Subject: [Rucus] [Fwd: I-D Action:draft-schwartz-rucus-problem-statement-01.txt]

From: Hannes Tschofenig <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2008 17:35:28 +0200

FYI

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	I-D Action:draft-schwartz-rucus-problem-statement-01.txt
Date: 	Mon, 18 Feb 2008 07:15:01 -0800 (PST)
From: 	[email-masked]
Reply-To: 	[email-masked]
To: 	[email-masked]

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.

	Title           : RUCUS Problem Statement
	Author(s)       : D. Schwartz
	Filename        : draft-schwartz-rucus-problem-statement-01.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2008-02-18

SIP is being used more an more today for everyday communication
purposes.  With this widespread adoption comes the inevitability of
abuse.  This document describes the problems that fit into the
category of "unwanted Communication".

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-schwartz-rucus-problem-statement-01.txt

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From: Otmar Lendl <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2008 22:11:17 +0100

> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-schwartz-rucus-problem-statement-01.txt

Two quick comments:

I'm a bit stumped that "Misrepresentation" lists "Telemarketing" as an
example. Based on my (rare) experiences with cold-call telemarketing
in the real world I'd rate "Telemarketing" as RUCUS without any
"Misrepresentation" as to who is calling.

I'm missing DoS (intentional and by software error) as category for 
"unwanted communication".

/ol
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---

From: David Schwartz <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2008 23:35:07 +0200

> "Misrepresentation" as to who is calling.

DS: This is a good catch. Telemarketing actually belongs to the "Lack- 
of-policy" group where there is no malice only annoyance.
> "unwanted communication".

DS: I didn't want to turn this into a general "VoIP Threat document"  
so I tried to focus on end-to-end communication threats (including  
number harvesting which leads to a call). (The "underprivileged"  
remained in by accident as this too is more of a system threat than an  
"unwanted communication" one.)

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---

From: Dan York <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2008 18:46:14 -0500

> of-policy" group where there is no malice only annoyance.

DY> Yes, this was one of my points, too, so I agree it needs to move.

> "unwanted communication" one.)

DY> I completely agree with this statement.  We need to scope this  
group appropriately or else we will never accomplish anything.  We  
can't address  all the VoIP security threats, but we can take a look  
at a subset related to unwanted communication.

DY> I'll follow up with more comments on the overall document soon.

Regards,
Dan

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---

From: Otmar Lendl <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2008 06:52:40 +0100

> "unwanted communication" one.)

David,

the scoping makes sense as you propose it. 

It might be helpful for your draft to explicitely list a few things
that you intentionally left out of scope in order to make it clear
that they were not forgotten.

/ol

---

From: "Charzinski, Joachim (NSN - DE/Muenich)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2008 09:16:28 +0100

> that they were not forgotten.

Does that mean you want to deal with unwanted communication only 
up to the degree that it is still nuisance and not yet DoS? 
In my opinion, there is a continuum of cases between simple nuisance
and real DoS, which is hard to distinguish technically. 
Just consider these two DoS-by-SPIT examples:
1. private subscribers receive so many annoying calls that they do 
   not pick up the phone anymore
2. enterprise line (fixed or mobile) receives a large number of calls 
   (e.g. >20) during the night that are recorded on the voice box.
   The next morning, the targeted employee will waste a lot of time 
   listening to the calls. If the calls targeted a larger number of 
   employees, it might even lead to instability of the voice box 
   system.

Is there any good reason for excluding these scenarios? Their intent 
might be different, but the technical methods and thus the appearance 
in the network will be similar to "ordinary" SPIT. 

Joachim.

----------------------------------------------------------
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Joachim Charzinski
Principal Innovator

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