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Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2002 15:10:28 -0500
From: Al Arsenault <awa1@comcast.net>
Subject: Meeting Minutes from 53rd IETF
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Cc: Magnus Nystrom <magnus@rsasecurity.com>, stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie
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Folks,

    After factoring in comments receiving, and smoothing out the wording =
somewhat in a couple of places, these are the final meeting minutes from =
the SACRED Working Group meeting at the 53rd IETF in Minneapolis, MN.

    It's been two weeks since the draft minutes were posted to the list, =
and there have been no new comments received in over a week.  So, unless =
there's something that I really got wrong but nobody's commented on =
before, these will stand as the final minutes of the meeting.

    Thanks,

            Al Arsenault
           =20

 =
_________________________________________________________________________=
_______________________________________

Meeting minutes - SACRED Working Group meeting, 53rd IETF, Minneapolis, =
MN

Meeting Chair:  Magnus Nystrom, RSA Security.  (Co-chair Stephen Farrell =
missed the meeting for personal reasons.)

Magnus started the meeting by going over the agenda, which was as =
follows:

Introduction, agenda walkthrough, WG status - Magnus Nystrom

Framework draft - Dale Gustafson

Protocol draft - Merlin Hughes

Updated milestones - Magnus Nystrom

All Other Business

Since there were no objections to the proposed agenda, Magnus started =
with the WG status.  He began by reviewing the objectives of this =
working group, and the objectives of this session.  He then summarized =
the WG status as follows:

There are 2 I-D's: the Framework ID; the current version is version -03, =
which was submitted in February; and the protocol I-D.  The current =
version of that is version -02, which was also submitted in February.

Dale Gustafson then spoke on the Framework draft, which is co-authored =
by himself, Mike Just, and Magnus Nystrom. Dale started by reviewing the =
SACRED Network architecture.  He noted that the purpose of the =
architecture is to allow credentials to be uploaded or downloaded into a =
variety of devices. The WG's job is to define a protocol between =
end-user device and credential server.  Management/administration of =
credential server is beyond the scope of this WG's charter.

Dale then summarized comments from the SACRED mailing list on previous =
drafts of the framework document. There were lots of comments in the =
August - December timeframe, so the authors went through list archives =
for comments that apply to the framework draft. They also harmonized the =
framework draft with the latest SACRED protocol draft. =20

Draft -03 was posted to the mailing list March 4th and again on March =
6th (it was the same version). The most important change from draft -02 =
is the reordering of several document sections.  The authors are waiting =
for comments from WG members to be posted on the mailing list.

Issues remaining on the Framework document include:

-          ID/fingerprint: the framework document was updated to use =
ID/fingerprint for all conditional operations (per recent list =
discussion), but the latest protocol draft uses the "last update" =
method. Should the authors change the framework document to match the =
protocol document, or leave it as is?

-          Security considerations section: the authors would like to =
ask mailing list members to review this section, and determine whether =
or not it is complete.=20

Dale then summarized plans for draft-04. The authors expect minimal or =
no changes for this document going forward. They will put out a revised =
draft soon, and expect WG last call in May 2002.

Merlin Hughes then summarized the Protocol document, written by Stephen =
Farrell.  Version -02 is current.  Merlin summarized the changes from =
the  -01 draft. He then identified the issues that are still open.  =
These include:=20

-          the "multiple substrates" issue;=20

-          the SASL authorization identity issue;=20

-          should we apply for a port number;=20

-          should the DTD or the schema be considered normative;=20

-          fix the DTD extensibility scheme;=20

-          should we specify a max value where "unbounded" is in the =
schema.

Multiple substrates issue:  this relates to how the protocol should be =
defined, and whether it should be bound tightly to a single lower-layer =
protocol stack, or left open for implementation on top of a variety of =
protocol stacks/transport mechanisms.  There was lots of discussion of =
this issue on the list, and at the Salt Lake City IETF meeting, but no =
clear consensus.  Currently, the document defines the bindings for the =
SACRED protocol to run over BEEP.  Since there was no clear consensus to =
change this, it was decided to leave the protocol the way it is.  Anyone =
who wants to modify the protocol to run over some other transport =
service will have to do the work himself.  Magnus Nystrom asked whether =
the WG felt that the protocol document should be left the way it is, =
with the PDUs, bindings, and protocol spec all in the same document; or =
would it be better to split the protocol into two documents, with the =
PDUs and bindings in a separate document, to make later implementation =
of the protocol on another transport easier.  The WG consensus was to =
leave it as a single document.

SASL authorization identity issue: the document does not address this at =
this moment. Bob Morgan suggested that this be modified to explicitly =
state that this is undefined.  That is now legal under the SASL =
document.  There was consensus to do this; Bob was asked to provide =
words for the document.

Applying for a port number: There was consensus that the WG needs to =
apply for a port number for its protocol.  It was also pointed out that =
it might be appropriate to register a service name and/or a URI, as SASL =
requires that all protocols making use of it have a registered GSSAPI =
service name.  It was agreed that we ought to register a service name.

DTD or schema being normative: The WG seemed to favor having the schema =
be normative, and drop the DTD.

DTD Extensibility scheme:  Stephen has agreed to fix this in the next =
draft; there was no further discussion.

Specifying a max value:  The consensus of the group was to leave this as =
"unbounded".

Merlin stated that Stephen's plan is as follows: once the meeting =
minutes from this meeting are published, a summary of issue resolutions =
will be sent to the list.  Then, Stephen will wait a week, and publish =
the -03 protocol draft.  He hopes for WG last call on -03.  If all goes =
well, that'll be in May.

Magnus then proposed a suggested new WG schedule.  For the framework =
document, he proposed to have the -04 I-D in April; take that to last =
call in May, and submit the Framework document to IESG in August for =
publication as an Informational RFC.

For the Protocol document, he proposed taking the Protocol I-D to WG =
last call in June.  (This assumes that there will actually be a couple =
more iterations of the document, to address last-minute comments.) The =
Protocol will be submitted to IESG in September for publication as a =
Standards-track RFC.

Magnus noted that the Protocol document has a dependency on SASL-SRP =
draft, so it can't actually be published as an RFC until after that =
document is done. Magnus asked if anyone had any insights into the =
progression of the SASL-SRP draft.  Lawrence Greenfield said that the =
last he knew, there were no outstanding issues on that draft, and he has =
no real idea what's holding it up.  Thus, it's possible that the block =
from SASL-SRP will soon be removed.

Given all of that, Bob Morgan suggested that there don't seem to be =
three months' of protocol issues left to be resolved; maybe the work =
will actually progress faster than the proposed schedule.  Magnus said =
that that would be good; but it's probably better to set a schedule and =
beat it than to set a more aggressive schedule and slip.

Bob Morgan noted that there might be IPR concerns around SRP that could =
hold this work up.  Jeff Schiller said that the IPR situation around SRP =
is "a mess". =20

David Jablon gave a quick presentation on draft-jablon-speke-00.txt. =
This individual I-D describes several password authenticated key =
exchange methods, including SPEKE, and discusses their relation to other =
methods and patents, including a Phoenix patent.  Toward the end of the =
presentation, Jeff Schiller asked David whether this is a technology =
that is patented by Phoenix, but in order to use it one has to ask =
Phoenix for license terms.  David asked Jeff if it's proper to discuss =
license terms in an IETF meeting.  Jeff answered no, it's not proper.  =
David answered yes, Phoenix has a patent, with terms obtainable by =
asking. Jeff Schiller stated that it was inappropriate to be soliciting =
business in this manner.=20

The meeting ended at 1400.

--Boundary_(ID_rUaceaV1OxJybez7mLJdeQ)
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<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Folks,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; After factoring in comments 
receiving, and smoothing out the wording somewhat in a couple of places, these 
are the final meeting minutes from the SACRED Working Group meeting at the 53rd 
IETF in Minneapolis, MN.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It's been two weeks since 
the draft minutes were posted to the list, and there have been no new comments 
received in over a week.&nbsp; So, unless there's&nbsp;something that I really 
got wrong but nobody's commented on before, these will stand as the final 
minutes of the meeting.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Thanks,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Al Arsenault</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;________________________________________________________________________________________________________________</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<P class=MsoNormal>Meeting minutes &#8211; SACRED Working Group meeting, 
53<SUP>rd</SUP> IETF, Minneapolis, MN</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Meeting Chair:<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; 
</SPAN>Magnus Nystrom, RSA Security.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; 
</SPAN>(Co-chair Stephen Farrell missed the meeting for personal reasons.)</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Magnus started the meeting by going over the agenda, which 
was as follows:</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Introduction, agenda walkthrough, WG status &#8211; Magnus 
Nystrom</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Framework draft &#8211; Dale Gustafson</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Protocol draft &#8211; Merlin Hughes</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Updated milestones &#8211; Magnus Nystrom</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>All Other Business</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Since there were no objections to the proposed agenda, Magnus 
started with the WG status.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>He 
began by reviewing the objectives of this working group, and the objectives of 
this session.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>He then summarized 
the WG status as follows:</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>There are 2 I-D&#8217;s: the Framework ID; the current version is 
version &#8211;03, which was submitted in February; and the protocol I-D.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>The current version of that is version 
&#8211;02, which was also submitted in February.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Dale Gustafson then spoke on the Framework draft, which is 
co-authored by himself, Mike Just, and Magnus Nystrom. Dale started by reviewing 
the SACRED Network architecture.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>He 
noted that the purpose of the architecture is to allow credentials to be 
uploaded or downloaded into a variety of devices. The WG&#8217;s job is to define a 
protocol between end-user device and credential server.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Management/administration of credential 
server is beyond the scope of this WG&#8217;s charter.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Dale then summarized comments from the SACRED mailing list on 
previous drafts of the framework document. There were lots of comments in the 
August &#8211; December timeframe, so the authors went through list archives for 
comments that apply to the framework draft. They also harmonized the framework 
draft with the latest SACRED protocol draft.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Draft &#8211;03 was posted to the mailing list March 4<SUP>th</SUP> 
and again on March 6<SUP>th</SUP> (it was the same version). The most important 
change from draft &#8211;02 is the reordering of several document sections.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>The authors are waiting for comments 
from WG members to be posted on the mailing list.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Issues remaining on the Framework document include:</P>
<P class=MsoNormal 
style="MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">-<SPAN 
style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
</SPAN>ID/fingerprint: the framework document was updated to use ID/fingerprint 
for all conditional operations (per recent list discussion), but the latest 
protocol draft uses the &#8220;last update&#8221; method. Should the authors change the 
framework document to match the protocol document, or leave it as is?</P>
<P class=MsoNormal 
style="MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">-<SPAN 
style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
</SPAN>Security considerations section: the authors would like to ask mailing 
list members to review this section, and determine whether or not it is 
complete. </P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Dale then summarized plans for draft-04. The authors expect 
minimal or no changes for this document going forward. They will put out a 
revised draft soon, and expect WG last call in May 2002.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Merlin Hughes then summarized the Protocol document, written 
by Stephen Farrell.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Version &#8211;02 is 
current.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Merlin summarized the 
changes from the<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>&#8211;01 draft. He then 
identified the issues that are still open.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; 
</SPAN>These include: </P>
<P class=MsoNormal 
style="MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">-<SPAN 
style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
</SPAN>the &#8220;multiple substrates&#8221; issue; </P>
<P class=MsoNormal 
style="MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">-<SPAN 
style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
</SPAN>the SASL authorization identity issue; </P>
<P class=MsoNormal 
style="MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">-<SPAN 
style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
</SPAN>should we apply for a port number; </P>
<P class=MsoNormal 
style="MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">-<SPAN 
style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
</SPAN>should the DTD or the schema be considered normative; </P>
<P class=MsoNormal 
style="MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">-<SPAN 
style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
</SPAN>fix the DTD extensibility scheme; </P>
<P class=MsoNormal 
style="MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">-<SPAN 
style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
</SPAN>should we specify a max value where &#8220;unbounded&#8221; is in the schema.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Multiple substrates issue:<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>this relates to how the protocol should 
be defined, and whether it should be bound tightly to a single lower-layer 
protocol stack, or left open for implementation on top of a variety of protocol 
stacks/transport mechanisms.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>There 
was lots of discussion of this issue on the list, and at the Salt Lake City IETF 
meeting, but no clear consensus.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; 
</SPAN>Currently, the document defines the bindings for the SACRED protocol to 
run over BEEP.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Since there was no 
clear consensus to change this, it was decided to leave the protocol the way it 
is.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Anyone who wants to modify the 
protocol to run over some other transport service will have to do the work 
himself.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Magnus Nystrom asked 
whether the WG felt that the protocol document should be left the way it is, 
with the PDUs, bindings, and protocol spec all in the same document; or would it 
be better to split the protocol into two documents, with the PDUs and bindings 
in a separate document, to make later implementation of the protocol on another 
transport easier.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>The WG consensus 
was to leave it as a single document.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>SASL authorization identity issue: the document does not 
address this at this moment. Bob Morgan suggested that this be modified to 
explicitly state that this is undefined.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; 
</SPAN>That is now legal under the SASL document.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>There was consensus to do this; Bob was 
asked to provide words for the document.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Applying for a port number: There was consensus that the WG 
needs to apply for a port number for its protocol.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>It was also pointed out that it might be 
appropriate to register a service name and/or a URI, as SASL requires that all 
protocols making use of it have a registered GSSAPI service name.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>It was agreed that we ought to register 
a service name.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>DTD or schema being normative: The WG seemed to favor having 
the schema be normative, and drop the DTD.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>DTD Extensibility scheme:<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Stephen has agreed to fix this in the 
next draft; there was no further discussion.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Specifying a max value:<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; 
</SPAN>The consensus of the group was to leave this as &#8220;unbounded&#8221;.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Merlin stated that Stephen&#8217;s plan is as follows: once the 
meeting minutes from this meeting are published, a summary of issue resolutions 
will be sent to the list.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Then, 
Stephen will wait a week, and publish the &#8211;03 protocol draft.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>He hopes for WG last call on &#8211;03.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>If all goes well, that&#8217;ll be in May.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Magnus then proposed a suggested new WG schedule.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>For the framework document, he proposed 
to have the &#8211;04 I-D in April; take that to last call in May, and submit the 
Framework document to IESG in August for publication as an Informational 
RFC.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>For the Protocol document, he proposed taking the Protocol 
I-D to WG last call in June.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>(This 
assumes that there will actually be a couple more iterations of the document, to 
address last-minute comments.) The Protocol will be submitted to IESG in 
September for publication as a Standards-track RFC.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Magnus noted that the Protocol document has a dependency on 
SASL-SRP draft, so it can&#8217;t actually be published as an RFC until after that 
document is done. Magnus asked if anyone had any insights into the progression 
of the SASL-SRP draft.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Lawrence 
Greenfield said that the last he knew, there were no outstanding issues on that 
draft, and he has no real idea what&#8217;s holding it up.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Thus, it&#8217;s possible that the block from 
SASL-SRP will soon be removed.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Given all of that, Bob Morgan suggested that there don&#8217;t seem 
to be three months&#8217; of protocol issues left to be resolved; maybe the work will 
actually progress faster than the proposed schedule.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Magnus said that that would be good; but 
it&#8217;s probably better to set a schedule and beat it than to set a more aggressive 
schedule and slip.</P>
<P class=MsoNormal>Bob Morgan noted that there might be IPR concerns around SRP 
that could hold this work up.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Jeff 
Schiller said that the IPR situation around SRP is &#8220;a mess&#8221;.<SPAN 
style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal>David Jablon gave a quick presentation on 
draft-jablon-speke-00.txt. This individual I-D describes several password 
authenticated key exchange methods, including SPEKE, and discusses their 
relation to other methods and patents, including a Phoenix patent.&nbsp; Toward 
the end of the presentation, Jeff Schiller asked David whether this is a 
technology that is patented by Phoenix, but in order to use it one has to ask 
Phoenix for license terms.&nbsp; David asked Jeff if it's proper to discuss 
license terms in an IETF meeting.&nbsp; Jeff answered no, it's not proper.&nbsp; 
David answered yes, Phoenix has a patent, with terms obtainable by asking. Jeff 
Schiller stated that it was inappropriate to be soliciting business in this 
manner. </P>
<DIV><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">The 
meeting ended at 1400.</SPAN></DIV></BODY></HTML>

--Boundary_(ID_rUaceaV1OxJybez7mLJdeQ)--


From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Thu Apr  4 07:54:03 2002
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Hi,

This mail is to ask for your comments on the W3C XKMS 
requirements document. See below for details.

Sorry for the short notice - however, we will welcome comments 
for a while after the official end of the last-call period.

Thanks,
Stephen.

On behalf of the W3C XML Key Managment Service WG [1], we are 
pleased to announce the publication of the "XKMS Requirements" 
Last Call Working Draft.  This is one of the deliverables of 
the WG.  The document address is:

  http://www.w3.org/TR/xkms2-req

Abstract 

This document lists the design principles, scope and requirements 
for XML Key Management specifications and trust server key management 
implementations. It includes requirements as they relate to the key 
management syntax, processing, security and coordination with other 
standards activities. 

Status of this Document 

This is the Last Call for the requirements Working Draft of the XML Key 
Management Working Group (Activity Statement). This version represents the 
consensus of the Working Group. The last call period is 3 weeks, ending on 
15 April 2002.

Please send review comments by that date to the editors - fjh@alum.mit.edu, 
mike.just@entrust.com and cc: www-xkms@w3.org, shivaram.mysore@sun.com, 
stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie

[1]  http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS

-- 
____________________________________________________________
Stephen Farrell         				   
Baltimore Technologies,   tel: (direct line) +353 1 881 6716
39 Parkgate Street,                     fax: +353 1 881 7000
Dublin 8.                mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie
Ireland                             http://www.baltimore.com


From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Sat Apr  6 03:43:02 2002
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From: John Viega <viega@securesw.com>
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I've just reviewed the SRP/SASL draft, and I have some comments that I
hope will be somewhat useful.  Some of these might be dead wrong... my
apologies in advance.
=20
1) I don't really like the method for protecting against key reuse
problems.  First, SRP doesn't really have a key reuse problem, even
when used with a stream cipher (or block cipher in a stream mode)
assuming the PRNG used on each side is securely seeded, and assuming
there's no resumption mechanism (which there isn't as far as I could
see). =20

Second, if there is a key reuse problem, from my first reading, at
least, the search space is only 2^16, which is too low.  I think this
is probably just underspecified, although I don't see why one wouldn't
just use a completely random IV, instead of using a null IV.  Probably
the additional k-4 octets in the block are meant to be random?

Third, even with the above construction assumed, the way I read it, it
does not do what it is intended to do.  In OFB, given a particular key
and IV, they keystream is constant.  Neither the plaintext nor the
ciphertext impacts the keystream.  The description indicates that the
first block should be the special value that "makes up for the IV"
(let's call it N).  Since the IV in OFB is the first block of
plaintext to the ECB encryption when generating the keystream, that
can't be what N is. =20

Encryption with OFB doesn't really work on blocks, so any other
description doesn't make so much sense.  Assuming the spec means the
first k octets of the keystream, then I have to assume that the first
N bits of plaintext are set to N.  The plaintext doesn't affect the
keystream, though, which is the intent of N.

2) Why OFB?  OFB has really been losing in popularity recently to
counter mode, because they largely have the same properties, except
that counter mode allows for random access and parallel computation of
the keystream.  CTR mode is now a NIST-recommended mode of operation,
and has provable security properties, assuming the security of the
underlying block cipher.  There's no compelling reason to use OFB over
CTR mode. =20

3) I don't understand why one would ever want to make encryption,
integrity and replay resistance optional.  I'd prefer to see a
specification that's easy to implement and apply securely.  If
everything other than authentication is optional, then security
against common network attacks is the responsibility of the people
applying the protocol, which is, IMHO very bad.  I suppose that
allowing for insecure usage caters to those who want to use SRP in
some environments where SASL is already being used insecurely.  In
that case, why not allow, but perhaps recommend against?

4) There are lots of ambiguities in the spec, from what I can tell.
For example, the shared secret one derives from SRP is twice the
digest length of the hash function.  It isn't well-specified how to
convert the shared secret into the keys used for the encryption and
message authentication.  I assume simple truncation, but why not use
seprate halves of the output to key the MAC and the cipher separately?

5) I wonder if people would consider the CCM-AES encryption mode as
the only mode, or the only required mode.  CCM-AES is proposed for the
new 802.11 security standard, and, from what I've heard, it is
expected to be fast-tracked through NIST to become an approved mode
for AES.  It essentially combines CTR mode with CBC-MAC using a single
key.  It is patent unencumbered.  It is provably secure, and simple to
implement.  Additionally, to streamline things, I think the server
proof should be mandatory.

Even if people don't agree with a "simpler is better" philosophy, how
would CCM-AES (or OCB mode for that matter) be specified?  It's an
encryption algorithm, but it does integrity, and it isn't clear at all
how such a thing would be specified.

6) For parameter generation, I'd like to see a requirement for secure
seeding of the PRNG, and use of a cryptographically secure PRNG. =20

7) What happens when tampering is detected?  How is an exception
signaled?  Is *abortion* actually required, or can one side request a
retransmission?  I'd like more specification here, and it'd be great
if connections could survive a non-sustained integrity attack.

8) The specication does say that the two OFB states (on the client and
server ends) need to be in lockstep.  This implies that there can be
no asynchronous sending of messages, lest there be a race condition on
the state.  I consider that quite a drawback for some protocols.  I'd
love to see an option for supporting asynchronous connections by using
two encryption contexts. =20

9) How do the sides know how long the plaintexts for individual
messages are??  That's not specified, as far as I could find.  I see a
specification for the maximum ciphertext buffer size, though.

10) The section on padding is totally baffling to me.  OFB has no need
for padding.  The unused bytes of the key stream can be saved for the
next message.  This seems totally superfluous, or am I missing
something?

John
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From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Mon Apr  8 07:39:22 2002
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Hi all,

Well, from reports of the sacred meeting it seems that though 
we've managed to bottom out all the previously known issues with 
the current draft, we still need to make some more changes to 
remove the dependence on SASL-SRP, given the uncertain future 
progress of that draft.

So if we want to progress the sacred protocol, we need to agree 
on some approach that doesn't suffer the same uncertainty.

Here's what appears to be a possible plan:-

1. remove srp dependencies from protocol document
2. make beep over tls mandatory to implement and pick 
   a "traditional" password based sasl scheme (hopefully
   with salt, iteration and digest - suggestions on a 
   postcard please!)
3. add/change security considerations to the effect that
   credential servers supporting the "must implement" 
   option do get to see a value that allows them to 
   mount a dictionary attack

As long as item 2 isn't controversial, this shouldn't take
very long.

What do we all think of doing this?

Sigh,
Stephen.

PS: I don't see much point in issuing a new protocol draft until
we sort this one out, let me know if you disagree with that.


-- 
____________________________________________________________
Stephen Farrell         				   
Baltimore Technologies,   tel: (direct line) +353 1 881 6716
39 Parkgate Street,                     fax: +353 1 881 7000
Dublin 8.                mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie
Ireland                             http://www.baltimore.com


From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Mon Apr  8 09:18:13 2002
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Subject: RE: protocol progress...
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2002 15:14:18 +0100
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Stephen,

Text such as the following is in the "APEX", "SOAP over BEEP" and other
BEEP profiles. Would you consider it or something similar for SACRED? 

It is much more likely BEEP implementions will automatically support a
common set of security considerations (so SACRED implementors will have
less work to do). 

Eamon

======================

Section 8 of
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-etal-beep-soap-06.txt

"8. Security Considerations

   Although service provisioning is a policy matter, at a minimum, all
   implementations must provide the following tuning profiles:

   for authentication: http://iana.org/beep/SASL/DIGEST-MD5

   for confidentiality: http://iana.org/beep/TLS (using the
      TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher)

   for both: http://iana.org/beep/TLS (using the
      TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher supporting client-side
      certificates)"





From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Tue Apr  9 15:09:46 2002
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Stephen,

If uncertainty about the SASL-SRP draft is an issue, why not go with 
SRP/TLS, or some other strong password solution?  Item 2 requires a 
weakening in the previously agreed-to security requirements, which seems 
like a Bad Thing.

Tom

Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> Well, from reports of the sacred meeting it seems that though 
> we've managed to bottom out all the previously known issues with 
> the current draft, we still need to make some more changes to 
> remove the dependence on SASL-SRP, given the uncertain future 
> progress of that draft.
> 
> So if we want to progress the sacred protocol, we need to agree 
> on some approach that doesn't suffer the same uncertainty.
> 
> Here's what appears to be a possible plan:-
> 
> 1. remove srp dependencies from protocol document
> 2. make beep over tls mandatory to implement and pick 
>    a "traditional" password based sasl scheme (hopefully
>    with salt, iteration and digest - suggestions on a 
>    postcard please!)
> 3. add/change security considerations to the effect that
>    credential servers supporting the "must implement" 
>    option do get to see a value that allows them to 
>    mount a dictionary attack
> 
> As long as item 2 isn't controversial, this shouldn't take
> very long.
> 
> What do we all think of doing this?
> 
> Sigh,
> Stephen.
> 
> PS: I don't see much point in issuing a new protocol draft until
> we sort this one out, let me know if you disagree with that.
> 
> 
> 



-- 
Tom Wu
Principal Software Engineer
Arcot Systems
(408) 969-6124
"The Borg?  Sounds Swedish..."



From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Thu Apr 18 07:14:22 2002
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Hi Tom,

Sorry for the slow response.

Tom Wu wrote:
> 
> Stephen,
> 
> If uncertainty about the SASL-SRP draft is an issue, why not go with
> SRP/TLS, or some other strong password solution?  

What's the status of the SRP/TLS work?

> Item 2 requires a
> weakening in the previously agreed-to security requirements, which seems
> like a Bad Thing.

I'm not sure that a zero-knowledge requirement was inclcuded, but in any
case I guess we have to either make progress or wait until whatever issues
bedevil SRP-SASL get solved.

Stephen.

> 
> Tom
> 
> Stephen Farrell wrote:
> >
> > Hi all,
> >
> > Well, from reports of the sacred meeting it seems that though
> > we've managed to bottom out all the previously known issues with
> > the current draft, we still need to make some more changes to
> > remove the dependence on SASL-SRP, given the uncertain future
> > progress of that draft.
> >
> > So if we want to progress the sacred protocol, we need to agree
> > on some approach that doesn't suffer the same uncertainty.
> >
> > Here's what appears to be a possible plan:-
> >
> > 1. remove srp dependencies from protocol document
> > 2. make beep over tls mandatory to implement and pick
> >    a "traditional" password based sasl scheme (hopefully
> >    with salt, iteration and digest - suggestions on a
> >    postcard please!)
> > 3. add/change security considerations to the effect that
> >    credential servers supporting the "must implement"
> >    option do get to see a value that allows them to
> >    mount a dictionary attack
> >
> > As long as item 2 isn't controversial, this shouldn't take
> > very long.
> >
> > What do we all think of doing this?
> >
> > Sigh,
> > Stephen.
> >
> > PS: I don't see much point in issuing a new protocol draft until
> > we sort this one out, let me know if you disagree with that.
> >
> >
> >
> 
> --
> Tom Wu
> Principal Software Engineer
> Arcot Systems
> (408) 969-6124
> "The Borg?  Sounds Swedish..."

-- 
____________________________________________________________
Stephen Farrell         				   
Baltimore Technologies,   tel: (direct line) +353 1 881 6716
39 Parkgate Street,                     fax: +353 1 881 7000
Dublin 8.                mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie
Ireland                             http://www.baltimore.com


From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Thu Apr 18 11:52:20 2002
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Stephen,


Stephen Farrell wrote:

> Hi Tom,
>
> Sorry for the slow response.
>
> Tom Wu wrote:
> >
> > Stephen,
> >
> > If uncertainty about the SASL-SRP draft is an issue, why not go with
> > SRP/TLS, or some other strong password solution?
>
> What's the status of the SRP/TLS work?
>
> > Item 2 requires a
> > weakening in the previously agreed-to security requirements, which seems
> > like a Bad Thing.
>
> I'm not sure that a zero-knowledge requirement was inclcuded, but in any
> case I guess we have to either make progress or wait until whatever issues
> bedevil SRP-SASL get solved.

I think the requirement has centered on:

1) mutual authentication (in most cases), and
2) negotiate or derive a session key known only to credential server and
roaming client.

Strong-pw is a very good way to do that.  Don't think we can afford to give
ground on the requirements -- they seem pretty basic for credential exchange.

Other alternatives are:

 - TLS with any other SASL mechanism(s) that provide both 1) and 2).
 - SRP/TLS
 - sTLS with a client password :-(
 - other?

Best Regards,

Dale Gustafson



>
>
> Stephen.
>
> >
> > Tom
> >
> > Stephen Farrell wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > Well, from reports of the sacred meeting it seems that though
> > > we've managed to bottom out all the previously known issues with
> > > the current draft, we still need to make some more changes to
> > > remove the dependence on SASL-SRP, given the uncertain future
> > > progress of that draft.
> > >
> > > So if we want to progress the sacred protocol, we need to agree
> > > on some approach that doesn't suffer the same uncertainty.
> > >
> > > Here's what appears to be a possible plan:-
> > >
> > > 1. remove srp dependencies from protocol document
> > > 2. make beep over tls mandatory to implement and pick
> > >    a "traditional" password based sasl scheme (hopefully
> > >    with salt, iteration and digest - suggestions on a
> > >    postcard please!)
> > > 3. add/change security considerations to the effect that
> > >    credential servers supporting the "must implement"
> > >    option do get to see a value that allows them to
> > >    mount a dictionary attack
> > >
> > > As long as item 2 isn't controversial, this shouldn't take
> > > very long.
> > >
> > > What do we all think of doing this?
> > >
> > > Sigh,
> > > Stephen.
> > >
> > > PS: I don't see much point in issuing a new protocol draft until
> > > we sort this one out, let me know if you disagree with that.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> > --
> > Tom Wu
> > Principal Software Engineer
> > Arcot Systems
> > (408) 969-6124
> > "The Borg?  Sounds Swedish..."
>
> --
> ____________________________________________________________
> Stephen Farrell
> Baltimore Technologies,   tel: (direct line) +353 1 881 6716
> 39 Parkgate Street,                     fax: +353 1 881 7000
> Dublin 8.                mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie
> Ireland                             http://www.baltimore.com



From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Thu Apr 18 12:21:24 2002
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Stephen Farrell wrote:

> Hi Tom,
>
> Sorry for the slow response.
>
> Tom Wu wrote:
> >
> > Stephen,
> >
> > If uncertainty about the SASL-SRP draft is an issue, why not go with
> > SRP/TLS, or some other strong password solution?

There are IPR issues with SRP in general, so from this prospective there is no
difference between SASL-SRP and SRP/TLS.
Am I wrong?

> What's the status of the SRP/TLS work?
>
> > Item 2 requires a
> > weakening in the previously agreed-to security requirements, which seems
> > like a Bad Thing.
>
> I'm not sure that a zero-knowledge requirement was included, but in any
> case I guess we have to either make progress or wait until whatever issues
> bedevil SRP-SASL get solved.
>
> Stephen.

Alexey Melnikov
__________________________________________
R & D, ACI Worldwide/MessagingDirect
Richmond, Surrey, UK
Phone: +44 20 8332 4508

I speak for myself only, not for my employer.
__________________________________________




From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Sat Apr 20 21:11:20 2002
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Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> 
>>Hi Tom,
>>
>>Sorry for the slow response.
>>
>>Tom Wu wrote:
>>
>>>Stephen,
>>>
>>>If uncertainty about the SASL-SRP draft is an issue, why not go with
>>>SRP/TLS, or some other strong password solution?
>>>
> 
> There are IPR issues with SRP in general, so from this prospective there is no
> difference between SASL-SRP and SRP/TLS.
> Am I wrong?

Did you have a specific IPR issue that concerned you?  Stanford's 
royalty-free IPR statement is on file with the IETF.  We should be 
careful not to make decisions based on rumors.

>>What's the status of the SRP/TLS work?
>>
>>
>>>Item 2 requires a
>>>weakening in the previously agreed-to security requirements, which seems
>>>like a Bad Thing.
>>>
>>I'm not sure that a zero-knowledge requirement was included, but in any
>>case I guess we have to either make progress or wait until whatever issues
>>bedevil SRP-SASL get solved.
>>
>>Stephen.
>>
> 
> Alexey Melnikov
> __________________________________________
> R & D, ACI Worldwide/MessagingDirect
> Richmond, Surrey, UK
> Phone: +44 20 8332 4508
> 
> I speak for myself only, not for my employer.
> __________________________________________
> 
> 

Tom

-- 
Tom Wu
Principal Software Engineer
Arcot Systems
(408) 969-6124
"The Borg?  Sounds Swedish..."



From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Sun Apr 21 06:06:04 2002
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Tom,

> Stanford's royalty-free IPR statement is on file with the IETF. 

True, and that is much appreciated, but ... 

.. has any company/organization other than Stanford make IPR claims
about SRP? If so, what are those claims, how valid are they, and are any
of those making the claims NOT prepared to offer royalty-free IPR on
them?

If the technically excellent SRP were totally free from royalty-bearing
IPR claims, I would be happy to see it used, otherwise a different
solution is needed. 

Eamon




From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Mon Apr 22 08:41:11 2002
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Eamon O'Tuathail wrote:

> Tom,
>
> > Stanford's royalty-free IPR statement is on file with the IETF.
>
> True, and that is much appreciated, but ...
>
> .. has any company/organization other than Stanford make IPR claims
> about SRP? If so, what are those claims, how valid are they, and are any
> of those making the claims NOT prepared to offer royalty-free IPR on
> them?

That is exactly the case. I am not in any shape or form an expert on IPR
issues, but I've got impression that some organization (other than Stanford)
has IPR claims for SRP. Can somebody clarify that?

> If the technically excellent SRP were totally free from royalty-bearing
> IPR claims, I would be happy to see it used, otherwise a different
> solution is needed.

Alexey
__________________________________________
R & D, ACI Worldwide/MessagingDirect
Richmond, Surrey, UK
Phone: +44 20 8332 4508

I speak for myself only, not for my employer.
__________________________________________




From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Mon Apr 22 10:51:12 2002
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Phoenix Technologies' statement can be found at:

http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/PHOENIX-SRP-RFC2945.txt

I think we will have to accept that the IPR situation is unclear at the
moment, and will continue to be so for some time. As long as we base our
security on a framework like SASL, however, it will always be possible to
revisit this issue later on without extensive re-architecturing.

Going back to Stephen's original posting therefore, one possible existing
SASL mechanism could be Digest-MD5, documented in RFC 2831. Digest-MD5
is not encumbered, offer security services such as integrity protection,
and does offer some advantages over other password-based mechanisms such
as CRAM-MD5.

-- Magnus

On Mon, 22 Apr 2002, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

>
> Eamon O'Tuathail wrote:
>
> > Tom,
> >
> > > Stanford's royalty-free IPR statement is on file with the IETF.
> >
> > True, and that is much appreciated, but ...
> >
> > .. has any company/organization other than Stanford make IPR claims
> > about SRP? If so, what are those claims, how valid are they, and are any
> > of those making the claims NOT prepared to offer royalty-free IPR on
> > them?
>
> That is exactly the case. I am not in any shape or form an expert on IPR
> issues, but I've got impression that some organization (other than Stanford)
> has IPR claims for SRP. Can somebody clarify that?
>
> > If the technically excellent SRP were totally free from royalty-bearing
> > IPR claims, I would be happy to see it used, otherwise a different



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From: Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu>
To: Magnus Nystrom <magnus@rsasecurity.com>
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> I think we will have to accept that the IPR situation is unclear at the
> moment, and will continue to be so for some time

the IPR situation will be unclear as long as software patents exist.

everyone must make his/her own decision about whether to support a proposal, 
based not only on the technical merit of the proposal but also whether 
he/she thinks that any patents that might be claimed for the proposal 
will cause sufficient harm to make that proposal unacceptable.

IETF will not make that determiniation; it's up to the individual 
particpants.

Keith


From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Mon Apr 22 13:20:50 2002
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Magnus Nystrom wrote:
> Phoenix Technologies' statement can be found at:
> 
> http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/PHOENIX-SRP-RFC2945.txt
> 
> I think we will have to accept that the IPR situation is unclear at the
> moment, and will continue to be so for some time. As long as we base our
> security on a framework like SASL, however, it will always be possible to
> revisit this issue later on without extensive re-architecturing.

As Keith pointed out, it is up to the individual WG member to evaluate 
the validity of IPR claims.  My own examination of the relevant patent 
and the circumstances surrounding it indicates that it does not have 
sufficient merit to prevent royalty-free implementation of RFC 2945.

> Going back to Stephen's original posting therefore, one possible existing
> SASL mechanism could be Digest-MD5, documented in RFC 2831. Digest-MD5
> is not encumbered, offer security services such as integrity protection,
> and does offer some advantages over other password-based mechanisms such
> as CRAM-MD5.

But it is still vulnerable to offline password-guessing.  Has there been 
some recently-established consensus to loosen the security requirements 
to accommodate a weaker authentication mechanism?

> -- Magnus

Tom

> On Mon, 22 Apr 2002, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> 
> 
>>Eamon O'Tuathail wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Tom,
>>>
>>>
>>>>Stanford's royalty-free IPR statement is on file with the IETF.
>>>>
>>>True, and that is much appreciated, but ...
>>>
>>>.. has any company/organization other than Stanford make IPR claims
>>>about SRP? If so, what are those claims, how valid are they, and are any
>>>of those making the claims NOT prepared to offer royalty-free IPR on
>>>them?
>>>
>>That is exactly the case. I am not in any shape or form an expert on IPR
>>issues, but I've got impression that some organization (other than Stanford)
>>has IPR claims for SRP. Can somebody clarify that?
>>
>>
>>>If the technically excellent SRP were totally free from royalty-bearing
>>>IPR claims, I would be happy to see it used, otherwise a different
>>>



-- 
Tom Wu
Principal Software Engineer
Arcot Systems
(408) 969-6124
"The Borg?  Sounds Swedish..."



From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Thu Apr 25 12:22:25 2002
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Subject: SACRED Framework -04
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Hi All,

We're ready to start another pass through the SACRED framework document to
create draft-04 (final).  Before we do that, we need to make sure we've got a
fairly complete list of things to do.

Things that we think should be included are:


1. Conditional Operations

In Framework-03 we updated all primary functions (upload, download, delete) to
include an optional Credential-ID that specifies a precondition that is checked
by the server before performing the requested operation.  The intent is to
provide a way to minimize redundant transfers or accidentally overwriting a new
credential with an older one, etc.

The most recent Protocol draft provides a similar capability but is based on a
last-modified date/time.  Since there had been quite a bit of list discussion on
this topic, I didn't want to arbitrarily change this when we created
Framework-03 just prior to the Minneapolis meeting.

What do folks think?  Do we want to revise the framework document to match the
most recent protocol document or leave it as is?


2. User Authentication

Right now, the framework assumes that the client and server are mutually
authenticated and a session level shared key is negotiated or derived then used
to provide the outer encryption layer for credentials that are uploaded or
downloaded.  Choice of strong password algorithm(s) or equivalent is left to the
protocol documents.

In light of the recent IPR discussions, is there anything we need to change in
this area of the Framework document?


3. Security Considerations

At the Minneapolis IETF meeting we asked the group to review the latest security
considerations section and suggest additional changes that should be added.

Does anyone have suggested changes or additional ideas they'd like to see
included in this section?


4. Basic Functions (Upload, Download, Delete)

Based on list discussion and a number of discussions at IETF meetings, we
focused on three primary credential exchange functions to standardize in SACRED
protocols (Upload Credential, Download Credential, and Delete Credential).  The
latest protocol document only provides two basic functions (e.g., upload of a
NULL credential is used to request a Delete operation).  When we were drafting
Framework-03 we didn't have time to change this part of the document.

What does everyone think -- should we leave this as is or change to match the
Protocol document?


5. Any Other Changes/Comments?


Best Regards,

Dale Gustafson





From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Fri Apr 26 13:00:50 2002
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From: Magnus Nystrom <magnus@rsasecurity.com>
To: Tom Wu <tom@arcot.com>
cc: ietf-sacred@imc.org
Subject: Re: protocol progress...
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Hi Tom,

Without having validated the statement, I cite RFC 2831:

"Offline dictionary attacks are defeated if the client chooses a fresh
 nonce for each authentication, as this specification requires."

Regarding your second point, and despite the fact that I am sympathetic to
it, I don't think that was a requirement in RFC 3157. But I could well be
wrong (don't have proper access to it right now).

BR,
-- Magnus

On Mon, 22 Apr 2002, Tom Wu wrote:

> Magnus Nystrom wrote:
> > Phoenix Technologies' statement can be found at:
> >
> > http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/PHOENIX-SRP-RFC2945.txt
> >
> > I think we will have to accept that the IPR situation is unclear at the
> > moment, and will continue to be so for some time. As long as we base our
> > security on a framework like SASL, however, it will always be possible to
> > revisit this issue later on without extensive re-architecturing.
>
> As Keith pointed out, it is up to the individual WG member to evaluate
> the validity of IPR claims.  My own examination of the relevant patent
> and the circumstances surrounding it indicates that it does not have
> sufficient merit to prevent royalty-free implementation of RFC 2945.
>
> > Going back to Stephen's original posting therefore, one possible existing
> > SASL mechanism could be Digest-MD5, documented in RFC 2831. Digest-MD5
> > is not encumbered, offer security services such as integrity protection,
> > and does offer some advantages over other password-based mechanisms such
> > as CRAM-MD5.
>
> But it is still vulnerable to offline password-guessing.  Has there been
> some recently-established consensus to loosen the security requirements
> to accommodate a weaker authentication mechanism?
>
> > -- Magnus
>
> Tom
>
> > On Mon, 22 Apr 2002, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> >
> >
> >>Eamon O'Tuathail wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>Tom,
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>Stanford's royalty-free IPR statement is on file with the IETF.
> >>>>
> >>>True, and that is much appreciated, but ...
> >>>
> >>>.. has any company/organization other than Stanford make IPR claims
> >>>about SRP? If so, what are those claims, how valid are they, and are any
> >>>of those making the claims NOT prepared to offer royalty-free IPR on
> >>>them?
> >>>
> >>That is exactly the case. I am not in any shape or form an expert on IPR
> >>issues, but I've got impression that some organization (other than Stanford)
> >>has IPR claims for SRP. Can somebody clarify that?
> >>
> >>
> >>>If the technically excellent SRP were totally free from royalty-bearing
> >>>IPR claims, I would be happy to see it used, otherwise a different
> >>>
>
>
>
> --
> Tom Wu
> Principal Software Engineer
> Arcot Systems
> (408) 969-6124
> "The Borg?  Sounds Swedish..."
>
>

-- Magnus



From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Fri Apr 26 13:12:52 2002
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From: Magnus Nystrom <magnus@rsasecurity.com>
To: Tom Wu <tom@arcot.com>
cc: ietf-sacred@imc.org
Subject: Re: protocol progress...
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I would like to explain my second statement below a little bit, because I
feel it was not properly formulated. Clearly we need to protect against
off-line dictionary attacks, or SACRED would be next to useless. This can
be done, however, in several ways. Either by strong password protocols
such as SRP, or, to a certain extent at least, by layering a weaker
password protocol on top of a secure transport such as TLS. And yes,
clearly the passsword mechanism that we mandate must be as strong as
possible. But "possible" includes many aspects, and unfortunately not only
technical ones.

-- Magnus

On Fri, 26 Apr 2002, Magnus Nystrom wrote:

>
> Hi Tom,
>
> Without having validated the statement, I cite RFC 2831:
>
> "Offline dictionary attacks are defeated if the client chooses a fresh
>  nonce for each authentication, as this specification requires."
>
> Regarding your second point, and despite the fact that I am sympathetic to
> it, I don't think that was a requirement in RFC 3157. But I could well be
> wrong (don't have proper access to it right now).
>
> BR,
> -- Magnus
>
> On Mon, 22 Apr 2002, Tom Wu wrote:
>
> > Magnus Nystrom wrote:
> > > Phoenix Technologies' statement can be found at:
> > >
> > > http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/PHOENIX-SRP-RFC2945.txt
> > >
> > > I think we will have to accept that the IPR situation is unclear at the
> > > moment, and will continue to be so for some time. As long as we base our
> > > security on a framework like SASL, however, it will always be possible to
> > > revisit this issue later on without extensive re-architecturing.
> >
> > As Keith pointed out, it is up to the individual WG member to evaluate
> > the validity of IPR claims.  My own examination of the relevant patent
> > and the circumstances surrounding it indicates that it does not have
> > sufficient merit to prevent royalty-free implementation of RFC 2945.
> >
> > > Going back to Stephen's original posting therefore, one possible existing
> > > SASL mechanism could be Digest-MD5, documented in RFC 2831. Digest-MD5
> > > is not encumbered, offer security services such as integrity protection,
> > > and does offer some advantages over other password-based mechanisms such
> > > as CRAM-MD5.
> >
> > But it is still vulnerable to offline password-guessing.  Has there been
> > some recently-established consensus to loosen the security requirements
> > to accommodate a weaker authentication mechanism?
> >
> > > -- Magnus
> >
> > Tom
> >
> > > On Mon, 22 Apr 2002, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >>Eamon O'Tuathail wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>>Tom,
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>>Stanford's royalty-free IPR statement is on file with the IETF.
> > >>>>
> > >>>True, and that is much appreciated, but ...
> > >>>
> > >>>.. has any company/organization other than Stanford make IPR claims
> > >>>about SRP? If so, what are those claims, how valid are they, and are any
> > >>>of those making the claims NOT prepared to offer royalty-free IPR on
> > >>>them?
> > >>>
> > >>That is exactly the case. I am not in any shape or form an expert on IPR
> > >>issues, but I've got impression that some organization (other than Stanford)
> > >>has IPR claims for SRP. Can somebody clarify that?
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>>If the technically excellent SRP were totally free from royalty-bearing
> > >>>IPR claims, I would be happy to see it used, otherwise a different
> > >>>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Tom Wu
> > Principal Software Engineer
> > Arcot Systems
> > (408) 969-6124
> > "The Borg?  Sounds Swedish..."
> >
> >
>
> -- Magnus
>
>

-- Magnus



From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Fri Apr 26 16:21:42 2002
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Hi Magnus,

Comments inline.

Best Regards,

--dg


Magnus Nystrom wrote:

> I would like to explain my second statement below a little bit, because I
> feel it was not properly formulated. Clearly we need to protect against
> off-line dictionary attacks, or SACRED would be next to useless. This can
> be done, however, in several ways. Either by strong password protocols
> such as SRP, or, to a certain extent at least, by layering a weaker
> password protocol on top of a secure transport such as TLS. And yes,
> clearly the password mechanism that we mandate must be as strong as
> possible. But "possible" includes many aspects, and unfortunately not only
> technical ones.

If you mean sending user-id/password within an established TLS session, that is likely
more secure than using SASL protocols to create the secure session layer.  Some might
argue that the server authentication technique provided by TLS is not adequate for the
SACRED application.

It's been suggested that one or more SASL authentication methods might be able to
provide an adequate SACRED security service { server authentication, client
authentication, session key negotiation/derivation, roaming user support, ... } such
that basic attack scenarios would not be practical.  Is that really true?

I've not taken the time to go through all the SASL-based RFCs (and active drafts) to
create a more complete list of candidate algorithms but here's the current list from
IANA.  Perhaps others would care to comment on which algorithms appear to be suitable
for use with SACRED.  Recall that CRAM-MD5 and DIGEST-MD5 have been suggested to
date.  Also, based on a cursory read, it appears that RFC-3163 is N/A since it
provides authentication only.  If anyone knows of others that should be considered,
please send info.

Excerpt from IANA sasl-mechanism list follows:



SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL) MECHANISMS
----------------------------------------------------------

(last updated 2001 August 17)

[ ... ]

MECHANISMS              OWNER                                  REFERENCE
----------              -----                                  ---------

KERBEROS_V4             IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]

GSSAPI                  IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]

SKEY (OBSOLETE)         IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2444]

EXTERNAL                IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]

CRAM-MD5                IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2195]

ANONYMOUS               IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2245]

OTP                     IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2444]

GSS-SPNEGO              Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>        [Leach]

PLAIN                   IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2595]

SECURID                 Magnus Nystrom <magnus@rsasecurity.com>[RFC2808]

NTLM                    Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>        [Leach]

NMAS_LOGIN              Mark G. Gayman <mgayman@novell.com>     [Gayman]

NMAS_AUTHEN             Mark G. Gayman <mgayman@novell.com>     [Gayman]

DIGEST-MD5              IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2831]

9798-U-RSA-SHA1-ENC     robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]

9798-M-RSA-SHA1-ENC     robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]

9798-U-DSA-SHA1         robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]

9798-M-DSA-SHA1         robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]

9798-U-ECDSA-SHA1       robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]

9798-M-ECDSA-SHA1       robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]


>
>
> -- Magnus
>
> On Fri, 26 Apr 2002, Magnus Nystrom wrote:
>
> >
> > Hi Tom,
> >
> > Without having validated the statement, I cite RFC 2831:
> >
> > "Offline dictionary attacks are defeated if the client chooses a fresh
> >  nonce for each authentication, as this specification requires."
> >
> > Regarding your second point, and despite the fact that I am sympathetic to
> > it, I don't think that was a requirement in RFC 3157. But I could well be
> > wrong (don't have proper access to it right now).
> >
> > BR,
> > -- Magnus
> >
> > On Mon, 22 Apr 2002, Tom Wu wrote:
> >
> > > Magnus Nystrom wrote:
> > > > Phoenix Technologies' statement can be found at:
> > > >
> > > > http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/PHOENIX-SRP-RFC2945.txt
> > > >
> > > > I think we will have to accept that the IPR situation is unclear at the
> > > > moment, and will continue to be so for some time. As long as we base our
> > > > security on a framework like SASL, however, it will always be possible to
> > > > revisit this issue later on without extensive re-architecturing.
> > >
> > > As Keith pointed out, it is up to the individual WG member to evaluate
> > > the validity of IPR claims.  My own examination of the relevant patent
> > > and the circumstances surrounding it indicates that it does not have
> > > sufficient merit to prevent royalty-free implementation of RFC 2945.
> > >
> > > > Going back to Stephen's original posting therefore, one possible existing
> > > > SASL mechanism could be Digest-MD5, documented in RFC 2831. Digest-MD5
> > > > is not encumbered, offer security services such as integrity protection,
> > > > and does offer some advantages over other password-based mechanisms such
> > > > as CRAM-MD5.
> > >
> > > But it is still vulnerable to offline password-guessing.  Has there been
> > > some recently-established consensus to loosen the security requirements
> > > to accommodate a weaker authentication mechanism?
> > >
> > > > -- Magnus
> > >
> > > Tom
> > >
> > > > On Mon, 22 Apr 2002, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >>Eamon O'Tuathail wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>>Tom,
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>>Stanford's royalty-free IPR statement is on file with the IETF.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>True, and that is much appreciated, but ...
> > > >>>
> > > >>>.. has any company/organization other than Stanford make IPR claims
> > > >>>about SRP? If so, what are those claims, how valid are they, and are any
> > > >>>of those making the claims NOT prepared to offer royalty-free IPR on
> > > >>>them?
> > > >>>
> > > >>That is exactly the case. I am not in any shape or form an expert on IPR
> > > >>issues, but I've got impression that some organization (other than Stanford)
> > > >>has IPR claims for SRP. Can somebody clarify that?
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>>If the technically excellent SRP were totally free from royalty-bearing
> > > >>>IPR claims, I would be happy to see it used, otherwise a different
> > > >>>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Tom Wu
> > > Principal Software Engineer
> > > Arcot Systems
> > > (408) 969-6124
> > > "The Borg?  Sounds Swedish..."
> > >
> > >
> >
> > -- Magnus
> >
> >
>
> -- Magnus



From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Mon Apr 29 06:06:41 2002
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Hi John,

I am not the author of SASL SRP, but I will comment on some of your points.
Also, you should probably send comments about SASL SRP to SASL mailing list
<ietf-sasl@imc.org> and/or draft authors.

John Viega wrote:

> I've just reviewed the SRP/SASL draft, and I have some comments that I
> hope will be somewhat useful.  Some of these might be dead wrong... my
> apologies in advance.

...skipped...

> 3) I don't understand why one would ever want to make encryption,
> integrity and replay resistance optional.  I'd prefer to see a
> specification that's easy to implement and apply securely.  If
> everything other than authentication is optional, then security
> against common network attacks is the responsibility of the people
> applying the protocol, which is, IMHO very bad.  I suppose that
> allowing for insecure usage caters to those who want to use SRP in
> some environments where SASL is already being used insecurely.

The main point of SASL in authentication. Integrity and privacy protection are
optional for a SASL mechanisms.

> In that case, why not allow, but perhaps recommend against?

Sure.

> 4) There are lots of ambiguities in the spec, from what I can tell.
> For example, the shared secret one derives from SRP is twice the
> digest length of the hash function.  It isn't well-specified how to
> convert the shared secret into the keys used for the encryption and
> message authentication.  I assume simple truncation, but why not use
> seprate halves of the output to key the MAC and the cipher separately?

You are correct, this has to be clarified in the document.

...skipped...

> 7) What happens when tampering is detected?  How is an exception
> signaled?  Is *abortion* actually required, or can one side request a
> retransmission?  I'd like more specification here, and it'd be great
> if connections could survive a non-sustained integrity attack.

SASL work only with reliable data streams, so the only way you can signal an
exception is to abort the connection. Also, there is no way of knowing whether
somebody is tampering or whether there is a bug in the other peer's
implementation of SASL SRP.

> 8) The specication does say that the two OFB states (on the client and
> server ends) need to be in lockstep.

I don't believe that the document actually says that. But you are right,
encryption states for sending and receiving must be separate and this is how
it is in other SASL mechanisms.

> This implies that there can be
> no asynchronous sending of messages, lest there be a race condition on
> the state.  I consider that quite a drawback for some protocols.  I'd
> love to see an option for supporting asynchronous connections by using
> two encryption contexts.
>
> 9) How do the sides know how long the plaintexts for individual
> messages are??  That's not specified, as far as I could find.  I see a
> specification for the maximum ciphertext buffer size, though.

Well, you can estimate maximum plaintext buffer size from the maximum
ciphertext buffer size. Although I haven't seen a SASL mechanisms that defined
"maximal ciphertext buffer size", it always was "maximal plaintext buffer
size".

Alexey
__________________________________________
R & D, ACI Worldwide/MessagingDirect
Richmond, Surrey, UK
Phone: +44 20 8332 4508

I speak for myself only, not for my employer.
__________________________________________






From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Tue Apr 30 08:53:53 2002
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        ietf-sacred@imc.org
Subject: Re: protocol progress...
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Dale Gustafson wrote:

> ...
> It's been suggested that one or more SASL authentication methods might be able to
> provide an adequate SACRED security service { server authentication, client
> authentication, session key negotiation/derivation, roaming user support, ... } such
> that basic attack scenarios would not be practical.  Is that really true?
>
> I've not taken the time to go through all the SASL-based RFCs (and active drafts) to
> create a more complete list of candidate algorithms but here's the current list from
> IANA.  Perhaps others would care to comment on which algorithms appear to be suitable
> for use with SACRED.  Recall that CRAM-MD5 and DIGEST-MD5 have been suggested to
> date.  Also, based on a cursory read, it appears that RFC-3163 is N/A since it
> provides authentication only.  If anyone knows of others that should be considered,
> please send info.
>
> Excerpt from IANA sasl-mechanism list follows:

FYI, some other mechanisms also listed on the web page:

 http://www.sendmail.org/~ca/email/mel/Links.html

[Some links are broken as drafts expired.]

> SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL) MECHANISMS
> ----------------------------------------------------------
>
> (last updated 2001 August 17)
>
> [ ... ]
>
> MECHANISMS              OWNER                                  REFERENCE
> ----------              -----                                  ---------
>
> KERBEROS_V4             IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]
>
> GSSAPI                  IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]
>
> SKEY (OBSOLETE)         IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2444]
>
> EXTERNAL                IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]
>
> CRAM-MD5                IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2195]
>
> ANONYMOUS               IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2245]
>
> OTP                     IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2444]
>
> GSS-SPNEGO              Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>        [Leach]
>
> PLAIN                   IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2595]
>
> SECURID                 Magnus Nystrom <magnus@rsasecurity.com>[RFC2808]
>
> NTLM                    Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>        [Leach]
>
> NMAS_LOGIN              Mark G. Gayman <mgayman@novell.com>     [Gayman]
>
> NMAS_AUTHEN             Mark G. Gayman <mgayman@novell.com>     [Gayman]
>
> DIGEST-MD5              IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2831]
>
> 9798-U-RSA-SHA1-ENC     robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
>
> 9798-M-RSA-SHA1-ENC     robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
>
> 9798-U-DSA-SHA1         robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
>
> 9798-M-DSA-SHA1         robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
>
> 9798-U-ECDSA-SHA1       robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
>
> 9798-M-ECDSA-SHA1       robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]

Alexey Melnikov
__________________________________________
R & D, ACI Worldwide/MessagingDirect
Richmond, Surrey, UK
Phone: +44 20 8332 4508

I speak for myself only, not for my employer.
__________________________________________





From owner-ietf-sacred@mail.imc.org  Tue Apr 30 11:47:10 2002
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Thanks, Alexey.

One additional comment, inline.

Best Regards,

Dale Gustafson



Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> Dale Gustafson wrote:
>
> > ...

[ ... ]

>
> > Also, based on a cursory read, it appears that RFC-3163 is N/A since it
> > provides authentication only.  If anyone knows of others that should be considered,
> > please send info.

In a separate post, Magnus clarified that he is suggesting use of the DIGEST-MD5 protocol
"inside" the sTLS session.  That is, first a plain/vanilla TLS session (cert-based, server
side auth. only) is established and shifts into encrypted mode.  Then the client and server
applications perform the digest-md5 protocol exchanges necessary to achieve mutual
authentication whereby the client and server both prove that they know the same
pre-established password, etc.

I'm a little surprised there hasn't been more comment on this.  Also, I do think we'd have
to carefully analyze the security implications of this more complex combination.

In any event, if that's the technique we use, then the auth. protocol need only provide a
mutual authentication capability and my comment on RFC3163 is no longer meaningful -- this
suggests we could consider additional mutual-auth. protocols including those that are not
able to provide a privacy service.

Comments?



> >
> > Excerpt from IANA sasl-mechanism list follows:
>
> FYI, some other mechanisms also listed on the web page:
>
>  http://www.sendmail.org/~ca/email/mel/Links.html
>
> [Some links are broken as drafts expired.]
>
> > SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL) MECHANISMS
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > (last updated 2001 August 17)
> >
> > [ ... ]
> >
> > MECHANISMS              OWNER                                  REFERENCE
> > ----------              -----                                  ---------
> >
> > KERBEROS_V4             IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]
> >
> > GSSAPI                  IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]
> >
> > SKEY (OBSOLETE)         IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2444]
> >
> > EXTERNAL                IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2222]
> >
> > CRAM-MD5                IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2195]
> >
> > ANONYMOUS               IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2245]
> >
> > OTP                     IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2444]
> >
> > GSS-SPNEGO              Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>        [Leach]
> >
> > PLAIN                   IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2595]
> >
> > SECURID                 Magnus Nystrom <magnus@rsasecurity.com>[RFC2808]
> >
> > NTLM                    Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>        [Leach]
> >
> > NMAS_LOGIN              Mark G. Gayman <mgayman@novell.com>     [Gayman]
> >
> > NMAS_AUTHEN             Mark G. Gayman <mgayman@novell.com>     [Gayman]
> >
> > DIGEST-MD5              IESG <iesg@ietf.org>                   [RFC2831]
> >
> > 9798-U-RSA-SHA1-ENC     robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
> >
> > 9798-M-RSA-SHA1-ENC     robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
> >
> > 9798-U-DSA-SHA1         robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
> >
> > 9798-M-DSA-SHA1         robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
> >
> > 9798-U-ECDSA-SHA1       robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
> >
> > 9798-M-ECDSA-SHA1       robert.zuccherato@entrust.com          [RFC3163]
>
> Alexey Melnikov
> __________________________________________
> R & D, ACI Worldwide/MessagingDirect
> Richmond, Surrey, UK
> Phone: +44 20 8332 4508
>
> I speak for myself only, not for my employer.
> __________________________________________



