Subject: [Roll] [roll] #115: draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-01.txt --- Editorial Comments

From: "roll issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 08 May 2013 16:31:07 -0000

#115: draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-01.txt --- Editorial Comments

 Comments done by Stephen Kent (SK), source:[http://www.ietf.org/mail-
 archive/web/secdir/current/msg03712.html] and [http://www.ietf.org/mail-
 archive/web/secdir/current/msg03848.html][[BR]]
 Comments done by Sean Turner (ST),
 source:[https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-roll-security-
 threats/ballot/]

 === Section 3.1:[[BR]]
 * r/components and mechanisms/assets, points of access, and process -- by
 ST

 === Section 3.2: [[BR]]
 * The introduction of the term “misuse” under the heading of integrity
 strikes me as inappropriate. I disagree that  non-repudiation might be
 relevant here.  This security service (defined in ISO 7498-2)  applies to
 people and organizations, not to devices. --by SK[[BR]]
 * s3.2: Adding "misuse" in the integrity strikes me as wrong.  It's about
 determining whether data has changed.  The examples used are about delayed
 or replayed messages which seem to be better characterized as
 availability.--by ST

 === Section 3.4: [[BR]]
 * 3.4: several terms used here (misappropriated, legitimacy, and
 truthfulness) still represent poor choices of terminology, and should be
 fixed--by SK[[BR]]
 * s3.4: How about: In conjunction, it is necessary to be assured of the
 authenticity and legitimacy of the participants of the routing neighbor
 discovery process; NEW: In conjunction, it is necessary to be assured that
 authorized peers authenticate themselves during the routing neighbor
 discovery process;--BY ST[[BR]]
 * s3.4: I think you could drop eavesdropping and just say unauthorized
 exposure--BY ST

 === Section 4 [[BR]]
 * 4 – The use of the term “misappropriated” is odd (misappropriation in
 section 2.2 as well), at best. Are the authors referring to unauthorized
 use? The term “legitimacy,” applied to participants is not helpful. Do the
 authors mean ‘authorized” here? The term “truthfulness” appears here, and
 is equally unhelpful. How about “accurate?” I’m beginning to wonder how
 carefully the authors read 4593!--by SK[[BR]]

 === Section 4.1 [[BR]]
 * 4.1- the authors should use technical terminology from 4949, since they
 went to the trouble to cite in various places, e.g., replace “sniffing”
 with “passive wiretapping,” both here and throughput the document.--by SK

 === Section 4.2 [[BR]]
 * 4.2 – here too, addressing integrity and authentication separately might
 result in a clearer discussion. For example, “identity misappropriation”
 is really a violation of an authentication guarantee.  There is mention of
 “freshness” which might have been addressed by using the 7498-2
 terminology “connection-orietned integrity.”--by SK[[BR]]
 * 4.2.2: identity misappropriation is really about peer authentication and
 masquerading--by ST

 === Section 5.1.3 [[BR]]
 * 5.1.3 - TA is always a passive attack, so the description here “… may be
 passive…” is wrong.  --by SK

 === Section 5.2.3 [[BR]]
 * 5.2.3 – “liveliness” -> “liveness” --by SK

 === Section 5.3.2 [[BR]]
 * 5.3.2 – “Overload attacks are a form of DoS attack in that a malicious
 node overloads the network with irrelevant traffic, thereby draining the
 nodes' energy store quicker” -> “Overload attacks are a form of DoS attack
 in which a malicious node overloads the network with irrelevant traffic,
 thereby draining the nodes' energy store more quickly.” This sort of
 attack is not one against routing, unless the overload is the result of
 processing routing traffic?--by SK

 === Section 6 [[BR]]
 * 6 – I find the opening sentence to be very confusing: “The assessments
 and analysis in Section 4 examined all areas of threats and attacks that
 could impact routing, and the countermeasures presented in Section 5 were
 reached without confining the consideration to means only available to
 routing.”--by SK

 === Section 6.1 [[BR]]
 * 6.1 - “… and improve vulnerability against other more direct attacks …”
 -> “… and reduce vulnerabilities relative to other attacks …--by SK

 === Section 6.2 [[BR]]
 * 6.2 – Did you really mean to say “ … integrity of the encrypted message
 …”? Generally one applies integrity mechanisms to the plaintext message,
 prior to encryption. The requirement to verify “message sequence” is
 grammatically incorrect and ambiguous. Routing protocols may not require
 delivery of every routing message. If the requirement here is anti-replay,
 say so. Also, the phrase “unintentional Byzantine” seems odd to me. It
 does not appear earlier, in the discussion of Byzantine threats. The
 common notion of a Byzantine attack is that the actors are doing so with
 intent. --by SK

 === Section 6.4 [[BR]]
 * 6.4 – A more appropriate title would be “Cryptographic Key Management.”
 --by SK[[BR]]
 * s6.4: r/Security Key Management / Key Management -- BY ST

 === Section 6.5/6.5.1 [[BR]]
 * 6.5 – “ … diversified needs …” -> “… diverse needs…”--by SK

 === Section 8 [[BR]]
 *  “…mechanisms to be used to deal with each threat is specified …” ->
 “…mechanisms to be used to deal with each threat are specified …”--by SK

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |      Owner:
  [email-masked]          |  [email-masked]
     Type:  defect                   |     Status:  new
 Priority:  minor                    |  Milestone:
Component:  security-threats         |    Version:
 Severity:  Active WG Document       |   Keywords:  Editorial
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/roll/trac/ticket/115>
roll <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/roll/>