Subject: [rtcweb] #7: Section 4.2.4

From: "rtcweb issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 16 Feb 2013 22:07:55 -0000

#7: Section 4.2.4

 4.2.4. IP Location Privacy

    Note that as soon as the callee sends their ICE candidates, the
    caller learns the callee's IP addresses.  The callee's server
    reflexive address reveals a lot of information about the callee's
    location.  In order to avoid tracking, implementations may wish to
    suppress the start of ICE negotiation until the callee has answered.
    In addition, either side may wish to hide their location entirely by
    forcing all traffic through a TURN server.

 [BA] Might be useful to say explicitly that the concern about location
 privacy is restricted to media; hiding the client's location from the Web
 server is handled by things like ToR, and signaling privacy is constrained
 by the signaling protocol (e.g. SIP privacy, etc.).

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |      Owner:  draft-ietf-rtcweb-
  [email-masked]          |  [email-masked]
     Type:  defect                   |     Status:  new
 Priority:  minor                    |  Milestone:  milestone1
Component:  security                 |    Version:  1.0
 Severity:  In WG Last Call          |   Keywords:
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/wg/rtcweb/trac/ticket/7>
rtcweb <http://tools.ietf.org/rtcweb/>

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From: "rtcweb issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 17 Feb 2013 17:20:16 -0000

#7: Section 4.2.4

Comment (by [email-masked]):

 Section 5.4 of the Security-Arch document mentions ToR.  Does it make
 sense to move some of that material to Section 4.1 of this document?

 Severity:  In WG Last Call          |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |

Ticket URL: <https://wiki.tools.ietf.org/wg/rtcweb/trac/ticket/7#comment:1>
rtcweb <http://tools.ietf.org/rtcweb/>