Subject: [saag] Fwd: ANRP presentations at IETF-95

From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 16:52:02 +0000

FYI, some relevant talk @ IETF-95 if you're there and
not otherwise busy

Cheers,
S

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: ANRP presentations at IETF-95
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 16:34:47 +0000
From: Eggert, Lars <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked] <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked] <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
<[email-masked]>, [email-masked] <[email-masked]>

Hi,

we are extremely pleased to report that for the 2016 award period of
the Applied Networking Research Prize (ANRP), 53 eligible nominations
were received. Each submission was reviewed by several members of the
selection committee selection committee according to a diverse set of
criteria, including scientific excellence and substance, timeliness,
relevance, and potential impact on the Internet.

Based on this review, six submissions are awarded an Applied
Networking Research Prize in 2016. Two prize winners will present
their work at the IRTF Open Meeting during IETF-95 in Buenos Aires,
Argentina. The ANRPs for IETF-95 go to:

*** Roya Ensafi *** for examining how the Chinese "great firewall"
discovers hidden circumvention servers:

    Roya Ensafi, David Fifield, Philipp Winter, Nick Feamster,
    Nicholas Weaver, and Vern Paxson. Examining How the Great Firewall
    Discovers Hidden Circumvention Servers. Proc. ACM Internet
    Measurement Conference (IMC), Tokyo, Japan, October 28-30, 2015.

*** Zakir Durumeric *** for an empirical analysis of email delivery
security:

    Zakir Durumeric, David Adrian, Ariana Mirian, James Kasten, Elie
    Bursztein, Nicolas Lidzborski, Kurt Thomas, Vijay Eranti, Michael
    Bailey, and J. Alex Halderman. Neither Snow Nor Rain Nor MITM… An
    Empirical Analysis of Email Delivery Security. Proc. ACM Internet
    Measurement Conference (IMC), Tokyo, Japan, October 28-30, 2015.

Please subscribe to the IRTF-Announce mailing list in order to receive
future calls for ANRP nominations and join ISOC to stay informed of
other networking research initiatives:

    https://irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/irtf-announce
    https://isoc.org/join

Regards,

Lars Eggert, IRTF Chair            https://irtf.org/anrp
Mat Ford, Internet Society         https://isoc.org/research/

2016 ANRP Selection Committee

Mark Allman, ICIR
Marcelo Bagnulo, UC3M
Lou Berger, LabN
KC Claffy, CAIDA
Mark Crovella, Boston University
Lars Eggert, NetApp
Stephen Farrell, Trinity College Dublin
Nick Feamster, Princeton
Mat Ford, ISOC
Lisandro Granville, UFRGS
Volker Hilt, Bell Labs
Suresh Krishnan, Ericsson
Al Morton, AT&T Laboratories
Jörg Ott, Aalto University
Colin Perkins, University of Glasgow
Aiko Pras, University of Twente
Jürgen Schönwälder, Jacobs University Bremen
Joe Touch, USC/ISI
Rolf Winter, Hochschule Augsburg
Lixia Zhang, UCLA

---

From: Yoav Nir <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 19:40:18 +0200

> On 10 Mar 2016, at 6:52 PM, Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]> wrote:
> 
> 

Yeah. Too bad it’s at the same time as TLS.

Yoav

---

From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 18:41:10 +0000

> Yeah. Too bad it’s at the same time as TLS.

Indeed. For whatever reason we had many SEC area conflicts
this time around and we've not been able to get rid of them
all. Sorry for that, but it's not always doable

Cheers,
S.

---

From: Viktor Dukhovni <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 20:05:22 +0000

> all. Sorry for that, but it's not always doable

There'll likely be presentations of revised/updated versions of
some of the material in the future.

The "Neither Snow Nor Rain Nor MITM" paper presents results from
April 2015, but already significant changes have occurred.

    * In mid-February 2016 Google's transparency report is showing
      a significantly larger overall volume of inbound STARTTLS,
      from ~58% of all inbound mail to ~68% of all inbound email.

      This is likely largely the result of some large bulk senders
      enabling STARTTLS, but is nevertheless progress towards
      ubiquitous STARTTLS use.

    * Preferential use of RC4 in SMTP STARTTLS by large providers
      has ceased since the measurements reported from 2014/2015.
      RC4-only systems (Exchange 2003 and some old Email security
      appliances) have become significantly more rare.

    * Support for EXPORT ciphers started to diminish with LOGJAM,
      and will I expect drop substantially as MTA operators take
      steps to remediate DROWN.

    * Postfix 3.1.0 makes it much easier for O/S distributions to
      enable STARTTLS both inbound and outbound at installation
      time. http://www.postfix.org/postfix-tls.1.html

    * The "Let's Encrypt" CA is recently starting to get some
      traction.  One data-point is that of the ~1460 MX hosts that
      support DANE TLS ~180 have LE certificates.  Of the latter
      1/6th are "mail in box" MTAs that make it easy to deploy a
      turn-key system with LE certs, DNSSEC, DANE, ...
      https://mailinabox.email/

      So people looking for "trusted" certificates in peer SMTP
      servers should start to see a greater share of SMTP servers
      with "trusted" certificates.  (Which CAs one should trust,
      and how well the domain control is verified by the CA remains
      a tricky question).

    * DANE support is still growing, and with luck will see greater
      adoption once OpenSSL 1.1.0 with built-in DANE support becomes
      available in "current" O/S distributions later this year.
      DANE SMTP moving from draft to RFC in October 2015 should
      also help.

    * In October of 2015 I had found 24 domains with DANE TLS
      records that were "large enough" to have been listed in
      Google's email transparency report at some point in the last
      ~2 years.  That domain count is now 34.  The gentoo.org and
      mail.com domains are the two most recent additions.  The
      overall number of DANE domains I've found is now at 11.5k up
      from ~7k.  [ Some of that increase is due to expansion of
      the set of domains scanned. ]  So while DANE use is still
      very small, it continues to grow.

Yes, STARTTLS in SMTP is still opportunistic, and active downgrade
attacks cannot be avoided in many cases.  However the landscape
continues to evolve.

-- 
	Viktor.