From owner-ietf-sasl Mon Mar  1 03:05:44 2004
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To: Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
Cc: SASL WG <ietf-sasl@imc.org>
Subject: Re: New text is authentication/authorization id description
 (section 4.2)
References: <4042462A.6070806@isode.com>
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 06:05:42 -0500
In-Reply-To: <4042462A.6070806@isode.com> (Alexey Melnikov's message of
 "Mon, 01 Mar 2004 05:06:02 +0900")
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>>>>> "Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:

    Alexey> Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined
    Alexey> within each SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the
    Alexey> authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.  The
    Alexey> mechanism may not modify (by, e.g., normalization) the
    Alexey> authorization identity.

I do not believe there is currently a consensus to make a statement as
strong as this.  I agree the mechanism should not modify the
characters of the authorization identity, but as I said over the
weekend I'm unclear that we prohibit modifying the encoding.

If you want to make that change that's possible, if the working group
supports it, but I just want to all it out as a new change that needs
discussion.

--Sam


From owner-ietf-sasl Mon Mar  1 03:54:42 2004
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Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 20:54:39 +0900
To: Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: Re: New text is authentication/authorization id description
  (section 4.2)
Cc: SASL WG <ietf-sasl@imc.org>
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At 05:06 AM 3/1/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined within each
>SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.

What is the normalized (canonical) string form an email address?
What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a domain name?
What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a distinguished name?

While it possible to define normalized forms for each, these
definitions, to the best of my knowledge, presently do not
exist presently.

That is, my email address is commonly written "kurt@openldap.org",
"Kurt@OpenLDAP.org", and number of other ways.  Which
representation is normalized one?

Kurt 


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From: Rob Siemborski <rjs3@andrew.cmu.edu>
To: Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
cc: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>, ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long]
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On Mon, 1 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> >We should extend this to also cover things other than just TLS (e.g. a
> >compression layer, separate from either TLS or SASL).
> >
> >For example:
> >
> >If other transport or session layers (such as a Transport Layer Security
> >layer or a compression layer) in addition to the SASL security layer are
> >allowed to be negotiated by the protocol....
> >
> I don't think a protocol profile can reasonably define layering of
> multiple things when at least one of them is not known when the protocol
> profile is written.
> So I would rather not change the description.

Certainly if the existance of such a layer isn't know, you can't say where
it fits.  However, any known layers need to be documented for interop to
be ensured.

-Rob

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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Sam Hartman wrote:

>>>>>>"Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:
>>>>>>            
>>>>>>
>
>    Alexey> Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined
>    Alexey> within each SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the
>    Alexey> authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.  The
>    Alexey> mechanism may not modify (by, e.g., normalization) the
>    Alexey> authorization identity.
>
>I do not believe there is currently a consensus to make a statement as
>strong as this.  I agree the mechanism should not modify the
>characters of the authorization identity, but as I said over the
>weekend I'm unclear that we prohibit modifying the encoding.
>
I am not sure what you mean in the last sentence.

To me this text says that normalization is up to a protocol profile. It 
doesn't talk about encoding (which is mechanism specific), because 
encoding is not a "modification". Maybe it should?

>
>If you want to make that change that's possible, if the working group
>supports it, but I just want to all it out as a new change that needs
>discussion.
>
I agree that this needs discussion (although this is not a new issue, it 
is a continuation of the issue raised by Simon)

Alexey




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[This replies deals with two more comments from Kurt].

>>4.    Authentication mechanisms
>>
>>  SASL mechanisms are named by strings, from 1 to 20 characters in
>>  length, consisting of ASCII [ASCII] upper-case letters, digits,
>>  hyphens, and/or underscores.  SASL mechanism names must be registered
>>  with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). IETF standards
>>  track documents may direct the IANA to reserve a portion of the SASL
>>  mechanism namespace and may specify different registration criteria
>>  for the reserved portion; the GSSAPI mechanism specification
>>  [SASL-GSSAPI] does this.
>>    
>>
>
>The above sentence should be moved in IANA considerations section.
>
I think it already does:

8.2.  Registration procedure

...

There is no naming convention for SASL mechanisms; any name that
conforms to the syntax of a SASL mechanism name can be registered.
An IETF Standards Track document may reserve a portion of the SASL
mechanism namespace ("family of SASL mechanisms") for its own use,
amending the registration rules for that portion of the namespace.
Each family of SASL mechanisms MUST be identified by a prefix.

>>9.   Security considerations
>>
>>  Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.
>>
>>  The mechanisms that support integrity protection are designed such
>>  that the negotiation of the security layer and authorization identity
>>  is integrity protected.
>>    
>>
>
>This statement seems a bit circular.
>
>Also, "integrity protection" was defined as providing the capability
>to detection unauthorized changes to data transfered by the security
>layer.  However this uses the term implies that the authentication
>exchange, including layer negotiation is protected.  This is problematic.
>
I think the text should read:

The mechanisms that support integrity protection should be designed such ...

(I've changed "are" to "should be")

>If we look at DIGEST-MD5, which does offer a security layer
>with "integrity protection", we find a mechanism which does
> 
>
I assume you meant "does not".

>provide full integrity protection over the authentication
>exchange itself.
>
It doesn't protect the whole authentication exchange, but it protects 
both security layer negotiation and the authorization id.

>I think we need to a bit more precise with our terminology.  To
>avoid having to define a SASL-specific terminology, I strongly
>recommend we try to use RFC 2828 based terminology.
>
I think we should check if the SASL terminology in use now doesn't 
contradict RFC 2828.
This assumes that the document is updated to reference RFC 2828. I 
personally don't mind (if there are no major inconsistencies), but the 
WG has to give a feedback if this would be considered a good idea.

Alexey




From owner-ietf-sasl Mon Mar  1 16:20:37 2004
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Subject: Re: New text is authentication/authorization id description  (section
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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>At 05:06 AM 3/1/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined within each
>>SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.
>>    
>>
>
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form an email address?
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a domain name?
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a distinguished name?
>
>While it possible to define normalized forms for each, these
>definitions, to the best of my knowledge, presently do not
>exist presently.
>
>That is, my email address is commonly written "kurt@openldap.org",
>"Kurt@OpenLDAP.org", and number of other ways.  Which
>representation is normalized one?
>
I think I understand what you are talking about. Normalization is not to 
be confused with Unicode Normalization.
Suggestion for a better term is welcomed.

Alexey



From owner-ietf-sasl Mon Mar  1 16:16:04 2004
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Subject: Re: sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long]
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Rob Siemborski wrote:

>On Mon, 1 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>>We should extend this to also cover things other than just TLS (e.g. a
>>>compression layer, separate from either TLS or SASL).
>>>
>>>For example:
>>>
>>>If other transport or session layers (such as a Transport Layer Security
>>>layer or a compression layer) in addition to the SASL security layer are
>>>allowed to be negotiated by the protocol....
>>>
>>>      
>>>
>>I don't think a protocol profile can reasonably define layering of
>>multiple things when at least one of them is not known when the protocol
>>profile is written.
>>So I would rather not change the description.
>>    
>>
>
>Certainly if the existance of such a layer isn't know, you can't say where
>it fits.  However, any known layers need to be documented for interop to
>be ensured.
>
There is compression support in TLS now. Don't tell me you were talking 
about IMAP COMPRESS ;-).

My point is that if a new layer is invented later on, it has to document 
interaction with SASL security layer and TLS.

Alexey



From owner-ietf-sasl Mon Mar  1 16:08:25 2004
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Date: Tue, 02 Mar 2004 08:02:59 +0900
From: Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
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To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
CC: ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Editotorial changes (was Re: sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long])
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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>>  The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) provides a method
>>  for adding authentication support with an optional security layer to
>>  connection-based protocols.
>>    
>>
>
>As used here, the word "optional" implies that protocols MAY
>include security layer support.
>
In theory a protocol profile can disallow usage of a SASL security layer.

>Suggest this be reworded
>
>	The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a
>	framework for providing authentication and data security
>	services in connection-based protocols.
>
I like that.

>>                               It also describes a structure for
>>  authentication mechanisms.  The result is an abstraction layer
>>  between protocols and authentication mechanisms such that any SASL-
>>  compatible authentication mechanism can be used with any SASL-
>>  compatible protocol.
>>
>>  This document describes how a SASL authentication mechanism is
>>  structured, describes how a protocol adds support for SASL, defines
>>  the protocol for carrying a security layer over a connection, and
>>  defines the EXTERNAL SASL authentication mechanism.
>>    
>>
>
>It might be better to transpose EXTERNAL and SASL here.
>
Done.

>>2.    Organization of this document
>>
>>2.1.  How to read this document
>>
>>  This document is written to serve several different audiences,
>>  protocol designers using this specification to support authentication
>>  in their protocol, mechanism designers that define new SASL
>>  mechanisms, and implementors of clients or servers for those
>>  protocols using this specification.
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest using a bullet list for the above.
>
Sounds good.

>
>
>...
>
>>2.2.  Conventions used in this document
>>
>>  In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
>>  server respectively.
>>
>>  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
>>  in this document are to be interpreted as defined in "Key words for
>>  use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS].
>>
>>  Character names in this document use the notation for code points and
>>  names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode].  For example, the letter
>>  "a" may be represented as either <U+0061> or <LATIN SMALL LETTER A>.
>>
>>  This document uses terms "integrity protection" and "confidentiality
>>  protection".  The former references to a security layer that is able
>>  to detect data modification by using some kind of hash.  However,
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest the "by using some kind of hash" qualification be dropped.   
>The term "integrity protection" applies to any layer which is capable
>of detecting data modification (regardless of whether it using some
>kind of hash or not).  I suggest:
>
>    The term "integrity protection" refers to a security layer         
>    designed to detect unauthorized data modification.
>
Ok
...

>>  authentication mechanism to be defined once, making it usable by any
>>  SASL protocol profile.  In many implementations, the same SASL
>>  mechanism code is used for multiple protocols.
>>    
>>
>
>Add another (see above) subsection which
>
>X.Y. Relationship to other documents
>
>    This document obsoletes RFC 2222.  It replaces all portions of
>    RFC 2222 excepting sections 7.1 (Kerberos version 4 mechanism),
>    7.2 (GSSAPI mechanism), 7.3 (S/Key mechanism).  The Kerberos
>    version 4 (KERBEROS_IV) and S/Key (SKEY) mechanisms are now        
>    viewed as obsolete.  The GSSAPI mechanism is now separately 
>    specified [SASL-GSSAPI].
>
I've added this as "Appendix B". The detailed list of changes in now 
Appendix C.

>>  Procedures for registering new SASL mechanisms are given in section 8.
>>
>>  The "sasl-mech" production below defines the syntax of a SASL
>>  mechanism name.  This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
>>  notation as specified in [ABNF] and the ABNF core rules as specified
>>  in Appendix A of the ABNF specification [ABNF].
>>
>>  sasl-mech    = 1*20mech-char
>>  mech-char    = %x41-5A / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
>>                 ; mech names restricted to ASCII uppercase letters,
>>                 ; digits, "-" and "_"
>>
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest this comment be replaced with:
>        ; mech-char is restricted to "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", "-", and "_"
>        : from ASCII character set.
>
Done

>...
>
>>5.2.  Mechanism profile guidelines
>>
>>  Designers of new SASL mechanism should be aware of the following
>>  issues:
>>
>>  1) Authorization identity.
>>    
>>
>
>Remove the "."
>
Ok.

>>6.1.1.  Client sends data first examples
>>
>>  The following are two examples of an SECURID authentication [SASL-
>>  SECURID] in the SMTP protocol [SMTP].  In the first example below,
>>  the client is trying fast reauthentication by sending the initial
>>  response:
>>
>>     S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
>>     C: EHLO client.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.  Suggest you s/Hello.*/Welcome client.example.com/
>
Done.

>>     S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
>>     S: 250 DSN
>>     C: AUTH SECURID AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful
>>
>>  The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here the
>>  client chooses not to use the initial response parameter.
>>
>>     S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
>>     C: EHLO client.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.
>
Done.

>>     S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
>>     S: 250 DSN
>>     C: AUTH SECURID
>>     S: 334
>>     C: AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful
>>
>>     Section 7.2 contains an additional example.
>>    
>>
>
>Indention is off here.
>
Thanks.

>
>Also note that 7.2 provides two examples as does 6.2.1.
>So, this should read:
>	Additonal examples can be found in sections 6.2.1 and 7.2.
>
Changed.

>>     C: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         to='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         id='c2s_234'
>>         from='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:features>
>>          <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>            <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
>>            <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
>>          </mechanisms>
>>        </stream:features>
>>     C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
>>              mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
>>     S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long...
>
Fixed.

>>        LGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
>>        </challenge>
>>     C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWFsbT0ic29tZXJlYWxtIixub25jZT0i
>>        T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGNub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZWcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
>>        MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
>>        LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
>>        YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
>>        </response>
>>     S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
>>        </success>
>>
>>     The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here
>>     the server chooses not to use the additional data with success.
>>
>>     C: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         to='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         id='c2s_234'
>>         from='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:features>
>>          <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>            <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
>>            <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
>>          </mechanisms>
>>        </stream:features>
>>     C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
>>              mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
>>     S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.
>
Fixed.

>...
>  
>
>>  Non-terminals referenced but not defined below are as defined by
>>  [UTF-8].
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest the non-terminal productions be directly incorporated
>into this document.
>
I actually disagree.
If there is an update to UTF-8, I wouldn't like to waste additional time 
trying to synchronize the two.

>>  The "extern-init-resp" rule below defines the initial response sent
>>  from client to server.
>>
>>  extern-init-resp  = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )
>>
>>  UTF8-char-no-nul  = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
>>
>>  UTF8-1-no-nul     = %x01-7F
>>
>>
>>7.2.  Example
>>
>>...
>>
>>  The following example is almost identical to the one above, but the
>>  client doesn't use proxy authentication.
>>    
>>
>
>s/use/request/
>
Changed.

>>     S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
>>     C: EHLO jgm.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com
>>     S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
>>     C: AUTH EXTERNAL
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful.
>>
>>
>>8.    IANA Considerations
>>
>>8.1.  Guidelines for IANA
>>
>>  It is requested that IANA updates the SASL mechanisms registry as
>>  follows:
>>
>>     Change the "Intended usage" of the KERBEROS_V4 and SKEY mechanism
>>     registrations to OBSOLETE.  Change the "Published specification"
>>     of the EXTERNAL mechanism to this document. Updated registration
>>     is provided in Section 8.6.
>>    
>>
>
>s/registration/registration information/
>
Done.

>>...
>>    
>>
>>10.    References
>>
>>10.1.  Normative References
>>
>>  [ABNF] Crocker, D. (Ed.), Overell, P., "Augmented BNF for Syntax
>>  Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997
>>
>>  [ASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Code Extension
>>  Techniques for Use with the 7-bit Coded Character Set of American
>>  National Standard Code (ASCII) for Information Interchange", FIPS PUB
>>  35, 1974
>>
>>  [CHARSET-POLICY] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
>>  Languages", RFC 2277, BCP 18, January 1998
>>
>>  [GSSAPI] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
>>  Interface, Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000
>>
>>  [ISO-10646] "Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) -
>>  Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane", ISO/IEC 10646-1 : 1993.
>>    
>>
>
>This reference is never used and hence should be deleted.
>
Done.

>>  [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
>>  Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 19, March 1997
>>
>>  [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
>>  3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" (Reading,
>>  MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), as amended by the
>>  "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode 3.1"
>>  (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the "Unicode Standard
>>  Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).
>>
>>  [Stringprep] Hoffman, P., Blanchet, M., "Preparation of
>>  Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002.
>>
>>  [SASLprep] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names
>>  and passwords", Work in progress, draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-XX.txt.
>>
>>  [UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
>>  RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003.
>>
>>10.2.  Informative References
>>
>>  [SASL-GSSAPI] Melnikov, A., "SASL GSSAPI mechanisms", work in
>>  progress, draft-ietf-sasl-gssapi-XX.txt, November 2003
>>
>>  [SASL-DIGEST] Leach, P., Newman, C., Melnikov, A., "Using Digest
>>  Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", work in progress, draft-ietf-
>>  sasl-rfc2831bis-XX.txt, replaces RFC 2831
>>
>>  [SASL-OTP] Newman, C., "The One-Time-Password SASL Mechanism", RFC
>>  2444, October 1998.
>>
>>  [SASL-SECURID] Nystrom, M., "The SecurID(r) SASL Mechanism", RFC
>>  2808, April 2000.
>>
>>  [SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 2821, April
>>  2001.
>>
>>  [SMTP-AUTH] Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
>>  RFC 2554, March 1999.
>>
>>  Being revised by Siemborski, R., "SMTP Service Extension for
>>  Authentication", work in progress, draft-siemborski-rfc2554bis-
>>  XX.txt.
>>    
>>
>
>This reference should be put into proper form.
>
I am not sure what exactly you suggest here.

>
>>  [XMPP] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
>>  (XMPP): Core", work in progress, draft-ietf-xmpp-core-XX.txt.
>>
>>  [BASE64] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
>>
>>
>>
>>A. Melnikov                                            FORMFEED[Page 21]
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Internet DRAFT                    SASL                  14 February 2004
>>
>>
>>  Encodings", RFC 3548, July 2003.
>>
>>  [RFC-INSTRUCTIONS] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., "Instructions to RFC
>>  Authors", RFC 2223, October 1997.
>>
>>  [IANA-SASL]  IANA, "SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL)
>>  MECHANISMS", http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms.
>>
>>11.   Editor's Address
>>
>>    Alexey Melnikov
>>    Isode Limited
>>
>>    Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
>>
>>12.   Acknowledgments
>>
>>  This document is a revision of RFC 2222 written by John G. Myers.  He
>>  also contributed significantly to this revision.
>>
>>  Magnus Nystrom provided the ASCII art used in Section 6.3.
>>
>>  Definition of partition was extracted from RFC 2617 ("HTTP
>>  Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication").
>>
>>  Contributions of many members of the SASL mailing list are gratefully
>>  acknowledged, in particular Kurt D. Zeilenga, Peter Saint-Andre, Rob
>>  Siemborski, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Hallvard B Furuseth, Tony Hansen and
>>  Abhijit Menon-Sen for proofreading the document and various editorial
>>  suggestions.
>>    
>>
>
>Suggest you drop middle initials.
>
As you wish :-).

>Needs IPR notice.
>
Added.

Alexey




From owner-ietf-sasl Mon Mar  1 20:47:22 2004
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To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Cc: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>, ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: SASLprep in rfc2222bis-06
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 23:47:21 -0500
In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.0.20040225170830.04ce6f88@127.0.0.1> (Kurt D.
 Zeilenga's message of "Wed, 25 Feb 2004 17:14:01 -0800")
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>>>>> "Kurt" == Kurt D Zeilenga <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> writes:

    Kurt> Hence, it is very important that where a mechanism uses the
    Kurt> authorization identity as input to a cryptographic function
    Kurt> that it uses the precise form transferred (or to be
    Kurt> transferred) by the mechanism.


In a discussion today, we came to an additional constraint.  The
mechanism should not use the authorization identity in any long-term
cryptographic keys/hashes.  For example, it would be wrong to change
the digest-md5 spec to include the authz id in the a1 hash.

The reason is that there may be multiple forms of the authz id that
compare the same and some clients may use one form while other clients
use a different form.

We don't yet have text for this constraint.


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Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 14:25:38 +0900
To: ietf-sasl@imc.org
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: chatroom log from our IETF#59 session
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Here is the jabber log from our IETF#59 session.
Thanks to Bob for scribing!

Kurt

[4:54 PM]<rlbob> i'll be scribing
[4:54 PM]<rlbob> session is now underway
[4:55 PM]<rlbob> sh:  2222bis is main item, also stringprep
[4:55 PM]<rlbob> sh:  all other documents have had revisions, but 2222bis is primary focus
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> sh:  specific individuals are being asked to review 2222bis
[4:57 PM]<hartmans> To clarify, there was some discussion on the list of saslprep, but I don't think any  changes were needed
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> kz:  need positive feedback that reviewers are happy with the doc
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> alexey now speaking about 2222bis issues
[4:58 PM]<rlbob> am:  suggested to use RFC 2828 for terminology, concern about possible conflicts
[4:59 PM]<rlbob> kz:  say "these terms are used as defined in 2828"
[4:59 PM]<rlbob> am:  need more generic description, not just list of documents to read
[5:00 PM]<rlbob> am:  thread on list about application of saslprep to authzid
[5:01 PM]<rlbob> am:  proposed text on list, didn't use "normalization" right, will give new text, will reflect agreement achieved on list
[5:01 PM]<rlbob> am:  big thread about what happens to layer on rengotiation if no new layer is requested [or something like that]
[5:02 PM]<rlbob> sh:  appears to be another example of chosen-ciphertext attack, already had discussion for digest-md5
[5:03 PM]<rlbob> sh:  will propose text for document ...
[5:06 PM]<rlbob> bob:  explains his note re importance of clarifying authz id
[5:07 PM]<hartmans> And dropping the concept of authentication ID
[5:08 PM]<rlbob> someone:  need to make distinction between them clear, easier if both are described and explained
[5:09 PM]<tonyhansen> (someone => Tony Hansen)
[5:10 PM]<rlbob> straw poll:  most people want to keep authn identity in the doc
[5:10 PM]<rlbob> kz:  discussion can continue, chairs will summarize next week
[5:13 PM]<hartmans> Bob Morgan: Concern about 2119 language applied to future specifications not to implementations
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> kz: Important that it be clear what the keywords refer to.
[5:14 PM]<rlbob> bob:  concern that 2119 MUST etc don't necessarily apply to constraints on authors, but don't have new language to offer
[5:14 PM]<rlbob> kz:  maybe problem is mixing different uses in the same doc, maybe can clarify per section
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> kz: Separate things so that requirements on specs are in different places than requirements on implementations
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> goal is that clear when reading the document.
[5:16 PM]<hartmans> kz: We still have more work to do on separation of requirements.  Then need to take a look at see if we will be confused.
[5:17 PM]<hartmans> am: Digest-md5
[5:17 PM]<rlbob> am:  moving on to digest-md5
[5:18 PM]<hartmans> am: Tried to clarify reauthentication, ABNF cleanup.
[5:19 PM]<rlbob> attempt to clarify saslprep issues, not finished yet
[5:19 PM]<rlbob> also attempt to clarify charset effects on realm, etc
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> cipher mode clarifications ...
[5:21 PM]<hartmans> am: Drop DES and 3DES per consensus.
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> reorganized confidentiality protection section
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> need lots of input on saslprep issues
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> also "what a realm should look like" question
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> still-open question:  need separate stringprep for realm?
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> kz:  good reason not to use saslprep?
[5:23 PM]<rlbob> am:  argument to made that realms should be same across digest, kerb, gss
[5:24 PM]<rlbob> sh:  gss has no realms, kerb realms are very complicated, so may not be able to be the same
[5:25 PM]<rlbob> am:  there is revision of http digest document, saying all username/passwords are UTF-8
[5:26 PM]<rlbob> am:  big hack in current http digest to use iso-8859-1 if possible, they're hoping to get rid of that ...
[5:27 PM]<hartmans> No the hack is in digest-md5 and was being considered for http-digest as I understand it.
[5:28 PM]<rlbob> sh:  let's take this issue to the list
[5:29 PM]<rlbob> am:  CBC attack
[5:30 PM]<rlbob> am:  two choices, explicit IV and ... sh will send comment to the list
[5:31 PM]<hartmans> second choice is a block type for explicit IV.
[5:31 PM]<rlbob> am:  document not ready for last call very soon
[5:32 PM]<rlbob> am:  also working on GSS document, posted in December
[5:33 PM]<rlbob> am:  example code removed, maybe should be added back
[5:35 PM]<rlbob> am:  should be able to get next rev of 2222bis shortly ...
[5:37 PM]<rlbob> kz:  looks like last on 2222bis may be in April, or even a little later
[5:38 PM]<rlbob> sh:  AD OK with May 04 for submission of 2222bis to IESG?
[5:38 PM]<rlbob> rh:  OK
[5:39 PM]<rlbob> sh:  reason gss doc looks simple is that gss community hasn't focused on it yet
[5:42 PM]<rlbob> kz:  chairs will post proposed new milestones to list by end of week
[5:43 PM]<rlbob> am:  working on C api
[5:43 PM]<rlbob> am:  also requested IETF last call on sasl-for-http document
[5:44 PM]<rlbob> jh:  has this been posted to sasl list?
[5:44 PM]<rlbob> am: yes
[5:45 PM]<rlbob> am:  sasl without persistent connection is "interesting"
[5:46 PM]<rlbob> bob:  intend to submit doc on SAML as SASL mechanism


From owner-ietf-sasl Tue Mar  2 23:47:03 2004
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Subject: Summary of SASL Session at IETF 59
References: 
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
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The SASL working group met for an hour at IETF 59.  The primary
objective of the meeting was to determine next steps for RFC 2222bis.

The chairs are concerned that the document has not received sufficient
review.  The chairs will contact the apps and security areas and ask
for review of the specification before last call.

Kurt Zeilenga raised several issues on the mailing list.  Most of
these were resolved before the meeting; Kurt will check future
versions of the draft to confirm resolution.

One of Kurt's issues that is not resolved is the handling of security
layers for multiple reauthentications.  At IETF 58, we decided not to
change the protocol because of this threat, but Kurt raised concerns
about the wording of the security consideration.  During this
discussion Sam Hartman realized this attack is apparently an instance
of a more general attack.  Sam will confirm this and propose text on
the list.

Bob Morgan described his concerns about the confusion between
authentication identity and authorization ID.  The sense of the room
was that while we want to be as clear as possible, both concepts are
important and we need to keep both terms.  This discussion is still
open on the list.

A new document will be published  shortly after the meeting.  There
will be a need for at least one more revision, slated for early April
before a last call.  We hope to have the base spec to the IESG by
May; this is a milestone slip.

ALexey Melnikov still needs input on use of stringprep and saslprep in
digest-md5.  There was discussion of dropping support for ISO 8859-1
and claiming that all strings are UTF8.  This will be resolved on the
list.  

Sam agreed to review the  AES mode for digest-md5.  The
working group previously agreed to use explicit IVs to avoid chosen
ciphertext attacks, but ALexey has two alternative wire formats for
explicit IVs.

We hope to have digest-md5 last called by July.  Alexey thinks this is
very optimistic.


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At the security area meeting we received a request from Russ to send
saslprep to the IESG now rather than waiting.


Kurt and I believe that the document is ready.  It has passed working
group last call.

If you had comments during that last call, please let us know if they
have not been addressed within a week.

If you have additional comments that you believe might block the
document let us know within a week.


Otherwise we'll request publication.


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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Simple Authentication and Security Layer Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords
	Author(s)	: K. Zeilenga
	Filename	: draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-06.txt
	Pages		: 6
	Date		: 2004-3-10
	
This document describes how to prepare Unicode strings representing
user names and passwords for comparison.  The document defines the
'SASLprep' 'stringprep' profile to be used for both user names and
passwords.  This profile is intended to be used by Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms (such as PLAIN,
CRAM-MD5, and DIGEST-MD5) as well as other protocols exchanging user
names and/or passwords.

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From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 10 23:31:21 2004
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Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2004 23:31:13 -0800
To: lyndon+rfc-crammd5@orthanc.ca
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
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Lyndon,

I found a number a technical and editorial issues in
draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-02.txt.   My concerns include:
 - new ABNF productions appears not to be consistent
   with those used in RFC 2095 (incorporating from RFC 822),
 - lack of clarity regarding use of SASLprep, and
 - lack of discussion as to why this mechanism is
   registered as having LIMITED usage.

Kurt


>Network Working Group                               L. Nerenberg, Editor
>Internet Draft: The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism              Orthanc Systems
>Document: draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-02.txt                    January 2004

Please update the headers to include:

Intended Category: Standards Track
Updates/Obsoletes: RFC xxxx
Expires: month year

>                      The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism
>
>
>Status of this Memo
>
>     This document is an Internet Draft and is in full conformance with
>     all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
>
>     Internet Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
>     Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
>     other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet
>     Drafts.
>
>     Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
>     months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other docu-
>     ments at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as
>     reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
>     progress."
>
>     The list of current Internet Drafts can be accessed at
>     http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet
>     Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
>     http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
>
>     Copyright 2003,2004 The Internet Society.  All Rights Reserved.
>
>     Please see the Copyright section near the end of this document for
>     more information.
>
>Abstract
>
>     This document defines a simple challenge-response authentication
>     mechanism, using a keyed-hash digest, for use with the Simple
>     Authentication and Security Layer (SASL).

It might be good for the abstract to, in one sentence, describe
its general applicability.

>1.  Conventions Used in this Document
>
>     The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
>     in this document are to be interpreted as defined in [KEYWORD].
>
>
>2.  CRAM-MD5 Authentication Mechanism
>
>     This document defines a simple challenge-response [SASL] authenti-
>     cation mechanism, using a [KEYED-MD5] digest, for use with [SASL].

It seems odd that [SASL] is provided twice here.  Also, SASL needs
to be spelled out on first use in body of document.

>     The mechanism name associated with CRAM-MD5 is 'CRAM-MD5'.

>     This mechanism does not provide a security layer.

I think this document needs to have an Introduction section consisting
of the above two paragraphs, a discussion of the mechanism's general
applicability, why it is usage is LIMITED, a discussion of this
document relates to other documents (e.g., what RFCs it updates/replaces),
and, lastly, followed by the above conventions.  This Introduction
(renumbered section 1) would be followed by a new "CRAM-MD5
Authentication Mechanism" section (numbered section 2).

>     The data encoded in the challenge contains a presumptively arbi-
>     trary string of random digits, a time-stamp, and the fully-quali-
>     fied primary host name of the server.

Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.

Why isn't RFC-822 msg-id production here as was done in RFC 2195?
The production below is quite different than a msg-id (in some
ways more restrictive and in other ways less restrictive).

For compatibility with existing RFC 2195, I think this specification
should simple incorporate (directly or by reference) the msg-id
production previously used.

>     The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
>     consisting of the user name, a space, and a "digest."  The latter

I think the double quotes around digest can be removed.  If you
really want to draw attention to digest being a production, wrap
it with angle brackets, e.g. <digest>.

>     is computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5]
>     where the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the chal-
>     lenge (including angle-brackets). The client MUST NOT interpret or
>     attempt to validate the contents of the challenge in any way.
>
>     This shared secret is a string known only to the client and server.
>     The "digest" parameter itself is a 16-octet value which is sent in
>     hexadecimal format, using lower-case US-ASCII characters.

Need reference for US-ASCII.

You should make it clear (in prose) that the hexadecimal format
is zero padded.  That is, if the most significant nimbles are zero,
they are not left these off.

>     When the server receives this client response, it verifies the
>     digest provided.  Since the user name may contain the space charac-
>     ter, the server MUST scan the client response from right to left;

You're MUST what is an implementation detail.  There are, in fact,
a number of other reasonable implementation options.  A server could
scan the response right to left to locate the last space.  A server
could just compute the position of the space (if the length of the
string is known).  Instead, you should note that implementations
should take care in parsing the string as it user name portion
can contain a space character.

>     the first space character encountered separates the digest from the
>     user name.  If the digest is correct, the server should consider
>     the client authenticated and respond appropriately.

I rather drop the "and respond appropriately" as this implies
that the server response is based only on wether the client
is authenticated.  The server may, of course, choose to fail
the exchange even though the client was authenticated (for
instance, because the client is not authorized for service
provided by the server).

>     The client MUST prepare the user name and shared secret strings
>     using the [SASLPrep] profile of the [StringPrep] algorithm.  The
>     resulting values MUST be encoded as UTF-8 [UTF8].

This likely should be stated upfront.

>
>2.1.  Formal Syntax
>
>     The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur
>     Form (ABNF) as specified in [ABNF], and incorporates by reference
>     the Core Rules defined in that document.
>
>     challenge  = "<" 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT "@" hostname ">"

This restricts digits to decimal digits.  However, it can be
argued that CRAM-MD5 previously allowed digits of other bases.
RFC 2195 said the challenge was a RFC822 msg-id.

>
>     digest     = 32(DIGIT / %x61-66)
>                  ; A hexadecimal string using only lower-case
>                  ; letters
>
>     hostname   = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT) *("." / "-" / ALPHA / DIGIT)

This production seems a bit odd in that it allows things like:
	a...

I think it would be better to written:
      label = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( "-" / ALPHA / DIGIT )

	  hostname = label *( "." label )

(but note this would not be needed if msg-id was used)

>     response   = user SP digest
>
>     user       = 1*OCTET

This should be replaced with a more precise UTF-8 production.

>2.2.  Examples

Suggest this be renumbered as separate section, e.g. 3.

>     The examples in this section do NOT form part of the specification.

I think it would be better to say:
	This section provides a number of examples which illustrate
	the CRAM-MD5 mechanism.  This section is informative.


>     Where conflicts exist between the examples and the formal grammar
>     or specification text, the latter are authoritative.

s/specification text/normative text in Section 2/.

>     These examples show the use of the CRAM-MD5 mechanism with the
>     IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE command [IMAP4].  The base64 encoding of the
>     challenges and responses is part of the IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE command,
>     not part of the CRAM-MD5 specification itself.

Add reference for base64.

>
>     S: * OK [CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS LOGINDISABLED AUTH=CRAM-MD5]
>     C: A0001 AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5
>     S: + PDE4OTYuNjk3MTcwOTUyQHBvc3RvZmZpY2UuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQ+
>     C: am9lIDNkYmM4OGYwNjI0Nzc2YTczN2IzOTA5M2Y2ZWI2NDI3
>     S: A0001 OK CRAM-MD5 authentication successful
>
>     In this example, the shared secret is the string
>
>          tanstaaftanstaaf
>
>     Hence, the Keyed MD5 digest is produced by calculating
>
>          MD5((tanstaaftanstaaf XOR opad),
>               MD5((tanstaaftanstaaf XOR ipad),
>               <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>))

I think the examples should show where SASLprep is applied.
That is, it might be good to replace the above with:
          MD5((SASLprep(tanstaaftanstaaf) XOR opad),
               MD5((SASLprep(tanstaaftanstaaf) XOR ipad),
               <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>))

(and this should likely be made more clear in Section 2)
>
>     where ipad and opad are as defined in [KEYED-MD5] and the string
>     shown in the challenge is the base64 encoding of
>     <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>. The shared secret is null-
>     padded to a length of 64 bytes.

It should be made clear (here and in section 2) that its the
output of SASLprep that is null-padded.

>     If the shared secret is longer than
>     64 bytes, the MD5 digest of the shared secret is used as a 16 byte
>     input to the keyed MD5 calculation.
>
>     This produces a digest value (in hexadecimal) of
>
>          3dbc88f0624776a737b39093f6eb6427
>
>     The user name is then prepended to it, forming
>
>          joe 3dbc88f0624776a737b39093f6eb6427

I'd like to see "joe" replaced with "joe smith" to hilite the
parsing issue.  Also, SASLprep should be discussed here.

>     Which is then base64 encoded to meet the requirements of the IMAP4
>     AUTHENTICATE command (or the similar POP3 AUTH command), yielding
>
>          am9lIDNkYmM4OGYwNjI0Nzc2YTczN2IzOTA5M2Y2ZWI2NDI3
>

It might also be useful to show an example that does not use
the optional initial response feature of the application
protocol.  And, I suggest use of another protocol (such as
ACAP) for this second example.

>
>3.  References
>
>3.1.  Normative References

References should be put into standard form.

>[ABNF]
>     Crocker, D., P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications:
>     ABNF", RFC2234, Internet Mail Consortium and Demon Internet Ltd.,
>     November 1997.
>
>[KEYED-MD5]
>     Krawczyk, Bellare, Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
>     Authentication", RFC 2104, IBM and UCSD, February 1997.
>
>[KEYWORD]
>     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
>     Levels", BCP 14, RFC2119, Harvard University, March 1997.
>
>[MD5]
>     Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, MIT Labo-
>     ratory for Computer Science and RSA Data Security, Inc., April
>     1992.
>
>[SASL]
>     Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)," RFC
>     2222, Netscape Communications, October 1997.
>
>[SASLPrep]
>     Zeilenga, K., "SASL String Preparation Profiles", draft-ietf-sasl-
>     saslprep (work in progress)
>
>[StringPrep]
>     Hoffman, P., M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings
>     (stringprep)", RFC 3454, IMC and Viagenie, December 2002.
>
>[UTF8]
>     Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
>     2279, Alis Technologies, January 1998.
>
>3.2.  Informative References
>
>[IMAP4]
>     Crispin, M., "Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1,"
>     RFC 3501, University of Washington, March 2003.
>
>
>4.  Security Considerations
>
>     It is conjectured that use of the CRAM-MD5 authentication mechanism
>     provides replay protection for a session.
>
>     This mechanism does not obscure the user name in any way.  Accord-
>     ingly, a server that implements both a clear-text password command
>     and this authentication type should not allow both methods of
>     access for a given user name.
>
>     Keyed MD5 is chosen for this application because of the greater
>     security imparted to authentication of short messages. In addition,
>     the use of the techniques described in [KEYED-MD5] for pre-computa-
>     tion of intermediate results make it possible to avoid explicit
>     clear-text storage of the shared secret on the server system by
>     instead storing the intermediate results which are known as "con-
>     texts."  While the saving, on the server, of the MD5 "context" is
>     marginally better than saving the shared secrets in clear-text, it
>     is not sufficient to protect the secrets if the server itself is
>     compromised.  Consequently, servers that store the secrets or con-
>     texts must both be protected to a level appropriate to the poten-
>     tial information value in the data and services protected by this
>     mechanism.  In other words, techniques like this one involve a
>     trade-off between vulnerability to network sniffing and I/O buffer
>     snooping and vulnerability of the server host's databases.  If one
>     believes that the host and its databases are subject to compromise,
>     and the network is not, this technique (and all others like it) is
>     unattractive.  It is perhaps even less attractive than clear-text
>     passwords, which are typically stored on hosts in one-way hash
>     form.  On the other hand, if the server databases are perceived as
>     reasonably secure, and one is concerned about client-side or net-
>     work interception of the passwords (secrets), then this (and simi-
>     lar) techniques are preferable to clear-text passwords by a wide
>     margin.
>
>     As the length of the shared secret increases, so does the diffi-
>     culty of deriving it.
>
>     While there are now suggestions in the literature that the use of
>     MD5 and keyed MD5 in authentication procedures probably has a lim-
>     ited effective lifetime, the technique is now widely deployed and
>     widely understood.  It is believed that this general understanding
>     may assist with the rapid replacement, by CRAM-MD5, of the current
>     uses of permanent clear-text passwords in many protocols.  This
>     document has been deliberately written to permit easy upgrading to
>     use SHA (or whatever alternatives emerge) when they are considered
>     to be widely available and adequately safe.
>
>     Even with the use of CRAM-MD5, users are still vulnerable to active
>     attacks.  An example of an increasingly common active attack is
>     'TCP Session Hijacking' as described in CERT Advisory CA-95:01.

An informative reference for this advisory would be useful.

Also, CERT should be spelled out.

>     CRAM-MD5 does not authenticate the server and does not include a
>     client-supplied nonce.  As a result, it is possible to construct a
>     server with a fixed challenge string that has pre-computed the
>     hashes for all possible passwords up to a certain length (or from a
>     dictionary).  Such a server could then immediately determine the
>     user's password if it is sufficiently short.
>
>
>5.  IANA Considerations
>
>     The SASL Mechanism Registry entry for CRAM-MD5 must be updated to
>     reference this specification.

This should be worded as a request.  That is,
	It is requested that the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
	update the SASL Mechanism Registry entry for CRAM-MD5 to refer to
	this document.

(The RFC-Editor with then, after the request is fulfilled by IANA,
replace this with a statement that IANA has made this update.)

>6.  Contributors
>
>     The CRAM-MD5 mechanism was originally specified in RFC 2095,
>     IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/Response.  The
>     authors of that document -- John C. Klensin, Paul Krumviede, and
>     Randy Catoe -- are to be credited with the design and specification
>     of CRAM-MD5, and they are the original authors of the majority of
>     the text in this document. This memo serves only to re-state CRAM-
>     MD5 within the formal context of SASL, which specification it pre-
>     ceded by several months.
>

A "Changes since RFC 2095" section is needed.

>7.  Intellectual Property
>
>     The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
>     intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to per-
>     tain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
>     this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
>     might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
>     has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on
>     the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
>     standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
>     claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances
>     of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made
>     to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such pro-
>     prietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can
>     be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
>
>     The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
>     copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
>     rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
>     this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Execu-
>     tive Director.
>
>
>8.  Editors' Address
>
>     Lyndon Nerenberg
>     Orthanc Systems
>     Email: lyndon+rfc-crammd5@orthanc.ca
>
>
>9.  Full Copyright Statement
>
>     Copyright 2003, 2004, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
>
>     This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
>     others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain
>     it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, pub-
>     lished and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of
>     any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this para-
>     graph are included on all such copies and derivative works.  How-
>     ever, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as
>     by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet
>     Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the
>     purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the proce-
>     dures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must
>     be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other
>     than English.  The limited permissions granted above are perpetual
>     and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors
>     or assigns.
>
>     This document and the information contained herein is provided on
>     an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGI-
>     NEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
>     INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
>     INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WAR-
>     RANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


From owner-ietf-sasl Thu Mar 11 00:05:49 2004
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Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 00:05:33 -0800
From: Lyndon Nerenberg <lyndon@orthanc.ca>
To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
cc: ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: CRAM-MD5 review notes [long]
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--On 2004-3-10 11:31 PM -0800 "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> 
wrote:

> Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.

Please shoot the groff authors, who have made it impossible to turn off 
hyphenation when using the -ms macros. I will generate the final 
version using a real version of nroff, where .nh and .hy work as 
documented.

As for the grammar changes, <msg-id> makes more sense. I think what 
happened here was that 2822 was still in limbo, but we didn't want to 
reference 822 as we knew it was going to be obsolete. I can't remember 
now just where we got the specific text for those changes. I will go 
through the grammar again and see what can be pulled from 2822. As for 
<user>, I will add a descriptive tag spelling out this must be valid 
UTF-8.

The rest of the changes seem reasonable, and I'll incorporate them into 
a new version. I had hoped to preserve the original text and format as 
much as possible, but since that won't happen now I will also bring the 
whole document up-to-date with the latest RFC Editor requirements.

--lyndon


From owner-ietf-sasl Thu Mar 11 06:04:11 2004
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Subject: Re: CRAM-MD5 review notes [long]
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Lyndon Nerenberg wrote:
> 
> --On 2004-3-10 11:31 PM -0800 "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> wrote:
> 
>> Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.
> 
> 
> Please shoot the groff authors, who have made it impossible to turn off 
> hyphenation when using the -ms macros. I will generate the final version 
> using a real version of nroff, where .nh and .hy work as documented.

I encountered the same problem when working on some LDAP I-Ds.  Try 
adding a line like this before your .hy 0 line :

.nr HY 0

See: http://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-groff/2000-09/msg00001.html

-- 
Mark Smith
LDAP Book Information: http://www.ldapbook.com/
What's Next:           http://www.pearlcrescent.com/



From owner-ietf-sasl Thu Mar 11 07:50:43 2004
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Subject: Proposed milestones
Message-Id: <20040311155000.32D6815159C@konishi-polis.mit.edu>
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If no one objects in the next two days I'll send these in:

May 04		Base spec
July 04		Digest md5
July 04		Cram-md5
September 04	GSSAPI
December 04	Conclude or recharter

Also, I will be submitting the new saslprep for publication shortly.

--Sam


From owner-ietf-sasl Thu Mar 11 08:05:15 2004
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Sam Hartman wrote:

>If no one objects in the next two days I'll send these in:
>
>May 04		Base spec
>July 04		Digest md5
>July 04		Cram-md5
>
Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed by DIGEST-MD5 
(July/August)

>September 04	GSSAPI
>December 04	Conclude or recharter
>
>Also, I will be submitting the new saslprep for publication shortly.
>  
>
Looks good otherwise.

Alexey



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>>>>> "Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:

    Alexey> Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed
    Alexey> by DIGEST-MD5 (July/August)


I think Kurt and I believe that digest is a higher priority.


From owner-ietf-sasl Thu Mar 11 08:23:53 2004
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Sam Hartman wrote:

>>>>>>"Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:
>>>>>>            
>>>>>>
>    Alexey> Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed
>    Alexey> by DIGEST-MD5 (July/August)
>
>I think Kurt and I believe that digest is a higher priority.
>
That is fine, but don't make them in the same month.

Alexey



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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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I am forwarding this message from the LDAPbis mailing list as suggested 
by Kurt.
Does this message have enough context to start a discussion of the issue?

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	Re: SASL mechanisms that return no data in last leg
Date: 	Thu, 11 Mar 2004 19:26:50 -0800
From: 	Kurt D. Zeilenga <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
To: 	Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
CC: 	lukeh@PADL.COM, ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org
References: 	<200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com> 
<404A778D.90302@isode.com> <6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1> 
<404E882B.8060702@isode.com>



At 07:14 PM 3/9/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:
>
>>I'd have to agree with Alexey.  The mechanism for provide data
>>with the last leg of the exchange is optional.  That is, if there
>>is data to be sent AND the server chooses not to require
>>another roundtrip, the server can attach the data to last
>>message.
>>
>>Another point is that SASL allows the mechanism data
>>in any message of the exchange to be any octet string,
>>including a zero length string.  Hence, it seems that
>>no string and a zero length string are not necessarily
>>semantically equivalent here.
>This is correct, however LDAP is the first SASL profile I've seen that is able to represent them differently.
>Do you think that we should say something about this in the base SASL document?

I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.

I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
recommendation made that applications support one or the
other but not both.

Kurt



--------------080406080208050408070403
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<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
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I am forwarding this message from the LDAPbis mailing list as suggested
by Kurt.<br>
Does this message have enough context to start a discussion of the
issue?<br>
<br>
-------- Original Message --------
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">Subject: </th>
      <td>Re: SASL mechanisms that return no data in last leg</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">Date: </th>
      <td>Thu, 11 Mar 2004 19:26:50 -0800</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">From: </th>
      <td>Kurt D. Zeilenga <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:Kurt@OpenLDAP.org">&lt;Kurt@OpenLDAP.org&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">To: </th>
      <td>Alexey Melnikov <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com">&lt;Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">CC: </th>
      <td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
 href="mailto:lukeh@PADL.COM">lukeh@PADL.COM</a>, <a
 class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
 href="mailto:ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org">ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">References: </th>
      <td><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com">&lt;200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:404A778D.90302@isode.com">&lt;404A778D.90302@isode.com&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1">&lt;6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:404E882B.8060702@isode.com">&lt;404E882B.8060702@isode.com&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<br>
<br>
<pre>At 07:14 PM 3/9/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
&gt;Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:
&gt;
&gt;&gt;I'd have to agree with Alexey.  The mechanism for provide data
&gt;&gt;with the last leg of the exchange is optional.  That is, if there
&gt;&gt;is data to be sent AND the server chooses not to require
&gt;&gt;another roundtrip, the server can attach the data to last
&gt;&gt;message.
&gt;&gt;
&gt;&gt;Another point is that SASL allows the mechanism data
&gt;&gt;in any message of the exchange to be any octet string,
&gt;&gt;including a zero length string.  Hence, it seems that
&gt;&gt;no string and a zero length string are not necessarily
&gt;&gt;semantically equivalent here.
&gt;This is correct, however LDAP is the first SASL profile I've seen that is able to represent them differently.
&gt;Do you think that we should say something about this in the base SASL document?

I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.

I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
recommendation made that applications support one or the
other but not both.

Kurt

</pre>
</body>
</html>

--------------080406080208050408070403--


From owner-ietf-sasl Fri Mar 12 07:52:04 2004
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On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
> will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
> for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
> they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.
>
> I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
> recommendation made that applications support one or the
> other but not both.

Except they aren't semanticly equivilent -- just like zero length and
absent initial responses aren't equivilent.

For, example, let's have an IMAP-like protocol with an initial response
(well, SASL-IR extension) and server-last capability:

C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL

is not at all equivilent to

C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL ""

The first requires that the server send an empty initial challenge,
whereas the second means that the entire exchange is complete.

In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:

....

C: (blob)
S: x OK ""

is not equivilent to

C: (blob)
S: x OK

The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.

-Rob

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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PGP:0x5CE32FCC | Cyert Hall 207 * rjs3@andrew.cmu.edu * 412.268.7456
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Rob Siemborski wrote:

>On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
>>will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
>>for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
>>they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.
>>
>>I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
>>recommendation made that applications support one or the
>>other but not both.
>>    
>>
>
>Except they aren't semanticly equivilent -- just like zero length and
>absent initial responses aren't equivilent.
>
>For, example, let's have an IMAP-like protocol with an initial response
>(well, SASL-IR extension) and server-last capability:
>
>C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL
>
>is not at all equivilent to
>
>C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL ""
>
>The first requires that the server send an empty initial challenge,
>whereas the second means that the entire exchange is complete.
>
>In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:
>
>....
>
>C: (blob)
>S: x OK ""
>
>is not equivilent to
>
>C: (blob)
>S: x OK
>
>The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
>client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
>(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.
>
The message wasn't talking about initial response, it was talking about 
"additional data with success".



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On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> >In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:
> >
> >....
> >
> >C: (blob)
> >S: x OK ""
> >
> >is not equivilent to
> >
> >C: (blob)
> >S: x OK
> >
> >The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
> >client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
> >(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.
> >
>
> The message wasn't talking about initial response, it was talking about
> "additional data with success".

Yes, obviously.  But the situation is very similar.

As in the example above -- the client is unable to tell if the server
omitted the response (since it is, after all optional) and thus is facing
an error, or if the server actually intended there to be data there.

Maybe, though, the client can assume the server is playing on the level if
it was expecting data with success, and got neither the extra round trip
*nor* the data, implying that the data was an empty string.  But this
seems very poor.

-Rob

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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PGP:0x5CE32FCC | Cyert Hall 207 * rjs3@andrew.cmu.edu * 412.268.7456
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To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
CC: ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: More editorial changes (was sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long])
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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>>  Procedures for registering new SASL mechanisms are given in section 8.
>>
>>  The "sasl-mech" production below defines the syntax of a SASL
>>  mechanism name.  This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
>>  notation as specified in [ABNF] and the ABNF core rules as specified
>>  in Appendix A of the ABNF specification [ABNF].
>>
>>  sasl-mech    = 1*20mech-char
>>  mech-char    = %x41-5A / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
>>                 ; mech names restricted to ASCII uppercase letters,
>>                 ; digits, "-" and "_"
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest this comment be replaced with:
>        ; mech-char is restricted to "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", "-", and "_"
>        : from ASCII character set.
>
Done.

>In the ABNF, I suggest (for consistency) replacing DIGIT, "-", and  
>"_" with %x30-39, %x2D, and %x5F, respectively.  This also avoids
>unnecessary reliance on a core rule (which would require the      
>implementor to look up meaning of DIGIT).
>
Done (it a slightly different manner).

>>  The "extern-init-resp" rule below defines the initial response sent
>>  from client to server.
>>
>>  extern-init-resp  = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )
>>
>>  UTF8-char-no-nul  = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
>>
>>  UTF8-1-no-nul     = %x01-7F
>>
>>
>>7.2.  Example
>>
>>  The following is an example of an EXTERNAL authentication in the SMTP
>>  protocol [SMTP].  In this example, the client is proxy
>>  authenticating, sending the authorization identity "fred" using in
>>  the (optional) initial response.  The server has determined the
>>  client's identity through IPsec and has a security policy that
>>  permits that identity to proxy authenticate as any other identity.
>>    
>>
>
>An informative reference for IPsec seems appropriate here as
>presently worded.  Suggest it be reworded,
>	The server has obtained the client's (authentication) identity
>	from an external service, such as IPsec, and has a security
>	policy that permits that identity to assume the identity of
>	the asserted authorization identity.
>
Done. I've also added an informative reference for IPSec, as it is 
mentioned in section 7.

Alexey




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Subject: Re: sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long]
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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>At 01:39 PM 2/26/2004, Rob Siemborski wrote:
>  
>
>>Implementors of a protocol using this specification will also need
>>a specification of a profile specific the protocol. 
>>
>
>This is somewhat better.  My previous concern was with
>the "all of this document" part of the current statement.
>For the other audiences, the section is quite specific
>as to what portions of this document they need to read.
>I think we should detail what each audience should read
>with equal specificity.
>
>I have no objection to saying, in addition to portions
>of this document, they need to read the specification
>of the protocol they are implementing, especially those
>portions of that specification which fulfill the
>requirements placed upon that specification by this
>document.
>
>I note as well that it might be appropriate to note
>that implementors need to read and understand
>aspects of mechanism specifications they intend to
>use (regardless of whether they are implementing the
>mechanisms themselves or using an existing implementation)
>to understand, for instance, the mechanism specific
>authentication identity forms, the offered services,
>and security and other considerations.
>
I've rewrote the paragraph to look like this:

The sections "Overview", "Authentication Mechanisms",  "Protocol profile 
requirements", "Specific issues" and
"Security Considerations" cover issues that implementors of a protocol 
that uses SASL framework need to understand.
The implementors will also need to understand a specification of a 
profile specific to the protocol, as well as aspects of mechanism
specifications they intend to use (regardless of whether they are 
implementing the mechanisms themselves or using an existing implementation)
to understand, for instance, the mechanism specific authentication 
identity forms, the offered services, and security and other considerations.

(Note that I've borrowed the text that Kurt used in his message)

Comments?

Alexey




From owner-ietf-sasl Tue Mar 16 15:52:41 2004
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I'm looking at the AES CBC cipher in digest-md5.  AS we discussed in
Seoul, there are two approaches under consideration.

I strongly prefer the option that includes an explicit IV in every AES
packet to the option that introduces a new packet type and only
sometimes sends an explicit IV.

There are two claimed advantages to the second approach:

1) Performance.

As I understand it, the performance implication of including the IV is
the cost of generating a 128-bit random number along with the cost of
encrypting one block of AES data.

2)  Simplicity of implementation: implementations could re-use
    existing packet formats.

I don't understand this at all.  It seems like you need to implement
both packet types in all implementations, so the I don't see how it is
simpler.

The advantages of the first approach seem to be security against the
attack that we were trying to defend against.  If an attacker can ever
predict a situation when an explicit IV is not going to be used, then
the attacker can mount the attack.

I do not expect the second approach would pass AD review.

For now, I'd recommend against ignoring the performance concern.  If
there are implementers who are seriously concerned about performance,
then we should consider counter mode instead of the explicit IV
approach.  

--Sam


From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 17 08:02:20 2004
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Sam:

I will not say that the second alternative will not pass AD 
review.  However, it will require justification.  The first alternative is 
the traditional way to do things, so no justification is needed.  There are 
many protocols that employ the first alternative, including IEEE 802.10b, 
IPsec, and S/MIME.  Notice this covers many different layers in the 
protocol stack.

If the working group selects the second alternative, the security 
considerations section MUST state why the first alternative is a poor fit, 
and it MUST state how the second alternative offers the same level of security.

Russ

At 06:52 PM 3/16/2004 -0500, Sam Hartman wrote:


>I'm looking at the AES CBC cipher in digest-md5.  AS we discussed in
>Seoul, there are two approaches under consideration.
>
>I strongly prefer the option that includes an explicit IV in every AES
>packet to the option that introduces a new packet type and only
>sometimes sends an explicit IV.
>
>There are two claimed advantages to the second approach:
>
>1) Performance.
>
>As I understand it, the performance implication of including the IV is
>the cost of generating a 128-bit random number along with the cost of
>encrypting one block of AES data.
>
>2)  Simplicity of implementation: implementations could re-use
>     existing packet formats.
>
>I don't understand this at all.  It seems like you need to implement
>both packet types in all implementations, so the I don't see how it is
>simpler.
>
>The advantages of the first approach seem to be security against the
>attack that we were trying to defend against.  If an attacker can ever
>predict a situation when an explicit IV is not going to be used, then
>the attacker can mount the attack.
>
>I do not expect the second approach would pass AD review.
>
>For now, I'd recommend against ignoring the performance concern.  If
>there are implementers who are seriously concerned about performance,
>then we should consider counter mode instead of the explicit IV
>approach.
>
>--Sam


From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 17 11:53:40 2004
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I want to confirm I'm understanding the attack described in the
section 6.3.1 of the current base spec draft.  If I understand the
attack, then I'll work with Kurt and Alexie to replace that text with
a more general security consideration.

I'd appreciate if Alexie and other parties who brought the attention
of the attack to this working group could confirm my understanding.

The client C is talking to a proxy P.

The proxy implements SASL decription and authentication services.  The
client authenticates to some service through P that is served by
server A. t 

Now most traffic goes from C to P, is decrypted and then sent over
another channel to A.

Later within the same session, the client wants to access another
resource requiring new authentication.  It reauthenticates to P, and
this new resource is on server B.

No new security layer is negotiated, so the same keys, IVs, etc are
used between P and C.


B can inject text into its channel to P, which P will encrypt for C.
B may also be able to cause C to send it certain text depending on the
protocol; this text would be encrypted to P and then later sent to B.

So it is possible that B could mount a chosen plaintext attack
potentially gaining information about the previous communications
between A and C.  

As an example, with the des mode of digest-md5, if B knows the last
block of ciphertext between P and A, B may be able to construct
plaintext to test a guess of plaintext previously communicated between
A and C.


In particular, this attack does not depend on B knowing the key used
to talk to C, nor does it assume that B is directly doing encryption.


If I'm understanding this correctly, there's a lot of complexity we
can get rid of in the current description of the attack.



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Subject: JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
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JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP

Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)

Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
Assassin 

Description: I need a world renownd expert in ISP email systems available
on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
accounts into a completely new invironment that includes POP and SMTP mail
accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
backup the staff I have working on this now.

Here are the areas of expertise we need:

Cyrus Electronic Mail
SASL 
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
Sendmail 
Postfix 
Squirrel Main 
Spam Assassin 

Rate: DOE,   Job Type: Contract,   Start Date: 3/17/2004,   Number Of
Openings: 1,   Location: NYC

Please email text resume to kontact@kandidates.com


From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 17 19:52:38 2004
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JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP

Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)

Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
Assassin 

Description: I need a world renowned expert in ISP email systems available
on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
accounts into a completely new environment that includes POP and SMTP mail
accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
backup the staff I have working on this now.

Here are the areas of expertise we need:

Cyrus Electronic Mail
SASL 
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
Sendmail 
Postfix 
Squirrel Main 
Spam Assassin 

Rate: DOE,   Job Type: Contract,   Start Date: 3/17/2004,   Number Of
Openings: 1,   Location: NYC

Please email text resume to kontact@kandidates.com


From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 17 21:52:52 2004
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Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 21:52:38 -0800
To: Kandidates <kontact@kandidates.com>
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: Re: JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
Cc: ietf-sasl@imc.org
In-Reply-To: <BC7E86E7.DCF%kontact@kandidates.com>
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 <BC7E86E7.DCF%kontact@kandidates.com>
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The ietf-sasl@imc.org mailing list is reserved for standardization
discussions regarding an Internet Protocol and other business of
the IETF SASL WG.  Your recent posts are off-topic and quite
inappropriate.  Please cease sending further such messages to
this list.

Kurt Zeilenga, co-chair
IETF SASL Working Group

At 07:51 PM 3/17/2004, Kandidates wrote:

>JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
>
>Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)
>
>Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
>Assassin 
>
>Description: I need a world renowned expert in ISP email systems available
>on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
>accounts into a completely new environment that includes POP and SMTP mail
>accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
>that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
>portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
>backup the staff I have working on this now.
>
>Here are the areas of expertise we need:
>
>Cyrus Electronic Mail
>SASL 
>The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
>protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
>IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
>Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
>and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
>Sendmail 
>Postfix 
>Squirrel Main 
>Spam Assassin 
>
>Rate: DOE,   Job Type: Contract,   Start Date: 3/17/2004,   Number Of
>Openings: 1,   Location: NYC
>
>Please email text resume to kontact@kandidates.com


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Sam Hartman wrote:

>I want to confirm I'm understanding the attack described in the
>section 6.3.1 of the current base spec draft.  If I understand the
>attack, then I'll work with Kurt and Alexie to replace that text with
>a more general security consideration.
>
>I'd appreciate if Alexie and other parties who brought the attention
>of the attack to this working group could confirm my understanding.
>
>The client C is talking to a proxy P.
>
>The proxy implements SASL decription and authentication services.  The
>client authenticates to some service through P that is served by
>server A. 
>
>Now most traffic goes from C to P, is decrypted and then sent over
>another channel to A.
>
>Later within the same session, the client wants to access another
>resource requiring new authentication.  It reauthenticates to P, and
>this new resource is on server B.
>
>No new security layer is negotiated, so the same keys, IVs, etc are
>used between P and C.
>
>
>B can inject text into its channel to P, which P will encrypt for C.
>B may also be able to cause C to send it certain text depending on the
>protocol; this text would be encrypted to P and then later sent to B.
>
Yes, your description seems to be correct.

>So it is possible that B could mount a chosen plaintext attack
>potentially gaining information about the previous communications
>between A and C.  
>
>As an example, with the des mode of digest-md5, if B knows the last
>block of ciphertext between P and A, B may be able to construct
>plaintext to test a guess of plaintext previously communicated between
>A and C.
>
>
>In particular, this attack does not depend on B knowing the key used
>to talk to C, nor does it assume that B is directly doing encryption.
>
>
>If I'm understanding this correctly, there's a lot of complexity we
>can get rid of in the current description of the attack.
>  
>
Alexey
__________________________________________
Isode Limited, http://www.isode.com

IETF standard related pages:
http://www.melnikov.ca/mel/devel/Links.html

Personal Home Page: http://www.melnikov.ca
__________________________________________



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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Simple Authentication and Security Layer Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords
	Author(s)	: K. Zeilenga
	Filename	: draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-07.txt
	Pages		: 6
	Date		: 2004-3-23
	
This document describes how to prepare Unicode strings representing
user names and passwords for comparison.  The document defines the
'SASLprep' 'stringprep' profile to be used for both user names and
passwords.  This profile is intended to be used by Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms (such as PLAIN,
CRAM-MD5, and DIGEST-MD5) as well as other protocols exchanging user
names and/or passwords.

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From owner-ietf-sasl Tue Mar 23 14:51:19 2004
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The IESG has received a request from the Simple Authentication and Security 
Layer WG to consider the following document:

- 'SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords'
   <draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-07.txt> as a Proposed Standard

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The file can be obtained via
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--=-=-=


Hi.  Looking at the chat log, I think the only issue discussed that
did not make it into the summary is Bob's concerns about RFC 2119.

Also, I claim that the digest-md5 attack is a chosen-ciphertext
attack.  It's actually an adaptive chosen plaintext attack; there is
an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against the DES modes of
digest-md5, but that's not what caused the IV change.


If I make these corrections and additions, anyone object to minutes
looking a lot like the summary?



--=-=-=
Content-Type: message/rfc822
Content-Disposition: inline

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Subject: Summary of SASL Session at IETF 59
References: 
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 02:46:54 -0500
In-Reply-To: <5.2.0.9.2.20040229212300.04537048@mail.binhost.com> (Russ
 Housley's message of "Sun, 29 Feb 2004 21:25:34 -0500")
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The SASL working group met for an hour at IETF 59.  The primary
objective of the meeting was to determine next steps for RFC 2222bis.

The chairs are concerned that the document has not received sufficient
review.  The chairs will contact the apps and security areas and ask
for review of the specification before last call.

Kurt Zeilenga raised several issues on the mailing list.  Most of
these were resolved before the meeting; Kurt will check future
versions of the draft to confirm resolution.

One of Kurt's issues that is not resolved is the handling of security
layers for multiple reauthentications.  At IETF 58, we decided not to
change the protocol because of this threat, but Kurt raised concerns
about the wording of the security consideration.  During this
discussion Sam Hartman realized this attack is apparently an instance
of a more general attack.  Sam will confirm this and propose text on
the list.

Bob Morgan described his concerns about the confusion between
authentication identity and authorization ID.  The sense of the room
was that while we want to be as clear as possible, both concepts are
important and we need to keep both terms.  This discussion is still
open on the list.

A new document will be published  shortly after the meeting.  There
will be a need for at least one more revision, slated for early April
before a last call.  We hope to have the base spec to the IESG by
May; this is a milestone slip.

ALexey Melnikov still needs input on use of stringprep and saslprep in
digest-md5.  There was discussion of dropping support for ISO 8859-1
and claiming that all strings are UTF8.  This will be resolved on the
list.  

Sam agreed to review the  AES mode for digest-md5.  The
working group previously agreed to use explicit IVs to avoid chosen
ciphertext attacks, but ALexey has two alternative wire formats for
explicit IVs.

We hope to have digest-md5 last called by July.  Alexey thinks this is
very optimistic.



--=-=-=--


From owner-ietf-sasl Mon Mar  1 03:05:44 2004
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
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In-Reply-To: <4042462A.6070806@isode.com> (Alexey Melnikov's message of
 "Mon, 01 Mar 2004 05:06:02 +0900")
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>>>>> "Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:

    Alexey> Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined
    Alexey> within each SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the
    Alexey> authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.  The
    Alexey> mechanism may not modify (by, e.g., normalization) the
    Alexey> authorization identity.

I do not believe there is currently a consensus to make a statement as
strong as this.  I agree the mechanism should not modify the
characters of the authorization identity, but as I said over the
weekend I'm unclear that we prohibit modifying the encoding.

If you want to make that change that's possible, if the working group
supports it, but I just want to all it out as a new change that needs
discussion.

--Sam


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Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 20:54:39 +0900
To: Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: Re: New text is authentication/authorization id description
  (section 4.2)
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At 05:06 AM 3/1/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined within each
>SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.

What is the normalized (canonical) string form an email address?
What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a domain name?
What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a distinguished name?

While it possible to define normalized forms for each, these
definitions, to the best of my knowledge, presently do not
exist presently.

That is, my email address is commonly written "kurt@openldap.org",
"Kurt@OpenLDAP.org", and number of other ways.  Which
representation is normalized one?

Kurt 


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From: Rob Siemborski <rjs3@andrew.cmu.edu>
To: Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
cc: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>, ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long]
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On Mon, 1 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> >We should extend this to also cover things other than just TLS (e.g. a
> >compression layer, separate from either TLS or SASL).
> >
> >For example:
> >
> >If other transport or session layers (such as a Transport Layer Security
> >layer or a compression layer) in addition to the SASL security layer are
> >allowed to be negotiated by the protocol....
> >
> I don't think a protocol profile can reasonably define layering of
> multiple things when at least one of them is not known when the protocol
> profile is written.
> So I would rather not change the description.

Certainly if the existance of such a layer isn't know, you can't say where
it fits.  However, any known layers need to be documented for interop to
be ensured.

-Rob

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Sam Hartman wrote:

>>>>>>"Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:
>>>>>>            
>>>>>>
>
>    Alexey> Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined
>    Alexey> within each SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the
>    Alexey> authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.  The
>    Alexey> mechanism may not modify (by, e.g., normalization) the
>    Alexey> authorization identity.
>
>I do not believe there is currently a consensus to make a statement as
>strong as this.  I agree the mechanism should not modify the
>characters of the authorization identity, but as I said over the
>weekend I'm unclear that we prohibit modifying the encoding.
>
I am not sure what you mean in the last sentence.

To me this text says that normalization is up to a protocol profile. It 
doesn't talk about encoding (which is mechanism specific), because 
encoding is not a "modification". Maybe it should?

>
>If you want to make that change that's possible, if the working group
>supports it, but I just want to all it out as a new change that needs
>discussion.
>
I agree that this needs discussion (although this is not a new issue, it 
is a continuation of the issue raised by Simon)

Alexey




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[This replies deals with two more comments from Kurt].

>>4.    Authentication mechanisms
>>
>>  SASL mechanisms are named by strings, from 1 to 20 characters in
>>  length, consisting of ASCII [ASCII] upper-case letters, digits,
>>  hyphens, and/or underscores.  SASL mechanism names must be registered
>>  with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). IETF standards
>>  track documents may direct the IANA to reserve a portion of the SASL
>>  mechanism namespace and may specify different registration criteria
>>  for the reserved portion; the GSSAPI mechanism specification
>>  [SASL-GSSAPI] does this.
>>    
>>
>
>The above sentence should be moved in IANA considerations section.
>
I think it already does:

8.2.  Registration procedure

...

There is no naming convention for SASL mechanisms; any name that
conforms to the syntax of a SASL mechanism name can be registered.
An IETF Standards Track document may reserve a portion of the SASL
mechanism namespace ("family of SASL mechanisms") for its own use,
amending the registration rules for that portion of the namespace.
Each family of SASL mechanisms MUST be identified by a prefix.

>>9.   Security considerations
>>
>>  Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.
>>
>>  The mechanisms that support integrity protection are designed such
>>  that the negotiation of the security layer and authorization identity
>>  is integrity protected.
>>    
>>
>
>This statement seems a bit circular.
>
>Also, "integrity protection" was defined as providing the capability
>to detection unauthorized changes to data transfered by the security
>layer.  However this uses the term implies that the authentication
>exchange, including layer negotiation is protected.  This is problematic.
>
I think the text should read:

The mechanisms that support integrity protection should be designed such ...

(I've changed "are" to "should be")

>If we look at DIGEST-MD5, which does offer a security layer
>with "integrity protection", we find a mechanism which does
> 
>
I assume you meant "does not".

>provide full integrity protection over the authentication
>exchange itself.
>
It doesn't protect the whole authentication exchange, but it protects 
both security layer negotiation and the authorization id.

>I think we need to a bit more precise with our terminology.  To
>avoid having to define a SASL-specific terminology, I strongly
>recommend we try to use RFC 2828 based terminology.
>
I think we should check if the SASL terminology in use now doesn't 
contradict RFC 2828.
This assumes that the document is updated to reference RFC 2828. I 
personally don't mind (if there are no major inconsistencies), but the 
WG has to give a feedback if this would be considered a good idea.

Alexey




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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>At 05:06 AM 3/1/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined within each
>>SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.
>>    
>>
>
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form an email address?
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a domain name?
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a distinguished name?
>
>While it possible to define normalized forms for each, these
>definitions, to the best of my knowledge, presently do not
>exist presently.
>
>That is, my email address is commonly written "kurt@openldap.org",
>"Kurt@OpenLDAP.org", and number of other ways.  Which
>representation is normalized one?
>
I think I understand what you are talking about. Normalization is not to 
be confused with Unicode Normalization.
Suggestion for a better term is welcomed.

Alexey



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Rob Siemborski wrote:

>On Mon, 1 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>>We should extend this to also cover things other than just TLS (e.g. a
>>>compression layer, separate from either TLS or SASL).
>>>
>>>For example:
>>>
>>>If other transport or session layers (such as a Transport Layer Security
>>>layer or a compression layer) in addition to the SASL security layer are
>>>allowed to be negotiated by the protocol....
>>>
>>>      
>>>
>>I don't think a protocol profile can reasonably define layering of
>>multiple things when at least one of them is not known when the protocol
>>profile is written.
>>So I would rather not change the description.
>>    
>>
>
>Certainly if the existance of such a layer isn't know, you can't say where
>it fits.  However, any known layers need to be documented for interop to
>be ensured.
>
There is compression support in TLS now. Don't tell me you were talking 
about IMAP COMPRESS ;-).

My point is that if a new layer is invented later on, it has to document 
interaction with SASL security layer and TLS.

Alexey



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To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
CC: ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Editotorial changes (was Re: sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long])
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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>>  The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) provides a method
>>  for adding authentication support with an optional security layer to
>>  connection-based protocols.
>>    
>>
>
>As used here, the word "optional" implies that protocols MAY
>include security layer support.
>
In theory a protocol profile can disallow usage of a SASL security layer.

>Suggest this be reworded
>
>	The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a
>	framework for providing authentication and data security
>	services in connection-based protocols.
>
I like that.

>>                               It also describes a structure for
>>  authentication mechanisms.  The result is an abstraction layer
>>  between protocols and authentication mechanisms such that any SASL-
>>  compatible authentication mechanism can be used with any SASL-
>>  compatible protocol.
>>
>>  This document describes how a SASL authentication mechanism is
>>  structured, describes how a protocol adds support for SASL, defines
>>  the protocol for carrying a security layer over a connection, and
>>  defines the EXTERNAL SASL authentication mechanism.
>>    
>>
>
>It might be better to transpose EXTERNAL and SASL here.
>
Done.

>>2.    Organization of this document
>>
>>2.1.  How to read this document
>>
>>  This document is written to serve several different audiences,
>>  protocol designers using this specification to support authentication
>>  in their protocol, mechanism designers that define new SASL
>>  mechanisms, and implementors of clients or servers for those
>>  protocols using this specification.
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest using a bullet list for the above.
>
Sounds good.

>
>
>...
>
>>2.2.  Conventions used in this document
>>
>>  In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
>>  server respectively.
>>
>>  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
>>  in this document are to be interpreted as defined in "Key words for
>>  use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS].
>>
>>  Character names in this document use the notation for code points and
>>  names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode].  For example, the letter
>>  "a" may be represented as either <U+0061> or <LATIN SMALL LETTER A>.
>>
>>  This document uses terms "integrity protection" and "confidentiality
>>  protection".  The former references to a security layer that is able
>>  to detect data modification by using some kind of hash.  However,
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest the "by using some kind of hash" qualification be dropped.   
>The term "integrity protection" applies to any layer which is capable
>of detecting data modification (regardless of whether it using some
>kind of hash or not).  I suggest:
>
>    The term "integrity protection" refers to a security layer         
>    designed to detect unauthorized data modification.
>
Ok
...

>>  authentication mechanism to be defined once, making it usable by any
>>  SASL protocol profile.  In many implementations, the same SASL
>>  mechanism code is used for multiple protocols.
>>    
>>
>
>Add another (see above) subsection which
>
>X.Y. Relationship to other documents
>
>    This document obsoletes RFC 2222.  It replaces all portions of
>    RFC 2222 excepting sections 7.1 (Kerberos version 4 mechanism),
>    7.2 (GSSAPI mechanism), 7.3 (S/Key mechanism).  The Kerberos
>    version 4 (KERBEROS_IV) and S/Key (SKEY) mechanisms are now        
>    viewed as obsolete.  The GSSAPI mechanism is now separately 
>    specified [SASL-GSSAPI].
>
I've added this as "Appendix B". The detailed list of changes in now 
Appendix C.

>>  Procedures for registering new SASL mechanisms are given in section 8.
>>
>>  The "sasl-mech" production below defines the syntax of a SASL
>>  mechanism name.  This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
>>  notation as specified in [ABNF] and the ABNF core rules as specified
>>  in Appendix A of the ABNF specification [ABNF].
>>
>>  sasl-mech    = 1*20mech-char
>>  mech-char    = %x41-5A / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
>>                 ; mech names restricted to ASCII uppercase letters,
>>                 ; digits, "-" and "_"
>>
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest this comment be replaced with:
>        ; mech-char is restricted to "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", "-", and "_"
>        : from ASCII character set.
>
Done

>...
>
>>5.2.  Mechanism profile guidelines
>>
>>  Designers of new SASL mechanism should be aware of the following
>>  issues:
>>
>>  1) Authorization identity.
>>    
>>
>
>Remove the "."
>
Ok.

>>6.1.1.  Client sends data first examples
>>
>>  The following are two examples of an SECURID authentication [SASL-
>>  SECURID] in the SMTP protocol [SMTP].  In the first example below,
>>  the client is trying fast reauthentication by sending the initial
>>  response:
>>
>>     S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
>>     C: EHLO client.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.  Suggest you s/Hello.*/Welcome client.example.com/
>
Done.

>>     S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
>>     S: 250 DSN
>>     C: AUTH SECURID AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful
>>
>>  The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here the
>>  client chooses not to use the initial response parameter.
>>
>>     S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
>>     C: EHLO client.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.
>
Done.

>>     S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
>>     S: 250 DSN
>>     C: AUTH SECURID
>>     S: 334
>>     C: AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful
>>
>>     Section 7.2 contains an additional example.
>>    
>>
>
>Indention is off here.
>
Thanks.

>
>Also note that 7.2 provides two examples as does 6.2.1.
>So, this should read:
>	Additonal examples can be found in sections 6.2.1 and 7.2.
>
Changed.

>>     C: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         to='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         id='c2s_234'
>>         from='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:features>
>>          <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>            <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
>>            <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
>>          </mechanisms>
>>        </stream:features>
>>     C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
>>              mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
>>     S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long...
>
Fixed.

>>        LGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
>>        </challenge>
>>     C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWFsbT0ic29tZXJlYWxtIixub25jZT0i
>>        T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGNub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZWcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
>>        MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
>>        LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
>>        YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
>>        </response>
>>     S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
>>        </success>
>>
>>     The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here
>>     the server chooses not to use the additional data with success.
>>
>>     C: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         to='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         id='c2s_234'
>>         from='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:features>
>>          <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>            <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
>>            <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
>>          </mechanisms>
>>        </stream:features>
>>     C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
>>              mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
>>     S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.
>
Fixed.

>...
>  
>
>>  Non-terminals referenced but not defined below are as defined by
>>  [UTF-8].
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest the non-terminal productions be directly incorporated
>into this document.
>
I actually disagree.
If there is an update to UTF-8, I wouldn't like to waste additional time 
trying to synchronize the two.

>>  The "extern-init-resp" rule below defines the initial response sent
>>  from client to server.
>>
>>  extern-init-resp  = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )
>>
>>  UTF8-char-no-nul  = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
>>
>>  UTF8-1-no-nul     = %x01-7F
>>
>>
>>7.2.  Example
>>
>>...
>>
>>  The following example is almost identical to the one above, but the
>>  client doesn't use proxy authentication.
>>    
>>
>
>s/use/request/
>
Changed.

>>     S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
>>     C: EHLO jgm.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com
>>     S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
>>     C: AUTH EXTERNAL
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful.
>>
>>
>>8.    IANA Considerations
>>
>>8.1.  Guidelines for IANA
>>
>>  It is requested that IANA updates the SASL mechanisms registry as
>>  follows:
>>
>>     Change the "Intended usage" of the KERBEROS_V4 and SKEY mechanism
>>     registrations to OBSOLETE.  Change the "Published specification"
>>     of the EXTERNAL mechanism to this document. Updated registration
>>     is provided in Section 8.6.
>>    
>>
>
>s/registration/registration information/
>
Done.

>>...
>>    
>>
>>10.    References
>>
>>10.1.  Normative References
>>
>>  [ABNF] Crocker, D. (Ed.), Overell, P., "Augmented BNF for Syntax
>>  Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997
>>
>>  [ASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Code Extension
>>  Techniques for Use with the 7-bit Coded Character Set of American
>>  National Standard Code (ASCII) for Information Interchange", FIPS PUB
>>  35, 1974
>>
>>  [CHARSET-POLICY] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
>>  Languages", RFC 2277, BCP 18, January 1998
>>
>>  [GSSAPI] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
>>  Interface, Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000
>>
>>  [ISO-10646] "Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) -
>>  Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane", ISO/IEC 10646-1 : 1993.
>>    
>>
>
>This reference is never used and hence should be deleted.
>
Done.

>>  [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
>>  Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 19, March 1997
>>
>>  [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
>>  3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" (Reading,
>>  MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), as amended by the
>>  "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode 3.1"
>>  (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the "Unicode Standard
>>  Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).
>>
>>  [Stringprep] Hoffman, P., Blanchet, M., "Preparation of
>>  Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002.
>>
>>  [SASLprep] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names
>>  and passwords", Work in progress, draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-XX.txt.
>>
>>  [UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
>>  RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003.
>>
>>10.2.  Informative References
>>
>>  [SASL-GSSAPI] Melnikov, A., "SASL GSSAPI mechanisms", work in
>>  progress, draft-ietf-sasl-gssapi-XX.txt, November 2003
>>
>>  [SASL-DIGEST] Leach, P., Newman, C., Melnikov, A., "Using Digest
>>  Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", work in progress, draft-ietf-
>>  sasl-rfc2831bis-XX.txt, replaces RFC 2831
>>
>>  [SASL-OTP] Newman, C., "The One-Time-Password SASL Mechanism", RFC
>>  2444, October 1998.
>>
>>  [SASL-SECURID] Nystrom, M., "The SecurID(r) SASL Mechanism", RFC
>>  2808, April 2000.
>>
>>  [SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 2821, April
>>  2001.
>>
>>  [SMTP-AUTH] Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
>>  RFC 2554, March 1999.
>>
>>  Being revised by Siemborski, R., "SMTP Service Extension for
>>  Authentication", work in progress, draft-siemborski-rfc2554bis-
>>  XX.txt.
>>    
>>
>
>This reference should be put into proper form.
>
I am not sure what exactly you suggest here.

>
>>  [XMPP] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
>>  (XMPP): Core", work in progress, draft-ietf-xmpp-core-XX.txt.
>>
>>  [BASE64] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
>>
>>
>>
>>A. Melnikov                                            FORMFEED[Page 21]
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Internet DRAFT                    SASL                  14 February 2004
>>
>>
>>  Encodings", RFC 3548, July 2003.
>>
>>  [RFC-INSTRUCTIONS] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., "Instructions to RFC
>>  Authors", RFC 2223, October 1997.
>>
>>  [IANA-SASL]  IANA, "SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL)
>>  MECHANISMS", http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms.
>>
>>11.   Editor's Address
>>
>>    Alexey Melnikov
>>    Isode Limited
>>
>>    Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
>>
>>12.   Acknowledgments
>>
>>  This document is a revision of RFC 2222 written by John G. Myers.  He
>>  also contributed significantly to this revision.
>>
>>  Magnus Nystrom provided the ASCII art used in Section 6.3.
>>
>>  Definition of partition was extracted from RFC 2617 ("HTTP
>>  Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication").
>>
>>  Contributions of many members of the SASL mailing list are gratefully
>>  acknowledged, in particular Kurt D. Zeilenga, Peter Saint-Andre, Rob
>>  Siemborski, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Hallvard B Furuseth, Tony Hansen and
>>  Abhijit Menon-Sen for proofreading the document and various editorial
>>  suggestions.
>>    
>>
>
>Suggest you drop middle initials.
>
As you wish :-).

>Needs IPR notice.
>
Added.

Alexey




From owner-ietf-sasl Mon Mar  1 20:47:22 2004
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To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Cc: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>, ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: SASLprep in rfc2222bis-06
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Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 23:47:21 -0500
In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.0.20040225170830.04ce6f88@127.0.0.1> (Kurt D.
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>>>>> "Kurt" == Kurt D Zeilenga <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> writes:

    Kurt> Hence, it is very important that where a mechanism uses the
    Kurt> authorization identity as input to a cryptographic function
    Kurt> that it uses the precise form transferred (or to be
    Kurt> transferred) by the mechanism.


In a discussion today, we came to an additional constraint.  The
mechanism should not use the authorization identity in any long-term
cryptographic keys/hashes.  For example, it would be wrong to change
the digest-md5 spec to include the authz id in the a1 hash.

The reason is that there may be multiple forms of the authz id that
compare the same and some clients may use one form while other clients
use a different form.

We don't yet have text for this constraint.


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Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 14:25:38 +0900
To: ietf-sasl@imc.org
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: chatroom log from our IETF#59 session
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Here is the jabber log from our IETF#59 session.
Thanks to Bob for scribing!

Kurt

[4:54 PM]<rlbob> i'll be scribing
[4:54 PM]<rlbob> session is now underway
[4:55 PM]<rlbob> sh:  2222bis is main item, also stringprep
[4:55 PM]<rlbob> sh:  all other documents have had revisions, but 2222bis is primary focus
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> sh:  specific individuals are being asked to review 2222bis
[4:57 PM]<hartmans> To clarify, there was some discussion on the list of saslprep, but I don't think any  changes were needed
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> kz:  need positive feedback that reviewers are happy with the doc
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> alexey now speaking about 2222bis issues
[4:58 PM]<rlbob> am:  suggested to use RFC 2828 for terminology, concern about possible conflicts
[4:59 PM]<rlbob> kz:  say "these terms are used as defined in 2828"
[4:59 PM]<rlbob> am:  need more generic description, not just list of documents to read
[5:00 PM]<rlbob> am:  thread on list about application of saslprep to authzid
[5:01 PM]<rlbob> am:  proposed text on list, didn't use "normalization" right, will give new text, will reflect agreement achieved on list
[5:01 PM]<rlbob> am:  big thread about what happens to layer on rengotiation if no new layer is requested [or something like that]
[5:02 PM]<rlbob> sh:  appears to be another example of chosen-ciphertext attack, already had discussion for digest-md5
[5:03 PM]<rlbob> sh:  will propose text for document ...
[5:06 PM]<rlbob> bob:  explains his note re importance of clarifying authz id
[5:07 PM]<hartmans> And dropping the concept of authentication ID
[5:08 PM]<rlbob> someone:  need to make distinction between them clear, easier if both are described and explained
[5:09 PM]<tonyhansen> (someone => Tony Hansen)
[5:10 PM]<rlbob> straw poll:  most people want to keep authn identity in the doc
[5:10 PM]<rlbob> kz:  discussion can continue, chairs will summarize next week
[5:13 PM]<hartmans> Bob Morgan: Concern about 2119 language applied to future specifications not to implementations
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> kz: Important that it be clear what the keywords refer to.
[5:14 PM]<rlbob> bob:  concern that 2119 MUST etc don't necessarily apply to constraints on authors, but don't have new language to offer
[5:14 PM]<rlbob> kz:  maybe problem is mixing different uses in the same doc, maybe can clarify per section
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> kz: Separate things so that requirements on specs are in different places than requirements on implementations
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> goal is that clear when reading the document.
[5:16 PM]<hartmans> kz: We still have more work to do on separation of requirements.  Then need to take a look at see if we will be confused.
[5:17 PM]<hartmans> am: Digest-md5
[5:17 PM]<rlbob> am:  moving on to digest-md5
[5:18 PM]<hartmans> am: Tried to clarify reauthentication, ABNF cleanup.
[5:19 PM]<rlbob> attempt to clarify saslprep issues, not finished yet
[5:19 PM]<rlbob> also attempt to clarify charset effects on realm, etc
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> cipher mode clarifications ...
[5:21 PM]<hartmans> am: Drop DES and 3DES per consensus.
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> reorganized confidentiality protection section
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> need lots of input on saslprep issues
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> also "what a realm should look like" question
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> still-open question:  need separate stringprep for realm?
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> kz:  good reason not to use saslprep?
[5:23 PM]<rlbob> am:  argument to made that realms should be same across digest, kerb, gss
[5:24 PM]<rlbob> sh:  gss has no realms, kerb realms are very complicated, so may not be able to be the same
[5:25 PM]<rlbob> am:  there is revision of http digest document, saying all username/passwords are UTF-8
[5:26 PM]<rlbob> am:  big hack in current http digest to use iso-8859-1 if possible, they're hoping to get rid of that ...
[5:27 PM]<hartmans> No the hack is in digest-md5 and was being considered for http-digest as I understand it.
[5:28 PM]<rlbob> sh:  let's take this issue to the list
[5:29 PM]<rlbob> am:  CBC attack
[5:30 PM]<rlbob> am:  two choices, explicit IV and ... sh will send comment to the list
[5:31 PM]<hartmans> second choice is a block type for explicit IV.
[5:31 PM]<rlbob> am:  document not ready for last call very soon
[5:32 PM]<rlbob> am:  also working on GSS document, posted in December
[5:33 PM]<rlbob> am:  example code removed, maybe should be added back
[5:35 PM]<rlbob> am:  should be able to get next rev of 2222bis shortly ...
[5:37 PM]<rlbob> kz:  looks like last on 2222bis may be in April, or even a little later
[5:38 PM]<rlbob> sh:  AD OK with May 04 for submission of 2222bis to IESG?
[5:38 PM]<rlbob> rh:  OK
[5:39 PM]<rlbob> sh:  reason gss doc looks simple is that gss community hasn't focused on it yet
[5:42 PM]<rlbob> kz:  chairs will post proposed new milestones to list by end of week
[5:43 PM]<rlbob> am:  working on C api
[5:43 PM]<rlbob> am:  also requested IETF last call on sasl-for-http document
[5:44 PM]<rlbob> jh:  has this been posted to sasl list?
[5:44 PM]<rlbob> am: yes
[5:45 PM]<rlbob> am:  sasl without persistent connection is "interesting"
[5:46 PM]<rlbob> bob:  intend to submit doc on SAML as SASL mechanism


From owner-ietf-sasl Tue Mar  2 23:47:03 2004
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Subject: Summary of SASL Session at IETF 59
References: 
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
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The SASL working group met for an hour at IETF 59.  The primary
objective of the meeting was to determine next steps for RFC 2222bis.

The chairs are concerned that the document has not received sufficient
review.  The chairs will contact the apps and security areas and ask
for review of the specification before last call.

Kurt Zeilenga raised several issues on the mailing list.  Most of
these were resolved before the meeting; Kurt will check future
versions of the draft to confirm resolution.

One of Kurt's issues that is not resolved is the handling of security
layers for multiple reauthentications.  At IETF 58, we decided not to
change the protocol because of this threat, but Kurt raised concerns
about the wording of the security consideration.  During this
discussion Sam Hartman realized this attack is apparently an instance
of a more general attack.  Sam will confirm this and propose text on
the list.

Bob Morgan described his concerns about the confusion between
authentication identity and authorization ID.  The sense of the room
was that while we want to be as clear as possible, both concepts are
important and we need to keep both terms.  This discussion is still
open on the list.

A new document will be published  shortly after the meeting.  There
will be a need for at least one more revision, slated for early April
before a last call.  We hope to have the base spec to the IESG by
May; this is a milestone slip.

ALexey Melnikov still needs input on use of stringprep and saslprep in
digest-md5.  There was discussion of dropping support for ISO 8859-1
and claiming that all strings are UTF8.  This will be resolved on the
list.  

Sam agreed to review the  AES mode for digest-md5.  The
working group previously agreed to use explicit IVs to avoid chosen
ciphertext attacks, but ALexey has two alternative wire formats for
explicit IVs.

We hope to have digest-md5 last called by July.  Alexey thinks this is
very optimistic.


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At the security area meeting we received a request from Russ to send
saslprep to the IESG now rather than waiting.


Kurt and I believe that the document is ready.  It has passed working
group last call.

If you had comments during that last call, please let us know if they
have not been addressed within a week.

If you have additional comments that you believe might block the
document let us know within a week.


Otherwise we'll request publication.


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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Simple Authentication and Security Layer Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords
	Author(s)	: K. Zeilenga
	Filename	: draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-06.txt
	Pages		: 6
	Date		: 2004-3-10
	
This document describes how to prepare Unicode strings representing
user names and passwords for comparison.  The document defines the
'SASLprep' 'stringprep' profile to be used for both user names and
passwords.  This profile is intended to be used by Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms (such as PLAIN,
CRAM-MD5, and DIGEST-MD5) as well as other protocols exchanging user
names and/or passwords.

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From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 10 23:31:21 2004
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Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2004 23:31:13 -0800
To: lyndon+rfc-crammd5@orthanc.ca
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Lyndon,

I found a number a technical and editorial issues in
draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-02.txt.   My concerns include:
 - new ABNF productions appears not to be consistent
   with those used in RFC 2095 (incorporating from RFC 822),
 - lack of clarity regarding use of SASLprep, and
 - lack of discussion as to why this mechanism is
   registered as having LIMITED usage.

Kurt


>Network Working Group                               L. Nerenberg, Editor
>Internet Draft: The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism              Orthanc Systems
>Document: draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-02.txt                    January 2004

Please update the headers to include:

Intended Category: Standards Track
Updates/Obsoletes: RFC xxxx
Expires: month year

>                      The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism
>
>
>Status of this Memo
>
>     This document is an Internet Draft and is in full conformance with
>     all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
>
>     Internet Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
>     Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
>     other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet
>     Drafts.
>
>     Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
>     months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other docu-
>     ments at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as
>     reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
>     progress."
>
>     The list of current Internet Drafts can be accessed at
>     http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet
>     Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
>     http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
>
>     Copyright 2003,2004 The Internet Society.  All Rights Reserved.
>
>     Please see the Copyright section near the end of this document for
>     more information.
>
>Abstract
>
>     This document defines a simple challenge-response authentication
>     mechanism, using a keyed-hash digest, for use with the Simple
>     Authentication and Security Layer (SASL).

It might be good for the abstract to, in one sentence, describe
its general applicability.

>1.  Conventions Used in this Document
>
>     The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
>     in this document are to be interpreted as defined in [KEYWORD].
>
>
>2.  CRAM-MD5 Authentication Mechanism
>
>     This document defines a simple challenge-response [SASL] authenti-
>     cation mechanism, using a [KEYED-MD5] digest, for use with [SASL].

It seems odd that [SASL] is provided twice here.  Also, SASL needs
to be spelled out on first use in body of document.

>     The mechanism name associated with CRAM-MD5 is 'CRAM-MD5'.

>     This mechanism does not provide a security layer.

I think this document needs to have an Introduction section consisting
of the above two paragraphs, a discussion of the mechanism's general
applicability, why it is usage is LIMITED, a discussion of this
document relates to other documents (e.g., what RFCs it updates/replaces),
and, lastly, followed by the above conventions.  This Introduction
(renumbered section 1) would be followed by a new "CRAM-MD5
Authentication Mechanism" section (numbered section 2).

>     The data encoded in the challenge contains a presumptively arbi-
>     trary string of random digits, a time-stamp, and the fully-quali-
>     fied primary host name of the server.

Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.

Why isn't RFC-822 msg-id production here as was done in RFC 2195?
The production below is quite different than a msg-id (in some
ways more restrictive and in other ways less restrictive).

For compatibility with existing RFC 2195, I think this specification
should simple incorporate (directly or by reference) the msg-id
production previously used.

>     The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
>     consisting of the user name, a space, and a "digest."  The latter

I think the double quotes around digest can be removed.  If you
really want to draw attention to digest being a production, wrap
it with angle brackets, e.g. <digest>.

>     is computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5]
>     where the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the chal-
>     lenge (including angle-brackets). The client MUST NOT interpret or
>     attempt to validate the contents of the challenge in any way.
>
>     This shared secret is a string known only to the client and server.
>     The "digest" parameter itself is a 16-octet value which is sent in
>     hexadecimal format, using lower-case US-ASCII characters.

Need reference for US-ASCII.

You should make it clear (in prose) that the hexadecimal format
is zero padded.  That is, if the most significant nimbles are zero,
they are not left these off.

>     When the server receives this client response, it verifies the
>     digest provided.  Since the user name may contain the space charac-
>     ter, the server MUST scan the client response from right to left;

You're MUST what is an implementation detail.  There are, in fact,
a number of other reasonable implementation options.  A server could
scan the response right to left to locate the last space.  A server
could just compute the position of the space (if the length of the
string is known).  Instead, you should note that implementations
should take care in parsing the string as it user name portion
can contain a space character.

>     the first space character encountered separates the digest from the
>     user name.  If the digest is correct, the server should consider
>     the client authenticated and respond appropriately.

I rather drop the "and respond appropriately" as this implies
that the server response is based only on wether the client
is authenticated.  The server may, of course, choose to fail
the exchange even though the client was authenticated (for
instance, because the client is not authorized for service
provided by the server).

>     The client MUST prepare the user name and shared secret strings
>     using the [SASLPrep] profile of the [StringPrep] algorithm.  The
>     resulting values MUST be encoded as UTF-8 [UTF8].

This likely should be stated upfront.

>
>2.1.  Formal Syntax
>
>     The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur
>     Form (ABNF) as specified in [ABNF], and incorporates by reference
>     the Core Rules defined in that document.
>
>     challenge  = "<" 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT "@" hostname ">"

This restricts digits to decimal digits.  However, it can be
argued that CRAM-MD5 previously allowed digits of other bases.
RFC 2195 said the challenge was a RFC822 msg-id.

>
>     digest     = 32(DIGIT / %x61-66)
>                  ; A hexadecimal string using only lower-case
>                  ; letters
>
>     hostname   = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT) *("." / "-" / ALPHA / DIGIT)

This production seems a bit odd in that it allows things like:
	a...

I think it would be better to written:
      label = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( "-" / ALPHA / DIGIT )

	  hostname = label *( "." label )

(but note this would not be needed if msg-id was used)

>     response   = user SP digest
>
>     user       = 1*OCTET

This should be replaced with a more precise UTF-8 production.

>2.2.  Examples

Suggest this be renumbered as separate section, e.g. 3.

>     The examples in this section do NOT form part of the specification.

I think it would be better to say:
	This section provides a number of examples which illustrate
	the CRAM-MD5 mechanism.  This section is informative.


>     Where conflicts exist between the examples and the formal grammar
>     or specification text, the latter are authoritative.

s/specification text/normative text in Section 2/.

>     These examples show the use of the CRAM-MD5 mechanism with the
>     IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE command [IMAP4].  The base64 encoding of the
>     challenges and responses is part of the IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE command,
>     not part of the CRAM-MD5 specification itself.

Add reference for base64.

>
>     S: * OK [CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS LOGINDISABLED AUTH=CRAM-MD5]
>     C: A0001 AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5
>     S: + PDE4OTYuNjk3MTcwOTUyQHBvc3RvZmZpY2UuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQ+
>     C: am9lIDNkYmM4OGYwNjI0Nzc2YTczN2IzOTA5M2Y2ZWI2NDI3
>     S: A0001 OK CRAM-MD5 authentication successful
>
>     In this example, the shared secret is the string
>
>          tanstaaftanstaaf
>
>     Hence, the Keyed MD5 digest is produced by calculating
>
>          MD5((tanstaaftanstaaf XOR opad),
>               MD5((tanstaaftanstaaf XOR ipad),
>               <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>))

I think the examples should show where SASLprep is applied.
That is, it might be good to replace the above with:
          MD5((SASLprep(tanstaaftanstaaf) XOR opad),
               MD5((SASLprep(tanstaaftanstaaf) XOR ipad),
               <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>))

(and this should likely be made more clear in Section 2)
>
>     where ipad and opad are as defined in [KEYED-MD5] and the string
>     shown in the challenge is the base64 encoding of
>     <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>. The shared secret is null-
>     padded to a length of 64 bytes.

It should be made clear (here and in section 2) that its the
output of SASLprep that is null-padded.

>     If the shared secret is longer than
>     64 bytes, the MD5 digest of the shared secret is used as a 16 byte
>     input to the keyed MD5 calculation.
>
>     This produces a digest value (in hexadecimal) of
>
>          3dbc88f0624776a737b39093f6eb6427
>
>     The user name is then prepended to it, forming
>
>          joe 3dbc88f0624776a737b39093f6eb6427

I'd like to see "joe" replaced with "joe smith" to hilite the
parsing issue.  Also, SASLprep should be discussed here.

>     Which is then base64 encoded to meet the requirements of the IMAP4
>     AUTHENTICATE command (or the similar POP3 AUTH command), yielding
>
>          am9lIDNkYmM4OGYwNjI0Nzc2YTczN2IzOTA5M2Y2ZWI2NDI3
>

It might also be useful to show an example that does not use
the optional initial response feature of the application
protocol.  And, I suggest use of another protocol (such as
ACAP) for this second example.

>
>3.  References
>
>3.1.  Normative References

References should be put into standard form.

>[ABNF]
>     Crocker, D., P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications:
>     ABNF", RFC2234, Internet Mail Consortium and Demon Internet Ltd.,
>     November 1997.
>
>[KEYED-MD5]
>     Krawczyk, Bellare, Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
>     Authentication", RFC 2104, IBM and UCSD, February 1997.
>
>[KEYWORD]
>     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
>     Levels", BCP 14, RFC2119, Harvard University, March 1997.
>
>[MD5]
>     Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, MIT Labo-
>     ratory for Computer Science and RSA Data Security, Inc., April
>     1992.
>
>[SASL]
>     Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)," RFC
>     2222, Netscape Communications, October 1997.
>
>[SASLPrep]
>     Zeilenga, K., "SASL String Preparation Profiles", draft-ietf-sasl-
>     saslprep (work in progress)
>
>[StringPrep]
>     Hoffman, P., M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings
>     (stringprep)", RFC 3454, IMC and Viagenie, December 2002.
>
>[UTF8]
>     Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
>     2279, Alis Technologies, January 1998.
>
>3.2.  Informative References
>
>[IMAP4]
>     Crispin, M., "Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1,"
>     RFC 3501, University of Washington, March 2003.
>
>
>4.  Security Considerations
>
>     It is conjectured that use of the CRAM-MD5 authentication mechanism
>     provides replay protection for a session.
>
>     This mechanism does not obscure the user name in any way.  Accord-
>     ingly, a server that implements both a clear-text password command
>     and this authentication type should not allow both methods of
>     access for a given user name.
>
>     Keyed MD5 is chosen for this application because of the greater
>     security imparted to authentication of short messages. In addition,
>     the use of the techniques described in [KEYED-MD5] for pre-computa-
>     tion of intermediate results make it possible to avoid explicit
>     clear-text storage of the shared secret on the server system by
>     instead storing the intermediate results which are known as "con-
>     texts."  While the saving, on the server, of the MD5 "context" is
>     marginally better than saving the shared secrets in clear-text, it
>     is not sufficient to protect the secrets if the server itself is
>     compromised.  Consequently, servers that store the secrets or con-
>     texts must both be protected to a level appropriate to the poten-
>     tial information value in the data and services protected by this
>     mechanism.  In other words, techniques like this one involve a
>     trade-off between vulnerability to network sniffing and I/O buffer
>     snooping and vulnerability of the server host's databases.  If one
>     believes that the host and its databases are subject to compromise,
>     and the network is not, this technique (and all others like it) is
>     unattractive.  It is perhaps even less attractive than clear-text
>     passwords, which are typically stored on hosts in one-way hash
>     form.  On the other hand, if the server databases are perceived as
>     reasonably secure, and one is concerned about client-side or net-
>     work interception of the passwords (secrets), then this (and simi-
>     lar) techniques are preferable to clear-text passwords by a wide
>     margin.
>
>     As the length of the shared secret increases, so does the diffi-
>     culty of deriving it.
>
>     While there are now suggestions in the literature that the use of
>     MD5 and keyed MD5 in authentication procedures probably has a lim-
>     ited effective lifetime, the technique is now widely deployed and
>     widely understood.  It is believed that this general understanding
>     may assist with the rapid replacement, by CRAM-MD5, of the current
>     uses of permanent clear-text passwords in many protocols.  This
>     document has been deliberately written to permit easy upgrading to
>     use SHA (or whatever alternatives emerge) when they are considered
>     to be widely available and adequately safe.
>
>     Even with the use of CRAM-MD5, users are still vulnerable to active
>     attacks.  An example of an increasingly common active attack is
>     'TCP Session Hijacking' as described in CERT Advisory CA-95:01.

An informative reference for this advisory would be useful.

Also, CERT should be spelled out.

>     CRAM-MD5 does not authenticate the server and does not include a
>     client-supplied nonce.  As a result, it is possible to construct a
>     server with a fixed challenge string that has pre-computed the
>     hashes for all possible passwords up to a certain length (or from a
>     dictionary).  Such a server could then immediately determine the
>     user's password if it is sufficiently short.
>
>
>5.  IANA Considerations
>
>     The SASL Mechanism Registry entry for CRAM-MD5 must be updated to
>     reference this specification.

This should be worded as a request.  That is,
	It is requested that the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
	update the SASL Mechanism Registry entry for CRAM-MD5 to refer to
	this document.

(The RFC-Editor with then, after the request is fulfilled by IANA,
replace this with a statement that IANA has made this update.)

>6.  Contributors
>
>     The CRAM-MD5 mechanism was originally specified in RFC 2095,
>     IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/Response.  The
>     authors of that document -- John C. Klensin, Paul Krumviede, and
>     Randy Catoe -- are to be credited with the design and specification
>     of CRAM-MD5, and they are the original authors of the majority of
>     the text in this document. This memo serves only to re-state CRAM-
>     MD5 within the formal context of SASL, which specification it pre-
>     ceded by several months.
>

A "Changes since RFC 2095" section is needed.

>7.  Intellectual Property
>
>     The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
>     intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to per-
>     tain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
>     this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
>     might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
>     has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on
>     the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
>     standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
>     claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances
>     of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made
>     to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such pro-
>     prietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can
>     be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
>
>     The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
>     copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
>     rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
>     this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Execu-
>     tive Director.
>
>
>8.  Editors' Address
>
>     Lyndon Nerenberg
>     Orthanc Systems
>     Email: lyndon+rfc-crammd5@orthanc.ca
>
>
>9.  Full Copyright Statement
>
>     Copyright 2003, 2004, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
>
>     This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
>     others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain
>     it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, pub-
>     lished and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of
>     any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this para-
>     graph are included on all such copies and derivative works.  How-
>     ever, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as
>     by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet
>     Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the
>     purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the proce-
>     dures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must
>     be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other
>     than English.  The limited permissions granted above are perpetual
>     and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors
>     or assigns.
>
>     This document and the information contained herein is provided on
>     an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGI-
>     NEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
>     INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
>     INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WAR-
>     RANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


From owner-ietf-sasl Thu Mar 11 00:05:49 2004
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Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 00:05:33 -0800
From: Lyndon Nerenberg <lyndon@orthanc.ca>
To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
cc: ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: CRAM-MD5 review notes [long]
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--On 2004-3-10 11:31 PM -0800 "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> 
wrote:

> Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.

Please shoot the groff authors, who have made it impossible to turn off 
hyphenation when using the -ms macros. I will generate the final 
version using a real version of nroff, where .nh and .hy work as 
documented.

As for the grammar changes, <msg-id> makes more sense. I think what 
happened here was that 2822 was still in limbo, but we didn't want to 
reference 822 as we knew it was going to be obsolete. I can't remember 
now just where we got the specific text for those changes. I will go 
through the grammar again and see what can be pulled from 2822. As for 
<user>, I will add a descriptive tag spelling out this must be valid 
UTF-8.

The rest of the changes seem reasonable, and I'll incorporate them into 
a new version. I had hoped to preserve the original text and format as 
much as possible, but since that won't happen now I will also bring the 
whole document up-to-date with the latest RFC Editor requirements.

--lyndon


From owner-ietf-sasl Thu Mar 11 06:04:11 2004
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Subject: Re: CRAM-MD5 review notes [long]
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Lyndon Nerenberg wrote:
> 
> --On 2004-3-10 11:31 PM -0800 "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> wrote:
> 
>> Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.
> 
> 
> Please shoot the groff authors, who have made it impossible to turn off 
> hyphenation when using the -ms macros. I will generate the final version 
> using a real version of nroff, where .nh and .hy work as documented.

I encountered the same problem when working on some LDAP I-Ds.  Try 
adding a line like this before your .hy 0 line :

.nr HY 0

See: http://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-groff/2000-09/msg00001.html

-- 
Mark Smith
LDAP Book Information: http://www.ldapbook.com/
What's Next:           http://www.pearlcrescent.com/



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Subject: Proposed milestones
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If no one objects in the next two days I'll send these in:

May 04		Base spec
July 04		Digest md5
July 04		Cram-md5
September 04	GSSAPI
December 04	Conclude or recharter

Also, I will be submitting the new saslprep for publication shortly.

--Sam


From owner-ietf-sasl Thu Mar 11 08:05:15 2004
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Sam Hartman wrote:

>If no one objects in the next two days I'll send these in:
>
>May 04		Base spec
>July 04		Digest md5
>July 04		Cram-md5
>
Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed by DIGEST-MD5 
(July/August)

>September 04	GSSAPI
>December 04	Conclude or recharter
>
>Also, I will be submitting the new saslprep for publication shortly.
>  
>
Looks good otherwise.

Alexey



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 "Thu, 11 Mar 2004 16:04:59 +0000")
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>>>>> "Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:

    Alexey> Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed
    Alexey> by DIGEST-MD5 (July/August)


I think Kurt and I believe that digest is a higher priority.


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Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 16:23:49 +0000
From: Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: Proposed milestones
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Sam Hartman wrote:

>>>>>>"Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:
>>>>>>            
>>>>>>
>    Alexey> Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed
>    Alexey> by DIGEST-MD5 (July/August)
>
>I think Kurt and I believe that digest is a higher priority.
>
That is fine, but don't make them in the same month.

Alexey



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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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I am forwarding this message from the LDAPbis mailing list as suggested 
by Kurt.
Does this message have enough context to start a discussion of the issue?

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	Re: SASL mechanisms that return no data in last leg
Date: 	Thu, 11 Mar 2004 19:26:50 -0800
From: 	Kurt D. Zeilenga <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
To: 	Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
CC: 	lukeh@PADL.COM, ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org
References: 	<200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com> 
<404A778D.90302@isode.com> <6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1> 
<404E882B.8060702@isode.com>



At 07:14 PM 3/9/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:
>
>>I'd have to agree with Alexey.  The mechanism for provide data
>>with the last leg of the exchange is optional.  That is, if there
>>is data to be sent AND the server chooses not to require
>>another roundtrip, the server can attach the data to last
>>message.
>>
>>Another point is that SASL allows the mechanism data
>>in any message of the exchange to be any octet string,
>>including a zero length string.  Hence, it seems that
>>no string and a zero length string are not necessarily
>>semantically equivalent here.
>This is correct, however LDAP is the first SASL profile I've seen that is able to represent them differently.
>Do you think that we should say something about this in the base SASL document?

I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.

I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
recommendation made that applications support one or the
other but not both.

Kurt



--------------080406080208050408070403
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<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
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I am forwarding this message from the LDAPbis mailing list as suggested
by Kurt.<br>
Does this message have enough context to start a discussion of the
issue?<br>
<br>
-------- Original Message --------
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">Subject: </th>
      <td>Re: SASL mechanisms that return no data in last leg</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">Date: </th>
      <td>Thu, 11 Mar 2004 19:26:50 -0800</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">From: </th>
      <td>Kurt D. Zeilenga <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:Kurt@OpenLDAP.org">&lt;Kurt@OpenLDAP.org&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">To: </th>
      <td>Alexey Melnikov <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com">&lt;Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">CC: </th>
      <td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
 href="mailto:lukeh@PADL.COM">lukeh@PADL.COM</a>, <a
 class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
 href="mailto:ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org">ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">References: </th>
      <td><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com">&lt;200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:404A778D.90302@isode.com">&lt;404A778D.90302@isode.com&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1">&lt;6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:404E882B.8060702@isode.com">&lt;404E882B.8060702@isode.com&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<br>
<br>
<pre>At 07:14 PM 3/9/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
&gt;Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:
&gt;
&gt;&gt;I'd have to agree with Alexey.  The mechanism for provide data
&gt;&gt;with the last leg of the exchange is optional.  That is, if there
&gt;&gt;is data to be sent AND the server chooses not to require
&gt;&gt;another roundtrip, the server can attach the data to last
&gt;&gt;message.
&gt;&gt;
&gt;&gt;Another point is that SASL allows the mechanism data
&gt;&gt;in any message of the exchange to be any octet string,
&gt;&gt;including a zero length string.  Hence, it seems that
&gt;&gt;no string and a zero length string are not necessarily
&gt;&gt;semantically equivalent here.
&gt;This is correct, however LDAP is the first SASL profile I've seen that is able to represent them differently.
&gt;Do you think that we should say something about this in the base SASL document?

I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.

I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
recommendation made that applications support one or the
other but not both.

Kurt

</pre>
</body>
</html>

--------------080406080208050408070403--


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On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
> will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
> for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
> they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.
>
> I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
> recommendation made that applications support one or the
> other but not both.

Except they aren't semanticly equivilent -- just like zero length and
absent initial responses aren't equivilent.

For, example, let's have an IMAP-like protocol with an initial response
(well, SASL-IR extension) and server-last capability:

C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL

is not at all equivilent to

C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL ""

The first requires that the server send an empty initial challenge,
whereas the second means that the entire exchange is complete.

In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:

....

C: (blob)
S: x OK ""

is not equivilent to

C: (blob)
S: x OK

The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.

-Rob

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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Rob Siemborski wrote:

>On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
>>will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
>>for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
>>they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.
>>
>>I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
>>recommendation made that applications support one or the
>>other but not both.
>>    
>>
>
>Except they aren't semanticly equivilent -- just like zero length and
>absent initial responses aren't equivilent.
>
>For, example, let's have an IMAP-like protocol with an initial response
>(well, SASL-IR extension) and server-last capability:
>
>C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL
>
>is not at all equivilent to
>
>C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL ""
>
>The first requires that the server send an empty initial challenge,
>whereas the second means that the entire exchange is complete.
>
>In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:
>
>....
>
>C: (blob)
>S: x OK ""
>
>is not equivilent to
>
>C: (blob)
>S: x OK
>
>The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
>client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
>(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.
>
The message wasn't talking about initial response, it was talking about 
"additional data with success".



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On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> >In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:
> >
> >....
> >
> >C: (blob)
> >S: x OK ""
> >
> >is not equivilent to
> >
> >C: (blob)
> >S: x OK
> >
> >The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
> >client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
> >(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.
> >
>
> The message wasn't talking about initial response, it was talking about
> "additional data with success".

Yes, obviously.  But the situation is very similar.

As in the example above -- the client is unable to tell if the server
omitted the response (since it is, after all optional) and thus is facing
an error, or if the server actually intended there to be data there.

Maybe, though, the client can assume the server is playing on the level if
it was expecting data with success, and got neither the extra round trip
*nor* the data, implying that the data was an empty string.  But this
seems very poor.

-Rob

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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PGP:0x5CE32FCC | Cyert Hall 207 * rjs3@andrew.cmu.edu * 412.268.7456
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From owner-ietf-sasl Sun Mar 14 07:42:48 2004
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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>>  Procedures for registering new SASL mechanisms are given in section 8.
>>
>>  The "sasl-mech" production below defines the syntax of a SASL
>>  mechanism name.  This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
>>  notation as specified in [ABNF] and the ABNF core rules as specified
>>  in Appendix A of the ABNF specification [ABNF].
>>
>>  sasl-mech    = 1*20mech-char
>>  mech-char    = %x41-5A / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
>>                 ; mech names restricted to ASCII uppercase letters,
>>                 ; digits, "-" and "_"
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest this comment be replaced with:
>        ; mech-char is restricted to "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", "-", and "_"
>        : from ASCII character set.
>
Done.

>In the ABNF, I suggest (for consistency) replacing DIGIT, "-", and  
>"_" with %x30-39, %x2D, and %x5F, respectively.  This also avoids
>unnecessary reliance on a core rule (which would require the      
>implementor to look up meaning of DIGIT).
>
Done (it a slightly different manner).

>>  The "extern-init-resp" rule below defines the initial response sent
>>  from client to server.
>>
>>  extern-init-resp  = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )
>>
>>  UTF8-char-no-nul  = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
>>
>>  UTF8-1-no-nul     = %x01-7F
>>
>>
>>7.2.  Example
>>
>>  The following is an example of an EXTERNAL authentication in the SMTP
>>  protocol [SMTP].  In this example, the client is proxy
>>  authenticating, sending the authorization identity "fred" using in
>>  the (optional) initial response.  The server has determined the
>>  client's identity through IPsec and has a security policy that
>>  permits that identity to proxy authenticate as any other identity.
>>    
>>
>
>An informative reference for IPsec seems appropriate here as
>presently worded.  Suggest it be reworded,
>	The server has obtained the client's (authentication) identity
>	from an external service, such as IPsec, and has a security
>	policy that permits that identity to assume the identity of
>	the asserted authorization identity.
>
Done. I've also added an informative reference for IPSec, as it is 
mentioned in section 7.

Alexey




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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>At 01:39 PM 2/26/2004, Rob Siemborski wrote:
>  
>
>>Implementors of a protocol using this specification will also need
>>a specification of a profile specific the protocol. 
>>
>
>This is somewhat better.  My previous concern was with
>the "all of this document" part of the current statement.
>For the other audiences, the section is quite specific
>as to what portions of this document they need to read.
>I think we should detail what each audience should read
>with equal specificity.
>
>I have no objection to saying, in addition to portions
>of this document, they need to read the specification
>of the protocol they are implementing, especially those
>portions of that specification which fulfill the
>requirements placed upon that specification by this
>document.
>
>I note as well that it might be appropriate to note
>that implementors need to read and understand
>aspects of mechanism specifications they intend to
>use (regardless of whether they are implementing the
>mechanisms themselves or using an existing implementation)
>to understand, for instance, the mechanism specific
>authentication identity forms, the offered services,
>and security and other considerations.
>
I've rewrote the paragraph to look like this:

The sections "Overview", "Authentication Mechanisms",  "Protocol profile 
requirements", "Specific issues" and
"Security Considerations" cover issues that implementors of a protocol 
that uses SASL framework need to understand.
The implementors will also need to understand a specification of a 
profile specific to the protocol, as well as aspects of mechanism
specifications they intend to use (regardless of whether they are 
implementing the mechanisms themselves or using an existing implementation)
to understand, for instance, the mechanism specific authentication 
identity forms, the offered services, and security and other considerations.

(Note that I've borrowed the text that Kurt used in his message)

Comments?

Alexey




From owner-ietf-sasl Tue Mar 16 15:52:41 2004
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I'm looking at the AES CBC cipher in digest-md5.  AS we discussed in
Seoul, there are two approaches under consideration.

I strongly prefer the option that includes an explicit IV in every AES
packet to the option that introduces a new packet type and only
sometimes sends an explicit IV.

There are two claimed advantages to the second approach:

1) Performance.

As I understand it, the performance implication of including the IV is
the cost of generating a 128-bit random number along with the cost of
encrypting one block of AES data.

2)  Simplicity of implementation: implementations could re-use
    existing packet formats.

I don't understand this at all.  It seems like you need to implement
both packet types in all implementations, so the I don't see how it is
simpler.

The advantages of the first approach seem to be security against the
attack that we were trying to defend against.  If an attacker can ever
predict a situation when an explicit IV is not going to be used, then
the attacker can mount the attack.

I do not expect the second approach would pass AD review.

For now, I'd recommend against ignoring the performance concern.  If
there are implementers who are seriously concerned about performance,
then we should consider counter mode instead of the explicit IV
approach.  

--Sam


From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 17 08:02:20 2004
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Sam:

I will not say that the second alternative will not pass AD 
review.  However, it will require justification.  The first alternative is 
the traditional way to do things, so no justification is needed.  There are 
many protocols that employ the first alternative, including IEEE 802.10b, 
IPsec, and S/MIME.  Notice this covers many different layers in the 
protocol stack.

If the working group selects the second alternative, the security 
considerations section MUST state why the first alternative is a poor fit, 
and it MUST state how the second alternative offers the same level of security.

Russ

At 06:52 PM 3/16/2004 -0500, Sam Hartman wrote:


>I'm looking at the AES CBC cipher in digest-md5.  AS we discussed in
>Seoul, there are two approaches under consideration.
>
>I strongly prefer the option that includes an explicit IV in every AES
>packet to the option that introduces a new packet type and only
>sometimes sends an explicit IV.
>
>There are two claimed advantages to the second approach:
>
>1) Performance.
>
>As I understand it, the performance implication of including the IV is
>the cost of generating a 128-bit random number along with the cost of
>encrypting one block of AES data.
>
>2)  Simplicity of implementation: implementations could re-use
>     existing packet formats.
>
>I don't understand this at all.  It seems like you need to implement
>both packet types in all implementations, so the I don't see how it is
>simpler.
>
>The advantages of the first approach seem to be security against the
>attack that we were trying to defend against.  If an attacker can ever
>predict a situation when an explicit IV is not going to be used, then
>the attacker can mount the attack.
>
>I do not expect the second approach would pass AD review.
>
>For now, I'd recommend against ignoring the performance concern.  If
>there are implementers who are seriously concerned about performance,
>then we should consider counter mode instead of the explicit IV
>approach.
>
>--Sam


From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 17 11:53:40 2004
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I want to confirm I'm understanding the attack described in the
section 6.3.1 of the current base spec draft.  If I understand the
attack, then I'll work with Kurt and Alexie to replace that text with
a more general security consideration.

I'd appreciate if Alexie and other parties who brought the attention
of the attack to this working group could confirm my understanding.

The client C is talking to a proxy P.

The proxy implements SASL decription and authentication services.  The
client authenticates to some service through P that is served by
server A. t 

Now most traffic goes from C to P, is decrypted and then sent over
another channel to A.

Later within the same session, the client wants to access another
resource requiring new authentication.  It reauthenticates to P, and
this new resource is on server B.

No new security layer is negotiated, so the same keys, IVs, etc are
used between P and C.


B can inject text into its channel to P, which P will encrypt for C.
B may also be able to cause C to send it certain text depending on the
protocol; this text would be encrypted to P and then later sent to B.

So it is possible that B could mount a chosen plaintext attack
potentially gaining information about the previous communications
between A and C.  

As an example, with the des mode of digest-md5, if B knows the last
block of ciphertext between P and A, B may be able to construct
plaintext to test a guess of plaintext previously communicated between
A and C.


In particular, this attack does not depend on B knowing the key used
to talk to C, nor does it assume that B is directly doing encryption.


If I'm understanding this correctly, there's a lot of complexity we
can get rid of in the current description of the attack.



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Subject: JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
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JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP

Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)

Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
Assassin 

Description: I need a world renownd expert in ISP email systems available
on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
accounts into a completely new invironment that includes POP and SMTP mail
accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
backup the staff I have working on this now.

Here are the areas of expertise we need:

Cyrus Electronic Mail
SASL 
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
Sendmail 
Postfix 
Squirrel Main 
Spam Assassin 

Rate: DOE,   Job Type: Contract,   Start Date: 3/17/2004,   Number Of
Openings: 1,   Location: NYC

Please email text resume to kontact@kandidates.com


From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 17 19:52:38 2004
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JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP

Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)

Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
Assassin 

Description: I need a world renowned expert in ISP email systems available
on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
accounts into a completely new environment that includes POP and SMTP mail
accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
backup the staff I have working on this now.

Here are the areas of expertise we need:

Cyrus Electronic Mail
SASL 
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
Sendmail 
Postfix 
Squirrel Main 
Spam Assassin 

Rate: DOE,   Job Type: Contract,   Start Date: 3/17/2004,   Number Of
Openings: 1,   Location: NYC

Please email text resume to kontact@kandidates.com


From owner-ietf-sasl Wed Mar 17 21:52:52 2004
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From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: Re: JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
Cc: ietf-sasl@imc.org
In-Reply-To: <BC7E86E7.DCF%kontact@kandidates.com>
References: <BC7E8222.DC7%kontact@kandidates.com>
 <BC7E86E7.DCF%kontact@kandidates.com>
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The ietf-sasl@imc.org mailing list is reserved for standardization
discussions regarding an Internet Protocol and other business of
the IETF SASL WG.  Your recent posts are off-topic and quite
inappropriate.  Please cease sending further such messages to
this list.

Kurt Zeilenga, co-chair
IETF SASL Working Group

At 07:51 PM 3/17/2004, Kandidates wrote:

>JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
>
>Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)
>
>Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
>Assassin 
>
>Description: I need a world renowned expert in ISP email systems available
>on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
>accounts into a completely new environment that includes POP and SMTP mail
>accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
>that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
>portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
>backup the staff I have working on this now.
>
>Here are the areas of expertise we need:
>
>Cyrus Electronic Mail
>SASL 
>The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
>protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
>IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
>Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
>and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
>Sendmail 
>Postfix 
>Squirrel Main 
>Spam Assassin 
>
>Rate: DOE,   Job Type: Contract,   Start Date: 3/17/2004,   Number Of
>Openings: 1,   Location: NYC
>
>Please email text resume to kontact@kandidates.com


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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
CC: ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: The Confirmation of understanding of the multiple authentication
 attack
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Sam Hartman wrote:

>I want to confirm I'm understanding the attack described in the
>section 6.3.1 of the current base spec draft.  If I understand the
>attack, then I'll work with Kurt and Alexie to replace that text with
>a more general security consideration.
>
>I'd appreciate if Alexie and other parties who brought the attention
>of the attack to this working group could confirm my understanding.
>
>The client C is talking to a proxy P.
>
>The proxy implements SASL decription and authentication services.  The
>client authenticates to some service through P that is served by
>server A. 
>
>Now most traffic goes from C to P, is decrypted and then sent over
>another channel to A.
>
>Later within the same session, the client wants to access another
>resource requiring new authentication.  It reauthenticates to P, and
>this new resource is on server B.
>
>No new security layer is negotiated, so the same keys, IVs, etc are
>used between P and C.
>
>
>B can inject text into its channel to P, which P will encrypt for C.
>B may also be able to cause C to send it certain text depending on the
>protocol; this text would be encrypted to P and then later sent to B.
>
Yes, your description seems to be correct.

>So it is possible that B could mount a chosen plaintext attack
>potentially gaining information about the previous communications
>between A and C.  
>
>As an example, with the des mode of digest-md5, if B knows the last
>block of ciphertext between P and A, B may be able to construct
>plaintext to test a guess of plaintext previously communicated between
>A and C.
>
>
>In particular, this attack does not depend on B knowing the key used
>to talk to C, nor does it assume that B is directly doing encryption.
>
>
>If I'm understanding this correctly, there's a lot of complexity we
>can get rid of in the current description of the attack.
>  
>
Alexey
__________________________________________
Isode Limited, http://www.isode.com

IETF standard related pages:
http://www.melnikov.ca/mel/devel/Links.html

Personal Home Page: http://www.melnikov.ca
__________________________________________



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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Simple Authentication and Security Layer Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords
	Author(s)	: K. Zeilenga
	Filename	: draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-07.txt
	Pages		: 6
	Date		: 2004-3-23
	
This document describes how to prepare Unicode strings representing
user names and passwords for comparison.  The document defines the
'SASLprep' 'stringprep' profile to be used for both user names and
passwords.  This profile is intended to be used by Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms (such as PLAIN,
CRAM-MD5, and DIGEST-MD5) as well as other protocols exchanging user
names and/or passwords.

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The IESG has received a request from the Simple Authentication and Security 
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- 'SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords'
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--=-=-=


Hi.  Looking at the chat log, I think the only issue discussed that
did not make it into the summary is Bob's concerns about RFC 2119.

Also, I claim that the digest-md5 attack is a chosen-ciphertext
attack.  It's actually an adaptive chosen plaintext attack; there is
an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against the DES modes of
digest-md5, but that's not what caused the IV change.


If I make these corrections and additions, anyone object to minutes
looking a lot like the summary?



--=-=-=
Content-Type: message/rfc822
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Subject: Summary of SASL Session at IETF 59
References: 
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 02:46:54 -0500
In-Reply-To: <5.2.0.9.2.20040229212300.04537048@mail.binhost.com> (Russ
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The SASL working group met for an hour at IETF 59.  The primary
objective of the meeting was to determine next steps for RFC 2222bis.

The chairs are concerned that the document has not received sufficient
review.  The chairs will contact the apps and security areas and ask
for review of the specification before last call.

Kurt Zeilenga raised several issues on the mailing list.  Most of
these were resolved before the meeting; Kurt will check future
versions of the draft to confirm resolution.

One of Kurt's issues that is not resolved is the handling of security
layers for multiple reauthentications.  At IETF 58, we decided not to
change the protocol because of this threat, but Kurt raised concerns
about the wording of the security consideration.  During this
discussion Sam Hartman realized this attack is apparently an instance
of a more general attack.  Sam will confirm this and propose text on
the list.

Bob Morgan described his concerns about the confusion between
authentication identity and authorization ID.  The sense of the room
was that while we want to be as clear as possible, both concepts are
important and we need to keep both terms.  This discussion is still
open on the list.

A new document will be published  shortly after the meeting.  There
will be a need for at least one more revision, slated for early April
before a last call.  We hope to have the base spec to the IESG by
May; this is a milestone slip.

ALexey Melnikov still needs input on use of stringprep and saslprep in
digest-md5.  There was discussion of dropping support for ISO 8859-1
and claiming that all strings are UTF8.  This will be resolved on the
list.  

Sam agreed to review the  AES mode for digest-md5.  The
working group previously agreed to use explicit IVs to avoid chosen
ciphertext attacks, but ALexey has two alternative wire formats for
explicit IVs.

We hope to have digest-md5 last called by July.  Alexey thinks this is
very optimistic.



--=-=-=--



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--=-=-=


Hi.  Looking at the chat log, I think the only issue discussed that
did not make it into the summary is Bob's concerns about RFC 2119.

Also, I claim that the digest-md5 attack is a chosen-ciphertext
attack.  It's actually an adaptive chosen plaintext attack; there is
an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against the DES modes of
digest-md5, but that's not what caused the IV change.


If I make these corrections and additions, anyone object to minutes
looking a lot like the summary?



--=-=-=
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Subject: Summary of SASL Session at IETF 59
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@MIT.EDU>
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The SASL working group met for an hour at IETF 59.  The primary
objective of the meeting was to determine next steps for RFC 2222bis.

The chairs are concerned that the document has not received sufficient
review.  The chairs will contact the apps and security areas and ask
for review of the specification before last call.

Kurt Zeilenga raised several issues on the mailing list.  Most of
these were resolved before the meeting; Kurt will check future
versions of the draft to confirm resolution.

One of Kurt's issues that is not resolved is the handling of security
layers for multiple reauthentications.  At IETF 58, we decided not to
change the protocol because of this threat, but Kurt raised concerns
about the wording of the security consideration.  During this
discussion Sam Hartman realized this attack is apparently an instance
of a more general attack.  Sam will confirm this and propose text on
the list.

Bob Morgan described his concerns about the confusion between
authentication identity and authorization ID.  The sense of the room
was that while we want to be as clear as possible, both concepts are
important and we need to keep both terms.  This discussion is still
open on the list.

A new document will be published  shortly after the meeting.  There
will be a need for at least one more revision, slated for early April
before a last call.  We hope to have the base spec to the IESG by
May; this is a milestone slip.

ALexey Melnikov still needs input on use of stringprep and saslprep in
digest-md5.  There was discussion of dropping support for ISO 8859-1
and claiming that all strings are UTF8.  This will be resolved on the
list.  

Sam agreed to review the  AES mode for digest-md5.  The
working group previously agreed to use explicit IVs to avoid chosen
ciphertext attacks, but ALexey has two alternative wire formats for
explicit IVs.

We hope to have digest-md5 last called by July.  Alexey thinks this is
very optimistic.



--=-=-=--



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To: IETF-Announce :;
From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
Subject: Last Call: 'SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and  passwords' to Proposed Standard 
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The IESG has received a request from the Simple Authentication and Security 
Layer WG to consider the following document:

- 'SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords'
   <draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-07.txt> as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2004-04-06.

The file can be obtained via
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-07.txt



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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Simple Authentication and Security Layer Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords
	Author(s)	: K. Zeilenga
	Filename	: draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-07.txt
	Pages		: 6
	Date		: 2004-3-23
	
This document describes how to prepare Unicode strings representing
user names and passwords for comparison.  The document defines the
'SASLprep' 'stringprep' profile to be used for both user names and
passwords.  This profile is intended to be used by Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms (such as PLAIN,
CRAM-MD5, and DIGEST-MD5) as well as other protocols exchanging user
names and/or passwords.

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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: The Confirmation of understanding of the multiple authentication attack
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Sam Hartman wrote:

>I want to confirm I'm understanding the attack described in the
>section 6.3.1 of the current base spec draft.  If I understand the
>attack, then I'll work with Kurt and Alexie to replace that text with
>a more general security consideration.
>
>I'd appreciate if Alexie and other parties who brought the attention
>of the attack to this working group could confirm my understanding.
>
>The client C is talking to a proxy P.
>
>The proxy implements SASL decription and authentication services.  The
>client authenticates to some service through P that is served by
>server A. 
>
>Now most traffic goes from C to P, is decrypted and then sent over
>another channel to A.
>
>Later within the same session, the client wants to access another
>resource requiring new authentication.  It reauthenticates to P, and
>this new resource is on server B.
>
>No new security layer is negotiated, so the same keys, IVs, etc are
>used between P and C.
>
>
>B can inject text into its channel to P, which P will encrypt for C.
>B may also be able to cause C to send it certain text depending on the
>protocol; this text would be encrypted to P and then later sent to B.
>
Yes, your description seems to be correct.

>So it is possible that B could mount a chosen plaintext attack
>potentially gaining information about the previous communications
>between A and C.  
>
>As an example, with the des mode of digest-md5, if B knows the last
>block of ciphertext between P and A, B may be able to construct
>plaintext to test a guess of plaintext previously communicated between
>A and C.
>
>
>In particular, this attack does not depend on B knowing the key used
>to talk to C, nor does it assume that B is directly doing encryption.
>
>
>If I'm understanding this correctly, there's a lot of complexity we
>can get rid of in the current description of the attack.
>  
>
Alexey
__________________________________________
Isode Limited, http://www.isode.com

IETF standard related pages:
http://www.melnikov.ca/mel/devel/Links.html

Personal Home Page: http://www.melnikov.ca
__________________________________________




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Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 21:52:38 -0800
To: Kandidates <kontact@kandidates.com>
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: Re: JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
Cc: ietf-sasl@imc.org
In-Reply-To: <BC7E86E7.DCF%kontact@kandidates.com>
References: <BC7E8222.DC7%kontact@kandidates.com> <BC7E86E7.DCF%kontact@kandidates.com>
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The ietf-sasl@imc.org mailing list is reserved for standardization
discussions regarding an Internet Protocol and other business of
the IETF SASL WG.  Your recent posts are off-topic and quite
inappropriate.  Please cease sending further such messages to
this list.

Kurt Zeilenga, co-chair
IETF SASL Working Group

At 07:51 PM 3/17/2004, Kandidates wrote:

>JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
>
>Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)
>
>Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
>Assassin 
>
>Description: I need a world renowned expert in ISP email systems available
>on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
>accounts into a completely new environment that includes POP and SMTP mail
>accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
>that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
>portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
>backup the staff I have working on this now.
>
>Here are the areas of expertise we need:
>
>Cyrus Electronic Mail
>SASL 
>The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
>protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
>IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
>Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
>and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
>Sendmail 
>Postfix 
>Squirrel Main 
>Spam Assassin 
>
>Rate: DOE,   Job Type: Contract,   Start Date: 3/17/2004,   Number Of
>Openings: 1,   Location: NYC
>
>Please email text resume to kontact@kandidates.com



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Subject: JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
From: Kandidates <kontact@kandidates.com>
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JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP

Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)

Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
Assassin 

Description: I need a world renowned expert in ISP email systems available
on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
accounts into a completely new environment that includes POP and SMTP mail
accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
backup the staff I have working on this now.

Here are the areas of expertise we need:

Cyrus Electronic Mail
SASL 
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
Sendmail 
Postfix 
Squirrel Main 
Spam Assassin 

Rate: DOE,   Job Type: Contract,   Start Date: 3/17/2004,   Number Of
Openings: 1,   Location: NYC

Please email text resume to kontact@kandidates.com



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Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 22:30:58 -0500
Subject: JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP
From: Kandidates <kontact@kandidates.com>
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JOB: NYC: Cyrus SASL Expert needed ASAP

Rate: Open - Name Your Price (if you have the skills)

Skills: Cyrus Electronic Mail, SASL, Sendmail, Postfix, Squirrel Main, Spam
Assassin 

Description: I need a world renownd expert in ISP email systems available
on-site ASAP.  We are in the process of converting over 36,000 email
accounts into a completely new invironment that includes POP and SMTP mail
accounts.  At this time we are having serious problems with the SASL daemon
that is used to authenticate to our registration systems, both email and
portal.  I need to have someone that can work around the clock and help or
backup the staff I have working on this now.

Here are the areas of expertise we need:

Cyrus Electronic Mail
SASL 
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer, is a generic mechanism for
protocols to accomplish authentication. Since protocols (such as SMTP or
IMAP) use SASL, it is a natural place for code sharing between applications.
Some notable applications that use SASL include Sendmail (versions 8.10.0
and higher) and Cyrus imapd (versions 1.6.0 and higher).
Sendmail 
Postfix 
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Subject: The Confirmation of understanding of the multiple authentication attack
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From: hartmans@mit.edu (Sam Hartman)
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I want to confirm I'm understanding the attack described in the
section 6.3.1 of the current base spec draft.  If I understand the
attack, then I'll work with Kurt and Alexie to replace that text with
a more general security consideration.

I'd appreciate if Alexie and other parties who brought the attention
of the attack to this working group could confirm my understanding.

The client C is talking to a proxy P.

The proxy implements SASL decription and authentication services.  The
client authenticates to some service through P that is served by
server A. t 

Now most traffic goes from C to P, is decrypted and then sent over
another channel to A.

Later within the same session, the client wants to access another
resource requiring new authentication.  It reauthenticates to P, and
this new resource is on server B.

No new security layer is negotiated, so the same keys, IVs, etc are
used between P and C.


B can inject text into its channel to P, which P will encrypt for C.
B may also be able to cause C to send it certain text depending on the
protocol; this text would be encrypted to P and then later sent to B.

So it is possible that B could mount a chosen plaintext attack
potentially gaining information about the previous communications
between A and C.  

As an example, with the des mode of digest-md5, if B knows the last
block of ciphertext between P and A, B may be able to construct
plaintext to test a guess of plaintext previously communicated between
A and C.


In particular, this attack does not depend on B knowing the key used
to talk to C, nor does it assume that B is directly doing encryption.


If I'm understanding this correctly, there's a lot of complexity we
can get rid of in the current description of the attack.




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To: hartmans@mit.edu (Sam Hartman), ietf-sasl@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: digest-md5: strongly prefer explicit IV in every block
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Sam:

I will not say that the second alternative will not pass AD 
review.  However, it will require justification.  The first alternative is 
the traditional way to do things, so no justification is needed.  There are 
many protocols that employ the first alternative, including IEEE 802.10b, 
IPsec, and S/MIME.  Notice this covers many different layers in the 
protocol stack.

If the working group selects the second alternative, the security 
considerations section MUST state why the first alternative is a poor fit, 
and it MUST state how the second alternative offers the same level of security.

Russ

At 06:52 PM 3/16/2004 -0500, Sam Hartman wrote:


>I'm looking at the AES CBC cipher in digest-md5.  AS we discussed in
>Seoul, there are two approaches under consideration.
>
>I strongly prefer the option that includes an explicit IV in every AES
>packet to the option that introduces a new packet type and only
>sometimes sends an explicit IV.
>
>There are two claimed advantages to the second approach:
>
>1) Performance.
>
>As I understand it, the performance implication of including the IV is
>the cost of generating a 128-bit random number along with the cost of
>encrypting one block of AES data.
>
>2)  Simplicity of implementation: implementations could re-use
>     existing packet formats.
>
>I don't understand this at all.  It seems like you need to implement
>both packet types in all implementations, so the I don't see how it is
>simpler.
>
>The advantages of the first approach seem to be security against the
>attack that we were trying to defend against.  If an attacker can ever
>predict a situation when an explicit IV is not going to be used, then
>the attacker can mount the attack.
>
>I do not expect the second approach would pass AD review.
>
>For now, I'd recommend against ignoring the performance concern.  If
>there are implementers who are seriously concerned about performance,
>then we should consider counter mode instead of the explicit IV
>approach.
>
>--Sam



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Subject: digest-md5: strongly prefer explicit IV in every block
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I'm looking at the AES CBC cipher in digest-md5.  AS we discussed in
Seoul, there are two approaches under consideration.

I strongly prefer the option that includes an explicit IV in every AES
packet to the option that introduces a new packet type and only
sometimes sends an explicit IV.

There are two claimed advantages to the second approach:

1) Performance.

As I understand it, the performance implication of including the IV is
the cost of generating a 128-bit random number along with the cost of
encrypting one block of AES data.

2)  Simplicity of implementation: implementations could re-use
    existing packet formats.

I don't understand this at all.  It seems like you need to implement
both packet types in all implementations, so the I don't see how it is
simpler.

The advantages of the first approach seem to be security against the
attack that we were trying to defend against.  If an attacker can ever
predict a situation when an explicit IV is not going to be used, then
the attacker can mount the attack.

I do not expect the second approach would pass AD review.

For now, I'd recommend against ignoring the performance concern.  If
there are implementers who are seriously concerned about performance,
then we should consider counter mode instead of the explicit IV
approach.  

--Sam



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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>>  Procedures for registering new SASL mechanisms are given in section 8.
>>
>>  The "sasl-mech" production below defines the syntax of a SASL
>>  mechanism name.  This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
>>  notation as specified in [ABNF] and the ABNF core rules as specified
>>  in Appendix A of the ABNF specification [ABNF].
>>
>>  sasl-mech    = 1*20mech-char
>>  mech-char    = %x41-5A / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
>>                 ; mech names restricted to ASCII uppercase letters,
>>                 ; digits, "-" and "_"
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest this comment be replaced with:
>        ; mech-char is restricted to "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", "-", and "_"
>        : from ASCII character set.
>
Done.

>In the ABNF, I suggest (for consistency) replacing DIGIT, "-", and  
>"_" with %x30-39, %x2D, and %x5F, respectively.  This also avoids
>unnecessary reliance on a core rule (which would require the      
>implementor to look up meaning of DIGIT).
>
Done (it a slightly different manner).

>>  The "extern-init-resp" rule below defines the initial response sent
>>  from client to server.
>>
>>  extern-init-resp  = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )
>>
>>  UTF8-char-no-nul  = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
>>
>>  UTF8-1-no-nul     = %x01-7F
>>
>>
>>7.2.  Example
>>
>>  The following is an example of an EXTERNAL authentication in the SMTP
>>  protocol [SMTP].  In this example, the client is proxy
>>  authenticating, sending the authorization identity "fred" using in
>>  the (optional) initial response.  The server has determined the
>>  client's identity through IPsec and has a security policy that
>>  permits that identity to proxy authenticate as any other identity.
>>    
>>
>
>An informative reference for IPsec seems appropriate here as
>presently worded.  Suggest it be reworded,
>	The server has obtained the client's (authentication) identity
>	from an external service, such as IPsec, and has a security
>	policy that permits that identity to assume the identity of
>	the asserted authorization identity.
>
Done. I've also added an informative reference for IPSec, as it is 
mentioned in section 7.

Alexey





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Subject: Re: sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long]
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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>At 01:39 PM 2/26/2004, Rob Siemborski wrote:
>  
>
>>Implementors of a protocol using this specification will also need
>>a specification of a profile specific the protocol. 
>>
>
>This is somewhat better.  My previous concern was with
>the "all of this document" part of the current statement.
>For the other audiences, the section is quite specific
>as to what portions of this document they need to read.
>I think we should detail what each audience should read
>with equal specificity.
>
>I have no objection to saying, in addition to portions
>of this document, they need to read the specification
>of the protocol they are implementing, especially those
>portions of that specification which fulfill the
>requirements placed upon that specification by this
>document.
>
>I note as well that it might be appropriate to note
>that implementors need to read and understand
>aspects of mechanism specifications they intend to
>use (regardless of whether they are implementing the
>mechanisms themselves or using an existing implementation)
>to understand, for instance, the mechanism specific
>authentication identity forms, the offered services,
>and security and other considerations.
>
I've rewrote the paragraph to look like this:

The sections "Overview", "Authentication Mechanisms",  "Protocol profile 
requirements", "Specific issues" and
"Security Considerations" cover issues that implementors of a protocol 
that uses SASL framework need to understand.
The implementors will also need to understand a specification of a 
profile specific to the protocol, as well as aspects of mechanism
specifications they intend to use (regardless of whether they are 
implementing the mechanisms themselves or using an existing implementation)
to understand, for instance, the mechanism specific authentication 
identity forms, the offered services, and security and other considerations.

(Note that I've borrowed the text that Kurt used in his message)

Comments?

Alexey





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On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> >In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:
> >
> >....
> >
> >C: (blob)
> >S: x OK ""
> >
> >is not equivilent to
> >
> >C: (blob)
> >S: x OK
> >
> >The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
> >client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
> >(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.
> >
>
> The message wasn't talking about initial response, it was talking about
> "additional data with success".

Yes, obviously.  But the situation is very similar.

As in the example above -- the client is unable to tell if the server
omitted the response (since it is, after all optional) and thus is facing
an error, or if the server actually intended there to be data there.

Maybe, though, the client can assume the server is playing on the level if
it was expecting data with success, and got neither the extra round trip
*nor* the data, implying that the data was an empty string.  But this
seems very poor.

-Rob

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Rob Siemborski | Andrew Systems Group * Research Systems Programmer
PGP:0x5CE32FCC | Cyert Hall 207 * rjs3@andrew.cmu.edu * 412.268.7456
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Rob Siemborski wrote:

>On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
>>will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
>>for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
>>they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.
>>
>>I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
>>recommendation made that applications support one or the
>>other but not both.
>>    
>>
>
>Except they aren't semanticly equivilent -- just like zero length and
>absent initial responses aren't equivilent.
>
>For, example, let's have an IMAP-like protocol with an initial response
>(well, SASL-IR extension) and server-last capability:
>
>C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL
>
>is not at all equivilent to
>
>C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL ""
>
>The first requires that the server send an empty initial challenge,
>whereas the second means that the entire exchange is complete.
>
>In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:
>
>....
>
>C: (blob)
>S: x OK ""
>
>is not equivilent to
>
>C: (blob)
>S: x OK
>
>The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
>client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
>(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.
>
The message wasn't talking about initial response, it was talking about 
"additional data with success".




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On Fri, 12 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
> will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
> for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
> they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.
>
> I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
> recommendation made that applications support one or the
> other but not both.

Except they aren't semanticly equivilent -- just like zero length and
absent initial responses aren't equivilent.

For, example, let's have an IMAP-like protocol with an initial response
(well, SASL-IR extension) and server-last capability:

C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL

is not at all equivilent to

C: x AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL ""

The first requires that the server send an empty initial challenge,
whereas the second means that the entire exchange is complete.

In a server-last case, with a mechanism that is server-last:

....

C: (blob)
S: x OK ""

is not equivilent to

C: (blob)
S: x OK

The first is a valid conclusion, the second is an *error* according to the
client, because it cannot tell if the server omitted the final response
(it is, after all, optional), or if it was an empty string.

-Rob

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Rob Siemborski | Andrew Systems Group * Research Systems Programmer
PGP:0x5CE32FCC | Cyert Hall 207 * rjs3@andrew.cmu.edu * 412.268.7456
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Subject: No response versa an empty response in the last leg of a SASL exchange
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I am forwarding this message from the LDAPbis mailing list as suggested 
by Kurt.
Does this message have enough context to start a discussion of the issue?

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	Re: SASL mechanisms that return no data in last leg
Date: 	Thu, 11 Mar 2004 19:26:50 -0800
From: 	Kurt D. Zeilenga <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
To: 	Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
CC: 	lukeh@PADL.COM, ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org
References: 	<200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com> 
<404A778D.90302@isode.com> <6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1> 
<404E882B.8060702@isode.com>



At 07:14 PM 3/9/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:
>
>>I'd have to agree with Alexey.  The mechanism for provide data
>>with the last leg of the exchange is optional.  That is, if there
>>is data to be sent AND the server chooses not to require
>>another roundtrip, the server can attach the data to last
>>message.
>>
>>Another point is that SASL allows the mechanism data
>>in any message of the exchange to be any octet string,
>>including a zero length string.  Hence, it seems that
>>no string and a zero length string are not necessarily
>>semantically equivalent here.
>This is correct, however LDAP is the first SASL profile I've seen that is able to represent them differently.
>Do you think that we should say something about this in the base SASL document?

I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.

I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
recommendation made that applications support one or the
other but not both.

Kurt



--------------080406080208050408070403
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<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
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I am forwarding this message from the LDAPbis mailing list as suggested
by Kurt.<br>
Does this message have enough context to start a discussion of the
issue?<br>
<br>
-------- Original Message --------
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">Subject: </th>
      <td>Re: SASL mechanisms that return no data in last leg</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">Date: </th>
      <td>Thu, 11 Mar 2004 19:26:50 -0800</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">From: </th>
      <td>Kurt D. Zeilenga <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:Kurt@OpenLDAP.org">&lt;Kurt@OpenLDAP.org&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">To: </th>
      <td>Alexey Melnikov <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com">&lt;Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">CC: </th>
      <td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
 href="mailto:lukeh@PADL.COM">lukeh@PADL.COM</a>, <a
 class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
 href="mailto:ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org">ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">References: </th>
      <td><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com">&lt;200403040556.QAA02107@au.padl.com&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:404A778D.90302@isode.com">&lt;404A778D.90302@isode.com&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1">&lt;6.0.1.1.0.20040309155948.0515df90@127.0.0.1&gt;</a>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
 href="mailto:404E882B.8060702@isode.com">&lt;404E882B.8060702@isode.com&gt;</a></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<br>
<br>
<pre>At 07:14 PM 3/9/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
&gt;Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:
&gt;
&gt;&gt;I'd have to agree with Alexey.  The mechanism for provide data
&gt;&gt;with the last leg of the exchange is optional.  That is, if there
&gt;&gt;is data to be sent AND the server chooses not to require
&gt;&gt;another roundtrip, the server can attach the data to last
&gt;&gt;message.
&gt;&gt;
&gt;&gt;Another point is that SASL allows the mechanism data
&gt;&gt;in any message of the exchange to be any octet string,
&gt;&gt;including a zero length string.  Hence, it seems that
&gt;&gt;no string and a zero length string are not necessarily
&gt;&gt;semantically equivalent here.
&gt;This is correct, however LDAP is the first SASL profile I've seen that is able to represent them differently.
&gt;Do you think that we should say something about this in the base SASL document?

I suggest we take this one to the SASL WG list.  I suspect they
will have to say something about this, such as they had to do
for zero-length v. absent authorization identity strings.  Once
they reach consensus as to what to say, we'll adapt as needed.

I suspect they will have to be declared equivalent and a
recommendation made that applications support one or the
other but not both.

Kurt

</pre>
</body>
</html>

--------------080406080208050408070403--



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Sam Hartman wrote:

>>>>>>"Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:
>>>>>>            
>>>>>>
>    Alexey> Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed
>    Alexey> by DIGEST-MD5 (July/August)
>
>I think Kurt and I believe that digest is a higher priority.
>
That is fine, but don't make them in the same month.

Alexey




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>>>>> "Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:

    Alexey> Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed
    Alexey> by DIGEST-MD5 (July/August)


I think Kurt and I believe that digest is a higher priority.



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Sam Hartman wrote:

>If no one objects in the next two days I'll send these in:
>
>May 04		Base spec
>July 04		Digest md5
>July 04		Cram-md5
>
Maybe it make sense to do CRAM-MD5 first (June), followed by DIGEST-MD5 
(July/August)

>September 04	GSSAPI
>December 04	Conclude or recharter
>
>Also, I will be submitting the new saslprep for publication shortly.
>  
>
Looks good otherwise.

Alexey




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If no one objects in the next two days I'll send these in:

May 04		Base spec
July 04		Digest md5
July 04		Cram-md5
September 04	GSSAPI
December 04	Conclude or recharter

Also, I will be submitting the new saslprep for publication shortly.

--Sam



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To: Lyndon Nerenberg <lyndon@orthanc.ca>
CC: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>, ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: CRAM-MD5 review notes [long]
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Lyndon Nerenberg wrote:
> 
> --On 2004-3-10 11:31 PM -0800 "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> wrote:
> 
>> Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.
> 
> 
> Please shoot the groff authors, who have made it impossible to turn off 
> hyphenation when using the -ms macros. I will generate the final version 
> using a real version of nroff, where .nh and .hy work as documented.

I encountered the same problem when working on some LDAP I-Ds.  Try 
adding a line like this before your .hy 0 line :

.nr HY 0

See: http://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-groff/2000-09/msg00001.html

-- 
Mark Smith
LDAP Book Information: http://www.ldapbook.com/
What's Next:           http://www.pearlcrescent.com/




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Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 00:05:33 -0800
From: Lyndon Nerenberg <lyndon@orthanc.ca>
To: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
cc: ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: CRAM-MD5 review notes [long]
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--On 2004-3-10 11:31 PM -0800 "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> 
wrote:

> Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.

Please shoot the groff authors, who have made it impossible to turn off 
hyphenation when using the -ms macros. I will generate the final 
version using a real version of nroff, where .nh and .hy work as 
documented.

As for the grammar changes, <msg-id> makes more sense. I think what 
happened here was that 2822 was still in limbo, but we didn't want to 
reference 822 as we knew it was going to be obsolete. I can't remember 
now just where we got the specific text for those changes. I will go 
through the grammar again and see what can be pulled from 2822. As for 
<user>, I will add a descriptive tag spelling out this must be valid 
UTF-8.

The rest of the changes seem reasonable, and I'll incorporate them into 
a new version. I had hoped to preserve the original text and format as 
much as possible, but since that won't happen now I will also bring the 
whole document up-to-date with the latest RFC Editor requirements.

--lyndon



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Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2004 23:31:13 -0800
To: lyndon+rfc-crammd5@orthanc.ca
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: CRAM-MD5 review notes [long]
Cc: ietf-sasl@imc.org
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Lyndon,

I found a number a technical and editorial issues in
draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-02.txt.   My concerns include:
 - new ABNF productions appears not to be consistent
   with those used in RFC 2095 (incorporating from RFC 822),
 - lack of clarity regarding use of SASLprep, and
 - lack of discussion as to why this mechanism is
   registered as having LIMITED usage.

Kurt


>Network Working Group                               L. Nerenberg, Editor
>Internet Draft: The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism              Orthanc Systems
>Document: draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-02.txt                    January 2004

Please update the headers to include:

Intended Category: Standards Track
Updates/Obsoletes: RFC xxxx
Expires: month year

>                      The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism
>
>
>Status of this Memo
>
>     This document is an Internet Draft and is in full conformance with
>     all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
>
>     Internet Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
>     Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
>     other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet
>     Drafts.
>
>     Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
>     months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other docu-
>     ments at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as
>     reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
>     progress."
>
>     The list of current Internet Drafts can be accessed at
>     http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet
>     Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
>     http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
>
>     Copyright 2003,2004 The Internet Society.  All Rights Reserved.
>
>     Please see the Copyright section near the end of this document for
>     more information.
>
>Abstract
>
>     This document defines a simple challenge-response authentication
>     mechanism, using a keyed-hash digest, for use with the Simple
>     Authentication and Security Layer (SASL).

It might be good for the abstract to, in one sentence, describe
its general applicability.

>1.  Conventions Used in this Document
>
>     The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
>     in this document are to be interpreted as defined in [KEYWORD].
>
>
>2.  CRAM-MD5 Authentication Mechanism
>
>     This document defines a simple challenge-response [SASL] authenti-
>     cation mechanism, using a [KEYED-MD5] digest, for use with [SASL].

It seems odd that [SASL] is provided twice here.  Also, SASL needs
to be spelled out on first use in body of document.

>     The mechanism name associated with CRAM-MD5 is 'CRAM-MD5'.

>     This mechanism does not provide a security layer.

I think this document needs to have an Introduction section consisting
of the above two paragraphs, a discussion of the mechanism's general
applicability, why it is usage is LIMITED, a discussion of this
document relates to other documents (e.g., what RFCs it updates/replaces),
and, lastly, followed by the above conventions.  This Introduction
(renumbered section 1) would be followed by a new "CRAM-MD5
Authentication Mechanism" section (numbered section 2).

>     The data encoded in the challenge contains a presumptively arbi-
>     trary string of random digits, a time-stamp, and the fully-quali-
>     fied primary host name of the server.

Words should not be hyphenation in Internet-Drafts.

Why isn't RFC-822 msg-id production here as was done in RFC 2195?
The production below is quite different than a msg-id (in some
ways more restrictive and in other ways less restrictive).

For compatibility with existing RFC 2195, I think this specification
should simple incorporate (directly or by reference) the msg-id
production previously used.

>     The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
>     consisting of the user name, a space, and a "digest."  The latter

I think the double quotes around digest can be removed.  If you
really want to draw attention to digest being a production, wrap
it with angle brackets, e.g. <digest>.

>     is computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5]
>     where the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the chal-
>     lenge (including angle-brackets). The client MUST NOT interpret or
>     attempt to validate the contents of the challenge in any way.
>
>     This shared secret is a string known only to the client and server.
>     The "digest" parameter itself is a 16-octet value which is sent in
>     hexadecimal format, using lower-case US-ASCII characters.

Need reference for US-ASCII.

You should make it clear (in prose) that the hexadecimal format
is zero padded.  That is, if the most significant nimbles are zero,
they are not left these off.

>     When the server receives this client response, it verifies the
>     digest provided.  Since the user name may contain the space charac-
>     ter, the server MUST scan the client response from right to left;

You're MUST what is an implementation detail.  There are, in fact,
a number of other reasonable implementation options.  A server could
scan the response right to left to locate the last space.  A server
could just compute the position of the space (if the length of the
string is known).  Instead, you should note that implementations
should take care in parsing the string as it user name portion
can contain a space character.

>     the first space character encountered separates the digest from the
>     user name.  If the digest is correct, the server should consider
>     the client authenticated and respond appropriately.

I rather drop the "and respond appropriately" as this implies
that the server response is based only on wether the client
is authenticated.  The server may, of course, choose to fail
the exchange even though the client was authenticated (for
instance, because the client is not authorized for service
provided by the server).

>     The client MUST prepare the user name and shared secret strings
>     using the [SASLPrep] profile of the [StringPrep] algorithm.  The
>     resulting values MUST be encoded as UTF-8 [UTF8].

This likely should be stated upfront.

>
>2.1.  Formal Syntax
>
>     The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur
>     Form (ABNF) as specified in [ABNF], and incorporates by reference
>     the Core Rules defined in that document.
>
>     challenge  = "<" 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT "@" hostname ">"

This restricts digits to decimal digits.  However, it can be
argued that CRAM-MD5 previously allowed digits of other bases.
RFC 2195 said the challenge was a RFC822 msg-id.

>
>     digest     = 32(DIGIT / %x61-66)
>                  ; A hexadecimal string using only lower-case
>                  ; letters
>
>     hostname   = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT) *("." / "-" / ALPHA / DIGIT)

This production seems a bit odd in that it allows things like:
	a...

I think it would be better to written:
      label = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( "-" / ALPHA / DIGIT )

	  hostname = label *( "." label )

(but note this would not be needed if msg-id was used)

>     response   = user SP digest
>
>     user       = 1*OCTET

This should be replaced with a more precise UTF-8 production.

>2.2.  Examples

Suggest this be renumbered as separate section, e.g. 3.

>     The examples in this section do NOT form part of the specification.

I think it would be better to say:
	This section provides a number of examples which illustrate
	the CRAM-MD5 mechanism.  This section is informative.


>     Where conflicts exist between the examples and the formal grammar
>     or specification text, the latter are authoritative.

s/specification text/normative text in Section 2/.

>     These examples show the use of the CRAM-MD5 mechanism with the
>     IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE command [IMAP4].  The base64 encoding of the
>     challenges and responses is part of the IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE command,
>     not part of the CRAM-MD5 specification itself.

Add reference for base64.

>
>     S: * OK [CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS LOGINDISABLED AUTH=CRAM-MD5]
>     C: A0001 AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5
>     S: + PDE4OTYuNjk3MTcwOTUyQHBvc3RvZmZpY2UuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQ+
>     C: am9lIDNkYmM4OGYwNjI0Nzc2YTczN2IzOTA5M2Y2ZWI2NDI3
>     S: A0001 OK CRAM-MD5 authentication successful
>
>     In this example, the shared secret is the string
>
>          tanstaaftanstaaf
>
>     Hence, the Keyed MD5 digest is produced by calculating
>
>          MD5((tanstaaftanstaaf XOR opad),
>               MD5((tanstaaftanstaaf XOR ipad),
>               <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>))

I think the examples should show where SASLprep is applied.
That is, it might be good to replace the above with:
          MD5((SASLprep(tanstaaftanstaaf) XOR opad),
               MD5((SASLprep(tanstaaftanstaaf) XOR ipad),
               <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>))

(and this should likely be made more clear in Section 2)
>
>     where ipad and opad are as defined in [KEYED-MD5] and the string
>     shown in the challenge is the base64 encoding of
>     <1896.697170952@postoffice.example.net>. The shared secret is null-
>     padded to a length of 64 bytes.

It should be made clear (here and in section 2) that its the
output of SASLprep that is null-padded.

>     If the shared secret is longer than
>     64 bytes, the MD5 digest of the shared secret is used as a 16 byte
>     input to the keyed MD5 calculation.
>
>     This produces a digest value (in hexadecimal) of
>
>          3dbc88f0624776a737b39093f6eb6427
>
>     The user name is then prepended to it, forming
>
>          joe 3dbc88f0624776a737b39093f6eb6427

I'd like to see "joe" replaced with "joe smith" to hilite the
parsing issue.  Also, SASLprep should be discussed here.

>     Which is then base64 encoded to meet the requirements of the IMAP4
>     AUTHENTICATE command (or the similar POP3 AUTH command), yielding
>
>          am9lIDNkYmM4OGYwNjI0Nzc2YTczN2IzOTA5M2Y2ZWI2NDI3
>

It might also be useful to show an example that does not use
the optional initial response feature of the application
protocol.  And, I suggest use of another protocol (such as
ACAP) for this second example.

>
>3.  References
>
>3.1.  Normative References

References should be put into standard form.

>[ABNF]
>     Crocker, D., P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications:
>     ABNF", RFC2234, Internet Mail Consortium and Demon Internet Ltd.,
>     November 1997.
>
>[KEYED-MD5]
>     Krawczyk, Bellare, Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
>     Authentication", RFC 2104, IBM and UCSD, February 1997.
>
>[KEYWORD]
>     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
>     Levels", BCP 14, RFC2119, Harvard University, March 1997.
>
>[MD5]
>     Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, MIT Labo-
>     ratory for Computer Science and RSA Data Security, Inc., April
>     1992.
>
>[SASL]
>     Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)," RFC
>     2222, Netscape Communications, October 1997.
>
>[SASLPrep]
>     Zeilenga, K., "SASL String Preparation Profiles", draft-ietf-sasl-
>     saslprep (work in progress)
>
>[StringPrep]
>     Hoffman, P., M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings
>     (stringprep)", RFC 3454, IMC and Viagenie, December 2002.
>
>[UTF8]
>     Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
>     2279, Alis Technologies, January 1998.
>
>3.2.  Informative References
>
>[IMAP4]
>     Crispin, M., "Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1,"
>     RFC 3501, University of Washington, March 2003.
>
>
>4.  Security Considerations
>
>     It is conjectured that use of the CRAM-MD5 authentication mechanism
>     provides replay protection for a session.
>
>     This mechanism does not obscure the user name in any way.  Accord-
>     ingly, a server that implements both a clear-text password command
>     and this authentication type should not allow both methods of
>     access for a given user name.
>
>     Keyed MD5 is chosen for this application because of the greater
>     security imparted to authentication of short messages. In addition,
>     the use of the techniques described in [KEYED-MD5] for pre-computa-
>     tion of intermediate results make it possible to avoid explicit
>     clear-text storage of the shared secret on the server system by
>     instead storing the intermediate results which are known as "con-
>     texts."  While the saving, on the server, of the MD5 "context" is
>     marginally better than saving the shared secrets in clear-text, it
>     is not sufficient to protect the secrets if the server itself is
>     compromised.  Consequently, servers that store the secrets or con-
>     texts must both be protected to a level appropriate to the poten-
>     tial information value in the data and services protected by this
>     mechanism.  In other words, techniques like this one involve a
>     trade-off between vulnerability to network sniffing and I/O buffer
>     snooping and vulnerability of the server host's databases.  If one
>     believes that the host and its databases are subject to compromise,
>     and the network is not, this technique (and all others like it) is
>     unattractive.  It is perhaps even less attractive than clear-text
>     passwords, which are typically stored on hosts in one-way hash
>     form.  On the other hand, if the server databases are perceived as
>     reasonably secure, and one is concerned about client-side or net-
>     work interception of the passwords (secrets), then this (and simi-
>     lar) techniques are preferable to clear-text passwords by a wide
>     margin.
>
>     As the length of the shared secret increases, so does the diffi-
>     culty of deriving it.
>
>     While there are now suggestions in the literature that the use of
>     MD5 and keyed MD5 in authentication procedures probably has a lim-
>     ited effective lifetime, the technique is now widely deployed and
>     widely understood.  It is believed that this general understanding
>     may assist with the rapid replacement, by CRAM-MD5, of the current
>     uses of permanent clear-text passwords in many protocols.  This
>     document has been deliberately written to permit easy upgrading to
>     use SHA (or whatever alternatives emerge) when they are considered
>     to be widely available and adequately safe.
>
>     Even with the use of CRAM-MD5, users are still vulnerable to active
>     attacks.  An example of an increasingly common active attack is
>     'TCP Session Hijacking' as described in CERT Advisory CA-95:01.

An informative reference for this advisory would be useful.

Also, CERT should be spelled out.

>     CRAM-MD5 does not authenticate the server and does not include a
>     client-supplied nonce.  As a result, it is possible to construct a
>     server with a fixed challenge string that has pre-computed the
>     hashes for all possible passwords up to a certain length (or from a
>     dictionary).  Such a server could then immediately determine the
>     user's password if it is sufficiently short.
>
>
>5.  IANA Considerations
>
>     The SASL Mechanism Registry entry for CRAM-MD5 must be updated to
>     reference this specification.

This should be worded as a request.  That is,
	It is requested that the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
	update the SASL Mechanism Registry entry for CRAM-MD5 to refer to
	this document.

(The RFC-Editor with then, after the request is fulfilled by IANA,
replace this with a statement that IANA has made this update.)

>6.  Contributors
>
>     The CRAM-MD5 mechanism was originally specified in RFC 2095,
>     IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/Response.  The
>     authors of that document -- John C. Klensin, Paul Krumviede, and
>     Randy Catoe -- are to be credited with the design and specification
>     of CRAM-MD5, and they are the original authors of the majority of
>     the text in this document. This memo serves only to re-state CRAM-
>     MD5 within the formal context of SASL, which specification it pre-
>     ceded by several months.
>

A "Changes since RFC 2095" section is needed.

>7.  Intellectual Property
>
>     The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
>     intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to per-
>     tain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
>     this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
>     might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
>     has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on
>     the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
>     standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
>     claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances
>     of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made
>     to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such pro-
>     prietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can
>     be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
>
>     The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
>     copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
>     rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
>     this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Execu-
>     tive Director.
>
>
>8.  Editors' Address
>
>     Lyndon Nerenberg
>     Orthanc Systems
>     Email: lyndon+rfc-crammd5@orthanc.ca
>
>
>9.  Full Copyright Statement
>
>     Copyright 2003, 2004, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
>
>     This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
>     others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain
>     it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, pub-
>     lished and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of
>     any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this para-
>     graph are included on all such copies and derivative works.  How-
>     ever, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as
>     by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet
>     Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the
>     purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the proce-
>     dures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must
>     be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other
>     than English.  The limited permissions granted above are perpetual
>     and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors
>     or assigns.
>
>     This document and the information contained herein is provided on
>     an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGI-
>     NEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
>     INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
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This draft is a work item of the Simple Authentication and Security Layer Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords
	Author(s)	: K. Zeilenga
	Filename	: draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-06.txt
	Pages		: 6
	Date		: 2004-3-10
	
This document describes how to prepare Unicode strings representing
user names and passwords for comparison.  The document defines the
'SASLprep' 'stringprep' profile to be used for both user names and
passwords.  This profile is intended to be used by Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms (such as PLAIN,
CRAM-MD5, and DIGEST-MD5) as well as other protocols exchanging user
names and/or passwords.

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Cc: Russell Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Sending saslprep to the IESG early
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At the security area meeting we received a request from Russ to send
saslprep to the IESG now rather than waiting.


Kurt and I believe that the document is ready.  It has passed working
group last call.

If you had comments during that last call, please let us know if they
have not been addressed within a week.

If you have additional comments that you believe might block the
document let us know within a week.


Otherwise we'll request publication.



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Subject: Summary of SASL Session at IETF 59
References: 
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 02:46:54 -0500
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The SASL working group met for an hour at IETF 59.  The primary
objective of the meeting was to determine next steps for RFC 2222bis.

The chairs are concerned that the document has not received sufficient
review.  The chairs will contact the apps and security areas and ask
for review of the specification before last call.

Kurt Zeilenga raised several issues on the mailing list.  Most of
these were resolved before the meeting; Kurt will check future
versions of the draft to confirm resolution.

One of Kurt's issues that is not resolved is the handling of security
layers for multiple reauthentications.  At IETF 58, we decided not to
change the protocol because of this threat, but Kurt raised concerns
about the wording of the security consideration.  During this
discussion Sam Hartman realized this attack is apparently an instance
of a more general attack.  Sam will confirm this and propose text on
the list.

Bob Morgan described his concerns about the confusion between
authentication identity and authorization ID.  The sense of the room
was that while we want to be as clear as possible, both concepts are
important and we need to keep both terms.  This discussion is still
open on the list.

A new document will be published  shortly after the meeting.  There
will be a need for at least one more revision, slated for early April
before a last call.  We hope to have the base spec to the IESG by
May; this is a milestone slip.

ALexey Melnikov still needs input on use of stringprep and saslprep in
digest-md5.  There was discussion of dropping support for ISO 8859-1
and claiming that all strings are UTF8.  This will be resolved on the
list.  

Sam agreed to review the  AES mode for digest-md5.  The
working group previously agreed to use explicit IVs to avoid chosen
ciphertext attacks, but ALexey has two alternative wire formats for
explicit IVs.

We hope to have digest-md5 last called by July.  Alexey thinks this is
very optimistic.



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Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 14:25:38 +0900
To: ietf-sasl@imc.org
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: chatroom log from our IETF#59 session
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Here is the jabber log from our IETF#59 session.
Thanks to Bob for scribing!

Kurt

[4:54 PM]<rlbob> i'll be scribing
[4:54 PM]<rlbob> session is now underway
[4:55 PM]<rlbob> sh:  2222bis is main item, also stringprep
[4:55 PM]<rlbob> sh:  all other documents have had revisions, but 2222bis is primary focus
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> sh:  specific individuals are being asked to review 2222bis
[4:57 PM]<hartmans> To clarify, there was some discussion on the list of saslprep, but I don't think any  changes were needed
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> kz:  need positive feedback that reviewers are happy with the doc
[4:57 PM]<rlbob> alexey now speaking about 2222bis issues
[4:58 PM]<rlbob> am:  suggested to use RFC 2828 for terminology, concern about possible conflicts
[4:59 PM]<rlbob> kz:  say "these terms are used as defined in 2828"
[4:59 PM]<rlbob> am:  need more generic description, not just list of documents to read
[5:00 PM]<rlbob> am:  thread on list about application of saslprep to authzid
[5:01 PM]<rlbob> am:  proposed text on list, didn't use "normalization" right, will give new text, will reflect agreement achieved on list
[5:01 PM]<rlbob> am:  big thread about what happens to layer on rengotiation if no new layer is requested [or something like that]
[5:02 PM]<rlbob> sh:  appears to be another example of chosen-ciphertext attack, already had discussion for digest-md5
[5:03 PM]<rlbob> sh:  will propose text for document ...
[5:06 PM]<rlbob> bob:  explains his note re importance of clarifying authz id
[5:07 PM]<hartmans> And dropping the concept of authentication ID
[5:08 PM]<rlbob> someone:  need to make distinction between them clear, easier if both are described and explained
[5:09 PM]<tonyhansen> (someone => Tony Hansen)
[5:10 PM]<rlbob> straw poll:  most people want to keep authn identity in the doc
[5:10 PM]<rlbob> kz:  discussion can continue, chairs will summarize next week
[5:13 PM]<hartmans> Bob Morgan: Concern about 2119 language applied to future specifications not to implementations
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> kz: Important that it be clear what the keywords refer to.
[5:14 PM]<rlbob> bob:  concern that 2119 MUST etc don't necessarily apply to constraints on authors, but don't have new language to offer
[5:14 PM]<rlbob> kz:  maybe problem is mixing different uses in the same doc, maybe can clarify per section
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> kz: Separate things so that requirements on specs are in different places than requirements on implementations
[5:14 PM]<hartmans> goal is that clear when reading the document.
[5:16 PM]<hartmans> kz: We still have more work to do on separation of requirements.  Then need to take a look at see if we will be confused.
[5:17 PM]<hartmans> am: Digest-md5
[5:17 PM]<rlbob> am:  moving on to digest-md5
[5:18 PM]<hartmans> am: Tried to clarify reauthentication, ABNF cleanup.
[5:19 PM]<rlbob> attempt to clarify saslprep issues, not finished yet
[5:19 PM]<rlbob> also attempt to clarify charset effects on realm, etc
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> cipher mode clarifications ...
[5:21 PM]<hartmans> am: Drop DES and 3DES per consensus.
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> reorganized confidentiality protection section
[5:21 PM]<rlbob> need lots of input on saslprep issues
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> also "what a realm should look like" question
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> still-open question:  need separate stringprep for realm?
[5:22 PM]<rlbob> kz:  good reason not to use saslprep?
[5:23 PM]<rlbob> am:  argument to made that realms should be same across digest, kerb, gss
[5:24 PM]<rlbob> sh:  gss has no realms, kerb realms are very complicated, so may not be able to be the same
[5:25 PM]<rlbob> am:  there is revision of http digest document, saying all username/passwords are UTF-8
[5:26 PM]<rlbob> am:  big hack in current http digest to use iso-8859-1 if possible, they're hoping to get rid of that ...
[5:27 PM]<hartmans> No the hack is in digest-md5 and was being considered for http-digest as I understand it.
[5:28 PM]<rlbob> sh:  let's take this issue to the list
[5:29 PM]<rlbob> am:  CBC attack
[5:30 PM]<rlbob> am:  two choices, explicit IV and ... sh will send comment to the list
[5:31 PM]<hartmans> second choice is a block type for explicit IV.
[5:31 PM]<rlbob> am:  document not ready for last call very soon
[5:32 PM]<rlbob> am:  also working on GSS document, posted in December
[5:33 PM]<rlbob> am:  example code removed, maybe should be added back
[5:35 PM]<rlbob> am:  should be able to get next rev of 2222bis shortly ...
[5:37 PM]<rlbob> kz:  looks like last on 2222bis may be in April, or even a little later
[5:38 PM]<rlbob> sh:  AD OK with May 04 for submission of 2222bis to IESG?
[5:38 PM]<rlbob> rh:  OK
[5:39 PM]<rlbob> sh:  reason gss doc looks simple is that gss community hasn't focused on it yet
[5:42 PM]<rlbob> kz:  chairs will post proposed new milestones to list by end of week
[5:43 PM]<rlbob> am:  working on C api
[5:43 PM]<rlbob> am:  also requested IETF last call on sasl-for-http document
[5:44 PM]<rlbob> jh:  has this been posted to sasl list?
[5:44 PM]<rlbob> am: yes
[5:45 PM]<rlbob> am:  sasl without persistent connection is "interesting"
[5:46 PM]<rlbob> bob:  intend to submit doc on SAML as SASL mechanism



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References: <200402162041.PAA20167@ietf.org> <6.0.1.1.0.20040216200054.04c9df08@127.0.0.1> <4031F175.1070301@isode.com> <iluy8r1fuqb.fsf_-_@latte.josefsson.org> <6.0.1.1.0.20040223154320.04b42a30@127.0.0.1> <ilullmr84gw.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <ilufzcy206g.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <6.0.1.1.0.20040225170830.04ce6f88@127.0.0.1>
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In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.0.20040225170830.04ce6f88@127.0.0.1> (Kurt D. Zeilenga's message of "Wed, 25 Feb 2004 17:14:01 -0800")
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>>>>> "Kurt" == Kurt D Zeilenga <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org> writes:

    Kurt> Hence, it is very important that where a mechanism uses the
    Kurt> authorization identity as input to a cryptographic function
    Kurt> that it uses the precise form transferred (or to be
    Kurt> transferred) by the mechanism.


In a discussion today, we came to an additional constraint.  The
mechanism should not use the authorization identity in any long-term
cryptographic keys/hashes.  For example, it would be wrong to change
the digest-md5 spec to include the authz id in the a1 hash.

The reason is that there may be multiple forms of the authz id that
compare the same and some clients may use one form while other clients
use a different form.

We don't yet have text for this constraint.



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Subject: Re: New text is authentication/authorization id description  (section 4.2)
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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>At 05:06 AM 3/1/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined within each
>>SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.
>>    
>>
>
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form an email address?
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a domain name?
>What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a distinguished name?
>
>While it possible to define normalized forms for each, these
>definitions, to the best of my knowledge, presently do not
>exist presently.
>
>That is, my email address is commonly written "kurt@openldap.org",
>"Kurt@OpenLDAP.org", and number of other ways.  Which
>representation is normalized one?
>
I think I understand what you are talking about. Normalization is not to 
be confused with Unicode Normalization.
Suggestion for a better term is welcomed.

Alexey




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CC: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>, ietf-sasl@imc.org
Subject: Re: sasl-rfc2222bis review notes [long]
References: <6.0.1.1.0.20040225173049.04ce5210@127.0.0.1> <Pine.LNX.4.58-035.0402261536520.22937@sourcefour.andrew.cmu.edu> <404245EB.6070806@isode.com> <Pine.LNX.4.58-035.0403011130380.19515@sourcefour.andrew.cmu.edu>
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Rob Siemborski wrote:

>On Mon, 1 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>  
>
>>>We should extend this to also cover things other than just TLS (e.g. a
>>>compression layer, separate from either TLS or SASL).
>>>
>>>For example:
>>>
>>>If other transport or session layers (such as a Transport Layer Security
>>>layer or a compression layer) in addition to the SASL security layer are
>>>allowed to be negotiated by the protocol....
>>>
>>>      
>>>
>>I don't think a protocol profile can reasonably define layering of
>>multiple things when at least one of them is not known when the protocol
>>profile is written.
>>So I would rather not change the description.
>>    
>>
>
>Certainly if the existance of such a layer isn't know, you can't say where
>it fits.  However, any known layers need to be documented for interop to
>be ensured.
>
There is compression support in TLS now. Don't tell me you were talking 
about IMAP COMPRESS ;-).

My point is that if a new layer is invented later on, it has to document 
interaction with SASL security layer and TLS.

Alexey




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[This replies deals with two more comments from Kurt].

>>4.    Authentication mechanisms
>>
>>  SASL mechanisms are named by strings, from 1 to 20 characters in
>>  length, consisting of ASCII [ASCII] upper-case letters, digits,
>>  hyphens, and/or underscores.  SASL mechanism names must be registered
>>  with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). IETF standards
>>  track documents may direct the IANA to reserve a portion of the SASL
>>  mechanism namespace and may specify different registration criteria
>>  for the reserved portion; the GSSAPI mechanism specification
>>  [SASL-GSSAPI] does this.
>>    
>>
>
>The above sentence should be moved in IANA considerations section.
>
I think it already does:

8.2.  Registration procedure

...

There is no naming convention for SASL mechanisms; any name that
conforms to the syntax of a SASL mechanism name can be registered.
An IETF Standards Track document may reserve a portion of the SASL
mechanism namespace ("family of SASL mechanisms") for its own use,
amending the registration rules for that portion of the namespace.
Each family of SASL mechanisms MUST be identified by a prefix.

>>9.   Security considerations
>>
>>  Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.
>>
>>  The mechanisms that support integrity protection are designed such
>>  that the negotiation of the security layer and authorization identity
>>  is integrity protected.
>>    
>>
>
>This statement seems a bit circular.
>
>Also, "integrity protection" was defined as providing the capability
>to detection unauthorized changes to data transfered by the security
>layer.  However this uses the term implies that the authentication
>exchange, including layer negotiation is protected.  This is problematic.
>
I think the text should read:

The mechanisms that support integrity protection should be designed such ...

(I've changed "are" to "should be")

>If we look at DIGEST-MD5, which does offer a security layer
>with "integrity protection", we find a mechanism which does
> 
>
I assume you meant "does not".

>provide full integrity protection over the authentication
>exchange itself.
>
It doesn't protect the whole authentication exchange, but it protects 
both security layer negotiation and the authorization id.

>I think we need to a bit more precise with our terminology.  To
>avoid having to define a SASL-specific terminology, I strongly
>recommend we try to use RFC 2828 based terminology.
>
I think we should check if the SASL terminology in use now doesn't 
contradict RFC 2828.
This assumes that the document is updated to reference RFC 2828. I 
personally don't mind (if there are no major inconsistencies), but the 
WG has to give a feedback if this would be considered a good idea.

Alexey





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Kurt D. Zeilenga wrote:

>>  The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) provides a method
>>  for adding authentication support with an optional security layer to
>>  connection-based protocols.
>>    
>>
>
>As used here, the word "optional" implies that protocols MAY
>include security layer support.
>
In theory a protocol profile can disallow usage of a SASL security layer.

>Suggest this be reworded
>
>	The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a
>	framework for providing authentication and data security
>	services in connection-based protocols.
>
I like that.

>>                               It also describes a structure for
>>  authentication mechanisms.  The result is an abstraction layer
>>  between protocols and authentication mechanisms such that any SASL-
>>  compatible authentication mechanism can be used with any SASL-
>>  compatible protocol.
>>
>>  This document describes how a SASL authentication mechanism is
>>  structured, describes how a protocol adds support for SASL, defines
>>  the protocol for carrying a security layer over a connection, and
>>  defines the EXTERNAL SASL authentication mechanism.
>>    
>>
>
>It might be better to transpose EXTERNAL and SASL here.
>
Done.

>>2.    Organization of this document
>>
>>2.1.  How to read this document
>>
>>  This document is written to serve several different audiences,
>>  protocol designers using this specification to support authentication
>>  in their protocol, mechanism designers that define new SASL
>>  mechanisms, and implementors of clients or servers for those
>>  protocols using this specification.
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest using a bullet list for the above.
>
Sounds good.

>
>
>...
>
>>2.2.  Conventions used in this document
>>
>>  In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
>>  server respectively.
>>
>>  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
>>  in this document are to be interpreted as defined in "Key words for
>>  use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS].
>>
>>  Character names in this document use the notation for code points and
>>  names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode].  For example, the letter
>>  "a" may be represented as either <U+0061> or <LATIN SMALL LETTER A>.
>>
>>  This document uses terms "integrity protection" and "confidentiality
>>  protection".  The former references to a security layer that is able
>>  to detect data modification by using some kind of hash.  However,
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest the "by using some kind of hash" qualification be dropped.   
>The term "integrity protection" applies to any layer which is capable
>of detecting data modification (regardless of whether it using some
>kind of hash or not).  I suggest:
>
>    The term "integrity protection" refers to a security layer         
>    designed to detect unauthorized data modification.
>
Ok
...

>>  authentication mechanism to be defined once, making it usable by any
>>  SASL protocol profile.  In many implementations, the same SASL
>>  mechanism code is used for multiple protocols.
>>    
>>
>
>Add another (see above) subsection which
>
>X.Y. Relationship to other documents
>
>    This document obsoletes RFC 2222.  It replaces all portions of
>    RFC 2222 excepting sections 7.1 (Kerberos version 4 mechanism),
>    7.2 (GSSAPI mechanism), 7.3 (S/Key mechanism).  The Kerberos
>    version 4 (KERBEROS_IV) and S/Key (SKEY) mechanisms are now        
>    viewed as obsolete.  The GSSAPI mechanism is now separately 
>    specified [SASL-GSSAPI].
>
I've added this as "Appendix B". The detailed list of changes in now 
Appendix C.

>>  Procedures for registering new SASL mechanisms are given in section 8.
>>
>>  The "sasl-mech" production below defines the syntax of a SASL
>>  mechanism name.  This uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
>>  notation as specified in [ABNF] and the ABNF core rules as specified
>>  in Appendix A of the ABNF specification [ABNF].
>>
>>  sasl-mech    = 1*20mech-char
>>  mech-char    = %x41-5A / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
>>                 ; mech names restricted to ASCII uppercase letters,
>>                 ; digits, "-" and "_"
>>
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest this comment be replaced with:
>        ; mech-char is restricted to "A"-"Z", "0"-"9", "-", and "_"
>        : from ASCII character set.
>
Done

>...
>
>>5.2.  Mechanism profile guidelines
>>
>>  Designers of new SASL mechanism should be aware of the following
>>  issues:
>>
>>  1) Authorization identity.
>>    
>>
>
>Remove the "."
>
Ok.

>>6.1.1.  Client sends data first examples
>>
>>  The following are two examples of an SECURID authentication [SASL-
>>  SECURID] in the SMTP protocol [SMTP].  In the first example below,
>>  the client is trying fast reauthentication by sending the initial
>>  response:
>>
>>     S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
>>     C: EHLO client.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.  Suggest you s/Hello.*/Welcome client.example.com/
>
Done.

>>     S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
>>     S: 250 DSN
>>     C: AUTH SECURID AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful
>>
>>  The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here the
>>  client chooses not to use the initial response parameter.
>>
>>     S: 220-smtp.example.com ESMTP Server
>>     C: EHLO client.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com Hello client.example.com, pleased to meet you
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.
>
Done.

>>     S: 250-AUTH GSSAPI SECURID
>>     S: 250 DSN
>>     C: AUTH SECURID
>>     S: 334
>>     C: AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA=
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful
>>
>>     Section 7.2 contains an additional example.
>>    
>>
>
>Indention is off here.
>
Thanks.

>
>Also note that 7.2 provides two examples as does 6.2.1.
>So, this should read:
>	Additonal examples can be found in sections 6.2.1 and 7.2.
>
Changed.

>>     C: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         to='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         id='c2s_234'
>>         from='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:features>
>>          <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>            <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
>>            <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
>>          </mechanisms>
>>        </stream:features>
>>     C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
>>              mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
>>     S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long...
>
Fixed.

>>        LGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
>>        </challenge>
>>     C: <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWFsbT0ic29tZXJlYWxtIixub25jZT0i
>>        T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGNub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZWcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
>>        MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
>>        LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
>>        YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
>>        </response>
>>     S: <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
>>        </success>
>>
>>     The example below is almost identical to the previous, but here
>>     the server chooses not to use the additional data with success.
>>
>>     C: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         to='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:stream
>>         xmlns='jabber:client'
>>         xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
>>         id='c2s_234'
>>         from='example.com'
>>         version='1.0'>
>>     S: <stream:features>
>>          <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>            <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
>>            <mechanism>CRAM-MD5</mechanism>
>>          </mechanisms>
>>        </stream:features>
>>     C: <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
>>              mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>
>>     S: <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
>>        cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
>>    
>>
>
>This line is too long.
>
Fixed.

>...
>  
>
>>  Non-terminals referenced but not defined below are as defined by
>>  [UTF-8].
>>    
>>
>
>I suggest the non-terminal productions be directly incorporated
>into this document.
>
I actually disagree.
If there is an update to UTF-8, I wouldn't like to waste additional time 
trying to synchronize the two.

>>  The "extern-init-resp" rule below defines the initial response sent
>>  from client to server.
>>
>>  extern-init-resp  = *( UTF8-char-no-nul )
>>
>>  UTF8-char-no-nul  = UTF8-1-no-nul / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
>>
>>  UTF8-1-no-nul     = %x01-7F
>>
>>
>>7.2.  Example
>>
>>...
>>
>>  The following example is almost identical to the one above, but the
>>  client doesn't use proxy authentication.
>>    
>>
>
>s/use/request/
>
Changed.

>>     S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
>>     C: EHLO jgm.example.com
>>     S: 250-smtp.example.com
>>     S: 250 AUTH DIGEST-MD5 EXTERNAL
>>     C: AUTH EXTERNAL
>>     S: 235 Authentication successful.
>>
>>
>>8.    IANA Considerations
>>
>>8.1.  Guidelines for IANA
>>
>>  It is requested that IANA updates the SASL mechanisms registry as
>>  follows:
>>
>>     Change the "Intended usage" of the KERBEROS_V4 and SKEY mechanism
>>     registrations to OBSOLETE.  Change the "Published specification"
>>     of the EXTERNAL mechanism to this document. Updated registration
>>     is provided in Section 8.6.
>>    
>>
>
>s/registration/registration information/
>
Done.

>>...
>>    
>>
>>10.    References
>>
>>10.1.  Normative References
>>
>>  [ABNF] Crocker, D. (Ed.), Overell, P., "Augmented BNF for Syntax
>>  Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997
>>
>>  [ASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Code Extension
>>  Techniques for Use with the 7-bit Coded Character Set of American
>>  National Standard Code (ASCII) for Information Interchange", FIPS PUB
>>  35, 1974
>>
>>  [CHARSET-POLICY] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
>>  Languages", RFC 2277, BCP 18, January 1998
>>
>>  [GSSAPI] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
>>  Interface, Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000
>>
>>  [ISO-10646] "Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) -
>>  Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane", ISO/IEC 10646-1 : 1993.
>>    
>>
>
>This reference is never used and hence should be deleted.
>
Done.

>>  [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
>>  Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 19, March 1997
>>
>>  [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
>>  3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" (Reading,
>>  MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), as amended by the
>>  "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode 3.1"
>>  (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the "Unicode Standard
>>  Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).
>>
>>  [Stringprep] Hoffman, P., Blanchet, M., "Preparation of
>>  Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002.
>>
>>  [SASLprep] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names
>>  and passwords", Work in progress, draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-XX.txt.
>>
>>  [UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
>>  RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003.
>>
>>10.2.  Informative References
>>
>>  [SASL-GSSAPI] Melnikov, A., "SASL GSSAPI mechanisms", work in
>>  progress, draft-ietf-sasl-gssapi-XX.txt, November 2003
>>
>>  [SASL-DIGEST] Leach, P., Newman, C., Melnikov, A., "Using Digest
>>  Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", work in progress, draft-ietf-
>>  sasl-rfc2831bis-XX.txt, replaces RFC 2831
>>
>>  [SASL-OTP] Newman, C., "The One-Time-Password SASL Mechanism", RFC
>>  2444, October 1998.
>>
>>  [SASL-SECURID] Nystrom, M., "The SecurID(r) SASL Mechanism", RFC
>>  2808, April 2000.
>>
>>  [SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 2821, April
>>  2001.
>>
>>  [SMTP-AUTH] Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
>>  RFC 2554, March 1999.
>>
>>  Being revised by Siemborski, R., "SMTP Service Extension for
>>  Authentication", work in progress, draft-siemborski-rfc2554bis-
>>  XX.txt.
>>    
>>
>
>This reference should be put into proper form.
>
I am not sure what exactly you suggest here.

>
>>  [XMPP] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
>>  (XMPP): Core", work in progress, draft-ietf-xmpp-core-XX.txt.
>>
>>  [BASE64] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
>>
>>
>>
>>A. Melnikov                                            FORMFEED[Page 21]
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Internet DRAFT                    SASL                  14 February 2004
>>
>>
>>  Encodings", RFC 3548, July 2003.
>>
>>  [RFC-INSTRUCTIONS] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., "Instructions to RFC
>>  Authors", RFC 2223, October 1997.
>>
>>  [IANA-SASL]  IANA, "SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL)
>>  MECHANISMS", http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms.
>>
>>11.   Editor's Address
>>
>>    Alexey Melnikov
>>    Isode Limited
>>
>>    Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
>>
>>12.   Acknowledgments
>>
>>  This document is a revision of RFC 2222 written by John G. Myers.  He
>>  also contributed significantly to this revision.
>>
>>  Magnus Nystrom provided the ASCII art used in Section 6.3.
>>
>>  Definition of partition was extracted from RFC 2617 ("HTTP
>>  Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication").
>>
>>  Contributions of many members of the SASL mailing list are gratefully
>>  acknowledged, in particular Kurt D. Zeilenga, Peter Saint-Andre, Rob
>>  Siemborski, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Hallvard B Furuseth, Tony Hansen and
>>  Abhijit Menon-Sen for proofreading the document and various editorial
>>  suggestions.
>>    
>>
>
>Suggest you drop middle initials.
>
As you wish :-).

>Needs IPR notice.
>
Added.

Alexey





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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: New text is authentication/authorization id description (section 4.2)
References: <4042462A.6070806@isode.com> <tsl3c8s7rp5.fsf@konishi-polis.mit.edu>
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Sam Hartman wrote:

>>>>>>"Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:
>>>>>>            
>>>>>>
>
>    Alexey> Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined
>    Alexey> within each SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the
>    Alexey> authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.  The
>    Alexey> mechanism may not modify (by, e.g., normalization) the
>    Alexey> authorization identity.
>
>I do not believe there is currently a consensus to make a statement as
>strong as this.  I agree the mechanism should not modify the
>characters of the authorization identity, but as I said over the
>weekend I'm unclear that we prohibit modifying the encoding.
>
I am not sure what you mean in the last sentence.

To me this text says that normalization is up to a protocol profile. It 
doesn't talk about encoding (which is mechanism specific), because 
encoding is not a "modification". Maybe it should?

>
>If you want to make that change that's possible, if the working group
>supports it, but I just want to all it out as a new change that needs
>discussion.
>
I agree that this needs discussion (although this is not a new issue, it 
is a continuation of the issue raised by Simon)

Alexey





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On Mon, 1 Mar 2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> >We should extend this to also cover things other than just TLS (e.g. a
> >compression layer, separate from either TLS or SASL).
> >
> >For example:
> >
> >If other transport or session layers (such as a Transport Layer Security
> >layer or a compression layer) in addition to the SASL security layer are
> >allowed to be negotiated by the protocol....
> >
> I don't think a protocol profile can reasonably define layering of
> multiple things when at least one of them is not known when the protocol
> profile is written.
> So I would rather not change the description.

Certainly if the existance of such a layer isn't know, you can't say where
it fits.  However, any known layers need to be documented for interop to
be ensured.

-Rob

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To: Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
From: "Kurt D. Zeilenga" <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Subject: Re: New text is authentication/authorization id description (section 4.2)
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At 05:06 AM 3/1/2004, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined within each
>SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.

What is the normalized (canonical) string form an email address?
What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a domain name?
What is the normalized (canonical) string form of a distinguished name?

While it possible to define normalized forms for each, these
definitions, to the best of my knowledge, presently do not
exist presently.

That is, my email address is commonly written "kurt@openldap.org",
"Kurt@OpenLDAP.org", and number of other ways.  Which
representation is normalized one?

Kurt 



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Subject: Re: New text is authentication/authorization id description (section 4.2)
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
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>>>>> "Alexey" == Alexey Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com> writes:

    Alexey> Any normalization of the authorization identity is defined
    Alexey> within each SASL protocol profile, and occurs before the
    Alexey> authorization identity is handed to the mechanism.  The
    Alexey> mechanism may not modify (by, e.g., normalization) the
    Alexey> authorization identity.

I do not believe there is currently a consensus to make a statement as
strong as this.  I agree the mechanism should not modify the
characters of the authorization identity, but as I said over the
weekend I'm unclear that we prohibit modifying the encoding.

If you want to make that change that's possible, if the working group
supports it, but I just want to all it out as a new change that needs
discussion.

--Sam


