From mailman-owner@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 05:14:58 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id FAA10027 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 05:14:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id FAA26664 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 05:13:34 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 05:13:34 -0500 (EST) From: mailman-owner@ietf.org Message-Id: <200002011013.FAA26664@optimus.ietf.org> Subject: ietf.org mailing list memberships reminder To: raven-web-archive@optimus.ietf.org X-No-Archive: yes Precedence: bulk X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: This is a reminder, sent out once a month, about your ietf.org mailing list memberships. It includes your subscription info and how to use it to change it or unsubscribe from a list. 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Passwords for raven-web-archive@www.ietf.org: List Password // URL ---- -------- raven@ietf.org atEy http://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/raven/raven-web-archive@www.ietf.org From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 05:49:02 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id FAA10797 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 05:49:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id FAA03375; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 05:29:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id FAA03349 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 05:29:05 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id FAA10659 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 05:30:26 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002011030.FAA10659@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 28604 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 10:30:27 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 10:30:27 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:30:26 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.2.0.58.20000131202730.009c88f0@fast.synernet.com> References: <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 31 Jan 00, at 21:00, Ed Stone wrote: > > If they are criminals, arrest them. No need to bug folks who are already > arrestable and convictable. Just arrest them if they are committing crimes. > Typical? Total ignorance of organized crime and thus the underlying problem of this list? +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 07:08:08 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA11850 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:08:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA05254; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 06:43:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA05230 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 06:43:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from marvin.axion.bt.co.uk (marvin.axion.bt.co.uk [132.146.16.82]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA11431 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 06:44:25 -0500 (EST) From: phil.m.clarke@bt.com Received: from cbtlipnt01.btlabs.bt.co.uk by marvin (local) with ESMTP; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:41:16 +0000 Received: by cbtlipnt01.btlabs.bt.co.uk with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:42:00 -0000 Message-ID: <5104D4DBC598D211B5FE0000F8FE7EB20476F9A2@mbtlipnt02.btlabs.bt.co.uk> To: raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:42:12 -0000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > Typical? Total ignorance of organized crime and thus the underlying problem of this list? not really. "I talked with ... a human rights worker ... who documents atrocities from death squads. His documents are interviews with witnesses. If government troops were to capture these documents, they would find his witnesses and kill them. So he encrypts them ..." - Phil Zimmerman, USENIX Summer '94 'organised crime' is not limited to secret networks and shady italians in 1920's suits. _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 07:24:51 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA12345 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:24:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA05892; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:10:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA05863 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:10:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id HAA11930 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:11:49 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002011211.HAA11930@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 26715 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 12:11:47 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 12:11:47 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:11:47 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <5104D4DBC598D211B5FE0000F8FE7EB20476F9A2@mbtlipnt02.btlabs.bt.co.uk> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 11:42, phil.m.clarke@bt.com wrote: > > Typical? Total ignorance of organized crime and thus the underlying > problem of this list? > > not really. > > "I talked with ... a human rights worker ... who documents atrocities from > death squads. His documents are interviews with witnesses. If government > troops were to capture these documents, they would find his witnesses and > kill them. So he encrypts them ..." > > - Phil Zimmerman, USENIX Summer '94 > > > 'organised crime' is not limited to secret networks and shady italians in > 1920's suits. In this case regulated encryption probably means: They can get a licence! +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 07:39:35 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA13038 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:39:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA06479; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:34:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA06450 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:34:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from marvin.axion.bt.co.uk (marvin.axion.bt.co.uk [132.146.16.82]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA12919 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:35:54 -0500 (EST) From: phil.m.clarke@bt.com Received: from cbtlipnt01.btlabs.bt.co.uk by marvin (local) with ESMTP; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:35:19 +0000 Received: by cbtlipnt01.btlabs.bt.co.uk with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:36:05 -0000 Message-ID: <5104D4DBC598D211B5FE0000F8FE7EB20476F9A3@mbtlipnt02.btlabs.bt.co.uk> To: raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:36:18 -0000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > > "I talked with ... a human rights worker ... who documents atrocities > from > > death squads. His documents are interviews with witnesses. If government > > troops were to capture these documents, they would find his witnesses > and > > kill them. So he encrypts them ..." > > > > - Phil Zimmerman, USENIX Summer '94 > > In this case regulated encryption probably means: They can get a licence! "Dear Despot, I would like a license to operate regulated encryption within your territory and laws, for the purposes of undermining your forces of tyranny." .... ? Phil _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 07:46:01 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA13375 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:45:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA06252; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:29:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA06219 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:29:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from nix.swip.net (nix.swip.net [192.71.220.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA12624 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 07:30:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from localhost (bygg@localhost) by nix.swip.net (8.8.8/8.8.8) with SMTP id NAA04306 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:28:22 +0100 (MET) Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:28:21 +0100 (MET) From: Johnny Eriksson To: raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <200002011211.HAA11930@ietf.org> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Tue, 1 Feb 2000, chefren wrote: > On 1 Feb 00, at 11:42, phil.m.clarke@bt.com wrote: > > > > Typical? Total ignorance of organized crime and thus the underlying > > problem of this list? > > > > not really. > > > > "I talked with ... a human rights worker ... who documents atrocities from > > death squads. His documents are interviews with witnesses. If government > > troops were to capture these documents, they would find his witnesses and > > kill them. So he encrypts them ..." > > > > - Phil Zimmerman, USENIX Summer '94 > > > > > > 'organised crime' is not limited to secret networks and shady italians in > > 1920's suits. > > In this case regulated encryption probably means: > > They can get a licence! I have to admit that this is one of the funniest messages so far. A human rights worker, on unfriendly turf, that wants to keep secrets from this or that government, actually applying for a *licence* to use encryption from that same government, ... Why not throw in the concept of key escrow at the same time? Are you really that, eh, shortsighted or did you take lessons? > +++chefren --Johnny _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 08:48:10 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA16515 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:48:10 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA08749; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:43:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA08719 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:43:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA16376 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:44:49 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA19461 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:44:34 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000201084400.009996d0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 08:44:58 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <5104D4DBC598D211B5FE0000F8FE7EB20476F9A3@mbtlipnt02.btlabs .bt.co.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 07:36 AM 2/1/2000 , you wrote: > > > "I talked with ... a human rights worker ... who documents atrocities > > from > > > death squads. His documents are interviews with witnesses. If government > > > troops were to capture these documents, they would find his witnesses > > and > > > kill them. So he encrypts them ..." > > > > > > - Phil Zimmerman, USENIX Summer '94 > > > > In this case regulated encryption probably means: They can get a licence! > >"Dear Despot, I would like a license to operate regulated encryption within >your territory and laws, for the purposes of undermining your forces of >tyranny." > >.... ? > >Phil "What time would you like me to come down to the Ministry of Murder and Torture to pick up my permit?" >_______________________________________________ >raven mailing list >raven@ietf.org >http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 09:04:10 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA17364 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:04:10 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA08564; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:40:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA08535 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:40:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA16145 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:42:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA19436 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:41:48 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000201083808.009b1bc0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 08:42:13 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <200002011030.FAA10659@ietf.org> References: <4.2.0.58.20000131202730.009c88f0@fast.synernet.com> <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 05:30 AM 2/1/2000 , you wrote: >On 31 Jan 00, at 21:00, Ed Stone wrote: > > > > > If they are criminals, arrest them. No need to bug folks who are already > > arrestable and convictable. Just arrest them if they are committing crimes. > > > > >Typical? Total ignorance of organized crime and thus the >underlying problem of this list? Do you have a lot of experience with organized crime in Holland? I note that your incarceration rate is around 1/10th of that in the US. Shouldn't you lock up more people to deal with your rampant crime problem? You are not letting crime find a hiding place, are you? ;-) If you'd rather tap persons who can be, without tapping, proved guilty of a crime (i.e., they are "criminals" as you referred to them), then what you are interested in is wiretapping, not crime control. And the "underlying problem of this list" is not organized crime, rather it is privacy. -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 09:17:58 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA18179 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:17:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA09395; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:03:04 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA09368 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:03:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA17384 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:04:24 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA19633 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:04:11 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000201090214.009b18d0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 09:04:35 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <200002011030.FAA10659@ietf.org> References: <4.2.0.58.20000131202730.009c88f0@fast.synernet.com> <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 05:30 AM 2/1/2000 , you wrote: >On 31 Jan 00, at 21:00, Ed Stone wrote: > > > > > If they are criminals, arrest them. No need to bug folks who are already > > arrestable and convictable. Just arrest them if they are committing crimes. > > > > >Typical? Total ignorance of organized crime and thus the >underlying problem of this list? "Anybody using encryption technology, which protects electronic communcation from eavesdropping, should have delivered by hand a registration form to a tiny government office in a Beijing alleyway by Monday afternoon. All of China's estimated nine million Internet users were supposed to have turned up in person to comply -- if the letter of the new law had been followed. " Those who didn't turn up in person are criminals, right chefren? If not, why not? The Chinese govt is doing this to combat the rampant organized crime problem, right chefren? ;-) see http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/01/31/china.encryption.reut/index.html -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 10:54:58 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA22891 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 10:54:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA12742; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 10:39:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA12664 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 10:39:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from bommel.progressive-systems.com (216-132-55-12.velocityhsi.com [216.132.55.12]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA22355 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 10:41:15 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ge@localhost) by bommel.progressive-systems.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id IAA14729; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:41:11 -0700 Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 08:41:11 -0700 From: "Ge' Weijers" To: chefren Cc: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Message-ID: <20000201084111.C14590@progressive-systems.com> References: <200001312119.QAA15982@ietf.org> <4.2.0.58.20000131171841.00996b40@fast.synernet.com> <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org>; from chefren@pi.net on Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 01:32:12AM +0100 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 01:32:12AM +0100, chefren wrote: > If YOU were with law enforcement and the criminals were > using encryption, wouldn't you ask for laws that allow you > to place bugs in their keyboards? I would just bug the places where they operate, assuming they have given LE a good cause to be suspicious. That's an expensive operation. What we're talking about here is making it _easy_ for LE to snoop on people by accommodating electronic surveilance in protocols, which makes it economically feasible to monitor lots and lots of people. I'm sure 'proper' cause can be manufactured by lazy police, and a judge can be found to authorize it so it's all legal and proper. If there's a warrant it must be OK then. If _I_ was a LE officer I would still recognize that I have to work within certain limitations, and that LE risks being perceived as the enemy if it does not respect civil liberties. In the OJ Simpson case we saw a jury that could not trust the police because of the history of racial prejudice in the Los Angeles Police Dept. Recent news shows that this is not as farfetched as it may seem, 99 cases are reported to have been tainted by fabricated evidence. Ge' -- - Ge' Weijers Voice: (614)326 4600 Progressive Systems, Inc. FAX: (614)326 4601 2000 West Henderson Rd. Suite 400, Columbus OH 43220 _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 11:48:13 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA24823 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:48:12 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA14551; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:32:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA14522 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:32:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from mailgw1a.lmco.com (mailgw1a.lmco.com [192.31.106.7]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA24289 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:33:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from emss02g01.ems.lmco.com (emss02g01.ems.lmco.com [198.7.15.39]) by mailgw1a.lmco.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id JAA10610 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:33:37 -0700 (MST) Received: from CONVERSION-DAEMON by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) id <0FP900L01FBOJI@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:33:30 -0700 (MST) Received: from mbox.vs.lmco.com ([138.209.240.12]) by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) with ESMTP id <0FP9005DYFBKXV@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 09:33:20 -0700 (MST) Received: from poseidon (poseidon.vs.lmco.com [138.209.67.9]) by mbox.vs.lmco.com (8.8.5/8.8.8) with SMTP id KAA19750 for ; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 10:36:50 -0600 (CST) Received: from loupan.vs.lmco.com by poseidon (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA08710; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 10:37:43 -0600 (CST) Received: by loupan.vs.lmco.com (8.7.1) id QAA16600; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 16:37:27 +0000 (GMT) Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 10:37:27 -0600 From: Matthew Saroff Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-reply-to: Ge' Weijers <"Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> To: raven@ietf.org Reply-to: msaroff@pobox.com Message-id: <10002011037.ZM16598@loupan.vs.lmco.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Z-Mail (3.2.0 26oct94 MediaMail) Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT References: <200001312119.QAA15982@ietf.org> <4.2.0.58.20000131171841.00996b40@fast.synernet.com> <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org> <20000201084111.C14590@progressive-systems.com> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On May 11, 13:41, Ge' Weijers wrote: > If _I_ was a LE officer I would still recognize that I have to work > within certain limitations, and that LE risks being perceived as the > enemy if it does not respect civil liberties. In the OJ Simpson case > we saw a jury that could not trust the police because of the history > of racial prejudice in the Los Angeles Police Dept. Recent news shows > that this is not as farfetched as it may seem, 99 cases are reported > to have been tainted by fabricated evidence. The crisis is spreading, and is now not limited to Rampart division. Estimates range to more than as TEN THOUSAND cases. The 99 are just those most compelling cases currently under review. -- Matthew Saroff Do not reply directly to this message. Reply to msaroff@pobox.com _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 12:10:28 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA25547 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:10:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA15225; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:51:10 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA15198 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:51:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from mtiwmhc01.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc01.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.36]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA24981 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:52:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from alaptop.hotwired.com ([12.78.129.36]) by mtiwmhc01.worldnet.att.net (InterMail v03.02.07.07 118-134) with ESMTP id <20000201165155.UFV24946@alaptop.hotwired.com>; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:51:55 +0000 Message-Id: <4.3.0.29.0.20000201084912.01fe3050@pop.webcom.com> X-Sender: y2kc@pop.webcom.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.0.29 (Beta) Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 08:50:27 -0500 To: msaroff@pobox.com, raven@ietf.org From: Declan McCullagh Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <10002011037.ZM16598@loupan.vs.lmco.com> References: <"Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> <200001312119.QAA15982@ietf.org> <4.2.0.58.20000131171841.00996b40@fast.synernet.com> <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org> <20000201084111.C14590@progressive-systems.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org The LA public defenders office (do a web search) has all the relevant info on their web site. Last I checked in the fall, tens of thousands of conversations were illegally monitored; 99 cases underrepresents the breadth of police lawlessness. -Declan At 10:37 2/1/2000 -0600, Matthew Saroff wrote: >On May 11, 13:41, Ge' Weijers wrote: > > If _I_ was a LE officer I would still recognize that I have to work > > within certain limitations, and that LE risks being perceived as the > > enemy if it does not respect civil liberties. In the OJ Simpson case > > we saw a jury that could not trust the police because of the history > > of racial prejudice in the Los Angeles Police Dept. Recent news shows > > that this is not as farfetched as it may seem, 99 cases are reported > > to have been tainted by fabricated evidence. > The crisis is spreading, and is now not limited to Rampart division. > Estimates range to more than as TEN THOUSAND cases. The 99 are just those >most compelling cases currently under review. > >-- >Matthew Saroff >Do not reply directly to this message. Reply to >msaroff@pobox.com > >_______________________________________________ >raven mailing list >raven@ietf.org >http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 12:55:20 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA26803 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:55:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA17155; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:44:05 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA17125 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:44:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from yorktown.paranet.com (kirkwood.paranet.com [199.164.131.35]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA26608 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 12:45:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from sprintparanet.com (dhcp-65-247.phx.paranet.com [172.16.65.247]) by yorktown.paranet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA09470 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 11:40:14 -0600 (CST) Message-ID: <38971AC2.E2C4A697@sprintparanet.com> Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 10:41:22 -0700 From: Christian Price X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people References: <200001312119.QAA15982@ietf.org> <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit for tapping of encrypted data at the backbone to be effective, one would have to outlaw products which provide end-to-end encryption. since criminals by nature ignore laws, what will prevent them from ignoring the law banning end-to-end encryption? my guess is that this will only put the law abiding citizens at a disadvantage, while the criminals use as much encryption as they want, and the key recovery systems and taps at the backbone will be no use. another point, has anyone here read Ron Rivest's paper: "Chaffing and Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption" http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/chaffing.txt ?? I think it makes the whole issue of staving off strong encryption moot. Creative people will always find new alternatives that the law does not address. chefren wrote: > > Hm... As argued in another thread and before: The stronger > the encryption the stronger encountering laws for law > enforcement. > > If YOU were with law enforcement and the criminals were > using encryption, wouldn't you ask for laws that allow you > to place bugs in their keyboards? > > Inevitable and pretty dumb weapon race. > > +++chefren > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven -- --------.--------------------------------------. ------/ Christian Price / ----/ Assistant Technical Analyst / ---/ Four Corners Area ITOT/OSA / --/ SprintParanet, Phoenix Office / -/ 602-266-9242 / '--------------------------------------' _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 14:00:36 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA29003 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:00:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA18714; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:45:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA18689 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:45:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id NAA28490 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:46:40 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002011846.NAA28490@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 10119 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 18:46:32 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 18:46:32 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:46:30 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal References: <200002011211.HAA11930@ietf.org> In-reply-to: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 13:28, Johnny Eriksson wrote: > Are you really that, eh, shortsighted or did you take lessons? Studied somewhat more on the problems than others? I recognize most ideas here from quite some time ago. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 14:03:06 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA29104 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:03:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA18625; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:43:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA18596 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:43:50 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id NAA28442 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:45:04 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002011845.NAA28442@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 8720 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 18:44:40 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 18:44:40 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:44:38 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.3.0.29.0.20000201084912.01fe3050@pop.webcom.com> References: <10002011037.ZM16598@loupan.vs.lmco.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 8:50, Declan McCullagh wrote: > Date sent: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 08:50:27 -0500 > To: msaroff@pobox.com, raven@ietf.org > From: Declan McCullagh > Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > > The LA public defenders office (do a web search) has all the relevant info > on their web site. Last I checked in the fall, tens of thousands of > conversations were illegally monitored; 99 cases underrepresents the > breadth of police lawlessness. > > -Declan > > > At 10:37 2/1/2000 -0600, Matthew Saroff wrote: > >On May 11, 13:41, Ge' Weijers wrote: > > > If _I_ was a LE officer I would still recognize that I have to work > > > within certain limitations, and that LE risks being perceived as the > > > enemy if it does not respect civil liberties. In the OJ Simpson case > > > we saw a jury that could not trust the police because of the history > > > of racial prejudice in the Los Angeles Police Dept. Recent news shows > > > that this is not as farfetched as it may seem, 99 cases are reported > > > to have been tainted by fabricated evidence. > > The crisis is spreading, and is now not limited to Rampart division. > > Estimates range to more than as TEN THOUSAND cases. The 99 are just those > >most compelling cases currently under review. I understand most of you out there hate it but there is only ONE way to get rid of this: Better procedures. Technically speaking: Better standards. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 14:08:40 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA29210 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:08:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA18896; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:50:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA18873 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:50:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id NAA28717 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:52:14 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002011852.NAA28717@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 15039 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 18:51:52 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 18:51:52 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:51:51 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.2.0.58.20000201083808.009b1bc0@fast.synernet.com> References: <200002011030.FAA10659@ietf.org> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 8:42, Ed Stone wrote: > At 05:30 AM 2/1/2000 , you wrote: > >On 31 Jan 00, at 21:00, Ed Stone wrote: > > > > > > > > If they are criminals, arrest them. No need to bug folks who are already > > > arrestable and convictable. Just arrest them if they are committing crimes. > > > > > > > > >Typical? Total ignorance of organized crime and thus the > >underlying problem of this list? > > > Do you have a lot of experience with organized crime in Holland? I note > that your incarceration rate is around 1/10th of that in the US. Shouldn't > you lock up more people to deal with your rampant crime problem? You are > not letting crime find a hiding place, are you? ;-) As said here, the Netherlands has the most -official- taps in the world. The taps are mostly used for organized crime and some for murder. > If you'd rather tap persons who can be, without tapping, proved guilty of a > crime (i.e., they are "criminals" as you referred to them), then what you > are interested in is wiretapping, not crime control. Pretty impossible, with tapping it's possible to get a view on the organization. Hierarchy, spread, and all kind of details. > And the "underlying problem of this list" is not organized crime, rather it > is privacy. That's what the people who are little interested in society think? In serious countries tapping has definitely arrived in laws because of crime not because it breaks privacy. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 14:08:53 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA29229 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:08:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA19077; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:54:10 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA19051 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:54:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id NAA28841 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 13:55:22 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002011855.NAA28841@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 18167 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 18:55:13 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 18:55:13 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:55:12 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <20000201084111.C14590@progressive-systems.com> References: <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org>; from chefren@pi.net on Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 01:32:12AM +0100 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 8:41, Ge' Weijers wrote: > On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 01:32:12AM +0100, chefren wrote: > > If YOU were with law enforcement and the criminals were > > using encryption, wouldn't you ask for laws that allow you > > to place bugs in their keyboards? > > I would just bug the places where they operate, How do you know without being able to follow the communication? (We live in a world were someone in Australia can keep a drug gang going on in Amsterdam without physical contact.) > assuming they have given LE a good cause to be > suspicious. That's an expensive operation. Yes, too expensive in practice. > What we're talking about here is making it _easy_ for LE to snoop on > people by accommodating electronic surveilance in protocols, which > makes it economically feasible to monitor lots and lots of people. I'm > sure 'proper' cause can be manufactured by lazy police, and a judge > can be found to authorize it so it's all legal and proper. If there's > a warrant it must be OK then. And the authentication part must give lawyers a chance to get out of the courts again so it's useless. .. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 14:43:37 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA00350 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:43:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA20313; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:33:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA20285 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:32:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA00124 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:34:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA21958 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:33:50 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000201142825.009e9ef0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 14:34:10 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <200002011845.NAA28442@ietf.org> References: <4.3.0.29.0.20000201084912.01fe3050@pop.webcom.com> <10002011037.ZM16598@loupan.vs.lmco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > > > > The crisis is spreading, and is now not limited to Rampart > division. > > > Estimates range to more than as TEN THOUSAND cases. The 99 are just > those > > >most compelling cases currently under review. > > >I understand most of you out there hate it but there is >only ONE way to get rid of this: Better procedures. > >Technically speaking: Better standards. You mean that when Illinois turns free 13 death row convicts after finding out they were not guilty, during a time in which 12 were actually executed, the cure is to make a better electric chair? -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 14:50:53 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA00555 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:50:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA20509; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:39:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA20484 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:39:00 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA00311 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:40:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA22016 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:40:07 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000201143633.009e8190@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 14:40:25 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <200002011852.NAA28717@ietf.org> References: <4.2.0.58.20000201083808.009b1bc0@fast.synernet.com> <200002011030.FAA10659@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > > And the "underlying problem of this list" is not organized crime, > rather it > > is privacy. > >That's what the people who are little interested in society >think? > > >In serious countries tapping has definitely arrived in laws >because of crime not because it breaks privacy. You state well what has been called "the creed of slaves": "Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves. " William Pitt to the House of Commons, November 18, 1783 -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 15:40:23 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA02255 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:40:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA21736; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:23:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA21709 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:23:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id PAA01692 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:24:49 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002012024.PAA01692@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 1078 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 20:24:36 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 20:24:36 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 21:24:30 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal References: Ge' Weijers <"Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> In-reply-to: <10002011037.ZM16598@loupan.vs.lmco.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 10:37, Matthew Saroff wrote: > The crisis is spreading, and is now not limited to Rampart division. > Estimates range to more than as TEN THOUSAND cases. The 99 are just those > most compelling cases currently under review. Estimates... I thought there were computers these days. US definitely needs auditable taps... +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 16:20:31 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA04191 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:20:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA23043; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:05:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA23013 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:05:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from mailgw1a.lmco.com (mailgw1a.lmco.com [192.31.106.7]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA03429 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:06:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from emss02g01.ems.lmco.com (emss02g01.ems.lmco.com [198.7.15.39]) by mailgw1a.lmco.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id OAA12461 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:06:12 -0700 (MST) Received: from CONVERSION-DAEMON by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) id <0FP900501RY8CT@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 14:06:09 -0700 (MST) Received: from mbox.vs.lmco.com ([138.209.240.12]) by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) with ESMTP id <0FP900CZPRY2OL@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 14:06:04 -0700 (MST) Received: from poseidon (poseidon.vs.lmco.com [138.209.67.9]) by mbox.vs.lmco.com (8.8.5/8.8.8) with SMTP id PAA29338 for ; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 15:09:33 -0600 (CST) Received: from loupan.vs.lmco.com by poseidon (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA17636; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 15:10:26 -0600 (CST) Received: by loupan.vs.lmco.com (8.7.1) id VAA17208; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 21:10:09 +0000 (GMT) Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 15:10:09 -0600 From: Matthew Saroff Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-reply-to: chefren <"RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> To: raven@ietf.org Reply-to: msaroff@pobox.com Message-id: <10002011510.ZM17206@loupan.vs.lmco.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Z-Mail (3.2.0 26oct94 MediaMail) Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT References: <200002011211.HAA11930@ietf.org> <200002011846.NAA28490@ietf.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On May 12, 0:47, chefren wrote: > Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > On 1 Feb 00, at 13:28, Johnny Eriksson wrote: > > > Are you really that, eh, shortsighted or did you take lessons? > > > Studied somewhat more on the problems than others? > > I recognize most ideas here from quite some time ago. He manufactures tapping equipment. He's bought and paid for. It's his livelyhood. -- Matthew Saroff Do not reply directly to this message. Reply to msaroff@pobox.com _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 16:27:22 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA04559 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:27:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA23528; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:19:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA23500 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:19:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id QAA04217 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:20:50 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002012120.QAA04217@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 20598 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 21:19:34 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 21:19:34 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 22:19:31 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.2.0.58.20000201142825.009e9ef0@fast.synernet.com> References: <200002011845.NAA28442@ietf.org> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 14:34, Ed Stone wrote: > > > > > > > The crisis is spreading, and is now not limited to Rampart > > division. > > > > Estimates range to more than as TEN THOUSAND cases. The 99 are just > > those > > > >most compelling cases currently under review. > > > > > >I understand most of you out there hate it but there is > >only ONE way to get rid of this: Better procedures. > > > >Technically speaking: Better standards. > > > You mean that when Illinois turns free 13 death row convicts after finding > out they were not guilty, during a time in which 12 were actually executed, > the cure is to make a better electric chair? No, the cure is better procedures to prevent them getting unnecessarilly in the death row. This is were standards are needed, education standards for the people who study the case. If still too many not guilty people arrive in death row, the standards have to be adjusted. Also very simple standards like "after conviction no electric chair within xxx day's" can help. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 16:34:27 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA04953 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:34:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA23683; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:24:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA23658 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:24:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id QAA04487 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:25:11 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002012125.QAA04487@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 23803 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 21:23:07 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 21:23:07 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 22:23:05 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal References: chefren <"RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> In-reply-to: <10002011510.ZM17206@loupan.vs.lmco.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 15:10, Matthew Saroff wrote: > He manufactures tapping equipment. He's bought and paid for. It's his > livelyhood. Even if it would be true, would it matter? I can still be right... +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 16:36:44 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA05106 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:36:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA23356; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:13:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA23324 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:13:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id QAA03994 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:14:55 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002012114.QAA03994@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 16316 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 21:14:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.19) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 21:14:49 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 22:14:38 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <38971AC2.E2C4A697@sprintparanet.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 10:41, Christian Price wrote: > for tapping of encrypted data at the backbone to be effective, one would > have to outlaw products which provide end-to-end encryption. since > criminals by nature ignore laws, what will prevent them from ignoring > the law banning end-to-end encryption? my guess is that this will only > put the law abiding citizens at a disadvantage, while the criminals use > as much encryption as they want, and the key recovery systems and taps > at the backbone will be no use. > > another point, has anyone here read Ron Rivest's paper: > "Chaffing and Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption" > http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/chaffing.txt ?? > > I think it makes the whole issue of staving off strong encryption moot. > Creative people will always find new alternatives that the law does not > address. When encryption is regulated also having the programs will be regulated don't you think? So if you are caught having encryption, chaffing&winnowing and or steganography programs without permit, your are a... criminal! Not necessarily an organized one of course. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 17:16:44 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA07259 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 17:16:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA24756; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:55:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA24729 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:55:18 -0500 (EST) Received: from yorktown.paranet.com (kirkwood.paranet.com [199.164.131.35]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA06161 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:56:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from sprintparanet.com (dhcp-65-247.phx.paranet.com [172.16.65.247]) by yorktown.paranet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA13550; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 15:51:31 -0600 (CST) Message-ID: <389755A5.3D203F74@sprintparanet.com> Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 14:52:37 -0700 From: Christian Price X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: chefren CC: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people References: <200002012114.QAA03994@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit chefren wrote: > > On 1 Feb 00, at 10:41, Christian Price wrote: > > > for tapping of encrypted data at the backbone to be effective, one would > > have to outlaw products which provide end-to-end encryption. since > > criminals by nature ignore laws, what will prevent them from ignoring > > the law banning end-to-end encryption? my guess is that this will only > > put the law abiding citizens at a disadvantage, while the criminals use > > as much encryption as they want, and the key recovery systems and taps > > at the backbone will be no use. > > > > another point, has anyone here read Ron Rivest's paper: > > "Chaffing and Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption" > > http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/chaffing.txt ?? > > > > I think it makes the whole issue of staving off strong encryption moot. > > Creative people will always find new alternatives that the law does not > > address. > > When encryption is regulated also having the programs will > be regulated don't you think? How will this stop the criminals from using it? Criminals have access to lots of illegal things _because_ they operate outside the law. So the question is: If the criminals still use end-to-end encryption how will your system of taps help you track and arrest them? > So if you are caught having encryption, chaffing&winnowing > and or steganography programs without permit, your are a... > criminal! by definition if it is illegal. I notice that we are using the term criminal rather loosely here. a criminal is someone who breaks the law, not necessarily a bad person. law != morality. (!= is not equal). when blacks in the south chose to ride busses in the white only sections they were breaking the law to make th epoint that the law was wrong. they were in that sense criminals. yet we hold them in high moral regard. > Not necessarily an organized one of course. > > +++chefren > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven -- --------.--------------------------------------. ------/ Christian Price / ----/ Assistant Technical Analyst / ---/ Four Corners Area ITOT/OSA / --/ SprintParanet, Phoenix Office / -/ 602-266-9242 / '--------------------------------------' _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 19:03:07 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA10317 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:03:07 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA28185; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 18:54:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA28161 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 18:54:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id SAA10040 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 18:55:49 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002012355.SAA10040@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 11304 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2000 23:55:38 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.121) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 2000 23:55:38 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 00:55:33 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <389755A5.3D203F74@sprintparanet.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 1 Feb 00, at 14:52, Christian Price wrote: > chefren wrote: > > When encryption is regulated also having the programs will > > be regulated don't you think? > > How will this stop the criminals from using it? Criminals have access > to lots of illegal things _because_ they operate outside the law. True but that makes them detectable and punishable. The punishments are ajusted so everything is in balance with democratic will of the people. > So the question is: If the criminals still use end-to-end encryption > how will your system of taps help you track and arrest them? I still claim encrypted files will be more or less detectable with very advaced virus-scan like programs. So if a tap is made by law enforcement the officers will get some grip on the data just like with telephone taps. If they don't get enough grip and still think something is wrong they can go further. Regarding "chaffing", that's more or less their job. > > So if you are caught having encryption, chaffing&winnowing > > and or steganography programs without permit, your are a... > > criminal! > > by definition if it is illegal. > > I notice that we are using the term criminal rather loosely here. a > criminal is someone who breaks the law, not necessarily a bad person. > law != morality. (!= is not equal). when blacks in the south chose to > ride busses in the white only sections they were breaking the law to > make th epoint that the law was wrong. they were in that sense > criminals. yet we hold them in high moral regard. OK, and a criminal is only a criminal if convicted. > .. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 1 19:27:19 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA10763 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:27:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA28766; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:11:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA28735 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:11:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from mailgw1a.lmco.com (mailgw1a.lmco.com [192.31.106.7]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA10490 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 19:13:05 -0500 (EST) Received: from emss02g01.ems.lmco.com (emss02g01.ems.lmco.com [198.7.15.39]) by mailgw1a.lmco.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id RAA23260 for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 17:13:05 -0700 (MST) Received: from CONVERSION-DAEMON by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) id <0FPA002010LPUP@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 17:13:02 -0700 (MST) Received: from mbox.vs.lmco.com ([138.209.240.12]) by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) with ESMTP id <0FPA00OWT0LNAE@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 17:12:59 -0700 (MST) Received: from poseidon (poseidon.vs.lmco.com [138.209.67.9]) by mbox.vs.lmco.com (8.8.5/8.8.8) with SMTP id SAA05290 for ; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 18:16:29 -0600 (CST) Received: from loupan.vs.lmco.com by poseidon (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA25497; Tue, 01 Feb 2000 18:17:22 -0600 (CST) Received: by loupan.vs.lmco.com (8.7.1) id AAA17473; Wed, 02 Feb 2000 00:17:06 +0000 (GMT) Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 18:17:05 -0600 From: Matthew Saroff Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-reply-to: chefren <"Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> To: raven@ietf.org Reply-to: msaroff@pobox.com Message-id: <10002011817.ZM17471@loupan.vs.lmco.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Z-Mail (3.2.0 26oct94 MediaMail) Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT References: <200002012355.SAA10040@ietf.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On May 12, 5:56, chefren wrote: > > > So if you are caught having encryption, chaffing&winnowing > > > and or steganography programs without permit, your are a... > > > criminal! > > > > by definition if it is illegal. > > > > I notice that we are using the term criminal rather loosely here. a > > criminal is someone who breaks the law, not necessarily a bad person. > > law != morality. (!= is not equal). when blacks in the south chose to > > ride busses in the white only sections they were breaking the law to > > make th epoint that the law was wrong. they were in that sense > > criminals. yet we hold them in high moral regard. > > OK, and a criminal is only a criminal if convicted. THEY WERE CONVICTED. Dr. King spent months in Jail, as did Ghandi, Mandela, etc. Of course, they convicted, so by your definitions, they were criminals. Pray that you never find the equivlanet of an all white jury. -- Matthew Saroff Do not reply directly to this message. Reply to msaroff@pobox.com _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 04:26:20 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id EAA01956 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 04:26:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id EAA24330; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 04:02:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id EAA24302 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 04:02:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from marvin.axion.bt.co.uk (marvin.axion.bt.co.uk [132.146.16.82]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id EAA01632 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 04:03:53 -0500 (EST) From: phil.m.clarke@bt.com Received: from cbtlipnt01.btlabs.bt.co.uk by marvin (local) with ESMTP; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:03:04 +0000 Received: by cbtlipnt01.btlabs.bt.co.uk with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:04:05 -0000 Message-ID: <5104D4DBC598D211B5FE0000F8FE7EB20476F9A8@mbtlipnt02.btlabs.bt.co.uk> To: raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:04:06 -0000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > >there is only ONE way to get rid of this: Better procedures. > > > ... the cure is better procedures to prevent them getting unnecessarilly in the death row. Chefren, show us how, and tell us who the incorruptibles are who will monitor these standards. not forgetting that an entire police force of a city numbering millions couldnt control itself. > Also very simple standards like "after conviction no electric chair within xxx day's" can help. how many days is xxx then? Shall I bother to trail the history books for people proven innocent years after their execution? Face some simple facts: authorities are not immune to corruption. Authorities are the most difficult entity to police. Law is not infallible. Then perhaps we can get back to the purpose of the mailing list - ie should the IETF blah blah blah. Phil _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 04:41:34 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id EAA02119 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 04:41:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id EAA24704; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 04:18:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id EAA24673 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 04:18:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from fep7.mail.ozemail.net (fep7-old.mail.ozemail.net [203.2.192.99]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id EAA01913 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 04:19:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn11p14.ozemail.com.au [210.84.11.142]) by fep7.mail.ozemail.net (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id UAA06066 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 20:19:29 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 20:16:50 +1100 Message-ID: <002201bf6d5e$3caa4b50$8e0b54d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 In-reply-to: <5104D4DBC598D211B5FE0000F8FE7EB20476F9A8@mbtlipnt02.btlabs.bt.co.uk> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I think one simple answer can be explored. WE monitor the "authorities". The Auuthorities should be there to serve US. How - by providing a reliable evidence trail in the technology WE use. Do WE have this capability today? Not even close! Regards, Lyal > -----Original Message----- > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of > phil.m.clarke@bt.com > Sent: Wednesday, 2 February 2000 20:04 > To: raven@ietf.org > Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > > > > >there is only ONE way to get rid of this: Better procedures. > > > > > ... the cure is better procedures to prevent them getting unnecessarilly > in the death row. > > Chefren, show us how, and tell us who the incorruptibles are who will > monitor these standards. > > not forgetting that an entire police force of a city numbering millions > couldnt control itself. > > > Also very simple standards like "after conviction no electric > chair within > xxx day's" can help. > > how many days is xxx then? Shall I bother to trail the history books for > people proven innocent years after their execution? > > > > Face some simple facts: authorities are not immune to corruption. > Authorities are the most difficult entity to police. Law is not > infallible. > Then perhaps we can get back to the purpose of the mailing list - > ie should > the IETF blah blah blah. > > Phil > > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 07:27:15 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA04247 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 07:27:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA29173; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 07:08:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA29144 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 07:08:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA03753 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 07:10:18 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id HAA09237 for raven@ietf.org; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 07:10:17 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 02 Feb 2000 07:10:17 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 26 Message-ID: <86ln53ls9i.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <200002012355.SAA10040@ietf.org> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > I still claim encrypted files will be more or less > detectable with very advaced virus-scan like programs. Bunk. Good encryption is not distinguishable from good random number generation. > So > if a tap is made by law enforcement the officers will get > some grip on the data just like with telephone taps. If > they don't get enough grip and still think something is > wrong they can go further. Regarding "chaffing", that's > more or less their job. "Mr. Chefren, you're under arrest for encyphering without a license. We've captured packets on the Internet with your IP address on in them. We couldn't figure out how to decode the payload, so you must be using illegal encryption." Yeah, this sounds like a great plan. -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 08:17:08 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA06793 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:17:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA00913; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:03:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA00884 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:03:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from lint.cisco.com (lint.cisco.com [171.68.224.209]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA05991 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:04:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from bigger-dawgs (pferguso-isdn.cisco.com [171.70.114.134]) by lint.cisco.com (8.8.6 (PHNE_14041)/CISCO.SERVER.1.2) with ESMTP id FAA23817 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 05:04:25 -0800 (PST) Message-Id: <4.2.2.20000202080343.00a47450@lint.cisco.com> X-Sender: pferguso@lint.cisco.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.2 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 08:04:12 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Paul Ferguson Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org FYI. - paul >To: IETF-Announce:; >Cc: iab@isi.edu >From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org >Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org >Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt >Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 06:35:51 -0500 >Sender: nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us >X-SPAM: Yes >X-SPAM-REASON: Suspicious TO Address >X-SMTP-HELO: loki.ietf.org >X-SMTP-MAIL-FROM: ietf-123-owner@loki.ietf.org >X-SMAP-Received-From: outside >X-SMTP-PEER-INFO: loki.ietf.org [132.151.1.177] > >A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts >directories. >This draft is a work item of the Internet Architecture Board Working Group >of the IETF. > > Title : IETF Policy on Wiretapping > Author(s) : B. Carpenter, F. Baker > Filename : draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt > Pages : 8 > Date : 01-Feb-00 > >The IETF has been asked to take a position on the inclusion into IETF >standards-track documents of functionality designed to facilitate >wiretapping. > >This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its >answer is 'no', and what that answer means. > >A URL for this Internet-Draft is: >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt > >Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username >"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, >type "cd internet-drafts" and then > "get draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt". > >A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in >http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html >or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt > > >Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail. > >Send a message to: > mailserv@ietf.org. >In the body type: > "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt". > >NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in > MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this > feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" > command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or > a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers > exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with > "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split > up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on > how to manipulate these messages. > > >Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader >implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the >Internet-Draft. >Content-Type: text/plain >Content-ID: <20000201104606.I-D@ietf.org> > >ENCODING mime >FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt > > _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 09:13:42 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA09730 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:13:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA02360; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:56:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA02282 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:56:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA08933 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:58:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA26147 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:53:48 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000202081153.009dc710@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 08:53:28 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <002201bf6d5e$3caa4b50$8e0b54d2@here> References: <5104D4DBC598D211B5FE0000F8FE7EB20476F9A8@mbtlipnt02.btlabs.bt.co.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 04:16 AM 2/2/2000 , you wrote: >I think one simple answer can be explored. >WE monitor the "authorities". The Auuthorities should be there to serve US. >How - by providing a reliable evidence trail in the technology WE use. >Do WE have this capability today? Not even close! > >Regards, >Lyal And this evidence trail --- it would be harder to subvert than current Los Angeles police evidence trails in which thousands of convictions are likely to be thrown out or challenged for police perjury, and other misconduct? There, police have lied under oath when testifying about chain of evidence, about actions of defendants, about shootings followed by police throwing down the throw-down gun. There have been thousands of wiretaps on thousands of phones from a single improperly approved judicial warrant, etc. [It is noteworthy to describe how the LA Rampart police criminality was discovered. It was not via self monitoring of the police by the police. It was by a policeman, who had been inadvertantly arrested for separate crimes (using his policeman status to steal crack and cocaine and resell it thru prostitutes and providing protection for them) who offered to finger other police crimes for a reduced sentence.] Why is it so hard to understand that the fears one has of crime in the general population are equalled if not exceeded by justifiable and reasonable fears about crime in the government, law enforcement, and surveillance, where there is less accountability and greater secrecy -- and guns/power to arrest and imprison? Why is it so hard to understand that technical standards do not constrain the behavior of sovereign governments? Why is so hard to understand the natural suspicions of governmental entities who tell us they will police themselves, investigate themselves, place requirements on themselves, and be judge and jury on themselves? To trust such unprecedented additions to the concentration of power and authority in governments defies our understanding of history and human nature. One must ignore both to have even a reasonable hope that the good done by "crime control" will exceed the harm done by concentrating this secretly-used power in government, and stressing government to manage accumulated powers that are beyond its wisdom, morality (?), and temptations. Governments have murdered 170 million of their own subjects this century, excluding civil wars and international wars. There is no grouping of persons or organizations, to which the surveillance is proposed to be deployed, who can match the record of governments for outright murder. ("Death by Government"). It is not that the people in government are more evil than other people; rather it's that concentrations of power (including power to arrest and imprison and a legal monopoly on violence), combined with secrecy and general self-policing, inevitably result in abuse. The history of avoiding that is based not on protocols, but on limiting accumulations and concentrations of power. Where that fails, we find the major horrors of the twentieth century, far beyond any damage any non-government terrorist assemblage has ever committed. Those who think some standard or protocol by IETF can keep them on the straight and narrow have thus far failed to provide more than unsupported assertion as to that belief. Those who think IETF participating in building standards or protocols will constrain governments to a higher quality, more moral and limited surveillance behavior have thus far failed to provide a shred of evidence to demonstrate how such effort will constrain governments. Those who think such standards and protocols as an "auditable tap" can constrain a goverment who chooses from time to time not to be so constrained, have yet to provide even a science-fiction level description of how an "auditable tap" can tie the the hands of that miscreant government. Lastly, no one has pointed to any law (CALEA and its FCC August ruling) that provides basis in US law that requires IETF to do anything; the August FCC ruling is under legal challenge in court now. And no one has described the basis on which one nation's laws must direct IETF while another nation's laws would be ignored by IETF. That is why "IETF should NOT and will NOT participate in the creation or modification of protocols or standards to facilitate wiretapping...." And chefren, before you fall back on the mindless rubric that "it must be done because democracies require it", please simply turn back the clock sixty years, look a few miles southeast from where you now comfortably sit, and ponder what that democracy "required". That logical process is: 1. Is the entity that requires the action a democracy? 2. If yes, do the action and do not resist. History has taught us that each person must evaluate the action and its effects, not just the entity that issues the orders. I would have thought that lesson would be more widespread in Holland, at least. -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 09:18:39 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA09889 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:18:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA02461; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:59:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA02436 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:59:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net (wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net [192.48.96.19]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA09088 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:00:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from genesis by wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: cust117.tnt2.dial.tor2.uunet.ca [209.47.187.117]) id QQiaqy16540 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:00:58 GMT Message-ID: <002701bf6d85$e874a620$d964c8c7@genesis> From: "Richard Payne" To: References: <4.2.2.20000202080343.00a47450@lint.cisco.com> Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:00:47 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > > > >The IETF has been asked to take a position on the inclusion into IETF > >standards-track documents of functionality designed to facilitate > >wiretapping. > > > >This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its > >answer is 'no', and what that answer means. > > > >A URL for this Internet-Draft is: > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt > > The draft is eminently reasonable. Kudos to the authors. Richard Payne _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 09:31:00 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA10529 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:30:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA02985; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:20:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA02957 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:20:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA09995 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:22:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA26329 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:21:43 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000202092143.009d49a0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 09:22:09 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <86ln53ls9i.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <200002012355.SAA10040@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 07:10 AM 2/2/2000 , you wrote: >chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > > I still claim encrypted files will be more or less > > detectable with very advaced virus-scan like programs. > >Bunk. Good encryption is not distinguishable from good random number >generation. > > > So > > if a tap is made by law enforcement the officers will get > > some grip on the data just like with telephone taps. If > > they don't get enough grip and still think something is > > wrong they can go further. Regarding "chaffing", that's > > more or less their job. > >"Mr. Chefren, you're under arrest for encyphering without a license. >We've captured packets on the Internet with your IP address on in >them. We couldn't figure out how to decode the payload, so you must >be using illegal encryption." > >Yeah, this sounds like a great plan. "There's no way to rule innocent men. The only power any government has is the power to crack down on criminals. Well, when there aren't enough criminals, one makes them. One declares so many things to be a crime that it becomes impossible for men to live without breaking laws." Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, Ch. III, "White Blackmail" -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 09:53:44 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA11250 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:53:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA03475; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:40:37 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA03447 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:40:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA10909 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:41:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA26417 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 09:41:42 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000202094031.009e6100@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 09:42:05 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt In-Reply-To: <4.2.2.20000202080343.00a47450@lint.cisco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org "Wiretapping is what occurs when information passed across the Internet from one party to one or more other parties is delivered to a third party: 1. Without the sending party knowing about the third party 2. Without any of the recipient parties knowing about the delivery to the third party 3. When the normal expectation of the sender is that his information will only be seen by the recipient parties or parties obliged to keep the information in confidence 4. When the third party acts deliberately to target the transmission of the first party, either because he is of interest, or because the second party's reception is of interest. Thus, for instance, ... random monitoring is not wiretapping (condition 4 violated)..." Source: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven- 00.txt This is outrageous. A third party taps a communication in secret, but the selection is NOT targeted to a SPECIFIC person, so it is not "wiretapping". This is simply incredible! Example: Monitoring equipment is set to randomly monitor a proportion of traffic through a specific device (say, Mae West). No person or IP is targeted for monitoring, rather a machine selects random IPs that meet the "proportion of traffic" setting. So the "proportion of traffic" setting is set to .002% on Monday. Any problem? The monitoring is not wiretapping because no one is "targeted", right? On Tuesday, the setting is set to 64.2%. Still no one is targeted, right? On Wednesday, the setting is set to 92.6%. No one is targeted, right? The machine is picking IPs at random, right? So it's not wiretapping, right? So we are to understand that IETF thinks that it's not wiretapping if you just tap damn near everyone, but don't target anyone? We need a little rework here, I'd say. And conspicuously absent is the description of the portion of the vote at the meeting that voted NO. Only the votes for and abstentions are subjectively quantified.... -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 10:50:03 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA13085 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 10:50:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA06544; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 10:29:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA06514 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 10:29:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from bommel.progressive-systems.com (216-132-55-12.velocityhsi.com [216.132.55.12]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA12602 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 10:31:04 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ge@localhost) by bommel.progressive-systems.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id IAA19845; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:31:01 -0700 Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 08:31:01 -0700 From: "Ge' Weijers" To: chefren Cc: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Message-ID: <20000202083100.B18928@progressive-systems.com> References: <200002010032.TAA19028@ietf.org>; <20000201084111.C14590@progressive-systems.com> <200002011855.NAA28841@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <200002011855.NAA28841@ietf.org>; from chefren@pi.net on Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 07:55:12PM +0100 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 07:55:12PM +0100, chefren wrote: > On 1 Feb 00, at 8:41, Ge' Weijers wrote: > > > On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 01:32:12AM +0100, chefren wrote: > > > If YOU were with law enforcement and the criminals were > > > using encryption, wouldn't you ask for laws that allow you > > > to place bugs in their keyboards? > > > > I would just bug the places where they operate, > > How do you know without being able to follow the > communication? > > (We live in a world were someone in Australia can keep a > drug gang going on in Amsterdam without physical contact.) But the drug gang can be found because they have to move drugs around. There are all kinds of ways to get at this drug gang: infiltration, informants, bugging the gang members' homes, etc. A crime that's completely undetectable outside cyberspace is a questionable crime at best. > > > assuming they have given LE a good cause to be > > suspicious. That's an expensive operation. > > Yes, too expensive in practice. Yes, it's much cheaper to snoop. So if someone is killed in the Vondelpark you just tap all the phone lines in a 30 km radius? Technology and economies of scale will make this all possible. Where do you stop? -- - Ge' Weijers Voice: (614)326 4600 Progressive Systems, Inc. FAX: (614)326 4601 2000 West Henderson Rd. Suite 400, Columbus OH 43220 _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 11:32:46 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA14135 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:32:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA08039; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:16:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA08007 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:16:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from yorktown.paranet.com (kirkwood.paranet.com [199.164.131.35]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA13759 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:17:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from sprintparanet.com (dhcp-65-247.phx.paranet.com [172.16.65.247]) by yorktown.paranet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA25655 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 10:12:30 -0600 (CST) Message-ID: <389857AD.8AA6B626@sprintparanet.com> Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 09:13:33 -0700 From: Christian Price X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people References: <200002012355.SAA10040@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit chefren wrote: > > On 1 Feb 00, at 14:52, Christian Price wrote: > > > chefren wrote: > > > > When encryption is regulated also having the programs will > > > be regulated don't you think? > > > > How will this stop the criminals from using it? Criminals have access > > to lots of illegal things _because_ they operate outside the law. > > True but that makes them detectable and punishable. The > punishments are ajusted so everything is in balance with > democratic will of the people. > > > So the question is: If the criminals still use end-to-end encryption > > how will your system of taps help you track and arrest them? > > I still claim encrypted files will be more or less > detectable with very advaced virus-scan like programs. So > if a tap is made by law enforcement the officers will get > some grip on the data just like with telephone taps. If > they don't get enough grip and still think something is > wrong they can go further. Regarding "chaffing", that's > more or less their job. and I would dispute that claim given that it is possible to use encryption strong enough to not be broken within a useful time and it is possible to disguise the identity/location of the sender (and the reciever too if I am not mistaken), how can LE gain any useful information from your tap? It seems to me that they need to be able to learn one of three things from the tap: the content of the message, the origin of the message or the destination of the message. without any of these items, there is nothing to do except report that there is a problem - exactly the situation we have now. > > > So if you are caught having encryption, chaffing&winnowing > > > and or steganography programs without permit, your are a... > > > criminal! > > > > by definition if it is illegal. > > > > I notice that we are using the term criminal rather loosely here. a > > criminal is someone who breaks the law, not necessarily a bad person. > > law != morality. (!= is not equal). when blacks in the south chose to > > ride busses in the white only sections they were breaking the law to > > make th epoint that the law was wrong. they were in that sense > > criminals. yet we hold them in high moral regard. > > OK, and a criminal is only a criminal if convicted. > > > > > .. > > +++chefren > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven -- --------.--------------------------------------. ------/ Christian Price / ----/ Assistant Technical Analyst / ---/ Four Corners Area ITOT/OSA / --/ SprintParanet, Phoenix Office / -/ 602-266-9242 / '--------------------------------------' _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 11:37:28 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA14340 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:37:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA08322; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:25:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA08295 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:25:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA13901 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:26:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA27119 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:26:31 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000202112353.009d7520@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:26:54 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] what is wiretapping Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org I criticized the ietf draft definition of wiretapping. I was challenged to do better. Here is my attempt. Obviously, a civil liberties lawyer is need to do this properly: Wiretapping is what occurs when 1. information passed across the Internet (including but not limited to wire-bound signals, wireless communications, microwave segments, and incidental RF emanations from equipment on the Internet or intervening communications carriers traversed by the information anywhere from origin point to any reception point, including but not limited to systems that connect to the Internet to enter, convey, or effect receipt of Internet communications [such as a user's PC, for example]) from one party to one or more other parties 2. is delivered to or intercepted by a third party 3. for purposes of manually or programmatically inspecting or analyzing or classification, or storing for subsequent possible or certain manual or programmatic inspection or analyzing or classification of that information, 4. including but not limited to non-aggregated traffic analysis, any of which may be isolated to a specific IP, specific machine or processor (including network card, interface or modem device or processor), specific instance or class of an application, sender or recipient 5.When the sending party does not fully voluntarily and overtly cause and/or authorize such delivery or interception for each specific event and for each specific usage applied thereto or 6. When any of the recipient parties do not fully voluntarily and overtly cause and/or authorize such delivery or interception for each specific event and 7.When each specific disclosure of information applied thereto is not within the legitimate authority of one or more of the intended recipients to provide such voluntary and open disclosure in the absence of any legal (criminal or civl) process that compels such disclosure or which provides duress to induce such disclosure 8. With the expectation of privacy and confidentiality between sender and recipients as the default assumption in all cases, voided only by an overt and knowledgeable fully voluntary declaration by sender or intended recipient 9.When the third party acts a. deliberately to intercept and/or collect, or in a manner which may reasonably be expected to intercept and/or collect (whether intentionally or as a by-product of another process) b. at any point via any technical or other methodology c. the information, regardless of whether the collection or interception is based on a general or broad collection or a targeted collection of information d. and regardless of whether the information is encrypted, compressed, or plaintext e. and regrdless whether the information is selected manually or programmatically or because of certain programmatically or manually determined characteristics or "profiling", frequency, orgin, destination, size, entropy of content, headers, specific instance or class of initiating application, specific instance or class of network interface or device or other machine or processor,or any other characteristics that may from time to time become discernable by technology or persons. -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 12:09:08 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA15470 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:09:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA09366; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:52:13 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA09260 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:50:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from igatefp-1.trw.com (firewall-user@igatefp-1.trw.com [192.35.84.5]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id LAA14864 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:51:23 -0500 (EST) From: Bernie.Hoefer@trw.com Received: by igatefp-1.trw.com; id LAA20321; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:48:49 -0500 Received: from irissun1.resva.trw.com(158.114.122.90) by igatefp-1.trw.com via smap (V4.2) id xma011579; Wed, 2 Feb 00 11:44:26 -0500 Received: from trw.com (dhcp118-247.resva.trw.com) by irissun1.resva.trw.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA02744; Wed, 2 Feb 00 12:51:58 EST Message-Id: <38985F81.F134B245@trw.com> Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:46:57 -0500 X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U) X-Accept-Language: en Mime-Version: 1.0 To: chefren@pi.net, raven@ietf.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: [Raven] Winnowing & Chaffing Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Tue, 1 Feb 2000 22:14:38 +0100, chefren@pi.net wrote: --- > On 1 Feb 00, at 10:41, Christian Price wrote: > --- > > another point, has anyone here read Ron Rivest's paper: > > "Chaffing and Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption" > > http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/chaffing.txt ?? > --- > > When encryption is regulated also having the programs will > be regulated don't you think? > > So if you are caught having encryption, chaffing&winnowing > and or steganography programs without permit, your are a... > criminal! --- Chefren, did you even look at the link provided by Christian Price? So now you want to make it illegal for me to ignore some of the information my friend sends me? Never mind that this is the same technology that allows your computer to know that my computer is talking with it and not the computer two floors up from you! Next you'll be wanting to make it illegal for my friend to send ambiguous messages, like "the ant hill just got kicked over" because LEA doesn't know for certain what we are talking about. (A real ant hill got kicked? The basement in which he imprisoned his slaves just collapsed? The paper-mache structure we dance around in our foam ant costumes just got destroyed?) How far are you going to go with this, Chefren? I agree with Patrick May: "The clear and overwhelming consensus on this list and at the physical meeting is that the IETF should not sanction the weakening of new or existing protocols in order to facilitate wiretapping." Let's close this list. -- Bernie Hoefer TRW S&ITG, Inc. These opinions are my own and not my employer's. They usually think my ideas are silly anyway... _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 12:39:40 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA16329 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:39:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA10487; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:19:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA10455 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:19:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from mailgw1a.lmco.com (mailgw1a.lmco.com [192.31.106.7]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA15732 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:19:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from emss02g01.ems.lmco.com (emss02g01.ems.lmco.com [198.7.15.39]) by mailgw1a.lmco.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id KAA06935 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 10:19:09 -0700 (MST) Received: from CONVERSION-DAEMON by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) id <0FPB00201C3MD7@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 10:18:59 -0700 (MST) Received: from mbox.vs.lmco.com ([138.209.240.12]) by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) with ESMTP id <0FPB009KWC3IOG@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Wed, 02 Feb 2000 10:18:54 -0700 (MST) Received: from poseidon (poseidon.vs.lmco.com [138.209.67.9]) by mbox.vs.lmco.com (8.8.5/8.8.8) with SMTP id LAA28600 for ; Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:22:24 -0600 (CST) Received: from loupan.vs.lmco.com by poseidon (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA02028; Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:23:19 -0600 (CST) Received: by loupan.vs.lmco.com (8.7.1) id RAA19926; Wed, 02 Feb 2000 17:23:03 +0000 (GMT) Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:23:03 -0600 From: Matthew Saroff Subject: Re: [Raven] Winnowing & Chaffing In-reply-to: Bernie.Hoefer@trw.com "[Raven] Winnowing & Chaffing" (May 12, 16:47) To: raven@ietf.org Reply-to: msaroff@pobox.com Message-id: <10002021123.ZM19924@loupan.vs.lmco.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Z-Mail (3.2.0 26oct94 MediaMail) Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT References: <38985F81.F134B245@trw.com> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On May 12, 16:47, Bernie.Hoefer@trw.com wrote: > I agree with Patrick May: "The clear and overwhelming consensus > on this list and at the physical meeting is that the IETF should not > sanction the weakening of new or existing protocols in order to > facilitate wiretapping." Let's close this list. But not before someone comes up with a good T-shirt idea: http://www.pobox.com/~msaroff/raven.html. No offense intended, but nothing on the list, including my suggestions, grabs me. -- Matthew Saroff Do not reply directly to this message. Reply to msaroff@pobox.com _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 13:07:51 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id NAA17144 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 13:07:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA11389; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:51:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA11357 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:51:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from yorktown.paranet.com (kirkwood.paranet.com [199.164.131.35]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA16733 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:52:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from sprintparanet.com (dhcp-65-247.phx.paranet.com [172.16.65.247]) by yorktown.paranet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA08964 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:47:31 -0600 (CST) Message-ID: <38986DF1.87C574CD@sprintparanet.com> Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 10:48:33 -0700 From: Christian Price X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt References: <4.2.0.58.20000202094031.009e6100@fast.synernet.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hear Hear! This loophole is egriegious! (still, my utmost respect to the people who drafted this) Ed Stone wrote: > > "Wiretapping is what occurs when information passed across the > Internet from one party to one or more other parties is delivered to > a third party: > > 1. Without the sending party knowing about the third party > > 2. Without any of the recipient parties knowing about the delivery > to the third party > > 3. When the normal expectation of the sender is that his > information will only be seen by the recipient parties or parties > obliged to keep the information in confidence > > 4. When the third party acts deliberately to target the > transmission of the first party, either because he is of interest, > or because the second party's reception is of interest. > > > > Thus, for instance, ... random monitoring is not wiretapping > (condition 4 violated)..." > > Source: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven- > 00.txt > > This is outrageous. > > A third party taps a communication in secret, but the selection is > NOT targeted to a SPECIFIC person, so it is not "wiretapping". This > is simply incredible! > > Example: Monitoring equipment is set to randomly monitor a > proportion of traffic through a specific device (say, Mae West). > > No person or IP is targeted for monitoring, rather a machine selects > random IPs that meet the "proportion of traffic" setting. So the > "proportion of traffic" setting is set to .002% on Monday. Any > problem? The monitoring is not wiretapping because no one is > "targeted", right? > > On Tuesday, the setting is set to 64.2%. Still no one is targeted, > right? > > On Wednesday, the setting is set to 92.6%. No one is targeted, > right? The machine is picking IPs at random, right? So it's not > wiretapping, right? > > So we are to understand that IETF thinks that it's not wiretapping > if you just tap damn near everyone, but don't target anyone? > > We need a little rework here, I'd say. > > And conspicuously absent is the description of the portion of the vote at > the meeting that voted NO. Only the votes for and abstentions are > subjectively quantified.... > -- > -------------------------- > Ed Stone > estone@synernet.com > -------------------------- > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven -- --------.--------------------------------------. ------/ Christian Price / ----/ Assistant Technical Analyst / ---/ Four Corners Area ITOT/OSA / --/ SprintParanet, Phoenix Office / -/ 602-266-9242 / '--------------------------------------' _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 14:50:19 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA19501 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:50:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA14602; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:20:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA14574 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:20:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com (sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com [171.68.224.215]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA18796; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:21:48 -0500 (EST) Received: from rhino (rhino.cisco.com [172.20.9.57]) by sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA27822; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:40:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from p7020-img-nt (fred-hm-dhcp1.cisco.com [171.69.128.116]) by rhino (SMI-8.6/CISCO.WS.1.1) with SMTP id LAA25026; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:25:15 -0800 Message-Id: <4.1.20000202110817.02128630@flipper.cisco.com> X-Sender: fred@flipper.cisco.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.1 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 11:20:04 -0800 To: Ed Stone From: Fred Baker Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt Cc: raven@ietf.org, iab@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000202094031.009e6100@fast.synernet.com> References: <4.2.2.20000202080343.00a47450@lint.cisco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 09:42 AM 2/2/00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: >Thus, for instance, ... random monitoring is not wiretapping >(condition 4 violated)..." maybe you can offer some better text. What we were trying to say was that when one puts a sniffer on an Ethernet for network management purposes for a purpose unrelated to capturing a user's content (say, finding out what percentage of traffic is HTTP vs how much is SMTP, example at http://www.vbns.net/stats/flows/html), this was not wiretapping. The key feature of wiretapping is not the capture of traffic, but the capture of the content of traffic for the purpose of revealing that content in some way. _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 14:50:43 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA19519 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:50:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA15085; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:33:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA15056 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:33:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA19168 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:34:45 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA28505 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 14:34:22 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000202143148.009a2e40@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 14:34:36 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt In-Reply-To: <4.1.20000202110817.02128630@flipper.cisco.com> References: <4.2.0.58.20000202094031.009e6100@fast.synernet.com> <4.2.2.20000202080343.00a47450@lint.cisco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 02:20 PM 2/2/2000 , you wrote: >At 09:42 AM 2/2/00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: > >Thus, for instance, ... random monitoring is not wiretapping > >(condition 4 violated)..." > >maybe you can offer some better text. What we were trying to say was that >when one puts a sniffer on an Ethernet for network management purposes for >a purpose unrelated to capturing a user's content (say, finding out what >percentage of traffic is HTTP vs how much is SMTP, example at >http://www.vbns.net/stats/flows/html), this was not wiretapping. The key >feature of wiretapping is not the capture of traffic, but the capture of >the content of traffic for the purpose of revealing that content in some way. I understand. I really suggest that the wording of the definition of wiretapping get some scholarly civil liberties lawyer attention. For example, while capturing content for one purpose may be benign, that information is now available to secondary, possibly unintended usages. Examples are legion. My suggested very rough first pass is along these lines: Wiretapping is what occurs when 1. information passed across the Internet (including but not limited to wire-bound signals, wireless communications, microwave segments, and incidental RF emanations from equipment on the Internet or intervening communications carriers traversed by the information anywhere from origin point to any reception point, including but not limited to systems that connect to the Internet to enter, convey, or effect receipt of Internet communications [such as a user's PC, for example]) from one party to one or more other parties 2. is delivered to or intercepted by a third party 3. for purposes of manually or programmatically inspecting or analyzing or classification, or storing for subsequent possible or certain manual or programmatic inspection or analyzing or classification of that information, 4. including but not limited to non-aggregated traffic analysis, any of which may be isolated to a specific IP, specific machine or processor (including network card, interface or modem device or processor), specific instance or class of an application, sender or recipient 5.When the sending party does not fully voluntarily and overtly cause and/or authorize such delivery or interception for each specific event and for each specific usage applied thereto or 6. When any of the recipient parties do not fully voluntarily and overtly cause and/or authorize such delivery or interception for each specific event and 7.When each specific disclosure of information applied thereto is not within the legitimate authority of one or more of the intended recipients to provide such voluntary and open disclosure in the absence of any legal (criminal or civl) process that compels such disclosure or which provides duress to induce such disclosure 8. With the expectation of privacy and confidentiality between sender and recipients as the default assumption in all cases, voided only by an overt and knowledgeable fully voluntary declaration by sender or intended recipient 9.When the third party acts a. deliberately to intercept and/or collect, or in a manner which may reasonably be expected to intercept and/or collect (whether intentionally or as a by-product of another process) b. at any point via any technical or other methodology c. the information, regardless of whether the collection or interception is based on a general or broad collection or a targeted collection of information d. and regardless of whether the information is encrypted, compressed, or plaintext e. and regrdless whether the information is selected manually or programmatically or because of certain programmatically or manually determined characteristics or "profiling", frequency, orgin, destination, size, entropy of content, headers, specific instance or class of initiating application, specific instance or class of network interface or device or other machine or processor,or any other characteristics that may from time to time become discernable by technology or persons. -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 15:15:29 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20162 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:15:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16080; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:03:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16052 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:03:18 -0500 (EST) Received: from oznet15.ozemail.com.au (oznet15.ozemail.com.au [203.2.192.116]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA19893 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:04:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn37p05.ozemail.com.au [210.84.8.197]) by oznet15.ozemail.com.au (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id HAA21680 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 07:04:29 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] what is wiretapping Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 07:01:42 +1100 Message-ID: <000401bf6db8$52d739b0$c50854d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000202112353.009d7520@fast.synernet.com> Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Great - now all system administrators are wiretappers. Why restrict this view to "internet"? Why not all data transfer networks - LANs, sneakernet, dedicated leased/dial-up lines etc? re 5 - this seems to define all email as automatically wiretapped. re 6 ignores the fact of machines recieving data. How does a machine 'authorise" an abstract concept such as network quality monitoring, let alone wiretapping. 7 - is broadly similar to what telco and LE workers are required to obey, but not system administrators, in many countries Regards, Lyal > -----Original Message----- > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of Ed > Stone > Sent: Thursday, 3 February 2000 3:27 > To: raven@ietf.org > Subject: [Raven] what is wiretapping > > > I criticized the ietf draft definition of wiretapping. > > I was challenged to do better. Here is my attempt. Obviously, a civil > liberties lawyer is need to do this properly: > > Wiretapping is what occurs when > > 1. information passed across the Internet (including but not limited to > wire-bound signals, wireless communications, microwave segments, and > incidental RF emanations from equipment on the Internet or intervening > communications carriers traversed by the information anywhere from origin > point to any reception point, including but not limited to systems that > connect to the Internet to enter, convey, or effect receipt of Internet > communications [such as a user's PC, for example]) from one party > to one or > more other parties > > 2. is delivered to or intercepted by a third party > > 3. for purposes of manually or programmatically inspecting or > analyzing or > classification, or storing for subsequent possible or certain manual or > programmatic inspection or analyzing or classification of that > information, > > 4. including but not limited to non-aggregated traffic analysis, any of > which may be isolated to a specific IP, specific machine or processor > (including network card, interface or modem device or processor), > specific > instance or class of an application, sender or recipient > > 5.When the sending party does not fully voluntarily and overtly cause > and/or authorize such delivery or interception for each specific > event and > for each specific usage applied thereto > > or > > 6. When any of the recipient parties do not fully voluntarily and overtly > cause and/or authorize such delivery or interception for each > specific event > > and > > 7.When each specific disclosure of information applied thereto is not > within the legitimate authority of one or more of the intended recipients > to provide such voluntary and open disclosure in the absence of any legal > (criminal or civl) process that compels such disclosure or which provides > duress to induce such disclosure > > 8. With the expectation of privacy and confidentiality between sender and > recipients as the default assumption in all cases, voided only by > an overt > and knowledgeable fully voluntary declaration by sender or > intended recipient > > 9.When the third party acts > a. deliberately to intercept and/or collect, or in a manner which may > reasonably be expected to intercept and/or collect (whether intentionally > or as a by-product of another process) > > b. at any point via any technical or other methodology > > c. the information, regardless of whether the collection or > interception is > based on a general or broad collection or a targeted collection > of information > > d. and regardless of whether the information is encrypted, > compressed, or > plaintext > > e. and regrdless whether the information is selected manually or > programmatically or because of certain programmatically or manually > determined characteristics or "profiling", frequency, orgin, destination, > size, entropy of content, headers, specific instance or class of > initiating > application, specific instance or class of network interface or device or > other machine or processor,or any other characteristics that may > from time > to time become discernable by technology or persons. > -- > -------------------------- > Ed Stone > estone@synernet.com > -------------------------- > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 15:21:02 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20375 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:21:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16213; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:07:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16182 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:07:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from anis.crudites.com (mail.crudites.com [208.242.218.190]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id PAA19998 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:08:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from IVY (IVY [208.242.218.191]) by anis.crudites.com (NTMail 3.03.0017/1.ad24) with ESMTP id ba003849 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 11:05:01 +0000 From: "Brian Raney" Organization: Crudites To: raven@ietf.org Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 12:06:51 -7 Subject: Re: [Raven] what is wiretapping Reply-to: brianr@crudites.com Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.2.0.58.20000202112353.009d7520@fast.synernet.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Message-Id: <19050187601966@crudites.com> Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On 2 Feb 00, at 11:26, Ed Stone wrote: > I criticized the ietf draft definition of wiretapping. I, too, find the definition of wire tapping lacking. Delivery to third parties unknown both to the sender and receiver is fundamental to the operation of the Internet. When I send mail to someone it travels across many machines over which I have no control or knowledge. Also, as has been pointed out to B*b A**isat many times, the machines that make up the Internet are by and large owned by private companies that have every right to monitor all the traffic that goes through them. For example, Paul Vixie's spam black hole which delivers traffic to /dev/null is perfectly acceptable because the machine it runs on is privately held. There can be no expectation of privacy of non-encrypted IP traffic as long as that traffic traverses the networks owned by private entities with no legal requirement to maintain that privacy. I suggest eliminating most of the latter part of the document and stick with the first few points: wrong forum, multiple jurisdictions, and security. brianr _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 15:27:06 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20499 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:27:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16472; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:13:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16444 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:13:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from oznet15.ozemail.com.au (oznet15.ozemail.com.au [203.2.192.116]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20150 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:15:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn37p05.ozemail.com.au [210.84.8.197]) by oznet15.ozemail.com.au (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id HAA24879 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 07:15:00 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 07:12:12 +1100 Message-ID: <000501bf6db9$cad669d0$c50854d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000202081153.009dc710@fast.synernet.com> Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Evidence trails are only as good as the technology that implements them, and the society that reviews them. Would you speed in your car if the speedometer recorded all vehicle speed (and authorised road speed), and once a month had to submit the speedo to a review, with automatic fines for every transgression over the defined speed limit? With evidence trails, the activities of the Los Angeles police should have come to light much earlier, theoretically improving the privacy for all the others who where subsequently "privacy infringed". Regards, Lyal > -----Original Message----- > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of Ed > Stone > Sent: Thursday, 3 February 2000 0:53 > To: raven@ietf.org > Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > > > At 04:16 AM 2/2/2000 , you wrote: > >I think one simple answer can be explored. > >WE monitor the "authorities". The Auuthorities should be there > to serve US. > >How - by providing a reliable evidence trail in the technology WE use. > >Do WE have this capability today? Not even close! > > > >Regards, > >Lyal > > And this evidence trail --- it would be harder to subvert than > current Los > Angeles police evidence trails in which thousands of convictions > are likely > to be thrown out or challenged for police perjury, and other misconduct? > There, police have lied under oath when testifying about chain of > evidence, > about actions of defendants, about shootings followed by police throwing > down the throw-down gun. There have been thousands of wiretaps on > thousands > of phones from a single improperly approved judicial warrant, etc. > > [It is noteworthy to describe how the LA Rampart police criminality was > discovered. It was not via self monitoring of the police by the > police. It > was by a policeman, who had been inadvertantly arrested for > separate crimes > (using his policeman status to steal crack and cocaine and resell it thru > prostitutes and providing protection for them) who offered to > finger other > police crimes for a reduced sentence.] > > Why is it so hard to understand that the fears one has of crime in the > general population are equalled if not exceeded by justifiable and > reasonable fears about crime in the government, law enforcement, and > surveillance, where there is less accountability and greater > secrecy -- and > guns/power to arrest and imprison? > > Why is it so hard to understand that technical standards do not constrain > the behavior of sovereign governments? > > Why is so hard to understand the natural suspicions of governmental > entities who tell us they will police themselves, investigate themselves, > place requirements on themselves, and be judge and jury on themselves? > > To trust such unprecedented additions to the concentration of power and > authority in governments defies our understanding of history and human > nature. One must ignore both to have even a reasonable hope that the good > done by "crime control" will exceed the harm done by concentrating this > secretly-used power in government, and stressing government to manage > accumulated powers that are beyond its wisdom, morality (?), and > temptations. > > Governments have murdered 170 million of their own subjects this century, > excluding civil wars and international wars. There is no grouping of > persons or organizations, to which the surveillance is proposed to be > deployed, who can match the record of governments for outright murder. > ("Death by Government"). > > It is not that the people in government are more evil than other people; > rather it's that concentrations of power (including power to arrest and > imprison and a legal monopoly on violence), combined with secrecy and > general self-policing, inevitably result in abuse. The history of > avoiding > that is based not on protocols, but on limiting accumulations and > concentrations of power. Where that fails, we find the major > horrors of the > twentieth century, far beyond any damage any non-government terrorist > assemblage has ever committed. > > Those who think some standard or protocol by IETF can keep them on the > straight and narrow have thus far failed to provide more than unsupported > assertion as to that belief. > > Those who think IETF participating in building standards or > protocols will > constrain governments to a higher quality, more moral and limited > surveillance behavior have thus far failed to provide a shred of evidence > to demonstrate how such effort will constrain governments. > > Those who think such standards and protocols as an "auditable tap" can > constrain a goverment who chooses from time to time not to be so > constrained, have yet to provide even a science-fiction level description > of how an "auditable tap" can tie the the hands of that miscreant > government. > > Lastly, no one has pointed to any law (CALEA and its FCC August ruling) > that provides basis in US law that requires IETF to do anything; > the August > FCC ruling is under legal challenge in court now. And no one has > described > the basis on which one nation's laws must direct IETF while another > nation's laws would be ignored by IETF. > > That is why "IETF should NOT and will NOT participate in the creation or > modification of protocols or standards to facilitate wiretapping...." > > And chefren, before you fall back on the mindless rubric that "it must be > done because democracies require it", please simply turn back the clock > sixty years, look a few miles southeast from where you now > comfortably sit, > and ponder what that democracy "required". > > That logical process is: > 1. Is the entity that requires the action a democracy? > 2. If yes, do the action and do not resist. > > History has taught us that each person must evaluate the action and its > effects, not just the entity that issues the orders. I would have thought > that lesson would be more widespread in Holland, at least. > -- > -------------------------- > Ed Stone > estone@synernet.com > -------------------------- > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 15:28:02 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20516 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:28:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16310; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:10:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16283 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:10:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from mtiwmhc09.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc09.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.18]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20062 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:11:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from alaptop.hotwired.com ([12.78.126.186]) by mtiwmhc09.worldnet.att.net (InterMail v03.02.07.07 118-134) with ESMTP id <20000202201057.WUFB7433@alaptop.hotwired.com>; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 20:10:57 +0000 Message-Id: <4.3.0.33.0.20000202150724.01bbb340@pop.webcom.com> X-Sender: y2kc@pop.webcom.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.0.33 (Beta) Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 15:09:34 -0500 To: Ed Stone , raven@ietf.org From: Declan McCullagh Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000202143148.009a2e40@fast.synernet.com> References: <4.1.20000202110817.02128630@flipper.cisco.com> <4.2.0.58.20000202094031.009e6100@fast.synernet.com> <4.2.2.20000202080343.00a47450@lint.cisco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org My own personal take (not as a journalist, just as a longtime Net user and observer of politics) is that shorter definitions are better. Nine clauses, with subsections a-e, are not necessarily going to make a document more clear and precise than something more succinct. -Declan At 14:34 2/2/2000 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: >At 02:20 PM 2/2/2000 , you wrote: >>At 09:42 AM 2/2/00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: >> >Thus, for instance, ... random monitoring is not wiretapping >> >(condition 4 violated)..." >> >>maybe you can offer some better text. What we were trying to say was that >>when one puts a sniffer on an Ethernet for network management purposes for >>a purpose unrelated to capturing a user's content (say, finding out what >>percentage of traffic is HTTP vs how much is SMTP, example at >>http://www.vbns.net/stats/flows/html), this was not wiretapping. The key >>feature of wiretapping is not the capture of traffic, but the capture of >>the content of traffic for the purpose of revealing that content in some way. > > >I understand. I really suggest that the wording of the definition of >wiretapping get some scholarly civil liberties lawyer attention. > >For example, while capturing content for one purpose may be benign, that >information is now available to secondary, possibly unintended usages. >Examples are legion. > >My suggested very rough first pass is along these lines: > >Wiretapping is what occurs when > >1. information passed across the Internet (including but not limited to >wire-bound signals, wireless communications, microwave segments, and >incidental RF emanations from equipment on the Internet or intervening >communications carriers traversed by the information anywhere from origin >point to any reception point, including but not limited to systems that >connect to the Internet to enter, convey, or effect receipt of Internet >communications [such as a user's PC, for example]) from one party to one >or more other parties > >2. is delivered to or intercepted by a third party > >3. for purposes of manually or programmatically inspecting or analyzing or >classification, or storing for subsequent possible or certain manual or >programmatic inspection or analyzing or classification of that information, > >4. including but not limited to non-aggregated traffic analysis, any of >which may be isolated to a specific IP, specific machine or processor >(including network card, interface or modem device or processor), specific >instance or class of an application, sender or recipient > >5.When the sending party does not fully voluntarily and overtly cause >and/or authorize such delivery or interception for each specific event and >for each specific usage applied thereto > >or > >6. When any of the recipient parties do not fully voluntarily and overtly >cause and/or authorize such delivery or interception for each specific event > >and > >7.When each specific disclosure of information applied thereto is not >within the legitimate authority of one or more of the intended recipients >to provide such voluntary and open disclosure in the absence of any legal >(criminal or civl) process that compels such disclosure or which provides >duress to induce such disclosure > >8. With the expectation of privacy and confidentiality between sender and >recipients as the default assumption in all cases, voided only by an overt >and knowledgeable fully voluntary declaration by sender or intended recipient > >9.When the third party acts >a. deliberately to intercept and/or collect, or in a manner which may >reasonably be expected to intercept and/or collect (whether intentionally >or as a by-product of another process) > >b. at any point via any technical or other methodology > >c. the information, regardless of whether the collection or interception >is based on a general or broad collection or a targeted collection of >information > >d. and regardless of whether the information is encrypted, compressed, or >plaintext > >e. and regrdless whether the information is selected manually or >programmatically or because of certain programmatically or manually >determined characteristics or "profiling", frequency, orgin, destination, >size, entropy of content, headers, specific instance or class of >initiating application, specific instance or class of network interface or >device or other machine or processor,or any other characteristics that may >from time to time become discernable by technology or persons. > > >-- >-------------------------- >Ed Stone >estone@synernet.com >-------------------------- > >_______________________________________________ >raven mailing list >raven@ietf.org >http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 15:37:21 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20746 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:37:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16833; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:25:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16807 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:25:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20511 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:27:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA28930 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:26:59 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000202152607.0099fd30@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 15:27:12 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] what is wiretapping In-Reply-To: <000401bf6db8$52d739b0$c50854d2@here> References: <4.2.0.58.20000202112353.009d7520@fast.synernet.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 03:01 PM 2/2/2000 , you wrote: >Great - now all system administrators are wiretappers. Great! Thanks for volunteering to improve it! When can we see your revisions? >Why restrict this view to "internet"? >Why not all data transfer networks - LANs, sneakernet, dedicated >leased/dial-up lines etc? > >re 5 - this seems to define all email as automatically wiretapped. > >re 6 ignores the fact of machines recieving data. How does a machine >'authorise" an abstract concept such as network quality monitoring, let >alone wiretapping. > >7 - is broadly similar to what telco and LE workers are required to obey, >but not system administrators, in many countries > >Regards, >Lyal -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 16:08:58 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA21475 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 16:08:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA17779; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:52:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA17697 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:52:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from oznet15.ozemail.com.au (oznet15.ozemail.com.au [203.2.192.116]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA21127 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 15:53:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn37p05.ozemail.com.au [210.84.8.197]) by oznet15.ozemail.com.au (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id HAA07469 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 07:53:56 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] what is wiretapping Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 07:51:10 +1100 Message-ID: <000601bf6dbf$3c067320$c50854d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000202152607.0099fd30@fast.synernet.com> Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I apologise for my sarcasm. The IETF version seems to fit the needs somewhat better. I'm not entirely comfortable with the "random vs intent" clause - but recognise it may be the best compromise that does not inhibit Web site statistics monitoring, Intrusion Detecion Systems, Firewalls, and network performance monitoring, and probably a hundred other legitimate uses to have some form of network oriented monitoring (rather than human oriented). Regards, Lyal > -----Original Message----- > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of Ed > Stone > Sent: Thursday, 3 February 2000 7:27 > To: raven@ietf.org > Subject: RE: [Raven] what is wiretapping > > > At 03:01 PM 2/2/2000 , you wrote: > >Great - now all system administrators are wiretappers. > > Great! Thanks for volunteering to improve it! > When can we see your revisions? > > > >Why restrict this view to "internet"? > >Why not all data transfer networks - LANs, sneakernet, dedicated > >leased/dial-up lines etc? > > > >re 5 - this seems to define all email as automatically wiretapped. > > > >re 6 ignores the fact of machines recieving data. How does a machine > >'authorise" an abstract concept such as network quality monitoring, let > >alone wiretapping. > > > >7 - is broadly similar to what telco and LE workers are required to obey, > >but not system administrators, in many countries > > > >Regards, > >Lyal > > -- > -------------------------- > Ed Stone > estone@synernet.com > -------------------------- > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 18:11:58 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA23374 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 18:11:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA21190; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 17:50:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA21160 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 17:50:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from dokka.maxware.no (dokka.maxware.no [195.139.236.69]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA23153 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 17:51:37 -0500 (EST) Received: from alden ([10.128.167.143]) by dokka.maxware.no (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA24636; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 23:51:25 +0100 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000202231429.0570c6e0@dokka.maxware.no> X-Sender: hta@dokka.maxware.no X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 23:22:01 +0100 To: Ed Stone , raven@ietf.org From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000202094031.009e6100@fast.synernet.com> References: <4.2.2.20000202080343.00a47450@lint.cisco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] Whether 90% of MAE-West is a wiretap Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 09:42 02.02.00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: >Example: Monitoring equipment is set to randomly monitor a >proportion of traffic through a specific device (say, Mae West). ..... >On Wednesday, the setting is set to 92.6%. No one is targeted, >right? The machine is picking IPs at random, right? So it's not >wiretapping, right? good - now you have 92.6% of the traffic going through Mae West on Wednesday. Should be somewhere in the gigabyte to terabyte range - others might know. Now attempt to get useful information about a specific person out of that, without targeting anyone. The text attempts to differentiate between statistics and wiretaps by the "targeting" criteria, and includes the 3 phases of a wiretap: - Capture - Filtering - Delivery All phases must be considered before deciding whether a specific action is a wiretap or not - if you capture the traffic, keep it for a while, and then do the filtering and delivery, I would consider the total process a wiretap. Harald -- Harald Tveit Alvestrand, EDB Maxware, Norway Harald.Alvestrand@edb.maxware.no _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 2 21:19:18 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA24997 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 21:19:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA26343; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 20:47:37 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA26311 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 20:47:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from reel.demon.co.uk (IDENT:root@reel.demon.co.uk [158.152.96.65]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA24711 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2000 20:48:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from reel.demon.co.uk (peterg@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by reel.demon.co.uk (8.8.7/8.8.7) with ESMTP id BAA03478 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 01:48:48 GMT Message-Id: <200002030148.BAA03478@reel.demon.co.uk> X-Mailer: exmh version 2.0.2 To: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 01:48:48 +0000 From: Peter Greenwood Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org estone@synernet.com said: > I really suggest that the wording of the definition of wiretapping > get some scholarly civil liberties lawyer attention. IMHO the legalese is best left to legal documents (the usual problem of dealing with multiple jurisdictions applies here too). What is needed here is a definition sufficient for the purposes of this document. By my reading of the draft, the intent is pretty much what most people here are after, but the wording could do with a little clarification. Specifically the phrase "random monitoring is not wiretapping (condition 4 violated)" could be rephrased to something like "monitoring to gather network statistics with no user identification included is not wiretapping (condition 4 violated)" Condition 4 could be expanded specifically to cover large-scale monitoring operations, perhaps as follows: 4. When the third party acts deliberately to monitor the transmission of the first party, because he is of interest, because the second party's reception is of interest, or because all or many transmissions are of interest. -- Peter Greenwood peterg@reel.demon.co.uk _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 06:47:42 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA13367 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 06:47:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA21428; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 06:40:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA21399 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 06:40:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA13313 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 06:41:50 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id GAA12028 for raven@ietf.org; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 06:41:49 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 03 Feb 2000 06:41:49 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 30 Message-ID: <86r9euh5s2.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <000501bf6db9$cad669d0$c50854d2@here> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org lyalc@ozemail.com.au ("Lyal Collins") writes: > Would you speed in your car if the speedometer recorded all vehicle speed > (and authorised road speed), and once a month had to submit the speedo to a > review, with automatic fines for every transgression over the defined speed > limit? I would be tempted to find another means to travel. This hypothetical record of speeds traveled and speed limits seen would leak information about exactly where I've been. Why would I want to hand a list of such information to police even if it sometimes catches dangerous drivers? > With evidence trails, the activities of the Los Angeles police should have > come to light much earlier, theoretically improving the privacy for all the > others who where subsequently "privacy infringed". The problem here is that you're not proposing to impose any evidence trails on police. You're proposing to impose them on the general citizenry. That would not have helped the problem in LA; it would have just made the LAPD's job easier. It should be noted once again that the LAPD broke the law. No *technical* recommendations from the IETF can possibly track police who are disobeying the law. -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 08:52:15 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA17866 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:52:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA25202; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:34:48 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA25170 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:34:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from mailgw1a.lmco.com (mailgw1a.lmco.com [192.31.106.7]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA17408 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:36:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from emss02g01.ems.lmco.com (emss02g01.ems.lmco.com [198.7.15.39]) by mailgw1a.lmco.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id GAA15526 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 06:36:09 -0700 (MST) Received: from CONVERSION-DAEMON by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) id <0FPC00101WG0ZY@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 06:36:05 -0700 (MST) Received: from mbox.vs.lmco.com ([138.209.240.12]) by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) with ESMTP id <0FPC00MZYWFY16@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Thu, 03 Feb 2000 06:35:58 -0700 (MST) Received: from poseidon (poseidon.vs.lmco.com [138.209.67.9]) by mbox.vs.lmco.com (8.8.5/8.8.8) with SMTP id HAA26510 for ; Thu, 03 Feb 2000 07:39:29 -0600 (CST) Received: from loupan.vs.lmco.com by poseidon (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA15332; Thu, 03 Feb 2000 07:40:24 -0600 (CST) Received: by loupan.vs.lmco.com (8.7.1) id NAA23167; Thu, 03 Feb 2000 13:40:07 +0000 (GMT) Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 07:40:07 -0600 From: Matthew Saroff Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-reply-to: James Carlson <"Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> To: raven@ietf.org Reply-to: msaroff@pobox.com Message-id: <10002030740.ZM23165@loupan.vs.lmco.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Z-Mail (3.2.0 26oct94 MediaMail) Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT References: <000501bf6db9$cad669d0$c50854d2@here> <86r9euh5s2.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On May 13, 11:42, James Carlson wrote: > Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > lyalc@ozemail.com.au ("Lyal Collins") writes: > > Would you speed in your car if the speedometer recorded all vehicle speed > > (and authorised road speed), and once a month had to submit the speedo to a > > review, with automatic fines for every transgression over the defined speed > > limit? > > I would be tempted to find another means to travel. This hypothetical > record of speeds traveled and speed limits seen would leak information > about exactly where I've been. Why would I want to hand a list of > such information to police even if it sometimes catches dangerous > drivers? There is a proposal to do this in Britain, with the data being fed to an onboard governor to control auto speed. -- Matthew Saroff Do not reply directly to this message. Reply to msaroff@pobox.com _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 09:07:08 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA18426 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 09:07:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA25886; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:53:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA25858 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:53:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA17929 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:54:45 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1GM5QTLX>; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:59:57 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 08:59:57 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: [Raven] Where's the proposed statement re: tapping posted? Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Sorry, but the posting with the url for the proposed statement has gone to bit heaven on my system... Thanks Christopher W. Savage, Cole, Raywid & Braverman, L.L.P. 1919 Penn. Ave. N.W., Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20006 voice: 202-828-9811 e-fax: 703-991-1470 fax: 202-452-0067 *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 09:20:37 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA18648 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 09:20:37 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA26510; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 09:06:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA26485 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 09:06:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA18462 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 09:08:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA00422 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 09:07:59 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000203090648.009b2650@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 09:08:29 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone In-Reply-To: <86r9euh5s2.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <000501bf6db9$cad669d0$c50854d2@here> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] IETF says NO Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org "Thumbs Down on Net Wiretaps by Declan McCullagh 3:00 a.m. 3.Feb.2000 PST WASHINGTON -- It took four months, a grim debate, and thousands of mailing list messages, but the group that sets Internet standards has decided not to support wiretapping. The executive committees of the Internet Engineering Task Force dismissed the idea with characteristic understatement, saying they would not "consider requirements for wiretapping" in protocols. ...." source: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34055,00.html -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 14:06:22 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA27005 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 14:06:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA09095; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 13:51:48 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA09027 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 13:51:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from mtiwmhc10.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc10.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.17]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA20678 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 10:34:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from alaptop.hotwired.com ([206.221.193.158]) by mtiwmhc10.worldnet.att.net (InterMail v03.02.07.07 118-134) with ESMTP id <20000203153402.QSNY12791@alaptop.hotwired.com> for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:34:02 +0000 Message-Id: <4.3.0.33.0.20000203102639.01a64b90@mail.well.com> X-Sender: declan@mail.well.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.0.33 (Beta) Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 10:32:27 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Declan McCullagh Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] Wired News article on IETF document, raven list Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34055,00.html Thumbs Down on Net Wiretaps by Declan McCullagh (declan@wired.com) 3:00 a.m. 3.Feb.2000 PST WASHINGTON -- It took four months, a grim debate, and thousands of mailing list messages, but the group that sets Internet standards has decided not to support wiretapping. The executive committees of the Internet Engineering Task Force dismissed the idea with characteristic understatement, saying they would not "consider requirements for wiretapping" in protocols. The 15 KB draft document released this week caps an unusually public debate inside IETF that was marked by an FBI call to permit wiretaps, Congressional condemnation of the idea, and a flame-ridden mailing list called "raven" that lived up to its homophonous name. But in the end, most members of the loose-knit group that met here in November opposed the idea, and the draft written by the Internet Architecture Board and the Internet Engineering Steering Group is the result. [...] _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 15:20:15 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA28931 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:20:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16923; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:11:13 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA16895 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:11:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from fep9.mail.ozemail.net (fep9.mail.ozemail.net [203.2.192.103]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA28786 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:12:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn7p02.ozemail.com.au [210.84.10.130]) by fep9.mail.ozemail.net (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id HAA16953 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:12:30 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:09:43 +1100 Message-ID: <000a01bf6e82$9c5fef80$820a54d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 In-reply-to: <86r9euh5s2.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit My point was, and as accepted below, a degree of compulsory auditability (i.e set in law) dissuades you from undertaking activity outside the prescribed limits. The "LA police" issue is exactly that - a group of individuals acting outside prescribed limits. They know what the are, and chose to ignore them. If they were compulsorily audited, then they could have legally wiretapped, but been detected as soon as non-legal wiretapping occured, protecting the privacy of a large number of individuals. If list participants distrust them LE much, then let's make sure we have a process to make the accountable. Since "we citizens" are unlikely to pay for a "police the police force" consisting of thousands of privacy auditors, why not have technology provide the basic grunt work of collecting and collating audit material. The alternative is we keep sitting on our hands and bleating to ourselves. An example of a minimum could be making all network interfaces devices record when and how often they are put into promiscuous mode. Regards, Lyal > -----Original Message----- > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of > James Carlson > Sent: Thursday, 3 February 2000 22:42 > To: raven@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > > > lyalc@ozemail.com.au ("Lyal Collins") writes: > > Would you speed in your car if the speedometer recorded all > vehicle speed > > (and authorised road speed), and once a month had to submit the > speedo to a > > review, with automatic fines for every transgression over the > defined speed > > limit? > > I would be tempted to find another means to travel. This hypothetical > record of speeds traveled and speed limits seen would leak information > about exactly where I've been. Why would I want to hand a list of > such information to police even if it sometimes catches dangerous > drivers? > > > With evidence trails, the activities of the Los Angeles police > should have > > come to light much earlier, theoretically improving the privacy > for all the > > others who where subsequently "privacy infringed". > > The problem here is that you're not proposing to impose any evidence > trails on police. You're proposing to impose them on the general > citizenry. That would not have helped the problem in LA; it would > have just made the LAPD's job easier. > > It should be noted once again that the LAPD broke the law. No > *technical* recommendations from the IETF can possibly track police > who are disobeying the law. > > -- > James Carlson, System Architect > IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 > Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 > "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 15:50:59 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA29434 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:50:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA18076; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:39:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA18051 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:39:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from mtiwmhc10.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc10.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.17]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA29312 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:41:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from alaptop.hotwired.com ([12.78.178.67]) by mtiwmhc10.worldnet.att.net (InterMail v03.02.07.07 118-134) with ESMTP id <20000203204039.VRWM12791@alaptop.hotwired.com> for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 20:40:39 +0000 Message-Id: <4.3.0.33.0.20000203153850.01a5c010@mail.well.com> X-Sender: y2kc@pop.webcom.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.0.33 (Beta) Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 15:39:10 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Declan McCullagh Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wiretap thang Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org >From: "Alexander, Brad" >To: "Alexander, Brad" >Subject: Barr on Wiretaps >Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:23:54 -0500 >X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) > >BARR THANKS NET TASK FORCE >FOR REJECTING WIRETAPS > >WASHINGTON, DC -- U.S. Representative Bob Barr (GA-7) hailed reports today >that the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is poised to reject building >wiretapping into the Internet. According to Wired News, the IETF has >"decided not to support wiretapping." > >This decision follows requests by Barr and other privacy advocates last >year, urging the IETF to refuse to bow to government pressure to add >surveillance components to the Internet. The IETF is the international >group of volunteer computer experts that sets technical standards for >Internet communication. > >"Everyone who cares about their privacy in an age when information is >becoming increasingly accessible should heave a sigh of relief at this news. >If the IETF had agreed to help build wiretapping into the Internet, our >privacy would have been threatened both by invasive government surveillance >and by individuals taking advantage of newly created back doors," said Barr. > >"Fred Baker and the IETF membership deserve our thanks for following this >debate through and drafting technical standards that soundly reject Internet >wiretapping," Barr continued. > >The text of Barr's letter to the IETF last year is available from his >website at http://www.house.gov/barr/wiretapletter.html. > >--30-- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 16:44:26 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA00186 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:44:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA19863; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:29:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA19834 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:29:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from mgw-x2.nokia.com (mgw-x2.nokia.com [131.228.20.22]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA29968 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:31:01 -0500 (EST) From: Melinda.Shore@nokia.com Received: from mgw-i2.ntc.nokia.com (mgw-i2.ntc.nokia.com [131.228.118.61]) by mgw-x2.nokia.com (8.9.3/8.9.3/o) with ESMTP id XAA08857; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 23:30:59 +0200 (EET) Received: from daebh02nok.americas.nokia.com (daebh02nok.americas.nokia.com [172.18.242.183]) by mgw-i2.ntc.nokia.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA07560; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 23:30:58 +0200 (EET) Received: by daebh02nok with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1B3WDY7Q>; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:30:57 -0600 Message-ID: To: declan@wired.com, raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:30:50 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Given Barr's legislative and policy record, this is certainly nothing one would want to boast about. Melinda _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 16:58:09 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA00459 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:58:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA20230; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:41:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA20201 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:41:07 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id QAA00165 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:42:28 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002032142.QAA00165@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 17484 invoked by uid 0); 3 Feb 2000 21:42:25 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.41) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 3 Feb 2000 21:42:25 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 22:42:24 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.2.0.58.20000202081153.009dc710@fast.synernet.com> References: <002201bf6d5e$3caa4b50$8e0b54d2@here> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 2 Feb 00, at 8:53, Ed Stone wrote: > Why is it so hard to understand that the fears one has of crime in the > general population are equalled if not exceeded by justifiable and > reasonable fears about crime in the government, law enforcement, and > surveillance, where there is less accountability and greater secrecy -- and > guns/power to arrest and imprison? > > Why is it so hard to understand that technical standards do not constrain > the behavior of sovereign governments? > > Why is so hard to understand the natural suspicions of governmental > entities who tell us they will police themselves, investigate themselves, > place requirements on themselves, and be judge and jury on themselves? Why is it so hard to understand there is now known alternative for democracy? +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 17:11:54 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA01014 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:11:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA20619; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:57:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA20591 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:57:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA00477 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:58:55 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id QAA23579 for raven@ietf.org; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:58:55 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 03 Feb 2000 16:58:54 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 39 Message-ID: <86bt5ygd7l.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <000a01bf6e82$9c5fef80$820a54d2@here> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org lyalc@ozemail.com.au ("Lyal Collins") writes: > My point was, and as accepted below, a degree of compulsory auditability > (i.e set in law) dissuades you from undertaking activity outside the > prescribed limits. That's somewhat true, but still beside the point. We could have LE monitoring equipment duct-taped to our foreheads. I'm sure that would dissaude all sorts of crime and evil-doing. I don't know whether it would fly in Oz, but I assure you, it would not here. > If list participants distrust them LE much, then let's make sure we have a > process to make the accountable. Since "we citizens" are unlikely to pay > for a "police the police force" consisting of thousands of privacy auditors, > why not have technology provide the basic grunt work of collecting and > collating audit material. Accountability is a political issue, not a technical issue. > The alternative is we keep sitting on our hands and bleating to ourselves. Untrue. The clear alternative presented many times here is that we do NOT provide tapping capabilities and we use strong encryption without LEA backdoors when we care about our data. That doesn't sound like bleating to me. On the contrary, the plaintive wails from those who would acquiesce to the random and unsubstantiated demands to tap everything in sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep. > An example of a minimum could be making all network interfaces devices > record when and how often they are put into promiscuous mode. Many do, but that does not help a whit. How do I view logs of the network interface events that occur at my ISP? How about his upstream provider? -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 18:00:36 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA01677 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:00:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA21978; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:47:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA21949 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:47:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from mtiwmhc07.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc07.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.42]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA01515 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:48:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from alaptop.hotwired.com ([12.78.126.248]) by mtiwmhc07.worldnet.att.net (InterMail v03.02.07.07 118-134) with ESMTP id <20000203224741.LYHQ13032@alaptop.hotwired.com>; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 22:47:41 +0000 Message-Id: <4.3.0.33.0.20000203174543.01f46ce0@pop.webcom.com> X-Sender: y2kc@pop.webcom.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.0.33 (Beta) Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 17:46:17 -0500 To: Melinda.Shore@nokia.com, raven@ietf.org From: Declan McCullagh Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Certainly Barr is a black helicopter right-wing Clinton-hating wacko. But he has been very good on privacy issues, as anyone who has followed his legislative and privacy record knows. -Declan At 15:30 2/3/2000 -0600, Melinda.Shore@nokia.com wrote: >Given Barr's legislative and policy record, this is >certainly nothing one would want to boast about. > >Melinda > >_______________________________________________ >raven mailing list >raven@ietf.org >http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 18:06:07 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA01786 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:06:07 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA22214; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:56:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA22180 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:56:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from mgw-x1.nokia.com (mgw-x1.nokia.com [131.228.20.21]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA01639 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:57:49 -0500 (EST) From: Melinda.Shore@nokia.com Received: from mgw-i2.ntc.nokia.com (mgw-i2.ntc.nokia.com [131.228.118.61]) by mgw-x1.nokia.com (8.9.3/8.9.3/o) with ESMTP id AAA19913; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 00:57:50 +0200 (EET) Received: from daebh02nok.americas.nokia.com (daebh02nok.americas.nokia.com [172.18.242.183]) by mgw-i2.ntc.nokia.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA26697; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 00:57:48 +0200 (EET) Received: by daebh02nok with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1B3WDZTK>; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:57:47 -0600 Message-ID: To: declan@wired.com, raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 16:57:40 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > But he has been very good on privacy issues, as anyone who > has followed his legislative and privacy record knows. Unless Bob Barr doesn't approve of your sex life, in which case he believes that you do not have the right to engage in consensual acts with another adult in your own home. He also thinks that giving his own religious beliefs the force of law is a dandy thing to do, which is also (arguably) a privacy issue. Barr's trying to grab himself some visibility on internet stuff and he's using the wiretap stuff to do it, even though he really hasn't been able to formulate a coherent statement on the matter other than "wiretap bad, freedom good." Melinda _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 18:12:59 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA01894 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:12:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA22508; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:02:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA22482 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:02:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from willers.employees.org (willers.employees.org [192.31.7.82]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA01776 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:04:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from bigger-dawgs (pferguso-isdn.cisco.com [171.70.114.134]) by willers.employees.org (8.9.3/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA24806; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 15:02:51 -0800 (PST) Message-Id: <4.2.2.20000203180156.00a48690@willers.employees.org> X-Sender: ferguson@willers.employees.org (Unverified) X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.2 Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 18:02:38 -0500 To: Declan McCullagh From: Paul Ferguson Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang Cc: raven@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <4.3.0.33.0.20000203174543.01f46ce0@pop.webcom.com> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 05:46 PM 02/03/2000 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Certainly Barr is a black helicopter right-wing Clinton-hating wacko. Klinton-hating wackos are okay in my book. ;-) Speaking only for myself, - paul _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 18:16:07 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA01936 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:16:07 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA22565; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:03:07 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA22527 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:03:05 -0500 (EST) Received: from mtiwmhc07.worldnet.att.net (mtiwmhc07.worldnet.att.net [204.127.131.42]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA01778 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:04:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from alaptop.hotwired.com ([12.78.178.100]) by mtiwmhc07.worldnet.att.net (InterMail v03.02.07.07 118-134) with ESMTP id <20000203230400.MFOE13032@alaptop.hotwired.com>; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 23:04:00 +0000 Message-Id: <4.3.0.33.0.20000203175908.01f52130@pop.webcom.com> X-Sender: y2kc@pop.webcom.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.0.33 (Beta) Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 18:02:36 -0500 To: Melinda.Shore@nokia.com, raven@ietf.org From: Declan McCullagh Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Melinda, I'm hardly a defender of Bob Barr, as my previous message makes clear. But frothing doesn't cut it. Barr is a former US attorney and (believe it or not, based on my interviews with him) a pretty sharp fellow. Of course he's a religious right wacko, but when the Republicans control the Congress, religious right wackos who care about privacy can move some legislation. Look at Barr's speech last year at the Computers Freedom and Privacy conference, his promised hearings on NSA illegal surveillance, his opposition to CALEA, and so on. He's better than leftist Democrats (who do care about you right to do whatever you want in your bedroom, but automatically side with their pal in the White House when it comes to wiretapping) on those issues. -Declan At 16:57 2/3/2000 -0600, Melinda.Shore@nokia.com wrote: > > But he has been very good on privacy issues, as anyone who > > has followed his legislative and privacy record knows. > >Unless Bob Barr doesn't approve of your sex life, in >which case he believes that you do not have the right >to engage in consensual acts with another adult in >your own home. He also thinks that giving his own >religious beliefs the force of law is a dandy thing to >do, which is also (arguably) a privacy issue. > >Barr's trying to grab himself some visibility on >internet stuff and he's using the wiretap stuff to do >it, even though he really hasn't been able to formulate >a coherent statement on the matter other than "wiretap >bad, freedom good." > >Melinda _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 19:36:50 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA02640 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:36:50 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA25843; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:22:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA25812 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:22:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id TAA02503 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:23:55 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002040023.TAA02503@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 23701 invoked by uid 0); 4 Feb 2000 00:23:53 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.120.93) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 00:23:53 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 01:23:53 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 2 Feb 00, at 9:00, Richard Payne wrote: > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt > > > > > The draft is eminently reasonable. Kudos to the authors. > Ah? > - The IETF, being a standards body for communications that > pass across > networks that may be owned, operated and maintained by > people from numerous jurisdictions with numerous > requirements for privacy, believes that the operation of > the Internet and the needs of its users are best served by > making sure the security properties of connections across > the Internet are as well known as possible. At the present > stage of our ignorance this means making them as free from > security loopholes as possible. > > - Adding a requirement for wiretapping will make the designs > considerably more complex, thereby jeopardizing the > security of communications even when it is not being > tapped by any legal means; there are also obvious risks > raised by having to protect the access to the wiretap. > This is in conflict with the goal above. IETF wishes to forget that tapping IS required that tapping WILL be added and if not fully integrated in IETF standards will undoubtly jeopardize security of communications. That might well be by force: making use of IETF standards that prevent wiretapping illegal. This is no solution... +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 19:57:54 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA02822 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:57:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA27086; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:45:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA27056 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:45:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id TAA02712 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 19:46:26 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002040046.TAA02712@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 29364 invoked by uid 0); 4 Feb 2000 00:46:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.120.93) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 00:46:24 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 01:46:22 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.1.20000202110817.02128630@flipper.cisco.com> References: <4.2.0.58.20000202094031.009e6100@fast.synernet.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 2 Feb 00, at 11:20, Fred Baker wrote: > At 09:42 AM 2/2/00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: > >Thus, for instance, ... random monitoring is not wiretapping > >(condition 4 violated)..." > > maybe you can offer some better text. What we were trying to say was that > when one puts a sniffer on an Ethernet for network management purposes for > a purpose unrelated to capturing a user's content (say, finding out what > percentage of traffic is HTTP vs how much is SMTP, example at > http://www.vbns.net/stats/flows/html), this was not wiretapping. The key > feature of wiretapping is not the capture of traffic, but the capture of > the content of traffic for the purpose of revealing that content in some way. Capture of traffic and thus analysing who is communicating with who is a very important use of taps. In The Netherlands law enforcement often chooses only traffic analysis first for organised crime. Since they are required to report =everything= they tap and that's costly even for simple telephone calls, they try to avoid that. +++chefren p.s. As Declan said: shorter is better / more effective p.p.s. Typo: regrdless _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 20:47:38 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA03373 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 20:47:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA28998; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 20:36:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA28931 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 20:34:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com (sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com [171.68.224.215]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA03277; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 20:35:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from rhino (rhino.cisco.com [172.20.9.57]) by sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA16725; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:54:39 -0800 (PST) Received: from p7020-img-nt (fred-hm-dhcp1.cisco.com [171.69.128.116]) by rhino (SMI-8.6/CISCO.WS.1.1) with SMTP id RAA25220; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 17:39:43 -0800 Message-Id: <4.1.20000203171328.02193220@flipper.cisco.com> Message-Id: <4.1.20000203171328.02193220@flipper.cisco.com> X-Sender: fred@flipper.cisco.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.1 Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 17:14:25 -0800 To: "Alexander, Brad" From: Fred Baker In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: [Raven] Re: newsrelease Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Thanks. At 03:48 PM 2/3/00 -0500, Alexander, Brad wrote: >Thought you might want a copy of this ... > >BARR THANKS NET TASK FORCE >FOR REJECTING WIRETAPS > >WASHINGTON, DC -- U.S. Representative Bob Barr (GA-7) hailed reports today >that the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is poised to reject building >wiretapping into the Internet. According to Wired News, the IETF has >"decided not to support wiretapping." > >This decision follows requests by Barr and other privacy advocates last >year, urging the IETF to refuse to bow to government pressure to add >surveillance components to the Internet. The IETF is the international >group of volunteer computer experts that sets technical standards for >Internet communication. > >"Everyone who cares about their privacy in an age when information is >becoming increasingly accessible should heave a sigh of relief at this news. >If the IETF had agreed to help build wiretapping into the Internet, our >privacy would have been threatened both by invasive government surveillance >and by individuals taking advantage of newly created back doors," said Barr. > >"Fred Baker and the IETF membership deserve our thanks for following this >debate through and drafting technical standards that soundly reject Internet >wiretapping," Barr continued. > >The text of Barr's letter to the IETF last year is available from his >website at http://www.house.gov/barr/wiretapletter.html. > >--30-- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 21:34:21 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA03880 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 21:34:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id VAA29824; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 21:23:45 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id VAA29799 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 21:23:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from sys32.hou.wt.net (sys32.hou.wt.net [205.230.159.32]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA03733 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 21:25:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from tjunker (216-119-157-35.ipset37.wt.net [216.119.157.35]) by sys32.hou.wt.net (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA11754 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 20:25:16 -0600 (CST) Message-Id: <200002040225.UAA11754@sys32.hou.wt.net> From: "Thomas Junker" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 20:25:23 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wiretap thang Reply-to: Thomas Junker Priority: normal In-reply-to: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 3 Feb 00, at 15:30, Melinda.Shore@nokia.com wrote: > Given Barr's legislative and policy record, this is > certainly nothing one would want to boast about. > > Melinda Picky, picky, picky! Where were most of the other politicians on this issue? OTL? Maybe you'd prefer a word of thanks from the man who invented the Internet in his dreams, hmmm? Don't hold your breath. Regards, Thomas Junker tjunker@phoenix.net _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 3 21:45:25 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA04527 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 21:45:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id VAA00162; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 21:33:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id VAA00126 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 21:33:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from kickme.cisco.com (kickme.cisco.com [198.92.30.42]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA03908 for ; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 21:35:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from rhino (rhino.cisco.com [172.20.9.57]) by kickme.cisco.com (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA04382; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:25:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from p7020-img-nt (fred-hm-dhcp1.cisco.com [171.69.128.116]) by rhino (SMI-8.6/CISCO.WS.1.1) with SMTP id SAA25241; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 18:39:42 -0800 Message-Id: <4.1.20000203183133.029e4010@flipper.cisco.com> X-Sender: fred@flipper.cisco.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.1 Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2000 18:32:16 -0800 To: Melinda.Shore@nokia.com, Declan McCullagh From: Fred Baker Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang Cc: raven@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <4.3.0.33.0.20000203175908.01f52130@pop.webcom.com> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 06:02 PM 2/3/00 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Melinda, I'm hardly a defender of Bob Barr.. With al due respect, what has this discussion got to do with the subject of this list? _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 06:17:41 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA21789 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:17:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA19845; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:05:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA19818 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:05:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from fep7.mail.ozemail.net (fep7-old.mail.ozemail.net [203.2.192.99]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA21750 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:06:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn42p06.ozemail.com.au [210.84.5.198]) by fep7.mail.ozemail.net (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id WAA21200 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:06:41 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:03:50 +1100 Message-ID: <001701bf6eff$842757f0$c60554d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 In-reply-to: <86bt5ygd7l.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit [snip] > > The alternative is we keep sitting on our hands and bleating to > ourselves. > > Untrue. The clear alternative presented many times here is that we do > NOT provide tapping capabilities and we use strong encryption without > LEA backdoors when we care about our data. That doesn't sound like > bleating to me. On the contrary, the plaintive wails from those who > would acquiesce to the random and unsubstantiated demands to tap > everything in sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep. Which effectively ends up meaning that LE "legally" break into each individual computer, and read all data, even non-transmitted data. Lyal _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 06:29:51 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA21808 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:29:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA20019; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:14:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA19992 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:14:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA21786 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:16:13 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <12368FRX>; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:21:28 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "'chefren '" , "'raven@ietf.org '" Subject: RE: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:21:25 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org -----Original Message----- From: chefren To: raven@ietf.org Sent: 2/3/00 7:46 PM Subject: Re: [Raven] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt On 2 Feb 00, at 11:20, Fred Baker wrote: >At 09:42 AM 2/2/00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: >>Thus, for instance, ... random monitoring is not wiretapping >>(condition 4 violated)..." > >>maybe you can offer some better text. What we were trying to say was >>that when one puts a sniffer on an Ethernet for network management >>purposes for a purpose unrelated to capturing a user's content (say, >>finding out what percentage of traffic is HTTP vs how much is SMTP, >>example at http://www.vbns.net/stats/flows/html), this was not >>wiretapping. The key feature of wiretapping is not the capture of >>traffic, but the capture of the content of traffic for the purpose of >>revealing that content in some way. >Capture of traffic and thus analysing who is communicating >with who is a very important use of taps. >In The Netherlands law enforcement often chooses only >traffic analysis first for organised crime. Since they are >required to report =everything= they tap and that's costly >even for simple telephone calls, they try to avoid that. >+++chefren >p.s. As Declan said: shorter is better / more effective >p.p.s. Typo: regrdless I personally thought the draft was a nice job. As to traffic analysis, etc., IIRC a very early pair of observations on the list consisted of (a) today, right now, all sorts of ways exist to read/track traffic on the 'net (typically, I thought, as a result of network management tools) and therefore (b) anybody who really, really wants to communicate securely needs to be using end-to-end encryption anyway. So that if a LEA needs certain information that is obtainable by means of some existing technology that some 'net-related entity has already deployed for some purpose (network management, say), and the LEA can obtain appropriate authorization from the government (in the US, a warrant), then the 'net is already "tappable" to that extent. This is analogous to noting that houses typically have doors; that doors have locks; but locksmith tools (which can be used to change the setting on the lock, or get a locked-out homeowner in) can be used to facilitate a physical, clandestine search by a LEA I can certainly imagine a debate about whether Internet protocols should be changed/redesigned to make it harder than it now is to obtain data about the flow and content of traffic on the net. That would be analogous to the "Lock Engineering Task Force" debating whether to set new lock protocols that made them harder for locksmiths to pick. But I thought the debate we were having was the quite different one of whether the IETF should be taking affirmative steps to make the 'net *more* tappable than it already is. Chris S. All opinions my own... *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 06:53:09 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA22194 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:53:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA20565; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:42:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA20539 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:42:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id GAA22073 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:44:04 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041144.GAA22073@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 25630 invoked by uid 0); 4 Feb 2000 11:44:02 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 11:44:02 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 12:44:01 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <20000202083100.B18928@progressive-systems.com> References: <200002011855.NAA28841@ietf.org>; from chefren@pi.net on Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 07:55:12PM +0100 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 2 Feb 00, at 8:31, Ge' Weijers wrote: > On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 07:55:12PM +0100, chefren wrote: > > On 1 Feb 00, at 8:41, Ge' Weijers wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 01:32:12AM +0100, chefren wrote: > > > > If YOU were with law enforcement and the criminals were > > > > using encryption, wouldn't you ask for laws that allow you > > > > to place bugs in their keyboards? > > > > > > I would just bug the places where they operate, > > > > How do you know without being able to follow the > > communication? > > > > (We live in a world were someone in Australia can keep a > > drug gang going on in Amsterdam without physical contact.) > > But the drug gang can be found because they have to move drugs > around. There are all kinds of ways to get at this drug gang: > infiltration, informants, bugging the gang members' homes, etc. Infiltration asks too much from people. Informants are often very difficult to enter in an organization. (Think of Russian, Chinese, or Columbian gangs, very difficult to find someon that fits "in".) Impossible to bug members if you don't know who are the members. AND it's pretty costly and difficult to bug homes. > A crime that's completely undetectable outside cyberspace is a > questionable crime at best. I understand you don't recognize white-collar crimes? Cartels? And mixes of course. Organizations will tend to use as much encrypted communication as possible because it bears far less risk than seeing each other in person. .. > > > assuming they have given LE a good cause to be > > > suspicious. That's an expensive operation. > > > > Yes, too expensive in practice. > > Yes, it's much cheaper to snoop. So if someone is killed in the > Vondelpark you just tap all the phone lines in a 30 km radius? No they tap all known people who knew the killed person. Often only a few hours. Very effective way to find killers. > Technology and economies of scale will make this all > possible. Where do you stop? You still don't see that tapping done the way it is done in The Netherlands is too costly, besides that nobody will give you a warrant for such outragous way of trying to find facts... =everything= tapped should be reported, the tap should be usable for and against the tapped person. Rules are pretty strict, lots of checks and balances. +++chefren +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 07:10:08 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA22583 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:10:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA20964; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:58:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA20882 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:58:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id HAA22350 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:00:02 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041200.HAA22350@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 1437 invoked by uid 0); 4 Feb 2000 11:59:59 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 11:59:59 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 12:59:56 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <86r9euh5s2.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 3 Feb 00, at 6:41, James Carlson wrote: > It should be noted once again that the LAPD broke the law. No > *technical* recommendations from the IETF can possibly track police > who are disobeying the law. Nonsense. If technical and to the point recommendations of the IETF require a unique chipcard to start a car it's pretty difficult to start the car without a chipcard. All wiretap equipment should have auditability in it as should have routers and everything involved in the privacy of others. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 07:12:03 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA22641 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:12:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA21154; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:01:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA21130 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:01:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id HAA22480 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:03:20 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041203.HAA22480@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 3750 invoked by uid 0); 4 Feb 2000 12:03:18 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 12:03:18 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:03:13 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal References: James Carlson <"Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> In-reply-to: <10002030740.ZM23165@loupan.vs.lmco.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 3 Feb 00, at 7:40, Matthew Saroff wrote: > On May 13, 11:42, James Carlson wrote: > > Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > > lyalc@ozemail.com.au ("Lyal Collins") writes: > > > Would you speed in your car if the speedometer recorded all vehicle speed > > > (and authorised road speed), and once a month had to submit the speedo to a > > > review, with automatic fines for every transgression over the defined speed > > > limit? > > > > I would be tempted to find another means to travel. This hypothetical > > record of speeds traveled and speed limits seen would leak information > > about exactly where I've been. Why would I want to hand a list of > > such information to police even if it sometimes catches dangerous > > drivers? > There is a proposal to do this in Britain, with the data being fed to > an onboard governor to control auto speed. Strange views... It's not an offence to break speed limits to be able to punish people. It is to keep injuries/deaths low, to keep environment clean. So if a system is proposed that makes the cars drive automatically exactly the right speed for a given traject that's OK and prevents anyone getting fines for speed limits. The techies here tend to see lot's of things upside down... +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 07:24:24 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA23095 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:24:24 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA21414; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:12:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA21385 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:12:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id HAA22719 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:13:35 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041213.HAA22719@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 9294 invoked by uid 0); 4 Feb 2000 12:13:32 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 12:13:32 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:13:31 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: from -- RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <3899D6CC.7CA1@toledolink.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 3 Feb 00, at 14:28, ironsite@toledolink.com wrote: > chefren@pi.net was heard mumbling incoherently: > > >Pretty biased without the about 150 people My Lai eh? > > > >Old news from before the modern media. Vietnam war with > >cruelties like My Lai, pictured naked people running for > >napalm and the officer executing a guy on the street in > >front of a camera were more or less a turn. > > > > Well the people were running -from- the napalm not for it. Excuse for my bad english... > As to the Vietnamese General "executing a guy on the street in > front of a camera".....you shold check your facts more carefully before > you are lead around like a dog on a leash by the media. > > Sure the picture is sensational, but only 5 or so minutes before that > picture was taken (it was a movie/video btw, from which they took that > one frame) that same general witnessed the chap in question kill several > of his men, that is why he (the general) shot him. Pictures do not > always tell -ALL- the story. Clearly you are an idiot, you assert as > fact that which is merely what the media feeds you. It's still wrong to shoot another person. > How do -I- know what the general really did? I was there. And I -AM- > ashamed of what some idiot did in the name of the US Army (and by > extension the USA) at MyLai. And even you don't know if the guy shot in front of the camera was wrong when he shot several of his men. (Maybe they raped his mother one minute earlier?). It's always about which distance you want to take? It -seems- pretty clear the guy who shooted in front of the camera could also have jailed the person he shot and lead him to a judge. +++chefren p.s. I wouldn't be surprised if more than 150 people whould have get the death penalty wrongfully in the US. Please don't take this personally, why be ashamed for My Lay and not for death penalty? p.p.s. I still have comparable problems with free use of strong encryption... _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 07:25:54 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA23132 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:25:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA21513; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:14:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA21482 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:14:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from willers.employees.org (willers.employees.org [192.31.7.82]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA22772 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:15:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from bigger-dawgs (pferguso-isdn.cisco.com [171.70.114.134]) by willers.employees.org (8.9.3/8.9.1) with ESMTP id EAA07648; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 04:15:32 -0800 (PST) Message-Id: <4.2.2.20000204071120.00a47cf0@willers.employees.org> X-Sender: ferguson@willers.employees.org (Unverified) X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.2 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 07:15:17 -0500 To: "chefren" From: Paul Ferguson Cc: raven@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <200002041203.HAA22480@ietf.org> References: <10002030740.ZM23165@loupan.vs.lmco.com> <"Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people"@[138.209.240.12]> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] *plonk* Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 01:03 PM 02/04/2000 +0100, chefren wrote: >So if a system is proposed that makes the cars drive >automatically exactly the right speed for a given traject >that's OK and prevents anyone getting fines for speed >limits. *plonk* And with that ridiculous comment, you are now in my permanent twit filter list. You should also probably be added to the net.kooks list.... _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 07:35:56 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA23553 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:35:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA21603; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:16:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA21576 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:16:12 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id HAA22813 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:17:35 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041217.HAA22813@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 10978 invoked by uid 0); 4 Feb 2000 12:17:28 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 12:17:28 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:17:27 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <86bt5ygd7l.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 3 Feb 00, at 16:58, James Carlson wrote: > Untrue. The clear alternative presented many times here is that we do > NOT provide tapping capabilities and we use strong encryption without > LEA backdoors when we care about our data. And not about our community? > That doesn't sound like bleating to me. On the contrary, > the plaintive wails from those who would acquiesce to the > random and unsubstantiated demands to tap everything in > sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep. Who demands to tap everything in sight? The about 10+ people who aren't against tapping here are all for tightly integrated strong provisions against misuse. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 07:37:20 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA23590 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:37:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA22060; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:22:18 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA22033 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:22:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id HAA23033 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:23:41 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041223.HAA23033@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 13487 invoked by uid 0); 4 Feb 2000 12:23:39 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 12:23:39 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:23:38 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang Priority: normal In-reply-to: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 3 Feb 00, at 16:57, Melinda.Shore@nokia.com wrote: > > But he has been very good on privacy issues, as anyone who > > has followed his legislative and privacy record knows. > > Unless Bob Barr doesn't approve of your sex life, in > which case he believes that you do not have the right > to engage in consensual acts with another adult in > your own home. He also thinks that giving his own > religious beliefs the force of law is a dandy thing to > do, which is also (arguably) a privacy issue. So he clearly isn't "very good on privacy issues". > Barr's trying to grab himself some visibility on > internet stuff and he's using the wiretap stuff to do > it, even though he really hasn't been able to formulate > a coherent statement on the matter other than "wiretap > bad, freedom good." Make such a type head of NSA or CIA and "watch"... I saw Mc Cain saying something like "whatever I tell you I will always tell you the truth" You have lots of pretty pathetic and higly unrealistic politicians over there... +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 07:54:59 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA24335 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:54:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA22500; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:41:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA22469 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:41:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from caesar.acns.carleton.edu (Caesar.ACNS.Carleton.edu [137.22.1.26]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA23827 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:42:39 -0500 (EST) From: anderser@carleton.edu Received: from graceless.acns.carleton.edu (graceless.ACNS.Carleton.edu [137.22.1.18]) by carleton.edu (PMDF V5.2-32 #40542) with ESMTP id <0FPE00AIEON295@carleton.edu> for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 06:42:38 -0600 (CST) Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 06:42:38 -0600 (CST) Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-reply-to: <200002041158.GAA20907@optimus.ietf.org> X-Sender: pine@graceless.acns.carleton.edu To: raven@ietf.org Cc: anderser@carleton.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > From: "chefren" > To: raven@ietf.org > Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 22:42:24 +0100 > Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > > On 2 Feb 00, at 8:53, Ed Stone wrote: [snip] > > Why is so hard to understand the natural suspicions of governmental > > entities who tell us they will police themselves, investigate themselves, > > place requirements on themselves, and be judge and jury on themselves? > > Why is it so hard to understand there is now known > alternative for democracy? #1 Democracy is NOT a panacea. Adolph Hitler was democratically elected. The democratically elected parliament democratically voted to create one history's most evil dictatorships. The designers of the U.S. government (for example) - a republic - knew better than to trust democracy fully. The very concept of "checks and ballances" is to recognise that even democratically selected officials can do bad things, and their power must always be constrained. (Hopefully the political nature of this mailing list exempts it from Godwin's Law) #2 Of the world's 6 billion people, barely a billion live in a democratic state. Even if democracy were perfect, which it's not, most of the world is not a democracy. As often as not, the government is a band of murderous robbers, blessed with the authority to call their pillaging law. On the whole, I fear the world's governments and armies more than its mafias and street gangs. Recall that IETF decisions affect the Internet everywhere. #3 We cannot, now or ever, control how our standards are used. We can't make a warlord in Rwanda turn over his audit logs to the IETF or UN or anyone else, can we? We can't expect the bad guys to comply with our policies or build their equipment to our specs. We can only equip everyone (good and bad alike, alas) with the means to protect themselves. #4 "Impossible" is always better than "forbidden". _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 07:58:05 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA24489 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:58:00 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA22375; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:36:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA22349 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:36:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA23601 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:37:32 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id HAA24302 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:37:32 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 04 Feb 2000 07:37:32 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 40 Message-ID: <86aelhw3cj.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <200002041200.HAA22350@ietf.org> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > On 3 Feb 00, at 6:41, James Carlson wrote: > > > It should be noted once again that the LAPD broke the law. No > > *technical* recommendations from the IETF can possibly track police > > who are disobeying the law. > > > Nonsense. Certainly not. What's needed are legal and political solutions. Technical solutions cannot and will not by themselves force police (or anyone else for that matter) to respect anyone's rights. > If technical and to the point recommendations of the IETF > require a unique chipcard to start a car it's pretty > difficult to start the car without a chipcard. That's silly. If such a car were built, then the folks who need to start a car without being detected would MODIFY the car so that it will start that way -- a couple of wires would do it -- or simply use an old car that doesn't have the encumbrance. "Pretty difficult" here means only that the people who are inconvenienced are those who obey the law. Those who do not are not bothered a bit. > All wiretap equipment should have auditability in it as > should have routers and everything involved in the privacy > of others. That's still false. Auditability does not solve the privacy problem. In fact, it makes it worse. Only those who are obeying the law surrender their privacy to the auditing mechanism. -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 08:02:11 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA24731 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:02:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA22607; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:46:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA22579 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:46:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA23994 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:47:54 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id HAA26197 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:47:55 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 04 Feb 2000 07:47:54 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 30 Message-ID: <869011w2v9.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <001701bf6eff$842757f0$c60554d2@here> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org lyalc@ozemail.com.au ("Lyal Collins") writes: > Which effectively ends up meaning that LE "legally" break into each > individual computer, and read all data, even non-transmitted data. Assuming, of course, that the police need to recover evidence on someone's computer, yes. That's the usual way search warrants are handled and is highly unlikely to change. For what it's worth, this isn't the bogeyman, and yours is not a particularly strong argument. Suppose LE did have a tappable version of all known and knowable IP protocols. They use these to detect one of those newfangled thoughtcrimes in progress right here in Network City. Then what? Well, of course, they turn the evidence over to a prosecutor who then obtains warrants to break into each individual computer to make sure there's nothing else hiding in there. They'd be negligent if they did anything less. It is not the case, as you seem to be asserting, that allowing LE unfettered access to the contents of IP traffic will somehow obviate their perceived need to steal^H^H^H^H^Hgather evidence as they do today. In fact, since they would have enhanced means to detect crimes that they fail to detect today, I would certainly expect that the number of break-ins and seized computers would greatly increase under this hypothetical police state. -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 08:54:20 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA26462 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:54:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA23881; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:34:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA23859 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:34:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id IAA25974 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:36:01 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041336.IAA25974@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 1285 invoked from network); 4 Feb 2000 13:35:56 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 13:35:56 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 14:35:49 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <86aelhw3cj.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 4 Feb 00, at 7:37, James Carlson wrote: > chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > > On 3 Feb 00, at 6:41, James Carlson wrote: > > > > > It should be noted once again that the LAPD broke the law. No > > > *technical* recommendations from the IETF can possibly track police > > > who are disobeying the law. > > > > > > Nonsense. > > Certainly not. What's needed are legal and political solutions. > Technical solutions cannot and will not by themselves force police (or > anyone else for that matter) to respect anyone's rights. Such legal and political solutions are "forbid free use of strong encryption", "make tapping equipment fully auditable". The latter would for sure be helped by some good IETF standards. > > If technical and to the point recommendations of the IETF > > require a unique chipcard to start a car it's pretty > > difficult to start the car without a chipcard. > > That's silly. If such a car were built, then the folks who need to > start a car without being detected would MODIFY the car so that it > will start that way -- a couple of wires would do it -- or simply use > an old car that doesn't have the encumbrance. Modern cars don't start without the cpu running properly. > "Pretty difficult" here means only that the people who are > inconvenienced are those who obey the law. Those who do not are not > bothered a bit. I think this is beond reality. The newest modern cars in Europe are very difficult to steal because of techical tricks that cannot be circumvented with a few wires because they are tightly integrated in the design. Precisely what I think tapping needs. Tapboxes with lot's of technical tricks that prevent Law Enforcement or others misusing them. > > All wiretap equipment should have auditability in it as > > should have routers and everything involved in the privacy > > of others. > > That's still false. Auditability does not solve the privacy problem. > In fact, it makes it worse. Only those who are obeying the law > surrender their privacy to the auditing mechanism. I invite you to try to drive away in my car after I left it for one minute without locking it. It will lock itself after that time and close the doors. To drive away you need to open it physically by a remote controller with rolling key generator, that generator automatically unlocks the computer inside and a physical key to start the motor. Only the latter can probably be overruled with some wires. Encryption/authentication technology can be put in place to prevent misuse of taps and I'm pretty sure it works in a very high degree because I SEE it here in the Netherlands. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 09:04:43 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA26915 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:04:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA24309; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:49:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA24263 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:49:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA26431 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:50:48 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id IAA10859 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:50:49 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 04 Feb 2000 08:50:48 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 51 Message-ID: <861z6tvzyf.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <200002041217.HAA22813@ietf.org> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > On 3 Feb 00, at 16:58, James Carlson wrote: > > > Untrue. The clear alternative presented many times here is that we do > > NOT provide tapping capabilities and we use strong encryption without > > LEA backdoors when we care about our data. > > And not about our community? I'm afraid I fail to see the threat against the community at large posed by free access to strong encryption. (Quite off topic, but the funny thing about it is that several right-leaning folks on this list have stated without sufficient evidence that we lefties would like the government to control this. On the contrary! Speaking as one of those pinkos, I think government should keep its grubby fingers off my data.) > > That doesn't sound like bleating to me. On the contrary, > > the plaintive wails from those who would acquiesce to the > > random and unsubstantiated demands to tap everything in > > sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep. > > Who demands to tap everything in sight? Um, well, let's start with the LEs that rather forcefully request tapping interfaces on all telecommunications equipment. To that, you can add the sycophant manufacturers and developers who are pushing to standardize such a mistake and integrate the bug into IETF protocols. > The about 10+ people who aren't against tapping here are > all for tightly integrated strong provisions against misuse. I think you've misunderstood something. We admit that we don't know how to make complex security systems completely secure. We know for a fact that adding another interface to an already questionable security infrastructure makes the entire system more complex and less reliable. Given all of that, how do you propose the addition of intentional security holes that only "properly authorized" LE can use and that don't also violate the integrity of the system as a whole? I find the argument that misuse will be prevented by technical means to be wrong on the face of it and completely disingenuous. It's a fraud. -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 09:13:45 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA27446 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:13:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA24448; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:53:16 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA24412 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:53:13 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA26482 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:54:37 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id IAA11782 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 08:54:38 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: from -- RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 04 Feb 2000 08:54:38 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 21 Message-ID: <86zothul7l.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <200002041213.HAA22719@ietf.org> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > p.s. I wouldn't be surprised if more than 150 people whould > have get the death penalty wrongfully in the US. Please > don't take this personally, why be ashamed for My Lay and > not for death penalty? Many of us are. Off topic, of course. > p.p.s. I still have comparable problems with free use of > strong encryption... That's just absurd hyperbole. Nobody, but nobody, dies as a direct result of the use of any computer system. About the worst thing that happens is carpel tunnel syndrome and an expanding posterior. Strong encryption and murder are not comparable by any means. -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 09:44:11 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA28552 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:44:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA25712; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:28:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA25686 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:28:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id JAA27971 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:29:59 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041429.JAA27971@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 16729 invoked from network); 4 Feb 2000 14:29:54 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 14:29:54 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 15:29:26 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <861z6tvzyf.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 4 Feb 00, at 8:50, James Carlson wrote: > chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > > On 3 Feb 00, at 16:58, James Carlson wrote: > > > > > Untrue. The clear alternative presented many times here is that we do > > > NOT provide tapping capabilities and we use strong encryption without > > > LEA backdoors when we care about our data. > > > > And not about our community? > > I'm afraid I fail to see the threat against the community at large > posed by free access to strong encryption. People can organize cartels? And the non-business version in politics? Or plainly organize crime so it can get the scale of Colombia or Russia. .. > > > That doesn't sound like bleating to me. On the contrary, > > > the plaintive wails from those who would acquiesce to the > > > random and unsubstantiated demands to tap everything in > > > sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep. > > > > Who demands to tap everything in sight? > > Um, well, let's start with the LEs that rather forcefully request > tapping interfaces on all telecommunications equipment. That has nothing to do with sleepnetfishing, they demand access if necessary. If the provisions aren't made in telecom equipment the access won't be possible if necessary. [Here in The Netherlands there are laws that prevent the fire brigade finds blocks in their way if there is fire.] .. > > The about 10+ people who aren't against tapping here are > > all for tightly integrated strong provisions against misuse. > > I think you've misunderstood something. We admit that we don't know > how to make complex security systems completely secure. We know for a > fact that adding another interface to an already questionable security > infrastructure makes the entire system more complex and less reliable. I agree with that. But if society demands tappability, what do you want, a hodgepodge of proprietary standards or a well designed standard system that can be studied. > Given all of that, how do you propose the addition of intentional > security holes that only "properly authorized" LE can use and that > don't also violate the integrity of the system as a whole? It might well be that tappability will ad security holes but so are almost all requirements. > I find the argument that misuse will be prevented by technical means > to be wrong on the face of it and completely disingenuous. It's a > fraud. It isn't. Tapping of GSM and ISDN in The Netherlands is done according to the lines I described here some times and I can assure you it's pretty impossible to misuse it. You need special equipment, you need special software, you need keys, you need to be on a special place, there are at least three independently administering parties that are involved. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 09:44:44 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA28593 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:44:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA25987; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:33:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA25957 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:33:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id JAA28214 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:34:43 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041434.JAA28214@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 20249 invoked from network); 4 Feb 2000 14:34:42 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 14:34:42 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 15:34:40 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: from -- RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <86zothul7l.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 4 Feb 00, at 8:54, James Carlson wrote: > That's just absurd hyperbole. Nobody, but nobody, dies as a direct > result of the use of any computer system. People were killed by robots or failing medical equipment. Other people were often responsible for misprogramming. > About the worst thing that happens is carpel tunnel > syndrome and an expanding posterior. Strong encryption > and murder are not comparable by any means. You can gain power the old way by murdering and you can gain power by using encryption to hide methods that are forbidden. Like setting up a cartel. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 09:52:40 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA28939 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:52:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA26189; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:38:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA26160 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:38:48 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA28374 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:40:13 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id JAA28784 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:40:14 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 04 Feb 2000 09:40:14 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 61 Message-ID: <86ya91uj3l.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <200002041336.IAA25974@ietf.org> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > On 4 Feb 00, at 7:37, James Carlson wrote: > > Certainly not. What's needed are legal and political solutions. > > Technical solutions cannot and will not by themselves force police (or > > anyone else for that matter) to respect anyone's rights. > > Such legal and political solutions are "forbid free use of > strong encryption", "make tapping equipment fully > auditable". That appears to be a non sequitur. Just how does the lack of strong encryption or the addition of auditing force anyone to respect anyone's rights? You seem to be missing the point. > Modern cars don't start without the cpu running properly. Pre-modern cars are readily available. Would you like to prohibit the possession of 1971 Buick LeSabres on national security grounds? There certainly are some humorous conclusions to this line of "reasoning." > Precisely what I think tapping needs. Tapboxes with lot's > of technical tricks that prevent Law Enforcement or others > misusing them. You've never designed security systems, have you? The more technical tricks you add, the *LESS* secure the system is. The systems we have now cannot be completely analyzed from a security standpoint. Adding more complexity will make the problem (and the failures) far worse. We're an engineering group. Our goals are engineering goals. It's most certainly not a goal to produce security that doesn't work. > To drive away you need to open it physically by a remote > controller with rolling key generator, that generator > automatically unlocks the computer inside and a physical > key to start the motor. Only the latter can probably be > overruled with some wires. I'm not a skilled thief, and I never claimed to be. Such a system, though, is not secure against those skilled in the art. It simply deters amateurs. Someone who is good at this very likely does not need the key generator. Instead, he takes it to a garage, disassembles the car and replaces the computer with one more to his liking. This is roughly the situation with tapping. Suitable application of force will bypass flimsy protections. > Encryption/authentication technology can be put in place to > prevent misuse of taps and I'm pretty sure it works in a > very high degree because I SEE it here in the Netherlands. And your proof would be what? Anecdotal evidence? -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 09:57:26 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA29064 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:57:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA26394; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:43:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA26365 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:43:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from bommel.progressive-systems.com (216-132-55-12.velocityhsi.com [216.132.55.12]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA28597 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:44:44 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ge@localhost) by bommel.progressive-systems.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id HAA28602 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:44:42 -0700 Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 07:44:41 -0700 From: "Ge' Weijers" To: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Message-ID: <20000204074441.B28428@progressive-systems.com> References: <86bt5ygd7l.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> <001701bf6eff$842757f0$c60554d2@here> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <001701bf6eff$842757f0$c60554d2@here>; from lyalc@ozemail.com.au on Fri, Feb 04, 2000 at 10:03:50PM +1100 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Fri, Feb 04, 2000 at 10:03:50PM +1100, Lyal Collins wrote: > [snip] > > > The alternative is we keep sitting on our hands and bleating to > > ourselves. > > > > Untrue. The clear alternative presented many times here is that we do > > NOT provide tapping capabilities and we use strong encryption without > > LEA backdoors when we care about our data. That doesn't sound like > > bleating to me. On the contrary, the plaintive wails from those who > > would acquiesce to the random and unsubstantiated demands to tap > > everything in sight sound to *me* like the bleating of so many sheep. > > Which effectively ends up meaning that LE "legally" break into each > individual computer, and read all data, even non-transmitted data. This measure is more expensive, and far more riskier, so it will only be used where ordinary policework won't do the trick. Widespread abuse is far less likely. Ge' -- - Ge' Weijers Voice: (614)326 4600 Progressive Systems, Inc. FAX: (614)326 4601 2000 West Henderson Rd. Suite 400, Columbus OH 43220 _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 09:59:10 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA29109 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:59:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA28051; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:47:00 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA27935 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:46:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from newdev.harvard.edu (newdev.eecs.harvard.edu [140.247.60.212]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA28744 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:48:20 -0500 (EST) Received: (from sob@localhost) by newdev.harvard.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) id JAA03657 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:48:20 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 09:48:20 -0500 (EST) From: Scott Bradner Message-Id: <200002041448.JAA03657@newdev.harvard.edu> To: raven@ietf.org Subject: [Raven] encryption Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org there has been a bunch of mail on this list of late about banning encryption - that is outside of the scope of the mailing list charter the topic on the table at the moment is the draft of the IAB/IESG statement - can people please address that document directly. The IESG & IAB will be putting the document out for general last-call soon and has asked this mailing list for a review if you have comments please be as specific as posible - include the specifc text you are commenting on and supply alternate wording thanks Scott _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 10:24:09 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA29930 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:24:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA29333; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:10:48 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA29306 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:10:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from ironbridgenetworks.com (helios.ironbridgenetworks.com [146.115.140.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA29593 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:12:07 -0500 (EST) Received: (from news@localhost) by ironbridgenetworks.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id KAA09832 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:11:44 -0500 (EST) To: raven@ietf.org From: James Carlson Newsgroups: lists.ietf.raven Subject: Re: from -- RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: 04 Feb 2000 10:11:44 -0500 Organization: IronBridge Networks Lines: 36 Message-ID: <86wvoluhn3.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> References: <200002041434.JAA28214@ietf.org> NNTP-Posting-Host: helios.ibnets.com X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.5/Emacs 20.3 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > People were killed by robots or failing medical equipment. Those are mechanical issues. The data itself didn't cause harm. The transgressions occurred out here in the real world, not down in the electrons. > You can gain power the old way by murdering and you can > gain power by using encryption to hide methods that are > forbidden. Like setting up a cartel. I still fail to see the problem. A "cartel" that merely exchanges "forbidden" data does nobody any harm. It's only when the members of that cartel perform some external *action* that there's a problem, and it's that action that is subject to ordinary law enforcement. One of the things that we're dancing around seems to be whether George Orwell's thoughcrimes are legitimate targets of law enforcement. Am I guilty of a crime because I thought about it? What if I talk about it with someone else but do nothing and never have the intent of doing anything? Some of us, like me, fall on the side of permitting illicit or immoral thoughts and speech, even if criminals might also think or speak. Others want to try to prevent crime before it happens by intercepting speech and prosecuting it. In any event, those are *legal* viewpoints. They're not technical. They're not the subject of this list. They're not legitimate topics for the IETF to address at all. -- James Carlson, System Architect IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 10:36:28 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA00339 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:36:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA29884; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:24:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA29853 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:24:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from eastwood.aldigital.algroup.co.uk (eastwood.aldigital.algroup.co.uk [194.128.162.193]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA29998 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 10:25:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from freeby.ben.algroup.co.uk (freeby.ben.algroup.co.uk [193.133.15.6]) by eastwood.aldigital.algroup.co.uk (8.8.8/8.6.12) with ESMTP id PAA17575; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 15:25:21 GMT Received: from algroup.co.uk (naughty.ben.algroup.co.uk [193.133.15.107]) by freeby.ben.algroup.co.uk (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id PAA00857; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 15:25:38 GMT Message-ID: <389AEF60.B15034E4@algroup.co.uk> Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 15:25:20 +0000 From: Ben Laurie Organization: A.L. Group plc X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: James Carlson CC: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: from -- RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people References: <200002041434.JAA28214@ietf.org> <86wvoluhn3.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit James Carlson wrote: > > chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > > People were killed by robots or failing medical equipment. > > Those are mechanical issues. The data itself didn't cause harm. The > transgressions occurred out here in the real world, not down in the > electrons. This completely off-topic, but there is a well-known case where people were killed by faulty software in an X-ray machine (it could set the machine to "treatment" mode whilst the operator thought it was in "scan" mode, thus resulting in people getting sufficiently high X-ray doses to kill them). Another obvious case that illustrates how you could kill people with software (though in this case it didn't) was the failure of Ariane. Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Y19100 no-prize winner! http://www.ntk.net/index.cgi?back=2000/now0121.txt _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 11:36:18 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA01978 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:36:18 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA01932; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:15:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA01905 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:15:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id LAA01476 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:16:58 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002041616.LAA01476@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 14309 invoked from network); 4 Feb 2000 16:16:58 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.229) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 16:16:58 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:16:57 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: from -- RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <389AEF60.B15034E4@algroup.co.uk> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 4 Feb 00, at 15:25, Ben Laurie wrote: > James Carlson wrote: > > > > chefren@pi.net ("chefren") writes: > > > People were killed by robots or failing medical equipment. > > > > Those are mechanical issues. The data itself didn't cause harm. The > > transgressions occurred out here in the real world, not down in the > > electrons. > > This completely off-topic, but there is a well-known case where people > were killed by faulty software in an X-ray machine (it could set the > machine to "treatment" mode whilst the operator thought it was in "scan" > mode, thus resulting in people getting sufficiently high X-ray doses to > kill them). > > Another obvious case that illustrates how you could kill people with > software (though in this case it didn't) was the failure of Ariane. > > Cheers, > > Ben. I strongly doubt this is off-topic. I estimate a large part of the audience of this platform thinks communication being simple zeroes and ones can "never" harm people or society and thus privacy is the main issue that has to be dealt with while thinking about tapping. On a far larger scale, governments/democracies, it's decided on the highest thinkable level, law, it's nonsense and laws have been put in place that require tappability. The proposed text is proof now even IETF keeps mixing up belief with democratic reality. Simply said: IF the Internet requires tappability it should be integrated as well as possible to get the safest design concerning privacy of the users. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 12:06:28 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA02979 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 12:06:24 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA03965; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:51:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA03883 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:51:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA02542 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:53:05 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <12368F7L>; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:58:24 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 11:58:23 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01BF6F31.0C4D0BC0" Subject: [Raven] Comments on Draft Document Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_000_01BF6F31.0C4D0BC0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" I have taken a stab at editorial comments on the draft statement. My intention with all of these edits is to clarify the intent of the statement as originally drafted and perhaps to improve readability in some cases. I have marked up the document and stored it as an .rtf file (to preserve strike-through of stuff I would delete and underlining of stuff I would add). I am attaching the .rtf file to this post, but I have no idea if the list will accept it. If it doesn't, and anyone is interested, email me privately and I'll ship you a copy. Chris S. All opinions are my own... <> *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. 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\s43\qc\sa640\nowidctlpar\adjustright \b\f1 \sbasedon0 \snext43 = LABELS;}{\s44\qj\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\tx-720\adjustright \sbasedon41 = \snext44 \sautoupd Plain = Double;}{\s45\qj\fi-720\li720\sa180\nowidctlpar\adjustright \sbasedon41 = \snext45 NumberList;}{ \s46\qj\sa120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\adjustright \sbasedon0 \snext46 = \sautoupd WorkNormal;}{\s47\qj\sl360\slmult1\nowidctlpar\adjustright = \f2\fs20 \sbasedon0 \snext47 Plain Text;}}{\info{\title = Abstract}{\author Chris Savage}{\operator Chris Savage} {\creatim\yr2000\mo2\dy4\hr11\min54}{\revtim\yr2000\mo2\dy4\hr11\min54}{= \printim\yr2000\mo2\dy4\hr11\min44}{\version2}{\edmins0}{\nofpages6}{\no= fwords1955}{\nofchars11145}{\*\company = CRBLaw}{\nofcharsws0}{\vern113}}\margl1319\margr1319=20 \widowctrl\ftnbj\aenddoc\hyphcaps0\formshade\viewkind4\viewscale100\pgbr= drhead\pgbrdrfoot \fet0\sectd \linex0\endnhere\sectdefaultcl = {\*\pnseclvl1\pnucrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta = .}}{\*\pnseclvl2\pnucltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta .}} {\*\pnseclvl3\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta = .}}{\*\pnseclvl4\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta = )}}{\*\pnseclvl5\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta = )}}{\*\pnseclvl6\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (} {\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl7\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb = (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl8\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb = (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl9\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb = (}{\pntxta )}}\pard\plain=20 \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 Abstract \par=20 \par The IETF has been asked to take a position on the inclusion into = IETF standards-track documents of functionality designed to facilitate = wiretapping. \par=20 \par This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why = its answer is "no", and what that answer means. \par=20 \par=20 \par 1. Summary position \par=20 \par The IETF has decided not to consider requirements for wiretapping = as part of the process for creating and maintaining IETF standards. \par=20 \par It takes this position for the following basic reasons: \par=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab The IETF, an international standards body, believes itself to be = the wrong forum for designing protocol or equipment features that = address needs }{\strike\f2\fs20=20 perceived by national law, which vary}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = arising from the laws of individual countries, because these = laws}{\f2\fs20 vary widely across the areas }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb in = which}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 that}{\f2\fs20=20 IETF standards are deployed}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb .}{\f2\fs20 = }{\strike\f2\fs20 in.}{\f2\fs20=20 \par=20 \par \tab Bodies }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb whose scope of authority corresponds = to a single country}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 that}{\f2\fs20 are = }{\strike\f2\fs20 constrained to a single regime of jurisdiction = are}{\f2\fs20 more appropriate for this }{ \b\f2\fs20\uldb type of country-specific}{\f2\fs20 task. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab The IETF}{\strike\f2\fs20 , being a}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = sets}{\f2\fs20 standards }{\strike\f2\fs20 body}{\f2\fs20=20 for communications that pass across networks that may be owned, = operated and maintained by people from numerous jurisdictions with = numerous }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb and potentially divergent}{\f2\fs20 = requirements for privacy}{\strike\f2\fs20 ,}{ \b\f2\fs20\uldb .}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb In light of these = potentially divergent requirements, the IETF}{\f2\fs20 believes that = the operation of the Internet and the needs of its users are best = served by }{\strike\f2\fs20 making sure}{\f2\fs20 }{ \b\f2\fs20\uldb ensuring that}{\f2\fs20 the security properties of = connections across the Internet are as well known as possible. At the = present stage of our ignorance this means making them as free from = security loopholes as possible. }{ \b\f2\fs20\uldb This is one of the IETF\rquote s principal goals with = regard to this topic.=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = [moved up one paragraph] \par=20 \par -\tab The IETF believes that }{\strike\f2\fs20 in the case = of}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb for}{\f2\fs20 traffic that is = }{\strike\f2\fs20 today}{\f2\fs20 going across the Internet = }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb today}{\f2\fs20 without }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb=20 encryption implemented at}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 being protected = by}{\f2\fs20 the end systems, the use of existing network features, if = deployed intelligently, }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb provides extensive = opportunities for}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20=20 will be adequate for the}{\f2\fs20 wiretapping}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = .}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 needs seen at present.}{\f2\fs20 = }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb At the same time, the}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 = The}{\f2\fs20 IETF }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb is not aware of}{ \f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 does not see}{\f2\fs20 an engineering = solution that allows }{\strike\f2\fs20 such}{\f2\fs20 wiretapping when = the end systems take adequate measures to protect their communications. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab Adding }{\strike\f2\fs20 a}{\f2\fs20 = requirement}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb s to further enable or = facilitate}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 for}{\f2\fs20 wiretapping will = make the designs }{ \b\f2\fs20\uldb of Internet protocols and equipment}{\f2\fs20 = considerably more complex}{\strike\f2\fs20 ,}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb . = Experience has shown that increased complexity almost inevitably = jeopardizes}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 thereby jeopardizing} {\f2\fs20 the security of communications even when }{\strike\f2\fs20 = it is}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb those communications are}{\f2\fs20 = not being tapped by any legal means; there are also obvious risks raised = by having to protect the access to the wiretap. This is in conflict = with the goal }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb stated}{\f2\fs20 above. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab The IETF restates its strongly held belief, stated at greater = length in [RFC 1984], tha t both commercial development of the Internet and adequate privacy for = its users against illegal intrusion requires the wide availability of = strong cryptographic technology. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab On the other hand, the IETF believes that mechanisms = }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb designed to facilitate or enable}{\f2\fs20 = }{\strike\f2\fs20 for}{\f2\fs20 wiretapping }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb=20 (or, if designed for another purpose, that can be used for = wiretapping)}{\f2\fs20 should be openly described}{\strike\f2\fs20 = ,}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb .}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb This openness will = permit}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 so as to ensure the}{ \f2\fs20 maximum review of the mechanisms and }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = provide opportunities to}{\f2\fs20 ensure that they adhere=20 as closely as possible to their design constraints. The IETF believes = that the publication of such mechanisms, and the publication of known = weaknesses in such mechanisms, is a Good Thing. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par=20 \par 2. The Raven process \par=20 \par The issue of the IETF doing work on legal intercept technologies = came up as a byproduct of the extensive work that the IETF is now doing = in the area }{\strike\f2\fs20 if}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = of}{\f2\fs20 IP-based telephony. \par=20 \par In the telephony world, }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb a long tradition of = cooperation between law enforcement and}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 = there has been a tradition that}{\f2\fs20 companies that build = }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb and operate}{\f2\fs20=20 telephone equipment }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb has led to a broad consensus = surrounding the}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 add wiretapping}{\f2\fs20 = features }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb=20 of such equipment, and its operating characteristics, that are and = should be used to facilitate and enable wiretapping.}{\f2\fs20 = }{\strike\f2\fs20 to their telephony-related equipment, and}{\f2\fs20 = }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb It is therefore not surprising that }{\f2\fs20 some traditional telephony standards organizations have = supported }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb wiretapping, pursuant to various national = legal regimes,}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 this}{\f2\fs20 by adding = }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb wiretap-related}{\f2\fs20 }{ \strike\f2\fs20 intercept}{\f2\fs20 features to their telephony = }{\strike\f2\fs20 -related}{\f2\fs20 standards. \par=20 \par Since the future of the telephone seems to be intertwined with the = Internet it is inevitable that the primary Internet standards = organization would be faced with the issue sooner or later. \par=20 \par In this case some of the participants of one of the=20 IETF working groups working on a new standard for communication between = components of a distributed phone switch brought up the issue. Since = adding features of this type would be something the IETF had never done = before, the IETF management decided to hav e a public discussion before deciding if the working group should go = ahead. A new mailing list was created (the Raven mailing list, see = http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven) for this discussion. Close = to 500 people subscribed to the list and about 1 0% of those sent at least one message to the list. The discussion on = this list was a precursor to a discussion held during the IETF plenary = in Washington. \par=20 \par Twenty nine people spoke during the plenary session. Opinions = ranged from libertarian: 'governments have no right to wiretap' \endash = to pragmatic: 'it will be done somewhere, best have it done where the = technology was developed'. At the end of the discussion there was a = show of hands to indicate opinions: should the IETF add special = features, not do this or ab stain. Very few people spoke out strongly in support for adding the = intercept features, but a sizable portion of the audience refused to = state an opinion (raised their hands when asked for "abstain" in the = show of hands). \par=20 \par This is the background on the basis of which the IESG and the IAB = was asked to formulate a policy. \par=20 \par=20 \par 3. A definition of wiretapping \par=20 \par The various legal statutes defining wiretapping do not give = adequate definitions to distinguish between wiretapping and various = other activities at the technical level. For the purposes of this memo, = the following definition of wiretapping is used: \par=20 \par Wiretapping }{\strike\f2\fs20 is what}{\f2\fs20 occurs when = information passed across the Internet from one party }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = (or group)}{\f2\fs20 to one or more other parties is delivered to a = third party: \par=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = 1.\tab Without the sending party }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb (or group)}{\f2\fs20 = knowing about the third party \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = 2.\tab Without any of the recipient parties knowing about the delivery = to the third party \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = 3.\tab When the normal expectation of the }{\strike\f2\fs20 = sender}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb sending party (or group)}{\f2\fs20 = is that }{\strike\f2\fs20 his}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb=20 the transmitted}{\f2\fs20 information will only be seen by the = recipient parties or parties obliged to keep the information in confiden= ce \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = 4.\tab When the third party acts deliberately to target the = transmission of the first party }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb (or group)}{\f2\fs20 = , either because he is }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb (or they are)}{ \f2\fs20 of interest, or because the second party's reception is of = interest. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par Of course, many wiretaps will be bidirectional, monitoring traffic = sent by two or more parties. \par=20 \par Thus, for instance, monitoring public newsgroups is not = wiretapping (condition 3 violated), random monitoring }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = of network traffic}{\f2\fs20=20 is not wiretapping (condition 4 violated), a recipient passing on = private email is not wiretapping (condition 2 violated). = }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb=20 \par }{\f2\fs20=20 \par }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb The definition above is limited to Internet = transmissions and so does not apply to traditional circuit-switched = telephone calls. By analogy, however,}{\f2\fs20=20 telephone call tracing by means of accounting logs (sometimes called = "pen registers") }{\strike\f2\fs20 is}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = would}{\f2\fs20 also }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb be}{\f2\fs20 = wiretapping}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb ,}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20=20 by this definition,}{\f2\fs20 since the normal expectation of the = sender is that the telephone company will keep this information in = confidence. }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb=20 For this reason, in the Internet context, random monitoring of network = traffic may become (or at least facilitate) wiretapping if records of = the monitored traffic are kept and are then reviewed to identify the tr ansmissions of particular sending parties or groups.=20 \par }{\f2\fs20=20 \par This definition deliberately does not include considerations of: \par=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab Whether the wiretap is legal or not, since that is a legal, not a = technical matter \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab Whether the wiretap occurs in real time, or can be performed = after the fact by looking at information recorded for other purposes = (such as the accounting example given above) \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab What the medium targeted by the wiretap is - whether it is email, = IP telephony, Web browsing or EDI transfers \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par These questions are believed to be irrelevant to the policy = outlined in this memo. \par=20 \par Wiretap}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb ping}{\f2\fs20 is also sometimes called = "interception", but that term is also used in a sense that is = considerably wider than the monitoring of data crossing networks, and = is therefore not used here. \par=20 \par Wiretapping may logically be thought of as 3 distinct steps: \par=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab Capture - getting information off the wire that contains the = information wanted \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab Filtering - selecting the information wanted from information = gathered by accident \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab Delivery - transmitting the information wanted to the ones who = want it. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par In all these stages, the possibility of using or abusing = mechanisms defined for this purpose for other purposes exists. \par=20 \par=20 \par 4. Why the IETF does not take a moral position \par=20 \par Much of the debate about wiretapping has centered around the question of whether wiretapping is = morally evil, no matter who does it, necessary in any civilized = society, or an effective tool for catching criminals that has been = abused in the past and will be abused again. \par=20 \par The IETF has decided not to take a position in this matter, since: \par=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab There is no clear consensus around a single position in the IETF \par=20 \par -\tab There is no means of detecting the morality of an act "on = the wire". Since the IETF deals with protocol standardization, not = protocol deployment, it is not in a position to dictate that its = product is only used in moral or legal ways. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par However, a few observations can be made: \par=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab Experience shows that tools which are effective for a purpose = tend to be used for that purpose \par=20 \par -\tab Experience shows that tools designed for one purpose that = are effective for another tend to be used for that other purpose too, = no matter what }{\strike\f2\fs20 its}{\f2\fs20 }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = their}{\f2\fs20 designers intended. =20 \par=20 \par -\tab Experience shows that if a vulnerability exists in a = security system, it is likely that someone will take advantage of it = sooner or later. \par=20 \par -\tab Experience shows that human factors, not technology per se, = is the biggest single source of such vulnerabilities. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par What this boils down to is that if effective tools for wiretapping = exist, it is likely that they will be used as designed, for purposes legal in their = jurisdiction, and also in ways they were not intended for, in ways that = are not legal in that jurisdiction. When weighing the development or = deployment of such tools, this should be b orne in mind. \par=20 \par=20 \par 5. Utility considerations \par=20 \par When designing any communications function, it is = }{\strike\f2\fs20 a}{\f2\fs20 relevant }{\strike\f2\fs20 = question}{\f2\fs20 to ask if such functions }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb = efficiently}{\f2\fs20 perform the task}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb s}{\f2\fs20=20 they are designed for}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb ,}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 = in an efficient manner,}{\f2\fs20 or whether the work spent in = developing them is }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb not, in fact,}{\f2\fs20 worth the = benefit gained. \par=20 \par Given that there are no }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb specific}{\f2\fs20 = proposals on the table }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb to enable or facilitate = wiretapping, the IETF cannot}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 , it is not = possible to}{\f2\fs20=20 weigh proposals for wiretapping directly in this manner. \par=20 \par However, as above, a few general observations can be made: \par=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab=20 Wiretapping by copying the bytes passed between two users of the = Internet with known, static points of attachment is not hard. Standard = functions designed for diagnostic purposes can accomplish this.=20 \par=20 \par -\tab Identifying }{\strike\f2\fs20 users'}{\f2\fs20 points of = attachment to the Internet can be significantly harder, but not = impossible, if the user}{\b\f2\fs20\uldb s}{\f2\fs20 = use}{\strike\f2\fs20 s}{\f2\fs20=20 standard means of identification. However, this means linking into = multiple Internet subsystems used for address assignment, name = resolution and so on; this is not trivial. \par=20 \par -\tab An adversary has several simple countermeasures available = }{\strike\f2\fs20 to him in order}{\f2\fs20 to defeat wiretapping = attempts, even without resorting to encryption. }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb These = include}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 This includes}{ \f2\fs20 Internet cafes and anonymous dialups, anonymous remailers, = multi-hop login sessions and use of obscure communications media; these = are well known tools in the cracker community. \par=20 \par -\tab Of course, communications where the content is protected by = strong encryption can be easily recorded, but the content is st ill not available to the wiretapper, defeating all information gathering= apart from traffic analysis. Since Internet data is already in = digital form, encrypting it is very simple for the end-user. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par These things taken together mean that while wiretapping i s an efficient tool for use in situations where the target of a wiretap = is either ignorant or believes himself innocent of wrongdoing, = Internet-based wiretapping is a less useful tool than might be imagined = against an alerted and technically competent adv ersary. \par=20 \par=20 \par 6. Security considerations \par=20 \par Wiretapping, by definition (see above), releases information that = the }{\strike\f2\fs20 information}{\f2\fs20 sender did not expect to = be released. \par=20 \par This means that a system that allows wiretapping has to contain a = function that can be exercised without alerting the }{\strike\f2\fs20 = information}{\f2\fs20 sender to the fact that his desires for privacy = are not being met. \par=20 \par This, in turn, means that }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb any system designed to = permit wiretapping}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 one has to design the = system in such a way that it}{\f2\fs20 cannot guarantee any level of = privacy; }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb=20 the most such a system can guarantee is that privacy will exist if the = wiretapping function}{\f2\fs20 }{\strike\f2\fs20 at the maximum, it = can only guarantee it as long as the function for wiretapping}{\f2\fs20 = is not exercised. }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb=20 But since any effective wiretapping design will conceal the operation = of the wiretapping function from the sender, the sender can never be = assured of privacy. \par }{\f2\fs20=20 \par For instance, encrypted telephone conferences have to be designed = in such a way that the participants cannot know to whom any shared = keying material is being revealed. \par=20 \par This means: \par=20 \par }\pard \s41\qj\fi-432\li432\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20 = -\tab The system is less secure than it could be had this function not = been present. \par=20 \par -\tab The system is more complex than it could be had this = function not been present. \par=20 \par -\tab Being more complex, the risk of unintended security flaws in = the system is larger. \par }\pard \s41\qj\nowidctlpar\adjustright {\f2\fs20=20 \par }{\b\f2\fs20\uldb It follows that}{\f2\fs20 wiretapping, even = when it is not being exercised, }{\strike\f2\fs20 therefore}{\f2\fs20 = lowers the security of the system. \par=20 \par }} ------_=_NextPart_000_01BF6F31.0C4D0BC0-- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 13:35:53 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id NAA05941 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:35:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA07995; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:21:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA07962 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:21:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from newdev.harvard.edu (newdev.eecs.harvard.edu [140.247.60.212]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id NAA05549 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:23:07 -0500 (EST) Received: (from sob@localhost) by newdev.harvard.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) id NAA04688 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:23:06 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 13:23:06 -0500 (EST) From: Scott Bradner Message-Id: <200002041823.NAA04688@newdev.harvard.edu> To: raven@ietf.org Subject: [Raven] draft statement Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org I was asked to repost the draft statement - instead here is a pointer http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven-00.txt Scott _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 16:39:44 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA10963 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:39:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13205; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:28:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13176 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:28:37 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA10708 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:30:00 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <12368GKG>; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:26:07 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:26:06 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Having been duly chastised for placing my comments into an attachment to an email file, I am re-doing them in a format that works with text-only email. The following are my proposed changes to Section 1 of the draft. I would characterize all of these as "editorial" rather than substantive, but, of course, views may vary on that. At least I am not consciously trying to change what I understood to be the intent of the draft. Here goes: 1. Summary position . . . It takes this position for the following basic reasons: [[[Replace this:]]] - The IETF, an international standards body, believes itself to be the wrong forum for designing protocol or equipment features that address needs perceived by national law, which vary widely across the areas that IETF standards are deployed in. Bodies that are constrained to a single regime of jurisdiction are more appropriate for this task. [[[With this:]]] - The IETF, an international standards body, believes itself to be the wrong forum for designing protocol or equipment features that address needs arising from the laws of individual countries, because these laws vary widely across the areas in which IETF standards are deployed. Bodies whose scope of authority corresponds to a single country are more appropriate for this type of country-specific task. [[[Replace this:]]] - The IETF, being a standards body for communications that pass across networks that may be owned, operated and maintained by people from numerous jurisdictions with numerous requirements for privacy, believes that the operation of the Internet and the needs of its users are best served by making sure the security properties of connections across the Internet are as well known as possible. At the present stage of our ignorance this means making them as free from security loopholes as possible. [[[With this:]]] - The IETF sets standards for communications that pass across networks that may be owned, operated and maintained by people from numerous jurisdictions with numerous and potentially divergent requirements for privacy. In light of these potentially divergent requirements, the IETF believes that the operation of the Internet and the needs of its users are best served by ensuring that the security properties of connections across the Internet are as well known as possible. At the present stage of our ignorance this means making them as free from security loopholes as possible. This is one of the IETF's principal goals with regard to this topic. [[[The following paragraph now appears as the fourth under heading 1. It should be made the third and modified as follows: [[[Replace this:]]] - The IETF believes that in the case of traffic that is today going across the Internet without being protected by the end systems, the use of existing network features, if deployed intelligently, will be adequate for the wiretapping needs seen at present. The IETF does not see an engineering solution that allows such wiretapping when the end systems take adequate measures to protect their communications. [[[With this:]]] - The IETF believes that, for traffic that is going across the Internet today without encryption implemented at the end systems, the use of existing network features, if deployed intelligently, provides extensive opportunities for wiretapping. At the same time, the IETF is not aware of an engineering solution that allows wiretapping when the end systems take adequate measures to protect their communications. [[[The following now appears as the third paragraph under heading 1. It should be made the fourth paragraph and modified as follows: [[[Replace this:]]] - Adding a requirement for wiretapping will make the designs considerably more complex, thereby jeopardizing the security of communications even when it is not being tapped by any legal means; there are also obvious risks raised by having to protect the access to the wiretap. This is in conflict with the goal above. [[[With this:]]] - Adding requirements to further enable or facilitate wiretapping will make the designs of Internet protocols and equipment considerably more complex. Experience has shown that increased complexity almost inevitably jeopardizes the security of communications even when those communications are not being tapped by any legal means; there are also obvious risks raised by having to protect the access to the wiretap. This is in conflict with the goal stated above. [[[Skip a paragraph, then: [[[Replace this:]]] - On the other hand, the IETF believes that mechanisms for wiretapping should be openly described, so as to ensure the maximum review of the mechanisms and ensure that they adhere as closely as possible to their design constraints. The IETF believes that the publication of such mechanisms, and the publication of known weaknesses in such mechanisms, is a Good Thing. [[[With this:]]] - On the other hand, the IETF believes that mechanisms designed to facilitate or enable wiretapping (or, if designed for another purpose, that can be used for wiretapping) should be openly described. This openness will permit maximum review of the mechanisms and provide opportunities to ensure that they adhere as closely as possible to their design constraints. The IETF believes that the publication of such mechanisms, and the publication of known weaknesses in such mechanisms, is a Good Thing. More to come.... Chris S. All views/opinions my own... *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 16:39:46 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA10974 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:39:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13139; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:28:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13111 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:28:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA10703 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:29:29 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <12368GKY>; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:34:51 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:34:51 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: [Raven] Comments on Draft--Take 2A Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org My only comment on all of Section 2 had to do with the second paragraph, which I would revise fairly substantially. My gut reaction was that the overall point was well taken, but that it made the telecom industry seem to be a bit more like mere tools of the LEAs than is actually the case. Those in the US will note that the telecom industry and the LEAs battled for years over what to do to implement CALEA, with the LEAs not getting some fairly significant things they wanted. I think that telecom companies have generally viewed cooperating with LEAs to be part of their civic duty (easy in non-US countries where the telco is often part of the government). Even so, at least in the US, telcos have recognized their privacy obligations as well. All of this by way of an apologetic for a fairly significant, and maybe even "substantive," revision: 2. The Raven process . . . [[[Replace this:]]] In the telephony world, there has been a tradition that companies that build telephone equipment add wiretapping features to their telephony-related equipment, and some traditional telephony standards organizations have supported this by adding intercept features to their telephony-related standards. [[[With this:]]] In the telephony world, a long tradition of cooperation between law enforcement and companies that build and operate telephone equipment has led to a broad consensus surrounding the features of such equipment, and its operating characteristics, that are and should be used to facilitate and enable wiretapping. It is therefore not surprising that some traditional telephony standards organizations have supported wiretapping, pursuant to various national legal regimes, by adding wiretap-related features to their telephony standards. Chris S. All views/opinions my own... *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 16:58:00 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA11258 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:58:00 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13736; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:45:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13709 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:45:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from oznet15.ozemail.com.au (oznet15.ozemail.com.au [203.2.192.116]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA11106 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:46:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn49p22.ozemail.com.au [210.84.2.214]) by oznet15.ozemail.com.au (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id IAA06591 for ; Sat, 5 Feb 2000 08:46:51 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 08:44:03 +1100 Message-ID: <000401bf6f58$f461ab70$d60254d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 In-reply-to: <869011w2v9.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I think the point of the previous misses the thread of the discussion. While it it true that a warrant would be issued to examine computer contents IF evidence were gained elsewhere (including by police-work or tapping), in the absence of adequate tapping facilities, LE WILL, secretly and indiscriminately, gain secret access to large numbers of computers. You can't imagine they'd be silly enough to not get a copy of BO source code, pay someone to tweak it, and then embed it into a dozen of so common peices of shareware or software tools/accessories distributed with every operating system. For $500k, they'd have us all by the short and curlies. This creates the analogy of the "LAPD tapping abuse", which reaches into millions of computers, anywhere in the world, not just in the individual LE officer's jurisdiction. To put it bluntly, there won't be reliable means of detecting such "Break and Enter" and "Break & Bug" software or hardware tools in operation. Some months ago I made two assertions on this list that a) so far, no untapped encryption protocols existed (they mostly depend on external factors for security), and b) no "secure enough" consumer PC-like operating systems existed to preclude simple B&E to computers. The recent CERT announced web vulnerability confirms the latter, and no-one disputed the former. And since more than 99.5% of internet users are less that security literate, or computers-literate to manage their own security, this situation will remain while ever "WE" take no steps. Unless we look at these issues long and hard, we are wasting out time with this, and all similar lists. Regards, Lyal > -----Original Message----- > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of > James Carlson > Sent: Friday, 4 February 2000 23:48 > To: raven@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people > > > lyalc@ozemail.com.au ("Lyal Collins") writes: > > Which effectively ends up meaning that LE "legally" break into each > > individual computer, and read all data, even non-transmitted data. > > Assuming, of course, that the police need to recover evidence on > someone's computer, yes. That's the usual way search warrants are > handled and is highly unlikely to change. > > For what it's worth, this isn't the bogeyman, and yours is not a > particularly strong argument. Suppose LE did have a tappable version > of all known and knowable IP protocols. They use these to detect one > of those newfangled thoughtcrimes in progress right here in Network > City. Then what? Well, of course, they turn the evidence over to a > prosecutor who then obtains warrants to break into each individual > computer to make sure there's nothing else hiding in there. They'd be > negligent if they did anything less. > > It is not the case, as you seem to be asserting, that allowing LE > unfettered access to the contents of IP traffic will somehow obviate > their perceived need to steal^H^H^H^H^Hgather evidence as they do > today. In fact, since they would have enhanced means to detect crimes > that they fail to detect today, I would certainly expect that the > number of break-ins and seized computers would greatly increase under > this hypothetical police state. > > -- > James Carlson, System Architect > IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue 71.246W Vox: +1 781 372 8132 > Lexington MA 02421-7996 / USA 42.423N Fax: +1 781 372 8090 > "PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 17:06:51 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA11595 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:06:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13931; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:55:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA13904 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:55:50 -0500 (EST) Received: from oznet15.ozemail.com.au (oznet15.ozemail.com.au [203.2.192.116]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA11239 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 16:57:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn49p22.ozemail.com.au [210.84.2.214]) by oznet15.ozemail.com.au (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id IAA09704 for ; Sat, 5 Feb 2000 08:57:10 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 08:54:22 +1100 Message-ID: <000501bf6f5a$655ebab0$d60254d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 In-reply-to: <20000204074441.B28428@progressive-systems.com> Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit [snip] > Which effectively ends up meaning that LE "legally" break into each > > individual computer, and read all data, even non-transmitted data. > > This measure is more expensive, and far more riskier, so it will only > be used where ordinary policework won't do the trick. Widespread abuse > is far less likely. I don't think it would be any riskier, and comparatively cheap - probably cheaper than mass tapping. The plethora of undetected Back-Orifice style trojans successfully operating on the Internet is testament to the low-risk, low cost, high success attacks that could be launched. Getting these trojans into machines is not a difficult or expensive task. The most expensive option may be to simply buy a software comapny, and put the code into a few items of code that is distributed as shareware, or as accessory tools to an OS distribution. The Real music player and WebTV incidents are examples of how long it takes millions of users to detect something is not kosher in their device. Lyal _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 17:49:09 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA12183 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:49:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA14841; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:35:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA14813 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:35:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id RAA12025 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:36:52 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002042236.RAA12025@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 16360 invoked from network); 4 Feb 2000 22:36:45 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.85) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 22:36:45 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 23:36:44 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Priority: normal In-reply-to: <000401bf6f58$f461ab70$d60254d2@here> References: <869011w2v9.fsf@ironbridgenetworks.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: [Raven] Future Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 5 Feb 00, at 8:44, Lyal Collins wrote: > > And since more than 99.5% of internet users are less that security literate, > or computers-literate to manage their own security, this situation will > remain while ever "WE" take no steps. > > Unless we look at these issues long and hard, we are wasting out time with > this, and all similar lists. > I don't know. What I do know is that withing a few years PC's will be out. They are cumbersome and the programmability is their weakness. Internetterminals with minimal "OS" and an XHTML compatible browser in FlashROM will be in. All functionality will be in the applications that run on central Hotmail like servers. Of course people like us will still have personal computers and workstations but the big majority (95% or more of the people) will be behind more or less unprogrammable networkterminals. Java-Sandbox will be the maximum local freedom for normal users. Strong encryption will probably only be possible with help of an chipcard-slot and a highly standardized chipcard (unique personal ID on it...). Since all communication is provided and the service provider is one of the communication partners decryption for law enforcement will be no problem at all(?). Maybe we make far too much trouble about this? +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 17:58:23 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA12299 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:58:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA15152; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:47:45 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA15118 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:47:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA12180 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:49:04 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <12368GPH>; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:54:25 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:54:24 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: [Raven] Comments on Draft: Take 2B Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Below are my comments on Section 3 of the draft. 3. A definition of wiretapping . . . [[[Replace this:]]] Wiretapping is what occurs when information passed across the Internet from one party to one or more other parties is delivered to a third party: [[[With this:]]] Wiretapping occurs when information passed across the Internet from one party (or group) to one or more other parties is delivered to a third party: [[[Replace this:]]] 1. Without the sending party knowing about the third party [[[With this:]]] 1. Without the sending party (or group) knowing about the third party [[[Replace this:]]] 3. When the normal expectation of the sender is that his information will only be seen by the recipient parties or parties obliged to keep the information in confidence [[[With this:]]] 3. When the normal expectation of the sending party (or group) is that the transmitted information will only be seen by the recipient parties or parties obliged to keep the information in confidence [[[Replace this:]]] 4. When the third party acts deliberately to target the transmission of the first party, either because he is of interest, or because the second party's reception is of interest. [[[With this:]]] 4. When the third party acts deliberately to target the transmission of the first party (or group), either because he is (or they are) of interest, or because the second party's reception is of interest. . . . [[[Replace this:]]] Thus, for instance, monitoring public newsgroups is not wiretapping (condition 3 violated), random monitoring is not wiretapping (condition 4 violated), a recipient passing on private email is not wiretapping (condition 2 violated). [[[With this:]]] Thus, for instance, monitoring public newsgroups is not wiretapping (condition 3 violated), random monitoring is not wiretapping (condition 4 violated), a recipient passing on private email is not wiretapping (condition 2 violated). [[[The following might be construed to be a substantive change but is intended to clarify things. [[[Replace this:]]] Telephone call tracing by means of accounting logs (sometimes called "pen registers") is also wiretapping by this definition, since the normal expectation of the sender is that the telephone company will keep this information in confidence. [[[With this:]]] The definition above is limited to Internet transmissions and so does not apply to traditional circuit-switched telephone calls. By analogy, however, telephone call tracing by means of accounting logs (sometimes called "pen registers") would also be wiretapping, since the normal expectation of the sender is that the telephone company will keep this information in confidence. For this reason, in the Internet context, random monitoring of network traffic may become (or at least facilitate) wiretapping if records of the monitored traffic are kept and are then reviewed to identify the transmissions of particular sending parties or groups. . . . [[[Replace this:]]] Wiretap is also sometimes called "interception", but that term is also used in a sense that is considerably wider than the monitoring of data crossing networks, and is therefore not used here. [[[With this (only change is first word):]]] Wiretapping is also sometimes called "interception", but that term is also used in a sense that is considerably wider than the monitoring of data crossing networks, and is therefore not used here. Chris S. All views/opinions my own... *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 18:04:01 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA12419 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:04:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA15273; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:52:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA15245 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:52:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA12254 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:54:15 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <12368GPN>; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:59:39 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:59:38 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: [Raven] More comments on Draft: Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org I have no comments on Section 4. 5. Utility considerations [[[Replace this:]]] When designing any communications function, it is a relevant question to ask if such functions perform the task they are designed for in an efficient manner, or whether the work spent in developing them is worth the benefit gained. [[[With this:]]] When designing any communications function, it is relevant to ask if such functions efficiently perform the tasks they are designed for, or whether the work spent in developing them is not, in fact, worth the benefit gained. [[[Replace this:]]] Given that there are no proposals on the table, it is not possible to weigh proposals for wiretapping directly in this manner. [[[With this:]]] Given that there are no specific proposals on the table to enable or facilitate wiretapping, the IETF cannot weigh proposals for wiretapping directly in this manner. . . . [[[Replace this:]]] - Identifying users' points of attachment to the Internet can be significantly harder, but not impossible, if the user uses standard means of identification. However, this means linking into multiple Internet subsystems used for address assignment, name resolution and so on; this is not trivial. [[[With this:]]] - Identifying points of attachment to the Internet can be significantly harder, but not impossible, if the users use standard means of identification. However, this means linking into multiple Internet subsystems used for address assignment, name resolution and so on; this is not trivial. [[[Replace this:]]] - An adversary has several simple countermeasures available to him in order to defeat wiretapping attempts, even without resorting to encryption. This includes Internet cafes and anonymous dialups, anonymous remailers, multi-hop login sessions and use of obscure communications media; these are well known tools in the cracker community. [[[With this:]]] - An adversary has several simple countermeasures available to defeat wiretapping attempts, even without resorting to encryption. These include Internet cafes and anonymous dialups, anonymous remailers, multi-hop login sessions and use of obscure communications media; these are well known tools in the cracker community. Chris S. All views/opinions are my own. *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 18:11:01 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA12491 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:11:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA15398; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:59:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA15369 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 17:59:13 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA12334 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:00:37 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <12368GP5>; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:06:01 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:06:00 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Subject: [Raven] Final comments on draft Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Here's what I have on Section 6: 6. Security considerations [[[Replace this:]]] Wiretapping, by definition (see above), releases information that the information sender did not expect to be released. [[[With this:]]] Wiretapping, by definition (see above), releases information that the sender did not expect to be released. [[[Replace this:]]] This means that a system that allows wiretapping has to contain a function that can be exercised without alerting the information sender to the fact that his desires for privacy are not being met. [[[With this:]]] This means that a system that allows wiretapping has to contain a function that can be exercised without alerting the sender to the fact that his desires for privacy are not being met. [[[Replace this:]]] This, in turn, means that one has to design the system in such a way that it cannot guarantee any level of privacy; at the maximum, it can only guarantee it as long as the function for wiretapping is not exercised. [[[With this:]]] This, in turn, means that any system designed to permit wiretapping cannot guarantee any level of privacy; the most such a system can guarantee is that privacy will exist if the wiretapping function is not exercised. But since any effective wiretapping design will conceal the operation of the wiretapping function from the sender, the sender can never be assured of privacy. . . . [[[Replace this:]]] Wiretapping, even when it is not being exercised, therefore lowers the security of the system. [[[With this:]]] It follows that wiretapping, even when it is not being exercised, lowers the security of the system. ************************************************* As I said much earlier, I think the draft is a good job. All of my comments are intended to clarify the language and improve readability. Both of these are to some extent in the eye of the beholder, so I haven't made much of an effort to explain or justify any particular proposed change. If anyone is interested or has any comments, I'd be happy to respond. Chris S. All views/opinions are my own... *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 18:34:43 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA12780 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:34:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA16202; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:24:37 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA16176 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:24:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id SAA12652 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:25:59 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002042325.SAA12652@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 16003 invoked from network); 4 Feb 2000 23:25:59 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.85) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 23:25:59 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 00:25:57 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: [Raven] sooner or later Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-raven- 00.txt .. - Experience shows that if a vulnerability exists in a security system, it is likely that someone will take advantage of it sooner or later. Why is it so difficult to see this is also perfectly true on a slightly larger scale, for an untappable communication system? .. Wiretapping, even when it is not being exercised, therefore lowers the security of the system. The Internet is a subsystem of our community and the problem is that the community says the Internet in the current form lowers the security of the community in an unacceptable way. = = There is no balance in the piece with the outside world that requires tapping. It may be well written but it is only saying what a small group of people wants to hear and knows already for years. It's no solution. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 19:05:57 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13081 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 19:05:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA17191; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:54:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA17163 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:54:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id SAA12959 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 18:55:49 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002042355.SAA12959@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 31647 invoked from network); 4 Feb 2000 23:55:45 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.85) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 4 Feb 2000 23:55:45 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 00:55:43 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] More comments on Draft: Priority: normal In-reply-to: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 4 Feb 00, at 17:59, Chris Savage wrote: > > [[[Replace this:]]] > > Given that there are no proposals on the table, it is not possible to weigh > proposals for wiretapping directly in this manner. > > [[[With this:]]] > > Given that there are no specific proposals on the table to enable or > facilitate wiretapping, the IETF cannot weigh proposals for wiretapping > directly in this manner. > Auditable version of tcpdump no specific proposal? +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 19:38:54 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13663 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 19:38:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA18973; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 19:28:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA18947 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 19:28:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from eastwood.aldigital.algroup.co.uk (eastwood.aldigital.algroup.co.uk [194.128.162.193]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13374 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 19:29:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from freeby.ben.algroup.co.uk (freeby.ben.algroup.co.uk [193.133.15.6]) by eastwood.aldigital.algroup.co.uk (8.8.8/8.6.12) with ESMTP id AAA11991; Sat, 5 Feb 2000 00:29:03 GMT Received: from algroup.co.uk (naughty.ben.algroup.co.uk [193.133.15.107]) by freeby.ben.algroup.co.uk (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id AAA04043; Sat, 5 Feb 2000 00:29:30 GMT Message-ID: <389B6ECD.3E85B43D@algroup.co.uk> Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2000 00:29:01 +0000 From: Ben Laurie Organization: A.L. Group plc X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Chris Savage CC: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Subject: Re: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Various People wrote: > The IETF ... believes that the > operation of the Internet and the needs of its users are best served by > making sure the security properties of connections across the Internet are > as well known as possible. This keeps niggling at me. Surely if Internet connections were certain to be completely insecure (i.e. any interested party could intercept the plaintext of any connection) then this requirement would be satisfied? But it seems clear to me that such a situation would not even remotely be in the best interests of the Internet's users. I'd say "...as well known as possible" should be replaced with "...as good as possible" - except you probably need to rejig the whole sentence to turn it back into English. Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Y19100 no-prize winner! http://www.ntk.net/index.cgi?back=2000/now0121.txt _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 20:45:12 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA14862 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:45:12 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22391; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:31:50 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22311 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:31:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA14790 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:33:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA10552 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:32:44 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000204203007.009b8280@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 20:33:21 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people In-Reply-To: <200002032142.QAA00165@ietf.org> References: <4.2.0.58.20000202081153.009dc710@fast.synernet.com> <002201bf6d5e$3caa4b50$8e0b54d2@here> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 04:42 PM 2/3/2000 , you wrote: >On 2 Feb 00, at 8:53, Ed Stone wrote: > > > Why is it so hard to understand that the fears one has of crime in the > > general population are equalled if not exceeded by justifiable and > > reasonable fears about crime in the government, law enforcement, and > > surveillance, where there is less accountability and greater secrecy -- > and > > guns/power to arrest and imprison? > > > > Why is it so hard to understand that technical standards do not constrain > > the behavior of sovereign governments? > > > > Why is so hard to understand the natural suspicions of governmental > > entities who tell us they will police themselves, investigate themselves, > > place requirements on themselves, and be judge and jury on themselves? > > >Why is it so hard to understand there is now known >alternative for democracy? If democracy were a certification of reasonable respect for human rights, Holland would not have had to put up its 18 minute defense against a regime to its south east 60 years ago, a regime which was, uh, democratically elected by a large and vigorous majority. Others found a cure for that democracy. Those who are unaware of history are condemned to support wiretapping, it seems. -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 20:46:50 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA14936 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:46:49 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22547; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:37:05 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22519 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:37:04 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA14816 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:38:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA10579 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:38:01 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000204203553.009aca70@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 20:38:38 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang In-Reply-To: <4.3.0.33.0.20000203175908.01f52130@pop.webcom.com> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 06:02 PM 2/3/2000 , you wrote: >Melinda, I'm hardly a defender of Bob Barr, as my previous message makes >clear. But frothing doesn't cut it. Barr is a former US attorney and >(believe it or not, based on my interviews with him) a pretty sharp fellow. > >Of course he's a religious right wacko, but when the Republicans control >the Congress, religious right wackos who care about privacy can move some >legislation. And what we need are anti-religious left-wing wackos, to set things right! Who are the leading left-wing congress critters who are supporting the legal actions against the recent FCC Calea decision, against the DOJ CESA proposal, against the network monitoring proposal? -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 20:50:41 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA15009 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:50:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22656; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:40:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22629 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:40:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA14838 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:42:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA10615 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:41:50 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000204204026.009a3100@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 20:42:27 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wiretap thang In-Reply-To: <200002040225.UAA11754@sys32.hou.wt.net> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 09:25 PM 2/3/2000 , you wrote: >On 3 Feb 00, at 15:30, Melinda.Shore@nokia.com wrote: > > > Given Barr's legislative and policy record, this is > > certainly nothing one would want to boast about. > > > > Melinda > >Picky, picky, picky! Where were most of the other >politicians on this issue? OTL? > >Maybe you'd prefer a word of thanks from the man who >invented the Internet in his dreams, hmmm? Don't hold >your breath. That's right! Wasn't Internet inventor and model for Ryan O'neils character in Love Story (Al Gore) a leading proponent of this drastic and expansive additional new intrusion? -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 20:51:21 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA15028 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:51:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22716; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:41:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22689 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:41:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA14853 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:43:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA10631 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:42:52 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000204204239.009b4260@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 20:43:28 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang In-Reply-To: <4.1.20000203183133.029e4010@flipper.cisco.com> References: <4.3.0.33.0.20000203175908.01f52130@pop.webcom.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 09:32 PM 2/3/2000 , you wrote: >At 06:02 PM 2/3/00 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >Melinda, I'm hardly a defender of Bob Barr.. > >With al due respect, what has this discussion got to do with the subject of >this list? I guess that after the draft, many think the subject of the list has been fulfilled. Not right? -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 20:58:16 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA15091 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:58:16 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22916; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:47:49 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA22887 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:47:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA14956 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:49:12 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA10661 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:48:45 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000204204612.009b4ac0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 20:49:21 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang In-Reply-To: <200002041223.HAA23033@ietf.org> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 07:23 AM 2/4/2000 , you wrote: >On 3 Feb 00, at 16:57, Melinda.Shore@nokia.com wrote: > > > > But he has been very good on privacy issues, as anyone who > > > has followed his legislative and privacy record knows. > > > > Unless Bob Barr doesn't approve of your sex life, in > > which case he believes that you do not have the right > > to engage in consensual acts with another adult in > > your own home. He also thinks that giving his own > > religious beliefs the force of law is a dandy thing to > > do, which is also (arguably) a privacy issue. > >So he clearly isn't "very good on privacy issues". Ah the old consenting adults in the privacy of their home line..... A simple puncture of that follows: Persons A and B, both adults iving in the same home consent to an arrangement in which A shoots B in the head in front of a camera in return for $500,000 paid to a person B designates. This is 1) consenting 2) adults 3) in their home. Next juvenile attempt? -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 21:08:46 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA15221 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 21:08:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA23210; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:57:49 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA23183 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:57:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from oznet15.ozemail.com.au (oznet15.ozemail.com.au [203.2.192.116]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA15107 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:59:10 -0500 (EST) Received: from here (slsdn11p61.ozemail.com.au [210.84.11.189]) by oznet15.ozemail.com.au (8.9.0/8.6.12) with SMTP id MAA21050; Sat, 5 Feb 2000 12:58:57 +1100 (EST) From: "Lyal Collins" To: "Chris Savage" , "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 12:56:05 +1100 Message-ID: <000901bf6f7c$298d30d0$bd0b54d2@here> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3612.1700 In-Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I'm not entirely comfortable with the summary position, which focusses heavily on national laws. While national laws have one level of impact on wiretapping, the global nature of the Internet means it is no more costly (and probably more convenient) for a LE agency in one jurisdiction to monitor communications in an external jurisdiction. As one example, this may free LE from the burden of having to comply with local jurisdiction approval/warrant processes by tapping communications with "out-of-jurisdiction" entities, who may or may not be invovled in inappropriate activities. Think "LAPD-style wiretapping" in every state/country, not just a single city. Is the resulting assumption, that IETF does not see itself having a global role in this matter, true? If so, is there an indication of how many countries will need to have a "common" requirement for tapping before IETF acts further in this area (in either the pro- or anti- directions)? And, have we a definitive count of such countries? There are at least 4 I can think of (US, Holland, Australia and China spring to mind). Regards, Lyal > -----Original Message----- > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of > Chris Savage > Sent: Saturday, 5 February 2000 8:26 > To: IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail) > Subject: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 > > > Having been duly chastised for placing my comments into an > attachment to an > email file, I am re-doing them in a format that works with > text-only email. > > The following are my proposed changes to Section 1 of the draft. I would > characterize all of these as "editorial" rather than substantive, but, of > course, views may vary on that. At least I am not consciously trying to > change what I understood to be the intent of the draft. > > Here goes: > > 1. Summary position > > . . . > > It takes this position for the following basic reasons: > > [[[Replace this:]]] > > - The IETF, an international standards body, believes itself to be the > wrong forum for designing protocol or equipment features that > address needs > perceived by national law, which vary widely across the areas that IETF > standards are deployed in. > > Bodies that are constrained to a single regime of jurisdiction are > more appropriate for this task. > > [[[With this:]]] > > - The IETF, an international standards body, believes itself to be the > wrong forum for designing protocol or equipment features that > address needs > arising from the laws of individual countries, because these laws vary > widely across the areas in which IETF standards are deployed. > > Bodies whose scope of authority corresponds to a single country are > more appropriate for this type of country-specific task. > > [[[Replace this:]]] > > - The IETF, being a standards body for communications that pass across > networks that may be owned, operated and maintained by people > from numerous > jurisdictions with numerous requirements for privacy, believes that the > operation of the Internet and the needs of its users are best served by > making sure the security properties of connections across the Internet are > as well known as possible. At the present stage of our ignorance > this means > making them as free from security loopholes as possible. > > [[[With this:]]] > > - The IETF sets standards for communications that pass across networks > that may be owned, operated and maintained by people from numerous > jurisdictions with numerous and potentially divergent requirements for > privacy. In light of these potentially divergent requirements, the IETF > believes that the operation of the Internet and the needs of its users are > best served by ensuring that the security properties of connections across > the Internet are as well known as possible. At the present stage of our > ignorance this means making them as free from security loopholes as > possible. This is one of the IETF's principal goals with regard to this > topic. > > [[[The following paragraph now appears as the fourth under heading 1. It > should be made the third and modified as follows: > > [[[Replace this:]]] > > - The IETF believes that in the case of traffic that is today going > across the Internet without being protected by the end systems, the use of > existing network features, if deployed intelligently, will be adequate for > the wiretapping needs seen at present. The IETF does not see an > engineering > solution that allows such wiretapping when the end systems take adequate > measures to protect their communications. > > [[[With this:]]] > > - The IETF believes that, for traffic that is going across the > Internet today without encryption implemented at the end systems, > the use of > existing network features, if deployed intelligently, provides extensive > opportunities for wiretapping. At the same time, the IETF is not > aware of an > engineering solution that allows wiretapping when the end systems take > adequate measures to protect their communications. > > [[[The following now appears as the third paragraph under heading 1. It > should be made the fourth paragraph and modified as follows: > > [[[Replace this:]]] > > - Adding a requirement for wiretapping will make the designs > considerably more complex, thereby jeopardizing the security of > communications even when it is not being tapped by any legal means; there > are also obvious risks raised by having to protect the access to the > wiretap. This is in conflict with the goal above. > > [[[With this:]]] > > - Adding requirements to further enable or facilitate wiretapping will > make the designs of Internet protocols and equipment considerably more > complex. Experience has shown that increased complexity almost inevitably > jeopardizes the security of communications even when those communications > are not being tapped by any legal means; there are also obvious > risks raised > by having to protect the access to the wiretap. This is in > conflict with the > goal stated above. > > [[[Skip a paragraph, then: > > [[[Replace this:]]] > > - On the other hand, the IETF believes that mechanisms for wiretapping > should be openly described, so as to ensure the maximum review of the > mechanisms and ensure that they adhere as closely as possible to their > design constraints. The IETF believes that the publication of such > mechanisms, and the publication of known weaknesses in such > mechanisms, is a > Good Thing. > > [[[With this:]]] > > - On the other hand, the IETF believes that mechanisms designed to > facilitate or enable wiretapping (or, if designed for another > purpose, that > can be used for wiretapping) should be openly described. This > openness will > permit maximum review of the mechanisms and provide opportunities > to ensure > that they adhere as closely as possible to their design constraints. The > IETF believes that the publication of such mechanisms, and the publication > of known weaknesses in such mechanisms, is a Good Thing. > > More to come.... > > Chris S. > All views/opinions my own... > > > ****************************************************************** > ********* > This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or > privileged information. If you believe that you have received the > message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission > and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. > ****************************************************************** > ********* > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 22:14:40 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id WAA16817 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:14:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id WAA24203; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:04:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id WAA24172 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:04:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id WAA16763 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:06:16 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002050306.WAA16763@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 16951 invoked from network); 5 Feb 2000 03:06:16 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.85) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 5 Feb 2000 03:06:16 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 04:06:14 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] IP: China spies on its own people Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.2.0.58.20000204203007.009b8280@fast.synernet.com> References: <200002032142.QAA00165@ietf.org> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 4 Feb 00, at 20:33, Ed Stone wrote: > Those who are unaware of history are condemned to > support wiretapping, it seems. You are very fixed on history. If history was a =guarantee= for the future everybody would be rich and famous. (0) And we wouldn't have anything new. Things change. Democracies have decided that individuals can not be allowed to hide their communication in an absolute way for law enforcement. +++chefren (0) Yes, stupid thought. _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 22:21:24 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id WAA16835 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:21:24 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id WAA24317; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:11:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id WAA24290 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:11:45 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id WAA16811 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 22:13:08 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002050313.WAA16811@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 18674 invoked from network); 5 Feb 2000 03:13:00 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.85) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 5 Feb 2000 03:13:00 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 04:12:58 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Priority: normal In-reply-to: <000901bf6f7c$298d30d0$bd0b54d2@here> References: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 5 Feb 00, at 12:56, Lyal Collins wrote: > I'm not entirely comfortable with the summary position, which focusses > heavily on national laws. > While national laws have one level of impact on wiretapping, the global > nature of the Internet means it is no more costly (and probably more > convenient) for a LE agency in one jurisdiction to monitor communications in > an external jurisdiction. > > As one example, this may free LE from the burden of having to comply with > local jurisdiction approval/warrant processes by tapping communications with > "out-of-jurisdiction" entities, who may or may not be invovled in > inappropriate activities. > > Think "LAPD-style wiretapping" in every state/country, not just a single > city. > > Is the resulting assumption, that IETF does not see itself having a global > role in this matter, true? > > If so, is there an indication of how many countries will need to have a > "common" requirement for tapping before IETF acts further in this area (in > either the pro- or anti- directions)? > > And, have we a definitive count of such countries? > There are at least 4 I can think of (US, Holland, Australia and China spring > to mind). I have heard Germany allows tapping too but no confirmation yet. We definitely have to little current information. I have tried at least 5 times to get information about it from the EU. I estimate that this list will not choose to change protocols even if all countries in this world require Internet tapping. Majority prefers to wait until some of their standards are forbidden by law and replaced by ad-hoc mouse/camel-like designs that have nothing to do with the good intentions IETF certainly has. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 4 23:58:24 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id XAA18842 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 23:58:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id XAA25473; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 23:48:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id XAA25445 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 23:48:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from songbird.com (IDENT:kent@songbird.com [206.14.4.2]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id XAA18786 for ; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 23:49:57 -0500 (EST) Received: (from kent@localhost) by songbird.com (8.9.1a/8.9.1) id UAA21017 for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:49:57 -0800 Message-ID: <20000204204957.C20251@songbird.com> Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 20:49:57 -0800 From: Kent Crispin To: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang Mail-Followup-To: raven@ietf.org References: <200002041223.HAA23033@ietf.org> <4.2.0.58.20000204204612.009b4ac0@fast.synernet.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 0.93.2i In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000204204612.009b4ac0@fast.synernet.com>; from Ed Stone on Fri, Feb 04, 2000 at 08:49:21PM -0500 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Fri, Feb 04, 2000 at 08:49:21PM -0500, Ed Stone wrote: > At 07:23 AM 2/4/2000 , you wrote: > >On 3 Feb 00, at 16:57, Melinda.Shore@nokia.com wrote: > > > > > > But he has been very good on privacy issues, as anyone who > > > > has followed his legislative and privacy record knows. > > > > > > Unless Bob Barr doesn't approve of your sex life, in > > > which case he believes that you do not have the right > > > to engage in consensual acts with another adult in > > > your own home. He also thinks that giving his own > > > religious beliefs the force of law is a dandy thing to > > > do, which is also (arguably) a privacy issue. > > > >So he clearly isn't "very good on privacy issues". > > > Ah the old consenting adults in the privacy of their home line..... > > A simple puncture of that follows: Persons A and B, both adults iving in > the same home consent to an arrangement in which A shoots B in the head in > front of a camera in return for $500,000 paid to a person B designates. > This is 1) consenting 2) adults 3) in their home. Next juvenile attempt? This "puncture" is indeed quite juvenile, and utterly misses the point. People shooting people in the privacy of their homes is *still* no basis for removing privacy rights, much *less* private consenting sexual behavior. If Mr Barr indeed thinks that private sexual behavior is grounds for going around privacy rights, then his position is flawed. -- Kent Crispin "Do good, and you'll be kent@songbird.com lonesome." -- Mark Twain _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 11:05:31 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA13540 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 11:05:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA21454; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:44:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA21421 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:44:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA13125 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:45:47 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1KQ81W0X>; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:51:19 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "'Ben Laurie'" , Chris Savage Cc: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:51:17 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org >-----Original Message----- >From: Ben Laurie [mailto:ben@algroup.co.uk] >Sent: Friday, February 04, 2000 7:29 PM >To: Chris Savage >Cc: IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail) >Subject: Re: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 > > >Various People wrote: > >> The IETF ... believes that the >> operation of the Internet and the needs of its users are >best served by >> making sure the security properties of connections across >the Internet are >> as well known as possible. > >This keeps niggling at me. Surely if Internet connections were certain >to be completely insecure (i.e. any interested party could >intercept the >plaintext of any connection) then this requirement would be satisfied? >But it seems clear to me that such a situation would not even remotely >be in the best interests of the Internet's users. As far as I know, the "connections" aren't generally "secure" and it would be extremely hard to make them so. And if, for example, it were true that every packet sent anywhere on the net were stored in some public data file, then it would plainly be in the interests of users to have that level of (in)security widely and fully understood. And doesn't RFC 1984 go to the heart of the matter wrt encryption? Chris S. *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 11:12:23 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA13702 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 11:12:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA21640; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:49:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA21611 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:49:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA13238 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:51:00 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1KQ81XAH>; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:56:39 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "'Lyal Collins'" , Chris Savage , "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 10:56:33 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org >-----Original Message----- >From: Lyal Collins [mailto:lyalc@ozemail.com.au] >Sent: Friday, February 04, 2000 8:56 PM >To: Chris Savage; IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail) >Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 > > >I'm not entirely comfortable with the summary position, which focusses >heavily on national laws. >While national laws have one level of impact on wiretapping, the global >nature of the Internet means it is no more costly (and probably more >convenient) for a LE agency in one jurisdiction to monitor >communications in >an external jurisdiction. > >As one example, this may free LE from the burden of having to >comply with >local jurisdiction approval/warrant processes by tapping >communications with >"out-of-jurisdiction" entities, who may or may not be invovled in >inappropriate activities. > >Think "LAPD-style wiretapping" in every state/country, not >just a single >city. > >Is the resulting assumption, that IETF does not see itself >having a global >role in this matter, true? > >If so, is there an indication of how many countries will need to have a >"common" requirement for tapping before IETF acts further in >this area (in >either the pro- or anti- directions)? > >And, have we a definitive count of such countries? >There are at least 4 I can think of (US, Holland, Australia >and China spring >to mind). IMHO this portion of the draft is pointing out that as matters stand today, the divergence of national laws regarding wiretapping is one thing that makes an IETF standard to facilitate tapping a bad or unworkable idea. In a totally hypothetical world in which (say) countries making up 95% of 'net traffic and users had effectively identical wiretapping requirements, divergence of national laws would not be as strong an argument against IETF activity in this area. It does not follow that the IETF, in such a situation, either would or should create a standard. It is just that in such a situation the reasoning might have to be a bit different. As someone famous once said, "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof..." Chris S. All views/opinions my own *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 11:50:39 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA14991 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 11:50:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA23501; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 11:38:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id LAA23474 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 11:38:00 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id LAA14603 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 11:39:24 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002071639.LAA14603@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 3322 invoked by uid 0); 7 Feb 2000 16:39:18 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.204) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 7 Feb 2000 16:39:18 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 17:39:07 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Priority: normal In-reply-to: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 7 Feb 00, at 10:56, Chris Savage wrote: > IMHO this portion of the draft is pointing out that as matters stand > today, the divergence of national laws regarding wiretapping is one thing > that makes an IETF standard to facilitate tapping a bad or unworkable > idea. Is this "tested"? I don't know of divergence of national laws, to the contrary, all EU countries are lining up. > In a totally hypothetical world in which (say) countries > making up 95% of 'net traffic and users had effectively > identical wiretapping requirements, divergence of > national laws would not be as strong an argument against > IETF activity in this area. It does not follow that the > IETF, in such a situation, either would or should create > a standard. It is just that in such a situation the > reasoning might have to be a bit different. As someone > famous once said, "sufficient unto the day is the evil > thereof..." I see a strong kind of "not invented here" resistance. There is no will to think about what wiretap standard could be there is only an "against". IETF could perfectly design a auditable version of tcpdump. A good tap just taps everything to and from a programmed IP address without editing the content in any way. That's all, nothing more and nothing less. "Divergence of national laws", sigh... +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 12:23:01 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA15937 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 12:23:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA25233; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 12:09:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA25207 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 12:09:50 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA15626 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 12:11:16 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1KQ81X1B>; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 12:14:02 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "'chefren'" , raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 12:13:59 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org >-----Original Message----- >From: chefren [mailto:chefren@pi.net] >Sent: Monday, February 07, 2000 11:39 AM >To: raven@ietf.org >Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 > > >On 7 Feb 00, at 10:56, Chris Savage wrote: > >> IMHO this portion of the draft is pointing out that as matters stand >> today, the divergence of national laws regarding wiretapping >is one thing >> that makes an IETF standard to facilitate tapping a bad or unworkable >> idea. > >Is this "tested"? I don't know of divergence of national >laws, to the contrary, all EU countries are lining up. My own knowledge is most focused on US/CALEA issues. AFAIK the specific requirements of CALEA (which applies, one will recall, only to carriers and manufacturers of carrier equipment, not to "information service" providers) are unique to the US in various respects. Other countries have other specific things that one has to do, as I understand it. Some time ago I pointed out that to actually determine the degree of difference/overlap between the legal requirements of various countries would entail a non-trivial amount of lawyer time and effort. That said, due to various quirkiness-es of US law, I would suspect that what CALEA will require for particular carriers/manufacturers will be different from what other countries will require. Note also that in most countries, I think, people who are not carriers (e.g., in the US, ISPs, backbone providers) are still subject to getting served with a court order to cough up information, allow the attachment of listening devices, etc. The questions in such cases are (a) what kind of a showing does the LEA have to make to the judge to get the order? and (b) who bears any extraordinary costs associated with the activity? From this perspective, CALEA is a lot more about allocating costs than about technical capabilities (although there is obviously a large "technical capabilities" component to it). So, to answer your question directly, no, AFAIK my proposition has not been "tested" -- the "testing" is what would take a bunch of lawyers a bunch of (high-cost) hours to confirm. But it strikes me as having a very high likelihood of being true. >> In a totally hypothetical world in which (say) countries >> making up 95% of 'net traffic and users had effectively >> identical wiretapping requirements, divergence of >> national laws would not be as strong an argument against >> IETF activity in this area. It does not follow that the >> IETF, in such a situation, either would or should create >> a standard. It is just that in such a situation the >> reasoning might have to be a bit different. As someone >> famous once said, "sufficient unto the day is the evil >> thereof..." > > >I see a strong kind of "not invented here" resistance. > >There is no will to think about what wiretap standard could >be there is only an "against". It seems to me that the predominant opinion on the list is that wiretapping by LEAs is a (maybe) necessary evil, but plainly an evil that the IETF should not facilitate. Also, that any "legal" wiretapping regime could be abused by either oppressive authorities (insert your favorite villainous regime here) or by out-of-sanction LEAs (the LAPD example), not to mention random Bad Guys who somehow get in a position to use the capability. This leads to a consensus that on the whole facilitating the process from a technical perspective is, net-net-net, a Bad Thing, as opposed to a Good Thing. The point at this late stage of the discussion is not to claim that your counter-arguments have zero persuasive power. Perhaps by virtue my own (lawyer) training (every issue has at least two sides), it seems clear to me that the persuasive power of your arguments is well above zero. Even so, those arguments have failed, in this forum, to persuade very many people. Again, maybe due to my training, the notion that good, sensible arguments might lose (and, yes, I know some on the list would not credit yours in that way) is not shocking -- it happens every day. Either because better, more sensible arguments prevail, or because the decision-maker perceives the actual issue to be one as to which the arguments are not quite as strong or relevant as their proponent would like. > >IETF could perfectly design a auditable version of tcpdump. I'm not techie enough to comment on this. >A good tap just taps everything to and from a programmed IP >address without editing the content in any way. That's all, >nothing more and nothing less. Isn't that do-able today? >"Divergence of national laws", sigh... We still live in a multi-national world. Perhaps we always will. Don't think of it as social bug, think of it as a social feature... Chris S. All views/opinions my own... *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 13:53:52 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id NAA18933 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 13:53:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA29154; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 13:33:48 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA29125 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 13:33:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id NAA18453 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 13:35:12 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002071835.NAA18453@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 5295 invoked by uid 0); 7 Feb 2000 18:35:11 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.204) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 7 Feb 2000 18:35:11 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 19:35:10 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Priority: normal In-reply-to: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 7 Feb 00, at 12:13, Chris Savage wrote: > Some time ago I pointed out that to actually determine the degree of > difference/overlap between the legal requirements of various countries > would entail a non-trivial amount of lawyer time and effort. That said, > due to various quirkiness-es of US law, I would suspect that what CALEA > will require for particular carriers/manufacturers will be different from > what other countries will require. IETF should look primarily at technical side of the problem, that's pretty simple: pass al information to and from an IP address without changing the information. The information should be encapsulated in a timestamped package with details like who had set the tap, which warrant, checksums against modifications and so on. Not that difficult. .. > So, to answer your question directly, no, AFAIK my proposition has not > been "tested" -- the "testing" is what would take a bunch of lawyers a > bunch of (high-cost) hours to confirm. But it strikes me as having a very > high likelihood of being true. I don't see the necessity of a bunch of lawyers. This can and should be handled strictly as a technical problem. .. > >I see a strong kind of "not invented here" resistance. > > > >There is no will to think about what wiretap standard could > >be there is only an "against". > > It seems to me that the predominant opinion on the list is that > wiretapping by LEAs is a (maybe) necessary evil, but plainly an evil that > the IETF should not facilitate. "Maybe necessary" or "necessary"? That's no question. It is necessary and not up to IETF to decide. It's up to governments and important ones have decided. > Also, that any "legal" wiretapping regime > could be abused by either oppressive authorities (insert your favorite > villainous regime here) or by out-of-sanction LEAs (the LAPD example), not > to mention random Bad Guys who somehow get in a position to use the > capability. Since when is the IETF interested in the message? Or in this case specific use of the Internet? > This leads to a consensus that on the whole facilitating the > process from a technical perspective is, net-net-net, a Bad Thing, as > opposed to a Good Thing. That's not upon IETF, IETF shouldn't be a political organization. > The point at this late stage of the discussion Late? The proposed text has nothing to do with a solution for the real problem. We still have to start... > is not to claim that your > counter-arguments have zero persuasive power. Perhaps by virtue my own > (lawyer) training (every issue has at least two sides), it seems clear to > me that the persuasive power of your arguments is well above zero. Even > so, those arguments have failed, in this forum, to persuade very many > people. Again, maybe due to my training, the notion that good, sensible > arguments might lose (and, yes, I know some on the list would not credit > yours in that way) is not shocking -- it happens every day. No problems with that here... > Either because better, more sensible arguments prevail, > or because the decision-maker perceives the actual issue > to be one as to which the arguments are not quite as > strong or relevant as their proponent would like. The decision-maker, IETF, has made standards for a long time happily with little or even no interference with laws. Unfortunately(!) that has ended. The current stuborness of IETF may well be described as childish... > >IETF could perfectly design a auditable version of tcpdump. > > I'm not techie enough to comment on this. > > >A good tap just taps everything to and from a programmed IP > >address without editing the content in any way. That's all, > >nothing more and nothing less. > > Isn't that do-able today? Of course but if everyone in this world does it in a different way the incompatibilities will cost an unnecessary amount of money. To do it well and as good and secure as possible it has to be implemented in routers in a standard way. .. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 14:31:26 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA19734 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:31:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA00161; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:00:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA00128 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:00:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA19157 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:02:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA23911 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:01:43 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000207140010.009a92d0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 14:02:03 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 In-Reply-To: <200002071835.NAA18453@ietf.org> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 01:35 PM 2/7/2000 , chefren wrote: >Late? The proposed text has nothing to do with a solution >for the real problem. We still have to start... IETF has decided NOT to start. See the draft. >The decision-maker, IETF, has made standards for a long >time happily with little or even no interference with laws. >Unfortunately(!) that has ended. The current stuborness of >IETF may well be described as childish... The draft states IETF's position. Do you have contributions to the definition of wiretapping or the rationale? -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 15:10:56 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20580 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:10:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA01622; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:44:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA01594 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:44:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com (sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com [171.68.224.215]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA20077 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:45:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from rhino (rhino.cisco.com [172.20.9.57]) by sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA25151; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 12:05:35 -0800 (PST) Received: from p7020-img-nt (fred-hm-dhcp1.cisco.com [171.69.128.116]) by rhino (SMI-8.6/CISCO.WS.1.1) with SMTP id LAA25528; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 11:50:11 -0800 Message-Id: <4.1.20000207112537.03f48e50@flipper.cisco.com> X-Sender: fred@flipper.cisco.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.1 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 11:37:13 -0800 To: Ed Stone From: Fred Baker Subject: RE: [Raven] Congressman Bob Barr thanks IETF for not doing the wi retap thang Cc: raven@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000204204239.009b4260@fast.synernet.com> References: <4.1.20000203183133.029e4010@flipper.cisco.com> <4.3.0.33.0.20000203175908.01f52130@pop.webcom.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 08:43 PM 2/4/00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: >>With al due respect, what has this discussion got to do with the subject of >>this list? > >I guess that after the draft, many think the subject of the list has been >fulfilled. Not right? The subject of the list remains discussing what the IETF should or should not be doing about wiretap. In context, I would like to believe that is mostly has to do with getting the current draft statement right, and pointing out anything else that is important and might be missed. I note that Chris Savage has been trying to do exactly that; I can't say that much of the rest of this mail over the past week seems related to that. The fact that you have decided that the work is done is not an invitation to useless and pointless chatter. Gouges at people, including but in no sense limited to countries that have different viewpoints on the topic than you hold, congressmen, left-wing-wackos, right-wing-wackos, low-flying-wackos, submarine-wackos, and other people who have taken the time to contribute to the discussion, are off-topic. I utterly fail to see any connection between "consenting adults" and "communications diverted without the communicator's knowledge or consent". When the statement is completed, we will indeed take the list down. There is so much noise here it is hard to distinguish which few notes add signal, and last I checked the IETF was intended to be about signal. _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 15:11:02 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20596 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:11:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA01783; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:49:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id OAA01756 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:49:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from yorktown.paranet.com (kirkwood.paranet.com [199.164.131.35]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA20153 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:51:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from sprintparanet.com (dhcp-65-247.phx.paranet.com [172.16.65.247]) by yorktown.paranet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA11241 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 13:46:05 -0600 (CST) Message-ID: <389F2135.EF3217C9@sprintparanet.com> Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 12:47:01 -0700 From: Christian Price X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (Win95; U) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 References: <4.2.0.58.20000207140010.009a92d0@fast.synernet.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I think it is more accurate to say that the IETF has determined that the lack of tapability in strong encryption is not a problem. One does not need to fix something that is not broken. Ed Stone wrote: > > At 01:35 PM 2/7/2000 , chefren wrote: > > >Late? The proposed text has nothing to do with a solution > >for the real problem. We still have to start... > > IETF has decided NOT to start. See the draft. > > >The decision-maker, IETF, has made standards for a long > >time happily with little or even no interference with laws. > >Unfortunately(!) that has ended. The current stuborness of > >IETF may well be described as childish... > > The draft states IETF's position. Do you have contributions to the > definition of wiretapping or the rationale? > > -- > -------------------------- > Ed Stone > estone@synernet.com > -------------------------- > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven -- --------.--------------------------------------. ------/ Christian Price / ----/ Technical Solutions Consultant / ---/ Four Corners Area ITOT/OSA / --/ SprintParanet, Phoenix Office / -/ 602-266-9242 / '--------------------------------------' _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 15:26:19 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20950 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:26:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA02558; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:09:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA02535 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:09:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20624 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:11:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA24461 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:10:43 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000207150913.009add50@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 15:10:59 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: Re: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 In-Reply-To: <389F2135.EF3217C9@sprintparanet.com> References: <4.2.0.58.20000207140010.009a92d0@fast.synernet.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 02:47 PM 2/7/2000 , you wrote: >I think it is more accurate to say that the IETF has determined that the >lack of tapability in strong encryption is not a problem. One does not >need to fix something that is not broken. It has been my understanding that the wiretap issue addressed by this process is separate and apart from any encryption issues. Specifically, it excludes matters related to encryption of the contents that may be intercepted by wiretaps, as I understand it. >Ed Stone wrote: > > > > At 01:35 PM 2/7/2000 , chefren wrote: > > > > >Late? The proposed text has nothing to do with a solution > > >for the real problem. We still have to start... > > > > IETF has decided NOT to start. See the draft. > > > > >The decision-maker, IETF, has made standards for a long > > >time happily with little or even no interference with laws. > > >Unfortunately(!) that has ended. The current stuborness of > > >IETF may well be described as childish... > > > > The draft states IETF's position. Do you have contributions to the > > definition of wiretapping or the rationale? > > > > -- > > -------------------------- > > Ed Stone > > estone@synernet.com > > -------------------------- > > > > _______________________________________________ > > raven mailing list > > raven@ietf.org > > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > >-- >--------.--------------------------------------. > ------/ Christian Price / > ----/ Technical Solutions Consultant / > ---/ Four Corners Area ITOT/OSA / > --/ SprintParanet, Phoenix Office / > -/ 602-266-9242 / > '--------------------------------------' > >_______________________________________________ >raven mailing list >raven@ietf.org >http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 15:30:43 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20986 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:30:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA02293; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:03:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA02262 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:03:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id PAA20477 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:05:06 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002072005.PAA20477@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 32118 invoked by uid 0); 7 Feb 2000 20:04:59 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.204) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 7 Feb 2000 20:04:59 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 21:04:52 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Priority: normal In-reply-to: <389F2135.EF3217C9@sprintparanet.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 7 Feb 00, at 12:47, Christian Price wrote: > I think it is more accurate to say that the IETF has determined that the > lack of tapability in strong encryption is not a problem. One does not > need to fix something that is not broken. Strong encrypted data is as tapable as unencrypted data. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 16:29:30 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA22243 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 16:29:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA02739; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:15:13 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA02708 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:15:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA20721 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:16:36 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1KQ81XLJ>; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:22:10 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "'chefren'" , raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 15:22:05 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org >-----Original Message----- >From: chefren [mailto:chefren@pi.net] >Sent: Monday, February 07, 2000 1:35 PM >To: raven@ietf.org >Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 > > >On 7 Feb 00, at 12:13, Chris Savage wrote: > >> Some time ago I pointed out that to actually determine the degree of >> difference/overlap between the legal requirements of various >countries >> would entail a non-trivial amount of lawyer time and effort. > That said, >> due to various quirkiness-es of US law, I would suspect that >what CALEA >> will require for particular carriers/manufacturers will be >different from >> what other countries will require. > >IETF should look primarily at technical side of the >problem, that's pretty simple: pass al information to and >from an IP address without changing the information. The >information should be encapsulated in a timestamped package >with details like who had set the tap, which warrant, >checksums against modifications and so on. Not that >difficult. You can't avoid the legal problems, unfortunately. The solution you just described -- ship all the data to someone (LEA?) who will agree to only look at the stuff they are entitled to -- would probably affirmatively violate CALEA in the US, which requires (lots of glossing over of details here) giving the LEAs what they are entitled to, but not more than they are entitled to. In the case of IP addresses, most consumers here (targets of taps) access the 'net via dial-up, and ISPs typically dynamically assign IP addresses to dial-up users. So I don't see how your proposal would give the LEAs either (a) all the information regarding someone they are legitimately tapping (different IP addresses for different sessions) or (b) only the information they are entitled to (since different users would have the same IP address over time). The discussion above has at least met, and probably exceeded, my actual technical knowledge. But if it is even remotely right, your solution might be okay under Dutch law, or some other country's law, but I don't think it would cut it in the US. Here the FCC is in court defending a decision to approve, on what amounts to an interim (and probably never-to-be-implemented) basis, a system where the LEA gets full packets to/from a target when their authorization extends only to address information, not content. So you can imagine what would happen with a system that gave full packets from lots of people in order to allow the capture of data relating only to one or a few... >> So, to answer your question directly, no, AFAIK my >>proposition has not >> been "tested" -- the "testing" is what would take a bunch of >>lawyers a >> bunch of (high-cost) hours to confirm. But it strikes me as >>having a very >> high likelihood of being true. > >I don't see the necessity of a bunch of lawyers. This can >and should be handled strictly as a technical problem. This is probably where you experience the greatest disconnect with a lot of other people on the list, IMHO. I suppose if we define the problem as, "What's the most technically efficient way to ensure that LEAs get all the data they need to find any Bad Guy they need to find?" that's (largely) a technical problem. But it assumes that the goal of the exercise is as stated, i.e., that LEAs' data needs are captured by: "getting them all the data they need..." In fact, LEAs' data needs (in practical terms) are constrained by what their respective national laws authorize them to collect. Hence the need to know what the laws are. Hence the need for lawyers. (Hey, don't feel so bad. Most lawyers acknowledge that they need engineers...) >> >I see a strong kind of "not invented here" resistance. >> > >> >There is no will to think about what wiretap standard could >> >be there is only an "against". >> >> It seems to me that the predominant opinion on the list is that >> wiretapping by LEAs is a (maybe) necessary evil, but plainly >> an evil that >> the IETF should not facilitate. > >"Maybe necessary" or "necessary"? That's no question. It is >necessary and not up to IETF to decide. It's up to >governments and important ones have decided. My earlier posting was trying to summarize what I think is the consensus of the list. You, obviously, disagree (as is your right). But I think my summary is more or less an accurate description of what people have stated here, your disagreement with those statements notwithstanding. >> Also, that any "legal" wiretapping regime >> could be abused by either oppressive authorities (insert >>your favorite >> villainous regime here) or by out-of-sanction LEAs (the LAPD >>example), not >> to mention random Bad Guys who somehow get in a position to use the >> capability. > >Since when is the IETF interested in the message? Or in >this case specific use of the Internet? Interesting question. I think that the Internet community writ large has long been interested in various uses of the Internet. As to the IETF's interest, I think that is explained in the draft... >> This leads to a consensus that on the whole facilitating the >> process from a technical perspective is, net-net-net, a Bad Thing, as >> opposed to a Good Thing. > >That's not upon IETF, IETF shouldn't be a political >organization. But it has been asked, in essence, a political question, to which it is, in its own techie-oriented way, crafting a political response. That doesn't make it "a political organization." That simply means that politics has impinged on what it does. In the grand scheme of things, I take this as an indicator that the 'net is, indeed, continuing to "grow up." >> The point at this late stage of the discussion > >Late? The proposed text has nothing to do with a solution >for the real problem. We still have to start... Here again, I think there is a disconnect between the problem you see (see above for my attempt to capture it) and the problem the IETF sees. >> is not to claim that your >> counter-arguments have zero persuasive power. Perhaps by >virtue my own >> (lawyer) training (every issue has at least two sides), it >seems clear to >> me that the persuasive power of your arguments is well above >zero. Even >> so, those arguments have failed, in this forum, to persuade very many >> people. Again, maybe due to my training, the notion that >good, sensible >> arguments might lose (and, yes, I know some on the list >would not credit >> yours in that way) is not shocking -- it happens every day. > >No problems with that here... > >> Either because better, more sensible arguments prevail, >> or because the decision-maker perceives the actual issue >> to be one as to which the arguments are not quite as >> strong or relevant as their proponent would like. > >The decision-maker, IETF, has made standards for a long >time happily with little or even no interference with laws. >Unfortunately(!) that has ended. The current stuborness of >IETF may well be described as childish... Actually, I think it shows considerable restraint and maturity. It would have been a different matter if (say) ARPA had originally conceived of the network it was supporting/inventing as primarily a communications tool for governments. If ARPA had demanded that the requisite protocols being developed (more or less) on its nickel included tappability, and the ARPA-funded researchers had said "no," that would probably have been childish. But the days are long past when the 'net and its protocols could remotely be considered to be under government "control" or "ownership." The guts of the 'net -- the routers, the servers, the pipes -- are owned and controlled by private parties. So all the normal concerns attendant on government trying to get private parties to do things -- is this legal? who will bear the cost? -- applies to making the (current) 'net more easily tappable. Chris S. All views/opinions my own *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 17:11:39 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA23009 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 17:11:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA05545; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 16:47:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA05518 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 16:47:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from bommel.progressive-systems.com (216-132-55-12.velocityhsi.com [216.132.55.12]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA22667 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 16:48:50 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ge@localhost) by bommel.progressive-systems.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id OAA02125 for raven@ietf.org; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:48:51 -0700 Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 14:48:51 -0700 From: "Ge' Weijers" To: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Message-ID: <20000207144851.B2020@progressive-systems.com> References: <200002071639.LAA14603@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <200002071639.LAA14603@ietf.org>; from chefren@pi.net on Mon, Feb 07, 2000 at 05:39:07PM +0100 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Mon, Feb 07, 2000 at 05:39:07PM +0100, chefren wrote: > Is this "tested"? I don't know of divergence of national > laws, to the contrary, all EU countries are lining up. US: no requirement to facilitate wiretapping of Internet data traffic, i.e. it's not (yet?) the ISP's problem. NL (and maybe a few more EU countries currently) require wiretaps on warrant. ISP needs to comply. Russia: enable snooping on everything all the time by security services. ISP needs to feed a copy of all traffic to the spooks. That's about as divergent as it gets, and different requirement will need different solutions. Ge' _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 17:57:51 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id RAA23738 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 17:57:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA06390; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 17:11:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA06305 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 17:11:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id RAA23030 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 17:12:54 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002072212.RAA23030@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 28125 invoked by uid 0); 7 Feb 2000 22:12:48 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.204) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 7 Feb 2000 22:12:48 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 23:12:43 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: RE: [Raven] Comments on Draft -- Take 2 Priority: normal In-reply-to: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 7 Feb 00, at 15:22, Chris Savage wrote: > >From: chefren [mailto:chefren@pi.net] > >On 7 Feb 00, at 12:13, Chris Savage wrote: > >IETF should look primarily at technical side of the > >problem, that's pretty simple: pass al information to and > >from an IP address without changing the information. The > >information should be encapsulated in a timestamped package > >with details like who had set the tap, which warrant, > >checksums against modifications and so on. Not that > >difficult. > > You can't avoid the legal problems, unfortunately. > > The solution you just described -- ship all the data to someone (LEA?) who > will agree to only look at the stuff they are entitled to -- would probably > affirmatively violate CALEA in the US, which requires (lots of glossing over > of details here) giving the LEAs what they are entitled to, but not more > than they are entitled to. That's important basics for serious tapping, not tapping streams or data of other channels. "Sleepnet fishing" is out of the question. > In the case of IP addresses, most consumers here > (targets of taps) access the 'net via dial-up, and ISPs typically > dynamically assign IP addresses to dial-up users. So I don't see how your > proposal would give the LEAs either (a) all the information regarding > someone they are legitimately tapping (different IP addresses for different > sessions) or (b) only the information they are entitled to (since different > users would have the same IP address over time). Right!!! So this is why central, IETF, standards are necessary. Take your example, the equiment that receives a dial-in- call and checks name and password has to program the routers dynamically. Not very difficult but definitely needs standards. > The discussion above has at least met, and probably exceeded, my actual > technical knowledge. But if it is even remotely right, your solution might > be okay under Dutch law, or some other country's law, but I don't think it > would cut it in the US. True for here too. And the worst part is: The law states the providers have to serve all this around December, after a 2 year "grace" period. Without good standards it's impossible so what happens: A very bad kludge of solutions will appear that definitely do nothing good for privacy. > Here the FCC is in court defending a decision to > approve, on what amounts to an interim (and probably > never-to-be-implemented) basis, a system where the LEA gets full packets > to/from a target when their authorization extends only to address > information, not content. So you can imagine what would happen with a > system that gave full packets from lots of people in order to allow the > capture of data relating only to one or a few... That should be prevented. Now the access providers, typically more or less low-tech guys that buy high end hardware and software, have the law that presses them to do it good and the industry that doesn't deliver because lacking standards. .. > >I don't see the necessity of a bunch of lawyers. This can > >and should be handled strictly as a technical problem. > > This is probably where you experience the greatest disconnect with a lot of > other people on the list, IMHO. Probably "the other people on the list" were never involved in design for tapping before. My company met telephone tapping by accident 10 years ago because our digital recording machines had better sound reproduction quality than other machines with 2 times compression and the SCSI storage technology was flexible enough to store so much on a tape that lots of things could be automated in a way that prevented recording errors, exchange of data between different cases, editing of tapes and more. > I suppose if we define the problem as, > "What's the most technically efficient way to ensure that LEAs get all the > data they need to find any Bad Guy they need to find?" that's (largely) a > technical problem. But it assumes that the goal of the exercise is as > stated, i.e., that LEAs' data needs are captured by: "getting them all the > data they need..." In fact, LEAs' data needs (in practical terms) are > constrained by what their respective national laws authorize them to > collect. Hence the need to know what the laws are. Hence the need for > lawyers. (Hey, don't feel so bad. Most lawyers acknowledge that they need > engineers...) As I mentioned earlier, often Law Enforcement only wants traffic data, just because it's too costly to make reports of more. .. > My earlier posting was trying to summarize what I think is the consensus of > the list. You, obviously, disagree (as is your right). It makes little or no sence in a discussion to write was already written... > But I think my summary is more or less an accurate > description of what people have stated here, your > disagreement with those statements notwithstanding. No problem... I think lots of people here do their best in their own way. .. > >Since when is the IETF interested in the message? Or in > >this case specific use of the Internet? > > Interesting question. I think that the Internet community writ large has > long been interested in various uses of the Internet. As to the IETF's > interest, I think that is explained in the draft... I have to give in that I haven't read even 50% of RFC's but this seems one of the most =political= pieces ever to me... > >> This leads to a consensus that on the whole facilitating the > >> process from a technical perspective is, net-net-net, a Bad Thing, as > >> opposed to a Good Thing. > > > >That's not upon IETF, IETF shouldn't be a political > >organization. > > But it has been asked, in essence, a political question, to which it is, in > its own techie-oriented way, crafting a political response. I think it is =made= a political question. .. > So all the normal concerns attendant on government trying to get private > parties to do things -- is this legal? who will bear the cost? -- applies > to making the (current) 'net more easily tappable. Long ago solved here, costs will go to the industry. Like with chemical factories: One that creates a problem pays for it. (uh oh...) +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 18:31:24 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA24228 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 18:31:24 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA08053; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 18:14:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA08025 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 18:14:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA24034 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 18:16:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id SAA25864 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 18:15:37 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000207181122.009b8ea0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:15:45 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone In-Reply-To: <200002072212.RAA23030@ietf.org> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] US NSA/DoD Wiretap funding Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org "Half of that money, $120 million, will come from the Department of Defense's "national security" budget -- a move that alarms privacy groups. "The proposal to use thinly disguised intelligence agency money to fund CALEA confirms what we have suspected all along: the National Security Agency is a silent partner in the government's campaign to make our entire telecommunications system, including the Net, wiretap ready," says Barry Steinhardt, associate director of the American Civil Liberties Union." Source: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34164,00.html -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 7 19:22:08 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA24581 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 19:22:08 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA09740; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 19:05:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA09708 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 19:05:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id TAA24516 for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2000 19:07:23 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002080007.TAA24516@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 21072 invoked by uid 0); 8 Feb 2000 00:07:23 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.66) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 8 Feb 2000 00:07:23 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 01:07:23 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] US NSA/DoD Wiretap funding Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.2.0.58.20000207181122.009b8ea0@fast.synernet.com> References: <200002072212.RAA23030@ietf.org> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 7 Feb 00, at 18:15, Ed Stone wrote: > "Half of that money, $120 million, will come from the > Department of Defense's "national security" budget -- a > move that alarms privacy groups. > > "The proposal to use thinly disguised intelligence agency > money to fund CALEA confirms what we have suspected all > along: the National Security Agency is a silent partner > in the government's campaign to make our entire > telecommunications system, including the Net, wiretap > ready," says Barry Steinhardt, associate director of the > American Civil Liberties Union." > > Source: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34164,00.html Thanks Ed! IETF: please help get this all out of the dark as soon as possible by OPEN STANDARDS!!! =THINK=!!! +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 8 12:52:14 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA04535 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:52:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA18804; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:30:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA18775 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:30:12 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtprch1.nortel.com (smtprch1.nortelnetworks.com [192.135.215.14]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA03542 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:31:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from zsc4c002.corpwest.baynetworks.com (actually 134.177.2.149) by smtprch1.nortel.com; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 11:30:45 -0600 Received: by zsc4c002.corpwest.baynetworks.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <1QSLB7Y4>; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 09:29:42 -0800 Message-ID: <7D0C2EAEF250D3119BD10008C791823C114D17@ZBL6C008> From: "Carter Bullard" To: "'raven@ietf.org'" Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 09:29:42 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01BF725A.15A5B94E" Subject: [Raven] DNS query capture Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_001_01BF725A.15A5B94E Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Gentle people, When Law Enforcement (LE) has permission to use a Pen Register wiretap, the local phone company is required to give LE what is called participant information for every call made from a specific handset, in near-realtime. When thinking about how Pen Register wiretaps would work in packet-mode networks, it seems reasonable to think that you would need to provide the same type of information that is provided by local carriers in the PSTN. One aspect of this can be satisfied by providing RMON2 network matrix data that includes the target IP address. This will give LE the analogy of the called party numbers. But Pen Register wiretaps can also provide the name of the subscriber of the called telephone number. Providing the name associated with a specific IP address in not as straight forward as it is in the PSTN. The simplest way would be to allow Law Enforcement to capture the contents of DNS requests and responses to and from the target of the wiretap. My question(s) are: Is the DNS protocol IP network control plane information? Is the DNS a public service? Does the requestor have any claim to ownership of the response? Carter ------_=_NextPart_001_01BF725A.15A5B94E Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" DNS query capture

Gentle people,
   When Law Enforcement (LE) has permission to
use a Pen Register wiretap, the local phone
company is required to give LE what is called
participant information for every call made from
a specific handset, in near-realtime.

   When thinking about how Pen Register wiretaps
would work in packet-mode networks, it seems
reasonable to think that you would need to provide
the same type of information that is provided by
local carriers in the PSTN.

   One aspect of this can be satisfied by providing
RMON2 network matrix data that includes the target
IP address.  This will give LE the analogy of the
called party numbers.  But Pen Register wiretaps
can also provide the name of the subscriber of the called
telephone number.

   Providing the name associated with a specific
IP address in not as straight forward as it is in
the PSTN.  The simplest way would be to allow
Law Enforcement to capture the contents of DNS requests
and responses to and from the target of the wiretap.

   My question(s) are:

      Is the DNS protocol IP network control plane information?
        Is the DNS a public service?
        Does the requestor have any claim to ownership of the response?

Carter

------_=_NextPart_001_01BF725A.15A5B94E-- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 8 18:56:55 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA13707 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 18:56:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA00936; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 18:43:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA00905 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 18:43:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from mc-qout4.whowhere.com (mc-qout4.whowhere.com [209.185.123.18]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id SAA13609 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 18:44:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from Unknown/Local ([?.?.?.?]) by angelfire.com; Tue Feb 8 15:43:49 2000 To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2000 15:43:49 -0800 From: "l c s" Message-ID: Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sent-Mail: off X-Mailer: MailCity Service X-Sender-Ip: 199.253.44.251 Organization: Angelfire (http://email.angelfire.com:80) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Language: en Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: [Raven] take me off your mailing list ... Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit --please! On Tue, 8 Feb 2000 12:00:06 raven-admin wrote: > >Send raven mailing list submissions to > raven@ietf.org > >To subscribe or unsubscribe via the web, visit > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven >or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > raven-request@ietf.org >You can reach the person managing the list at > raven-admin@ietf.org > >When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than >"Re: Contents of raven digest..." > > >Today's Topics: > > 1. US NSA/DoD Wiretap funding (Ed Stone) > 2. Re: US NSA/DoD Wiretap funding (chefren) > >--__--__-- > >Message: 1 >Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2000 18:15:45 -0500 >To: raven@ietf.org >From: Ed Stone >Subject: [Raven] US NSA/DoD Wiretap funding > >"Half of that money, $120 million, will come >from the Department of Defense's >"national security" budget -- a move that >alarms privacy groups. > >"The proposal to use thinly disguised >intelligence agency money to fund CALEA >confirms what we have suspected all >along: the National Security Agency is a >silent partner in the government's >campaign to make our entire >telecommunications system, including the >Net, wiretap ready," says Barry >Steinhardt, associate director of the >American Civil Liberties Union." > >Source: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34164,00.html > > >-- >-------------------------- >Ed Stone >estone@synernet.com >-------------------------- > >--__--__-- > >Message: 2 >From: "chefren" >To: raven@ietf.org >Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 01:07:23 +0100 >Subject: Re: [Raven] US NSA/DoD Wiretap funding > >On 7 Feb 00, at 18:15, Ed Stone wrote: > >> "Half of that money, $120 million, will come from the >> Department of Defense's "national security" budget -- a >> move that alarms privacy groups. >> >> "The proposal to use thinly disguised intelligence agency >> money to fund CALEA confirms what we have suspected all >> along: the National Security Agency is a silent partner >> in the government's campaign to make our entire >> telecommunications system, including the Net, wiretap >> ready," says Barry Steinhardt, associate director of the >> American Civil Liberties Union." >> >> Source: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34164,00.html > >Thanks Ed! > > > > IETF: please help get this all out of the dark as soon > as possible by OPEN STANDARDS!!! > > =THINK=!!! > >+++chefren > > > > >--__--__-- > >_______________________________________________ >raven mailing list >raven@ietf.org >http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven > > >End of raven Digest > Angelfire for your free web-based e-mail. http://www.angelfire.com _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 8 19:27:13 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13943 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 19:27:12 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA02453; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 19:17:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA02423 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 19:17:18 -0500 (EST) Received: from bommel.progressive-systems.com (216-132-55-12.velocityhsi.com [216.132.55.12]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13905 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 19:18:48 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ge@localhost) by bommel.progressive-systems.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id RAA04626; Tue, 8 Feb 2000 17:18:31 -0700 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 17:18:31 -0700 From: "Ge' Weijers" To: Carter Bullard Cc: "'raven@ietf.org'" Subject: Re: [Raven] DNS query capture Message-ID: <20000208171831.B4522@progressive-systems.com> References: <7D0C2EAEF250D3119BD10008C791823C114D17@ZBL6C008> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <7D0C2EAEF250D3119BD10008C791823C114D17@ZBL6C008>; from cbullard@nortelnetworks.com on Tue, Feb 08, 2000 at 09:29:42AM -0800 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Tue, Feb 08, 2000 at 09:29:42AM -0800, Carter Bullard wrote: > Is the DNS protocol IP network control plane information? I'd see DNS as an automated 411 service. The network does not need the DNS information to 'complete the call', an IP number will do nicely. Even e-mail will work without. A simple router does not need more than the destination address to forward a packet (it should update the hop count, and use the source address for error messages). I'd say that anything in a packet that can be encrypted without loss of functionality of the network is not control plane information. This includes TCP port numbers. > Is the DNS a public service? Define 'public'. My employer's DNS server is privately owned, and I assume that the ownership of the data lies with the employer too. The service is accessible to the public, but so is a web server. > Does the requestor have any claim to ownership of the response? As much claim as he or she has to the contents of a web page being viewed. Ge' -- - Ge' Weijers Voice: (614)326 4600 Progressive Systems, Inc. FAX: (614)326 4601 2000 West Henderson Rd. Suite 400, Columbus OH 43220 _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 10 13:41:25 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id NAA07270 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:41:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA03237; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:11:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id NAA03210 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:11:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from anchor-post-30.mail.demon.net (anchor-post-30.mail.demon.net [194.217.242.88]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id NAA06279 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:12:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from fipr.demon.co.uk ([212.228.119.220] helo=DIRECTOR) by anchor-post-30.mail.demon.net with smtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Iy4f-000M44-0U for raven@ietf.org; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:12:18 +0000 From: "Caspar Bowden" To: Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:14:33 -0000 Message-ID: <002201bf73f2$af29b810$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.5600 Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_638000/638041.stm Surveillance bill under fire At issue is the burden of proof The UK Government came under fire on Thursday from the internet community after it published a Bill to regulate covert surveillance. The critics say the legislation, if passed, could lead to innocent people being sent to jail simply because they have lost their data encryption codes. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill covers the monitoring and the interception of communications by law enforcement and security agencies. It will, for example, lay down the legal rules that must be followed by the police and security services when they tap someone's phone. It also regulates the authorities' access to the codes that encrypt data sent over the net. Such encryption will increasingly become a routine tool of e-commerce, built into ordinary e-mail and browser software. But the Home Office is deeply concerned that criminals, such as paedophiles, will use encryption to hide their activities. And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who refuse. The government believes it has built sufficient safeguards into the legislation. But Caspar Bowden, from the Foundation for Information Policy Research, said the law as drafted was "impossible" and accused the government of ignoring all the advice and lobbying it had received from the net community over the past year. Net privacy At issue is the burden of proof. Critics of the legislation say someone might go to jail unless they could prove they did not have a requested key - an impossible defence for someone who has lost the software code. "This law could make a criminal out of anyone who uses encryption to protect their privacy on the internet," Mr Bowden said. "The Department of Trade and Industry jettisoned decryption powers from its e-Communications Bill last year because it did not believe that a law which presumes someone guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent was compatible with the Human Rights Act. "But the corpse of a law laid to rest by Trade Secretary Stephen Byers has been stitched up and jolted back into life by Home Secretary Jack Straw." Under the new legislation, the police would have to have "reasonable grounds to believe" someone suspected illegal activity had a key. Previous attempts to draft the legislation had only used the word "appear". Human rights Caspar Bowden acknowledged that the change replaced a subjective test with one requiring some objective evidence. The prosecution would have to show that someone receiving encrypted e-mail has or had a key. However, he said the presumption of guilt remained for those who had genuinely lost or forgotten their keys. "It's clear we are heading for the courts with a human rights test case," Mr Bowden told BBC News Online. "The legislation could be amended, but it's obvious the government is not going to take that course." However, the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, is clearly confident about the legal advice he has received. "The Human Rights Act and rapid change in technology are the twin drivers of the new Bill," he said. "None of the law enforcement activities specified in the Bill is new. Covert surveillance by police and other law enforcement officers is as old as policing itself; so too is the use of informants, agents, and undercover officers. "What is new is that for the first time the use of these techniques will be properly regulated by law, and externally supervised, not least to ensure that law enforcement operations are consistent with the duties imposed on public authorities by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act." _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 10 15:27:21 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA09743 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:27:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA10753; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:13:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA10724 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:13:42 -0500 (EST) Received: from wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net (wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net [192.48.96.19]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA09529 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:15:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from genesis by wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: cust75.tnt4.dial.tor2.ca.uu.net [209.167.195.75]) id QQibvl27507 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 20:15:06 GMT Message-ID: <000f01bf7403$7c1c0c00$d964c8c7@genesis> From: "Richard Payne" To: References: <002201bf73f2$af29b810$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> Subject: Re: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:14:48 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Presumably the right to silence, which still exists in the U.K., overrides the powers supposedly granted to the police by this bill? Richard Payne ----- Original Message ----- From: Caspar Bowden To: Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:14 PM Subject: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" > http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_638000/638041.stm > Surveillance bill under fire > > At issue is the burden of proof > > The UK Government came under fire on Thursday from the internet community > after it published a Bill to regulate covert surveillance. > > The critics say the legislation, if passed, could lead to innocent people > being sent to jail simply because they have lost their data encryption > codes. > > The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill covers the monitoring and the > interception of communications by law enforcement and security agencies. It > will, for example, lay down the legal rules that must be followed by the > police and security services when they tap someone's phone. > > It also regulates the authorities' access to the codes that encrypt data > sent over the net. Such encryption will increasingly become a routine tool > of e-commerce, built into ordinary e-mail and browser software. But the Home > Office is deeply concerned that criminals, such as paedophiles, will use > encryption to hide their activities. > > And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services > should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the > plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who > refuse. > > The government believes it has built sufficient safeguards into the > legislation. But Caspar Bowden, from the Foundation for Information Policy > Research, said the law as drafted was "impossible" and accused the > government of ignoring all the advice and lobbying it had received from the > net community over the past year. > > Net privacy > > At issue is the burden of proof. Critics of the legislation say someone > might go to jail unless they could prove they did not have a requested key - > an impossible defence for someone who has lost the software code. > > "This law could make a criminal out of anyone who uses encryption to protect > their privacy on the internet," Mr Bowden said. > > "The Department of Trade and Industry jettisoned decryption powers from its > e-Communications Bill last year because it did not believe that a law which > presumes someone guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent was > compatible with the Human Rights Act. > > "But the corpse of a law laid to rest by Trade Secretary Stephen Byers has > been stitched up and jolted back into life by Home Secretary Jack Straw." > > Under the new legislation, the police would have to have "reasonable grounds > to believe" someone suspected illegal activity had a key. Previous attempts > to draft the legislation had only used the word "appear". > > Human rights > > Caspar Bowden acknowledged that the change replaced a subjective test with > one requiring some objective evidence. The prosecution would have to show > that someone receiving encrypted e-mail has or had a key. However, he said > the presumption of guilt remained for those who had genuinely lost or > forgotten their keys. > > "It's clear we are heading for the courts with a human rights test case," Mr > Bowden told BBC News Online. "The legislation could be amended, but it's > obvious the government is not going to take that course." > > However, the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, is clearly confident about the > legal advice he has received. > > "The Human Rights Act and rapid change in technology are the twin drivers of > the new Bill," he said. > > "None of the law enforcement activities specified in the Bill is new. Covert > surveillance by police and other law enforcement officers is as old as > policing itself; so too is the use of informants, agents, and undercover > officers. > > "What is new is that for the first time the use of these techniques will be > properly regulated by law, and externally supervised, not least to ensure > that law enforcement operations are consistent with the duties imposed on > public authorities by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human > Rights Act." > > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 10 16:06:52 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA10653 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:06:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA11648; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:51:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA11617 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:51:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from mailgw1a.lmco.com (mailgw1a.lmco.com [192.31.106.7]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id PAA10384 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:53:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from emss02g01.ems.lmco.com (emss02g01.ems.lmco.com [198.7.15.39]) by mailgw1a.lmco.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id NAA31331 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:53:23 -0700 (MST) Received: from CONVERSION-DAEMON by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) id <0FPQ00A01FCL6P@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:53:11 -0700 (MST) Received: from mbox.vs.lmco.com ([138.209.240.12]) by lmco.com (PMDF V5.2-32 #38887) with ESMTP id <0FPQ00593FC6I1@lmco.com> for raven@ietf.org; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:52:55 -0700 (MST) Received: from poseidon (poseidon.vs.lmco.com [138.209.67.9]) by mbox.vs.lmco.com (8.8.5/8.8.8) with SMTP id OAA23665 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 14:56:24 -0600 (CST) Received: from adama.vs.lmco.com by poseidon (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA09829; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 14:57:33 -0600 (CST) Received: by adama.vs.lmco.com (8.7.1) id UAA15946; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 20:54:51 +0000 (GMT) Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 14:54:51 -0600 From: Matthew Saroff Subject: Re: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" In-reply-to: Richard Payne To: raven@ietf.org Reply-to: msaroff@pobox.com Message-id: <10002101454.ZM15944@adama.vs.lmco.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Z-Mail (3.2.0 26oct94 MediaMail) Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT References: <002201bf73f2$af29b810$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> <000f01bf7403$7c1c0c00$d964c8c7@genesis> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On May 20, 20:15, Richard Payne wrote: > Subject: Re: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" > Presumably the right to silence, which still exists in the U.K., overrides > the powers supposedly granted to the police by this bill? I believe that that has changed. Juries are permitted to use someone's silence against them in the UK. -- Matthew Saroff Do not reply directly to this message. Reply to msaroff@pobox.com _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 10 16:52:20 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA11476 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:52:20 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA12693; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:31:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id QAA12664 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:31:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id QAA11104 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 16:32:52 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002102132.QAA11104@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 16625 invoked by uid 0); 10 Feb 2000 21:32:44 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.120.29) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 10 Feb 2000 21:32:44 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 22:32:43 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Priority: normal References: Richard Payne In-reply-to: <10002101454.ZM15944@adama.vs.lmco.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 10 Feb 00, at 14:54, Matthew Saroff wrote: > On May 20, 20:15, Richard Payne wrote: > > Subject: Re: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" > > Presumably the right to silence, which still exists in the U.K., overrides > > the powers supposedly granted to the police by this bill? > I believe that that has changed. Juries are permitted to use someone's > silence against them in the UK. There are more samples, here in The Netherlands one can be imprisoned it the only way to find the truth is by letting a specified person speak. Also tax laws know "reversed proof". Please remark: This is all about information. Lawmakers have had problems with this earlier, now with Internet it comes back. In general: People should always be accountable for what they do and say. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 10 20:08:11 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA13728 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 20:08:10 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA19839; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 19:55:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA19811 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 19:55:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from anchor-post-30.mail.demon.net (anchor-post-30.mail.demon.net [194.217.242.88]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13594 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 19:57:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from fipr.demon.co.uk ([212.228.119.220] helo=DIRECTOR) by anchor-post-30.mail.demon.net with smtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12J4OU-0000wq-0U; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 00:57:10 +0000 From: "Caspar Bowden" To: , "Ukcrypto \(E-mail\)" Subject: RE: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 00:59:31 -0000 Message-ID: <002f01bf742b$41b9e1e0$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.5600 In-Reply-To: <000f01bf7403$7c1c0c00$d964c8c7@genesis> Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > From: raven-admin@ietf.org [mailto:raven-admin@ietf.org]On Behalf Of > Richard Payne ... > Presumably the right to silence, which still exists in the > U.K., overrides > the powers supposedly granted to the police by this bill? It's a nice point. See 49(1). http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/00064--j.htm#4 9 The prosecution must show that the person "has or has had" possession of the key, but if you are claiming it has been lost or forgotten, naturally that is conceded. If you do claim it is lost or forgotten (or inaccessible), you can't just leave it at that, because the burden falls on you to PROVE that in order to establish your defence. If nothing at all is said (that can be used in evidence)...I guess they DO have to show that the person has or has had possession of they key (beyond reasonable doubt). Interesting - that was not so in the July 99 E-Comms Bill. Comments ? -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 11 03:19:16 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id DAA02385 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 03:19:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id DAA08225; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 03:10:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id DAA08197 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 03:10:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from anchor-post-31.mail.demon.net (anchor-post-31.mail.demon.net [194.217.242.89]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id DAA02294 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 03:12:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from fipr.demon.co.uk ([212.228.119.220] helo=DIRECTOR) by anchor-post-31.mail.demon.net with smtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12JBBV-000FYD-0V for raven@ietf.org; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:12:14 +0000 From: "Caspar Bowden" To: Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 08:14:38 -0000 Message-ID: <004301bf7468$0aee6680$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.5600 Importance: Normal Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: [Raven] FT 11/2/2000: "BIG BROTHER: Government unveils e-mail surveillance law" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q34646a.htm Financial Times, Friday February 11 2000 BIG BROTHER: Government unveils e-mail surveillance law By Jean Eaglesham, Legal Correspondent The government will face an "inevitable" human rights challenge to a new law unveiled yesterday allowing officials to bug and tap e-mails and mobile phones, civil liberties campaigners said. Industry also expressed concern about the potential cost of the law, which will force internet service providers to have the technical capacity to intercept communications. Ministers insisted the regulation of investigatory powers bill was not a "snoopers charter", despite its extremely wide ambit. The law covers surveillance, bugging and tapping by all state bodies, including tax and social security inspectors, police and security services. Jack Straw, the home secretary, insisted none of the powers in the bill were new. "Covert surveillance by police and other law enforcement officers is as old as policing itself," Mr Straw said. "What is new is that for the first time the use of these techniques will be properly regulated by law". The bill is intended to update rules on surveillance to cope with modern technology including mobile phones, e-mail, pagers and the internet. It is also meant to provide a legal shield for existing techniques that have been ruled to breach the European Convention on Human Rights. The government aims to push the bill through Parliament before the Human Rights Act, incorporating the convention into UK law, takes effect in October. But controversial powers in the bill to decode encrypted e-mails will lay the government open to "inevitable" human rights challenges, according to the Foundation for Information Policy Research, an internet thinktank. The bill will allow people to be imprisoned for up to two years and fined for refusing to either provide a decryption key or a plain text version of the intercepted message. Caspar Bowden, director of the FIPR, said Britain had become "the only country in the world to publish a law which could imprison users of encryption technology for forgetting or losing their keys". Civil liberties campaigners also expressed concern that the new law will allow agencies such as the police to sign their own warrants for covert surveillance. Industry criticism centred on the cost of the new measures. The government said it has not yet decided whether the taxpayer should pick up the bill - it will consult on this issue later this year. Nick Landsman, secretary general of the Internet Service Providers Association, said he was pleased the government was open to consultation but companies did not see why they should pay for crime enforcement measures. _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 11 04:00:30 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id EAA02735 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 04:00:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id DAA09601; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 03:44:45 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id DAA09573 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 03:44:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from mgw-x2.nokia.com (mgw-x2.nokia.com [131.228.20.22]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id DAA02655 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 03:46:11 -0500 (EST) From: janne.haikonen@nokia.com Received: from mgw-i1.ntc.nokia.com (mgw-i1.ntc.nokia.com [131.228.118.60]) by mgw-x2.nokia.com (8.9.3/8.9.3/o) with ESMTP id KAA28486; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:46:10 +0200 (EET) Received: from esebh02nok.ntc.nokia.com (esebh02nok.ntc.nokia.com [131.228.118.151]) by mgw-i1.ntc.nokia.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA11073; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:46:08 +0200 (EET) Received: by esebh02nok with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.10) id ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:46:06 +0200 Message-ID: <6D1A8E7871B9D211B3B00008C7490AA501A82054@treis03nok> To: raven@ietf.org, ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: RE: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:46:03 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.10) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > The prosecution must show that the person "has or has had" > possession of the key, but if you are claiming it has been > lost or forgotten, naturally that is conceded. If you do > claim it is lost or forgotten (or inaccessible), you > can't just leave it at that, because the burden falls on you > to PROVE that in order to establish your defence. - Have they though about how exactly can one prove that he/she has forgotten/lost some security token (e.g. password/phrase/key)? "Give us your passphrase." "Sorry, but I don't remember it." "Prove that!" "Err... you see.. err... I've just forgotten it.." > If nothing at all is said (that can be used in evidence)...I > guess they DO have to show that the person has or has had > possession of they key (beyond reasonable doubt). Interesting - > that was not so in the July 99 E-Comms Bill. - That one is interesting too. If the LE can't decrypt your data (i.e. they have no access to the key/knowledge of it), how can they prove that the key ever existed in the first place. You can always claim that the file/communication was just garbage, and when they ask e.g. about some magic cookies or crypto signalling IEs that were present in your file/communication you can always act stupid and claim that you have no knowledge of what you computer/terminal does behind your back... Eh? Just my few cents, Janne Haikonen _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 11 11:26:05 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA13233 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 11:26:05 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA20801; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:58:18 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA20768 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:57:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from typhoon.mail.pipex.net (typhoon.mail.pipex.net [158.43.128.27]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id KAA12402 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 10:59:22 -0500 (EST) Received: (qmail 20822 invoked from network); 11 Feb 2000 15:59:12 -0000 Received: from userai63.uk.uudial.com (HELO GK-VAIO) (62.188.133.93) by smtp.dial.pipex.com with SMTP; 11 Feb 2000 15:59:12 -0000 Message-Id: <4.2.2.20000211130915.00ab1f00@pop.dial.pipex.com> X-Sender: maiw03@pop.dial.pipex.com (Unverified) X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.2 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 13:11:26 +0000 To: "Caspar Bowden" From: Graham Klyne Subject: Re: [Raven] FT 11/2/2000: "BIG BROTHER: Government unveils e-mail surveillance law" Cc: In-Reply-To: <004301bf7468$0aee6680$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 08:14 AM 2/11/00 +0000, Caspar Bowden wrote: >Jack Straw, the home secretary, insisted none of the powers in the bill were >new. "Covert surveillance by police and other law enforcement officers is as >old as policing itself," Mr Straw said. "What is new is that for the first >time the use of these techniques will be properly regulated by law". Humph! The way I see it, for the first time the *targets* of such use will be "properly regulated by law" :-( #g ------------ Graham Klyne (GK@ACM.ORG) _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 11 20:56:09 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA29060 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:56:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA06334; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:41:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA06306 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:41:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com (sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com [171.68.224.215]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA28784 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:43:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from rhino (rhino.cisco.com [172.20.9.57]) by sj-mailhub-3.cisco.com (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA15550; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 18:02:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from p7020-img-nt (fred-hm-dhcp1.cisco.com [171.69.128.116]) by rhino (SMI-8.6/CISCO.WS.1.1) with SMTP id RAA26831; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:47:04 -0800 Message-Id: <4.1.20000211173802.04868c20@flipper.cisco.com> X-Sender: fred@flipper.cisco.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.1 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:40:22 -0800 To: janne.haikonen@nokia.com From: Fred Baker Subject: RE: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Cc: raven@ietf.org, ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk In-Reply-To: <6D1A8E7871B9D211B3B00008C7490AA501A82054@treis03nok> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 10:46 AM 2/11/00 +0200, janne.haikonen@nokia.com wrote: >You can always >claim that the file/communication was just garbage, and when they >ask e.g. about some magic cookies or crypto signalling IEs that were >present in your file/communication you can always act stupid and >claim that you have no knowledge of what you computer/terminal >does behind your back... I think that would last about 9 milliseconds in the presence of a competent lawyer. Let's see, you're paying how much every month for the privilege of sending someone else something neither you nor they know or can use the contens of? Why are you doing that? Doesn't doing so constitute some form of denial of service attack which may itself be punishable? _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 11 20:58:58 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA29118 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:58:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA06286; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:40:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA06255 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:40:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from kickme.cisco.com (kickme.cisco.com [198.92.30.42]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA28776 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:42:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from rhino (rhino.cisco.com [172.20.9.57]) by kickme.cisco.com (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA11248; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:32:34 -0800 (PST) Received: from p7020-img-nt (fred-hm-dhcp1.cisco.com [171.69.128.116]) by rhino (SMI-8.6/CISCO.WS.1.1) with SMTP id RAA26829; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:47:03 -0800 Message-Id: <4.1.20000211173214.0486c760@flipper.cisco.com> X-Sender: fred@flipper.cisco.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.1 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:36:00 -0800 To: "Caspar Bowden" From: Fred Baker Subject: Re: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Cc: In-Reply-To: <002201bf73f2$af29b810$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 03:14 PM 2/10/00 +0000, Caspar Bowden wrote: >And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services >should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the >plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who >refuse. You might point out RFC 1984 to them. >"What is new is that for the first time the use of these techniques will be >properly regulated by law, and externally supervised, not least to ensure >that law enforcement operations are consistent with the duties imposed on >public authorities by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human >Rights Act." This is an important point... _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Fri Feb 11 21:05:31 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA29288 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 21:05:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA06614; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:57:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id UAA06586 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:56:59 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA29099 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:58:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA17778 for ; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:57:37 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000211205446.009a6c00@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:58:04 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: Re: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" In-Reply-To: <4.1.20000211173214.0486c760@flipper.cisco.com> References: <002201bf73f2$af29b810$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > >"What is new is that for the first time the use of these techniques will be > >properly regulated by law, and externally supervised, not least to ensure > >that law enforcement operations are consistent with the duties imposed on > >public authorities by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human > >Rights Act." > >This is an important point... What is the nature and extent of the officers and arrest powers of the European Convention on Human Rights, and what is their warrant, search and seizure authority in law enforcement agencies in the UK? If the answer is "none", then why is this an interesting point? -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Sun Feb 13 12:41:46 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA12118 for ; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 12:41:45 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA19016; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 12:33:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA18985 for ; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 12:33:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from anchor-post-34.mail.demon.net (anchor-post-34.mail.demon.net [194.217.242.92]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA12104 for ; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 12:35:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from fipr.demon.co.uk ([212.228.119.220] helo=DIRECTOR) by anchor-post-34.mail.demon.net with smtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12K2va-000Htn-0Y for raven@ietf.org; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 17:35:22 +0000 From: "Caspar Bowden" To: Subject: RE: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 17:37:16 -0000 Message-ID: <000501bf7648$f9e572b0$0100a8c0@DIRECTOR> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000211205446.009a6c00@fast.synernet.com> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.5600 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Jack Straw (UK Home Secretary) said: > >"What is new is that for the first time the use of these techniques will be > >properly regulated by law, and externally supervised, not least to ensure > >that law enforcement operations are consistent with the duties imposed on > >public authorities by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human > >Rights Act." Fred Baker said: >This is an important point... Ed Stone said: > What is the nature and extent of the officers and arrest > powers of the European Convention on Human Rights, and what is their > warrant, search and seizure authority in law enforcement agencies in the UK? If > the answer is "none", then why is this an interesting point? I realize there is no reason why the Raven list should know the background to recent UK encryption/interception policy. In case it helps (and before we've finished a full analysis of the RIP bill - watch FIPR site), here is an article which will appear this week in "IT Review" (sent to every British MP and their researchers), which gives the FIPR view in more detail - it went to press before publication of RIP, but I haven't seen anything yet to cause me to revise... -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 Information Technology Review, Spring 2000 "RIP it up" =========== Caspar Bowden says that measures contained in the governments Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill could wreck confidence in UK e-commerce Have you ever lost or forgotten the PIN number of your bank card? Suppose that the police had the power to demand it - how could you convince them that you really do not have it? Would it be fair to be imprisoned if you could not prove that you did not have it? A PIN is an example of a key which protects access to computer data. Cryptography - the science of codes and ciphers - is routinely used to keep credit-card numbers safe in transit to a website, or encrypt confidential e-mails so only the intended receiver can read them. Encryption is a basic tool for keeping messages and data secure. But the need for e-commerce security on the internet has forced radical changes to a Cold War-era policy. After two years of controversy the Electronic Communications Bill finally arrived in parliament without key-escrow - the mandatory requirement to deposit spare keys to all stored or transmitted data with an officially authorised third party. It appears that Whitehall had finally heeded warnings that unilateral controls would drive e-business offshore. But the new regulation of investigatory powers bill may contain a booby-trap that could still wreck confidence in British e-commerce. The Home Office says that merely failing to decrypt data on demand should not only be a criminal offence, but would carry a presumption of guilt that the key was being wilfully withheld, with obvious dangers that innocent persons could be framed or intimidated. The defence must somehow prove they do not have a key. How can this be done? Nobody has suggested a convincing solution. A key may be irreplaceably lost or forgotten, so there is no analogy of existing laws that require production of a DNA sample or a driving licence. Even a person not suspected of any crime could go to jail for two years if they could not decrypt data required. Even more chilling, a discretionary gagging order could prevent their complaining publicly with a penalty of five years imprisonment. But surely an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty? Last year, the Foundation for Information Policy Research published the detailed legal opinion of two experts on the European Convention on Human Rights. They said the proposed decryption powers would have the inevitable consequence of compromising the affected individuals whole security and privacy apparatus and were likely to contravene Article 8 of the convention on respect for privacy. The opinion also found a likely violation of Article 6, on the right to a fair trial. The indications are that the Home Office will disregard this advice and overwhelming opposition from the industry. Moreover, after taking two years to abandon its key-escrow policy, the government says it must now legislate hastily, without further consultation, to comply with the Human Rights Act's entry into force in October. This richly ironic excuse is itself questionable - police methods of covert investigation should already be in compliance today, otherwise a prosecution case could fail in a trial occurring after October. The RIP bill will also require ISPs to install costly tapping equipment, but it will be impossible for them to unscramble messages encrypted by their customers. Law-enforcement will have to resort to sophisticated bugging and burgling operations (under warrant), to covertly capture keys. The Home Secretary personally scrutinises an average of seven tapping warrants each day, but it is judges or the police who issue search warrants, and bugging is self-authorised by senior police officers. Senior judges appointed as Commissioners make spot checks on the bugging and tapping paperwork, but have no technical staff to query information. Subjects of surveillance are not informed after an investigation, and consequently few complaints out of thousands of warrants have ever been investigated and none upheld. This may be because the law considers surveillance to be properly authorised, even if based on erroneous intelligence, provided the information was believed correct at the time. The efficacy of current safeguards is already dubious, but can they possibly suffice for the bewildering complexity and entirely new dangers of Internet surveillance? Powerful data-mining techniques will be used to analyse data intercepts automatically, and flag suspicious associations in traffic logs that record the activity of the innocent and guilty alike. The solution is to replace the Byzantine oversight and patchwork authorisation of bugging, tapping and secret searches with a rigorous and consistent system of judicial warrants. But the Home Office says it has run out of time - time that they themselves have squandered. It looks as though the statutory framework for the next fifteen years will have been cobbled together from unco-ordinated plans drafted in ignorance of the technology. With the effective dismantling of US export controls, Windows 2000 will ship with unfettered strong encryption and tens of thousands of ordinary computer users and professional IT managers will begin to use encryption. It cannot be long before the first test case challenges decryption powers under the Human Rights Act. ======= _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 14 06:59:29 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA03711 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 06:59:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA16765; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 06:53:23 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA16738 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 06:53:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from msw.mimesweeper.com (msw.mimesweeper.com [194.168.90.18]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA03647 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 06:54:55 -0500 (EST) Received: from bell.mimesweeper.com (unverified) by msw.mimesweeper.com (Content Technologies SMTPRS 4.1.5) with ESMTP id for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:56:51 +0000 Received: from GK-VAIO (gk-vaio.mimesweeper.com [194.168.90.137]) by bell.mimesweeper.com with SMTP (Microsoft Exchange Internet Mail Service Version 5.5.2448.0) id DKP3H5GD; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:56:18 -0000 Message-Id: <4.2.2.20000214112426.00aaff00@pop.dial.pipex.com> X-Sender: xex41@pop.dial.pipex.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.2 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:28:13 +0000 To: raven@ietf.org From: Graham Klyne Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Subject: [Raven] Of DDOS and Raven? Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org From ACM technews: http://www.acm.org/technews/articles/2000-2/0211f.html#item1 The recent spate of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks seems to have given the LEAs another bone to chew... >The FBI says law enforcement has trouble keeping up with cybercrime, and >is pushing for greater freedom to place wiretaps on phone and computer >networks in order to track down hackers more easily. #g ------------ Graham Klyne (GK@ACM.ORG) _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 14 07:49:56 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA05987 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:49:56 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA17852; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:39:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA17822 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:39:12 -0500 (EST) Received: from marvin.axion.bt.co.uk (marvin.axion.bt.co.uk [132.146.16.82]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA05452 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:40:43 -0500 (EST) From: phil.m.clarke@bt.com Received: from cbtlipnt01.btlabs.bt.co.uk by marvin (local) with ESMTP; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:44:26 +0000 Received: by cbtlipnt01.btlabs.bt.co.uk with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1VRKAKXK>; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:45:38 -0000 Message-ID: <5104D4DBC598D211B5FE0000F8FE7EB20476FA19@mbtlipnt02.btlabs.bt.co.uk> To: raven@ietf.org Subject: RE: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:45:39 -0000 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org > Presumably the right to silence, which still exists in the U.K., overrides the powers supposedly granted to the police by this bill? the right to silence is still there, but since the Criminal Justice Act (1994, and strongly opposed at the time) the police caution now goes: "You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in Court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence." The stock reply is usually "I have nothing to say until I have consulted my solicitor" and to ask the officer to record this reply. This gives you a reasonable counter-argument when, in court, something like "the defendant did not tell this to the investigating police but relies on it now, & in doing so has hampered invesigations" is used to imply motives for your silence. (disclaimer: this is not legal advice) Phil _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 14 09:44:06 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA12698 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:44:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA20278; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:26:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA20251 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:26:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from bommel.progressive-systems.com (216-132-55-12.velocityhsi.com [216.132.55.12]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA11755 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:27:46 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ge@localhost) by bommel.progressive-systems.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id HAA27832; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:27:42 -0700 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 07:27:41 -0700 From: "Ge' Weijers" To: chefren Cc: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] BBC Online 10/2/2000: "Surveillance bill under fire" Message-ID: <20000214072741.A27764@progressive-systems.com> References: <10002101454.ZM15944@adama.vs.lmco.com> <200002102132.QAA11104@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <200002102132.QAA11104@ietf.org>; from chefren@pi.net on Thu, Feb 10, 2000 at 10:32:43PM +0100 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Thu, Feb 10, 2000 at 10:32:43PM +0100, chefren wrote: > There are more samples, here in The Netherlands one can be > imprisoned it the only way to find the truth is by letting > a specified person speak. This does not apply to the suspect. The UK proposed laws however create a Catch-22 situation for the suspect: if you don't want to incriminate yourself by revealing the key you go to jail for not revealing your key. > Also tax laws know "reversed proof". It's kind of obvious that if you claim a deduction you need to show a receipt on request. And the law does not speak of "proof", the standard is set lower, you only have to show that your claims are reasonable and likely to be correct ("aannemelijk maken"). Ge' _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 14 19:01:24 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA26944 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 19:01:24 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA04310; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 18:14:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA04278 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 18:14:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id SAA26201 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 18:15:56 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002142315.SAA26201@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 30192 invoked from network); 14 Feb 2000 23:15:39 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.100) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 14 Feb 2000 23:15:39 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 00:15:37 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Comment at the end... = = This NEWS.COM (http://www.news.com/) story has been sent to you from chefren@pi.net German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks By Stephen Shankland February 14, 2000, 12:35 p.m. PT http://home.cnet.com/category/0-1005-200-1549399.html The federal investigation into last week's attacks on major Web sites has reportedly turned to at least one anonymous programmer believed to have written software that may have been used in the assaults. A programmer known only as "Mixter," who says he resides in Germany, has not been publicly accused in any of the cases and denies any responsibility for the "distributed denial of service" (DDoS) attacks. Mixter is part of a small group of underground programmers who say they create assault technologies that can be used in testing to improve Internet security. The recent attacks have renewed controversy over this practice, raising questions about whether these programs increase the potential for misuse when they are posted publicly online. In an interview Wednesday with CNET News.com at the height of last week's shutdowns, Mixter explained his actions and philosophy on technological security. CNET News.com: Were you in fact the author of the attack tools? (Several versions of the attack tools exist, including Tribe Flood Network, its sequel TFN2K, Trinoo and Stacheldraht.) Mixter: I am in fact the author of the programs called TFN and TFN2K, but not of Trinoo. The original Trinoo was made some months earlier than the first TFN, but unlike TFN, (it's) not distributed publicly...Stacheldraht isn't written by me. There have been many false rumors about this. There is another German hacker who goes by the name "Randomizer" who wrote that one. Why did you write the software? I first heard about Trinoo in July '99, and I considered it as interesting from a technical perspective, but also as potentially powerful in a negative way. I knew some facts of how Trinoo worked, and since I didn't manage to get Trinoo sources or binaries at that time, I wrote my own server- client network that was capable of performing denial of service; later that month I published a working version of TFN on a handful of security sites to make the information public and generate awareness of the issue. The original Trinoo and other distributed tools existed since 1998. Were you involved directly or indirectly in any of the recent high-profile attacks on Yahoo, eBay, CNN, Buy.com or Amazon? No. The fact that I authored these tools does in no way mean that I condone their active use. I must admit I was quite shocked to hear about the latest attacks. It seems that the attackers are pretty clueless people who misuse powerful resources and tools for generally harmful and senseless activities just "because they can." What is your real name? I really prefer not to give you my real name. On the one hand it is a sad fact that many, many people have a bad opinion of anyone involved with "this strange hacking stuff" and that they make no difference between pointing out security weaknesses and exploiting them, and on the other hand, I'm using my handle, Mixter, because I do believe in privacy, and I simply want to keep my privacy on the Net, like many other nonmalicious people who care about security do. What is your occupation? I finished school approximately half a year ago, and I have been getting some offers from security companies since then. However, due to personal issues I haven't yet been able to start an employment, but I will probably be going to work in the area of source code security auditing, where I will have a great potential of improving both my knowledge and network software. How difficult is it to write the distributed denial of service attack tools? Not very difficult. The main concept is simply the client-server concept present in almost all Internet applications. Packet flooding and similar attacks are publicly known and available and can easily be implemented. When it comes to implementing stealth features, it might get a bit trickier. But factually, DDoS tools just make an old concept easier. Before DDoS, an attacker would just have to log on to every compromised machine, (then start) a flooding tool from each machine against the target. How difficult is it to take over a sufficient number of computers to mount a distributed denial of service attack large enough to take down Yahoo? Unfortunately, it is quite easy. It is safe to assume that all of the flood servers are installed on hosts compromised through vulnerabilities that are publicly known, rather old, and can easily be patched. Most attackers use automated...scripts to do long-range scans for known vulnerabilities. This procedure can take some time, but the concept is really easy. They also do this from compromised and specially modified machines to be sure that their origin cannot be traced back. How many computers would you estimate were used in the Yahoo attack? The amount they need depends. It isn't only the number, it is the bandwidth of each of these. From what I've heard from security mailing lists, attackers have already compromised Internet2 and other high-speed machines. Given that TFN2K uses master and slave computers and encrypted communications channels, how diffi cult is it to find out who originally sent the order to attack? Remote detection is practically impossible unless the attack goes on for a timed amount of days . In that case, if all backbone providers would cooperate and monitor their routers, the origin of some of the "slave" servers could be tracked. That was a point I wanted to prove. Since the other existing DDoS tools weren't totally anonymous and untraceable, I saw the possibil ity that security people would waste their time trying to find ways to track the attacker, while th e DDoS tools would sooner or later become sophisticated enough to make this impossible. There is st ill the chance of finding attackers if they aren't extremely careful and leave traces on the compro mised hosts or manipulate and damage things on the compromised hosts enough so that the administrat or detects them locally. Do you know if TFN or Trinoo were used in the Yahoo, eBay, Amazon, CNN or Buy.com attacks, or wa s it other software? I'm pretty sure a tool derived from TFN and/or Trinoo was used. Currently, many people seem to be modifying those tools, or developing new, similar ones, and keeping them private. This is becaus e when a program is publicly known, people have a chance of identifying it locally when it is installed on their server by searching for binary patterns, as the FBI (National Infrastructure Protection Center) proved. This is basically the Trojan/virus problem, where antivirus vendors continuously bring out updated scanners, and virus authors continuously bring out new or modified viruses. Anything else you'd like to say? I'd like to remind people that the real problem is the insecurity of the huge amount of servers, and not the people that are exploiting it. If security companies and governments are starting a "hunt" against the people they call "hackers," they might succeed in tracking and persecuting some of them, but the real problem remains: Everyone who can manage to learn a handful of Unix commands and to set up a tool can commence DDoS attacks, as long as the overall Internet security is as bad as it is now. I found it really disturbing and scary when I read that President Clinton is intending to dedicate $240 million for the sole purpose of wiretapping and domestic surveillance. In my opinion, no amount of denial of service attacks or computer intrusions could ever cause a comparable amount of money to be lost in the future. Additionally, such methods and laws can easily be circumvented by malicious people using compromised systems to relay through a number of encrypted channels and are therefore affecting everyone except the people they are intended against. ------------------------------------------------------- (Pretty clueless ideas regarding a society as far as I see it. It's simply not acceptable for a lawful society that vandalists can produce damage worth of millons of dollars without much chance of getting cought.) It might well be that just tapping personal or business communication won't be enough to stop digital vandalism in the near future and police needs a sight at the traffic like they can look at numberplates of cars in a city... Oops! The net really starts growing up with both pain and joy... +++chefren p.s. I still think Raven might mark the point in time IETF lost the guidance of Internet standards. I don't expect IPv6 to take off as we know it (maybe via UTMS with absolute(!) addresses), I expect a 5-10 year "standards" vacuum without a lot of new things and after that some form of government by UN/ETSI or even a new UN guided agency. _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 08:52:55 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA00787 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:52:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA03587; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 07:52:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA03555 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 07:52:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id HAA26146 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 07:54:15 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002151254.HAA26146@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 27068 invoked from network); 15 Feb 2000 12:54:13 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.120.53) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 15 Feb 2000 12:54:13 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 13:54:10 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: [Raven] http://www.cnn.com/ Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Main issue today at http://www.cnn.com/ President to announce creation of national cyber security center President Bill Clinton on Tuesday will endorse the creation of a national cyber security center where Internet and e-commerce companies can work together to cope with hacker attacks, administration officials said. "These denial of service attacks obviously are very disturbing," Clinton said during an online interview with CNN.com. "And I think there is a way that we can clearly promote security." _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 09:15:37 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA02744 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 09:15:37 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA04421; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:21:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA04396 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:21:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA28253 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:23:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA00471 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:21:59 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000215080415.0097ebc0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:23:19 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: Re: [Raven] http://www.cnn.com/ In-Reply-To: <200002151254.HAA26146@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Mr. Baker has written: "The subject of the list remains discussing what the IETF should or should not be doing about wiretap. In context, I would like to believe that is mostly has to do with getting the current draft statement right, and pointing out anything else that is important and might be missed. I note that Chris Savage has been trying to do exactly that; I can't say that much of the rest of this mail over the past week seems related to that. The fact that you have decided that the work is done is not an invitation to useless and pointless chatter." At 07:54 AM 2/15/2000 , chefren wrote: >Main issue today at http://www.cnn.com/ > > > President to announce creation of national cyber security > center > > President Bill Clinton on Tuesday will endorse the > creation of a national cyber security center where > Internet and e-commerce companies can work together to > cope with hacker attacks, administration officials said. > > "These denial of service attacks obviously are very > disturbing," Clinton said during an online interview with > CNN.com. "And I think there is a way that we can clearly > promote security." -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 10:42:03 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA09989 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:42:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA07222; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 09:49:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA07195 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 09:49:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net (wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net [192.48.96.19]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA05783 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 09:51:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from genesis by wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: cust18.tnt2.dial.tor2.uunet.ca [209.47.187.18]) id QQicnb03221 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 14:51:03 GMT Message-ID: <000501bf77c4$0a612fe0$d964c8c7@genesis> From: "Richard Payne" To: References: <200002142315.SAA26201@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 09:50:44 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit ch*fr*n wrote: > > (Pretty clueless ideas regarding a society as far as I see > it. It's simply not acceptable for a lawful society that > vandalists can produce damage worth of millons of dollars > without much chance of getting cought.) > > > It might well be that just tapping personal or business > communication won't be enough to stop digital vandalism in > the near future and police needs a sight at the traffic > like they can look at numberplates of cars in a city... > Using distributed denial of service as yet another rationale for tapping makes very little sense. The number of zombies involved makes it likely that the originators of the attacks will eventually be caught. As pointed out by mixter in the interview, the underlying problem is lax security on the zombies. The end result will be better security as people become aware of the potential problems. ch*fr*n also wrote: > > p.s. I still think Raven might mark the point in time IETF > lost the guidance of Internet standards. I don't expect > IPv6 to take off as we know it (maybe via UTMS with > absolute(!) addresses), I expect a 5-10 year "standards" > vacuum without a lot of new things and after that some form > of government by UN/ETSI or even a new UN guided agency. > The UN running the Internet? Saints preserve us in creosote! Richard Payne _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 10:51:50 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA10729 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:51:50 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA07703; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:01:19 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA07678 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:01:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from bommel.progressive-systems.com (216-132-55-12.velocityhsi.com [216.132.55.12]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA07053 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:02:50 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ge@localhost) by bommel.progressive-systems.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id IAA30437; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:02:42 -0700 Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:02:42 -0700 From: "Ge' Weijers" To: chefren Cc: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks [OFFTOPIC] Message-ID: <20000215080242.A30347@progressive-systems.com> References: <200002142315.SAA26201@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <200002142315.SAA26201@ietf.org>; from chefren@pi.net on Tue, Feb 15, 2000 at 12:15:37AM +0100 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Tue, Feb 15, 2000 at 12:15:37AM +0100, chefren wrote: > p.s. I still think Raven might mark the point in time IETF > lost the guidance of Internet standards. I don't expect > IPv6 to take off as we know it (maybe via UTMS with > absolute(!) addresses), I expect a 5-10 year "standards" > vacuum without a lot of new things and after that some form > of government by UN/ETSI or even a new UN guided agency. This was already tried, in the ITU (nee CCITT). Intergovernemental agencies produce insane standards like X.25 and SS7. OSI is only used in textbooks. There's nothing significant coming out of the ITU anymore, SS7 was their crowning achievement of bloat and multilayered complexity. It still amazes me dialtone is as reliable as it is. Most of the new stuff is not developed in the ITU anymore (ATM etc). X.500 never got off the ground because of its own weight, X.400 e-mail is almost dead as well. The IETF has serves us well, its processes are far more effective than those of ITU or ETSI, all because of its informal, loose-knit structure. And because of its informal nature it is not the right forum to handle the politically hot potato of wiretaps. Back to our scheduled program of rants and rave[n]s. Ge' -- - Ge' Weijers Voice: (614)326 4600 Progressive Systems, Inc. FAX: (614)326 4601 2000 West Henderson Rd. Suite 400, Columbus OH 43220 _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 11:02:21 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA11320 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 11:02:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA08014; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:11:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA07985 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:11:01 -0500 (EST) Received: from bommel.progressive-systems.com (216-132-55-12.velocityhsi.com [216.132.55.12]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA07798 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:12:34 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ge@localhost) by bommel.progressive-systems.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id IAA30458; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:12:33 -0700 Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 08:12:33 -0700 From: "Ge' Weijers" To: Richard Payne Cc: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks Message-ID: <20000215081233.B30347@progressive-systems.com> References: <200002142315.SAA26201@ietf.org> <000501bf77c4$0a612fe0$d964c8c7@genesis> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 1.0i In-Reply-To: <000501bf77c4$0a612fe0$d964c8c7@genesis>; from rcp@gfpx.com on Tue, Feb 15, 2000 at 09:50:44AM -0500 Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Tue, Feb 15, 2000 at 09:50:44AM -0500, Richard Payne wrote: > The UN running the Internet? Saints preserve us in creosote! Of course it should be the UN. It's the highest authority, and authorities are always right. Ge' _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 11:10:54 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA11655 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 11:10:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA08302; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:20:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA08275 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:20:06 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA08478 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:21:39 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <101A8TTZ>; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:26:43 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "'Ge' Weijers'" , "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Subject: RE: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks [OF FTOPIC] Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:26:42 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org >-----Original Message----- >From: Ge' Weijers [mailto:ge@progressive-systems.com] >Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 10:03 AM >To: chefren >Cc: raven@ietf.org >Subject: Re: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks >[OFFTOPIC] >It still amazes me dialtone is as reliable as it is. A former employee of a particular large carrier in the US has told me that the informal motto of that firm is: "[Company] -- Where dialtone is an adventure, every day!" Chris S. *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 11:44:15 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id LAA13146 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 11:44:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA09243; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:53:24 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id KAA09215 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:53:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from fn3.freenet.tlh.fl.us ([199.44.37.210]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA10885 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 10:54:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from localhost (ponder@localhost) by fn3.freenet.tlh.fl.us (8.8.8/8.6.9) with SMTP id LAA28903 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 11:14:59 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 11:14:58 -0500 (EST) From: "P.J. Ponder" To: raven@ietf.org Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Subject: [Raven] Internet Draft comments Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org In the interest of nudging the list back toward the actual draft of the wiretapping document, I think the document as originally posted is concise and addresses the major points that are the subject of the questions raised. There were some comments about the definition of 'wire-tapping', and some other more or less substantive comments in the rest of the draft. These comments may deserve further discussion. Overall, though, I think the draft is more than adequate as it stands to set forth a reasoned and articulate policy statement for the IETF, the IAB, and the IESG regarding wiretapping. I don't see any glaring errors or 'show-stoppers' in the draft, and I am willing to argue that we have reached that state of grace once described as 'rough consensus'. We could debate grammatical niceties and diction, but in terms of substance, I think we have a policy statement that makes sense and cleary states a position. _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 13:31:30 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id NAA17549 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 13:31:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA12535; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 12:35:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA12502 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 12:35:50 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA15655 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 12:37:24 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <101A8T9C>; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 12:42:49 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "'P.J. Ponder'" , "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" Subject: RE: [Raven] Internet Draft comments Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 12:42:48 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org >-----Original Message----- >From: P.J. Ponder [mailto:ponder@freenet.tlh.fl.us] >Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 11:15 AM >To: raven@ietf.org >Subject: [Raven] Internet Draft comments > > >In the interest of nudging the list back toward the actual draft of the >wiretapping document, I think the document as originally >posted is concise >and addresses the major points that are the subject of the questions >raised. > >There were some comments about the definition of >'wire-tapping', and some >other more or less substantive comments in the rest of the >draft. These >comments may deserve further discussion. > >Overall, though, I think the draft is more than adequate as it >stands to >set forth a reasoned and articulate policy statement for the IETF, the >IAB, and the IESG regarding wiretapping. I don't see any >glaring errors >or 'show-stoppers' in the draft, and I am willing to argue that we have >reached that state of grace once described as 'rough consensus'. > >We could debate grammatical niceties and diction, but in terms of >substance, I think we have a policy statement that makes sense >and cleary >states a position. As the (AFAIK) only proponent of a significant number of word changes, let me say that I agree. As I said earlier, the point of my proposed changes was to clarify the draft's evident intent, not to make actual, substantive changes. The only possible exception was that, having defined "wiretapping" for purposes of the document to relate to communications on the 'net, an example that asserted that certain telco practices would "be" wiretapping seemed inconsistent; that discussion received, I think, my heaviest suggested editorial pen. But even that was intended to clarify and tighten up the discussion, not to change its basic thrust in any way. Time to declare victory and go home? Chris S. *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 20:33:28 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA00037 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 20:33:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA22945; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 19:43:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA22918 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 19:43:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id TAA29194 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 19:44:56 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002160044.TAA29194@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 25250 invoked from network); 16 Feb 2000 00:44:45 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.164) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 16 Feb 2000 00:44:45 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2000 01:44:43 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks [OFFTOPIC] Priority: normal In-reply-to: <20000215080242.A30347@progressive-systems.com> References: <200002142315.SAA26201@ietf.org>; from chefren@pi.net on Tue, Feb 15, 2000 at 12:15:37AM +0100 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 15 Feb 00, at 8:02, Ge' Weijers wrote: > On Tue, Feb 15, 2000 at 12:15:37AM +0100, chefren wrote: .. > This was already tried, in the ITU (nee CCITT). Intergovernemental > agencies produce insane standards like X.25 and SS7. OSI is only > used in textbooks. > > There's nothing significant coming out of the ITU anymore, SS7 was > their crowning achievement of bloat and multilayered complexity. It > still amazes me dialtone is as reliable as it is. Most of the new > stuff is not developed in the ITU anymore (ATM etc). X.500 never got > off the ground because of its own weight, X.400 e-mail is almost dead > as well. I agree. > The IETF has serves us well, its processes are far more effective than > those of ITU or ETSI, all because of its informal, loose-knit > structure. "Serves" or "served", that's the question. The demands of the world are not heard or understood here. Techie problem? > And because of its informal nature it is not the right > forum to handle the politically hot potato of wiretaps. To get further the IETF has it's weaknesses. Social responsibility is clearly one of them. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 15 20:33:41 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id UAA00049 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 20:33:41 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA23147; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 19:52:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA23120 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 19:52:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id TAA29342 for ; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 19:54:05 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002160054.TAA29342@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 28633 invoked from network); 16 Feb 2000 00:53:58 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.164) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 16 Feb 2000 00:53:58 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2000 01:53:54 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks Priority: normal In-reply-to: <000501bf77c4$0a612fe0$d964c8c7@genesis> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 15 Feb 00, at 9:50, Richard Payne wrote: > ch*fr*n wrote: > > > > > (Pretty clueless ideas regarding a society as far as I see > > it. It's simply not acceptable for a lawful society that > > vandalists can produce damage worth of millons of dollars > > without much chance of getting cought.) > > > > > > It might well be that just tapping personal or business > > communication won't be enough to stop digital vandalism in > > the near future and police needs a sight at the traffic > > like they can look at numberplates of cars in a city... > > > > Using distributed denial of service as yet another rationale for tapping > makes very little sense. Rationale for more control. Tapping is just one aspect, this goes somewhat beyond. > The number of zombies involved makes it likely that > the originators of the attacks will eventually be caught. As pointed out by > mixter in the interview, the underlying problem is lax security on the > zombies. The end result will be better security as people become aware of > the potential problems. Security against lot's of request to a server? .. > > p.s. I still think Raven might mark the point in time IETF > > lost the guidance of Internet standards. I don't expect > > IPv6 to take off as we know it (maybe via UTMS with > > absolute(!) addresses), I expect a 5-10 year "standards" > > vacuum without a lot of new things and after that some form > > of government by UN/ETSI or even a new UN guided agency. > > > > The UN running the Internet? Saints preserve us in creosote! Might be... UN isn't ideal... Who/what do you expect to "police/rule the world" in 10/25/50/100 years? Some form of world wide government and policing will definitely appear af far as I see it and why wouldn't it be able to push new standards? +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 16 10:03:34 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA00683 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 10:03:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA21492; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:25:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA21463 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:25:15 -0500 (EST) Received: from dokka.maxware.no (dokka.maxware.no [195.139.236.69]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA29038 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:26:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from alden (alden.maxware.no [10.128.1.246]) by dokka.maxware.no (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA09825; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 15:25:38 +0100 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000216152627.0278bba0@dokka.maxware.no> X-Sender: hta@dokka.maxware.no X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2000 15:27:56 +0100 To: Chris Savage , "'P.J. Ponder'" , "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand Subject: RE: [Raven] Internet Draft comments In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 12:42 15.02.00 -0500, Chris Savage wrote: > >-----Original Message----- > >From: P.J. Ponder [mailto:ponder@freenet.tlh.fl.us] > >Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 11:15 AM > >To: raven@ietf.org > >Subject: [Raven] Internet Draft comments > > > > > >In the interest of nudging the list back toward the actual draft of the > >wiretapping document, I think the document as originally > >posted is concise > >and addresses the major points that are the subject of the questions > >raised. > > > >There were some comments about the definition of > >'wire-tapping', and some > >other more or less substantive comments in the rest of the > >draft. These > >comments may deserve further discussion. > > > >Overall, though, I think the draft is more than adequate as it > >stands to > >set forth a reasoned and articulate policy statement for the IETF, the > >IAB, and the IESG regarding wiretapping. I don't see any > >glaring errors > >or 'show-stoppers' in the draft, and I am willing to argue that we have > >reached that state of grace once described as 'rough consensus'. > > > >We could debate grammatical niceties and diction, but in terms of > >substance, I think we have a policy statement that makes sense > >and cleary > >states a position. > >As the (AFAIK) only proponent of a significant number of word changes, let >me say that I agree. > >As I said earlier, the point of my proposed changes was to clarify the >draft's evident intent, not to make actual, substantive changes. The only >possible exception was that, having defined "wiretapping" for purposes of >the document to relate to communications on the 'net, an example that >asserted that certain telco practices would "be" wiretapping seemed >inconsistent; that discussion received, I think, my heaviest suggested >editorial pen. But even that was intended to clarify and tighten up the >discussion, not to change its basic thrust in any way. > >Time to declare victory and go home? I'd hope so. I know the editors have your input in their queue; a new draft will probably be forthcoming reasonably soon, with the intent of shipping it to the IESG for processing and RFC publication (possibly with an IETF-wide Last Call). After that, we should be done. Harald -- Harald Tveit Alvestrand, EDB Maxware, Norway Harald.Alvestrand@edb.maxware.no _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 16 10:05:33 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA00756 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 10:05:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA20984; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:04:47 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA20959 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:04:45 -0500 (EST) Received: from wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net (wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net [192.48.96.19]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA28036 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:06:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from genesis by wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: cust100.tnt2.dial.tor2.uunet.ca [209.47.187.100]) id QQicqq14957 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 14:05:59 GMT Message-ID: <000b01bf7886$e97b83c0$d964c8c7@genesis> From: "Richard Payne" To: References: Subject: Re: [Raven] Internet Draft comments Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:05:40 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I have nothing to add to Chris' comments, which I believe improved the draft quite noticeably. Richard Payne ----- Original Message ----- From: Chris Savage To: 'P.J. Ponder' ; IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail) Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 12:42 PM Subject: RE: [Raven] Internet Draft comments > >-----Original Message----- > >From: P.J. Ponder [mailto:ponder@freenet.tlh.fl.us] > >Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 11:15 AM > >To: raven@ietf.org > >Subject: [Raven] Internet Draft comments > > > > > >In the interest of nudging the list back toward the actual draft of the > >wiretapping document, I think the document as originally > >posted is concise > >and addresses the major points that are the subject of the questions > >raised. > > > >There were some comments about the definition of > >'wire-tapping', and some > >other more or less substantive comments in the rest of the > >draft. These > >comments may deserve further discussion. > > > >Overall, though, I think the draft is more than adequate as it > >stands to > >set forth a reasoned and articulate policy statement for the IETF, the > >IAB, and the IESG regarding wiretapping. I don't see any > >glaring errors > >or 'show-stoppers' in the draft, and I am willing to argue that we have > >reached that state of grace once described as 'rough consensus'. > > > >We could debate grammatical niceties and diction, but in terms of > >substance, I think we have a policy statement that makes sense > >and cleary > >states a position. > > As the (AFAIK) only proponent of a significant number of word changes, let > me say that I agree. > > As I said earlier, the point of my proposed changes was to clarify the > draft's evident intent, not to make actual, substantive changes. The only > possible exception was that, having defined "wiretapping" for purposes of > the document to relate to communications on the 'net, an example that > asserted that certain telco practices would "be" wiretapping seemed > inconsistent; that discussion received, I think, my heaviest suggested > editorial pen. But even that was intended to clarify and tighten up the > discussion, not to change its basic thrust in any way. > > Time to declare victory and go home? > > Chris S. > > > *************************************************************************** > This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or > privileged information. If you believe that you have received the > message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission > and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. > *************************************************************************** > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 16 10:23:10 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id KAA01714 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 10:23:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA22308; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:56:18 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA22280 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:56:16 -0500 (EST) Received: from fast.synernet.com (IDENT:root@fast.synernet.net [166.82.6.2] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA00337 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:57:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from computername (a793c.vnet.net [166.82.194.182]) by fast.synernet.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA07170 for ; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:55:36 -0500 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000216094658.009993b0@fast.synernet.com> X-Sender: estone@fast.synernet.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2000 09:57:02 -0500 To: raven@ietf.org From: Ed Stone Subject: RE: [Raven] Internet Draft comments In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000216152627.0278bba0@dokka.maxware.no> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org The draft is a good general document, in my view, but it should be judged in light of how it will be applied. For example, if evaluated as a limited technical document expressing a general policy, I think it serves that purpose adequately. If evaluated as a clear, complete and unambiguous statement that plugs all loopholes that government lawyers may want to find in it by way of pointing to industry and user support for some kind of intrusion, experience teaches us that any crevice will be so exploited. If the draft needs only to serve the former purpose, I think it is sufficient, with one modification: the wiretapping definition should include intercepts whether they are targeted or untargeted, whether processed in realtime or stored for potential subsequent processing. If the draft is exploited by a government entity to declare industry and user acceptance of some further intrusion, it has ample crevices to accomodate that, unintended as that usage might be by the overwhelming consensus expressed at the meeting and in this list. I assume we should judge the draft by the former criteria, and protest loudly if the latter exploitation comes forth. At 09:27 AM 2/16/2000 , you wrote: >At 12:42 15.02.00 -0500, Chris Savage wrote: >> >-----Original Message----- >> >From: P.J. Ponder [mailto:ponder@freenet.tlh.fl.us] >> >Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2000 11:15 AM >> >To: raven@ietf.org >> >Subject: [Raven] Internet Draft comments >> > >> > >> >In the interest of nudging the list back toward the actual draft of the >> >wiretapping document, I think the document as originally >> >posted is concise >> >and addresses the major points that are the subject of the questions >> >raised. >> > >> >There were some comments about the definition of >> >'wire-tapping', and some >> >other more or less substantive comments in the rest of the >> >draft. These >> >comments may deserve further discussion. >> > >> >Overall, though, I think the draft is more than adequate as it >> >stands to >> >set forth a reasoned and articulate policy statement for the IETF, the >> >IAB, and the IESG regarding wiretapping. I don't see any >> >glaring errors >> >or 'show-stoppers' in the draft, and I am willing to argue that we have >> >reached that state of grace once described as 'rough consensus'. >> > >> >We could debate grammatical niceties and diction, but in terms of >> >substance, I think we have a policy statement that makes sense >> >and cleary >> >states a position. >> >>As the (AFAIK) only proponent of a significant number of word changes, let >>me say that I agree. >> >>As I said earlier, the point of my proposed changes was to clarify the >>draft's evident intent, not to make actual, substantive changes. The only >>possible exception was that, having defined "wiretapping" for purposes of >>the document to relate to communications on the 'net, an example that >>asserted that certain telco practices would "be" wiretapping seemed >>inconsistent; that discussion received, I think, my heaviest suggested >>editorial pen. But even that was intended to clarify and tighten up the >>discussion, not to change its basic thrust in any way. >> >>Time to declare victory and go home? > >I'd hope so. >I know the editors have your input in their queue; a new draft will >probably be forthcoming reasonably soon, with the intent of shipping it to >the IESG for processing and RFC publication (possibly with an IETF-wide >Last Call). > >After that, we should be done. > > Harald > >-- >Harald Tveit Alvestrand, EDB Maxware, Norway >Harald.Alvestrand@edb.maxware.no > > >_______________________________________________ >raven mailing list >raven@ietf.org >http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven -- -------------------------- Ed Stone estone@synernet.com -------------------------- _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Sun Feb 20 19:20:44 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13897 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 19:20:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA19000; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 19:13:04 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA18943 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 19:12:48 -0500 (EST) Received: from dokka.maxware.no (dokka.maxware.no [195.139.236.69]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13875 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 19:14:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from alden ([10.128.167.143]) by dokka.maxware.no (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA21883; Mon, 21 Feb 2000 01:14:23 +0100 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000221011536.034b0aa0@dokka.maxware.no> X-Sender: hta@dokka.maxware.no X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 01:18:10 +0100 To: "chefren" , raven@ietf.org From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand Subject: Re: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks [OFFTOPIC] In-Reply-To: <200002160044.TAA29194@ietf.org> References: <20000215080242.A30347@progressive-systems.com> <200002142315.SAA26201@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 01:44 16.02.00 +0100, chefren wrote: > > The IETF has serves us well, its processes are far more effective than > > those of ITU or ETSI, all because of its informal, loose-knit > > structure. > >"Serves" or "served", that's the question. The demands of >the world are not heard or understood here. Techie problem? The demands of Chefren and the FBI are heard, but not accepted here, I would say, while the demands of the ACLU, the EFF, and that US senator are both heard and accepted. The world is not of one voice. Harald -- Harald Tveit Alvestrand, EDB Maxware, Norway Harald.Alvestrand@edb.maxware.no _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Sun Feb 20 19:26:32 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13924 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 19:26:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA19022; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 19:13:05 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id TAA18955 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 19:12:58 -0500 (EST) Received: from dokka.maxware.no (dokka.maxware.no [195.139.236.69]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id TAA13878 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 19:14:38 -0500 (EST) Received: from alden ([10.128.167.143]) by dokka.maxware.no (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA21880; Mon, 21 Feb 2000 01:14:21 +0100 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000221010724.0349c1f0@dokka.maxware.no> X-Sender: hta@dokka.maxware.no X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 01:13:05 +0100 To: Ed Stone , raven@ietf.org From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand Subject: RE: [Raven] Internet Draft comments In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000216094658.009993b0@fast.synernet.com> References: <4.2.0.58.20000216152627.0278bba0@dokka.maxware.no> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 09:57 16.02.00 -0500, Ed Stone wrote: >The draft is a good general document, in my view, but it should be judged >in light of how it will be applied. For example, if evaluated as a limited >technical document expressing a general policy, I think it serves that >purpose adequately. If evaluated as a clear, complete and unambiguous >statement that plugs all loopholes that government lawyers may want to >find in it by way of pointing to industry and user support for some kind >of intrusion, experience teaches us that any crevice will be so exploited. Anyone who thinks you can get a loophole-free document that is also understandable either has not worked much with standards or laws, or worked too long with them. I think the former interpretation is the only sensible one. >If the draft needs only to serve the former purpose, I think it is >sufficient, with one modification: the wiretapping definition should >include intercepts whether they are targeted or untargeted, whether >processed in realtime or stored for potential subsequent processing. I don't believe we can do that without declaring traffic statistics as wiretaps. Or spending an extremely long time arguing about the borderline cases. Harald Harald -- Harald Tveit Alvestrand, EDB Maxware, Norway Harald.Alvestrand@edb.maxware.no _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Sun Feb 20 21:35:14 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA14666 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 21:35:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id VAA23359; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 21:18:52 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id VAA23332 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 21:18:51 -0500 (EST) Received: from pcans1.pca.net (msaroff@pcans1.pca.net [207.136.42.18]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id VAA14556 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 21:20:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from localhost (msaroff@localhost) by pcans1.pca.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA01817 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 20:21:45 -0600 Date: Sun, 20 Feb 2000 20:21:45 -0600 (CST) From: "Matthew G. Saroff" Reply-To: pobox cc: raven@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Raven] German programmer "Mixter" addresses cyberattacks [OFFTOPIC] In-Reply-To: <4.2.0.58.20000221011536.034b0aa0@dokka.maxware.no> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org On Mon, 21 Feb 2000, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote: > The demands of Chefren and the FBI are heard, but not accepted here, I > would say, while the demands of the ACLU, the EFF, and that US senator are > both heard and accepted. I believe that you are referring to Representative Bob Barr. He is a member of the House of Representatives, not a senator. -- Matthew Saroff | Standard Disclaimer: Not only do I speak for _____ | No one else, I don't even Speak for me. All my / o o \ | personalities and the spirits that I channel ______|_____|_____| disavow all knowledge of my activities. ;-) uuu U uuu | | In fact, all my personalities and channeled spirits Saroff wuz here | hate my guts. (Well, maybe with garlic & butter...) For law enforcement officials monitoring the net: abortion, marijuana, cocaine, CIA, plutonium, ammonium nitrate, militia, DEA, NSA, PGP, hacker, assassinate. Hackers Ascend Upper 'Echelon' FBI CIA NSA IRS ATF BATF DOD Send suggestions for new and interesting words to: msaroff@123456.pobox.com (remove the numbers to reply) Check http://www.pobox.com/~msaroff, including The Bad Hair Web Page _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 21 16:03:12 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id QAA16557 for ; Mon, 21 Feb 2000 16:03:12 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA28276; Mon, 21 Feb 2000 15:55:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id PAA28248 for ; Mon, 21 Feb 2000 15:55:21 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpe.casema.net (smtpe.casema.net [195.96.96.172]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id PAA16399 for ; Mon, 21 Feb 2000 15:56:57 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002212056.PAA16399@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 28719 invoked from network); 21 Feb 2000 20:56:01 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.121.59) by smtpe.casema.net with SMTP; 21 Feb 2000 20:56:01 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 21:56:00 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Priority: normal In-reply-to: <4.2.0.58.20000221011536.034b0aa0@dokka.maxware.no> References: <200002160044.TAA29194@ietf.org> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.11) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: [Raven] Re: The world is not of one voice. Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT On 21 Feb 00, at 1:18, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote: > At 01:44 16.02.00 +0100, chefren wrote: > > > > The IETF has serves us well, its processes are far more effective than > > > those of ITU or ETSI, all because of its informal, loose-knit > > > structure. > > > >"Serves" or "served", that's the question. The demands of > >the world are not heard or understood here. Techie problem? > > The demands of Chefren and the FBI are heard, but not accepted here, I > would say, while the demands of the ACLU, the EFF, and that US senator are > both heard and accepted. > > The world is not of one voice. However, we do have to live =together= and it doesn't seem the IETF understands what's necessary for that. Unfortunately IETF seems so "weldfremd" that it has only hardened old messages instead of looking for alternatives and keep more or less in touch with the rest of the world. IETF could =at least= advise something like "make a law that forbids the use of wrong return addresses in IP packets. Or do an open proposal to the router industry to filter all packets with wrong return addresses out. The proposed no-saying is useless. With or without nice wording. +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 22 07:44:50 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA09374 for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 07:44:50 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA27431; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 07:38:09 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA27398 for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 07:38:07 -0500 (EST) Received: from dokka.maxware.no (dokka.maxware.no [195.139.236.69]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id HAA09287 for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 07:39:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from alden (alden.maxware.no [10.128.1.246]) by dokka.maxware.no (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA04981; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 13:39:28 +0100 Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.20000222131904.01c42d40@dokka.maxware.no> X-Sender: hta@dokka.maxware.no X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58 Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2000 13:23:14 +0100 To: "chefren" , raven@ietf.org From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand Subject: Re: [Raven] Re: The world is not of one voice. In-Reply-To: <200002212056.PAA16399@ietf.org> References: <4.2.0.58.20000221011536.034b0aa0@dokka.maxware.no> <200002160044.TAA29194@ietf.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org At 21:56 21.02.00 +0100, chefren wrote: >IETF could =at least= advise something like "make a law >that forbids the use of wrong return addresses in IP >packets. Or do an open proposal to the router industry to >filter all packets with wrong return addresses out. RFC 2267, you mean? This was recently raised to Best Current Practice status - announced Feb 15. >The proposed no-saying is useless. With or without nice >wording. Useless for progressing wiretapping standards, yes. Harald -- Harald Tveit Alvestrand, EDB Maxware, Norway Harald.Alvestrand@edb.maxware.no _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Tue Feb 22 13:06:22 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id NAA17147 for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 13:06:22 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA06524; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 12:41:40 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id MAA06496 for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 12:41:39 -0500 (EST) Received: from episteme-software.com (resnick1.qualcomm.com [63.250.90.98]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id MAA16437 for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 12:43:13 -0500 (EST) Received: from resnick2.qualcomm.com (63.250.90.99) by episteme-software.com with ESMTP (Eudora Internet Mail Server 3.0b7) for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 11:42:29 -0600 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: resnick (Unverified) Message-Id: X-Mailer: Eudora [Macintosh version 4.3a?] Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2000 11:42:27 -0600 To: raven@ietf.org From: Pete Resnick Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" Subject: [Raven] One small objection to -01 draft Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org This may seem like a trivial objection to some folks, but I think it is significant because of its placement: >Abstract > >The IETF has been asked to take a position on the inclusion into >IETF standards-track documents of functionality designed to >facilitate wiretapping. > >This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its >answer is "no", and what that answer means. I really think this needs to be changed. The first sentence states no question, let alone one to which the answer could be "no". By triangulation in the rest of the document, you might be able to figure out that the question might be "Should the IETF consider requirements for wiretapping as part of the process for creating and maintaining IETF standards?" (see first sentence of section 1). However, my fear is that people will read the first sentence, assume the question is "Should there ever be wiretapping on the Internet?" and think that the *IETF* answer to that question is "no". Whatever my personal position on the latter question is, it is certainly not a question to which this document gives (or should give) a definitive answer. Might I suggest that the second sentence in the abstract be changed to: "This memo explains why the IETF has decided not to consider requirements for wiretapping as part of the process for creating and maintaining IETF standards." pr -- Pete Resnick Eudora Engineering - QUALCOMM Incorporated _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Wed Feb 23 18:35:36 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id SAA05002 for ; Wed, 23 Feb 2000 18:35:36 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA04834; Wed, 23 Feb 2000 18:18:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id SAA04805 for ; Wed, 23 Feb 2000 18:18:13 -0500 (EST) Received: from bga.com (mail5.realtime.net [205.238.128.241]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id SAA04715 for ; Wed, 23 Feb 2000 18:19:53 -0500 (EST) Received: from isdn5-53.ip.realtime.net ([205.238.160.53]) by bga.com ; Wed, 23 Feb 2000 17:19:53 -0600 From: mikus@bga.com (Mikus Grinbergs) Newsgroups: list.ietf To: raven@ietf.org Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2000 17:04:01 -0600 Organization: Gone Walkabout Message-ID: Lines: 26 Subject: [Raven] CALEA & Electronic Surveillance of packet networks (fwd) Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org The nanog mailing list (to which I do not subscribe) carries an announcement of ballotting by TIA and Committee T1 on the second revision of J-STD-025, which is described as the only "safe harbor" standard that currently exists for CALEA. The ballot deadline is March 6: > >Theoretically (depending on FCC decisions, outcomes of court cases, etc.), >this standard would define how you would provide the information required >by a warrant to a LEA (e.g., FBI). The deadline for when this must be >deployed is in September, 2001. > > T1 LB 838, Draft Proposed ANSI Trial-Use/Interim > Standard - Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance > - J-STD-025 Revision A (Joint TIA/T1 draft proposal) > > >To obtain a copy of lb838.pdf go to: > >WWW: http://www.t1.org/index/10001.htm >FTP: ftp://ftp.t1.org/pub/ballots/current/lb838.pdf > >TIA maintains a web page for information on CALEA at: >http://www.tiaonline.org/government/CALEA/ _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Thu Feb 24 06:27:30 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA25858 for ; Thu, 24 Feb 2000 06:27:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA01230; Thu, 24 Feb 2000 06:22:04 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id GAA01201 for ; Thu, 24 Feb 2000 06:22:03 -0500 (EST) Received: from crbexch.crblaw.com (webaccess.crblaw.com [216.88.51.71]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id GAA25635 for ; Thu, 24 Feb 2000 06:23:47 -0500 (EST) Received: by webaccess.crblaw.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id ; Thu, 24 Feb 2000 06:30:08 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Savage To: "'mikus@bga.com '" , "'raven@ietf.org '" Subject: RE: [Raven] CALEA & Electronic Surveillance of packet networks (f wd) Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2000 06:30:06 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org -----Original Message----- From: mikus@bga.com To: raven@ietf.org Sent: 2/23/00 6:04 PM Subject: [Raven] CALEA & Electronic Surveillance of packet networks (fwd) >The nanog mailing list (to which I do not subscribe) carries an >announcement of ballotting by TIA and Committee T1 on the second >revision of J-STD-025, which is described as the only "safe harbor" >standard that currently exists for CALEA. TIA is slightly in error, I think. The J-STD, as amended by the FCC in some orders from 8/99, is the only safe harbor that has been approved by the FCC. A CALEA "safe harbor" exists, however (at least as I read the law) as soon as it has been made publicly available by the relevant standards body/industry group that developed it. I know that CableLabs (the research arm of the US cable industry) has generated one for voice communications over cable systems. I think that the PCIA (a wireless communications trade association) has also generated one for paging services. There may be others as well. Chris S. *************************************************************************** This electronic mail transmission may contain confidential or privileged information. If you believe that you have received the message in error, please notify the sender by reply transmission and delete the message without copying or disclosing it. *************************************************************************** _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 28 08:06:45 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id IAA06303 for ; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 08:06:45 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA27139; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 07:59:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id HAA27113 for ; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 07:59:44 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpf.casema.net (smtpf.casema.net [195.96.96.173]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with SMTP id IAA06183 for ; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 08:01:31 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200002281301.IAA06183@ietf.org> Received: (qmail 20250 invoked by uid 0); 28 Feb 2000 13:01:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO system) (195.96.120.190) by smtpf.casema.net with SMTP; 28 Feb 2000 13:01:24 -0000 From: "chefren" To: raven@ietf.org Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 14:01:23 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: [Raven] Links from Europe Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT I have asked the European Union some questions long time ago, regarding implementation of "Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications" http://europa.eu.int/eur- lex/en/lif/dat/1996/en_496Y1104_01.html They pointed me at the information below: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/l00000.htm "UNION POLICIES" with "NEW TECHNOLOGIES - INFORMATION SOCIETY" that leads to: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/l21000.htm with "NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING MEASURES" that leads to: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/m21000.htm Unfortunately as far as I see it without a clue to http://europa.eu.int/eur- lex/en/lif/dat/1996/en_496Y1104_01.html "496Y1104(01) Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications" Questions can be asked directly: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/information_society/index_en.h tm I did so... +++chefren _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven From raven-admin@ietf.org Mon Feb 28 09:13:26 2000 Received: from optimus.ietf.org (ietf.org [132.151.1.19] (may be forged)) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA09059 for ; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:13:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from optimus.ietf.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA29067; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:07:28 -0500 (EST) Received: from ietf.org (odin [132.151.1.176]) by optimus.ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id JAA29042 for ; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:07:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net (wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net [192.48.96.19]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id JAA08961 for ; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:09:14 -0500 (EST) Received: from genesis by wodc7mr3.ffx.ops.us.uu.net with SMTP (peer crosschecked as: cust187.tnt1.dial.tor2.uunet.ca [209.47.186.187]) id QQieiy18626 for ; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 14:09:14 GMT Message-ID: <001f01bf81f5$5f577140$d964c8c7@genesis> From: "Richard Payne" To: References: <200002281301.IAA06183@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [Raven] Links from Europe Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:09:03 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: raven-admin@ietf.org Errors-To: raven-admin@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-Id: Raven Discussion List X-BeenThere: raven@ietf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit This one seems a little closer to what you're looking for, but it's not very detailed. http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33084.htm Richard Payne ----- Original Message ----- From: chefren To: Sent: Monday, February 28, 2000 8:01 AM Subject: [Raven] Links from Europe > > I have asked the European Union some questions long time > ago, regarding implementation of "Council Resolution of 17 > January 1995 on the lawful interception of > telecommunications" > > http://europa.eu.int/eur- > lex/en/lif/dat/1996/en_496Y1104_01.html > > > > > They pointed me at the information below: > > > http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/l00000.htm > > "UNION POLICIES" > > with > > "NEW TECHNOLOGIES - INFORMATION SOCIETY" > > that leads to: > > http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/l21000.htm > > with > > "NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING MEASURES" > > that leads to: > > http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/m21000.htm > > > Unfortunately as far as I see it without a clue to > > http://europa.eu.int/eur- > lex/en/lif/dat/1996/en_496Y1104_01.html > > "496Y1104(01) Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the > lawful interception of telecommunications" > > > Questions can be asked directly: > > http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/information_society/index_en.h > tm > > > > I did so... > > +++chefren > > > _______________________________________________ > raven mailing list > raven@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven _______________________________________________ raven mailing list raven@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven