Subject: [saag] FW: Kerberos WG IETF72 meeting summary

From: Larry Zhu <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2008 05:12:14 -0700

________________________________
From: Larry Zhu
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 5:11 AM
To: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: Kerberos WG IETF72 meeting summary

This is a SUMMARY of the Kerberos WG meeting held this week in Dublin of Ireland as part of the 72st IETF meeting. Full minutes will be posted on a later date.

-- larry

Kerberos Working Group - IETF 72 meeting summary

ACTION ITEMS:
* Nicolas Williams - send an updated version of set-change password
* Chairs - finish review and writeup of cross-realm problem statement
* Larry Zhu – respond to one last comment to the naming draft
* Larry Zhu – follow up on the remaining comments for the anonymous ID
* Leif Johansson – summarize discussions on missing attributes in the data model document
* Gareth Richard – respond to existing and future comments for the OTP currently in WGLC
* Sam Hartman and Larry Zhu – resolving open issues in the Kerberos preauth framework document
* Larry Zhu and Tim Polk – validation of KDF test vectors and followup
* Shoichi Sakane – Explain to the list why DNS is not acceptable for the DHCPv6 options.
* chairs – writeup of summary of starttls discussion
*shawn Emery – update the hash agility document per agreements in last meeting and the list
* Larry Zhu – refresh IAKERB and get it ready for WGLC

DECISIONS (to be validated):
* “SHOULD” remove AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS in the anonymos draft
* restrict anonymous PKINIT to full anonymous and turn off KDC’s ability to add back partial anonymity
* add a padata to PKINIT to enforce the ticket session is derived from the DH or ECDH exchange.

SESSION SUMMARY:

We reviewed the status of several documents that are working their way
through the queue, and discussed several documents which have recently
concluded IETF or Working Group Last Call.

•         The set-change password document is waiting for an updated version which the author didn't quite get in before the meeting, and then it will go to Tim and the IESG.

•         The cross-realm problem statement document finished WG last call some time ago, and has been waiting for the chairs to finish their review and writeup.

•         All issues for PKINIT ECC document has been resolved and is waiting for go-ahead from Tim.

•         There were comments for missing attributes in the data-model documents. Leif is to follow up with a summary of discussion to the list. A new revision and another last call are expected.

•         There were a few remaining issues for the anonymous draft, and a new revision is expected. No decision is made whether another last call is necessary.  The working group had two decision to be validated on the list: 1) SHOULD” remove AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS in the anonymos draft, 2) restrict anonymous PKINIT to full anonymous and turn off KDC’s ability to add back partial anonymity

•         There is one comment unresolved for the naming draft and it is expected to be straightforward.

•         The last revision of the hash agility document does not address all the comments, and Shawn is to publish a new revision.

•         The PKINIT KDF document need test vectors to be validated.

The OTP document is currently in working group last call.

We then proceeded to the technical discussion section. Sam Hartman reviewed recent updates to the Preauth Framework document and discussed open issues. We discussed a MITM issue under one specific configuration where the channel is established using anonymous Diffie-Hellman. This issue was discovered in the context of the encrypted challenge preauth data type introduced in the last revision, and the working group discussed several options to fix the issue. One way to fix it is to combine the long term key with the replaced key. We discussed unique channel binding using anonymous PKINIT. In addition, we will add a padata to PKINIT to combine the reply key with the ticket session key thus no party can unilaterally determine the ticket session key. The ticket key is later used in Kerberos preauth framework in naming the outer channel, with the additional change to combine the client session key and ticket session to form the armor key, no party can unilaterally determine the armor key.

At the open mic, Shoichi Sakane mentioned the proposal he brought to
the dhc working group to create a DHCPv6 option for identifying a KDC. There is no support in the working group and Shoichi is asked to explain to the list why DNS is not acceptable in the applicable environment.
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