Subject: [rtcweb] I-D Action: draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-00.txt

From: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2011 00:54:33 -0700

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Real-Time Communication in WEB-browsers Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Security Considerations for RTC-Web
	Author(s)       : Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-00.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2011-09-21

   The Real-Time Communications on the Web (RTC-Web) working group is
   tasked with standardizing protocols for real-time communications
   between Web browsers.  The major use cases for RTC-Web technology are
   real-time audio and/or video calls, Web conferencing, and direct data
   transfer.  Unlike most conventional real-time systems (e.g., SIP-
   based soft phones) RTC-Web communications are directly controlled by
   some Web server, which poses new security challenges.  For instance,
   a Web browser might expose a JavaScript API which allows a server to
   place a video call.  Unrestricted access to such an API would allow
   any site which a user visited to &quot;bug&quot; a user&#39;s computer, capturing
   any activity which passed in front of their camera.  This document
   defines the RTC-Web threat model and defines an architecture which
   provides security within that threat model.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-00.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-00.txt

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From: Magnus Westerlund <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2011 14:45:15 +0200

Hi EKR,

(As an individual)

Thanks for posting the draft.

I am missing a few security issues that I think should be considered.

1. The attempt to overload the links in an domain by concentrating
traffic on the domain by choosing peer-pairs. Not that I think there is
any real protection against this other than limit the flows to their
"fair" share.

2. Configuring RTCP or other automatically sent traffic to high
bit-rates. Especially under conditions where continued consent can't be
determined.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

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From: Eric Rescorla <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2011 07:08:23 -0700

Thanks. for pointing these out. I will add them to my TODO list to write up.