>
> order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of
>
> key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this
>
> will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).
>
>
>
>
>
> Viele Grüße,
>
>
>
> Henk
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> RATS mailing list
>
> RATS@ietf.org<mailto:RATS@ietf.org>
>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>
>   *   [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE>  Henk Birkholz
>   *   Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA>  Giridhar Mandyam
>   *   Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms>  Laurence Lundblade
>   *   Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g>  Simon Frost
>   *   Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8>  Henk Birkholz
>   *   [Rats] 答复: New RATS Architecture document<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU>  Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)

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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <p>Hi Frank,</p>
    <p>you are totally right in terms of replay attacks. I was talking
      about reLay attacks (e.g. Asokan attack), not about rePLay
      attacks.</p>
    <p>Open CIT (<a href="https://github.com/opencit">https://github.com/opencit</a>)
      for example is doing that, too.<br>
    </p>
    <p>Best regards,<br>
      Michael<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-signature">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <title></title>
      <font face="Arial"> <img moz-do-not-send="false"
          src="cid:part2.A9A635FF.88683131@sit.fraunhofer.de"
          alt="Fraunhofer SIT" width="190" height="52"><br>
        <b>Michael Eckel</b><br>
        Cyber Security Researcher<br>
        📧 <a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de">michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de</a><br>
        🕿 <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:+496151869221">+49 6151
          869-221</a><br>
        <br>
        Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT<br>
        🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security<br>
        🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany<br>
        🌍 <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="https://sit.fraunhofer.de/">sit.fraunhofer.de</a><br>
        <br>
        <img moz-do-not-send="false"
          src="cid:part6.A6DC30CF.A461416C@sit.fraunhofer.de"
          alt="Member of CRISP" width="218" height="47"><br>
        <br>
      </font> </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18.09.19 04:21, Xialiang (Frank,
      Network Standard &amp; Patent Dept) wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:C02846B1344F344EB4FAA6FA7AF481F13E8F8575@dggemm511-mbx.china.huawei.com">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">But the nonce itself without IP  address can protect against replay attack already. Right?
I understand this method is just for verifying the same Attester address, right? The Attester authentication can do the same job too.

In summary, I don’t see very clear benefit for this method.


This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by phone or email immediately and delete it!

发件人: RATS [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org</a>] 代表 Michael Eckel
发送时间: 2019年9月17日 20:31
收件人: Henk Birkholz <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de">&lt;henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de&gt;</a>
抄送: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rats@ietf.org">rats@ietf.org</a>
主题: Re: [Rats] 答复: New RATS Architecture document


Hi Frank,

just to reply to your comment on Section 5. The approach of replacing the first four bytes with the 4 bytes IPv4 address is to counter (some flavors of) relay attacks. The Attester replaces these 4 bytes with its IP address and the Verifier in a verification process does the same with the IP address of the Attester that it sent the attestation request to. Verification will be successful only if the IP addresses are the same.

Thanks,
Michael
--
[Fraunhofer SIT]
Michael Eckel
Cyber Security Researcher
📧 <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de">michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de</a><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de">&lt;mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de&gt;</a>
🕿 +49 6151 869-221<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="tel:+496151869221">&lt;tel:+496151869221&gt;</a>

Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT
🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security
🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
🌍 sit.fraunhofer.de<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://sit.fraunhofer.de/">&lt;https://sit.fraunhofer.de/&gt;</a>

[Member of CRISP]



Hi Henk, other draft authors,

Thanks for the efforts for largely simplifying this new version, which looks much more clear and understandable.



I have reviewed the draft through and have some comments as below:

Section 1.1

1. should "message digest" be "MAC"?

2. nit. s/A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses trustworthiness Claims/ A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses Reference Claims/

3. the Endorsements definition in Section 4.3.2 seems to be more correct than the one in this section, but still be a little abstract. Is my understanding right: an example of Endorsements is manufacturer's CA?

4. In general, the overlapping exists for the RATS messages' definition in this section and section 4.3.2. Please combine them into one.



Section 3

The last sentence emphasis on the "change". Can you clarify what kind of change it is? The change of the Evidence with time or the change between Evidence and KGV? The former seems to be too narrow, the latter is better.



Section 3.2

Although I can understand, but some contents in it are not straightforward, like: " recursive trustworthiness properties and the need for termination. " and others. I suggest to re-write them using other well-known text such as: trust chain, root of trust, etc.



Section 4.2

1. Freshness is only for replay attack? No any time freshness meaning?

2. for the principle of Identity, do you consider the privacy protection issue: run remote attestation without revealing the device's identity?

3. Some confusing terminologies: does Provenance equal to source authentication? does Veracity equal to integrity protection? Validity seems to be like Freshness, right?



Section 5

I don't get your point why the last four bytes of a challenge nonce are replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its response. Can you clarify?





B.R.

Frank





-----邮件原件-----

发件人: RATS [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org</a>] 代表 Henk Birkholz

发送时间: 2019年9月10日 21:13

收件人: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rats@ietf.org">rats@ietf.org</a><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rats@ietf.org">&lt;mailto:rats@ietf.org&gt;</a>

主题: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document



Hi all,



we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and represents the state of the current discussion and the material presented at the last IETF meeting.



The current Editor's version can be found here:



</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap=""><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir">https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">kholz-rats-architecture.html
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">


We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.



TL;DR

Below you can find a list of essential changes &amp; a list of action items still to be addressed.





This version of the RATS Architecture document:



* does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust

Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role

_is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely

on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this

document),



* does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as

"Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),



* provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS

Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:



</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap=""><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">


* introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the

trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection

characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other

entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined

levels of confidence metrics,



* is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of

"trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,



* simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to

have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri

and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why

they may need to be modified,



* differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the

Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an

Attester,



* uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence,

Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept

is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?).

(Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information

model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a

key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and

not mandated by an information model), and



* analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of

Attestation Assertions.





For future versions the authors intent:



* to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary

diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS

Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified

mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),



* to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas.

(the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that

direction),



* still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for

them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a

base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they

actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon

and Thomas,



* to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation,

addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the

(un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain

points of time, or, another example given, addressing the

differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an

Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,



* to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by

Ian,



* to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the

RATS Architecture draft, and



* to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in

order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of

key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this

will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).





Viele Grüße,



Henk













_______________________________________________

RATS mailing list

<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:RATS@ietf.org">RATS@ietf.org</a><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:RATS@ietf.org">&lt;mailto:RATS@ietf.org&gt;</a>

<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a>

  *   [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE&gt;</a>  Henk Birkholz
  *   Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA&gt;</a>  Giridhar Mandyam
  *   Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms&gt;</a>  Laurence Lundblade
  *   Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g&gt;</a>  Simon Frost
  *   Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8&gt;</a>  Henk Birkholz
  *   [Rats] 答复: New RATS Architecture document<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU&gt;</a>  Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard &amp; Patent Dept)
</pre>
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To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
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From: Michael Eckel <michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
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Hi Laurence,

I think I understand your concern.

But first some clarification. The IP address is never
exposed/transferred in plain text during transmission. It is, as part of
the nonce, hashed again in a signature (or at least cryptographically
scrambled/blinded, depending on the used signature algorithm).

Sure, you lose some entropy with that technique. That is true. But if
you chose the nonce to be big enough, you should be able to compensate
for that, right?

Having the IP address to be part of another (explicit) claim can
definitely make sense in some use cases, I can imagine.

The IP address here is chosen to "augment" the nonce with rather easy to
obtain additional information that is known to both the Verifier and the
Attester. There could be something different--and perhaps more
suitable--,such as a unique device ID, that is hard for an attacker to
find out/guess. Again, this unique device ID would never be transmitted
in plain over the wire! And that is the important thing to be aware of
here. I hope that helps ...

Thanks, Michael


Fraunhofer SIT
*Michael Eckel*
Cyber Security Researcher
📧 michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de <mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
🕿 +49 6151 869-221 <tel:+496151869221>

Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT
🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security
🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
🌍 sit.fraunhofer.de <https://sit.fraunhofer.de/>

Member of CRISP

On 18.09.19 06:49, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
> Seems like the IP address should just be a claim on its own rather than stuffing it into the nonce. That avoids losing some nonce entropy. The IP address might be privacy violating in use cases where as a plain nonce is not. So in a privacy sensitive use case you’d want to just use the plain nonce and no IP address, so keeping them separate seems better.
>
> LL
>
>> On Sep 17, 2019, at 5:31 AM, Michael Eckel <michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Frank,
>>
>> just to reply to your comment on Section 5. The approach of replacing the first four bytes with the 4 bytes IPv4 address is to counter (some flavors of) relay attacks. The Attester replaces these 4 bytes with its IP address and the Verifier in a verification process does the same with the IP address of the Attester that it sent the attestation request to. Verification will be successful only if the IP addresses are the same.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Michael
>>
>> -- 
>> <sit.gif>
>> Michael Eckel
>> Cyber Security Researcher
>> 📧 michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de <x-msg://63/mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
>> 🕿 +49 6151 869-221 <tel:+496151869221>
>>
>> Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT
>> 🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security
>> 🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
>> 🌍 sit.fraunhofer.de <https://sit.fraunhofer.de/>
>>
>> <crisp.gif>
>>
>>
>> Hi Henk, other draft authors,
>> Thanks for the efforts for largely simplifying this new version, which looks much more clear and understandable.
>>
>> I have reviewed the draft through and have some comments as below:
>> Section 1.1
>> 1. should "message digest" be "MAC"?
>> 2. nit. s/A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses trustworthiness Claims/ A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses Reference Claims/
>> 3. the Endorsements definition in Section 4.3.2 seems to be more correct than the one in this section, but still be a little abstract. Is my understanding right: an example of Endorsements is manufacturer's CA?
>> 4. In general, the overlapping exists for the RATS messages' definition in this section and section 4.3.2. Please combine them into one.
>>
>> Section 3
>> The last sentence emphasis on the "change". Can you clarify what kind of change it is? The change of the Evidence with time or the change between Evidence and KGV? The former seems to be too narrow, the latter is better.
>>
>> Section 3.2
>> Although I can understand, but some contents in it are not straightforward, like: " recursive trustworthiness properties and the need for termination. " and others. I suggest to re-write them using other well-known text such as: trust chain, root of trust, etc.
>>
>> Section 4.2
>> 1. Freshness is only for replay attack? No any time freshness meaning?
>> 2. for the principle of Identity, do you consider the privacy protection issue: run remote attestation without revealing the device's identity?
>> 3. Some confusing terminologies: does Provenance equal to source authentication? does Veracity equal to integrity protection? Validity seems to be like Freshness, right?
>>
>> Section 5
>> I don't get your point why the last four bytes of a challenge nonce are replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its response. Can you clarify?
>>
>>
>> B.R.
>> Frank
>>
>>
>> -----邮件原件-----
>> 发件人: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org>] 代表 Henk Birkholz
>> 发送时间: 2019年9月10日 21:13
>> 收件人: rats@ietf.org <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
>> 主题: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and represents the state of the current discussion and the material presented at the last IETF meeting.
>>
>> The current Editor's version can be found here:
>>
>>> https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir <https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir>
>>> kholz-rats-architecture.html
>> We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.
>>
>> TL;DR
>> Below you can find a list of essential changes & a list of action items still to be addressed.
>>
>>
>> This version of the RATS Architecture document:
>>
>> * does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust 
>> Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role 
>> _is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely 
>> on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this 
>> document),
>>
>> * does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as 
>> "Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),
>>
>> * provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS 
>> Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:
>>
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf>
>> * introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the 
>> trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection 
>> characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other 
>> entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined 
>> levels of confidence metrics,
>>
>> * is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of 
>> "trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,
>>
>> * simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to 
>> have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri 
>> and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why 
>> they may need to be modified,
>>
>> * differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the 
>> Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an 
>> Attester,
>>
>> * uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence, 
>> Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept 
>> is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?). 
>> (Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information 
>> model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a 
>> key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and 
>> not mandated by an information model), and
>>
>> * analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of 
>> Attestation Assertions.
>>
>>
>> For future versions the authors intent:
>>
>> * to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary 
>> diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS 
>> Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified 
>> mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),
>>
>> * to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas. 
>> (the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that 
>> direction),
>>
>> * still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for 
>> them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a 
>> base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they 
>> actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon 
>> and Thomas,
>>
>> * to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation, 
>> addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the 
>> (un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain 
>> points of time, or, another example given, addressing the 
>> differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an 
>> Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,
>>
>> * to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by 
>> Ian,
>>
>> * to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the 
>> RATS Architecture draft, and
>>
>> * to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in 
>> order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of 
>> key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this 
>> will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).
>>
>>
>> Viele Grüße,
>>
>> Henk
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> RATS mailing list
>> RATS@ietf.org <mailto:RATS@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats>
>> [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE>  Henk Birkholz
>> Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA>  Giridhar Mandyam
>> Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms>  Laurence Lundblade
>> Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g>  Simon Frost
>> Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8>  Henk Birkholz
>> [Rats] 答复: New RATS Architecture document <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU>  Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept)
>> _______________________________________________
>> RATS mailing list
>> RATS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
>

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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <p>Hi Laurence,</p>
    <p>I think I understand your concern.</p>
    <p>But first some clarification. The IP address is never
      exposed/transferred in plain text during transmission. It is, as
      part of the nonce, hashed again in a signature (or at least
      cryptographically scrambled/blinded, depending on the used
      signature algorithm).</p>
    <p>Sure, you lose some entropy with that technique. That is true.
      But if you chose the nonce to be big enough, you should be able to
      compensate for that, right?</p>
    <p>Having the IP address to be part of another (explicit) claim can
      definitely make sense in some use cases, I can imagine.</p>
    <p>The IP address here is chosen to "augment" the nonce with rather
      easy to obtain additional information that is known to both the
      Verifier and the Attester. There could be something different--and
      perhaps more suitable--,such as a unique device ID, that is hard
      for an attacker to find out/guess. Again, this unique device ID
      would never be transmitted in plain over the wire! And that is the
      important thing to be aware of here. I hope that helps ...</p>
    <p>Thanks, Michael<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-signature">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <title></title>
      <font face="Arial"> <img moz-do-not-send="false"
          src="cid:part1.362557CA.CB7A8B03@sit.fraunhofer.de"
          alt="Fraunhofer SIT" width="190" height="52"><br>
        <b>Michael Eckel</b><br>
        Cyber Security Researcher<br>
        📧 <a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de">michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de</a><br>
        🕿 <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:+496151869221">+49 6151
          869-221</a><br>
        <br>
        Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT<br>
        🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security<br>
        🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany<br>
        🌍 <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="https://sit.fraunhofer.de/">sit.fraunhofer.de</a><br>
        <br>
        <img moz-do-not-send="false"
          src="cid:part5.1C5998C4.D2E04D1D@sit.fraunhofer.de"
          alt="Member of CRISP" width="218" height="47"><br>
        <br>
      </font> </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18.09.19 06:49, Laurence Lundblade
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:C0CFA5BE-EEA0-4CA5-ABFF-7D8355FB5DCC@island-resort.com">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Seems like the IP address should just be a claim on its own rather than stuffing it into the nonce. That avoids losing some nonce entropy. The IP address might be privacy violating in use cases where as a plain nonce is not. So in a privacy sensitive use case you’d want to just use the plain nonce and no IP address, so keeping them separate seems better.

LL

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">On Sep 17, 2019, at 5:31 AM, Michael Eckel <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de">&lt;michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de&gt;</a> wrote:

Hi Frank,

just to reply to your comment on Section 5. The approach of replacing the first four bytes with the 4 bytes IPv4 address is to counter (some flavors of) relay attacks. The Attester replaces these 4 bytes with its IP address and the Verifier in a verification process does the same with the IP address of the Attester that it sent the attestation request to. Verification will be successful only if the IP addresses are the same.

Thanks,
Michael

-- 
&lt;sit.gif&gt;
Michael Eckel
Cyber Security Researcher
📧 <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de">michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de</a> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:x-msg://63/mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de">&lt;x-msg://63/mailtomichael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de&gt;</a>
🕿 +49 6151 869-221 <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="tel:+496151869221">&lt;tel:+496151869221&gt;</a>

Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT
🏭 Cyber-physical Systems Security
🏠 Rheinstraße 75, 64295 Darmstadt, Germany
🌍 sit.fraunhofer.de <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://sit.fraunhofer.de/">&lt;https://sit.fraunhofer.de/&gt;</a>

&lt;crisp.gif&gt;


Hi Henk, other draft authors,
Thanks for the efforts for largely simplifying this new version, which looks much more clear and understandable.

I have reviewed the draft through and have some comments as below:
Section 1.1
1. should "message digest" be "MAC"?
2. nit. s/A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses trustworthiness Claims/ A corresponding attestation provisioning workflow uses Reference Claims/
3. the Endorsements definition in Section 4.3.2 seems to be more correct than the one in this section, but still be a little abstract. Is my understanding right: an example of Endorsements is manufacturer's CA?
4. In general, the overlapping exists for the RATS messages' definition in this section and section 4.3.2. Please combine them into one.

Section 3
The last sentence emphasis on the "change". Can you clarify what kind of change it is? The change of the Evidence with time or the change between Evidence and KGV? The former seems to be too narrow, the latter is better.

Section 3.2
Although I can understand, but some contents in it are not straightforward, like: " recursive trustworthiness properties and the need for termination. " and others. I suggest to re-write them using other well-known text such as: trust chain, root of trust, etc.

Section 4.2
1. Freshness is only for replay attack? No any time freshness meaning?
2. for the principle of Identity, do you consider the privacy protection issue: run remote attestation without revealing the device's identity?
3. Some confusing terminologies: does Provenance equal to source authentication? does Veracity equal to integrity protection? Validity seems to be like Freshness, right?

Section 5
I don't get your point why the last four bytes of a challenge nonce are replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its response. Can you clarify?


B.R.
Frank


-----邮件原件-----
发件人: RATS [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org</a> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org">&lt;mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</a>] 代表 Henk Birkholz
发送时间: 2019年9月10日 21:13
收件人: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rats@ietf.org">rats@ietf.org</a> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rats@ietf.org">&lt;mailto:rats@ietf.org&gt;</a>
主题: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document

Hi all,

we created a fully revised architecture document that maps and represents the state of the current discussion and the material presented at the last IETF meeting.

The current Editor's version can be found here:

</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap=""><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir">https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir</a> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir">&lt;https://ietf-rats.github.io/draft-birkholz-rats-architecture/draft-bir&gt;</a>
kholz-rats-architecture.html
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
We will submit a new version the day after the RATS virtual interim.

TL;DR
Below you can find a list of essential changes &amp; a list of action items still to be addressed.


This version of the RATS Architecture document:

* does not define or uses the terms "root(s) of trust" (RoT) or "Trust 
Anchor" (TA) at the moment. (Note: It is a fact that the Asserter Role 
_is_ a TA for the Verifier Role and that an Attester Role _could_ rely 
on RoTs. But - this content will not go into the main body of this 
document),

* does define RATS Roles, Messages, and Principals formerly known as 
"Actors" (borrowing heavily from ABLP),

* provides an even more "base" interaction model diagram for the RATS 
Roles than presented in the last IETF meeting slide deck:

</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap=""><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf</a> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf">&lt;https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-rats-sessb-rats-architecture-interaction-model-challange-response-yang-module-information-module-00.pdf&gt;</a>
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
* introduces a framework for "level of confidence" in the 
trustworthiness of an Attester and the endorsement of the protection 
characteristics of its "Attesting Computing Context", allowing for other 
entities to use this framework and fill it with, e.g., openly defined 
levels of confidence metrics,

* is not based on the primitive of "trust" but the concept of 
"trustworthiness" as illustrated by the RATS charter,

* simplifies the definitions of Attester and Verifier that seemed to 
have caused some unfortunate confusion following the proposal of Giri 
and starting with commonly-accepted definitions and then justify why 
they may need to be modified,

* differentiates between the Attesting Computing Environment and the 
Attested Computing Environment better, which both are components of an 
Attester,

* uses the "Claim" concept as a building block to compose Evidence, 
Known-Good-Values and Endorsements. Conversely, the "Assertion" concept 
is dropped in this proposal (as initially suggested by Laurence, IIRC?). 
(Note: this was done to simplify the discussion about the information 
model. Please also note: Due to the {J|C}WT definition of "Claim", a 
key/value pair is implied, which is already a data model decision and 
not mandated by an information model), and

* analogously, now uses the term Known-Good-Values instead of 
Attestation Assertions.


For future versions the authors intent:

* to elaborate on the use of RATS Principals, including more exemplary 
diagrams of RATS Role composition and interaction between RATS 
Principals based on the use case document (and by that address a unified 
mapping to TEEP, RIV, and models that use EAT),

* to shift some of the focus on technical-trust as proposed by Thomas. 
(the Endorsements provided by an Asserter are a first step into that 
direction),

* still not to define the roots of trust terms nor invent new words for 
them :) But - start to reference them on a minimal level and define a 
base set of primitives they can provide in order to describe what they 
actually are and can do in the context of RATS as proposed by Ira, Simon 
and Thomas,

* to introduce and define a concise scope for layered attestation, 
addressing, e.g., the staging of Computing Environments and the 
(un-)availability of an Attesting Computing Environment at certain 
points of time, or, another example given, addressing the 
differentiation of an attested boot sequence of an Attester and an 
Attester running TEEs or rich systems for years,

* to address the change of Roles of a Principal over time as proposed by 
Ian,

* to move the remaining architectural sections in the EAT draft into the 
RATS Architecture draft, and

* to shift some of the focus on the out-of-band trust establishment in 
order to illustrate a coherent RATS ecosystem (e.g. the provisioning of 
key material is not include in the "base diagram" anymore for now - this 
will be more elaborated on in future section of the architecture).


Viele Grüße,

Henk






_______________________________________________
RATS mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:RATS@ietf.org">RATS@ietf.org</a> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:RATS@ietf.org">&lt;mailto:RATS@ietf.org&gt;</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats">&lt;https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats&gt;</a>
[Rats] New RATS Architecture document <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/wSGCnW6oAveg6EXC7BuEC1UVBvE&gt;</a>  Henk Birkholz
Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ATlF1dyQTPLBU62-uD7pBnZfwaA&gt;</a>  Giridhar Mandyam
Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/MMYVbA0RnARJyNCs9ujZi5H85Ms&gt;</a>  Laurence Lundblade
Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/mZYSW1fWfBNa5-g6iLRqvQkuk1g&gt;</a>  Simon Frost
Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/NmoL5MaM6urrz21Z3DvQH9ileW8&gt;</a>  Henk Birkholz
[Rats] 答复: New RATS Architecture document <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU">&lt;https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/7EM4bPJowc4FhrvUkDkSW_0_ZBU&gt;</a>  Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard &amp; Patent Dept)
_______________________________________________
RATS mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:RATS@ietf.org">RATS@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">

</pre>
    </blockquote>
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From: Simon Frost <Simon.Frost@arm.com>
To: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/pG7V5qIOQ65XBg-d80T_68MxYEE>
Subject: Re: [Rats] New RATS Architecture document
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From: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>
To: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
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Thread-Topic: RATS virtual interim recording link
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From: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
To: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>
CC: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: RATS virtual interim recording link
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Subject: Re: [Rats] RATS virtual interim recording link
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From nobody Thu Sep 19 12:32:57 2019
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From: "Eric Voit (evoit)" <evoit@cisco.com>
To: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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Subject: Re: [Rats] CWT and JWT are good enough?
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And another +1

> >    +1 for EAT claims being Specification Required.
> 
> +2 :)
> 
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats

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From: Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu>
To: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
CC: "henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de" <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
Thread-Topic: Comments on draft-birkholz-rats-basic-yang-module-01
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Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2019 12:48:57 +0000
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Folks,

Here are some of my comments regarding the Yang draft (draft-birkholz-rats-=
basic-yang-module-01).

-- The draft needs could benefit from opening text to describe the purpose =
of Yang and the broader background context (e.g. maybe a couple of paragrap=
hs explaining the use cases of the composite-device, such as constrained en=
vironments like IoT).

-- It would be useful to provide a basic definition of a =93composite-devic=
e=94 as the reader may not be familiar with this.  The terminology draft (d=
raft-birkholz-attestation-terminology-02) does not actually define it, unle=
ss I missed it.

-- Would it be useful to provide a paragraph that explains to the reader th=
at some matching reference values (i.e. matching the tree) are expected to =
be possessed by the Verifier for each client composite-device that seeks to=
 be verified.




-- thomas --


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From: Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu>
To: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
CC: "henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de" <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>
Thread-Topic: Comments on draft-birkholz-rats-basic-yang-module-01
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Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2019 20:48:28 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Comments on draft-birkholz-rats-basic-yang-module-01
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I forgot to add that I support this draft being adopted by the RATS working=
 group (assuming the first two easy items have been added).

The third item, which involves reference measurements can be added later, o=
nce the Architecture document settles down and explains reference measureme=
nts.


-- thomas --


________________________________________
From: RATS [rats-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Thomas Hardjono [hardjono@m=
it.edu]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2019 8:48 AM
To: rats@ietf.org
Cc: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
Subject: [Rats] Comments on draft-birkholz-rats-basic-yang-module-01

Folks,

Here are some of my comments regarding the Yang draft (draft-birkholz-rats-=
basic-yang-module-01).

-- The draft needs could benefit from opening text to describe the purpose =
of Yang and the broader background context (e.g. maybe a couple of paragrap=
hs explaining the use cases of the composite-device, such as constrained en=
vironments like IoT).

-- It would be useful to provide a basic definition of a =93composite-devic=
e=94 as the reader may not be familiar with this.  The terminology draft (d=
raft-birkholz-attestation-terminology-02) does not actually define it, unle=
ss I missed it.

-- Would it be useful to provide a paragraph that explains to the reader th=
at some matching reference values (i.e. matching the tree) are expected to =
be possessed by the Verifier for each client composite-device that seeks to=
 be verified.




-- thomas --

_______________________________________________
RATS mailing list
RATS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats


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Subject: [Rats] comments on draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-02
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Hi,

I am rather new here to please forgive my ignorance. I thought I start
by reading the architecture document. Some of my questions may just
show my ignorance but then this is what happens if you get fresh
reads...

- What is 'normative guidance'?

- Would it not make sense to also define the terms introduced in 1.1?

  - Claims
  - Evidence
  - Known-Good-Values
  - Endorsements
  - Attestation Results

  Perhaps section 1.1 should be folded into section 2 so that all
  terminology is defined in one place. What about terms such as

  - Attester
  - Verifier
  - Asserter
  - Relying Party

- What are 'architectural constituents'?

- Separation:

   A Computing Environment with the capability of remote attestation:

   o  is separate from other Attested Computing Environments (about
      which attestation evidence is created), and

  Does it always have to be separate? Is there an architectural
  requirement for these to be separate?

- If you read this document for the first time, it is difficult to put
  the various terms together in your head. Figure 1 helps but it comes
  a bit late, it would help if it would be shown early. It would have
  helped me if all key terms are defined upfront followed by a Figure
  explaining relationships or interactions before the discussion of
  details starts.

- Not sure this helps me understand things:

  (e.g.  Prinicipals that are Supply Chain Entities)

- What are Appraisals?

   [...]  Attestation Results are the output of appraisals.

  There is text in 3.3 about appraisals that I do not understand.  If
  Attestation Results are the output of appraisals, then appraisals
  are some form of a function. I thought that the Verifier is creating
  appraisals based on the received Evidence and the received
  Endorsements and that leads to Attestation Results, i.e., in a
  functional writing style:

  Verifier :: Known-Good-Values -> Endorsements -> Evidence -> Attestation =
Results

  This is also how I understand the definition of Verifier in 4.3.1.
  It seems appraisals are something internal to the logic of the
  Verifier, i.e., they may be produced by the logic of the Verifier but
  then the Attestation Results are really the output of the Verifier.

- Evidence

  I understand that Evidence is a specific form of a claim. I am not
  sure, though, what exactly turns a claim into Evidence.

   o  Evidence is provable Claims about a specific Computing Environment
      made by an Attester.

  What makes a claim a provable claim? Who is originating the claim
  and who is originating the Evidence?

- Endorsements

  It is not clear to me yet what the difference between Endorsements
  and KGV really is.

- Security Considerations

   RATS Evidence, Verifiable Assertions and Results SHOULD use formats
   ...

  Should that be

   RATS Evidence, Endorsements, Known-Good-Values, and Attestation
   Results SHOULD use formats ...

  to be consistent with terminology? The term 'Verifiable Assertions'
  shows up here the for the first time...

   [...]  Nonce Claims often piggy-
   back other information and can convey attestation semantics that are
   of essence to RATS, e.g. the last four bytes of a challenge nonce
   could be replaced by the IPv4 address-value of the Attester in its
   response.

  Despite wondering whether this is a good thing or a bad thing, I
  wonder why this is in the security considerations of the
  architecture document. The architecture does not define how Nonce
  Claims look like, so why would it discuss specific issues about
  Nonce Claims?

- Editorial

  s/capabile/capable/

  Singular/plural confusion in the following?

   Likely, there are a set of Claims that is widely applicable across
   most, if not all environments.  Conversely, there are Claims that are

/js

--=20
Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
Phone: +49 421 200 3587         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
Fax:   +49 421 200 3103         <https://www.jacobs-university.de/>


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