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From: Black_David@emc.com
To: lars.eggert@netlab.nec.de
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2006 17:11:41 -0400 
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Subject: [rddp] FW: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-rddp-mpa-03.txt 
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Lars,

> I'm starting to look at the rddp and ips drafts. I'm a bit confused  
> about draft-ietf-rddp-mpa. The ID repository has:
>
>	Feb 11  2005 draft-ietf-rddp-mpa-02.pdf*
>	Feb 11  2005 draft-ietf-rddp-mpa-02.txt*
>	Oct  3 17:23 draft-ietf-rddp-mpa-03.pdf*
>
> i.e., there is an -03 PDF with no TXT version. Did something fall  
> through the cracks here?

Maybe.  See below for the original announcement.  I'm guessing that
the secretariat expired the .txt without expiring the PDF.  Since the draft
is in AD Evaluation state, expiration should not have happened.  The
original draft announcement notice for -03 did contain a .txt in addition
to a .pdf .  Could you ask the Secretariat to go find the text version
ASAP, please.

Thanks,
--David
----------------------------------------------------
David L. Black, Senior Technologist
EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
----------------------------------------------------

-----Original Message-----
From: i-d-announce-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:i-d-announce-bounces@ietf.org]
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Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-rddp-mpa-03.txt 

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Remote Direct Data Placement Working Group
of the IETF.

	Title		: Marker PDU Aligned Framing for TCP Specification
	Author(s)	: P. Culley, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-rddp-mpa-03.txt,.pdf
	Pages		: 74
	Date		: 2005-10-3
	
MPA (Marker Protocol data unit Aligned framing) is designed to work
   as an "adaptation layer" between TCP and the Direct Data Placement
   [DDP] protocol, preserving the reliable, in-order delivery of TCP,
   while adding the preservation of higher-level protocol record
   boundaries that DDP requires. MPA is fully compliant with applicable
   TCP RFCs and can be utilized with existing TCP implementations. MPA
   also supports integrated implementations that combine TCP, MPA and
   DDP to reduce buffering requirements in the implementation and
   improve performance at the system level.

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We would like to invite interested parties on this list to submit papers
to the third workshop on RDMA: Applications, Implementations, and
Technologies (RAIT 2006). See below for the detailed call for papers.

Hemal and Jim (RAIT 2006 Workshop co-chairs)

------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

Third Workshop on Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA): Applications,
Implementations, and Technologies (RAIT 2006)

To be held on Sept 28th, 2006, in Barcelona, Spain
in conjunction with the Cluster 2006 conference.

Barcelona, Spain.

=20


------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------

Call for papers=20
Paper submission=20
Important dates=20
Organizers and program committee=20

------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------

=20

Call for papers

=20

Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) enables transfer of data across a
network directly to and from application buffers without requiring any
intermediate copies or buffers. RDMA, along with direct access to the
networking hardware, also provides a low overhead mechanism for
achieving low latency, high-bandwidth communication. RDMA has become a
desirable feature in high-speed clusters and data-center networks.=20

=20

Scope

The RAIT 2006 workshop is the third time that the RAIT workshop has been
held. RAIT 2006 is intended to serve as a forum to present the latest
research work by the researchers and developers from both academia and
industry. The workshop focuses on the applications of RDMA, the
implementation aspects of RDMA, and the technologies for RDMA. Topics of
special interest include advanced new features such as TCP offload
engines embedded within RDMA, virtualization technologies for RDMA, and
new techniques to extend RDMA functionality, such as atomics, multicast,
and broadcast operations.  =20

=20

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:

=20

*        RDMA hardware (RDMA-enabled Ethernet adapters, InfiniBand
adapters, or other adapters)

*        RDMA-aware networks and interfaces

*        Middleware and network services for RDMA-based networking

*       Virtualization and RDMA

*       Applications of RDMA (iSCSI/iSER, NFS, DAFS, SDP, databases,
clustering, storage networking, etc.)

*        RDMA Protocols

*        Protocol offload engines (TCP offload engines, RDMA offload
engines, etc.)=20

*       Operating system infrastructure for RDMA

*        RDMA performance evaluation (application performance,
performance metrics, network performance, etc.)

*        RDMA and security

*        Future directions for RDMA    =20

=20


------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------

=20

Paper Submission

=20

We invite submissions of technical papers, position papers, and case
studies relevant to the workshop. Submission implies the willingness of
at least one of the authors to present the paper and register.
Submission should include on the front page the authors' name,
affiliations, addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers.

=20

Please submit a full paper not exceeding 8 single-spaced pages in PDF or
Postscript form, page-numbered, in 10-point font or larger, and suitable
for printing on 8.5"x11" paper with at least 1 inch margin all around.
Please submit the full paper for consideration to this workshop to Hemal
Shah (hemal@broadcom.com) and James Pinkerton (jpink@microsoft.com) by
email. =20

=20


------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------

=20

Important dates


Deadline for submission                          May 31, 2006


Notification of acceptance                      June 19, 2006

Camera ready papers                             July 10, 2006

Workshop date                                      September 28, 2006

=20


------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------

=20

Organizers

Program Co-chair: Hemal V. Shah, Broadcom Corporation

Program Co-chair: James Pinkerton, Microsoft Corporation

=20

Program Committee

Jeff Chase, Duke University

Uri Elzur, Broadcom Corporation

Dirk Grunwald, University of Colorado, Boulder

Mike Ko, IBM Research

Michael Krause, Hewlett-Packard Company

Kai Li, Princeton University

Dhabaleswar Panda, Ohio State University

Fabrizio Petrini, Los Alamos National Laboratory


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From rddp-bounces@ietf.org Wed Apr 05 16:49:06 2006
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Subject: [rddp] Last Call: 'DDP/RDMAP Security' to Proposed Standard 
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The IESG has received a request from the Remote Direct Data Placement WG to 
consider the following documents:

- 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
   <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
- 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data 
   Placement (DDP) '
   <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2006-04-19.

The file can be obtained via
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt


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Hi,

I was asked to review draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt.  Enclosed
below are my comments.

-derek

----

Section 2.2.4  Protection Domain (PD)

It says:

                                Protection 
   Domains are assigned to two of the resources of concern, Stream 
   Context Memory and STags associated with Page Translation Table 
   entries and data buffers. 

This is confusing.  What are the "two resources of concern"?  I
don't know how to parse the rest of this sentence into two objects,
in my reading I see three:

  1) Stream Context Memory
  2) STags associated with Page Translation Table entires
  3) data buffers

I suspect some simple punctuation marks could help here.

----

Section 2.3.2  Non-Privileged Data Interface Semantics 

It says:

         . Three RDMAP data transfer mechanisms are 
   defined, one using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages), 
   and one using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA 
   Writes).

Maybe my math is wrong, but I only count two mechanisms here:

  1) using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages)
  2) using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA Writes)

What's the third?

--

A couple paragraphs later it says:

              For data reception, for DDP it can receive Untagged 
   Messages into buffers that have been posted on the Receive Queue 
   or Shared Receive Queue. 

This sentence doesn't parse properly.  I think you need to remove
the second "for" and the following "it", so it reads:

         For data reception, DDP can receive ...

----

Section 2.3.4  Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for Data Transfer  

It says:

   Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation Table 
   (i.e. it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a Data 
   Buffer). In this case threats and mitigations associated with the 
   Page Translation Table are not relevant. 

I don't believe this is true.  I think that the security implications
of STag to Data Buffer mapping is JUST as relevant as having the Page
Translation Table.  The threats are all about an attacker trying to
get data into (or out of) a buffer they are not authorized to access.
The threats are the same regardless of the number of layers of mapping
involved.  Indeed, one would think that the Page Translation Table
makes protecting the Data Buffer EASIER, because you can add columns
to the table to include the Stream, PD, and access right information
directly in the PTT, sort of like the IPsec PAD.

----

Section 5.4.2  TLS is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security 

Part 2 talks about TLS as a connection oriented protocol and
goes on to talk about the problems of buffering and reordering
of packets.  But that's really a red-herring.  It's not TLS
that causes that.  It's TCP!  TCP requires the buffering of
out-of-order packets, because TCP assures in-order streams of
data.  So it's not TLS that causes the problem, but the choice
of using TCP.  TLS doesn't run on top of UDP.   I don't know
if TLS runs on top of SCTP.

So I don't think it's fair to blame TLS for problems that are
really a result of using TCP.

----

Section 6.2.1  Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response 

I really like this section.  This should be emphasized more.

----

6.3.2  Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data 

It says:

   Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale data 
   is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights are 
   granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, 
   for example).  

This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still
remains.  It is still possible for an attacker to read this buffer,
only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.  A better
approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP
that the buffer is available.  E.g., allow even an Non-Privileged ULP
to notify the engine that a buffer is "in process" and not available..
Sort of like marking the buffer (or stag) as "Busy".  That way the
Stream can only make buffers available that have valid data and you
don't get invalid data buffers.

----

Section 8  Security considerations 

Says, in its entirety:

   This entire document is focused on security considerations. 


While this statement is true, it still might be useful to reiterate
the key points of the document.   E.g.:

  - you must validate your inputs
  - dont do this, do do that, ...
  - etc.



Sam Weiler <weiler@tislabs.com> writes:

> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 16:49:04 -0400
> From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
> To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
> Cc: rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: Last Call: 'DDP/RDMAP Security' to Proposed Standard
>
> The IESG has received a request from the Remote Direct Data Placement WG to
> consider the following documents:
>
> - 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
> - 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data
>    Placement (DDP) '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC
>
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
> iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2006-04-19.
>
> The file can be obtained via
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
>
>
>
>

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

_______________________________________________
rddp mailing list
rddp@ietf.org
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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
References: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0604070643490.4241@lemon.samweiler.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 17:57:49 -0400
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Hi,

I was asked to review draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt.  Enclosed
below are my comments.

-derek

----

Section 2.2.4  Protection Domain (PD)

It says:

                                Protection 
   Domains are assigned to two of the resources of concern, Stream 
   Context Memory and STags associated with Page Translation Table 
   entries and data buffers. 

This is confusing.  What are the "two resources of concern"?  I
don't know how to parse the rest of this sentence into two objects,
in my reading I see three:

  1) Stream Context Memory
  2) STags associated with Page Translation Table entires
  3) data buffers

I suspect some simple punctuation marks could help here.

----

Section 2.3.2  Non-Privileged Data Interface Semantics 

It says:

         . Three RDMAP data transfer mechanisms are 
   defined, one using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages), 
   and one using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA 
   Writes).

Maybe my math is wrong, but I only count two mechanisms here:

  1) using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages)
  2) using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA Writes)

What's the third?

--

A couple paragraphs later it says:

              For data reception, for DDP it can receive Untagged 
   Messages into buffers that have been posted on the Receive Queue 
   or Shared Receive Queue. 

This sentence doesn't parse properly.  I think you need to remove
the second "for" and the following "it", so it reads:

         For data reception, DDP can receive ...

----

Section 2.3.4  Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for Data Transfer  

It says:

   Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation Table 
   (i.e. it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a Data 
   Buffer). In this case threats and mitigations associfo/rddp

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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
References: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0604070643490.4241@lemon.samweiler.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 13:12:47 -0400
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Subject: [rddp] DDP/RDMAP Applicability
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I was asked to review the DDP/RDMAP specifications.  Here are my
comments on draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt

-derek

----

Spelling error in Abstract:

   It comparese and contrasts the different transport options over IP

should be:

   It compares ...

----

Spelling/typographical errors in section 4, Tagged Messages:

   Tagged messages standardizes direct placemtn of data without per-

should be:

   Tagged messages standardizes direct placement of data without per-

--

   DDP provides a standardized\ 'packing list' which can be interpreted

should be:

   DDP provides a standardized 'packing list' which can be interpreted

----

Typo in 6.9.2. RDMA-Conditional Session Establishment:

   In key difference is that with SCTP the determination as to whether

should (probably) be:

   One key difference ...

----
----

Section 6.6 : Data Integrity Implications

CRC32 helps protect against accidental data corruption, but not
intensional data corruption.  An attacker could easily intentionally
corrupt the data and a CRC32 cannot detect that.  I recommend some
stronger wording that an active attacker could easily subvert the
CRC32, or at least additional text that explains that CRC32 only
protects against accidental data corruption and not intensional data
corruption.

----

Section 9 : Security considerations

The discussion of the steering tag doesn't discuss what information is
exposed, or how guessable these tags could be.  What's the implication
of a "peer" guessing at random STags?  Could I get data that I
shouldn't have access to?  Are these STags tied to a particular peer
session, and if so how?

--

There's no discussion of peer authentication.  How do I know who I'm
talking to and how do I authenticate and authorize their RDMA access?

----

Section 9.2 : Tagged Buffer Exposure

This section does not go into enough detail of what can happen if an
attacker can insert random (or worse, non random!) data into arbitrary
buffers.  We've got so many buffer overrun attacks.  Imagine what
could happen if an attacker didn't need to overrun a buffer but could
co-opt the RDMA and insert arbitrary data into buffers directly.

> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 16:49:04 -0400
> From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
> To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
> Cc: rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: Last Call: 'DDP/RDMAP Security' to Proposed Standard
>
> The IESG has received a request from the Remote Direct Data Placement WG to
> consider the following documents:
>
> - 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
> - 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data
>    Placement (DDP) '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC
>
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
> iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2006-04-19.
>
> The file can be obtained via
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
>
>
>
>

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

_______________________________________________
rddp mailing list
rddp@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp





ated with the 
   Page Translation Table are not relevant. 

I don't believe this is true.  I think that the security implications
of STag to Data Buffer mapping is JUST as relevant as having the Page
Translation Table.  The threats are all about an attacker trying to
get data into (or out of) a buffer they are not authorized to access.
The threats are the same regardless of the number of layers of mapping
involved.  Indeed, one would think that the Page Translation Table
makes protecting the Data Buffer EASIER, because you can add columns
to the table to include the Stream, PD, and access right information
directly in the PTT, sort of like the IPsec PAD.

----

Section 5.4.2  TLS is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security 

Part 2 talks about TLS as a connection oriented protocol and
goes on to talk about the problems of buffering and reordering
of packets.  But that's really a red-herring.  It's not TLS
that causes that.  It's TCP!  TCP requires the buffering of
out-of-order packets, because TCP assures in-order streams of
data.  So it's not TLS that causes the problem, but the choice
of using TCP.  TLS doesn't run on top of UDP.   I don't know
if TLS runs on top of SCTP.

So I don't think it's fair to blame TLS for problems that are
really a result of using TCP.

----

Section 6.2.1  Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response 

I really like this section.  This should be emphasized more.

----

6.3.2  Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data 

It says:

   Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale data 
   is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights are 
   granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, 
   for example).  

This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still
remains.  It is still possible for an attacker to read this buffer,
only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.  A better
approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP
that the buffer is available.  E.g., allow even an Non-Privileged ULP
to notify the engine that a buffer is "in process" and not available..
Sort of like marking the buffer (or stag) as "Busy".  That way the
Stream can only make buffers available that have valid data and you
don't get invalid data buffers.

----

Section 8  Security considerations 

Says, in its entirety:

   This entire document is focused on security considerations. 


While this statement is true, it still might be useful to reiterate
the key points of the document.   E.g.:

  - you must validate your inputs
  - dont do this, do do that, ...
  - etc.



Sam Weiler <weiler@tislabs.com> writes:

> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 16:49:04 -0400
> From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
> To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
> Cc: rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: Last Call: 'DDP/RDMAP Security' to Proposed Standard
>
> The IESG has received a request from the Remote Direct Data Placement WG to
> consider the following documents:
>
> - 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
> - 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data
>    Placement (DDP) '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC
>
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
> iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2006-04-19.
>
> The file can be obtained via
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
>
>
>
>

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

_______________________________________________
rddp mailing list
rddp@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp

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To: secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
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Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 13:12:47 -0400
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Subject: [rddp] DDP/RDMAP Applicability
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I was asked to review the DDP/RDMAP specifications.  Here are my
comments on draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt

-derek

----

Spelling error in Abstract:

   It comparese and contrasts the different transport options over IP

should be:

   It compares ...

----

Spelling/typographical errors in section 4, Tagged Messages:

   Tagged messages standardizes direct placemtn of data without per-

should be:

   Tagged messages standardizes direct placement of data without per-

--

   DDP provides a standardized\ 'packing list' which can be interpreted

should be:

   DDP provides a standardized 'packing list' which can be interpreted

----

Typo in 6.9.2. RDMA-Conditional Session Establishment:

   In key difference is that with SCTP the determination as to whether

should (probably) be:

   One key difference ...

----
----

Section 6.6 : Data Integrity Implications

CRC32 helps protect against accidental data corruption, but not
intensional data corruption.  An attacker could easily intentionally
corrupt the data and a CRC32 cannot detect that.  I recommend some
stronger wording that an active attacker could easily subvert the
CRC32, or at least additional text that explains that CRC32 only
protects against accidental data corruption and not intensional data
corruption.

----

Section 9 : Security considerations

The discussion of the steering tag doesn't discuss what information is
exposed, or how guessable these tags could be.  What's the implication
of a "peer" guessing at random STags?  Could I get data that I
shouldn't have access to?  Are these STags tied to a particular peer
session, and if so how?

--

There's no discussion of peer authentication.  How do I know who I'm
talking to and how do I authenticate and authorize their RDMA access?

----

Section 9.2 : Tagged Buffer Exposure

This section does not go into enough detail of what can happen if an
attacker can insert random (or worse, non random!) data into arbitrary
buffers.  We've got so many buffer overrun attacks.  Imagine what
could happen if an attacker didn't need to overrun a buffer but could
co-opt the RDMA and insert arbitrary data into buffers directly.

> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 16:49:04 -0400
> From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
> To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
> Cc: rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: Last Call: 'DDP/RDMAP Security' to Proposed Standard
>
> The IESG has received a request from the Remote Direct Data Placement WG to
> consider the following documents:
>
> - 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
> - 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data
>    Placement (DDP) '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC
>
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
> iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2006-04-19.
>
> The file can be obtained via
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
>
>
>
>

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

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Subject: RE: [rddp] DDP/RDMAP Applicability
Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 09:19:36 -0700
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Thread-Topic: [rddp] DDP/RDMAP Applicability
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From: "Caitlin Bestler" <caitlinb@broadcom.com>
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Derek Atkins wrote:
> I was asked to review the DDP/RDMAP specifications.  Here are
> my comments on draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt
>=20

Typos noted and fixed. Thanks.

>=20
> ----
> ----
>=20
> Section 6.6 : Data Integrity Implications
>=20
> CRC32 helps protect against accidental data corruption, but
> not intensional data corruption.  An attacker could easily
> intentionally corrupt the data and a CRC32 cannot detect
> that.  I recommend some stronger wording that an active
> attacker could easily subvert the CRC32, or at least
> additional text that explains that CRC32 only protects
> against accidental data corruption and not intensional data
> corruption.=20
>=20

Clarification on the types of corruption will be added.

> ----
>=20
> Section 9 : Security considerations
>=20
> The discussion of the steering tag doesn't discuss what
> information is exposed, or how guessable these tags could be.
>  What's the implication of a "peer" guessing at random STags?
>  Could I get data that I shouldn't have access to?  Are these
> STags tied to a particular peer session, and if so how?
>=20

A paragraph will be added to emphasize that STags must be
validated for use on a connection. Therefore there is a set
of advertised buffers that a peer can access, and those
are the *only* buffers that the peer can use. There is
no "guessing" involved.

However there is no way for the RDMA layer to know that
the peer has not *confused* which of the buffers it is
authorized to use and has specified the wrong one.

> --
>=20
> There's no discussion of peer authentication.  How do I know
> who I'm talking to and how do I authenticate and authorize
> their RDMA access?
>=20
> ----
>=20
> Section 9.2 : Tagged Buffer Exposure
>=20
> This section does not go into enough detail of what can
> happen if an attacker can insert random (or worse, non
> random!) data into arbitrary buffers.  We've got so many
> buffer overrun attacks.  Imagine what could happen if an
> attacker didn't need to overrun a buffer but could co-opt the
> RDMA and insert arbitrary data into buffers directly.
>=20

Language will be added emphasizing that random data placed
into advertised buffers must be handled by the ULP, just
as sending arbitrary data over a non-RDMA connection must
be detected and handled up the ULP.


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From rddp-bounces@ietf.org Thu Apr 20 16:08:55 2006
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Subject: RE: [rddp] DDP/RDMAP Applicability
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These are additional paragraphs that would address the questions raised:


In 6.6 (data integrity implications)

   CRC32c only provides protection against random corruption.  To
   protect against unauthorized alteration or forging of data packets
   security methods must be applied.  Use of IPSEC is supported for=20
   both SCTP and MPA/TCP.


In 9.1 (Security Consideratins - Connection/Association Setup)

   Authentication of peers and approval of connections is outside of the
   scope of DDP.  Connections are initiated and accepted by the ULP
   using authentication information as provided by the LLP.  IPSEC is
   usable for both TCP and SCTP.

In 9.2 (Security Considerations - Tagged Buffer Exposure)

   DDP validates that STags are only used by the remote peer to the
   extent authorized by the ULP.  The STag is selects amongst authorized
   buffers; an STag by itself does not authorize access.  Spacing STags
   is more a defense against 'off by one' errors than a cryptographic
   protection.


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From rddp-bounces@ietf.org Thu Apr 20 18:03:24 2006
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From: Black_David@emc.com
To: caitlinb@broadcom.com, rddp@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [rddp] DDP/RDMAP Applicability
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Caitlin,

The correct capitalization of IPsec is IPsec ("sec" is lower case).
I also noticed that the ESP reference needs to be updated from
RFC 2406 to RFC 4303 - it is one of a number of references that
aren't cited in the body of the draft (citations should be added
or the reference dropped).  I also have a few comments below.

Please make these changes plus the typo fix noted in previous email
and submit the resulting draft on Monday, just in case anyone else
wants to comment on the new text in the interim.

Thanks,
--David (rddp WG chair)
----------------------------------------------------
David L. Black, Senior Technologist
EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
----------------------------------------------------

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Caitlin Bestler [mailto:caitlinb@broadcom.com] 
> Sent: Thursday, April 20, 2006 4:09 PM
> To: rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [rddp] DDP/RDMAP Applicability
> 
> These are additional paragraphs that would address the 
> questions raised:
> 
> 
> In 6.6 (data integrity implications)
> 
>    CRC32c only provides protection against random corruption.  To
>    protect against unauthorized alteration or forging of data packets

Add a comma at the end of this line.

>    security methods must be applied.  Use of IPSEC is supported for 
>    both SCTP and MPA/TCP.
> 
> 
> In 9.1 (Security Consideratins - Connection/Association Setup)
> 
>    Authentication of peers and approval of connections is outside of the
>    scope of DDP.  Connections are initiated and accepted by the ULP
>    using authentication information as provided by the LLP.  IPSEC is
>    usable for both TCP and SCTP.

"using authentication information as provided by the LLP" could be
misread as implying use of LLP identities.  Change it to "and
connection authentication is the responsibility of the ULP".  In 
addition to fixing the capitalization of IPsec, add the following
to the end of the last sentence above : "and can provide authentication
at a protocol layer beneath DDP"

> In 9.2 (Security Considerations - Tagged Buffer Exposure)
> 
>    DDP validates that STags are only used by the remote peer to the
>    extent authorized by the ULP.  The STag is selects amongst authorized
>    buffers;

"is selects amongst authorized buffers" --> "selects among buffers
previously authorized by the ULP"

>          an STag by itself does not authorize access.  Spacing STags
>    is more a defense against 'off by one' errors than a cryptographic
>    protection.

Replace the last sentence with:

	Use of randomization in generating STag values may be useful in
	preventing 'off by one' and other programmatic errors, but is
	of limited value in countering generation and misuse of STag values
	by an active attacker.  IPsec provides countermeasures that can
	prevent such an unauthorized attacker from gaining access to
	buffers used by DDP and RDMAP.

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From: Black_David@emc.com
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Derek,

Thanks for your review of this and the applicability draft.  It
looks like all the issues involve wording, but I wanted to make
a few comments on some of your concerns that may appear to be technical:

--------

> Section 2.3.4  Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for 
> Data Transfer  
> 
> It says:
> 
>    Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation Table 
>    (i.e. it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a Data 
>    Buffer). In this case threats and mitigations associated with the 
>    Page Translation Table are not relevant. 
> 
> I don't believe this is true.  I think that the security implications
> of STag to Data Buffer mapping is JUST as relevant as having the Page
> Translation Table.  The threats are all about an attacker trying to
> get data into (or out of) a buffer they are not authorized to access.

I believe that what was intended was to say that if there is no Page
Translation Table, then attacks based on changing its contents or
exhausting its resources are impossible.  The text will need to be
rephrased to say that.

-------------

> Section 5.4.2  TLS is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security

[... snip ...]

> So I don't think it's fair to blame TLS for problems that are
> really a result of using TCP.

I believe both protocols share the blame, and the text should be
revised to make it clear that it is the TLS/TCP combination that
has the drawback.

-------------

> 6.3.2  Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data 
> 
> It says:
> 
>    Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale data 
>    is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights are 
>    granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, 
>    for example).  
> 
> This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still
> remains.  It is still possible for an attacker to read this buffer,
> only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.  A better
> approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP
> that the buffer is available.

This text needs some clarifying editing, because it is attempting
to describe the "better approach," namely to zero a not-remotely-
accessible buffer *before* authorizing remote access to it.

Thanks,
--David (rddp WG chair)
----------------------------------------------------
David L. Black, Senior Technologist
EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
----------------------------------------------------



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Derek Atkins [mailto:derek@ihtfp.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 5:58 PM
> To: secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
> Cc: Russ Housley; Pat Cain; Sam Hartman; rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I was asked to review draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt.  Enclosed
> below are my comments.
> 
> -derek
> 
> ----
> 
> Section 2.2.4  Protection Domain (PD)
> 
> It says:
> 
>                                 Protection 
>    Domains are assigned to two of the resources of concern, Stream 
>    Context Memory and STags associated with Page Translation Table 
>    entries and data buffers. 
> 
> This is confusing.  What are the "two resources of concern"?  I
> don't know how to parse the rest of this sentence into two objects,
> in my reading I see three:
> 
>   1) Stream Context Memory
>   2) STags associated with Page Translation Table entires
>   3) data buffers
> 
> I suspect some simple punctuation marks could help here.
> 
> ----
> 
> Section 2.3.2  Non-Privileged Data Interface Semantics 
> 
> It says:
> 
>          . Three RDMAP data transfer mechanisms are 
>    defined, one using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages), 
>    and one using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA 
>    Writes).
> 
> Maybe my math is wrong, but I only count two mechanisms here:
> 
>   1) using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages)
>   2) using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA Writes)
> 
> What's the third?
> 
> --
> 
> A couple paragraphs later it says:
> 
>               For data reception, for DDP it can receive Untagged 
>    Messages into buffers that have been posted on the Receive Queue 
>    or Shared Receive Queue. 
> 
> This sentence doesn't parse properly.  I think you need to remove
> the second "for" and the following "it", so it reads:
> 
>          For data reception, DDP can receive ...
> 
> ----
> 
> Section 2.3.4  Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for 
> Data Transfer  
> 
> It says:
> 
>    Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation Table 
>    (i.e. it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a Data 
>    Buffer). In this case threats and mitigations associated with the 
>    Page Translation Table are not relevant. 
> 
> I don't believe this is true.  I think that the security implications
> of STag to Data Buffer mapping is JUST as relevant as having the Page
> Translation Table.  The threats are all about an attacker trying to
> get data into (or out of) a buffer they are not authorized to access.
> The threats are the same regardless of the number of layers of mapping
> involved.  Indeed, one would think that the Page Translation Table
> makes protecting the Data Buffer EASIER, because you can add columns
> to the table to include the Stream, PD, and access right information
> directly in the PTT, sort of like the IPsec PAD.
> 
> ----
> 
> Section 5.4.2  TLS is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security 
> 
> Part 2 talks about TLS as a connection oriented protocol and
> goes on to talk about the problems of buffering and reordering
> of packets.  But that's really a red-herring.  It's not TLS
> that causes that.  It's TCP!  TCP requires the buffering of
> out-of-order packets, because TCP assures in-order streams of
> data.  So it's not TLS that causes the problem, but the choice
> of using TCP.  TLS doesn't run on top of UDP.   I don't know
> if TLS runs on top of SCTP.
> 
> So I don't think it's fair to blame TLS for problems that are
> really a result of using TCP.
> 
> ----
> 
> Section 6.2.1  Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response 
> 
> I really like this section.  This should be emphasized more.
> 
> ----
> 
> 6.3.2  Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data 
> 
> It says:
> 
>    Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale data 
>    is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights are 
>    granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, 
>    for example).  
> 
> This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still
> remains.  It is still possible for an attacker to read this buffer,
> only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.  A better
> approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP
> that the buffer is available.  E.g., allow even an Non-Privileged ULP
> to notify the engine that a buffer is "in process" and not available..
> Sort of like marking the buffer (or stag) as "Busy".  That way the
> Stream can only make buffers available that have valid data and you
> don't get invalid data buffers.
> 
> ----
> 
> Section 8  Security considerations 
> 
> Says, in its entirety:
> 
>    This entire document is focused on security considerations. 
> 
> 
> While this statement is true, it still might be useful to reiterate
> the key points of the document.   E.g.:
> 
>   - you must validate your inputs
>   - dont do this, do do that, ...
>   - etc.
> 
> 
> 
> Sam Weiler <weiler@tislabs.com> writes:
> 
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 16:49:04 -0400
> > From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
> > To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
> > Cc: rddp@ietf.org
> > Subject: Last Call: 'DDP/RDMAP Security' to Proposed Standard
> >
> > The IESG has received a request from the Remote Direct Data Placement WG
to
> > consider the following documents:
> >
> > - 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
> >    <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
> > - 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and
Direct Data
> >    Placement (DDP) '
> >    <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC
> >
> > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> > final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
> > iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2006-04-19.
> >
> > The file can be obtained via
> > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicabil
> ity-05.txt
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > IETF-Announce mailing list
> > IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
> >
> >
> >
> >
> 
> -- 
>        Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
>        derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
>        Computer and Internet Security Consultant
> 
> _______________________________________________
> rddp mailing list
> rddp@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp
> 

_______________________________________________
rddp mailing list
rddp@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp



From rddp-bounces@ietf.org Fri Apr 21 16:45:44 2006
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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Black_David@emc.com
Subject: Re: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
References: <F222151D3323874393F83102D614E05502B66A34@CORPUSMX20A.corp.emc.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 12:25:11 -0400
In-Reply-To: <F222151D3323874393F83102D614E05502B66A34@CORPUSMX20A.corp.emc.com>
	(Black David's message of "Thu, 20 Apr 2006 18:28:43 -0400")
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Yes, your descriptions sound good to me.

Technically I did not have significant concerns of these drafts.

-derek

Black_David@emc.com writes:

> Derek,
>
> Thanks for your review of this and the applicability draft.  It
> looks like all the issues involve wording, but I wanted to make
> a few comments on some of your concerns that may appear to be technical:
>
> --------
>
>> Section 2.3.4  Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for 
>> Data Transfer  
>> 
>> It says:
>> 
>>    Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation Table 
>>    (i.e. it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a Data 
>>    Buffer). In this case threats and mitigations associated with the 
>>    Page Translation Table are not relevant. 
>> 
>> I don't believe this is true.  I think that the security implications
>> of STag to Data Buffer mapping is JUST as relevant as having the Page
>> Translation Table.  The threats are all about an attacker trying to
>> get data into (or out of) a buffer they are not authorized to access.
>
> I believe that what was intended was to say that if there is no Page
> Translation Table, then attacks based on changing its contents or
> exhausting its resources are impossible.  The text will need to be
> rephrased to say that.
>
> -------------
>
>> Section 5.4.2  TLS is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security
>
> [... snip ...]
>
>> So I don't think it's fair to blame TLS for problems that are
>> really a result of using TCP.
>
> I believe both protocols share the blame, and the text should be
> revised to make it clear that it is the TLS/TCP combination that
> has the drawback.
>
> -------------
>
>> 6.3.2  Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data 
>> 
>> It says:
>> 
>>    Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale data 
>>    is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights are 
>>    granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, 
>>    for example).  
>> 
>> This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still
>> remains.  It is still possible for an attacker to read this buffer,
>> only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.  A better
>> approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP
>> that the buffer is available.
>
> This text needs some clarifying editing, because it is attempting
> to describe the "better approach," namely to zero a not-remotely-
> accessible buffer *before* authorizing remote access to it.
>
> Thanks,
> --David (rddp WG chair)
> ----------------------------------------------------
> David L. Black, Senior Technologist
> EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
> +1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
> black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Derek Atkins [mailto:derek@ihtfp.com] 
>> Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 5:58 PM
>> To: secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
>> Cc: Russ Housley; Pat Cain; Sam Hartman; rddp@ietf.org
>> Subject: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
>> 
>> Hi,
>> 
>> I was asked to review draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt.  Enclosed
>> below are my comments.
>> 
>> -derek
>> 
>> ----
>> 
>> Section 2.2.4  Protection Domain (PD)
>> 
>> It says:
>> 
>>                                 Protection 
>>    Domains are assigned to two of the resources of concern, Stream 
>>    Context Memory and STags associated with Page Translation Table 
>>    entries and data buffers. 
>> 
>> This is confusing.  What are the "two resources of concern"?  I
>> don't know how to parse the rest of this sentence into two objects,
>> in my reading I see three:
>> 
>>   1) Stream Context Memory
>>   2) STags associated with Page Translation Table entires
>>   3) data buffers
>> 
>> I suspect some simple punctuation marks could help here.
>> 
>> ----
>> 
>> Section 2.3.2  Non-Privileged Data Interface Semantics 
>> 
>> It says:
>> 
>>          . Three RDMAP data transfer mechanisms are 
>>    defined, one using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages), 
>>    and one using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA 
>>    Writes).
>> 
>> Maybe my math is wrong, but I only count two mechanisms here:
>> 
>>   1) using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages)
>>   2) using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA Writes)
>> 
>> What's the third?
>> 
>> --
>> 
>> A couple paragraphs later it says:
>> 
>>               For data reception, for DDP it can receive Untagged 
>>    Messages into buffers that have been posted on the Receive Queue 
>>    or Shared Receive Queue. 
>> 
>> This sentence doesn't parse properly.  I think you need to remove
>> the second "for" and the following "it", so it reads:
>> 
>>          For data reception, DDP can receive ...
>> 
>> ----
>> 
>> Section 2.3.4  Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for 
>> Data Transfer  
>> 
>> It says:
>> 
>>    Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation Table 
>>    (i.e. it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a Data 
>>    Buffer). In this case threats and mitigations associated with the 
>>    Page Translation Table are not relevant. 
>> 
>> I don't believe this is true.  I think that the security implications
>> of STag to Data Buffer mapping is JUST as relevant as having the Page
>> Translation Table.  The threats are all about an attacker trying to
>> get data into (or out of) a buffer they are not authorized to access.
>> The threats are the same regardless of the number of layers of mapping
>> involved.  Indeed, one would think that the Page Translation Table
>> makes protecting the Data Buffer EASIER, because you can add columns
>> to the table to include the Stream, PD, and access right information
>> directly in the PTT, sort of like the IPsec PAD.
>> 
>> ----
>> 
>> Section 5.4.2  TLS is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security 
>> 
>> Part 2 talks about TLS as a connection oriented protocol and
>> goes on to talk about the problems of buffering and reordering
>> of packets.  But that's really a red-herring.  It's not TLS
>> that causes that.  It's TCP!  TCP requires the buffering of
>> out-of-order packets, because TCP assures in-order streams of
>> data.  So it's not TLS that causes the problem, but the choice
>> of using TCP.  TLS doesn't run on top of UDP.   I don't know
>> if TLS runs on top of SCTP.
>> 
>> So I don't think it's fair to blame TLS for problems that are
>> really a result of using TCP.
>> 
>> ----
>> 
>> Section 6.2.1  Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response 
>> 
>> I really like this section.  This should be emphasized more.
>> 
>> ----
>> 
>> 6.3.2  Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data 
>> 
>> It says:
>> 
>>    Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale data 
>>    is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights are 
>>    granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, 
>>    for example).  
>> 
>> This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still
>> remains.  It is still possible for an attacker to read this buffer,
>> only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.  A better
>> approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP
>> that the buffer is available.  E.g., allow even an Non-Privileged ULP
>> to notify the engine that a buffer is "in process" and not available..
>> Sort of like marking the buffer (or stag) as "Busy".  That way the
>> Stream can only make buffers available that have valid data and you
>> don't get invalid data buffers.
>> 
>> ----
>> 
>> Section 8  Security considerations 
>> 
>> Says, in its entirety:
>> 
>>    This entire document is focused on security considerations. 
>> 
>> 
>> While this statement is true, it still might be useful to reiterate
>> the key points of the document.   E.g.:
>> 
>>   - you must validate your inputs
>>   - dont do this, do do that, ...
>>   - etc.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Sam Weiler <weiler@tislabs.com> writes:
>> 
>> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> > Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 16:49:04 -0400
>> > From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
>> > To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
>> > Cc: rddp@ietf.org
>> > Subject: Last Call: 'DDP/RDMAP Security' to Proposed Standard
>> >
>> > The IESG has received a request from the Remote Direct Data Placement WG
> to
>> > consider the following documents:
>> >
>> > - 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
>> >    <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
>> > - 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and
> Direct Data
>> >    Placement (DDP) '
>> >    <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC
>> >
>> > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>> > final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
>> > iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2006-04-19.
>> >
>> > The file can be obtained via
>> > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
>> > 
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicabil
>> ity-05.txt
>> >

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

_______________________________________________
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https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp



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Subject: RE: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
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=A0
Derek, thanks for the detailed review. Comments/updated text enclosed =
below. I should have a revised ID by end of next, pending any feedback =
you have on my revisions.
=A0
=A0
Jim
=A0
=A0
=A0
=A0
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Derek Atkins [mailto:derek@ihtfp.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 2:58 PM
> To: secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
> Cc: Russ Housley; Pat Cain; Sam Hartman; rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> I was asked to review draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt.=A0 Enclosed
> below are my comments.
>=20
> -derek
>=20
> ----
>=20
> Section 2.2.4=A0 Protection Domain (PD)
>=20
> It says:
>=20
> =
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0Protection
> =A0=A0=A0Domains are assigned to two of the resources of concern, =
Stream
> =A0=A0=A0Context Memory and STags associated with Page Translation =
Table
> =A0=A0=A0entries and data buffers.
>=20
> This is confusing.=A0 What are the "two resources of concern"?=A0 I
> don't know how to parse the rest of this sentence into two objects,
> in my reading I see three:
>=20
> =A0=A01) Stream Context Memory
> =A0=A02) STags associated with Page Translation Table entires
> =A0=A03) data buffers
>=20
> I suspect some simple punctuation marks could help here.
[<jim>]=20
I modified the sentence to state:
=A0
Protection Domains are assigned to three of the resources of concern - =
Stream Context Memory, STags associated with Page Translation Table =
entries, and data buffers.=20
=A0
>=20
> ----
>=20
> Section 2.3.2=A0 Non-Privileged Data Interface Semantics
>=20
> It says:
>=20
> =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0. Three RDMAP data transfer mechanisms are
> =A0=A0=A0defined, one using Untagged data transfer (Send Type =
Messages),
> =A0=A0=A0and one using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and =
RDMA
> =A0=A0=A0Writes).
>=20
> Maybe my math is wrong, but I only count two mechanisms here:
>=20
> =A0=A01) using Untagged data transfer (Send Type Messages)
> =A0=A02) using Tagged data transfer (RDMA Read Responses and RDMA =
Writes)
>=20
> What's the third?
[<jim>]=20
=A0
This was a typo that was introduced as part of the rewrite to address =
concerns about Untagged data transfers not having high enough exposure. =
Thus the document submitted for your review re-categorized the three =
mechanisms as two, as stated. So your math is right :-) thanks.
=A0
>=20
> --
>=20
> A couple paragraphs later it says:
>=20
> =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0For data reception, for DDP =
it can receive Untagged
> =A0=A0=A0Messages into buffers that have been posted on the Receive =
Queue
> =A0=A0=A0or Shared Receive Queue.
>=20
> This sentence doesn't parse properly.=A0 I think you need to remove
> the second "for" and the following "it", so it reads:
>=20
> =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0For data reception, DDP can receive ...
[<jim>]=20
Done. Thanks.
=A0
>=20
> ----
>=20
> Section 2.3.4=A0 Initialization of RNIC Data Structures for Data =
Transfer
>=20
> It says:
>=20
> =A0=A0=A0Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation =
Table
> =A0=A0=A0(i.e. it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a =
Data
> =A0=A0=A0Buffer). In this case threats and mitigations associated with =
the
> =A0=A0=A0Page Translation Table are not relevant.
>=20
> I don't believe this is true.=A0 I think that the security =
implications
> of STag to Data Buffer mapping is JUST as relevant as having the Page
> Translation Table.=A0 The threats are all about an attacker trying to
> get data into (or out of) a buffer they are not authorized to access.
> The threats are the same regardless of the number of layers of mapping
> involved.=A0 Indeed, one would think that the Page Translation Table
> makes protecting the Data Buffer EASIER, because you can add columns
> to the table to include the Stream, PD, and access right information
> directly in the PTT, sort of like the IPsec PAD.
[<jim>]=20
=A0
As David mentioned, the intent was to state that if the resource doesn't =
exist, you can't attack it. To make this more explicit, I modified the =
text to:
=A0
Note that an implementation may not have a Page Translation Table (i.e. =
it may support a direct mapping between an STag and a Data Buffer). If =
there is no Page Translation Table, then attacks based on changing its =
contents or exhausting its resources are not possible.
=A0
=A0
>=20
> ----
>=20
> Section 5.4.2=A0 TLS is Inappropriate for DDP/RDMAP Security
>=20
> Part 2 talks about TLS as a connection oriented protocol and
> goes on to talk about the problems of buffering and reordering
> of packets.=A0 But that's really a red-herring.=A0 It's not TLS
> that causes that.=A0 It's TCP!=A0 TCP requires the buffering of
> out-of-order packets, because TCP assures in-order streams of
> data.=A0 So it's not TLS that causes the problem, but the choice
> of using TCP.=A0 TLS doesn't run on top of UDP.=A0=A0 I don't know
> if TLS runs on top of SCTP.
>=20
> So I don't think it's fair to blame TLS for problems that are
> really a result of using TCP.
>=20
[<jim>]=20
=A0
Per David's suggestion, I've attempted to make it more clear that the =
issue is an interaction between TLS/TCP when RDMAP/DDP concepts are =
applied. Here's the text.
=A0
2.=A0=A0=A0 TLS is a connection oriented protocol. If a stream cipher or =
block cipher in CBC mode is used for bulk encryption, then a packet can =
be decrypted only after all the packets preceding it have already =
arrived. If TLS is used to protect DDP/RDMAP traffic, then TCP must =
gather all out-of-order packets before TLS can decrypt them. Only after =
this is done can RDMAP/DDP place them into the ULP buffer. Thus one of =
the primary features of DDP/RDMAP - enabling implementations to have a =
flow-through architecture with little to no buffering, can not be =
achieved if TLS is used to protect the data stream.
=A0
> ----
>=20
> Section 6.2.1=A0 Buffer Overrun - RDMA Write or Read Response
>=20
> I really like this section.=A0 This should be emphasized more.
>=20
[<jim>]=20
=A0
Apologies, but I'm unsure on what to do here. I think the topic is well =
covered in the section. Please advise on what needs to be "emphasized =
more"?
=A0
=A0
> ----
>=20
> 6.3.2=A0 Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data
>=20
> It says:
>=20
> =A0=A0=A0Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale =
data
> =A0=A0=A0is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights =
are
> =A0=A0=A0granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the =
memory,
> =A0=A0=A0for example).
>=20
> This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still
> remains.=A0 It is still possible for an attacker to read this buffer,
> only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.=A0 A better
> approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP
> that the buffer is available.=A0 E.g., allow even an Non-Privileged =
ULP
> to notify the engine that a buffer is "in process" and not available..
> Sort of like marking the buffer (or stag) as "Busy".=A0 That way the
> Stream can only make buffers available that have valid data and you
> don't get invalid data buffers.
>=20
[<jim>]=20
David's comment was right on, in terms of the intent - apologies for not =
making this clear that with this solution the race is eliminated. =
Revised text:
=A0
If a buffer is being used for some combination of reads and writes =
(either remote or local), and is exposed to a Remote Peer with at least =
remote read access rights, the Remote Peer may be able to examine the =
contents of the buffer before it is initialized with the correct data. =
Because of this potential race condition, whatever contents were present =
in the buffer before the buffer is advertised can be viewed by the =
Remote Peer, if the Remote Peer performs an RDMA Read. This becomes a =
security issue if the prior contents of the buffer were not intended to =
be shared with the Remote Peer.
To eliminate this race condition, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no =
stale data is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights =
are granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, for =
example). This ensures that the Remote Peer can not access the buffer =
until the stale data has been removed.
=A0
=A0
=A0
> ----
>=20
> Section 8=A0 Security considerations
>=20
> Says, in its entirety:
>=20
> =A0=A0=A0This entire document is focused on security considerations.
>=20
>=20
> While this statement is true, it still might be useful to reiterate
> the key points of the document.=A0=A0 E.g.:
>=20
> =A0=A0- you must validate your inputs
> =A0=A0- dont do this, do do that, ...
> =A0=A0- etc.
[<jim>]=20
=A0
The spec has quite a bit of summary info in the appendices - but totally =
understood the text isn't very professional. Would the following work, =
where I provide a brief overview of the various sections and goals? =
Here's the text:
=A0
Please see Sections 5 Attacks That Can be Mitigated With End-to-End =
Security, Section 6 Attacks from Remote Peers, and Section 7 Attacks =
from Local Peers, for a detailed analysis of attacks and normative =
countermeasures to mitigate the attacks.=20
=A0
Additionally, the appendices provide a summary of the security =
requirements for specific audiences. Section 11 Appendix A: ULP Issues =
for RDDP Client/Server Protocols provides a summary of implementation =
issues and requirements for applications which implement a traditional =
client/server style of interaction. It provides additional insight and =
applicability of the normative text in Sections 5, 6, and 7. Section 12, =
Appendix B: Summary of RNIC and ULP Implementation Requirements provides =
a convenient summary of normative requirements for implementers.
=A0
=A0
=A0
=A0
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Sam Weiler <weiler@tislabs.com> writes:
>=20
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 16:49:04 -0400
> > From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
> > To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
> > Cc: rddp@ietf.org
> > Subject: Last Call: 'DDP/RDMAP Security' to Proposed Standard
> >
> > The IESG has received a request from the Remote Direct Data =
Placement WG
> to
> > consider the following documents:
> >
> > - 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
> >=A0=A0=A0 <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
> > - 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and
> Direct Data
> >=A0=A0=A0 Placement (DDP) '
> >=A0=A0=A0 <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational =
RFC
> >
> > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and =
solicits
> > final comments on this action.=A0 Please send any comments to the
> > iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2006-04-19.
> >
> > The file can be obtained via
> > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
> > =
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > IETF-Announce mailing list
> > IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
> >
> >
> >
> >
>=20
> --
> =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0Derek =
Atkins=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 617-623-3745
> =
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0derek@ihtfp.com=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 =
www.ihtfp.com
> =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0Computer and Internet Security Consultant
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> rddp mailing list
> rddp@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp

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From rddp-bounces@ietf.org Fri Apr 21 21:26:13 2006
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To: "Mary Barnes" <mary.barnes@nortel.com>,<gen-art@ietf.org>
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <joel@stevecrocker.com>
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Subject: [rddp] Re: [Gen-art] IETF LC reviews: rddp security and
	applicability
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I was selected as General Area Review Team reviewer for this specification
(for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).

(These reviews treat DDP and RDMAP as given, and do not comment 
directly on those protocols.)

RDDP/ RDMAP Security
    Given the nature of RDDP, this document is a very good idea.  I 
am glad to see it.
    This review does not check the completeness of the security 
coverage.  However, as a lay reader I am quite impressed.

    The document is ready for publication as an Informational RFC, 
and probably ready as a Proposed Standard.
    Personally, I would put the one IPSec requirement into the main 
document, and consider the rest of the material to be in the category 
of good advice.  This is driven by the fact that the actual advice is 
somewhere between difficult and impossible to observe on the wire.

    minor point:  The last sentence of the introduction reads:

    If all recommended mitigations are in place the implemented usage
    models, the RDMAP/DDP protocol can be shown to not expose any new
    security vulnerabilities.

   Aside from the linguistic oddity of this sentence, it is unclear 
what state is being compared.  I.e., compared with what condition is 
there an absence of new security vulnerabilities.   (Presumably some 
state other than "not communicating".)  There are scattered other odd 
English usages.
    minor: In section 2.3.2, in describing three mechanisms, the text 
refers to one mechanism (X) and one mechanism (Y and Z).  It should 
refer to two mechanisms (Y and Z).

     IDNits reports some references missing and some unused.


RDMA/DDP Applicability:
Other than needing a good English language editor, this document 
appears ready for publication as an Informational RFC.
An example of this is that the references ought to actually be 
referenced in the body of the document.



At 03:46 PM 4/13/2006, Mary Barnes wrote:
>Reviewer: Joel Halpern
>
>- 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
>- 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and
>Direct Data
>    Placement (DDP) '
>    <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC
>
>IETF LC ends on 2006-04-19.
>
>The file can be obtained via
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt


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To: "Jim Pinkerton" <jpink@windows.microsoft.com>,
	"Derek Atkins" <derek@ihtfp.com>, secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
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Jim,  Looks good. I think the text suggested for 6.3.2 is a bit awkward. =
I've suggested a change below marked with my initials, PAT. Pat

-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Pinkerton [mailto:jpink@windows.microsoft.com]=20
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 1:57 PM
To: Derek Atkins; secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
Cc: Sam Hartman; Pat Cain; Russ Housley; rddp@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment

=A0
Derek, thanks for the detailed review. Comments/updated text enclosed =
below. I should have a revised ID by end of next, pending any feedback =
you have on my revisions.
=A0
=A0
Jim
=A0
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Derek Atkins [mailto:derek@ihtfp.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 2:58 PM
> To: secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
> Cc: Russ Housley; Pat Cain; Sam Hartman; rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
>=20
   <snip>
=A0
> ----
>=20
> 6.3.2=A0 Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data
>=20
> It says:
>=20
> =A0=A0=A0Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale =
data
> =A0=A0=A0is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights =
are
> =A0=A0=A0granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the =
memory,
> =A0=A0=A0for example).
>=20
> This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still=20
> remains.=A0 It is still possible for an attacker to read this buffer,=20
> only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.=A0 A better =

> approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP=20
> that the buffer is available.=A0 E.g., allow even an Non-Privileged =
ULP=20
> to notify the engine that a buffer is "in process" and not available..
> Sort of like marking the buffer (or stag) as "Busy".=A0 That way the=20
> Stream can only make buffers available that have valid data and you=20
> don't get invalid data buffers.
>=20
[<jim>]
David's comment was right on, in terms of the intent - apologies for not =
making this clear that with this solution the race is eliminated. =
Revised text:
=A0
If a buffer is being used for some combination of reads and writes =
(either remote or local), and is exposed to a Remote Peer with at least =
remote read access rights, the Remote Peer may be able to examine the =
contents of the buffer before it is initialized with the correct data. =
Because of this potential race condition, whatever contents were present =
in the buffer before the buffer is advertised can be viewed by the =
Remote Peer, if the Remote Peer performs an RDMA Read. This becomes a =
security issue if the prior contents of the buffer were not intended to =
be shared with the Remote Peer.
To eliminate this race condition, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no =
stale data is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights =
are granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, for =
example). This ensures that the Remote Peer can not access the buffer =
until the stale data has been removed.
=A0
<PAT> I find the rewrite confusing because of excessive redundancy. The =
sentence starting "Because of this potential race condition" just =
repeats the same information as the sentence before. I find it more =
clear with that sentence deleted. If you want to get the words "race =
condition" in there the first sentence could be reworded:
If a buffer is being used for some combination of reads and writes =
(either remote or local) and is exposed to a Remote Peer with at least =
remote read access rights before it is initialized with the correct =
data, there is a potential race condition where the Remote Peer can view =
the prior contents of the buffer. <PAT>
=A0


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Subject: RE: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 14:59:51 -0700
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From: "Jim Pinkerton" <jpink@windows.microsoft.com>
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Comments look good. Thanks.

After your feedback, section 6.3.2 now reads:

If a buffer is being used for some combination of reads and writes =
(either remote or local), and is exposed to a Remote Peer with at least =
remote read access rights before it is initialized with the correct =
data, there is a potential race condition where the Remote Peer can view =
the prior contents of the buffer. This becomes a security issue if the =
prior contents of the buffer were not intended to be shared with the =
Remote Peer.

To eliminate this race condition, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no =
stale data is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights =
are granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, for =
example). This ensures that the Remote Peer can not access the buffer =
until the stale data has been removed.



Jim





> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pat Thaler [mailto:pthaler@broadcom.com]
> Sent: Monday, April 24, 2006 1:38 PM
> To: Jim Pinkerton; Derek Atkins; secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
> Cc: Sam Hartman; Pat Cain; Russ Housley; rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
>=20
> Jim,  Looks good. I think the text suggested for 6.3.2 is a bit =
awkward.
> I've suggested a change below marked with my initials, PAT. Pat
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jim Pinkerton [mailto:jpink@windows.microsoft.com]
> Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 1:57 PM
> To: Derek Atkins; secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
> Cc: Sam Hartman; Pat Cain; Russ Housley; rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
>=20
>=20
> Derek, thanks for the detailed review. Comments/updated text enclosed
> below. I should have a revised ID by end of next, pending any feedback =
you
> have on my revisions.
>=20
>=20
> Jim
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Derek Atkins [mailto:derek@ihtfp.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 2:58 PM
> > To: secdir-secretary@MIT.EDU
> > Cc: Russ Housley; Pat Cain; Sam Hartman; rddp@ietf.org
> > Subject: [rddp] Re: SecDir review assignment
> >
>    <snip>
>=20
> > ----
> >
> > 6.3.2=A0 Using RDMA Read to Access Stale Data
> >
> > It says:
> >
> > =A0=A0=A0Because of this, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no stale =
data
> > =A0=A0=A0is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights =
are
> > =A0=A0=A0granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the =
memory,
> > =A0=A0=A0for example).
> >
> > This reduces the threat to a race condition, but the threat still
> > remains.=A0 It is still possible for an attacker to read this =
buffer,
> > only the time window is reduced before the data is zero'd.=A0 A =
better
> > approach would be a means to allow the ULP to inform the DDP/RDMAP
> > that the buffer is available.=A0 E.g., allow even an Non-Privileged =
ULP
> > to notify the engine that a buffer is "in process" and not =
available..
> > Sort of like marking the buffer (or stag) as "Busy".=A0 That way the
> > Stream can only make buffers available that have valid data and you
> > don't get invalid data buffers.
> >
> [<jim>]
> David's comment was right on, in terms of the intent - apologies for =
not
> making this clear that with this solution the race is eliminated. =
Revised
> text:
>=20
> If a buffer is being used for some combination of reads and writes =
(either
> remote or local), and is exposed to a Remote Peer with at least remote
> read access rights, the Remote Peer may be able to examine the =
contents of
> the buffer before it is initialized with the correct data. Because of =
this
> potential race condition, whatever contents were present in the buffer
> before the buffer is advertised can be viewed by the Remote Peer, if =
the
> Remote Peer performs an RDMA Read. This becomes a security issue if =
the
> prior contents of the buffer were not intended to be shared with the
> Remote Peer.
> To eliminate this race condition, the local ULP SHOULD ensure that no
> stale data is contained in the buffer before remote read access rights =
are
> granted (this can be done by zeroing the contents of the memory, for
> example). This ensures that the Remote Peer can not access the buffer
> until the stale data has been removed.
>=20
> <PAT> I find the rewrite confusing because of excessive redundancy. =
The
> sentence starting "Because of this potential race condition" just =
repeats
> the same information as the sentence before. I find it more clear with
> that sentence deleted. If you want to get the words "race condition" =
in
> there the first sentence could be reworded:
> If a buffer is being used for some combination of reads and writes =
(either
> remote or local) and is exposed to a Remote Peer with at least remote =
read
> access rights before it is initialized with the correct data, there is =
a
> potential race condition where the Remote Peer can view the prior =
contents
> of the buffer. <PAT>
>=20
>=20


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Subject: RE: [rddp] Re: [Gen-art] IETF LC reviews: rddp security
	andapplicability
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Thanks for the feedback Joel. Comments in-line.


Jim



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joel M. Halpern [mailto:joel@stevecrocker.com]
> Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 6:10 PM
> To: Mary Barnes; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: lars.eggert@netlab.nec.de; rddp@ietf.org
> Subject: [rddp] Re: [Gen-art] IETF LC reviews: rddp security
> andapplicability
>=20
> I was selected as General Area Review Team reviewer for this
specification
> (for background on Gen-ART, please see
> http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).
>=20
> (These reviews treat DDP and RDMAP as given, and do not comment
> directly on those protocols.)
>=20
> RDDP/ RDMAP Security
>     Given the nature of RDDP, this document is a very good idea.  I
> am glad to see it.
>     This review does not check the completeness of the security
> coverage.  However, as a lay reader I am quite impressed.
>=20
>     The document is ready for publication as an Informational RFC,
> and probably ready as a Proposed Standard.
>     Personally, I would put the one IPSec requirement into the main
> document, and consider the rest of the material to be in the category
> of good advice.  This is driven by the fact that the actual advice is
> somewhere between difficult and impossible to observe on the wire.
>=20
>     minor point:  The last sentence of the introduction reads:
>=20
>     If all recommended mitigations are in place the implemented usage
>     models, the RDMAP/DDP protocol can be shown to not expose any new
>     security vulnerabilities.
>=20
>    Aside from the linguistic oddity of this sentence, it is unclear
> what state is being compared.  I.e., compared with what condition is
> there an absence of new security vulnerabilities.   (Presumably some
> state other than "not communicating".)  There are scattered other odd
> English usages.
[<jim>]=20

Good point. Below is the suggested rewording to address your concerns,
plus after rereading the section, it doesn't summarize the appendices
(it does summarize all the other sections), so I add some informative
text describing them just before this text.

The appendices provide focused summaries of this specification. Section
11 Appendix A: ULP Issues for RDDP Client/Server Protocols focuses on
implementers of traditional client/server protocols. Section 12 Appendix
B: Summary of RNIC and ULP Implementation Requirements summarizes all
normative requirements in this specification. Section 13 Appendix C:
Partial Trust Taxonomy provides an abstract model for categorizing trust
boundaries.

If an RDMAP/DDP protocol implementation uses the mitigations recommended
in this document, that implementation should not exhibit additional
security vulnerabilities above and beyond those of an implementation of
the transport protocol (i.e., TCP or SCTP) and protocols beneath it
(e.g., IP) without RDMAP/DDP.

>     minor: In section 2.3.2, in describing three mechanisms, the text
> refers to one mechanism (X) and one mechanism (Y and Z).  It should
> refer to two mechanisms (Y and Z).
>=20
[<jim>]=20
Thanks. Fixed.



>      IDNits reports some references missing and some unused.
>=20
>=20
[<jim>]=20
Thanks. Reran and fixed the issues.


Jim



> RDMA/DDP Applicability:
> Other than needing a good English language editor, this document
> appears ready for publication as an Informational RFC.
> An example of this is that the references ought to actually be
> referenced in the body of the document.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> At 03:46 PM 4/13/2006, Mary Barnes wrote:
> >Reviewer: Joel Halpern
> >
> >- 'DDP/RDMAP Security '
> >    <draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard
> >- 'Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and
> >Direct Data
> >    Placement (DDP) '
> >    <draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt> as an Informational RFC
> >
> >IETF LC ends on 2006-04-19.
> >
> >The file can be obtained via
> >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-security-08.txt
>
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.tx
t
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> rddp mailing list
> rddp@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp

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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Remote Direct Data Placement Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data Placement (DDP)
	Author(s)	: C. Bestler, L. Coene
	Filename	: draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-06.txt
	Pages		: 27
	Date		: 2006-4-25
	
This document describes the applicability of Remote Direct Memory
Access Protocol (RDMAP) and the Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP).
It compares and contrasts the different transport options over IP
that DDP can use, provides guidance to ULP developers on choosing
between available transports and/or how to be indifferent to the
specific transport layer used, compares use of DDP with direct use of
the supporting transports, and compares DDP over IP transports with
non-IP transports that support RDMA functionality.

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Thread-Topic: Further editorial changes to the security spec
thread-index: AcZoorO4JacEiJMcRSCTMyewwVFLow==
From: "Jim Pinkerton" <jpink@windows.microsoft.com>
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Subject: [rddp] Further editorial changes to the security spec
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=20

I've in the middle of doing a careful read through of the whole security
spec, and found the following issues that I plan to fix in the next
revision. Feedback welcome.

=20

The existing section 6.37 "Controlling Access to PTT & STag Mapping" is
in the wrong section. It is not a Remote Peer attack - it's a Local Peer
attack. Sorry for the mis-categorization when the spec was re-organized
per the AD's feedback. Thus this attack should be in section 7. I moved
it to a new section 7.3, renaming it "Local ULP Attacking the PTT & STag
Mapping", but using the same body text.

=20

=20

=20

Jim

=20

=20

=20


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<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>I&#8217;ve in the middle of doing a careful read =
through of
the whole security spec, and found the following issues that I plan to =
fix in
the next revision. Feedback welcome.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>The existing section 6.37 &#8220;Controlling Access =
to PTT
&amp; STag Mapping&#8221; is in the wrong section. It is not a Remote =
Peer
attack &#8211; it&#8217;s a Local Peer attack. Sorry for the =
mis-categorization
when the spec was re-organized per the AD&#8217;s feedback. Thus this =
attack
should be in section 7. I moved it to a new section 7.3, renaming it =
&#8220;Local
ULP Attacking the PTT &amp; STag Mapping&#8221;, but using the same body =
text.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>Jim</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
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font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

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font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

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