Subject: [saag] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-eastlake-randomness3-00.txt

From: Donald Eastlake <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 15:29:24 -0500

This is a starting point for an RFC4086bis. I think it has quite a
ways to go. At the Security Directorate meeting (which is currently in
progress), the idea of a separate mailing to discuss randomness, this
document, etc., met with general approval. So you might want to wait
until that is announced plus a day or two for people to sign up,
before posting. But, regardless, if you feel like sending comments to
the authors of this draft, feel free to do so.

Thanks,
Donald
=============================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
 [email-masked]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:  <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 2:23 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-eastlake-randomness3-00.txt
To: Steve Crocker <[email-masked]>, "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd"
<[email-masked]>, "Jeffrey I. Schiller" <[email-masked]>, Charlie
Kaufman <[email-masked]>

A new version of I-D, draft-eastlake-randomness3-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Donald E. Eastlake and posted to the
IETF repository.

Filename:        draft-eastlake-randomness3
Revision:        00
Title:           Randomness Requirements for Security
Creation date:   2013-11-05
Group:           Individual Submission
Number of pages: 53
URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-eastlake-randomness3-00.txt
Status:          http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-eastlake-randomness3
Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-eastlake-randomness3-00

Abstract:
   Security systems are built on strong cryptographic algorithms that
   foil pattern analysis attempts. However, the security of these
   systems is dependent on generating secret quantities for passwords,
   cryptographic keys, and similar values. The use of pseudo-random
   processes to generate secret quantities can result in pseudo-
   security.  For example, the sophisticated attacker of these security
   systems may find it easier to reproduce the environment that produced
   the secret quantities, searching a resulting small set of
   possibilities, than to locate the quantities in the whole of the
   potential number space.

   Choosing random quantities to foil a resourceful and motivated
   adversary can be surprisingly difficult. This document points out
   many pitfalls in using poor entropy sources or traditional pseudo-
   random number generation techniques for generating such quantities.
   It recommends the use of multiple sources with a strong mixing
   function, so that no single source need be fully trusted, and
   provides techniques for extending a random seed to a larger quantity
   of pseudo-random material in a cryptographically secure way. And it
   gives examples of how large such quantities need to be for some
   applications. This document obsoletes RFC 4086.

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