Subject: [saag] fyi: Dan Geer: Tradeoffs in Cyber Security [9 October 13, UNCC[

From: =JeffH <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 08:27:46 -0700

.Tradeoffs in Cyber Security
.Dan Geer, 9 October 13, UNCC
<http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt>

Thank you for the invitation to speak with you today, which, let
me be clear, is me speaking as myself and not for anybody or anything
else.  As you know, I work the cybersecurity trade, and I am gratified
that ten days ago the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, on behalf
of the Department of Homeland Security, concluded that cybersecurity
should be seen as an occupation and not a profession because the
rate of change is too great to consider professionalization.[1]
That rate of change is why cybersecurity is perhaps the most
intellectually demanding occupation on the planet.  In writing this
essay, the breadth of tradeoffs in cyber security and that fundamental
intellectual challenge in those tradeoffs caused me to choose to
narrow my focus to one class of tradeoffs in cyber security rather
than them all; looking at the state of the current world, I decided
to focus on personal data and the government.

I am not yet old in chronologic years when compared to the life
expectancies that obtain in the United States of 2013, but measured
in Internet years I'm an ancient.  Ancient-ness makes it tempting
to just tell stories that begin with "In my day" which, if nothing
else, proves that you are no longer in the century in which you
actually belong.  Stories are good, but as economist Roger Brinner
so succinctly said, "The plural of anecdote is not data."

Except that maybe it, or something like it, is.  In a gathering of
this size you can play a game that I'll just describe rather than
play.  Ask for an audience volunteer willing to answer a mildly
embarrassing question, something as mild as "How many pairs of
never-used underwear do you own?"  Then see if that volunteer will
take a second question, and make it similarly mild such as "Have
you ever had an evil grin while wrapping a birthday gift?"  If you
keep going at this game, the volunteer will become uneasy and no
one will get to the proverbial "twenty questions."  Why?  Because
the subject realizes that you are publicly triangulating them, that
data fusion of even mild, innocuous questions has the effect of
painting a picture.  In this game, the questions cannot be mild
enough to be innocuous in sum.  In point of fact, the more inane
the questions are, the more inane the picture painted becomes.

If you get to pick the questions and the subject is sufficiently
willing to keep answering them, then you can pretty much box in
your subject however you like.  Politicians know that the surest
way to win an argument is, as they say, to "frame the question" by
which they mean painting a picture that their opposition has to
work to overcome.  The better practitioners at the political version
of this game can impose a considerable work factor on their opponents,
one that is not unlike what we here call a denial of service.  Every
time there is a televised debate where some self-important interlocutor
asks a question that is impossible to answer succinctly, and then
gives the candidate sixty seconds of airtime, painting into a corner
by way of selective disclosure is what is happening.

I previously worked for a data protection company.  Our product
was, and I believe still is, the most thorough on the market.  By
"thorough" I mean the dictionary definition, "careful about doing
something in an accurate and exact way."  To this end, installing
our product instrumented every system call on the target machine.
Data did not and could not move in any sense of the word "move"
without detection.  Every data operation was caught and monitored.
It was total surveillance data protection.  Its customers were
companies that don't accept half-measures.  What made this product
stick out was that very thoroughness, but here is the point: Unless
you fully instrument your data handling, it is not possible for you
to say what did not happen.  With total surveillance, and total
surveillance alone, it is possible to treat the absence of evidence
as the evidence of absence.  Only when you know everything that
*did* happen with your data can you say what did *not* happen with
your data.

The alternative to total surveillance of data handling is to answer
more narrow questions, questions like "Can the user steal data with
a USB stick?" or "Does this outbound e-mail have a Social Security
Number in it?"  Answering direct questions is exactly what a defensive
mindset says you must do, and that is "never make the same mistake
twice."  In other words, if someone has lost data because of misuse
of some facility on the computer, then you either disable that
facility or you wrap it in some kind of perimeter.  Lather, rinse,
and repeat.  This extends all the way to such trivial matters as
timer-based screen locking.

The difficulty with the defensive mindset is that it leaves in place
the fundamental strategic asymmetry of cybersecurity, namely that
while the workfactor for the offender is the price of finding a new
method of attack, the workfactor for the defender is the cumulative
cost of forever defending against all attack methods yet discovered.
Over time, the curve for the cost of finding a new attack and the
curve for the cost of defending against all attacks to date cross.
Once those curves cross, the offender never has to worry about being
out of the money.  I believe that that crossing occurred some time
ago.

The total surveillance strategy is, to my mind, an offensive strategy
used for defensive purposes.  It says "I don't know what the
opposition is going to try, so everything is forbidden unless we
know it is good."  In that sense, it is like whitelisting applications.
Taking either the application whitelisting or the total data
surveillance approach is saying "That which is not permitted is
forbidden."

The essential character of a free society is this: That which is
not forbidden is permitted.  The essential character of an unfree
society is the inverse, that which is not permitted is forbidden.
The U.S. began as a free society without question; the weight of
regulation, whether open or implicit, can only push it toward being
unfree.  Under the pressure to defend against offenders with a
permanent structural advantage, defenders who opt for forbidding
anything that is not expressly permitted are encouraging a computing
environment that does not embody the freedom with which we are
heretofore familiar.

This brings us to the larger question.  No one in this room needs
to be told that more and more data is collected and more and more
of that data is in play.  The general dynamics of change are these:
Moore's Law continues to give us two orders of magnitude in compute
power per dollar per decade while storage grows at three orders of
magnitude and bandwidth at four.  These are top-down economic
drivers.  As such, the future is increasingly dense with stored
data but, paradoxically, despite the massive growth of data volume,
that data becomes more mobile with time.

Everyone here knows the terminology "attack surface" and knows that
one of the defender's highest goals is to minimize the attack surface
wherever possible.  Every coder adhering to a security-cognizant
software lifecycle program does this.  Every company or research
group engaged in static analysis of binaries does this.  Every
agency enforcing a need-to-know regime for data access does this.
Every individual who reserves one low-limit credit card for their
Internet purchases does this.  I might otherwise say that any person
who encrypts their e-mail to their closest counterparties does this,
but because consistent e-mail encryption is so rare, encrypting
one's e-mail marks it for collection and indefinite retention by
those entities in a position to do so, regardless of what country
you live in.

Data retention for observable data is growing by legislative fiat
seemingly everywhere.  The narrow logic is sound, namely if data
has passed through your hands then that you retain it has no new
risk for the transmitter and may contain valuable protections against
malfeasance.  In parallel with the game I proposed at the outset,
neither you nor I would be concerned with some entity having access
to one of our transmitted messages, but 1000 of them is a different
story, and all-of-them forever is a different world.

I have not yet said the phrase that is the title of this talk, which
is "Tradeoffs in Cyber Security."  Perhaps you will soon see why
I am slow to do so.  As is frequently noted, in the United States
90+% of the critical infrastructure is in private hands.  With each
passing day Internet-dependent services become more essential to
what I will for the moment call "normal life."  As we have seen,
the Government's response to the growing pervasiveness of Internet
services held in private hands is deputize the owners of those
services against their will.  The entire imbroglio around ISPs, the
NSA, and so forth and so on comes down to that -- if the government
does not itself own the critical infrastructure, those that do own
it can and will be compelled to become government agents.  In the
21st century, we have a physical army of volunteers but a digital
army of conscripts.

At the core of it all there is data.  The great majority of attacks
target data acquisition.  The work of surveillance is, per se,
targeted data acquisition.  There is considerable irony in the
Federal Communications Commission classifying the Internet as an
information service and not as a communications service insofar as
while that may have been a gambit to relieve ISPs of telephone-era
regulation, the value of the Internet is ever more the bits it
carries, not the carriage of those bits.  The FCC decisions are
both several and now old, the FCC classified cable as an information
service in 2002, classified DSL as an information service in 2005,
classified wireless broadband as an information service in 2007,
and classified broadband over power lines as an information service
in 2008.  A decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on this
very point is pending as we speak: Is the Internet a telecommunications
service or an information service?

If I ran the zoo, I would call up the ISPs and say

   Hello, Uncle Sam here.

   You can charge whatever you like based on the contents of what
   you are carrying, but you are responsible for that content if it
   is illegal; inspecting brings with it a responsibility for what
   you learn.
    -or-
   You can enjoy common carrier protections at all times, but you
   can neither inspect nor act on the contents of what you are
   carrying and can only charge for carriage itself.  Bits are bits.

   Choose wisely.  No refunds or exchanges at this window.

We humans can design systems more complex than we can then operate.
The financial sector's "flash crashes" are an example of that;
perhaps the fifty interlocked insurance exchanges for Obamacare
will soon be another.  Above some threshold of system complexity,
it is no longer possible to test, it is only possible to react to
emergent behavior.  Even the lowliest Internet user is involved --
one web page can easily touch scores of different domains.  While
writing this, the top level page from cnn.com had 400 out-references
to 85 unique domains each of which is likely to be similarly
constructed and all of which move data one way or another.  If you
leave those pages up and they have an auto-refresh, then moving to
a new network signals to every one of those ad networks that you
have done so.

We have known for some time that traffic analysis is more powerful
than content analysis.  If I know everything about to whom you
communicate including when, where, with what inter-message latency
and at what length, then I know you.  If all I have is the undated,
unaddressed text of your messages, then I am an archaeologist, not
a case officer.  The soothing mendacity of proxies for the President
saying "It's only metadata" relies on the ignorance of the listener.

But this is not an attack on the business of intelligence.  The
Intelligence Community is operating under the rules it knows, most
of which you, too, know, and the goal states it has been tasked to
achieve.  The center of gravity for policy is those goal states.

We all know the truism, that knowledge is power.  We all know that
there is a subtle yet important distinction between information and
knowledge.  We all know that a negative declaration like "X did not
happen" can only proven true if you have the enumeration of
*everything* that did happen and can show that X is not in it.  We
all know that when a President says "Never again" he is asking for
the kind of outcome for which proving a negative, lots of negatives,
is categorically essential.  Proving a negative requires omniscience.
Omniscience requires god-like powers.

Perhaps the point is that the more technologic the society becomes,
the greater the dynamic range of possible failures.  When you live
in a cave, starvation, predators, disease, and lightning are about
the full range of failures that end life as you know it and you are
well familiar with all of them.  When you live in a technologic
society where everybody and everything is optimized in some way
akin to just-in-time delivery, the dynamic range of failures is
incomprehensibly larger and largely incomprehensible.  The wider
the dynamic range of failure, the more prevention is the watchword.
Cadres of people charged with defending masses of other people must
focus on prevention, and prevention is all about proving negatives.
Therefore, one must conclude that as technologic society grows more
interdependent within itself, the more it must rely on prediction
based on data collected in broad ways, not targeted ways.

Spoken of in this manner, intelligence agencies that hoover up
everything are reacting rationally to the demand that they ensure
"Never again" comes true.  Not only that, the more complex the
society they are charged with protecting becomes, the more they
must surveil, the more they must analyze, the more data fusion
becomes their only focus.

Part of the picture is that it is categorically true that technology
is today far more democratically available than it was yesterday
and less than it will be tomorrow.  3D printing, the whole "maker"
community, DIY biology, micro-drones, search, constant contact with
whomever you choose to be in constant contact with -- these are all
examples of democratizing technology.  This is perhaps our last
fundamental tradeoff before the Singularity occurs: Do we, as a
society, want the comfort and convenience of increasingly technologic,
invisible digital integration enough to pay for those benefits with
the liberties that must be given up to be protected from the downsides
of that integration?

This is not a Chicken Little talk, it is an attempt to preserve if
not make a choice while choice is still relevant.  We are ever more
a service economy, but every time an existing service disappears
into the cloud, our vulnerability to its absence increases.  Every
time we ask the government to provide goodnesses that can only be
done with more data, we are asking government to collect more data.
Let me ask a yesterday question: How do you feel about traffic jam
detection based on the handoff rate between cell towers of those
cell phones in use in cars on the road?  Let me ask a today question:
How do you feel about auto insurance that is priced from a daily
readout of your automobile's black box?  Let me ask a tomorrow
question: In what calendar year will compulsory auto insurance be
more expensive for the driver who insists on driving their car
themselves rather than letting a robot do it?  How do you feel about
public health surveillance done by requiring Google and Bing to
report on searches for cold remedies and the like?  How do you feel
about a Smart Grid that reduces your power costs and greens the
atmosphere but reports minute-by-minute what is on and what is off
in your home?  Have you or would you install that toilet that does
a urinalysis with every use?

How do you feel about using standoff biometrics as a solution to
authentication?  At this moment in time, facial recognition is
possible at 500 meters, iris recognition is possible at 50 meters,
and heart-beat recognition is possible at 5 meters.  Your dog can
identify you by smell; so, too, can an electronic dog's nose.  Your
cell phone's accelerometer is plenty sensitive enough to identify
you by gait analysis.  There are 3+ billion new photos online each
month, and even if you've never uploaded photos of yourself someone
else has.  All of these are data dependent, cheap, convenient, and
none of them reveal anything that is a secret as we currently
understand the term "secret" yet the sum of them is greater than
the parts.

Everyone in this room knows how and why passwords are a problem.
At the same time, passwords may be flatly essential for a reason
that requires I read a paragraph from Marcia Hofmann's September
12th piece in Wired[2]

    If the police try to force you to divulge the combination to a
    wall safe, your response would reveal the contents of your mind
    and so would implicate the Fifth Amendment.  (If you've written
    down the combination on a piece of paper and the police demand
    that you give it to them, that may be a different story.)

    To invoke Fifth Amendment protection, there may be a difference
    between things we have or are -- and things we know.  The important
    feature about PINs and passwords is that they're generally
    something we know.  These memory-based authenticators are the
    type of fact that benefit from strong Fifth Amendment protection
    should the government try to make us turn them over against our
    will.  Indeed, last year a federal appeals court held that a man
    could not be forced by the government to decrypt data.

    But if we move toward authentication systems based solely on
    physical tokens or biometrics -- things we have or things we
    are, rather than things we remember -- the government could
    demand that we produce them without implicating anything we know.
    Which would make it less likely that a valid privilege against
    self-incrimination would apply.

As Hofmann notes, a Court could find otherwise and set a different
precedent, but her analysis is cautionary.  Perhaps a balance of
power requires the individual actually does have some secrets.  But
is having some secrets the same as having some privacy?

No society, no people need rules against things which are impossible.
Today I observe a couple fornicating on a roof top in circumstances
where I can never know who the couple are.  Do they have privacy?
The answer is "no" if your definition of privacy is the absence of
observability.  The answer is "yes" if your definition of privacy
is the absence of identifiability.

Technical progress in image acquisition guarantees observability
pretty much everywhere now.  Those standoff biometrics are delivering
multi-factor identifiability at ever greater distances.  We will
soon live in a society where identity is not an assertion like "My
name is Dan," but rather an observable like "Sensors confirm that
is Dan."  With enough sensors, concentration camps don't need to
tatoo their inmates.  How many sensors are we installing in normal
life?

If data kills both privacy as impossible-to-observe and privacy as
impossible-to-identify, then what might be an alternative?  If you
are an optimist or an apparatchik, then your answer will tend toward
rules of procedure administered by a government you trust or control.
If you are a pessimist or a hacker/maker, then your answer will
tend towards the operational, and your definition of a state of
privacy will be mine: the effective capacity to misrepresent yourself.

Misrepresentation is using disinformation to frustrate data fusion
on the part of whomever it is that is watching you.  Misrepresentation
means paying your therapist in cash under an assumed name.
Misrepresentation means arming yourself not at Walmart but in living
rooms.  Misrepresentation means swapping affinity cards at random
with like-minded folks.  Misrepresentation means keeping an inventory
of misconfigured webservers to proxy through.  Misrepresentation
means putting a motor-generator between you and the Smart Grid.
Misrepresentation means using Tor for no reason at all.  Misrepresentation
means hiding in plain sight when there is nowhere else to hide.
Misrepresentation means having not one digital identity that you
cherish, burnish, and protect, but having as many as you can.  Your
identity is not a question unless you work to make it be.

The Obama administration's issuance of a National Strategy for
Trusted Identities in Cyberspace is case-in-point; it "calls for
the development of interoperable technology standards and policies
-- an 'Identity Ecosystem' -- where individuals, organizations, and
underlying infrastructure -- such as routers and servers -- can be
authoritatively authenticated."  If you can trust a digital identity,
that is because it can't be faked.  Why does the government care
about this?  It cares because it wants to digitally deliver government
services and it wants attribution.  Is having a non-fake-able digital
identity for government services worth the registration of your
remaining secrets with that government?  Is there any real difference
between a system that permits easy, secure, identity-based services
and a surveillance system?  Do you trust those who hold surveillance
data on you over the long haul by which I mean the indefinite
retention of transactional data between government services and
you, the individual required to proffer a non-fake-able identity
to engage in those transactions?  If you are building authentication
systems today, then you are playing in this league.

Standoff biometry by itself terminates the argument over whether
security and privacy are a zero sum game -- the sum is nowhere near
that good, and it is the surveilled who are capitalizing the system.
As with my game, entirely innocuous things become problematic when
surveilled.  Shoshana Zuboff, Harvard Business School Emerita,
called this "anticipatory conformity" and said:

    [W]e anticipate surveillance and we conform, and we do that with
    awareness. We know, for example, when we're going through the
    security line at the airport not to make jokes about terrorists
    or we'll get nailed, and nobody wants to get nailed for cracking
    a joke.  It's within our awareness to self-censor.  And that
    self-censorship represents a diminution of our freedom.  We
    self-censor not only to follow the rules, but also to avoid the
    shame of being publicly singled out.  Once anticipatory conformity
    becomes second nature, it becomes progressively easier for people
    to adapt to new impositions on their privacy, their freedoms.
    The habit has been set.

Leonard Downie, the former executive editor of The Washington Post,
wrote in that very paper on October 4th:

    Many reporters covering national security and government policy
    in Washington these days are taking precautions to keep their
    sources from becoming casualties in the Obama administration's
    war on leaks.  They and their remaining government sources often
    avoid telephone conversations and e-mail exchanges, arranging
    furtive one-on-one meetings instead.  A few news organizations
    have even set up separate computer networks and safe rooms for
    journalists trained in encryption and other ways to thwart
    surveillance.[3]

Once again, this is all about data and, to the exact point, about
fused data from many sources.  Do you like it?  Do you not like it?
All you engineers know that for the engineer, it is "fast, cheap,
reliable: choose two."  I am here to argue that for policy makers
working the cybersecurity beat, it is "freedom, security, convenience:
choose two."  But so long as policy makers in a democracy eventually
come around to the people's desires, my argument, such as it is,
is with the public at large, not with those who are trying to deliver
failure-proof protection to an impatient, risk-averse, gadget-addicted
population.

We learned in the financial crisis that there are levels of achievable
financial return that require levels of unsustainable financial
risk.  We learned that lesson on the large scale and on the small,
on the national scale and on the personal one.  I would like us to
not have to learn the parallel lesson with respect to data that
powers the good versus data that powers the bad.  If we can, for
the moment, think of data as a kind of money, then investing too
much our own data in an institution too big to influence is just
as insensate as investing too much of our own money in an institution
too big to fail.

I have become convinced that all security tools and all the data
that they acquire are, as they say in the military, dual use -- the
security tools and their data can be used for good or for ill.  I
am similarly convinced that the root cause, the wellspring of risk
is dependence, especially dependence on expectations of system
state.  If you would accept that you are most at risk from the
things you most depend upon, then damping dependence is the cheapest,
most straightforward, lowest latency way to damp risk.  This is,
in further analogy, just like the proven fact that the fastest and
most reliable way to put more money on the bottom line is through
cost control.  John Gilmore famously said, "Never give a government
a power you wouldn't want a despot to have."  I might amend that
to read "Never demand the government have a power you wouldn't want
a despot to have."

I have also become convinced that a state of security is one in
which there is no unmitigatable surprise, that is to say that you
have reached a state of security when you can mitigate the surprises
you will face.  Note that I did not say a state of security is the
absence of surprise, but rather the absence of unmitigatable surprise.
California Senate Bill 1386, the first of the state-level data
breach laws, did not criminalize losing credit card data; rather,
it prescribed the actions that a firm which has lost the credit
card data of its customers must take.  SB1386 is wise in that regard.

But only rarely do we ask our Legislatures to make mitigation
effective.  Instead, over and over again we ask our Legislatures
to make failure impossible.  When you embark on making failure
impossible, and that includes delivering on statements like "Never
again," you are forced into cost-benefit analyses where at least
one of the variables is infinite.  It is not heartless to say that
if every human life is actually priceless, then it follows that
there will never be enough money.  One is not anti-government to
say that doing a good job at preventing terrorism is better than
doing a perfect job.

And there is the Gordian Knot of this discussion: As society becomes
more technologic, even the mundane comes to depend on distant digital
perfection.  Our food pipeline contains less than a week's supply,
just to take one example, and that pipeline depends on digital
services for everything from GPS driven tractors to robot vegetable
sorting machinery to coast-to-coast logistics to RFID-tagged
livestock.  Is all the technologic dependency and the data that
fuels it making us more resilient or more fragile?

In cybersecurity practice, in which most of us here work, we seem
to be getting better and better.  We have better tools, we have
better understood practices, and we have more colleagues.  That's
the plus side.  But I'm interested in the ratio of skill to challenge,
and as far as I can estimate, we are expanding the society-wide
attack surface faster than we are expanding our collection of tools,
practices, and colleagues.  If you are growing more food, that's
great.  If your population is growing faster than your improvements
in food production can keep up, that's bad.  As with most decision
making under uncertainty, statistics have a role, particularly ratio
statistics that magnify trends so that the latency of feedback from
policy changes is more quickly clear.  Yet statistics, too, require
data.

In medicine, we have well established rules about medical privacy.
Those rules are helpful.  Those rules also have holes big enough
to drive a truck through.  Regardless, when you check into the
hospital there is an accountability-based, need-to-know regime that
governs your data most days.  However, if you check in with Bubonic
Plague or Anthrax, you will have zero privacy as those are mandatory
data reporting conditions.  So I ask you, would it make sense in a
public health of the Internet way to have a mandatory reporting
regime for cybersecurity failures?  Do you favor having to report
penetrations of your firm or household to the government or face
criminal charges for failing to make that report?  Is that data
that you want to share?  Sharing it can only harm you.  It might
help others.

This is not, in fact, about you personally.  Even Julian Assange,
in his book _Cypherpunks_, said "Individual targeting is not the
threat."  It is about a culture where personal data is increasingly
public data, and assembled en masse.  All we have to go on now is
the hopeful phrase "A reasonable expectation of privacy" but what
is reasonable when one inch block letters can be read from orbit?
What is reasonable when all of your financial or medical life is
digitized and available primarily over the Internet?  Do you want
ISPs to retain e-mails when you are asking your doctor a medical
question (or, for that matter, do you want those e-mails to become
part of your Electronic Health Record)?  Who owns your medical data
anyway?  Until the 1970s, it was the patient but regulations then
made it the provider.  With an Electronic Health Record, it is
likely to revert to patient ownership but if the EHR belongs to
you, do you get to surveil the use that is made of it by medical
providers and those that they outsource to?  And if not, why not?

Observability is fast extending to devices.  Some of it has already
appeared, such as the fact that any newish car is broadcasting four
unique Bluetooth radio IDs, one for each tire's valve stem.  Some
of it is in a daily progression, such as training our youngsters
to accept surveillance by stuffing a locator beacon in their backpack
as soon as they go off to Kindergarten.  Some of it is newly
technologic, like through the wall imaging, and some of it is simply
that we are now surrounded by cameras that we can't even see where
no one camera is important but they are important in the aggregate
when their data is fused.  Anything that has "wireless" in its name
creates an opportunity for traffic analysis.

In the days of radio, there was Sarnoff's Law, namely that the value
of a broadcast network was proportional to N, the number of listeners.
Then came packetized network communications and Metcalfe's Law,
that the value of a network was proportional to N squared, the
number of possible two-way conversations.  We are now in the era
of Reed's Law where the value of a network is proportional to the
number of groups that can form in it, that is to say 2 to the power
N.  Reed's Law is the new reality because it fits the age of social
networks.  In tune with my claim that everything is dual use, any
entity (such as a government) that can acquire the entirety of all
social media transactions learns nearly everything there is to
learn, and all in one place, and all courtesy of the participants
themselves.  The growth of social networks is a surveiller's dream
come true.

Total system complexity from a security person's point of view is
essentially just geometry.  Security is non-composable -- we can
get insecure results even when our systems are assembled from secure
components.  The more components, the less likely a secure result.
Might the same be said of data?  Of course it can -- search for the
term "reidentification" and you'll find that incomplete data, even
intentionally anonymized data, can be put together if there is
enough of it, and what is enough seems to be a lower hurdle every
year.  Put differently, if you share one fact each with ten different
people, how many of the ten have to be compromised before you are
exposed?

Howard Brin was the first to suggest that if you lose control over
what data is collected on you, the only freedom-preserving alternative
is that if everyone else does, too.  If the government or the
corporation can surveil you without asking, then the balance of
power is preserved when you can surveil them without asking.  Bruce
Schneier countered that preserving the balance of power doesn't
mean much if the effect of new information is non-linear, that is
to say if new information is the exponent in an equation, not one
more factor in a linear sum.[4]  Solving that debate requires you
have a strong opinion on what data fusion means operationally to
you, to others, to society.

There is some axiom of Nature at work here.  Decision making under
uncertainty is what we do in the small, and what policy makers do
in the large.  Uncertainty is partial information, so it is natural
to want information that is less partial.  We are closing in on
having more information than we can use.  The Intelligence Community
has felt the heat of too much information to handle for some time.
The business community is feeling it now insofar as it is far cheaper
to keep everything than it is to do careful selective deletion.
The individual is feeling pretty warm, too, as evidenced by something
as simple as how much they depend on the ability to search their
e-mail rather than folderizing it after reading.

I have amassed all the fortune I am going to amass.  I have raised
all the children I am going to raise.  I have made all the commitments
I am going to make.  I am old enough that I can opt out of many of
the corporate data collection schemes and live out the remainder
of my days unaffected by what I might be missing out on.  That those
corporations are agents of government data collection means that
for now I am opting out of some of that as well.  Anyone under 40
has no such option, or at least no such easy option.  Everything I
am talking about here is a young person's problem, just like the
National Debt, which the young will soon inherit.  It is your choice
and responsibility whether to demand protections and conveniences
and services that can only be done with pervasive data.  It is your
choice and responsibility whether to fear only fear itself or to
fear the absence of fear.  It is your choice and responsibility to
be part of the problem or part of the solution.

Any finite tolerance for risk caps the amount of information you
will want in play.  This has nothing whatsoever to do with whether
you have anything to hide, and therefore it is your choice and
responsibility to make it understood that just as "..there is nothing
sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to [minimize] taxes"[5]
neither is there anything sinister in minimizing the data collectible
from you.  The price of freedom is the probability of crime.  But
as technology progresses, your choice will not be between Big Brother
or no Big Brother, rather it is already between one Big Brother and
lots of Little Brothers.  Think carefully, yours is the last
generation that will have a choice.

As Dylan Thomas wrote, "Do not go gentle into that good night//
Rage, rage against the dying of the light."

Thank you for hearing me out.

--------------

[1] "Professionalizing the Nation's Cyber Workforce?"
www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=18446

[2] "Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can't 'Take the Fifth'," Marcia Hofmann
www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/the-unexpected-result-of-fingerprint-authentication-that-you-cant-take-the-fifth

[3] "In Obama's War on Leaks, Reporters Fight Back," Leonard Downie
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-obamas-war-on-leaks-reporters-fight-b
ack/2013/10/04/70231e1c-2aeb-11e3-b139-029811dbb57f_print.html

[4a] "The Myth of the 'Transparent Society'," Bruce Schneier
www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/03/securitymatters_0306
[4b] "Rebuttal," David Brin
www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2008/03/brin_rebuttal

[5] Judge Learned Hand, COMMISSIONER V. NEWMAN, 159 F.2D 848, 850-851
(CA2 1947): "Over and over again, the courts have said there is
nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as
low as possible.  Everybody does so, rich and poor, and all do
right, for nobody owes any duty to pay more tax than the law demands.
Taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions.  To
demand more in the name of morals is mere cant."

---
end

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From: Scott Brim <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 13:08:27 -0400

This is fantastic.  Thanks.

It illumines something: Surveillance by governments is not the biggest of
our problems. Privacy in the ordinary operation of a technology-based
society is significantly bigger. Criminals, big business ... but also
businesses and casual individuals have access to data you wish they didn't.
Yes the IETF needs to do better with crypto and authentication, but the
fundamental designs of the protocols they are being added to need to
support them.  From the bottom up, we need to proactively (not reactively)
make sure that IETF protocol designs take privacy into consideration.

Scott