
From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Fri Apr  2 07:37:42 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A3123A68F8 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  2 Apr 2010 07:37:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.012
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.012 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.119,  BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_OPENWHOIS=1.13]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id JhAuVgoGM0jf for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  2 Apr 2010 07:37:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 454E83A688D for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  2 Apr 2010 07:37:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 96DE932362AC; Fri,  2 Apr 2010 07:38:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-52-254.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.52.254]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9A44B32362AA; Fri,  2 Apr 2010 07:38:14 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2010 10:38:13 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO> <4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com> <4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>
In-Reply-To: <4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2010 14:37:42 -0000

This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had observed 
significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of observation was a 
theoretical analysis.
Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec quotation 
you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it about the 
reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"

Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.

Yours,
Joel

Guang Yao wrote:
>  Hi Joel,
> 
> Please refer to RFC4862
> "
>    If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first message sent
>    from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the node SHOULD
>    delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a random delay
>    between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in [RFC4861].
>    This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up on the
>    link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and may help to
>    avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to solicit
>    for the same address at the same time.
> 
>    Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
>    message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
>    multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
>    MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is configured
>    by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast address.  The
>    delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are going to
>    configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast router
>    advertisement.
> "
> 
> SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random delay after
> interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
> probability greatly.
> 
> BR,
> Guang
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Joel
>> M. Halpern
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
>> To: Jun Bi
>> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI
> "
>> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, that we
>> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local addresses
>> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out of scope,
>> that simplifies many things.
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>> Yes, that's a good point.
>>>
>>> Jun
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Guang Yao" <yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
>>> To: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
>>>
>>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
>>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
>>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
>>>>
>>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
>>>> address is
>>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be performed until a
>>>> RA is
>>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
>>>>
>>>> BR,
>>>> Guang
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 
> 

From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Thu Apr  1 23:35:44 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 493053A6874 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  1 Apr 2010 23:35:44 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.469
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.469 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, DNS_FROM_OPENWHOIS=1.13]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wg7t0Ljc3ho0 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  1 Apr 2010 23:35:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-gy0-f172.google.com (mail-gy0-f172.google.com [209.85.160.172]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 74D0F3A68DD for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu,  1 Apr 2010 23:35:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by gyh4 with SMTP id 4so860685gyh.31 for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu, 01 Apr 2010 23:36:06 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=ztoGCBFUu4kFc03CqDNsliYP/y98jSsbYeN/1ZxULIs=; b=pGz1FTNplvFxF5VgC6pVgeCHlNPsj45ySOBU0u/2CWf83z2Phs+kAl3L++b0bgOOIj w1WHpa9uRdNPJrP4ZcalzsCjeAMrdEX7FzyRloQm44MXIu87PCGPrL7ealaWQ4cjuJGX COt1a+53ZpQO56YSKhGTZQczCi5LSq1JLxggg=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=U8kzLnxZkE/DYBVBd4K9P7yHG9ysAE1JwOCi4v5IV3m6KkZU2UV0Uc8O+LlR3ybEUr n5+kMbreR7yyNg0EUCRzyccgOWnYf9kgyZXCsQ007xE/knTXSOgyuNxLXEeTWOHFPIDP LC+ULYmR0qOJq13qpi7KY73o0dkLJ3HWkdc3s=
Received: by 10.150.160.8 with SMTP id i8mr2380518ybe.141.1270190166717; Thu, 01 Apr 2010 23:36:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (th024208.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [59.66.24.208]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 20sm730713iwn.13.2010.04.01.23.36.02 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Thu, 01 Apr 2010 23:36:05 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'Joel M. Halpern'" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "'Jun Bi'" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO> <4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Apr 2010 14:35:56 +0800
Message-ID: <4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcrLY1mqJOJ9YiyHRK+O9FWym8moCwGypRzw
Content-Language: zh-cn
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 02 Apr 2010 22:33:58 -0700
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2010 06:37:58 -0000

 Hi Joel,

Please refer to RFC4862
"
   If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first message sent
   from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the node SHOULD
   delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a random delay
   between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in [RFC4861].
   This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up on the
   link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and may help to
   avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to solicit
   for the same address at the same time.

   Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
   message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
   multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
   MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is configured
   by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast address.  The
   delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are going to
   configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast router
   advertisement.
"

SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random delay after
interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
probability greatly.

BR,
Guang

> -----Original Message-----
> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Joel
> M. Halpern
> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
> To: Jun Bi
> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI
"
> 
> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, that we
> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local addresses
> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out of scope,
> that simplifies many things.
> 
> Yours,
> Joel
> 
> Jun Bi wrote:
> > Yes, that's a good point.
> >
> > Jun
> >
> > --------------------------------------------------
> > From: "Guang Yao" <yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
> > Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
> > To: <savi@ietf.org>
> > Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
> >
> >> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
> >> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
> >> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
> >>
> >> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
> >> address is
> >> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be performed until a
> >> RA is
> >> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
> >>
> >> BR,
> >> Guang
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> savi mailing list
> >> savi@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > savi mailing list
> > savi@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi


From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Sat Apr  3 02:06:33 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 646853A6870 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 02:06:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.131
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.131 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_OPENWHOIS=1.13]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BxhIy+eZstPx for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 02:06:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pz0-f179.google.com (mail-pz0-f179.google.com [209.85.222.179]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 645173A684D for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 02:06:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pzk9 with SMTP id 9so463821pzk.19 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 03 Apr 2010 02:06:28 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=pnAt6KhCPnmBfNMp1/gDac8mYQw45bENN/sGa1mndEA=; b=rSQyYCUXZQPIiRvQecD/N16Xb8JnSPEZdJo3GXoLnK3yZ7BlNKZXzdh+BMeo0AIqtk +jei/ziD2z1oHTuD5uiFMZeIA4oeTpzWt5huhImKf0/hzcUtDQCWoAoULOYJsVPeDmmy YC0chwxEVTOsrnh/XXkx0N2hZ/MCJlkbJlRVw=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=czV7rHFtZHYL4AMUaI42ko+Sv87f43uGoPxfej4y7vOSJuwQaaK61aTyeP4taj8gDT gyzGjw/oIqJSxJNkIq7Qs79EPY/AWJN/Lxzvbn4+oDrBu78+tAMLcILjiCCxOb0WewKx iEtbyfNlrLrBBhDOoSfEroqwEh40Wflbi3rMw=
Received: by 10.141.90.5 with SMTP id s5mr2178497rvl.262.1270285588253; Sat, 03 Apr 2010 02:06:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (tu132201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.132.201]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 21sm8711158pzk.8.2010.04.03.02.06.24 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Sat, 03 Apr 2010 02:06:27 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'Joel M. Halpern'" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "'Bi Jun'" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com> <4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 2010 17:06:18 +0800
Message-ID: <4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcrScdRk1Tg3OjxpTCy2ajxnoRw/HQAlC06g
Content-Language: zh-cn
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Apr 2010 09:06:33 -0000

Hi Joel,

>From our experience on testing prototypes from four vendors, two of the
prototypes did face loss of link local DAD in the early stage. Then they
found the synchronous mechanism in initialization should be implemented with
care to avoid first packet loss. All the later stage prototypes are free of
this problem.

Although this doesn't prove first DAD will never get lost, this at least
shows first DAD loss is not a event with certain probability, from
observation on reality. Currently the possibility of first DAD loss is just
proved in analysis.

DAD is not reliable, but it is still reasonable. It is not designed to be a
dispensable protocol. In general case, I think "almost certain" is enough.

We all go with the assumption that "the earth wouldn't be destroyed
tomorrow", right? This assumption doesn't have absolute 100% probability,
either. Should we spend all our savings today because of fearing of non-zero
probability fatal event?

BR,
Guang

> -----Original Message-----
> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Joel
> M. Halpern
> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:38 PM
> To: Guang Yao
> Cc: savi@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI
"
> 
> This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had observed
> significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
> Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of observation was a
> theoretical analysis.
> Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec quotation
> you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it about the
> reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"
> 
> Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.
> 
> Yours,
> Joel
> 
> Guang Yao wrote:
> >  Hi Joel,
> >
> > Please refer to RFC4862
> > "
> >    If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first message sent
> >    from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the node SHOULD
> >    delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a random delay
> >    between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in
> [RFC4861].
> >    This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up on the
> >    link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and may help to
> >    avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to solicit
> >    for the same address at the same time.
> >
> >    Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
> >    message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
> >    multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
> >    MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is
> configured
> >    by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast address.  The
> >    delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are going to
> >    configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast router
> >    advertisement.
> > "
> >
> > SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random delay
after
> > interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
> > probability greatly.
> >
> > BR,
> > Guang
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> > Joel
> >> M. Halpern
> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
> >> To: Jun Bi
> >> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
> >> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in
SAVI
> > "
> >> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, that we
> >> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local addresses
> >> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out of scope,
> >> that simplifies many things.
> >>
> >> Yours,
> >> Joel
> >>
> >> Jun Bi wrote:
> >>> Yes, that's a good point.
> >>>
> >>> Jun
> >>>
> >>> --------------------------------------------------
> >>> From: "Guang Yao" <yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
> >>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
> >>> To: <savi@ietf.org>
> >>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI
"
> >>>
> >>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
> >>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
> >>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
> >>>>
> >>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
> >>>> address is
> >>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be performed until
a
> >>>> RA is
> >>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
> >>>>
> >>>> BR,
> >>>> Guang
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> savi mailing list
> >>>> savi@ietf.org
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> savi mailing list
> >>> savi@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> savi mailing list
> >> savi@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >
> >
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sat Apr  3 05:28:33 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5CAF13A694D for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 05:28:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -104.007
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-104.007 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.137, BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_OPENWHOIS=1.13, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 96bAybVUoiQV for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 05:28:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8B993A692E for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 05:28:31 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (48.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.48]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 784F9823552; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 14:28:28 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sat, 03 Apr 2010 14:28:27 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: savi@ietf.org, Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>,  Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com> <4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>
In-Reply-To: <4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Apr 2010 12:28:33 -0000

El 03/04/10 11:06, Guang Yao escribió:
> Hi Joel,
>
> > From our experience on testing prototypes from four vendors, two of the
> prototypes did face loss of link local DAD in the early stage. Then they
> found the synchronous mechanism in initialization should be implemented with
> care to avoid first packet loss. All the later stage prototypes are free of
> this problem.
>    

that mostly proves that in your specific controlled environment, you 
didn't experience the problem
The input that the first packets have more probabilty of getting lost 
than subsequent ones and that in particular the DAD packets, is an input 
from a couple of people (cc) that have been working on related issues 
(they happen to be the co chairs of the DNA WG)
> Although this doesn't prove first DAD will never get lost, this at least
> shows first DAD loss is not a event with certain probability,
i fail to understand this sentence. The lost of DAD packet is certainly 
an event with a certain probability.
DAD is NOT reliable and it is not a reasonable approach to reduce the 
robustness of the network to this level

besides, i fail to see why we keep on agruing this point, since it seems 
to be significant amount of people that think that it is possible to 
implement data triggered actions (such as the proxy DAD procedure) using 
the approach suggested by Fred, which makes all this a non issues, since 
all we need to restore the reliability of the network is to trigger the 
DAD or the DHCP query upon the reception of one (or more) data packets 
for which we don't have a binding
>   from
> observation on reality. Currently the possibility of first DAD loss is just
> proved in analysis.
>
> DAD is not reliable, but it is still reasonable. It is not designed to be a
> dispensable protocol. In general case, I think "almost certain" is enough.
>
>    
we simply disagree here and everybody in the previous meeting seemed to 
disagree with this (at least nobody said anything about this in the meeting)

> We all go with the assumption that "the earth wouldn't be destroyed
> tomorrow", right?
no, a DAD packet getting lost have significant more probability than 
that, i am afraid

Regards, marcelo

>   This assumption doesn't have absolute 100% probability,
> either. Should we spend all our savings today because of fearing of non-zero
> probability fatal event?
>
> BR,
> Guang
>
>    
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>      
> Joel
>    
>> M. Halpern
>> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:38 PM
>> To: Guang Yao
>> Cc: savi@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI
>>      
> "
>    
>> This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had observed
>> significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
>> Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of observation was a
>> theoretical analysis.
>> Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec quotation
>> you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it about the
>> reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"
>>
>> Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> Guang Yao wrote:
>>      
>>>   Hi Joel,
>>>
>>> Please refer to RFC4862
>>> "
>>>     If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first message sent
>>>     from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the node SHOULD
>>>     delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a random delay
>>>     between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in
>>>        
>> [RFC4861].
>>      
>>>     This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up on the
>>>     link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and may help to
>>>     avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to solicit
>>>     for the same address at the same time.
>>>
>>>     Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
>>>     message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
>>>     multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
>>>     MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is
>>>        
>> configured
>>      
>>>     by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast address.  The
>>>     delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are going to
>>>     configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast router
>>>     advertisement.
>>> "
>>>
>>> SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random delay
>>>        
> after
>    
>>> interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
>>> probability greatly.
>>>
>>> BR,
>>> Guang
>>>
>>>        
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>>>          
>>> Joel
>>>        
>>>> M. Halpern
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
>>>> To: Jun Bi
>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in
>>>>          
> SAVI
>    
>>> "
>>>        
>>>> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, that we
>>>> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local addresses
>>>> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out of scope,
>>>> that simplifies many things.
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>          
>>>>> Yes, that's a good point.
>>>>>
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "Guang Yao"<yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
>>>>> To:<savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI
>>>>>            
> "
>    
>>>>>            
>>>>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
>>>>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
>>>>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
>>>>>> address is
>>>>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be performed until
>>>>>>              
> a
>    
>>>>>> RA is
>>>>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>>              
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>>            
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>          
>>>
>>>        
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>      
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>
>    


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sat Apr  3 07:39:59 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0BC9C3A6926 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 07:39:59 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.626
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.626 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_OPENWHOIS=1.13, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id J98Y5bZP9PEK for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 07:39:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C05193A67AD for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 07:39:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024184.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.184] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1Ny4Vn-0003Ao-HB; Sat, 03 Apr 2010 22:39:47 +0800
Message-ID: <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, <savi@ietf.org>, "Greg Daley" <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 2010 22:39:51 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Apr 2010 14:39:59 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Saturday, April 03, 2010 8:28 PM
To: <savi@ietf.org>; "Greg Daley" <hoskuld@hotmail.com>; "Suresh Krishnan" 
<suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> El 03/04/10 11:06, Guang Yao escribió:
>> Hi Joel,
>>
>> > From our experience on testing prototypes from four vendors, two of the
>> prototypes did face loss of link local DAD in the early stage. Then they
>> found the synchronous mechanism in initialization should be implemented 
>> with
>> care to avoid first packet loss. All the later stage prototypes are free 
>> of
>> this problem.
>>
>
> that mostly proves that in your specific controlled environment, you 
> didn't experience the problem
> The input that the first packets have more probabilty of getting lost than 
> subsequent ones and that in particular the DAD packets, is an input from a 
> couple of people (cc) that have been working on related issues (they 
> happen to be the co chairs of the DNA WG)
>> Although this doesn't prove first DAD will never get lost, this at least
>> shows first DAD loss is not a event with certain probability,
> i fail to understand this sentence. The lost of DAD packet is certainly an 
> event with a certain probability.
> DAD is NOT reliable and it is not a reasonable approach to reduce the 
> robustness of the network to this level
>
> besides, i fail to see why we keep on agruing this point, since it seems 
> to be significant amount of people that think that it is possible to

Hi Marcelo,

"possible" doesn't mean MUST, may mean SHOULD.

thanks,
Jun



> implement data triggered actions (such as the proxy DAD procedure) using 
> the approach suggested by Fred, which makes all this a non issues, since 
> all we need to restore the reliability of the network is to trigger the 
> DAD or the DHCP query upon the reception of one (or more) data packets for 
> which we don't have a binding
>>   from
>> observation on reality. Currently the possibility of first DAD loss is 
>> just
>> proved in analysis.
>>
>> DAD is not reliable, but it is still reasonable. It is not designed to be 
>> a
>> dispensable protocol. In general case, I think "almost certain" is 
>> enough.
>>
>>
> we simply disagree here and everybody in the previous meeting seemed to 
> disagree with this (at least nobody said anything about this in the 
> meeting)
>
>> We all go with the assumption that "the earth wouldn't be destroyed
>> tomorrow", right?
> no, a DAD packet getting lost have significant more probability than that, 
> i am afraid
>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>>   This assumption doesn't have absolute 100% probability,
>> either. Should we spend all our savings today because of fearing of 
>> non-zero
>> probability fatal event?
>>
>> BR,
>> Guang
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>>
>> Joel
>>
>>> M. Halpern
>>> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:38 PM
>>> To: Guang Yao
>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>> SAVI
>>>
>> "
>>
>>> This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had observed
>>> significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
>>> Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of observation was a
>>> theoretical analysis.
>>> Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec quotation
>>> you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it about the
>>> reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"
>>>
>>> Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>> Guang Yao wrote:
>>>
>>>>   Hi Joel,
>>>>
>>>> Please refer to RFC4862
>>>> "
>>>>     If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first message sent
>>>>     from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the node 
>>>> SHOULD
>>>>     delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a random 
>>>> delay
>>>>     between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in
>>>>
>>> [RFC4861].
>>>
>>>>     This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up on the
>>>>     link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and may help 
>>>> to
>>>>     avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to solicit
>>>>     for the same address at the same time.
>>>>
>>>>     Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
>>>>     message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
>>>>     multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
>>>>     MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is
>>>>
>>> configured
>>>
>>>>     by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast address.  The
>>>>     delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are going 
>>>> to
>>>>     configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast router
>>>>     advertisement.
>>>> "
>>>>
>>>> SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random delay
>>>>
>> after
>>
>>>> interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
>>>> probability greatly.
>>>>
>>>> BR,
>>>> Guang
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf 
>>>>> Of
>>>>>
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
>>>>> To: Jun Bi
>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in
>>>>>
>> SAVI
>>
>>>> "
>>>>
>>>>> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, that 
>>>>> we
>>>>> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local 
>>>>> addresses
>>>>> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out of 
>>>>> scope,
>>>>> that simplifies many things.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, that's a good point.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "Guang Yao"<yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
>>>>>> To:<savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>>
>> "
>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
>>>>>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
>>>>>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
>>>>>>> address is
>>>>>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be performed until
>>>>>>>
>> a
>>
>>>>>>> RA is
>>>>>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sat Apr  3 07:51:13 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE15B3A67AD for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 07:51:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.627
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.627 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.000,  BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_OPENWHOIS=1.13, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id SPXxicjn6-R5 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 07:51:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40AF63A63EC for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 07:51:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024184.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.184] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1Ny4gk-0003Kq-CQ for savi@ietf.org; Sat, 03 Apr 2010 22:51:06 +0800
Message-ID: <11CC889F3A3542CAA9571EB86B82B7FC@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 2010 22:51:10 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0B0F_01CAD380.2780FD80"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Subject: [savi] draft version of savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Apr 2010 14:51:14 -0000

ÕâÊÇÒ»·â MIME ¸ñÊ½µÄ¶à·½ÓÊ¼þ¡£

------=_NextPart_000_0B0F_01CAD380.2780FD80
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0B10_01CAD380.2780FD80"


------=_NextPart_001_0B10_01CAD380.2780FD80
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="gb2312"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Dear WG members,

Based on the discussion during IETF77 meeting and on the mailing-list,
we gathered the inputs and make draft version of savi-dhcp-02.
Please provide your valuable comment before we submit it to IETF.

Best Regards,
Jun Bi
------=_NextPart_001_0B10_01CAD380.2780FD80
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="gb2312"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META content=3Dtext/html;charset=3Dgb2312 http-equiv=3DContent-Type>
<META name=3DGENERATOR content=3D"MSHTML 8.00.7600.16490"></HEAD>
<BODY style=3D"PADDING-LEFT: 10px; PADDING-RIGHT: 10px; PADDING-TOP: =
15px"=20
id=3DMailContainerBody leftMargin=3D0 topMargin=3D0 =
CanvasTabStop=3D"true"=20
name=3D"Compose message area">
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri>Dear WG members,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri>Based on the discussion during IETF77 meeting =
and on the=20
mailing-list,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri>we gathered the inputs and make draft version=20
of&nbsp;savi-dhcp-02.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri>Please provide your valuable comment before we =
submit it=20
to IETF.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri>Best Regards,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri>Jun Bi</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>

------=_NextPart_001_0B10_01CAD380.2780FD80--

------=_NextPart_000_0B0F_01CAD380.2780FD80
Content-Type: text/plain;
	name="draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename="draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt"

SAVI                                                      J. Bi, J. Wu
Internet Draft                                                 CERNET
Intended status: Standard Tracks                               G. Yao
Expires: October 2010                                   Tsinghua Univ.
                                                             F. Baker
                                                                Cisco
                                                         April 3, 2010



                          SAVI Solution for DHCP
                        draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt


Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, except to publish it
   as an RFC and to translate it into languages other than English.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November =
10,
   2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as =
Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html




Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 1]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 3, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Abstract

   This document specifies the procedure for creating bindings between a
   DHCPv4 [RFC2131]/DHCPv6 [RFC3315] assigned source IP address and a
   binding anchor (refer to [SAVI-framework]) on SAVI (Source Address
   Validation Improvements) device. The bindings can be used to filter
   packets generated on the local link with forged IP addresses.

Table of Contents


   Copyright Notice ............................................... 2
   Abstract ....................................................... 2
   1. Introduction ................................................ 4
   2. Conventions used in this document............................ 4
   3. Mechanism Overview .......................................... 4
   4. Background and Related Protocols............................. 4
   5. Terminology ................................................. 5
   6. Conceptual Data Structures................................... 5
      6.1. Binding State Table (BST)............................... 5
      6.2. Filtering Table (FT).................................... 6
   7. Binding States Description................................... 6
   8. DHCP Scenario ............................................... 7
   9. Anchor Attributes ........................................... 7
      9.1. SAVI-Validation Attribute............................... 7
      9.2. SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute............................... 8
      9.3. SAVI-SAVI Attribute..................................... 8
      9.4. Optional Attributes..................................... 8
         9.4.1. SAVI-LocalGroup Attribute.......................... 8
         9.4.2. SAVI-DataTrigger Attribute......................... 9


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 2]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   10. Prefix Configuration........................................ 9
   11. Binding Set Up ............................................ 10
      11.1. Process of DHCP Snooping.............................. 10
         11.1.1. Initialization................................... 10
            11.1.1.1. Trigger Event............................... 11
            11.1.1.2. Event Validation............................ 11
            11.1.1.3. Following Actions........................... 11
         11.1.2. From START to LIVE............................... 11
            11.1.2.1. Trigger Event............................... 11
            11.1.2.2. Event Validation............................ 12
            11.1.2.3. Following Actions........................... 12
         11.1.3. From LIVE to DETECTION........................... 13
            11.1.3.2. Event Validation............................ 13
            11.1.3.3. Following Actions........................... 13
         11.1.4. From DETECTION to BOUND.......................... 14
            11.1.4.1. Trigger Event............................... 14
            11.1.4.2. Following Actions........................... 14
         11.1.5. After BOUND...................................... 14
      11.2. State Machine of DHCP Snooping........................ 15
   12. Filtering Specification.................................... 17
      12.1. Data Packet Filtering................................. 17
      12.2. Control Packet Filtering.............................. 17
   13. Format and Delivery of Probe Messages...................... 18
      13.1. Duplicate detection................................... 18
   14. Binding Remove ............................................ 19
   15. Handle Anchor Off-link event............................... 19
   16. About Collision in Detection............................... 19
      16.1. Whether to Notify the DHCP Server..................... 19
      16.2. The Result of Detection without Host Aware............ 19
   17. Filtering during Detection................................. 20
   18. Binding Number Limitation.................................. 20
   19. MLD Consideration ......................................... 20
   20. State Restoration ......................................... 20
   21. Data Triggered Process..................................... 21
   22. Stateless DHCP ............................................ 22
   23. Confirm Triggered Binding.................................. 22
   24. Counter Triggered Binding.................................. 22
   25. Handle Layer 2 Path Change................................. 23
   26. Constants ................................................. 23
   27. Security Considerations.................................... 24
   28. IANA Considerations........................................ 24
   29. References ................................................ 24
      29.1. Normative References.................................. 24
      29.2. Informative References................................ 24
   30. Acknowledgments ........................................... 25




Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 3]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


1. Introduction

   This document describes the procedure for creating bindings between
   DHCP assigned addresses and an anchor (refer to [savi-framework]).
   Other related details about this procedure are also specified in this
   document.

   These bindings can be used to filter packets with forged IP =
addresses.
   How to use these bindings is specified in [savi-framework], depending
   on the environment and configuration. The definition and examples of
   anchor is also specified in [savi-framework].

   The binding process is inspired by the work of IP Source Guard. This
   solution differs from IP Source Guard in the specification for
   collision detection, which is essential in environments with multiple
   address assignment methods. There are also other differences in
   details.

2. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Mechanism Overview

   The mechanism specified in this document is designed to provide a
   host level source IP address validation granularity, as a supplement
   to BCP38 [BCP38]. This mechanism is deployed on the access device
   (including access switch, wireless access point/controller, etc), and
   performs mainly DHCP snooping to set up bindings between DHCP
   assigned IP addresses and corresponding anchors. The bindings can be
   used to validate the source address in the packets.

4. Background and Related Protocols

   This mechanism is an instance of a SAVI [savi-framework] solution,
   specialized for addresses assigned using the DHCP protocol.

   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 4 [RFC2131] and Dynamic
   Host Configuration Protocol version 6 [RFC3315] specify the
   procedures for providing a client with assigned address and other
   configuration information from a DHCP server. If a client gets an
   address through the DHCP protocol, the address should be regarded as
   a potential "authorized" or "registered" address of the client.




Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 4]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   In IPv6, IPv6 Stateless Autoconfiguration [RFC4862] is used as
   another address assignment mechanism. A node can use this mechanism
   to auto-configure an IPv6 address. A DHCPv6 client may use a
   stateless address to send message to DHCP server. Even in a DHCPv6-
   only environment, a node must assign its link-local address through
   this mechanism. [RFC4862] clearly requires that duplicated address
   detection must be performed on any IPv6 address, including DHCPv6
   address.

   [RFC4861] specifies the Neighbor Discovery protocol, which is an
   essential part of IPv6 address assignment.

   [RFC5227] specifies the procedure to detect IPv4 address collision.
   It is not required currently. However, this feature is useful to
   determine the uniqueness of an IPv4 address on the link. Considering
   not all the operating systems support [RFC5227], this solution is
   designed to be compatible with operating systems not complying with
   [RFC5227].

5. Terminology

   Main terms used in this document are described in [savi-framework],
   [RFC2131] and [RFC3315].

6. Conceptual Data Structures

   This section describes the possible conceptual data structures used
   in this mechanism.

   Two main data structures are used to record bindings and their states
   respectively. There is redundancy between the two structures, for the
   consideration of separation of data plane and control plane.

6.1.  Binding State Table (BST)

   This table contains the state of binding between source address and
   anchor. Entries are keyed on the anchor and source IP address. Each
   entry has a lifetime field recording the remaining lifetime of the
   entry, a state field recording the state of the binding and a field
   recording other information.








Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 5]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


             +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
             | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime  |Other  |
             +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
             | A       | IP_1     | Bound |  65535    |       |
             +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
             | A       | IP_2     | Bound |  10000    |       |
             +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
             | B       | IP_3     |_Start |      1    |       |
             +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
                         Figure 1 Instance of BST


6.2.  Filtering Table (FT)

   This table contains the bindings between anchor and address, keyed on
   anchor. This table doesn't contain any state of the binding. This
   table is only used to filter packets. An Access Control List can be
   regarded as a practical instance of this table.

                          +---------+----------+
                          |Anchor   |Address   |
                          +---------+----------+
                          |A        |IP_1      |
                          +---------+----------+
                          |A        |IP_2      |
                          +---------+----------+
                          Figure 2 Instance of FT

7. Binding States Description

   This section describes the binding states of this mechanism.

   START        A DHCP request (or a DHCPv6 Confirm, or a DHCPv6
   Solicitation with Rapid Commit option) has been received from host,
   and it may trigger a new binding.

   LIVE       A DHCP address has been acknowledged by a DHCP server.

   DETECTION    A gratuitous ARP or Duplicate Address Detection NSOL
   has been sent by the host (or the SAVI device).

   BOUND       The address has passed duplicate detection and
             it is bound with the anchor.






Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 6]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


8. DHCP Scenario

   Figure 3 shows the main elements in a DHCP enabled network. At least
   one DHCP server MUST be deployed in the network, and DHCP relay MAY
   be used to relay message between client and server. Other address
   assignment mechanisms may be also used in such network.

                                +--------+
                                | DHCP   |
                                | Server |
                                +-------,+
                                    |
                                    |
                                    |
                               +----'-----+
                               |  SAVI    |
                               |  Device  |
                               +-/------/-+
                                 |      |
                            +----\-+   +\-----+
                            |DHCP  |   |Client|
                            |Relay |   |      |
                            +------+   +------+
                          Figure 3 DHCP Scenario

9. Anchor Attributes

   This section specifies the anchor attributes involved in this
   mechanism.

   Anchor is defined in the [savi-framework]. Attribute of each anchor
   is configurable. In default, anchor has no attribute. An anchor MAY
   be configured to have one or more compatible attributes. However, an
   anchor MAY have no attribute.

   If an anchor has no attribute, server type DHCP message from this
   anchor MUST be dropped. However, other packets SHOULD NOT be dropped.

9.1. SAVI-Validation Attribute

   If and only if source address validation must be performed on the
   traffic from an anchor, this anchor MUST be set to have SAVI-
   Validation attribute. The filtering process on anchor with such
   attribute is described in section 12.





Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 7]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


9.2. SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute

   If and only if an anchor is associated with a trustable DHCP
   server/relay, it SHOULD be set to have this attribute.

   If DHCP is used to assign address in the network, there MUST be at
   least one anchor with this attribute. DHCP Reply message not coming
   from such ports MUST be dropped.

9.3. SAVI-SAVI Attribute

   If and only if an anchor is associated with another SAVI device, it
   SHOULD be set to have this attribute. All traffic from anchor with
   this attribute will be forwarded without check.

   This attribute can also be set on other anchors if the administrator
   decides not to validate the traffic from the anchor. Note that DHCP
   server message and router message will also be trusted.

   This attribute is mutually exclusive with SAVI-Validation.

9.4. Optional Attributes

   This section specifies the attributes optional for the implementation
   of this solution. The usage of these attributes may be suboptimal
   compared with manual configuration, because of the additional
   complexity. However, in scenarios that manual configuration is hardly
   to be taken timely or even impossible, these attributes can be =
useful.

   The implementation and configuration of these attributes are left to
   be determined by vendors, network administrators and clients.

9.4.1. SAVI-LocalGroup Attribute

   If a group of anchors on a SAVI device are associated with the same
   group of clients, these anchors can be set to have SAVI-LocalGroup
   attribute.

   SAVI-LocalGroup Attribute is set with the index or name of the group.

   The bindings set up on an anchor with this attribute MUST be
   replicated to other anchors in the same group. If a binding entry is
   removed, the replicated entries on other anchors MUST be deleted,
   unless the entry is removed because the associated anchor is =
off-link.

   This attribute is designed to handle the scenario that a group of
   clients (including a single client) posses multiple anchors, but


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 8]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   control packets are only transmitted with one of the anchors. After
   address assignment, the assigned address may be used with other
   anchors.

   This attribute is mutually exclusive with SAVI-SAVI.

9.4.2. SAVI-DataTrigger Attribute

   If on an anchor, data packet (non-DHCP message and non-NDP message)
   is required to trigger binding set up, this anchor should be set to
   have this attribute.

   The process of data triggered binding is specified in section 22.

   This attribute is designed to handle some special cases that control
   packet will not be received by SAVI device, including:

   1. Local Link Move without Re-configuration Process

   2. Multiple Attachments to Different Devices

   Note that, both scenarios can be handled if client chooses to repair
   its network manually. But this attribute can be set to improve user
   experience and network robustness; meanwhile it brings additional
   complexity and possible security risk.

   This attribute is mutually exclusive with SAVI-SAVI and SAVI-
   Validation.

10. Prefix Configuration

   In DHCP scenario, address advertised by DHCP server should be
   believed in. However, in this solution, a node shares the same anchor
   as the DHCP server can disguise as the DHCP server and offer the
   client incorrect configuration information. Without fully deployment
   of SAVI, this problem is difficult to solve. Thus, it is SUGGESTED
   that correct address prefix should be configured, and DHCP server
   message which assigns address out of the scope should be dropped.
   This mechanism can ensure the client can at least get an address with
   proper prefix.

   This document suggests set 3 prefix scopes:

   IPv4 Prefix:

         The allowed scope of any kind of IPv4 addresses. It can be set
         manually.


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010                [Page 9]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   IPv6 SLAAC Prefixes:

         The allowed scope of SLAAC and manually configured IPv6
         addresses. It can be set through snooping RA message from port
         with SAVI-RA-Trust attribute, DHCP-PD or manual configuration.

       FE80::/64 MUST be set to a feasible prefix.

   IPv6 DHCPv6 Prefixes:

         The allowed scope of DHCPv6 addresses. It can be set through RA
         snooping, DHCP-PD protocol, or manual configuration.

   There is no need to explicitly present these prefix scopes. But these
   restrictions SHOULD be used as premier check in binding set up.

   Refer to security consideration for other discussions.

11. Binding Set Up

   This section specifies the procedure of setting up bindings based on
   control packet snooping. The binding procedure specified here is
   exclusively designed for anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.

11.1. Process of DHCP Snooping

11.1.1. Initialization

   A binding entry is initialized in this step.

   This step MAY NOT be performed if:

   1. Option 82 is used to keep anchor in DHCP Request and Reply, or

   2. Unspoofable MAC is used as anchor(802.11i,802.1ae/af), or

   3. The mapping table from MAC to anchor is secure.

   If none of these three requirements are satisfied, this step SHOULD
   be performed.

   If this step is not performed, then binding entry will be initialized
   in the next step.

   This step is performed for the consideration that anchor and DHCP
   assigned address can be bound with security in the next step.



Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 10]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   Otherwise the security of binding setup is based on the mapping
   mechanism from MAC to anchor on SAVI device, which may be vulnerable.

   This step can also help limit the request rate of client to prevent
   Denial of Services attack against DHCP server.

11.1.1.1. Trigger Event

   A DHCPv4/v6 Request or a DHCPv6 Confirm or a DHCPv6 Solicitation with
   Rapid Commit option is received.

11.1.1.2. Event Validation

   The SAVI device checks current BST as follows:

   1. Whether the limitation on binding entry number of this anchor will
      be exceeded if a new entry is triggered.

11.1.1.3. Following Actions

   If the check is passed:

   The SAVI device MUST forward the message.

   The SAVI device MUST generate an entry for the anchor in the Binding
   State Table (BST) and set the state field to START. The lifetime of
   this entry MUST set to be MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME. The Transaction ID
   (Refer to Section 2 in [RFC2131] and Section 4.2 in [RFC3315]) field
   of the request packet SHOULD be recorded in the entry.

   +---------+----------+-------+-----------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime              |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-------+-----------------------+-------+
   | A       |          | START |MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME | TID   |
   +---------+----------+-------+-----------------------+-------+
              Figure 4 Binding entry in BST on initialization

   The TID is kept for assurance that the assigned address can be bound
   with anchor securely. It is suggested to keep TID in entry. However,
   TID MAY NOT be contained in the entry.

11.1.2. From START to LIVE

11.1.2.1. Trigger Event

   A DHCPv4 DHCPACK or DHCPv6 REPLY message is received.



Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 11]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


11.1.2.2. Event Validation

   The SAVI device checks the message and BST as follows:

   1. Whether the message is received from an anchor which has the SAVI-
      DHCP-Trust attribute;

   2. Whether the entry in the BST with corresponding TID is in the
      START state. Or if the prior step is not performed, check whether
      the binding number limitation will be exceeded.

11.1.2.3. Following Actions

   If the check is passed:

   The SAVI device MUST deliver the message to the destination.

   The SAVI device MUST set the state of the corresponding entry to be
   LIVE. If prior step is not performed, a new entry MUST be generated
   in the BST. The lifetime of the entry MUST be set to be
   MAX_ARP_PREPARE_DELAY or MAX_DAD_PREPARE_DELAY respectively. The
   lease time MUST be recorded in the entry.

   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime               |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | LIVE  |MAX_ARP_PREPARE_DELAY or| Lease |
   |         |          |       |MAX_DAD_PREPARE_DELAY   | Time  |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
                Figure 5 Binding entry in BST on assignment

   Then, the SAVI device MAY set the state of the corresponding entry to
   be DETECTION, and send two or more ARP Request or NSOL for the
   assigned address. If the SAVI device sends detection packet directly,
   the next step MUST be omitted.

   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State     | Lifetime        |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | DETECTION |MAX_ARP_DELAY or | Lease |
   |         |          |           |MAX_DAD_DELAY    | Time  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
         Figure 6 Binding entry in BST on assignment: another case

   The SAVI device MUST insert an entry into the Filtering Table if the
   assigned address is not bound with another anchor in current BST.



Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 12]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   Note that duplicate bindings of the same address are allowed, only if
   the binding processes are finished successfully respectively.

                          +---------+----------+
                          |Anchor   |Address   |
                          +---------+----------+
                          |A        |Addr      |
                          +---------+----------+
                Figure 7 Binding entry in FT on assignment

   The following steps after this step MAY NOT be performed. It is
   SUGGESTED to perform following steps unless in some specified
   scenario, e.g., a DHCP-only scenario. If the following steps are not
   performed because of implementation or configuration, the state of
   the corresponding entry MUST be changed to BOUND, and the lifetime is
   set to lease time.

11.1.3. From LIVE to DETECTION

11.1.3.1. Trigger Event

   A gratuitous ARP Request or Duplicate Address Detection Neighbor
   Solicitation is received from anchor. Or a timeout event of an entry
   with state LIVE happens.

11.1.3.2. Event Validation

   The SAVI device checks the message and BST as follows:

   1. Whether the Target IP Address field of the ARP Request or Neighbor
      Solicitation has been bound with the corresponding anchor in BST
      or FT.

11.1.3.3. Following Actions

   If the check is passed:

   If timeout event of an entry with state LIVE happens, the SAVI device
   MUST send one or more ARP Request or a DAD NSOL, with Target Address
   set to the recorded address in the entry. If detection packets are
   sent, the SAVI device MUST set the state of the entry to be =
DETECTION.
   The lifetime of the entry MUST be set to be MAX_ARP_DELAY or
   MAX_DAD_DELAY respectively. If no detection packet is sent, the entry
   MUST be removed from BST and FT. If the SAVI device chooses not to
   send detection packet, valid packets may get dropped because a number
   of operating systems don't fully support [RFC4862] and [RFC5227] and
   don't send detection packets themselves. Thus, it is SUGGESTED the


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 13]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   SAVI device SHOULD send detection packet in case the client doesn't
   send that itself.

   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State      | Lifetime       |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | DETECTION  |MAX_ARP_DELAY or| Lease |
   |         |          |            |MAX_DAD_DELAY   | Time  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
                Figure 8 Binding entry in BST on detection

11.1.4. From DETECTION to BOUND

11.1.4.1. Trigger Event

   A timeout event of an entry with state DETECTION occurs or an ARP
   Response or NA for an address in BST with state DETECTION is =
received.

11.1.4.2. Following Actions

   If a timeout event of an entry with state DETECTION occurs, set the
   state of the entry to be BOUND. The lifetime of the entry is set to
   be the Lease time acknowledged by DHCP server.

   +---------+----------+-----------+----------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State     | Lifetime       |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+----------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | BOUND     | Lease time     |       |
   +---------+----------+-----------+----------------+-------+
               Figure 9 Binding entry in BST on finalization

   If an ARP Response or NA for an address in BST with state DETECTION
   is received, remove the corresponding entry in BST and FT. The ARP
   Response or NA MUST be delivered to the client.

11.1.5. After BOUND

   Once a binding entry is set up for an anchor, the binding will be
   used to filter packet with the anchor, as specified in section 12. On
   the other hand, DHCP messages with the anchor will affect the =
binding.
   The binding is also affected by DHCP server message toward the =
anchor.

   Before a DHCP message is found that it may change the corresponding
   binding, its validity MUST be checked as described in section 12.2.

   Whenever a DHCP Decline is received, delete the corresponding entry
   in BST and FT.


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 14]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   Whenever a DHCP Release is received, if the state of the entry is
   BOUND, delete the entry in BST and FT.

   If a DHCPv4 Acknowledgement or DHCPv6 Reply with Renew/Rebind sign is
   received from the server, set lifetime of the entry in BST to be the
   new lease time.

   If the lifetime of an entry with state BOUND expires, delete the
   entry in BST and Filter Table.

   The binding may also be affected by control messages with or toward
   another anchor. The binding MAY be move to another anchor to handle
   local link movement, as described in section 11.1.2.3. In this
   situation, the node assigned a DCHP address changes to associate with
   another anchor, thus the address should be bound with the anchor
   which the node migrates to. Other than this situation, the binding
   will not be changed, for the consideration of simplicity. Even if an
   attached node becomes inactive and doesn't reply to any NS or ARP
   Request, the associated bindings will not be removed.

   Switch port down event (or more general, anchor turns off-link) will
   change the corresponding entry, as described in section 15.

11.2. State Machine of DHCP Snooping

   The main state transits are listed as follows. Note that the anchor
   migration of binding entry is not included.

   State      Message/Event       Action                      Next State

   -          REQ/CFM/SOL+RC      Generate entry                   START

   *-         ACK/RPL             Generate entry with lease         LIVE

   *-         ACK/RPL             Generate entry with lease        BOUND

   **-        ACK/RPL             Generate entry with lease    DETECTION

                                 , send probe

   START      ACK/RPL             Record lease time                 LIVE

   **START    ACK/RPL             Send probe                   DETECTION

   ***START   ACK/RPL             Set up entry                     BOUND

   START      Timeout             Remove entry                         -


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 15]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   LIVE       Gra ARP REQ/DAD NS  -                            DETECTION

   LIVE       DECLINE             Remove entry                         -

   LIVE       Timeout             Send probe                   DETECTION

   *LIVE      Timeout             Remove entry                         -

   DETECTION  Timeout             -                                BOUND

   DETECTION  ARP RES/DAD NA      Remove entry                         -

   DETECTION  DECLINE             Remove entry                         -

   BOUND      RELEASE/DECLINE     Remove entry                         -

   BOUND      Timeout             Remove entry                         -

   BOUND      RENEW/REBOUND       Set new lifetime                 BOUND

   *: optional but NOT SUGGESTED.

   **: optional and MAY conflict other transits

   ***: allowed in DHCP only scenario

   REQ: DHCP REQUEST

   CFM: DHCP CONFIRM

   SOL: DHCP SOLICITATION

   RC:  Rapid Commit option

   ACK: DHCP ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

   RPL: DHCP REPLY

   Probe Gratuitous ARP REQUEST or Duplicate Address Detection Neighbor
   Solicitation, described in section 13.1

   Gra ARP REQ: Gratuitous ARP REQUEST

   ARP RES: ARP RESPONSE

   DAD NS: Duplicate Address Detection Neighbor Solicitation



Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 16]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   DAD NA: Neighbor Advertisement targeting at a tentative address

   DECLINE: DHCP DECLINE

   RELEASE: DHCP RELEASE

   RENEW: DHCP RENEW

   REBOUND: DHCP REBOUND

12. Filtering Specification

   This section specifies how to use bindings to filter packets. Because
   the Filtering Table is an allow-table, packet with source address not
   in the table will be filtered. Considering DHCP may coexist with
   other address assignment methods, e.g., Stateless Auto-configuration,
   the specification made here is based on the assumption that other
   SAVI solutions will also use BST and FT to keep bindings and filter
   packets. Otherwise this solution will conflict with other SAVI
   solutions.

   Filtering policies are different for data packet and control packet.
   DHCP and ND messages that may cause state transit are classified into
   control packet. Neighbor Advertisement and ARP Response are also
   included in control packet, because the Target Address of NA and ARP
   Response should be checked to prevent spoofing. All other packets are
   considered to be data packets.

12.1. Data Packet Filtering

   Data packets with an anchor which has attribute SAVI-Validation MUST
   be checked.

   If the source of a packet associated with its anchor is in the FT,
   this packet SHOULD be forwarded; or else the packet MUST be =
discarded.

12.2. Control Packet Filtering

   For anchors with SAVI-Validation attribute:

   The source address of DHCPv4 Discovery MUST be set to all zeros. The
   source address of DHCPv4 Request MUST be set to all zeros or a bound
   address in FT.

   The source address of DHCPv6 Request MUST be an address associated
   with the corresponding anchor in FT. The source address of DHCPv6
   Confirm MUST be a link local address associated with the


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 17]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   corresponding anchor in FT. The source address of DHCPv6 Solicit MUST
   be a link layer address bound with corresponding anchor. The link
   layer address MAY be bound based on SAVI-SLAAC solution or other
   solutions.

   The source address of other types of DHCP messages MUST be an address
   bound with the corresponding anchor.

   The source address of IPv6 NS and IPv4 gratuitous ARP MUST pass the
   check on FT.

   The target address and source address in all the Neighbor
   Advertisement packets and ARP replies MUST also pass the checks on =
FT.

   For other anchors:

   All DHCP Reply/Ack packets MUST be from anchor with the SAVI-DHCP-
   Trust attribute.

13. Format and Delivery of Probe Messages

   As described in section 11.1.2.3 and 11.1.3.3, the SAVI device MAY
   send detection probes on behavior of client to determine whether the
   assigned address is duplicated. Currently no other probes are
   designed in this solution.

13.1. Duplicate detection

      Message Type: DAD NS, Gratuitous ARP Request

      Format:

                   Link layer source - link layer address of host;

                   Link layer destination - For IPv6, use multicast =
address
      specified in [RFC3307]; For IPv4, use broadcast address;

                   IP source - Unspecified address for IPv6; The =
tentative

      address for IPv4;

                   IP destination - For IPv6, multicast address =
specified in
      section 5.4.2 of [RFC4861]; For IPv4, the tentative address;

      Delivery:




Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 18]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


         MUST not be delivered to the host which the SAVI device is
      performing DAD on behavior of.

14. Binding Remove

   If the lifetime of an entry with state BOUND expires, the entry MUST
   be removed.

   When the SAVI device receives a DAD NS/Gra ARP request target at an
   address bound and there is no reply from the anchor, if the anchor is
   currently off-link, the entry SHOULD be removed.

15. Handle Anchor Off-link event

   Port DOWN event MUST be handled if switch port is used as anchor. In
   more general case, if an anchor turns off-link, this event MUST be
   handled.

   Whenever an anchor with attribute SAVI-Validation turns down, the
   bindings with the anchor MUST be kept for a short time.

   To handle movement, if receiving DAD NS/Gra ARP request targeting at
   the address during the period, the entry MAY be removed.

   If the anchor turns on-link during the period, recover bindings. It
   may result in some security problem, e.g., a malicious node
   immediately associates with the anchor got off by a previous node,
   then it can use the address assigned to the previous node. However,
   this situation is very rare in reality. Authors decide not to handle
   this situation.

16. About Collision in Detection

   The SAVI device may receive a response in detection. Some related
   details are specified here.

16.1. Whether to Notify the DHCP Server

   It is unnecessary for the SAVI device to notify the DHCP server,
   because the host will send a DECLINE message to it once it finds the
   advertised address is conflict.

16.2. The Result of Detection without Host Aware

   In case the SAVI device send detection packet instead of the host,
   the host will not be aware of the detection result. If the detection
   succeeds, there is no problem. However, if the detection fails, the


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 19]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   packets from the host with the assigned address will be filtered out.
   This result can be regarded as a reasonable punishment for not
   performing duplicate detection and using a collision address. The
   SAVI device MAY choose to notice the client that the assigned address
   has been used, through a NA message. This mechanism is not required
   in this solution.

17. Filtering during Detection

   In this mechanism, whenever the DHCP server replies an address, this
   address will be allowed immediately even before duplicate detection
   is completed. This design is in consideration of a host may start to
   send packets straightway without detection. Also this design is to be
   compatible with optimistic DAD [RFC4429].

   However, this feature may allow an attacker to send quantities of
   packets with source addresses already assigned to other nodes. A
   practical solution for this vulnerability is configuring the address
   pool and allocation algorithm of the DHCP server carefully.

18. Binding Number Limitation

   It is suggested to configure some mechanism in order to prevent a
   single node from exhausting the binding table entries on the SAVI
   device. Either of the following mechanism is sufficient to prevent
   such attack.

   1. Set the upper bound of binding number for each anchor with SAVI-
      Validation.

   2. Reserve a number of binding entries for each anchor with SAVI-
      Validation attribute and all anchors share a pool of the other
      binding entries.

   3. Limit DHCP Request rate per anchor, using the bound entry number
      of each anchor as reverse indicator.

19. MLD Consideration

   The SAVI device MUST join the tentative address multicast group
   whenever perform duplicate detection on behavior of host.

20. State Restoration

   If a SAVI device reboots accidentally or designedly, the states kept
   in volatile memory will get lost. This may cause hosts indirectly
   attached to the SAVI device to be broken away from the network,


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 20]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   because they can't recover bindings on the SAVI device of themselves.
   Thus, binding entries MUST be saved into non-volatile storage
   whenever a new binding entry changes to BOUND state, or a binding
   with state BOUND is removed. Immediately after reboot, the SAVI
   device MUST restore binding states from the non-volatile storage. The
   lifetime and the system time of save process should be stored. Then
   the device can check whether the saved entries are obsolete when
   rebooting.

   If the SAVI device is also the DHCP relay, an alternative mechanism
   is fetching the bindings through bulk DHCP LEASEQUERY [RFC5460].

   If the network enables 802.1ag, the bindings can be recovered with
   the help of the first hop routers through snooping unicast Neighbor
   Solicitations sent by routers based on the Neighbor Table.

21. Data Triggered Process

   If an anchor is set to have SAVI-DataTrigger attribute, data packet,
   including DHCP, ARP and NDP messages whose source address is not
   bound with the anchor, is not filtered directly; instead, the SAVI
   device will check whether the address can be used by the client on
   the local link:

   1. If the address has a local conflict, meaning the DAD on the
      address fails, the packet MUST be discarded. If the address is not
      being used, go to the next step.

   2. IPv4 address:

      Send a DHCPLEASEQUERY [RFC4388] message querying by IP address to
      all DHCPv4 servers for IPv4 address or a configured server =
address.
      The server addresses may be discovered through DHCPv4 Discovery.
      If no DHCPLEASEACTIVE message is received, discard the packet;
      otherwise generate a new binding entry for the address.

      IPv6 address:

      Send a LEASEQUERY [RFC5007] message querying by IP address to
      All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address or a
      configured server address. If no successful LEASEQUERY-REPLY is
      received, discard the packet; otherwise generate a new binding
      entry for the address. The SAVI device may repeat this process if
      a LEASEQUERY-REPLY with OPTION_CLIENT_LINK is received, in order
      to set up binding entries for all the address of the client.




Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 21]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   The data triggered process MUST be rate limited to avoid Denial of
   Services attack against the SAVI device itself.

   Data triggered process is not strict secure. The node with data-
   trigger anchor has the ability to use the address of an inactive =
node,
   which doesn't reply to the DAD.

   In case that the SAVI device is a pure layer 2 device, DAD and DHCP
   Confirm can be used to replace the DHCP LEASEQUERY. The security
   degree may degrade for the address may not be assigned by DHCP.

   Data triggered process may fail if any DHCP server doesn't support
   LEASEQUERY.

22. Stateless DHCP

   In a stateless DHCP scenario [RFC3736], DHCP is used to configure
   other parameters but rather IP address. The address of the client
   SHOULD be bound based on other SAVI solutions, but rather this
   solution designed for stateful DHCP.

23. Confirm Triggered Binding

   If a binding entry is triggered by a CONFIRM message from the client,
   no lease time will be contained in the REPLY from DHCP server. The
   SAVI device MUST send LEASEQUERY message to get the lease time of the
   address to complete the binding entry. If no successful LEASEQUERY-
   REPLY is received, the binding entry SHOULD be removed. In this
   scenario, the address is not regarded as assigned by DHCP, and it may
   be bound through other SAVI solution.

   If the confirmed address has local conflict, the Client-ID field of
   Confirm and LEASEQUERY-REPLY MUST be compared. If they are not match,
   the new binding entry MUST be deleted.

24. Counter Triggered Binding

   Counter triggered binding process MUST be enabled if data-trigger
   attribute is not configured on all the anchors on which control
   packet snooping is not sure to work with no false positive (refer to
   the analysis in [savi-marcelo-analysis]).

   A counter is used to record the number of filter packets by this
   solution or all the enabled SAVI solutions. A number TRIGGER_COUNT is
   set with the counter.




Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 22]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


   Whenever the counter reaches TRIGGER_COUNT, this event MUST be
   handled by the SAVI device. The SAVI device performs following steps:

   1. Set the counter to 0;

   2. If the SAVI device is a layer-3 device, it SHOULD perform
      LEASEQUERY or DAD to check whether the addresses associated with
      the triggering anchor, which learned in Neighbor Table, can be
      used. If it is a layer-2 device, Inverse Neighbor Discovery or
      Reverse Address Resolution Protocol can be used to discover the
      layer-3 address from the learned layer-2 address. And then DHCP
      LEASEQUERY or DAD can be used to determine whether the layer-3
      address can be used.

   3. A SNMP trap MUST be triggered to announce this event to network
      administrator; or an alert MUST be generated to announce this
      event on pure layer-2 device.

   The constant TRIGGER_COUNT SHOULD be configured to fit the specified
   deployment scenario. In extreme situation, it can be set to 1 when
   layer 2 topology changes frequently.

25. Handle Layer 2 Path Change

   Layer 2 path change is an important challenge on this control plane
   based solution. The SAVI device MUST be sensitive to any layer 2 path
   change. Whenever a layer 2 control protocol frame, including STP,
   RSTP, TRILL, is received from some anchor, which announces a layer 2
   incoming path is changed to the anchor, data packet trigger process
   MUST be enabled on the anchor for a period, or the device MUST
   forward the packets directly for a period, and set up bindings from
   Neighbor Table or link layer address table as described in section =
24.
   Although generally such events can be handled through pre-
   configuration of data-trigger attribute, the future layer 2 protocol
   may be flexible and hard to handle through manual configuration.

26. Constants

   MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME     120s

   MAX_ARP_PREPARE_DELAY      Default 1s but configurable

   MAX_ARP_DELAY              Default 1s but configurable

   MAX_DAD_PREPARE_DELAY      Default 1s but configurable

   MAX_DAD_DELAY              Default 1s but configurable


Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 23]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


27. Security Considerations

   For prefix level granularity filtering is the basis of host level
   granularity filtering, to learn and configure correct prefix is of
   great importance to this mechanism. Thus, it's important to keep RA
   and DHCP-PD secure. [draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-03] describes a
   mechanism to improve the security of RA message.

28. IANA Considerations

   There is no IANA consideration currently.

29. References

29.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

29.2. Informative References

   [RFC2131] R. Droms, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC2131,
   March 1997.

   [RFC3307] B. Haberman, "Allocation Guidelines for IPv6 Multicast
   Addresses", RFC3307, August 2002.

   [RFC3315] R. Droms, Ed. "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
   (DHCPv6)", RFC3315, July 2003.

   [RFC4388] R. Woundy and K. Kinnear, "Dynamic Host Configuration
   Protocol (DHCP) Leasequery", RFC4388, February 2006.

   [RFC4861] T. Narten, E. Nordmark, W. Simpson, and H. Soliman,
   "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC4861, September =
2007.

   [RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T. and Jinmei, T., "IPv6 Stateless
   Autoconfiguration", RFC4862, September, 2007.

   [RFC5007] J. Brzozowski, K. Kinnear, B. Volz, S. Zeng, "DHCPv6
   Leasequery", RFC5007, September 2007.

   [RFC5227] S. Cheshire, "IPv4 Address Conflict Detection", RFC5227,
   July 2008.





Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 24]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


30. Acknowledgments

Thanks to Christian Vogt, Eric Levy-Abegnoli, Mark Williams, Erik
Nordmark, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun, Alberto Garcia, Jari Arkko, David
Harrington, Pekka Savola, Xing Li, Lixia Zhang, Robert Raszuk, Greg
Daley, Joel M. Halpern, Mikael Abrahamsson, John Kaippallimalil and Tao
Lin for their valuable contributions.









































Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 25]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                     April 2010


Authors' Addresses

   Jun Bi
   CERNET
   Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
   Beijing 100084
   China
   Email: junbi@cernet.edu.cn

   Jianping Wu
   CERNET
   Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing 100084
   China
   Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn

   Guang Yao
   CERNET
   Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
   Beijing 100084
   China
   Email: yaog@netarchlab.tsinghua.edu.cn

   Fred Baker
   Cisco Systems
   Email: fred@cisco.com



















Bi                    Expires October 3, 2010               [Page 26]
=0C

------=_NextPart_000_0B0F_01CAD380.2780FD80--


From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Sat Apr  3 09:34:39 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8ABF3A677C for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 09:34:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.13
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.13 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[DNS_FROM_OPENWHOIS=1.13]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id V0qIPEsdUkqo for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 09:34:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5D733A63EC for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 09:34:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5BF1B3235BEE for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 09:34:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-50-141.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.50.141]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A03853235BE6 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat,  3 Apr 2010 09:34:34 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BB76E19.7070806@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 03 Apr 2010 12:34:33 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: SAVI Mailing List <savi@ietf.org>
References: <11CC889F3A3542CAA9571EB86B82B7FC@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <11CC889F3A3542CAA9571EB86B82B7FC@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=GB2312
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: Re: [savi] draft version of savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Apr 2010 16:34:39 -0000

Apologies for the length of these comments.  I suspect that some of
these are probably older questions that I should have raised sooner.


1) The description of "Optional Attributes" (section 9.4) needs some
clarification.  It is not clear if these are intended to be optional to
implement, optional to use, or some other combination.  Also, the
current wording seems to say that the usage of these attributes (the
optional ones) is suboptimal.  This would seem to decrease the reason
for having them.  I believe this is largely a linguistic issue.

2) The SAVI-LocalGroup Attribute appears to define something that is
purely an implementation technique.  As such, it does not belong in this
spec.

3) I am not sure the Prefix configuration is actually a good idea.  The
spec already includes the notion of what port a DHCP reply message is
allowed from.  presumably, there at least can be configuration to
restrict which ports DHCP replies are accepted from.  In the absence of
such messages, prefix control is not a major improvement.  I am
concerned that requiring every sqitch to have this configuration
significnatly increases complexity.

4) I believe that the intent is to describe the DHCP Snooping process as
a finite state machine.  However, I found myself confused by teh
initialization section.  it is perfectly reasonable that there are
several different events that all cause initialization.  But
initialization can not actually be skipped.
As a minor point, I find it helpful particularly for initialization if
the trigger description includes the note that there is no table entry
for the anchor.
(Note, I do appreciate that an effort has been made to recognize and
take advantage of the knowledge provided by other mechanisms.)
4') There is a similar issue that the reply processing has a minor note
to create an entry.  This seems "interesting" in that as described the
original request will not have been sent upstream, so there won't be a
reply.

5) There is a note saying that "duplicate bindings of the same address
are allowed" under certain circumstances.  I would like to see this
expanded, as it appears counter-intuitive as written.  Is this allowing
multiple anchors to bind to the same IP address?

6) Section 11.2, although it is named a State Machine, is not a state
machine.  It shows different next-states from the same starting state
with the same event occurring.  It may be that trying for a concise
representation of the many choices available is not practical.  or it
may be that we need to reduce the number of choices.

7) I am concerned about the wording in section 20 on State Restoration.
 In IETF documents, when trying to say that an implementation must take
care of a certain problem, but may use one of several mechanisms, we do
not normally describe the first mechanism as MUST.  There are two common
writing techniques for this.
7a) If there is one specific solution that is expected to be the common
case, one can write that devices SHOULD implementat that, unless they
implement specified alternatives.
7b) If there are several equal alternatives, one can write that devices
MUST implement a mechanism to address the issue, and that the known
mechanisms are, followed by listing the mechanisms.  Whether the wording
says that one of the known tools MUST be sued depends upon the specific
protocol.

8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative conclusion
about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that the
answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, but
merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)

9) Why does the data triggered refer to DHCP and ND messages as data
packets?  Even if we are allowing datat triggered behavior, presumably
the control triggered behavior is still desired, and those are control
packets.  I think I am missing something in the beginning of section 21
in this regard.

Yours,
Joel M. Halpern

Jun Bi wrote:
> 
> Dear WG members,
>  
> Based on the discussion during IETF77 meeting and on the mailing-list,
> we gathered the inputs and make draft version of savi-dhcp-02.
> Please provide your valuable comment before we submit it to IETF.
>  
> Best Regards,
> Jun Bi
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr  4 01:44:19 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C1643A6955 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 01:44:19 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -103.999
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-103.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EVi7qzmsQv8x for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 01:44:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F11E3A67D1 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 01:44:16 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (88.30.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.30.88]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6480BCED13; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 10:44:09 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 10:43:46 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 08:44:19 -0000

El 03/04/10 16:39, Jun Bi escribió:
>
>>
>> besides, i fail to see why we keep on agruing this point, since it 
>> seems to be significant amount of people that think that it is 
>> possible to
>
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> "possible" doesn't mean MUST, may mean SHOULD.
>

The point is that we do have an implementer that says that this is 
feasible, which was the main argument against doing do. No other 
implementers have voiced in the ml that they have a problem implementing 
this in the way Fred has proposed, so i simply fail to see what are the 
arguments against doing this at this point.

This is needed in order to have the solution work properly and preserve 
the robustness of the network, and there are no arguments against doing 
it afaics.

Regards, marcelo


> thanks,
> Jun
>
>
>
>> implement data triggered actions (such as the proxy DAD procedure) 
>> using the approach suggested by Fred, which makes all this a non 
>> issues, since all we need to restore the reliability of the network 
>> is to trigger the DAD or the DHCP query upon the reception of one (or 
>> more) data packets for which we don't have a binding
>>>   from
>>> observation on reality. Currently the possibility of first DAD loss 
>>> is just
>>> proved in analysis.
>>>
>>> DAD is not reliable, but it is still reasonable. It is not designed 
>>> to be a
>>> dispensable protocol. In general case, I think "almost certain" is 
>>> enough.
>>>
>>>
>> we simply disagree here and everybody in the previous meeting seemed 
>> to disagree with this (at least nobody said anything about this in 
>> the meeting)
>>
>>> We all go with the assumption that "the earth wouldn't be destroyed
>>> tomorrow", right?
>> no, a DAD packet getting lost have significant more probability than 
>> that, i am afraid
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>>   This assumption doesn't have absolute 100% probability,
>>> either. Should we spend all our savings today because of fearing of 
>>> non-zero
>>> probability fatal event?
>>>
>>> BR,
>>> Guang
>>>
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>
>>> Joel
>>>
>>>> M. Halpern
>>>> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>> To: Guang Yao
>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>> in SAVI
>>>>
>>> "
>>>
>>>> This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had observed
>>>> significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
>>>> Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of observation was a
>>>> theoretical analysis.
>>>> Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec 
>>>> quotation
>>>> you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it about the
>>>> reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"
>>>>
>>>> Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>> Guang Yao wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>   Hi Joel,
>>>>>
>>>>> Please refer to RFC4862
>>>>> "
>>>>>     If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first message 
>>>>> sent
>>>>>     from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the node 
>>>>> SHOULD
>>>>>     delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a random 
>>>>> delay
>>>>>     between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in
>>>>>
>>>> [RFC4861].
>>>>
>>>>>     This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up 
>>>>> on the
>>>>>     link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and may 
>>>>> help to
>>>>>     avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to 
>>>>> solicit
>>>>>     for the same address at the same time.
>>>>>
>>>>>     Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
>>>>>     message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
>>>>>     multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
>>>>>     MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is
>>>>>
>>>> configured
>>>>
>>>>>     by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast 
>>>>> address.  The
>>>>>     delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are 
>>>>> going to
>>>>>     configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast router
>>>>>     advertisement.
>>>>> "
>>>>>
>>>>> SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random delay
>>>>>
>>> after
>>>
>>>>> interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
>>>>> probability greatly.
>>>>>
>>>>> BR,
>>>>> Guang
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>>>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>>>
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
>>>>>> To: Jun Bi
>>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open 
>>>>>> Issues in
>>>>>>
>>> SAVI
>>>
>>>>> "
>>>>>
>>>>>> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, 
>>>>>> that we
>>>>>> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local 
>>>>>> addresses
>>>>>> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out of 
>>>>>> scope,
>>>>>> that simplifies many things.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, that's a good point.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "Guang Yao"<yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
>>>>>>> To:<savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>>>>> in SAVI
>>>>>>>
>>> "
>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
>>>>>>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
>>>>>>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
>>>>>>>> address is
>>>>>>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be performed 
>>>>>>>> until
>>>>>>>>
>>> a
>>>
>>>>>>>> RA is
>>>>>>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
>


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sun Apr  4 11:06:13 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 608F83A694F for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:06:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.496
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.496 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id MPQFuuia9U33 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:06:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D4023A6951 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:06:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th053201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.53.201] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1NyUCu-0006jr-RF; Mon, 05 Apr 2010 02:06:00 +0800
Message-ID: <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2010 02:05:30 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 18:06:13 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 04, 2010 4:43 PM
To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "Greg Daley" <hoskuld@hotmail.com>; "Suresh Krishnan" 
<suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> El 03/04/10 16:39, Jun Bi escribió:
>>
>>>
>>> besides, i fail to see why we keep on agruing this point, since it seems 
>>> to be significant amount of people that think that it is possible to
>>
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> "possible" doesn't mean MUST, may mean SHOULD.
>>
>
> The point is that we do have an implementer that says that this is 
> feasible, which was the main argument against doing do. No other 
> implementers have voiced in the ml that they have a problem implementing 
> this in the way Fred has proposed, so i simply fail to see what are the 
> arguments against doing this at this point.

Hi Marcelo,

Did I mean Fred's proposal is not feasible? That's counter triggered.

I meant data-triggered can't be MUST based on the feedback from vendors,
please refer to all my related emails in the past weeks.

thanks,
Jun



>
> This is needed in order to have the solution work properly and preserve 
> the robustness of the network, and there are no arguments against doing it 
> afaics.
>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>>
>>> implement data triggered actions (such as the proxy DAD procedure) using 
>>> the approach suggested by Fred, which makes all this a non issues, since 
>>> all we need to restore the reliability of the network is to trigger the 
>>> DAD or the DHCP query upon the reception of one (or more) data packets 
>>> for which we don't have a binding
>>>>   from
>>>> observation on reality. Currently the possibility of first DAD loss is 
>>>> just
>>>> proved in analysis.
>>>>
>>>> DAD is not reliable, but it is still reasonable. It is not designed to 
>>>> be a
>>>> dispensable protocol. In general case, I think "almost certain" is 
>>>> enough.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> we simply disagree here and everybody in the previous meeting seemed to 
>>> disagree with this (at least nobody said anything about this in the 
>>> meeting)
>>>
>>>> We all go with the assumption that "the earth wouldn't be destroyed
>>>> tomorrow", right?
>>> no, a DAD packet getting lost have significant more probability than 
>>> that, i am afraid
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>>   This assumption doesn't have absolute 100% probability,
>>>> either. Should we spend all our savings today because of fearing of 
>>>> non-zero
>>>> probability fatal event?
>>>>
>>>> BR,
>>>> Guang
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf 
>>>>> Of
>>>>>
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>> To: Guang Yao
>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>
>>>> "
>>>>
>>>>> This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had observed
>>>>> significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
>>>>> Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of observation was a
>>>>> theoretical analysis.
>>>>> Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec 
>>>>> quotation
>>>>> you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it about the
>>>>> reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"
>>>>>
>>>>> Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>> Guang Yao wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>   Hi Joel,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please refer to RFC4862
>>>>>> "
>>>>>>     If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first message 
>>>>>> sent
>>>>>>     from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the node 
>>>>>> SHOULD
>>>>>>     delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a random 
>>>>>> delay
>>>>>>     between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in
>>>>>>
>>>>> [RFC4861].
>>>>>
>>>>>>     This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up on 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>     link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and may 
>>>>>> help to
>>>>>>     avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to 
>>>>>> solicit
>>>>>>     for the same address at the same time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
>>>>>>     message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
>>>>>>     multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
>>>>>>     MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is
>>>>>>
>>>>> configured
>>>>>
>>>>>>     by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast address. 
>>>>>> The
>>>>>>     delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are going 
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>     configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast router
>>>>>>     advertisement.
>>>>>> "
>>>>>>
>>>>>> SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random delay
>>>>>>
>>>> after
>>>>
>>>>>> interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
>>>>>> probability greatly.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf 
>>>>>>> Of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
>>>>>>> To: Jun Bi
>>>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>
>>>> SAVI
>>>>
>>>>>> "
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, that 
>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local 
>>>>>>> addresses
>>>>>>> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out of 
>>>>>>> scope,
>>>>>>> that simplifies many things.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes, that's a good point.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "Guang Yao"<yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
>>>>>>>> To:<savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>>>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>>>>
>>>> "
>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
>>>>>>>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
>>>>>>>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
>>>>>>>>> address is
>>>>>>>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be performed 
>>>>>>>>> until
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> a
>>>>
>>>>>>>>> RA is
>>>>>>>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
>
> 

From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sun Apr  4 11:14:46 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 750A03A694F for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:14:46 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.497
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.497 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.001,  BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495, STOX_REPLY_TYPE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PAk9tFG5rJcD for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:14:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 048693A6974 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:14:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th053201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.53.201] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1NyULG-0006nd-Bi; Mon, 05 Apr 2010 02:14:38 +0800
Message-ID: <17C78E82B13D46C489323CD746402A96@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
References: <11CC889F3A3542CAA9571EB86B82B7FC@junbiVAIO> <4BB76E19.7070806@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BB76E19.7070806@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2010 02:14:40 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=original
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Subject: Re: [savi] draft version of savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 18:14:46 -0000

Hi Joel,

Thank you very much for your comments.

Since the length of comments is long, so please give us some time to 
investigate and feed you back.

Best Regards,
Jun Bi


--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 04, 2010 12:34 AM
To: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] draft version of savi-dhcp-02

> Apologies for the length of these comments.  I suspect that some of
> these are probably older questions that I should have raised sooner.
>
>
> 1) The description of "Optional Attributes" (section 9.4) needs some
> clarification.  It is not clear if these are intended to be optional to
> implement, optional to use, or some other combination.  Also, the
> current wording seems to say that the usage of these attributes (the
> optional ones) is suboptimal.  This would seem to decrease the reason
> for having them.  I believe this is largely a linguistic issue.
>
> 2) The SAVI-LocalGroup Attribute appears to define something that is
> purely an implementation technique.  As such, it does not belong in this
> spec.
>
> 3) I am not sure the Prefix configuration is actually a good idea.  The
> spec already includes the notion of what port a DHCP reply message is
> allowed from.  presumably, there at least can be configuration to
> restrict which ports DHCP replies are accepted from.  In the absence of
> such messages, prefix control is not a major improvement.  I am
> concerned that requiring every sqitch to have this configuration
> significnatly increases complexity.
>
> 4) I believe that the intent is to describe the DHCP Snooping process as
> a finite state machine.  However, I found myself confused by teh
> initialization section.  it is perfectly reasonable that there are
> several different events that all cause initialization.  But
> initialization can not actually be skipped.
> As a minor point, I find it helpful particularly for initialization if
> the trigger description includes the note that there is no table entry
> for the anchor.
> (Note, I do appreciate that an effort has been made to recognize and
> take advantage of the knowledge provided by other mechanisms.)
> 4') There is a similar issue that the reply processing has a minor note
> to create an entry.  This seems "interesting" in that as described the
> original request will not have been sent upstream, so there won't be a
> reply.
>
> 5) There is a note saying that "duplicate bindings of the same address
> are allowed" under certain circumstances.  I would like to see this
> expanded, as it appears counter-intuitive as written.  Is this allowing
> multiple anchors to bind to the same IP address?
>
> 6) Section 11.2, although it is named a State Machine, is not a state
> machine.  It shows different next-states from the same starting state
> with the same event occurring.  It may be that trying for a concise
> representation of the many choices available is not practical.  or it
> may be that we need to reduce the number of choices.
>
> 7) I am concerned about the wording in section 20 on State Restoration.
> In IETF documents, when trying to say that an implementation must take
> care of a certain problem, but may use one of several mechanisms, we do
> not normally describe the first mechanism as MUST.  There are two common
> writing techniques for this.
> 7a) If there is one specific solution that is expected to be the common
> case, one can write that devices SHOULD implementat that, unless they
> implement specified alternatives.
> 7b) If there are several equal alternatives, one can write that devices
> MUST implement a mechanism to address the issue, and that the known
> mechanisms are, followed by listing the mechanisms.  Whether the wording
> says that one of the known tools MUST be sued depends upon the specific
> protocol.
>
> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative conclusion
> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that the
> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, but
> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>
> 9) Why does the data triggered refer to DHCP and ND messages as data
> packets?  Even if we are allowing datat triggered behavior, presumably
> the control triggered behavior is still desired, and those are control
> packets.  I think I am missing something in the beginning of section 21
> in this regard.
>
> Yours,
> Joel M. Halpern
>
> Jun Bi wrote:
>>
>> Dear WG members,
>>
>> Based on the discussion during IETF77 meeting and on the mailing-list,
>> we gathered the inputs and make draft version of savi-dhcp-02.
>> Please provide your valuable comment before we submit it to IETF.
>>
>> Best Regards,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr  4 11:34:24 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E25B3A67F6 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:34:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -105.11
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-105.11 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-1.11, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7sxdaimDddy8 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:34:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BCB8C3A68C5 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:32:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (182.102.218.87.dynamic.jazztel.es [87.218.102.182]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id A90ED82E105; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 20:32:00 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 20:32:00 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es> <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 18:34:24 -0000

El 04/04/10 20:05, Jun Bi escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Sunday, April 04, 2010 4:43 PM
> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "Greg Daley" <hoskuld@hotmail.com>; "Suresh 
> Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
> SAVI "
>
>> El 03/04/10 16:39, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> besides, i fail to see why we keep on agruing this point, since it 
>>>> seems to be significant amount of people that think that it is 
>>>> possible to
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> "possible" doesn't mean MUST, may mean SHOULD.
>>>
>>
>> The point is that we do have an implementer that says that this is 
>> feasible, which was the main argument against doing do. No other 
>> implementers have voiced in the ml that they have a problem 
>> implementing this in the way Fred has proposed, so i simply fail to 
>> see what are the arguments against doing this at this point.
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> Did I mean Fred's proposal is not feasible? That's counter triggered.
so, you are ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?

Regards, marcelo

> I meant data-triggered can't be MUST based on the feedback from vendors,
> please refer to all my related emails in the past weeks.
>

> thanks,
> Jun
>
>
>
>>
>> This is needed in order to have the solution work properly and 
>> preserve the robustness of the network, and there are no arguments 
>> against doing it afaics.
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> implement data triggered actions (such as the proxy DAD procedure) 
>>>> using the approach suggested by Fred, which makes all this a non 
>>>> issues, since all we need to restore the reliability of the network 
>>>> is to trigger the DAD or the DHCP query upon the reception of one 
>>>> (or more) data packets for which we don't have a binding
>>>>>   from
>>>>> observation on reality. Currently the possibility of first DAD 
>>>>> loss is just
>>>>> proved in analysis.
>>>>>
>>>>> DAD is not reliable, but it is still reasonable. It is not 
>>>>> designed to be a
>>>>> dispensable protocol. In general case, I think "almost certain" is 
>>>>> enough.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> we simply disagree here and everybody in the previous meeting 
>>>> seemed to disagree with this (at least nobody said anything about 
>>>> this in the meeting)
>>>>
>>>>> We all go with the assumption that "the earth wouldn't be destroyed
>>>>> tomorrow", right?
>>>> no, a DAD packet getting lost have significant more probability 
>>>> than that, i am afraid
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>>   This assumption doesn't have absolute 100% probability,
>>>>> either. Should we spend all our savings today because of fearing 
>>>>> of non-zero
>>>>> probability fatal event?
>>>>>
>>>>> BR,
>>>>> Guang
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>>>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>>>
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>> To: Guang Yao
>>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open 
>>>>>> Issues in SAVI
>>>>>>
>>>>> "
>>>>>
>>>>>> This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had 
>>>>>> observed
>>>>>> significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
>>>>>> Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of observation 
>>>>>> was a
>>>>>> theoretical analysis.
>>>>>> Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec 
>>>>>> quotation
>>>>>> you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it about 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Guang Yao wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Please refer to RFC4862
>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>     If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first 
>>>>>>> message sent
>>>>>>>     from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the 
>>>>>>> node SHOULD
>>>>>>>     delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a 
>>>>>>> random delay
>>>>>>>     between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> [RFC4861].
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>     This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up 
>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>>     link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and 
>>>>>>> may help to
>>>>>>>     avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to 
>>>>>>> solicit
>>>>>>>     for the same address at the same time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>     Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
>>>>>>>     message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
>>>>>>>     multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
>>>>>>>     MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> configured
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>     by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast 
>>>>>>> address. The
>>>>>>>     delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are 
>>>>>>> going to
>>>>>>>     configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast 
>>>>>>> router
>>>>>>>     advertisement.
>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random 
>>>>>>> delay
>>>>>>>
>>>>> after
>>>>>
>>>>>>> interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
>>>>>>> probability greatly.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>>>>>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
>>>>>>>> To: Jun Bi
>>>>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open 
>>>>>>>> Issues in
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>
>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, 
>>>>>>>> that we
>>>>>>>> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local 
>>>>>>>> addresses
>>>>>>>> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out 
>>>>>>>> of scope,
>>>>>>>> that simplifies many things.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes, that's a good point.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> From: "Guang Yao"<yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
>>>>>>>>> To:<savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>>>>>>> in SAVI
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> "
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
>>>>>>>>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
>>>>>>>>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
>>>>>>>>>> address is
>>>>>>>>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be 
>>>>>>>>>> performed until
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> a
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> RA is
>>>>>>>>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sun Apr  4 11:38:22 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C38F3A682F for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:38:22 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.196
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.196 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.300,  BAYES_00=-2.599, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sn3re+NfKaNv for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:38:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BCB733A6452 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:38:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th053201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.53.201] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1NyUi5-00077K-PS; Mon, 05 Apr 2010 02:38:13 +0800
Message-ID: <35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es> <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2010 02:38:15 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 18:38:22 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Monday, April 05, 2010 2:32 AM
To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "Greg Daley" <hoskuld@hotmail.com>; "Suresh Krishnan" 
<suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> El 04/04/10 20:05, Jun Bi escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 04, 2010 4:43 PM
>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "Greg Daley" <hoskuld@hotmail.com>; "Suresh 
>> Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>> SAVI "
>>
>>> El 03/04/10 16:39, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> besides, i fail to see why we keep on agruing this point, since it 
>>>>> seems to be significant amount of people that think that it is 
>>>>> possible to
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> "possible" doesn't mean MUST, may mean SHOULD.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The point is that we do have an implementer that says that this is 
>>> feasible, which was the main argument against doing do. No other 
>>> implementers have voiced in the ml that they have a problem implementing 
>>> this in the way Fred has proposed, so i simply fail to see what are the 
>>> arguments against doing this at this point.
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> Did I mean Fred's proposal is not feasible? That's counter triggered.
> so, you are ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?

Hi Marcelo,

Did you read savi-dhcp-02 ?

thanks,
Jun

>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>> I meant data-triggered can't be MUST based on the feedback from vendors,
>> please refer to all my related emails in the past weeks.
>>
>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> This is needed in order to have the solution work properly and preserve 
>>> the robustness of the network, and there are no arguments against doing 
>>> it afaics.
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> implement data triggered actions (such as the proxy DAD procedure) 
>>>>> using the approach suggested by Fred, which makes all this a non 
>>>>> issues, since all we need to restore the reliability of the network is 
>>>>> to trigger the DAD or the DHCP query upon the reception of one (or 
>>>>> more) data packets for which we don't have a binding
>>>>>>   from
>>>>>> observation on reality. Currently the possibility of first DAD loss 
>>>>>> is just
>>>>>> proved in analysis.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> DAD is not reliable, but it is still reasonable. It is not designed 
>>>>>> to be a
>>>>>> dispensable protocol. In general case, I think "almost certain" is 
>>>>>> enough.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> we simply disagree here and everybody in the previous meeting seemed 
>>>>> to disagree with this (at least nobody said anything about this in the 
>>>>> meeting)
>>>>>
>>>>>> We all go with the assumption that "the earth wouldn't be destroyed
>>>>>> tomorrow", right?
>>>>> no, a DAD packet getting lost have significant more probability than 
>>>>> that, i am afraid
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>>   This assumption doesn't have absolute 100% probability,
>>>>>> either. Should we spend all our savings today because of fearing of 
>>>>>> non-zero
>>>>>> probability fatal event?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf 
>>>>>>> Of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>> To: Guang Yao
>>>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>>>>> in SAVI
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> "
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had 
>>>>>>> observed
>>>>>>> significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
>>>>>>> Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of observation was 
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> theoretical analysis.
>>>>>>> Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec 
>>>>>>> quotation
>>>>>>> you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it about 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Guang Yao wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>   Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Please refer to RFC4862
>>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>>     If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first message 
>>>>>>>> sent
>>>>>>>>     from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the node 
>>>>>>>> SHOULD
>>>>>>>>     delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a random 
>>>>>>>> delay
>>>>>>>>     between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [RFC4861].
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>     This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start up on 
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>     link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and may 
>>>>>>>> help to
>>>>>>>>     avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to 
>>>>>>>> solicit
>>>>>>>>     for the same address at the same time.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>     Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the first
>>>>>>>>     message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the solicited-node
>>>>>>>>     multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
>>>>>>>>     MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> configured
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>     by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast address. 
>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>>     delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes are 
>>>>>>>> going to
>>>>>>>>     configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast 
>>>>>>>> router
>>>>>>>>     advertisement.
>>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a random 
>>>>>>>> delay
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> after
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD loss
>>>>>>>> probability greatly.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
>>>>>>>>> To: Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on bridges, 
>>>>>>>>> that we
>>>>>>>>> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local 
>>>>>>>>> addresses
>>>>>>>>> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out of 
>>>>>>>>> scope,
>>>>>>>>> that simplifies many things.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes, that's a good point.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> From: "Guang Yao"<yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
>>>>>>>>>> To:<savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>>>>>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> "
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
>>>>>>>>>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
>>>>>>>>>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link local
>>>>>>>>>>> address is
>>>>>>>>>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be performed 
>>>>>>>>>>> until
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> a
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> RA is
>>>>>>>>>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr  4 11:56:35 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 914353A696F for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:56:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -105.855
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-105.855 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.744, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id G6wIz73-WZkp for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:56:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 26E853A6A8B for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 11:54:59 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (182.102.218.87.dynamic.jazztel.es [87.218.102.182]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDF1E82E380; Sun,  4 Apr 2010 20:54:56 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 20:54:55 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es> <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es> <35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 18:56:35 -0000

El 04/04/10 20:38, Jun Bi escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Monday, April 05, 2010 2:32 AM
> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "Greg Daley" <hoskuld@hotmail.com>; "Suresh 
> Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
> SAVI "
>
>> El 04/04/10 20:05, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Sunday, April 04, 2010 4:43 PM
>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "Greg Daley" <hoskuld@hotmail.com>; "Suresh 
>>> Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>> in SAVI "
>>>
>>>> El 03/04/10 16:39, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> besides, i fail to see why we keep on agruing this point, since 
>>>>>> it seems to be significant amount of people that think that it is 
>>>>>> possible to
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> "possible" doesn't mean MUST, may mean SHOULD.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The point is that we do have an implementer that says that this is 
>>>> feasible, which was the main argument against doing do. No other 
>>>> implementers have voiced in the ml that they have a problem 
>>>> implementing this in the way Fred has proposed, so i simply fail to 
>>>> see what are the arguments against doing this at this point.
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> Did I mean Fred's proposal is not feasible? That's counter triggered.
>> so, you are ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> Did you read savi-dhcp-02 ?
no

let me ask again, are you ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?

Regards, marcelo


>
> thanks,
> Jun
>
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>> I meant data-triggered can't be MUST based on the feedback from 
>>> vendors,
>>> please refer to all my related emails in the past weeks.
>>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is needed in order to have the solution work properly and 
>>>> preserve the robustness of the network, and there are no arguments 
>>>> against doing it afaics.
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> implement data triggered actions (such as the proxy DAD 
>>>>>> procedure) using the approach suggested by Fred, which makes all 
>>>>>> this a non issues, since all we need to restore the reliability 
>>>>>> of the network is to trigger the DAD or the DHCP query upon the 
>>>>>> reception of one (or more) data packets for which we don't have a 
>>>>>> binding
>>>>>>>   from
>>>>>>> observation on reality. Currently the possibility of first DAD 
>>>>>>> loss is just
>>>>>>> proved in analysis.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> DAD is not reliable, but it is still reasonable. It is not 
>>>>>>> designed to be a
>>>>>>> dispensable protocol. In general case, I think "almost certain" 
>>>>>>> is enough.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> we simply disagree here and everybody in the previous meeting 
>>>>>> seemed to disagree with this (at least nobody said anything about 
>>>>>> this in the meeting)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We all go with the assumption that "the earth wouldn't be destroyed
>>>>>>> tomorrow", right?
>>>>>> no, a DAD packet getting lost have significant more probability 
>>>>>> than that, i am afraid
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   This assumption doesn't have absolute 100% probability,
>>>>>>> either. Should we spend all our savings today because of fearing 
>>>>>>> of non-zero
>>>>>>> probability fatal event?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>>>>>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>>> To: Guang Yao
>>>>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open 
>>>>>>>> Issues in SAVI
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This sequence started with some folks reporting that they had 
>>>>>>>> observed
>>>>>>>> significant loss of DAD in certain topologies.
>>>>>>>> Now, it is possible that what I took for a report of 
>>>>>>>> observation was a
>>>>>>>> theoretical analysis.
>>>>>>>> Taking, for now, that it was observed, then observing the spec 
>>>>>>>> quotation
>>>>>>>> you provide, the question I would have would be "what is it 
>>>>>>>> about the
>>>>>>>> reality that means this is insufficient to solve the problem?"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Declaring that there is no problem seems premature.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Guang Yao wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>   Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Please refer to RFC4862
>>>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>>>     If the Neighbor Solicitation is going to be the first 
>>>>>>>>> message sent
>>>>>>>>>     from an interface after interface (re)initialization, the 
>>>>>>>>> node SHOULD
>>>>>>>>>     delay joining the solicited-node multicast address by a 
>>>>>>>>> random delay
>>>>>>>>>     between 0 and MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY as specified in
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [RFC4861].
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>     This serves to alleviate congestion when many nodes start 
>>>>>>>>> up on the
>>>>>>>>>     link at the same time, such as after a power failure, and 
>>>>>>>>> may help to
>>>>>>>>>     avoid race conditions when more than one node is trying to 
>>>>>>>>> solicit
>>>>>>>>>     for the same address at the same time.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>     Even if the Neighbor Solicitation is not going to be the 
>>>>>>>>> first
>>>>>>>>>     message sent, the node SHOULD delay joining the 
>>>>>>>>> solicited-node
>>>>>>>>>     multicast address by a random delay between 0 and
>>>>>>>>>     MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY if the address being checked is
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> configured
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>     by a router advertisement message sent to a multicast 
>>>>>>>>> address. The
>>>>>>>>>     delay will avoid similar congestion when multiple nodes 
>>>>>>>>> are going to
>>>>>>>>>     configure addresses by receiving the same single multicast 
>>>>>>>>> router
>>>>>>>>>     advertisement.
>>>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> SLAAC tries to avoid first packet loss through waiting a 
>>>>>>>>> random delay
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> after
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> interface initialization. This will reduce the link local DAD 
>>>>>>>>> loss
>>>>>>>>> probability greatly.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 11:07 PM
>>>>>>>>>> To: Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: savi@ietf.org; Guang Yao
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open 
>>>>>>>>>> Issues in
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I had presumed, since we are doing this enforcement on 
>>>>>>>>>> bridges, that we
>>>>>>>>>> were resposnible for controlling the allocation of link-local 
>>>>>>>>>> addresses
>>>>>>>>>> as well as global addresses.  If link-local addresses are out 
>>>>>>>>>> of scope,
>>>>>>>>>> that simplifies many things.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, that's a good point.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Guang Yao"<yaoa02@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:27 PM
>>>>>>>>>>> To:<savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open 
>>>>>>>>>>> Issues in SAVI
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On "Additional causes for DAD NSOL packets loss.
>>>>>>>>>>>> DAD NSOL is the first packet a host sends
>>>>>>>>>>>> Initial packets can potentially suffer a higher loss rate"
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It's not true for all the DAD messages. Only DAD for link 
>>>>>>>>>>>> local
>>>>>>>>>>>> address is
>>>>>>>>>>>> the first packet. DAD for global address will not be 
>>>>>>>>>>>> performed until
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> RA is
>>>>>>>>>>>> received. And it may be handled through snooping MLD message.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>


From fred@cisco.com  Mon Apr  5 10:59:52 2010
Return-Path: <fred@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0640B3A6853 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 10:59:52 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id w2cqzEGK1ATY for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 10:59:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sj-iport-5.cisco.com (sj-iport-5.cisco.com [171.68.10.87]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 01B903A659A for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 10:59:51 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-5.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvsEAMLBuUurR7H+/2dsb2JhbACbS3GeHpgUhQcEgyQ
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.51,366,1267401600"; d="scan'208";a="178073198"
Received: from sj-core-2.cisco.com ([171.71.177.254]) by sj-iport-5.cisco.com with ESMTP; 05 Apr 2010 17:59:49 +0000
Received: from stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com (stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com [10.32.244.222]) by sj-core-2.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o35HxnI6015571; Mon, 5 Apr 2010 17:59:49 GMT
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1078)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
From: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2010 10:59:48 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es> <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es> <35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO> <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>
To: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1078)
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Apr 2010 17:59:52 -0000

On Apr 4, 2010, at 11:54 AM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:

> let me ask again, are you ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?

I think making my off-handed "here's one way that it could be =
implemented", repeatedly stated as something I don't see the value of =
documenting AT ALL as competent implementors will think of such things =
without that help, a "MUST" would be completely idiotic.

http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Mon Apr  5 12:04:35 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 298A93A6953 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 12:04:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -105.299
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-105.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.300, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 40PqAb0066nQ for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 12:04:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAC2F3A67A4 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 12:04:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (wlap005.it.uc3m.es [163.117.139.108]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66CBA6F440F; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 21:04:29 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 05 Apr 2010 21:04:29 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es> <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es> <35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO> <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es> <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Apr 2010 19:04:35 -0000

El 05/04/10 19:59, Fred Baker escribió:
> On Apr 4, 2010, at 11:54 AM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>
>    
>> let me ask again, are you ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?
>>      
> I think making my off-handed "here's one way that it could be implemented", repeatedly stated as something I don't see the value of documenting AT ALL as competent implementors will think of such things without that help, a "MUST" would be completely idiotic.
>
>    

the thing is:
- There are several issues with blindly discarding data packets for 
which there is no binding in the SAVI switch, so it would make sense to 
require as MUST that SAVI switches trigger the binding creation 
procedure upon the reception of a data packet (instead of blindly 
discarding it)
- The argument against doing so is that it would be difficult to implement.
- You, in your previous note, described a way that this can be 
implemented, making this argument no longer hold.

So, the question is not whether the particular way of implementing this 
is a MUSt but the actual functionality of triggering the binding 
creation procedure is a MUST, given that the argument for not doing so 
no longer holds.

Regards, marcelo


> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>
>
>    


From fred@cisco.com  Mon Apr  5 12:16:25 2010
Return-Path: <fred@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E96B3A67A4 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 12:16:25 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1CmDeT0surmn for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 12:16:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sj-iport-6.cisco.com (sj-iport-6.cisco.com [171.71.176.117]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 526533A68D8 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 12:16:11 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-6.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvsEAM7TuUurR7Ht/2dsb2JhbACbTHGeWZgghQcEgyQ
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.51,366,1267401600"; d="scan'208";a="509632964"
Received: from sj-core-1.cisco.com ([171.71.177.237]) by sj-iport-6.cisco.com with ESMTP; 05 Apr 2010 19:16:09 +0000
Received: from stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com (stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com [10.32.244.222]) by sj-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o35JG9we018983; Mon, 5 Apr 2010 19:16:09 GMT
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1078)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
From: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2010 12:16:09 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es> <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es> <35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO> <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es> <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com> <4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>
To: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1078)
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Apr 2010 19:16:26 -0000

Your argument below suggests that it might be listed as a "MAY". If it =
was going into the RFC at all, I would suggest putting it in an appendix =
as a possible implementation approach.=20

On Apr 5, 2010, at 12:04 PM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:

> El 05/04/10 19:59, Fred Baker escribi=F3:
>> On Apr 4, 2010, at 11:54 AM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>=20
>>  =20
>>> let me ask again, are you ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?
>>>    =20
>> I think making my off-handed "here's one way that it could be =
implemented", repeatedly stated as something I don't see the value of =
documenting AT ALL as competent implementors will think of such things =
without that help, a "MUST" would be completely idiotic.
>>=20
>>  =20
>=20
> the thing is:
> - There are several issues with blindly discarding data packets for =
which there is no binding in the SAVI switch, so it would make sense to =
require as MUST that SAVI switches trigger the binding creation =
procedure upon the reception of a data packet (instead of blindly =
discarding it)
> - The argument against doing so is that it would be difficult to =
implement.
> - You, in your previous note, described a way that this can be =
implemented, making this argument no longer hold.
>=20
> So, the question is not whether the particular way of implementing =
this is a MUSt but the actual functionality of triggering the binding =
creation procedure is a MUST, given that the argument for not doing so =
no longer holds.
>=20
> Regards, marcelo
>=20
>=20
>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>=20
>>=20
>>  =20
>=20

http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Mon Apr  5 13:00:32 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08CCD3A695E for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 13:00:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.227
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.227 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.372, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mhFetb5OeKTx for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 13:00:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C5973A6948 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 13:00:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (182.102.218.87.dynamic.jazztel.es [87.218.102.182]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49A58BC1573; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 22:00:26 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 05 Apr 2010 22:00:05 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es> <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es> <35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO> <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es> <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com> <4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es> <79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Apr 2010 20:00:32 -0000

Not sure i understand what do you mean to include as a MAY. the 
implementation approach you suggested or the functionality of triggering 
the binding creation procedure upon the recpetion of a data packet for 
which there is no binding?

If the former, i agree.
If the latter, could you explain what are the reaons behind that? I 
mean, what are the reasons for not mandating the functionality?

Regards, marcelo



El 05/04/10 21:16, Fred Baker escribió:
> Your argument below suggests that it might be listed as a "MAY". If it was going into the RFC at all, I would suggest putting it in an appendix as a possible implementation approach.
>
> On Apr 5, 2010, at 12:04 PM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>
>    
>> El 05/04/10 19:59, Fred Baker escribió:
>>      
>>> On Apr 4, 2010, at 11:54 AM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>        
>>>> let me ask again, are you ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?
>>>>
>>>>          
>>> I think making my off-handed "here's one way that it could be implemented", repeatedly stated as something I don't see the value of documenting AT ALL as competent implementors will think of such things without that help, a "MUST" would be completely idiotic.
>>>
>>>
>>>        
>> the thing is:
>> - There are several issues with blindly discarding data packets for which there is no binding in the SAVI switch, so it would make sense to require as MUST that SAVI switches trigger the binding creation procedure upon the reception of a data packet (instead of blindly discarding it)
>> - The argument against doing so is that it would be difficult to implement.
>> - You, in your previous note, described a way that this can be implemented, making this argument no longer hold.
>>
>> So, the question is not whether the particular way of implementing this is a MUSt but the actual functionality of triggering the binding creation procedure is a MUST, given that the argument for not doing so no longer holds.
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>>      
>>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>        
>>      
> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>
>
>    


From fred@cisco.com  Mon Apr  5 13:27:45 2010
Return-Path: <fred@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 170843A6A90 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 13:27:45 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KxzpXKmtdwgk for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 13:27:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sj-iport-4.cisco.com (sj-iport-4.cisco.com [171.68.10.86]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CEF128C1AE for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 13:20:14 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-4.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvsEAEfjuUurR7H+/2dsb2JhbACbTXGfPJgyhQcEgyQ
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.51,366,1267401600"; d="scan'208";a="110448814"
Received: from sj-core-2.cisco.com ([171.71.177.254]) by sj-iport-4.cisco.com with ESMTP; 05 Apr 2010 20:20:12 +0000
Received: from stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com (stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com [10.32.244.222]) by sj-core-2.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o35KKAp9018713; Mon, 5 Apr 2010 20:20:11 GMT
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1078)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
From: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2010 13:20:10 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es> <47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es> <F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es> <35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO> <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es> <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com> <4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es> <79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com> <4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>
To: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1078)
Cc: Greg Daley <hoskuld@hotmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Apr 2010 20:27:45 -0000

The reason for not mandating it, as I have repeatedly stated in private =
and public email, is that it is not our business to tell implementors =
how to implement things. There may be other ways to do it in a given =
implementation approach that is just as good or better.

I'm very quickly becoming sorry I brought it up. This doesn't bode well =
for future observations I might consider making.


On Apr 5, 2010, at 1:00 PM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:

> Not sure i understand what do you mean to include as a MAY. the =
implementation approach you suggested or the functionality of triggering =
the binding creation procedure upon the recpetion of a data packet for =
which there is no binding?
>=20
> If the former, i agree.
> If the latter, could you explain what are the reaons behind that? I =
mean, what are the reasons for not mandating the functionality?
>=20
> Regards, marcelo
>=20
>=20
>=20
> El 05/04/10 21:16, Fred Baker escribi=F3:
>> Your argument below suggests that it might be listed as a "MAY". If =
it was going into the RFC at all, I would suggest putting it in an =
appendix as a possible implementation approach.
>>=20
>> On Apr 5, 2010, at 12:04 PM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>=20
>>  =20
>>> El 05/04/10 19:59, Fred Baker escribi=F3:
>>>    =20
>>>> On Apr 4, 2010, at 11:54 AM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>      =20
>>>>> let me ask again, are you ok to require Fred's proposal as a MUST?
>>>>>=20
>>>>>        =20
>>>> I think making my off-handed "here's one way that it could be =
implemented", repeatedly stated as something I don't see the value of =
documenting AT ALL as competent implementors will think of such things =
without that help, a "MUST" would be completely idiotic.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>      =20
>>> the thing is:
>>> - There are several issues with blindly discarding data packets for =
which there is no binding in the SAVI switch, so it would make sense to =
require as MUST that SAVI switches trigger the binding creation =
procedure upon the reception of a data packet (instead of blindly =
discarding it)
>>> - The argument against doing so is that it would be difficult to =
implement.
>>> - You, in your previous note, described a way that this can be =
implemented, making this argument no longer hold.
>>>=20
>>> So, the question is not whether the particular way of implementing =
this is a MUSt but the actual functionality of triggering the binding =
creation procedure is a MUST, given that the argument for not doing so =
no longer holds.
>>>=20
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>    =20
>>>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>      =20
>>>    =20
>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>=20
>>=20
>>  =20
>=20

http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF


From gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com  Mon Apr  5 22:16:05 2010
Return-Path: <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25A013A6851 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 22:16:05 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.605
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.605 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RELAY_IS_203=0.994]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id P4uqWYmlc8Fu for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 22:16:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.syd.netstarnetworks.com (mail.syd.netstarnetworks.com [203.8.7.220]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E862D3A694F for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon,  5 Apr 2010 22:16:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sdcexchht.netstarnetworks.com ([10.18.193.63]) by mail.syd.netstarnetworks.com (8.12.8/8.12.8) with ESMTP id o365FmE0014051 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Tue, 6 Apr 2010 15:15:48 +1000
Received: from sdcexch.netstarnetworks.com ([fe80::cccf:1c5b:c46b:c7b1]) by sdcexchht.netstarnetworks.com ([fe80::a92b:b7d5:8094:5e10%10]) with mapi; Tue, 6 Apr 2010 15:15:40 +1000
From: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>
To: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>, marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2010 15:15:39 +1000
Thread-Topic: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
Thread-Index: AcrU/nTPj0WBuDXFQ8qdzzCrq/n6kgARinLQ
Message-ID: <E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn> <A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO> <4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com> <4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com> <4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO> <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es> <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com> <4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es> <79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com> <4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es> <F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>
Accept-Language: en-US, en-AU
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US, en-AU
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 05:16:05 -0000

Hi Fred and Marcelo,=20

I think that it's necessary to highlight to implementors that they need
to (as in MUST) implement a mechanism to bootstrap new bindings for address=
es
which they do not already have, due to the fact that various link-layers ma=
y lose
vital signalling packets during the initial connection phase.

I would be happy if the mechanism itself was left to implementor's own disc=
retion,
but none of the techniques described before in this thread ( delays introdu=
ced by
RFC4862, etc) will cope with either the 802.1D(2006) point-to-point link as=
sessment
(3 seconds), or earlier spanning-tree delays.   It also may not handle=20
802.1X authentication delays, dependent on the authentication scheme involv=
ed.

So some measure must manditorily be deployed to allow new non-conflicting b=
indings.

Implementation guidance is necessary outside the appendix if there is only
one way to perform the binding or there are some subtleties requiring atten=
tion.

I wasn't at the meeting, but it appears this is not strictly the case=20
(Are minutes available yet?).=20

We can at least place the example method in the appendix where it will get =
some
review.=20

This would allow us to identify any protocol interactions in the domain (no=
t the implementation itself), which may require further notice.

Greg Daley
(From his other e-mail address)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On=20
> Behalf Of Fred Baker
> Sent: Tuesday, 6 April 2010 6:20 AM
> To: marcelo bagnulo braun
> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open=20
> Issues in SAVI "
>=20
> The reason for not mandating it, as I have repeatedly stated=20
> in private and public email, is that it is not our business=20
> to tell implementors how to implement things. There may be=20
> other ways to do it in a given implementation approach that=20
> is just as good or better.
>=20
> I'm very quickly becoming sorry I brought it up. This doesn't=20
> bode well for future observations I might consider making.
>=20
>=20
> On Apr 5, 2010, at 1:00 PM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>=20
> > Not sure i understand what do you mean to include as a MAY.=20
> the implementation approach you suggested or the=20
> functionality of triggering the binding creation procedure=20
> upon the recpetion of a data packet for which there is no binding?
> >=20
> > If the former, i agree.
> > If the latter, could you explain what are the reaons behind=20
> that? I mean, what are the reasons for not mandating the=20
> functionality?
> >=20
> > Regards, marcelo
> >=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > El 05/04/10 21:16, Fred Baker escribi=F3:
> >> Your argument below suggests that it might be listed as a=20
> "MAY". If it was going into the RFC at all, I would suggest=20
> putting it in an appendix as a possible implementation approach.
> >>=20
> >> On Apr 5, 2010, at 12:04 PM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
> >>=20
> >>  =20
> >>> El 05/04/10 19:59, Fred Baker escribi=F3:
> >>>    =20
> >>>> On Apr 4, 2010, at 11:54 AM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
> >>>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>      =20
> >>>>> let me ask again, are you ok to require Fred's proposal=20
> as a MUST?
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>>        =20
> >>>> I think making my off-handed "here's one way that it=20
> could be implemented", repeatedly stated as something I don't=20
> see the value of documenting AT ALL as competent implementors=20
> will think of such things without that help, a "MUST" would=20
> be completely idiotic.
> >>>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>      =20
> >>> the thing is:
> >>> - There are several issues with blindly discarding data=20
> packets for which there is no binding in the SAVI switch, so=20
> it would make sense to require as MUST that SAVI switches=20
> trigger the binding creation procedure upon the reception of=20
> a data packet (instead of blindly discarding it)
> >>> - The argument against doing so is that it would be=20
> difficult to implement.
> >>> - You, in your previous note, described a way that this=20
> can be implemented, making this argument no longer hold.
> >>>=20
> >>> So, the question is not whether the particular way of=20
> implementing this is a MUSt but the actual functionality of=20
> triggering the binding creation procedure is a MUST, given=20
> that the argument for not doing so no longer holds.
> >>>=20
> >>> Regards, marcelo
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>>    =20
> >>>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
> >>>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>      =20
> >>>    =20
> >> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
> >>=20
> >>=20
> >>  =20
> >=20
>=20
> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> =

From fred@cisco.com  Tue Apr  6 00:06:32 2010
Return-Path: <fred@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D71F3A6783 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 00:06:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Al+HXECwYepa for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 00:06:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sj-iport-5.cisco.com (sj-iport-5.cisco.com [171.68.10.87]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BF9E53A679F for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 00:06:28 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-5.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvsEAM55ukurRN+J/2dsb2JhbACbTXGfD5huhQcEgyQ
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.51,371,1267401600"; d="scan'208";a="178403451"
Received: from sj-core-3.cisco.com ([171.68.223.137]) by sj-iport-5.cisco.com with ESMTP; 06 Apr 2010 07:06:24 +0000
Received: from stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com (stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com [10.32.244.222]) by sj-core-3.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o3676O1l002430; Tue, 6 Apr 2010 07:06:24 GMT
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1078)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
From: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2010 00:06:24 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn> <A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO> <4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com> <4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com> <4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO> <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es> <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com> <4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es> <79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com> <4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es> <F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com> <E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com>
To: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1078)
Cc: "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 07:06:32 -0000

On Apr 5, 2010, at 10:15 PM, Greg Daley wrote:

> We can at least place the example method in the appendix where it will =
get some
> review.=20

As an example, fine. As a MUST - I'm sorry, it's not the only way to do =
it.

http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF


From elevyabe@cisco.com  Tue Apr  6 04:13:30 2010
Return-Path: <elevyabe@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0BC8228C173 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 04:13:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oRxz2v3B+dQT for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 04:13:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ams-iport-2.cisco.com (ams-iport-2.cisco.com [144.254.224.141]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D681928C0DC for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 04:07:28 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: ams-iport-2.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Al8CAGazukuQ/uCWe2dsb2JhbACbShUBAQsLIgYcnzmZBIUJBA
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.51,371,1267401600";  d="scan'208";a="5228652"
Received: from ams-core-1.cisco.com ([144.254.224.150]) by ams-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 06 Apr 2010 10:32:12 +0000
Received: from xbh-ams-201.cisco.com (xbh-ams-201.cisco.com [144.254.75.7]) by ams-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o36B7Pwr010481; Tue, 6 Apr 2010 11:07:25 GMT
Received: from xmb-ams-105.cisco.com ([144.254.74.80]) by xbh-ams-201.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Tue, 6 Apr 2010 13:07:25 +0200
Received: from [144.254.53.106] ([144.254.53.106]) by xmb-ams-105.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Tue, 6 Apr 2010 13:07:25 +0200
Message-ID: <4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 13:07:24 +0200
From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com> <DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Apr 2010 11:07:25.0362 (UTC) FILETIME=[56919120:01CAD579]
Cc: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 11:13:30 -0000

Fred Baker a écrit :
> On Apr 5, 2010, at 10:15 PM, Greg Daley wrote:
>
>   
>> We can at least place the example method in the appendix where it will get some
>> review. 
>>     
>
> As an example, fine. As a MUST - I'm sorry, it's not the only way to do it.
>   
The question is not wether the implementation example is a MUST or not. 
It obviously cannot be... for many reasons starting with how do you know 
the implementation of a given device?
The discussion on MUST vs SHOULD or MAY is regard the principle of 
triggering a binding from the receipt of a data packet.
And Marcelo's point is: why should that not be a MUST provided that we 
all agree it's implementable in a way or another, it solves a real 
problem, and we don't have another solution that works in all the cases.
So I am really interrested in somebody who would argue that 1) it does 
not solve a real problem 2) It's not implementable 3) There is a better 
solution.
Any compeling argument on any of these 3 topics would help us making 
progress.
Eric
> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>
>   


From fred@cisco.com  Tue Apr  6 07:23:34 2010
Return-Path: <fred@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 320363A6860 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 07:23:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.586
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.586 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.013, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0D+rsJDw4+jG for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 07:23:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sj-iport-4.cisco.com (sj-iport-4.cisco.com [171.68.10.86]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0F9A73A6921 for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 07:23:29 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-4.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.51,372,1267401600"; d="scan'208";a="110980075"
Received: from sj-core-2.cisco.com ([171.71.177.254]) by sj-iport-4.cisco.com with ESMTP; 06 Apr 2010 14:23:27 +0000
Received: from stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com (stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com [10.32.244.222]) by sj-core-2.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o36ENQjg016887; Tue, 6 Apr 2010 14:23:26 GMT
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1078)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
From: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2010 07:23:26 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com> <DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com> <4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com>
To: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1078)
Cc: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 14:23:34 -0000

On Apr 6, 2010, at 4:07 AM, Eric Levy-Abegnoli wrote:

> Fred Baker a =E9crit :
>> On Apr 5, 2010, at 10:15 PM, Greg Daley wrote:
>>=20
>> =20
>>> We can at least place the example method in the appendix where it =
will get some
>>> review.    =20
>>=20
>> As an example, fine. As a MUST - I'm sorry, it's not the only way to =
do it.
>> =20
> The question is not wether the implementation example is a MUST or =
not. It obviously cannot be... for many reasons starting with how do you =
know the implementation of a given device?

Tell Marcello. He's the one I am responding to.

> The discussion on MUST vs SHOULD or MAY is regard the principle of =
triggering a binding from the receipt of a data packet.
> And Marcelo's point is: why should that not be a MUST provided that we =
all agree it's implementable in a way or another, it solves a real =
problem, and we don't have another solution that works in all the cases.
> So I am really interrested in somebody who would argue that 1) it does =
not solve a real problem 2) It's not implementable 3) There is a better =
solution.

Well, I think that picking it up from DHCP is a better solution in =
networks that use DHCP, as DHCP is authoritative. In networks that don't =
use DHCP, I thought the working group had concluded that picking it up =
from uses of the address was the only workable approach.

I assert that it is implementable, and at least one way to do so is as I =
suggested.

I assert that while the working group consensus appears to be that FCFS =
is the only workable approach, it has a security problem. If the purpose =
of SAVI is to prevent hosts from spoofing addresses, we have to define =
"spoofing". Clearly if one host interface is using an address and a =
second host interface starts using it, the usage is incorrect and SAVI =
should prevent it. I assert that if a host starts using an address, it =
is not statically configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate =
address detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC, and this =
second usage is also a problem. FCFS doesn't detect the second case; it =
presumes that the address was statically configured or that the switch =
failed to observe the DAD.



> Any compeling argument on any of these 3 topics would help us making =
progress.
> Eric
>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>=20
>> =20
>=20

http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF


From elevyabe@cisco.com  Tue Apr  6 09:04:00 2010
Return-Path: <elevyabe@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 435933A68AA for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:04:00 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KDGHhTijohzS for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:03:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ams-iport-2.cisco.com (ams-iport-2.cisco.com [144.254.224.141]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 845013A6850 for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:03:58 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: ams-iport-2.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: As4BAFr4ukuQ/uCWe2dsb2JhbACbOxUBAQsLIgYcogSZBIUJBA
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.51,373,1267401600";  d="scan'208";a="5244730"
Received: from ams-core-1.cisco.com ([144.254.224.150]) by ams-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 06 Apr 2010 15:28:40 +0000
Received: from xbh-ams-201.cisco.com (xbh-ams-201.cisco.com [144.254.75.7]) by ams-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o36G3tTf006355; Tue, 6 Apr 2010 16:03:55 GMT
Received: from xmb-ams-105.cisco.com ([144.254.74.80]) by xbh-ams-201.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Tue, 6 Apr 2010 18:03:55 +0200
Received: from [144.254.53.106] ([144.254.53.106]) by xmb-ams-105.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Tue, 6 Apr 2010 18:03:54 +0200
Message-ID: <4BBB5B69.9020309@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 18:03:53 +0200
From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com> <DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com> <4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com> <F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Apr 2010 16:03:54.0753 (UTC) FILETIME=[C1DF3710:01CAD5A2]
Cc: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 16:04:00 -0000

Hi Fred,
Fred Baker a écrit :
> On Apr 6, 2010, at 4:07 AM, Eric Levy-Abegnoli wrote:
>
>   
>> Fred Baker a écrit :
>>     
>>> On Apr 5, 2010, at 10:15 PM, Greg Daley wrote:
>>>
>>>  
>>>       
>>>> We can at least place the example method in the appendix where it will get some
>>>> review.     
>>>>         
>>> As an example, fine. As a MUST - I'm sorry, it's not the only way to do it.
>>>  
>>>       
>> The question is not wether the implementation example is a MUST or not. It obviously cannot be... for many reasons starting with how do you know the implementation of a given device?
>>     
>
> Tell Marcello. He's the one I am responding to.
>   
Sure. Hopefully he will respond if he disagree.
>   
>> The discussion on MUST vs SHOULD or MAY is regard the principle of triggering a binding from the receipt of a data packet.
>> And Marcelo's point is: why should that not be a MUST provided that we all agree it's implementable in a way or another, it solves a real problem, and we don't have another solution that works in all the cases.
>> So I am really interrested in somebody who would argue that 1) it does not solve a real problem 2) It's not implementable 3) There is a better solution.
>>     
>
> Well, I think that picking it up from DHCP is a better solution in networks that use DHCP, as DHCP is authoritative. 
Not good. On a layer2 device; quite often there is no DHCP stack. And no 
IP, including no IP to source from.

> In networks that don't use DHCP, I thought the working group had concluded that picking it up from uses of the address was the only workable approach.
>
> I assert that it is implementable, and at least one way to do so is as I suggested.
>
> I assert that while the working group consensus appears to be that FCFS is the only workable approach, it has a security problem. If the purpose of SAVI is to prevent hosts from spoofing addresses, we have to define "spoofing". Clearly if one host interface is using an address and a second host interface starts using it, the usage is incorrect and SAVI should prevent it. I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not statically configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC, and this second usage is also a problem. FCFS doesn't detect the second case; it presumes that the address was statically configured or that the switch failed to observe the DAD.
>   
Just trying to clarify. What is the security issue there? That the 
switch will nicely  install a binding and accept subsequent traffic? 
That is pretty much un-avoidable with SLACC, isn't it? At least we know 
which anchor this IP is bound to, and we could always trace it back. 
DHCP is defintely more secure if that's your point. For global, not 
link-locals though.
Eric
>
>
>   
>> Any compeling argument on any of these 3 topics would help us making progress.
>> Eric
>>     
>>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>>  
>>>       
>
> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>
>
>   


From fred@cisco.com  Tue Apr  6 09:20:31 2010
Return-Path: <fred@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A4F43A6987 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:20:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id QuvZaT4vvuaN for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:20:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rtp-iport-2.cisco.com (rtp-iport-2.cisco.com [64.102.122.149]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F1F063A6984 for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:20:18 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: rtp-iport-2.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.51,373,1267401600"; d="scan'208";a="99345025"
Received: from rtp-core-1.cisco.com ([64.102.124.12]) by rtp-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 06 Apr 2010 16:20:15 +0000
Received: from stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com (stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com [10.32.244.222]) by rtp-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o36GKDdo007818; Tue, 6 Apr 2010 16:20:14 GMT
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1078)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
From: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBB5B69.9020309@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2010 09:20:13 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <D78B475D-A38D-4627-91BB-C9EBEB28BF93@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com> <DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com> <4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com> <F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com> <4BBB5B69.9020309@cisco.com>
To: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1078)
Cc: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 16:20:31 -0000

On Apr 6, 2010, at 9:03 AM, Eric Levy-Abegnoli wrote:
>> Well, I think that picking it up from DHCP is a better solution in =
networks that use DHCP, as DHCP is authoritative.=20
> Not good. On a layer2 device; quite often there is no DHCP stack. And =
no IP, including no IP to source from.

Hmm. We manage to do that for IPv4 in the field today...

>> In networks that don't use DHCP, I thought the working group had =
concluded that picking it up from uses of the address was the only =
workable approach.
>>=20
>> I assert that it is implementable, and at least one way to do so is =
as I suggested.
>>=20
>> I assert that while the working group consensus appears to be that =
FCFS is the only workable approach, it has a security problem. If the =
purpose of SAVI is to prevent hosts from spoofing addresses, we have to =
define "spoofing". Clearly if one host interface is using an address and =
a second host interface starts using it, the usage is incorrect and SAVI =
should prevent it. I assert that if a host starts using an address, it =
is not statically configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate =
address detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC, and this =
second usage is also a problem. FCFS doesn't detect the second case; it =
presumes that the address was statically configured or that the switch =
failed to observe the DAD.
>> =20
> Just trying to clarify. What is the security issue there? That the =
switch will nicely  install a binding and accept subsequent traffic? =
That is pretty much un-avoidable with SLACC, isn't it?

Well, if SLAAC is actually used, it is exactly as it should be. Reread =
my description of the issue. Absent DAD, SLAAC has not been used; the =
host has simply started using an address that it has not verified. What =
I am saying is that a host can fire-and-forget, using up addresses as =
fast as it can send datagrams, and that becomes an attack on the switch =
(it is using up memory and filter resources, and the process is very =
busy). I pointed this out when we first started discussing FCFS in =
Dublin, and it's still a DOS attack.

There is of course a mitigation. At some point the switch either stops =
accepting new addresses from the host or by some algorithm starts =
forgetting about old ones. Both of those have built-in attacks as well; =
let's assume that "some algorithm" is "LRU", so that in the general case =
we can expect the switch to stop remembering addresses that the host is =
no longer using. Let's assume that most processes on the host are using =
a certain one, allocated yesterday using SLAAC properly. But some rogue =
process (virus/whatever) starts chewing through addresses at a time that =
none of those other processes happen to be "speaking". This becomes a =
DOS on the other processes on the system - the SAVI switch will not =
accept their traffic.

IMHO, there is no real solution here; it should simply be noted as a =
"Security Consideration".

> At least we know which anchor this IP is bound to, and we could always =
trace it back. DHCP is defintely more secure if that's your point. For =
global, not link-locals though.

Yes, and of course.

> Eric
>>=20
>>=20
>> =20
>>> Any compeling argument on any of these 3 topics would help us making =
progress.
>>> Eric
>>>   =20
>>>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>=20
>>>>      =20
>>=20
>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>=20
>>=20
>> =20
>=20

http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Tue Apr  6 09:59:06 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D0CE3A67DF for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:59:06 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.237
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.237 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.866,  BAYES_00=-2.599, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495, STOX_REPLY_TYPE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yJEIFVEQO2WN for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:59:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD26B3A67AE for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 09:59:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024184.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.184] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1NzC6y-0005z4-Np; Wed, 07 Apr 2010 00:58:48 +0800
Message-ID: <2A75DC5B7EE643F98EEBBB53CDA4AD20@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>, "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
References: <D78B475D-A38D-4627-91BB-C9EBEB28BF93@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <D78B475D-A38D-4627-91BB-C9EBEB28BF93@cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 2010 00:58:54 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=original
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 16:59:06 -0000

Hi All,

Thanks to Fred, Eric, Greg, and others for the constructive discussion.

I think Fred Baker point out why the data-triggered can not be MUST.
Moreover, based on the feedback from vendors, and as one form operators, I 
am strongly against to have the data-triggered as a MUST, because I don't 
think it is not feasible and it can not be widely implementable (sorry to 
repeat my points so many times).

However, I have to say what Fred had proposed is not the original 
data-triggered actions, it is actually a new *counter-triggered actions* to 
help for recovering from the unexpected situation. The counter-triggered is 
implementable and is feasible to do rate limit (based on the discussions the 
past weeks, it's not feasible to rate limit for data-triggered actions).

Based on the discussions, I propose to have several alternatives we can 
state in the drafts:
1 every savi-switch MUST implement the counter-triggered (not 
data-triggered)
 alert (so that the admin can know and recover the state if he wants), and 
SHOULD implement the counter triggered probe. OR
2 Put the counter-triggered into the appendix (because as Fred and Greg 
stated, that's only one example of the feasible way). OR
3 Only state the problems in the security considerations.

Meanwhile, the data-triggered probe can be an optional function (although I 
think there will be very few real implementation on the data-triggered in 
reality, maybe only very high-end switch can implement it) in addition to 
any of the above alternative.

Best Regards,
Jun Bi





--------------------------------------------------
From: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 12:20 AM
To: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "Suresh 
Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

>
> On Apr 6, 2010, at 9:03 AM, Eric Levy-Abegnoli wrote:
>>> Well, I think that picking it up from DHCP is a better solution in 
>>> networks that use DHCP, as DHCP is authoritative.
>> Not good. On a layer2 device; quite often there is no DHCP stack. And no 
>> IP, including no IP to source from.
>
> Hmm. We manage to do that for IPv4 in the field today...
>
>>> In networks that don't use DHCP, I thought the working group had 
>>> concluded that picking it up from uses of the address was the only 
>>> workable approach.
>>>
>>> I assert that it is implementable, and at least one way to do so is as I 
>>> suggested.
>>>
>>> I assert that while the working group consensus appears to be that FCFS 
>>> is the only workable approach, it has a security problem. If the purpose 
>>> of SAVI is to prevent hosts from spoofing addresses, we have to define 
>>> "spoofing". Clearly if one host interface is using an address and a 
>>> second host interface starts using it, the usage is incorrect and SAVI 
>>> should prevent it. I assert that if a host starts using an address, it 
>>> is not statically configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate 
>>> address detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC, and this 
>>> second usage is also a problem. FCFS doesn't detect the second case; it 
>>> presumes that the address was statically configured or that the switch 
>>> failed to observe the DAD.
>>>
>> Just trying to clarify. What is the security issue there? That the switch 
>> will nicely  install a binding and accept subsequent traffic? That is 
>> pretty much un-avoidable with SLACC, isn't it?
>
> Well, if SLAAC is actually used, it is exactly as it should be. Reread my 
> description of the issue. Absent DAD, SLAAC has not been used; the host 
> has simply started using an address that it has not verified. What I am 
> saying is that a host can fire-and-forget, using up addresses as fast as 
> it can send datagrams, and that becomes an attack on the switch (it is 
> using up memory and filter resources, and the process is very busy). I 
> pointed this out when we first started discussing FCFS in Dublin, and it's 
> still a DOS attack.
>
> There is of course a mitigation. At some point the switch either stops 
> accepting new addresses from the host or by some algorithm starts 
> forgetting about old ones. Both of those have built-in attacks as well; 
> let's assume that "some algorithm" is "LRU", so that in the general case 
> we can expect the switch to stop remembering addresses that the host is no 
> longer using. Let's assume that most processes on the host are using a 
> certain one, allocated yesterday using SLAAC properly. But some rogue 
> process (virus/whatever) starts chewing through addresses at a time that 
> none of those other processes happen to be "speaking". This becomes a DOS 
> on the other processes on the system - the SAVI switch will not accept 
> their traffic.
>
> IMHO, there is no real solution here; it should simply be noted as a 
> "Security Consideration".
>
>> At least we know which anchor this IP is bound to, and we could always 
>> trace it back. DHCP is defintely more secure if that's your point. For 
>> global, not link-locals though.
>
> Yes, and of course.
>
>> Eric
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Any compeling argument on any of these 3 topics would help us making 
>>>> progress.
>>>> Eric
>>>>
>>>>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com  Tue Apr  6 10:20:50 2010
Return-Path: <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0897F3A68C2 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 10:20:46 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dX3MOxzAobFs for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 10:20:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from imr2.ericy.com (imr2.ericy.com [198.24.6.3]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32FB23A6803 for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 10:20:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from eusaamw0711.eamcs.ericsson.se ([147.117.20.178]) by imr2.ericy.com (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id o36HOXX3009625; Tue, 6 Apr 2010 12:24:33 -0500
Received: from [142.133.10.113] (147.117.20.212) by eusaamw0711.eamcs.ericsson.se (147.117.20.179) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 8.1.375.2; Tue, 6 Apr 2010 13:20:36 -0400
Message-ID: <4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2010 13:15:24 -0400
From: Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (X11/20100317)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com> <DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com> <4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com> <F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 17:20:50 -0000

Hi Fred,
    Responding just to one of your scenarios

On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
<snip>
> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not statically 
  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC

I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the host
DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability of
happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the savi
device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be very
unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover from this.

Thanks
Suresh



From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Tue Apr  6 10:41:41 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6100C3A6966 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 10:41:41 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.586
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.586 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-1.11, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jlz8ePrQBnWU for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 10:41:40 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 9A6323A6998 for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Apr 2010 10:41:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.184]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bbba52a; Wed, 07 Apr 2010 01:41:14 +0800
Message-ID: <094DB0E79C7641DDA94996B08A0CDB9E@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>, "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<A14868BFEB264490930FBA173FB99C6E@junbiVAIO>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com><DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com><4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com><F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com> <4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 2010 01:41:01 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: UWCmMzXB
Cc: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2010 17:41:41 -0000

Hi Suresh,

Thanks for the comment.

I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC itself, not 
savi-slaac. Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for 
anti-spoofing.

To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the SLAAC-state 
in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol and host change are 
not permitted).

Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal requirement 
might be that the admin need a way to figure out there is a problem when 
this none-0 possibility event happens. For this reason, then I think a 
counter-triggered alert might be considered as a MUST.

thanks,
Jun Bi

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> Hi Fred,
>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
>
> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
> <snip>
>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not statically
>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
>
> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the host
> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability of
> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the savi
> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be very
> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover from 
> this.
>
> Thanks
> Suresh
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From elevyabe@cisco.com  Thu Apr  8 02:11:38 2010
Return-Path: <elevyabe@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 558BB3A69F4 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 02:11:38 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=4.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id syyWhuL4T5To for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 02:11:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sj-iport-2.cisco.com (sj-iport-2.cisco.com [171.71.176.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8DE853A6A2A for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 02:11:19 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-2.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvsEAPs6vUurRN+K/2dsb2JhbACbLXGfWpkihQkEjjo
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.52,169,1270425600"; d="scan'208";a="249708326"
Received: from sj-core-4.cisco.com ([171.68.223.138]) by sj-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Apr 2010 09:11:16 +0000
Received: from xbh-ams-101.cisco.com (xbh-ams-101.cisco.com [144.254.74.71]) by sj-core-4.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o389BFio019829; Thu, 8 Apr 2010 09:11:16 GMT
Received: from xmb-ams-105.cisco.com ([144.254.74.80]) by xbh-ams-101.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Thu, 8 Apr 2010 11:11:11 +0200
Received: from [144.254.53.106] ([144.254.53.106]) by xmb-ams-105.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Thu, 8 Apr 2010 11:11:10 +0200
Message-ID: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>
Date: Thu, 08 Apr 2010 11:11:10 +0200
From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com><DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com><4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com><F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>	<4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com> <094DB0E79C7641DDA94996B08A0CDB9E@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <094DB0E79C7641DDA94996B08A0CDB9E@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 08 Apr 2010 09:11:10.0896 (UTC) FILETIME=[6E4A0300:01CAD6FB]
Cc: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, savi@ietf.org, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Apr 2010 09:11:38 -0000

Hi Jun,
Bi Jun a écrit :
>
> Hi Suresh,
>
> Thanks for the comment.
>
> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC 
> itself, not savi-slaac. 
The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is extremely 
low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated 
address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking traffic 
just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much bigger 
issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the loss of 
a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially probable)..
So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
Eric

> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for anti-spoofing.
>
> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the 
> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol 
> and host change are not permitted).
>
> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal 
> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there is 
> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this reason, 
> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a MUST.
>
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
> SAVI "
>
>> Hi Fred,
>>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
>>
>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
>> <snip>
>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not statically
>>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
>>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
>>
>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the host
>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability of
>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the savi
>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be very
>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover from 
>> this.
>>
>> Thanks
>> Suresh
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>


From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Thu Apr  8 02:34:49 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA5343A6825 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 02:34:49 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fgo1p9KwexIk for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 02:34:49 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from qw-out-2122.google.com (qw-out-2122.google.com [74.125.92.24]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A3E93A67D4 for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 02:34:48 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qw-out-2122.google.com with SMTP id 9so669338qwb.31 for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu, 08 Apr 2010 02:34:42 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=GZIdOzcbbcibq0ArlpFg8ZP7Yr/hZh/NmZFe1/Dw+U0=; b=MMAol3UgBZsv1FwkttWPP7fekujg9gnymW5LHcGWhXr6+2NBk8kIs+Zq6g4wkM3upG DNNtUG6uvKfRwiMvm6wf7DZgjzE9LEyCjoJypSeO0vIlDJb3aUkvw7vqgntaF3DfRR8V w7KLQuWTDyaLYHjF8K5yjM5X2DHw8Bpp60uGI=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=XyNGYNeRMeyC97sWu/uv9ii4otqkOYsh2v5h+1f+yW3fOKJuaNf5XrHoqAM55Z6YJk Q7C1zRP55FJUjrX0LNPVDVGq4bjeDpI/S+Kmo8Dyc9H553XQGMm1FcZtWqDXJ841oRST zPJv8i3pyw466zfu9w0pi24lQszdEW2i9qKc4=
Received: by 10.229.193.18 with SMTP id ds18mr4076463qcb.14.1270719282339; Thu, 08 Apr 2010 02:34:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (tu132201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.132.201]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id v26sm130416qce.7.2010.04.08.02.34.38 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Thu, 08 Apr 2010 02:34:41 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'Eric Levy-Abegnoli'" <elevyabe@cisco.com>, "'Bi Jun'" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com><DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com><4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com><F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>	<4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com>	<094DB0E79C7641DDA94996B08A0CDB9E@junbiVAIO> <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2010 17:34:27 +0800
Message-ID: <4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcrW+4PPWlvlzeTfQy234e7bUAQKJQAAlRKw
Content-Language: zh-cn
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Apr 2010 09:34:50 -0000

Hi Eric,

I don't think it's the problem of savi.=20

I'd rather to say, slaac is not suitable for savi. However, it's the =
only
protocol can be snooped in slaac-only scenario. Savi has no other =
choice.

BR,
Guang

> -----Original Message-----
> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of
Eric
> Levy-Abegnoli
> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
> To: Bi Jun
> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in =
SAVI
"
>=20
> Hi Jun,
> Bi Jun a =E9crit :
> >
> > Hi Suresh,
> >
> > Thanks for the comment.
> >
> > I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
> > itself, not savi-slaac.
> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is =
extremely
> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking =
traffic
> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much bigger
> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the loss =
of
> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially probable)..
> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
> Eric
>=20
> > Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
anti-spoofing.
> >
> > To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
> > 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
> > 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
> > SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol
> > and host change are not permitted).
> >
> > Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
> > requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there =
is
> > a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this =
reason,
> > then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a =
MUST.
> >
> > thanks,
> > Jun Bi
> >
> > --------------------------------------------------
> > From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
> > To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
> > Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
> > Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues =
in
> > SAVI "
> >
> >> Hi Fred,
> >>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
> >>
> >> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
> >> <snip>
> >>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not =
statically
> >>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
> >>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
> >>
> >> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the =
host
> >> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
> >> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability =
of
> >> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
> >> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the
savi
> >> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be =
very
> >> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover =
from
> >> this.
> >>
> >> Thanks
> >> Suresh
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> savi mailing list
> >> savi@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > savi mailing list
> > savi@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi


From fred@cisco.com  Thu Apr  8 11:02:37 2010
Return-Path: <fred@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97CB23A6A40 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 11:02:37 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.573
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.573 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.026, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id a5JK8y2iIR4S for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 11:02:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sj-iport-6.cisco.com (sj-iport-6.cisco.com [171.71.176.117]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 401013A68E6 for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 11:02:33 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-6.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.52,171,1270425600"; d="scan'208";a="511577775"
Received: from sj-core-3.cisco.com ([171.68.223.137]) by sj-iport-6.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Apr 2010 18:02:30 +0000
Received: from stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com (stealth-10-32-244-222.cisco.com [10.32.244.222]) by sj-core-3.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o38I2TUD005768; Thu, 8 Apr 2010 18:02:29 GMT
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1078)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
From: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2010 11:02:29 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <10CFBC22-7FA5-4EDC-9FBC-E9AD907170F5@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com><DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com><4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com><F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>	<4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com>	<094DB0E79C7641DDA94996B08A0CDB9E@junbiVAIO> <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com> <4bb da331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>
To: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1078)
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Apr 2010 18:02:37 -0000

There I would agree. What might be appropriate would be for SAVI to make =
a comment re SLAAC to 6man. But it's 6man's problem.

On Apr 8, 2010, at 2:34 AM, Guang Yao wrote:

> Hi Eric,
>=20
> I don't think it's the problem of savi.=20
>=20
> I'd rather to say, slaac is not suitable for savi. However, it's the =
only
> protocol can be snooped in slaac-only scenario. Savi has no other =
choice.
>=20
> BR,
> Guang
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of
> Eric
>> Levy-Abegnoli
>> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
>> To: Bi Jun
>> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in =
SAVI
> "
>>=20
>> Hi Jun,
>> Bi Jun a =E9crit :
>>>=20
>>> Hi Suresh,
>>>=20
>>> Thanks for the comment.
>>>=20
>>> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
>>> itself, not savi-slaac.
>> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is =
extremely
>> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
>> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking =
traffic
>> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much =
bigger
>> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the loss =
of
>> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially probable)..
>> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
>> Eric
>>=20
>>> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
> anti-spoofing.
>>>=20
>>> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
>>> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
>>> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
>>> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol
>>> and host change are not permitted).
>>>=20
>>> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
>>> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there =
is
>>> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this =
reason,
>>> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a =
MUST.
>>>=20
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>=20
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
>>> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
>>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues =
in
>>> SAVI "
>>>=20
>>>> Hi Fred,
>>>>   Responding just to one of your scenarios
>>>>=20
>>>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
>>>> <snip>
>>>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not =
statically
>>>>> configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
>>>>> detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
>>>>=20
>>>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the =
host
>>>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
>>>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability =
of
>>>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
>>>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the
> savi
>>>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be =
very
>>>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover =
from
>>>> this.
>>>>=20
>>>> Thanks
>>>> Suresh
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi

http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF


From gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com  Thu Apr  8 19:58:05 2010
Return-Path: <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CA24C3A6ABC for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 19:58:05 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.605
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.605 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RELAY_IS_203=0.994]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DpKm2xILSadO for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 19:58:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.syd.netstarnetworks.com (mail.syd.netstarnetworks.com [203.8.7.220]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38E6C3A69AC for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu,  8 Apr 2010 19:58:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sdcexchht.netstarnetworks.com ([10.18.193.63]) by mail.syd.netstarnetworks.com (8.12.8/8.12.8) with ESMTP id o392vqE0028115 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Fri, 9 Apr 2010 12:57:52 +1000
Received: from sdcexch.netstarnetworks.com ([fe80::cccf:1c5b:c46b:c7b1]) by sdcexchht.netstarnetworks.com ([fe80::a92b:b7d5:8094:5e10%10]) with mapi; Fri, 9 Apr 2010 12:57:45 +1000
From: Greg Daley <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>
To: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2010 12:57:43 +1000
Thread-Topic: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
Thread-Index: AcrXRazoHEdOJywfTvelKZcvelRAhgASqtzA
Message-ID: <E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46F7D@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn> <4BAA2A88.3080009@joelhalpern.com> <4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com> <4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com> <4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO> <4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO> <4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO> <4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es> <0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com> <4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es> <79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com> <4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es> <F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com> <E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com><DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com><4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com><F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com> <4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com>	<094DB0E79C7641DDA94996B08A0CDB9E@junbiVAIO> <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com> <4bb	da331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com> <10CFBC22-7FA5-4EDC-9FBC-E9AD907170F5@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <10CFBC22-7FA5-4EDC-9FBC-E9AD907170F5@cisco.com>
Accept-Language: en-US, en-AU
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US, en-AU
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 02:58:05 -0000

Hi Fred and Guang,

MLDv2 can be snooped as well, but doesn't provide direct unicast IP mapping=
s.

Greg Daley

=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On=20
> Behalf Of Fred Baker
> Sent: Friday, 9 April 2010 4:02 AM
> To: Guang Yao
> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; 'Suresh Krishnan'
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open=20
> Issues in SAVI "
>=20
> There I would agree. What might be appropriate would be for=20
> SAVI to make a comment re SLAAC to 6man. But it's 6man's problem.
>=20
> On Apr 8, 2010, at 2:34 AM, Guang Yao wrote:
>=20
> > Hi Eric,
> >=20
> > I don't think it's the problem of savi.=20
> >=20
> > I'd rather to say, slaac is not suitable for savi. However,=20
> it's the only
> > protocol can be snooped in slaac-only scenario. Savi has no=20
> other choice.
> >=20
> > BR,
> > Guang
> >=20
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org]=20
> On Behalf Of
> > Eric
> >> Levy-Abegnoli
> >> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
> >> To: Bi Jun
> >> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
> >> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of=20
> Open Issues in SAVI
> > "
> >>=20
> >> Hi Jun,
> >> Bi Jun a =E9crit :
> >>>=20
> >>> Hi Suresh,
> >>>=20
> >>> Thanks for the comment.
> >>>=20
> >>> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
> >>> itself, not savi-slaac.
> >> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone=20
> is extremely
> >> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
> >> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By=20
> blocking traffic
> >> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a=20
> much bigger
> >> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and=20
> since the loss of
> >> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially=20
> probable)..
> >> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
> >> Eric
> >>=20
> >>> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
> > anti-spoofing.
> >>>=20
> >>> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
> >>> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
> >>> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
> >>> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the=20
> new protocol
> >>> and host change are not permitted).
> >>>=20
> >>> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
> >>> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure=20
> out there is
> >>> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For=20
> this reason,
> >>> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be=20
> considered as a MUST.
> >>>=20
> >>> thanks,
> >>> Jun Bi
> >>>=20
> >>> --------------------------------------------------
> >>> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> >>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
> >>> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
> >>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
> >>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of=20
> Open Issues in
> >>> SAVI "
> >>>=20
> >>>> Hi Fred,
> >>>>   Responding just to one of your scenarios
> >>>>=20
> >>>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
> >>>> <snip>
> >>>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is=20
> not statically
> >>>>> configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
> >>>>> detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
> >>>>=20
> >>>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case=20
> where the host
> >>>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
> >>>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero=20
> probability of
> >>>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
> >>>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active=20
> and hence the
> > savi
> >>>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message.=20
> I would be very
> >>>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever=20
> recover from
> >>>> this.
> >>>>=20
> >>>> Thanks
> >>>> Suresh
> >>>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> savi mailing list
> >>>> savi@ietf.org
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>>>=20
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> savi mailing list
> >>> savi@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>>=20
> >>=20
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> savi mailing list
> >> savi@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > savi mailing list
> > savi@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>=20
> http://www.ipinc.net/IPv4.GIF
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> =

From elevyabe@cisco.com  Fri Apr  9 01:25:23 2010
Return-Path: <elevyabe@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8559C3A69CF for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 01:25:23 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.782
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.782 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.517,  BAYES_00=-2.599, MANGLED_WANT=2.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ilwMMcDEQCtZ for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 01:25:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ams-iport-1.cisco.com (ams-iport-1.cisco.com [144.254.224.140]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D73553A62C1 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 01:23:46 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: ams-iport-1.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AqQBAEeBvkuQ/uCWe2dsb2JhbACbOxUBAQsLIgYcn1KZK4UJBA
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.52,176,1270425600"; d="scan'208";a="59179700"
Received: from ams-core-1.cisco.com ([144.254.224.150]) by ams-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 09 Apr 2010 08:23:42 +0000
Received: from xbh-ams-201.cisco.com (xbh-ams-201.cisco.com [144.254.75.7]) by ams-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o398NgCh010505; Fri, 9 Apr 2010 08:23:42 GMT
Received: from xmb-ams-105.cisco.com ([144.254.74.80]) by xbh-ams-201.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Fri, 9 Apr 2010 10:23:41 +0200
Received: from [144.254.53.106] ([144.254.53.106]) by xmb-ams-105.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Fri, 9 Apr 2010 10:23:41 +0200
Message-ID: <4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 10:23:41 +0200
From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com><DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com><4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com><F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>	<4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com>	<094DB0E79C7641DDA94996B08A0CDB9E@junbiVAIO> <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com> <4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google. com>
In-Reply-To: <4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 09 Apr 2010 08:23:41.0746 (UTC) FILETIME=[F679F920:01CAD7BD]
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 08:25:23 -0000

Hi Guang,
Guang Yao a écrit :
> Hi Eric,
>
> I don't think it's the problem of savi. 
>
> I'd rather to say, slaac is not suitable for savi. However, it's the only
> protocol can be snooped in slaac-only scenario. Savi has no other choice.
>
>   
I don't understand this statement. Or rather we are going in circles. We 
could snoop anything. We could snoop TCP for what it's worth. UDP, ICMP, 
you name it. I know, none would work for what we need, but the 
reasonning behind 1) NDP/DAD is is the only thing we can (wan't?) snoop, 
2) it does not work in all cases for savi , 3) hence DAD is broken is a 
sophism.
There has been another snooping "type" (let's not call that "protocol") 
put on the table for the last 3 IETF: that is data-snooping. Maye it's 
time to take a poll at this one?
Note that if we conclude that it is not possible to build a decent 
binding tbale by snooping whatever traffic the solution is not to fix  
DAD  to make it snoopable. DAD is not a broken protocol as far as I 
know. Instead we need savi to have its own protocol (not snooping anymore).
Eric
> BR,
> Guang
>
>   
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>     
> Eric
>   
>> Levy-Abegnoli
>> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
>> To: Bi Jun
>> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI
>>     
> "
>   
>> Hi Jun,
>> Bi Jun a écrit :
>>     
>>> Hi Suresh,
>>>
>>> Thanks for the comment.
>>>
>>> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
>>> itself, not savi-slaac.
>>>       
>> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is extremely
>> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
>> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking traffic
>> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much bigger
>> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the loss of
>> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially probable)..
>> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
>> Eric
>>
>>     
>>> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
>>>       
> anti-spoofing.
>   
>>> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
>>> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
>>> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
>>> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol
>>> and host change are not permitted).
>>>
>>> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
>>> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there is
>>> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this reason,
>>> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a MUST.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
>>> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
>>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in
>>> SAVI "
>>>
>>>       
>>>> Hi Fred,
>>>>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
>>>>
>>>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
>>>> <snip>
>>>>         
>>>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not statically
>>>>>           
>>>>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
>>>>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
>>>>
>>>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the host
>>>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
>>>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability of
>>>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
>>>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the
>>>>         
> savi
>   
>>>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be very
>>>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover from
>>>> this.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>> Suresh
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>>       
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>     
>
>
>   


From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Fri Apr  9 03:13:06 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F0803A6982 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 03:13:06 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.149
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.149 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.450, BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_73=0.6, MANGLED_WANT=2.3]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 27-rFERhkxVW for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 03:13:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pw0-f44.google.com (mail-pw0-f44.google.com [209.85.160.44]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 617CF3A6919 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 03:13:03 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pwj2 with SMTP id 2so2669723pwj.31 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri, 09 Apr 2010 03:12:57 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=UDLZMgn2XmKLWBguseauKBNPZRu7ojBHLtkFYR5HlhI=; b=WGSwfcF5Aq08QrVOPNTSdTfSW0D/qkHmYqWqeYkEGM6CYR95X35lycGdCW0MIIiXza rG+8ku5pxrBXA3pQypw3ncAE00Kzfroyk2HwjlDM+LSTJHWwBlJucTp70mVBnzZK2Ftl SndDQNdZZY9raAenASj4Hw18c7xmbIQEe5APA=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=iV4E7ZE9ohUin7i9HOwsA/IQLhRs2LvKBDd9pWJQNsu6MbDdrVTr3eoBT5rrjklhwC h6Gv8YRQuWrb4/M1p8hI43mSct7BNp2GKUSXqfSmmEWIYl4USApcWmDl6m1rGkssE++O Qc1cLc1uw6EtWLcXaq6LVOPn4nflj3qf3vUhM=
Received: by 10.140.58.10 with SMTP id g10mr1765343rva.85.1270807977526; Fri, 09 Apr 2010 03:12:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (tu132201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.132.201]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 21sm822157pzk.0.2010.04.09.03.12.54 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Fri, 09 Apr 2010 03:12:57 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'Eric Levy-Abegnoli'" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
References: <001701cacb01$fce5e0d0$f6b1a270$@tsinghua.edu.cn>	<4bb59055.5444f10a.3081.35f8@mx.google.com>	<4BB60155.6010400@joelhalpern.com><4bb70513.9513f30a.3279.68ce@mx.google.com>	<4BB7346B.5030509@it.uc3m.es>	<47B159DB1C2F4F3FBF7F929B679E7A0D@junbiVAIO>	<4BB85142.7030200@it.uc3m.es>	<F03523C83B6441018C8A6FC30B28BC53@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8DB20.5020903@it.uc3m.es>	<35BF16C4F2B3428B85311DF83CC3D9C1@junbiVAIO>	<4BB8E07F.6020401@it.uc3m.es>	<0351704E-105E-4F7F-8C11-E43515B95F34@cisco.com>	<4BBA343D.6090501@it.uc3m.es>	<79C46CC6-986D-4B6D-BA2B-C0DB593AC2B1@cisco.com>	<4BBA4145.6070602@it.uc3m.es>	<F0C0AF99-1117-4906-945C-98ECACB4339A@cisco.com>	<E12CAEE9B45DF740BB60A487FC3B37C6012AD5C46DCC@SDCEXCH.netstarnetworks.com><DEA62F49-1746-4948-9902-D4F6992D431B@cisco.com><4BBB15EC.3040306@cisco.com><F9EDC199-2103-4135-8860-27EA58859B68@cisco.com>	<4BBB6C2C.7040500@ericsson.com>	<094DB0E79C7641DDA94996B08A0CDB9E@junbiVAIO> <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com> <4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google. com> <4BBEE40D.8090607 @cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2010 18:12:48 +0800
Message-ID: <4bbefda9.9513f30a.214d.3c9b@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcrXvffRc7ng2U8lT8ulk6r1KVeLfwABydKw
Content-Language: zh-cn
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 10:13:06 -0000

Hi Eric,

If RFC4862 said, the node can send a Data/TCP/UDP/ICMP instead of =
sending NS
when performing DAD, I will be OK with snooping other traffic. But as =
you
said, none would work . They have none business with address assignment
methods on standard tracks.

I admit that, if we want to build a decent binding table, DAD only =
snooping
is not enough for DAD loss problem raised. IMHO, a perfect solution for =
savi
is designing a reliable and snoopable DAD. Current DAD is not suitable =
for
SAVI, because of its unreliability; however, DAD snooping is still =
correct
and to respect existing standards.=20

Currently I wonder if snooping Neighbor Unreachability Detection would =
work
as a supplement of DAD snooping. If a node finds a path to neighbor =
fails,
it would try to perform NUD. Although NUD snooping is beyond DAD =
snooping,
it is at least control plane focused and problem(DAD loss or layer 2 =
path
change) related.=20

If a node persists sending Data/TCP/UDP packet without expecting =
response
and repairing the path, it is really suspicious.

>From RFC4861:
"
  Communication to or through a neighbor may fail for numerous reasons
   at any time, including hardware failure, hot-swap of an interface
   card, etc.  If the destination has failed, no recovery is possible
   and communication fails.  On the other hand, if it is the path that
   has failed, recovery may be possible.  Thus, a node _actively_ tracks
   the reachability "state" for the neighbors to which it is sending
   packets.
"

BR,
Guang

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli [mailto:elevyabe@cisco.com]
> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 4:24 PM
> To: Guang Yao
> Cc: 'Bi Jun'; 'Greg Daley'; savi@ietf.org; 'Suresh Krishnan'
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in =
SAVI
"
>=20
> Hi Guang,
> Guang Yao a =E9crit :
> > Hi Eric,
> >
> > I don't think it's the problem of savi.
> >
> > I'd rather to say, slaac is not suitable for savi. However, it's the
only
> > protocol can be snooped in slaac-only scenario. Savi has no other
choice.
> >
> >
> I don't understand this statement. Or rather we are going in circles. =
We
> could snoop anything. We could snoop TCP for what it's worth. UDP, =
ICMP,
> you name it. I know, none would work for what we need, but the
> reasonning behind 1) NDP/DAD is is the only thing we can (wan't?) =
snoop,
> 2) it does not work in all cases for savi , 3) hence DAD is broken is =
a
> sophism.
> There has been another snooping "type" (let's not call that =
"protocol")
> put on the table for the last 3 IETF: that is data-snooping. Maye it's
> time to take a poll at this one?
> Note that if we conclude that it is not possible to build a decent
> binding tbale by snooping whatever traffic the solution is not to fix
> DAD  to make it snoopable. DAD is not a broken protocol as far as I
> know. Instead we need savi to have its own protocol (not snooping
anymore).
> Eric
> > BR,
> > Guang
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On =
Behalf Of
> >>
> > Eric
> >
> >> Levy-Abegnoli
> >> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
> >> To: Bi Jun
> >> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
> >> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues =
in
SAVI
> >>
> > "
> >
> >> Hi Jun,
> >> Bi Jun a =E9crit :
> >>
> >>> Hi Suresh,
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for the comment.
> >>>
> >>> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
> >>> itself, not savi-slaac.
> >>>
> >> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is =
extremely
> >> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
> >> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking =
traffic
> >> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much =
bigger
> >> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the =
loss
of
> >> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially =
probable)..
> >> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
> >> Eric
> >>
> >>
> >>> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
> >>>
> > anti-spoofing.
> >
> >>> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
> >>> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
> >>> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
> >>> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new =
protocol
> >>> and host change are not permitted).
> >>>
> >>> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
> >>> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there =
is
> >>> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this =
reason,
> >>> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a =
MUST.
> >>>
> >>> thanks,
> >>> Jun Bi
> >>>
> >>> --------------------------------------------------
> >>> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> >>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
> >>> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
> >>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
> >>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues =
in
> >>> SAVI "
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Hi Fred,
> >>>>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
> >>>>
> >>>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
> >>>> <snip>
> >>>>
> >>>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not
statically
> >>>>>
> >>>>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
> >>>>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
> >>>>
> >>>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the =
host
> >>>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
> >>>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero =
probability
of
> >>>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
> >>>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence =
the
> >>>>
> > savi
> >
> >>>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would =
be
very
> >>>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover =
from
> >>>> this.
> >>>>
> >>>> Thanks
> >>>> Suresh
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> savi mailing list
> >>>> savi@ietf.org
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> savi mailing list
> >>> savi@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>>
> >>>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> savi mailing list
> >> savi@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >>
> >
> >
> >



From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Fri Apr  9 04:18:30 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6FBFF3A693B for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 04:18:29 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.992
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.992 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.405,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696, MANGLED_WANT=2.3]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id poW0UU0X7dqE for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 04:18:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id EE5D33A685A for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 04:18:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.184]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bbf1519; Fri, 09 Apr 2010 19:18:10 +0800
Message-ID: <01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>, "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com> <4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com> <4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2010 19:18:05 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: f9yNMAYB
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 11:18:30 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 4:23 PM
To: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
Cc: "'Bi Jun'" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; "'Greg Daley'" 
<gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
<suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> I don't understand this statement. Or rather we are going in circles. We 
> could snoop anything. We could snoop TCP for what it's worth. UDP, ICMP, 
> you name it. I know, none would work for what we need, but the reasonning 
> behind 1) NDP/DAD is is the only thing we can (wan't?) snoop, 2) it does 
> not work in all cases for savi , 3) hence DAD is broken is a sophism.
> There has been another snooping "type" (let's not call that "protocol") 
> put on the table for the last 3 IETF: that is data-snooping. Maye it's 
> time to take a poll at this one?

Hi Eric,

I think Fred had analyzed some problem of data-snoopping at SLAAC.
I didn't see your objection after Fred's message.

On another hand, I had expressed many times that the data-triggered actions 
(e.g. probes) will bring too much cost to switch and it's hard to do 
rate-limiting, then it
should not be a MUST. It will be useful as a optional.

thanks,
Jun Bi

From: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 12:20 AM
To: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "Suresh
Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> Well, if SLAAC is actually used, it is exactly as it should be. Reread my 
> description of the issue. Absent DAD, SLAAC has not been used; the host 
> has simply started using an address that it has not verified. What I am 
> saying is that a host can fire-and-forget, using up addresses as fast as 
> it can send datagrams, and that becomes an attack on the switch (it is 
> using up memory and filter resources, and the process is very busy). I 
> pointed this out when we first started discussing FCFS in Dublin, and it's 
> still a DOS attack.
>
> There is of course a mitigation. At some point the switch either stops 
> accepting new addresses from the host or by some algorithm starts 
> forgetting about old ones. Both of those have built-in attacks as well; 
> let's assume that "some algorithm" is "LRU", so that in the general case 
> we can expect the switch to stop remembering addresses that the host is no 
> longer using. Let's assume that most processes on the host are using a 
> certain one, allocated yesterday using SLAAC properly. But some rogue 
> process (virus/whatever) starts chewing through addresses at a time that 
> none of those other processes happen to be "speaking". This becomes a DOS 
> on the other processes on the system - the SAVI switch will not accept 
> their traffic.
>
> IMHO, there is no real solution here; it should simply be noted as a 
> "Security Consideration".




> Note that if we conclude that it is not possible to build a decent binding 
> tbale by snooping whatever traffic the solution is not to fix  DAD  to 
> make it snoopable. DAD is not a broken protocol as far as I know. Instead 
> we need savi to have its own protocol (not snooping anymore).
> Eric
>> BR,
>> Guang
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>>
>> Eric
>>
>>> Levy-Abegnoli
>>> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
>>> To: Bi Jun
>>> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>> SAVI
>>>
>> "
>>
>>> Hi Jun,
>>> Bi Jun a écrit :
>>>
>>>> Hi Suresh,
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for the comment.
>>>>
>>>> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
>>>> itself, not savi-slaac.
>>>>
>>> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is extremely
>>> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
>>> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking traffic
>>> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much bigger
>>> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the loss of
>>> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially probable)..
>>> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
>>> Eric
>>>
>>>
>>>> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
>>>>
>> anti-spoofing.
>>
>>>> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
>>>> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
>>>> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
>>>> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol
>>>> and host change are not permitted).
>>>>
>>>> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
>>>> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there is
>>>> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this reason,
>>>> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a MUST.
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
>>>> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
>>>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in
>>>> SAVI "
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Fred,
>>>>>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
>>>>>
>>>>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not statically
>>>>>>
>>>>>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
>>>>>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the host
>>>>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
>>>>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability of
>>>>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
>>>>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the
>>>>>
>> savi
>>
>>>>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be 
>>>>> very
>>>>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover from
>>>>> this.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks
>>>>> Suresh
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
>>
>>
> 

From elevyabe@cisco.com  Fri Apr  9 05:40:01 2010
Return-Path: <elevyabe@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 525CD3A67F0 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 05:40:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -7.162
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.162 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.137,  BAYES_00=-2.599, MANGLED_WANT=2.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aaCE5LQzNT0B for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 05:40:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sj-iport-1.cisco.com (sj-iport-1.cisco.com [171.71.176.70]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63EF93A68DC for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 05:39:52 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-1.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvsEAHe9vkurR7Hu/2dsb2JhbACbO3GhEZkxhQkEjj4
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.52,177,1270425600"; d="scan'208";a="315825690"
Received: from sj-core-5.cisco.com ([171.71.177.238]) by sj-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 09 Apr 2010 12:39:47 +0000
Received: from xbh-ams-101.cisco.com (xbh-ams-101.cisco.com [144.254.74.71]) by sj-core-5.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o39CdbGj023441; Fri, 9 Apr 2010 12:39:46 GMT
Received: from xmb-ams-105.cisco.com ([144.254.74.80]) by xbh-ams-101.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Fri, 9 Apr 2010 14:39:45 +0200
Received: from [144.254.53.106] ([144.254.53.106]) by xmb-ams-105.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);  Fri, 9 Apr 2010 14:39:45 +0200
Message-ID: <4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 14:39:44 +0200
From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com> <4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com> <4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com> <01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 09 Apr 2010 12:39:45.0552 (UTC) FILETIME=[BC04B900:01CAD7E1]
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 12:40:01 -0000

Jun,
Bi Jun a écrit :
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 4:23 PM
> To: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
> Cc: "'Bi Jun'" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; "'Greg Daley'" 
> <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
> SAVI "
>
>> I don't understand this statement. Or rather we are going in circles. 
>> We could snoop anything. We could snoop TCP for what it's worth. UDP, 
>> ICMP, you name it. I know, none would work for what we need, but the 
>> reasonning behind 1) NDP/DAD is is the only thing we can (wan't?) 
>> snoop, 2) it does not work in all cases for savi , 3) hence DAD is 
>> broken is a sophism.
>> There has been another snooping "type" (let's not call that 
>> "protocol") put on the table for the last 3 IETF: that is 
>> data-snooping. Maye it's time to take a poll at this one?
>
> Hi Eric,
>
> I think Fred had analyzed some problem of data-snoopping at SLAAC.
I don't recall any theoritical problem raised on data snooping. I recall 
one intrinsic to SLACC: it is not authoritative, so anybody can claim 
any address. By sending a DAD or a data packet. No difference to me. 
Unfortunately, the world is what it is: the vast majority of hosts use 
SLACC not DHCP to get an address.
> I didn't see your objection after Fred's message.
>
> On another hand, I had expressed many times that the data-triggered 
> actions (e.g. probes) will bring too much cost to switch and it's hard 
> to do rate-limiting, then it
> should not be a MUST. It will be useful as a optional.
I happen to be a switch implementer. So far, I believe I am the only one 
who voiced in this mailing list. I'd be glad the hear others.
While I did raise the rate-limiting issue, I also admited that it is 
just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and snooping 
data traffic is the only solution for addresses not assigned with DHCP. 
No need to argue more with me: I have made my point. You have made 
yours. Hopefully, the WG can make a decision on this.
Eric
>
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
> From: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 12:20 AM
> To: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "Suresh
> Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
> SAVI "
>
>> Well, if SLAAC is actually used, it is exactly as it should be. 
>> Reread my description of the issue. Absent DAD, SLAAC has not been 
>> used; the host has simply started using an address that it has not 
>> verified. What I am saying is that a host can fire-and-forget, using 
>> up addresses as fast as it can send datagrams, and that becomes an 
>> attack on the switch (it is using up memory and filter resources, and 
>> the process is very busy). I pointed this out when we first started 
>> discussing FCFS in Dublin, and it's still a DOS attack.
>>
>> There is of course a mitigation. At some point the switch either 
>> stops accepting new addresses from the host or by some algorithm 
>> starts forgetting about old ones. Both of those have built-in attacks 
>> as well; let's assume that "some algorithm" is "LRU", so that in the 
>> general case we can expect the switch to stop remembering addresses 
>> that the host is no longer using. Let's assume that most processes on 
>> the host are using a certain one, allocated yesterday using SLAAC 
>> properly. But some rogue process (virus/whatever) starts chewing 
>> through addresses at a time that none of those other processes happen 
>> to be "speaking". This becomes a DOS on the other processes on the 
>> system - the SAVI switch will not accept their traffic.
>>
>> IMHO, there is no real solution here; it should simply be noted as a 
>> "Security Consideration".
>
>
>
>
>> Note that if we conclude that it is not possible to build a decent 
>> binding tbale by snooping whatever traffic the solution is not to 
>> fix  DAD  to make it snoopable. DAD is not a broken protocol as far 
>> as I know. Instead we need savi to have its own protocol (not 
>> snooping anymore).
>> Eric
>>> BR,
>>> Guang
>>>
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>
>>> Eric
>>>
>>>> Levy-Abegnoli
>>>> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
>>>> To: Bi Jun
>>>> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>> in SAVI
>>>>
>>> "
>>>
>>>> Hi Jun,
>>>> Bi Jun a écrit :
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Suresh,
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for the comment.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
>>>>> itself, not savi-slaac.
>>>>>
>>>> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is 
>>>> extremely
>>>> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
>>>> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking 
>>>> traffic
>>>> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much bigger
>>>> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the 
>>>> loss of
>>>> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially probable)..
>>>> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
>>>> Eric
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
>>>>>
>>> anti-spoofing.
>>>
>>>>> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
>>>>> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
>>>>> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
>>>>> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol
>>>>> and host change are not permitted).
>>>>>
>>>>> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
>>>>> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there is
>>>>> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this 
>>>>> reason,
>>>>> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a MUST.
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
>>>>> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
>>>>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in
>>>>> SAVI "
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Fred,
>>>>>>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
>>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not 
>>>>>>> statically
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
>>>>>>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the 
>>>>>> host
>>>>>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
>>>>>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero 
>>>>>> probability of
>>>>>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
>>>>>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the
>>>>>>
>>> savi
>>>
>>>>>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would 
>>>>>> be very
>>>>>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover 
>>>>>> from
>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>> Suresh
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>


From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Fri Apr  9 06:05:11 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE5C528C0F5 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 06:05:10 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.194
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.194 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.203,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696, MANGLED_WANT=2.3]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id C7bwq5XPLr68 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 06:05:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 8168D28C0F0 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 06:05:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.184]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm104bbf2e18; Fri, 09 Apr 2010 21:04:49 +0800
Message-ID: <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>, <fred@cisco.com>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com> <4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com> <4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com> <01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO> <4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2010 21:04:45 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: fYLtNAYB
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 13:05:11 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 8:39 PM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; "'Greg Daley'" 
<gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
<suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> Jun,
> Bi Jun a écrit :
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
>> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 4:23 PM
>> To: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
>> Cc: "'Bi Jun'" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; "'Greg Daley'" 
>> <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
>> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>> SAVI "
>>
>>> I don't understand this statement. Or rather we are going in circles. We 
>>> could snoop anything. We could snoop TCP for what it's worth. UDP, ICMP, 
>>> you name it. I know, none would work for what we need, but the 
>>> reasonning behind 1) NDP/DAD is is the only thing we can (wan't?) snoop, 
>>> 2) it does not work in all cases for savi , 3) hence DAD is broken is a 
>>> sophism.
>>> There has been another snooping "type" (let's not call that "protocol") 
>>> put on the table for the last 3 IETF: that is data-snooping. Maye it's 
>>> time to take a poll at this one?
>>
>> Hi Eric,
>>
>> I think Fred had analyzed some problem of data-snoopping at SLAAC.
> I don't recall any theoritical problem raised on data snooping. I recall 
> one intrinsic to SLACC: it is not authoritative, so anybody can claim any 
> address. By sending a DAD or a data packet. No difference to me. 
> Unfortunately, the world is what it is: the vast majority of hosts use 
> SLACC not DHCP to get an address.
>> I didn't see your objection after Fred's message.
>>
>> On another hand, I had expressed many times that the data-triggered 
>> actions (e.g. probes) will bring too much cost to switch and it's hard to 
>> do rate-limiting, then it
>> should not be a MUST. It will be useful as a optional.
> I happen to be a switch implementer. So far, I believe I am the only one 
> who voiced in this mailing list. I'd be glad the hear others.
> While I did raise the rate-limiting issue, I also admited that it is

As an operator, the rate-limiting is more severe problem to us, because the 
data plan
won't deliver some important control packets to the switch under 
rate-limiting,
then the admin will have more troubles.
OK, as you know we are widely delaying SAVI in our IPv6 network, then could 
you implement an access switch with data snooping switch for me (without 
bring me those
security issues Fred Baker mentioned above)? If yes, I'd like to test one.
Otherwise, it should not be a MUST (see below for alternative solutions).


> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and snooping 
> data traffic is the only solution for addresses not assigned with DHCP.

No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative way and more 
feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped at the switch then the 
switch can send probe to detect
(it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving the binding 
in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as a MUST is realist for 
most vendors we consulted.


> No need to argue more with me: I have made my point. You have made yours. 
> Hopefully, the WG can make a decision on this.
> Eric

I don't want to argue with you. I already proposed in my past email:
--------------------------------------------------
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 12:58 AM
To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>; "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "Suresh 
Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

Based on the discussions, I propose to have several alternatives we can
state in the drafts:
1 every savi-switch MUST implement the counter-triggered (not
data-triggered) alert (so that the admin can know and recover the state if 
he wants), and SHOULD implement the counter triggered probe. OR
2 Put the counter-triggered into the appendix (because as Fred and Greg
stated, that's only one example of the feasible way). OR
3 Only state the problems in the security considerations.

Meanwhile, the data-triggered probe can be an optional function (although I
think there will be very few real implementation on the data-triggered in
reality, maybe only very high-end switch can implement it) in addition to
any of the above alternative.

Best Regards,
Jun Bi





>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>> From: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 12:20 AM
>> To: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "Suresh
>> Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>> SAVI "
>>
>>> Well, if SLAAC is actually used, it is exactly as it should be. Reread 
>>> my description of the issue. Absent DAD, SLAAC has not been used; the 
>>> host has simply started using an address that it has not verified. What 
>>> I am saying is that a host can fire-and-forget, using up addresses as 
>>> fast as it can send datagrams, and that becomes an attack on the switch 
>>> (it is using up memory and filter resources, and the process is very 
>>> busy). I pointed this out when we first started discussing FCFS in 
>>> Dublin, and it's still a DOS attack.
>>>
>>> There is of course a mitigation. At some point the switch either stops 
>>> accepting new addresses from the host or by some algorithm starts 
>>> forgetting about old ones. Both of those have built-in attacks as well; 
>>> let's assume that "some algorithm" is "LRU", so that in the general case 
>>> we can expect the switch to stop remembering addresses that the host is 
>>> no longer using. Let's assume that most processes on the host are using 
>>> a certain one, allocated yesterday using SLAAC properly. But some rogue 
>>> process (virus/whatever) starts chewing through addresses at a time that 
>>> none of those other processes happen to be "speaking". This becomes a 
>>> DOS on the other processes on the system - the SAVI switch will not 
>>> accept their traffic.
>>>
>>> IMHO, there is no real solution here; it should simply be noted as a 
>>> "Security Consideration".
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Note that if we conclude that it is not possible to build a decent 
>>> binding tbale by snooping whatever traffic the solution is not to fix 
>>> DAD  to make it snoopable. DAD is not a broken protocol as far as I 
>>> know. Instead we need savi to have its own protocol (not snooping 
>>> anymore).
>>> Eric
>>>> BR,
>>>> Guang
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf 
>>>>> Of
>>>>>
>>>> Eric
>>>>
>>>>> Levy-Abegnoli
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
>>>>> To: Bi Jun
>>>>> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>
>>>> "
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Jun,
>>>>> Bi Jun a écrit :
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Suresh,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for the comment.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
>>>>>> itself, not savi-slaac.
>>>>>>
>>>>> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is 
>>>>> extremely
>>>>> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
>>>>> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking 
>>>>> traffic
>>>>> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much bigger
>>>>> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the loss 
>>>>> of
>>>>> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially probable)..
>>>>> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
>>>>> Eric
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
>>>>>>
>>>> anti-spoofing.
>>>>
>>>>>> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
>>>>>> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
>>>>>> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
>>>>>> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol
>>>>>> and host change are not permitted).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
>>>>>> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there is
>>>>>> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this 
>>>>>> reason,
>>>>>> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a MUST.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
>>>>>> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
>>>>>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in
>>>>>> SAVI "
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Fred,
>>>>>>>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
>>>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not 
>>>>>>>> statically
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
>>>>>>>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the 
>>>>>>> host
>>>>>>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
>>>>>>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability 
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
>>>>>>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the
>>>>>>>
>>>> savi
>>>>
>>>>>>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be 
>>>>>>> very
>>>>>>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover 
>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>>> Suresh
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
> 

From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Fri Apr  9 06:11:44 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C89323A6911 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 06:11:44 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.996
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.996 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.800,  BAYES_00=-2.599, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495, J_CHICKENPOX_46=0.6, MANGLED_WANT=2.3]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 3H4kzsxfCCU3 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 06:11:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 86AD33A6A4B for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 06:11:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024184.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.184] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O0DzL-00030y-1U; Fri, 09 Apr 2010 21:11:11 +0800
Message-ID: <EC70685B78BF49E9963E984613D7F0E4@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>, "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>, <fred@cisco.com>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com><4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com><4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com><01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO><4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com> <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2010 21:11:12 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 13:11:44 -0000

a typo:

the data plan won't deliver some important control packets to the switch 
under
rate-limiting,

->
the data plan won't deliver some important control packets to the control 
plan (CPU)in a switch under rate-limiting, (I meant some important control 
packets will be lost, e.g, the SNMP,telnet packets to this switch)


--------------------------------------------------
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 9:04 PM
To: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>; <fred@cisco.com>
Cc: "'Greg Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" 
<yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
<suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 8:39 PM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; "'Greg Daley'" 
> <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI 
> "
>
>> Jun,
>> Bi Jun a écrit :
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
>>> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 4:23 PM
>>> To: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
>>> Cc: "'Bi Jun'" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; "'Greg Daley'" 
>>> <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
>>> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>> SAVI "
>>>
>>>> I don't understand this statement. Or rather we are going in circles. 
>>>> We could snoop anything. We could snoop TCP for what it's worth. UDP, 
>>>> ICMP, you name it. I know, none would work for what we need, but the 
>>>> reasonning behind 1) NDP/DAD is is the only thing we can (wan't?) 
>>>> snoop, 2) it does not work in all cases for savi , 3) hence DAD is 
>>>> broken is a sophism.
>>>> There has been another snooping "type" (let's not call that "protocol") 
>>>> put on the table for the last 3 IETF: that is data-snooping. Maye it's 
>>>> time to take a poll at this one?
>>>
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> I think Fred had analyzed some problem of data-snoopping at SLAAC.
>> I don't recall any theoritical problem raised on data snooping. I recall 
>> one intrinsic to SLACC: it is not authoritative, so anybody can claim any 
>> address. By sending a DAD or a data packet. No difference to me. 
>> Unfortunately, the world is what it is: the vast majority of hosts use 
>> SLACC not DHCP to get an address.
>>> I didn't see your objection after Fred's message.
>>>
>>> On another hand, I had expressed many times that the data-triggered 
>>> actions (e.g. probes) will bring too much cost to switch and it's hard 
>>> to do rate-limiting, then it
>>> should not be a MUST. It will be useful as a optional.
>> I happen to be a switch implementer. So far, I believe I am the only one 
>> who voiced in this mailing list. I'd be glad the hear others.
>> While I did raise the rate-limiting issue, I also admited that it is
>
> As an operator, the rate-limiting is more severe problem to us, because 
> the data plan
> won't deliver some important control packets to the switch under 
> rate-limiting,
> then the admin will have more troubles.
> OK, as you know we are widely delaying SAVI in our IPv6 network, then 
> could you implement an access switch with data snooping switch for me 
> (without bring me those
> security issues Fred Baker mentioned above)? If yes, I'd like to test one.
> Otherwise, it should not be a MUST (see below for alternative solutions).
>
>
>> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and snooping 
>> data traffic is the only solution for addresses not assigned with DHCP.
>
> No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
> counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative way and 
> more feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped at the switch then 
> the switch can send probe to detect
> (it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving the 
> binding in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as a MUST is 
> realist for most vendors we consulted.
>
>
>> No need to argue more with me: I have made my point. You have made yours. 
>> Hopefully, the WG can make a decision on this.
>> Eric
>
> I don't want to argue with you. I already proposed in my past email:
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 12:58 AM
> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>; "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" 
> <elevyabe@cisco.com>
> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "Suresh 
> Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI 
> "
>
> Based on the discussions, I propose to have several alternatives we can
> state in the drafts:
> 1 every savi-switch MUST implement the counter-triggered (not
> data-triggered) alert (so that the admin can know and recover the state if 
> he wants), and SHOULD implement the counter triggered probe. OR
> 2 Put the counter-triggered into the appendix (because as Fred and Greg
> stated, that's only one example of the feasible way). OR
> 3 Only state the problems in the security considerations.
>
> Meanwhile, the data-triggered probe can be an optional function (although 
> I
> think there will be very few real implementation on the data-triggered in
> reality, maybe only very high-end switch can implement it) in addition to
> any of the above alternative.
>
> Best Regards,
> Jun Bi
>
>
>
>
>
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>> From: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 12:20 AM
>>> To: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>
>>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "Suresh
>>> Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>> SAVI "
>>>
>>>> Well, if SLAAC is actually used, it is exactly as it should be. Reread 
>>>> my description of the issue. Absent DAD, SLAAC has not been used; the 
>>>> host has simply started using an address that it has not verified. What 
>>>> I am saying is that a host can fire-and-forget, using up addresses as 
>>>> fast as it can send datagrams, and that becomes an attack on the switch 
>>>> (it is using up memory and filter resources, and the process is very 
>>>> busy). I pointed this out when we first started discussing FCFS in 
>>>> Dublin, and it's still a DOS attack.
>>>>
>>>> There is of course a mitigation. At some point the switch either stops 
>>>> accepting new addresses from the host or by some algorithm starts 
>>>> forgetting about old ones. Both of those have built-in attacks as well; 
>>>> let's assume that "some algorithm" is "LRU", so that in the general 
>>>> case we can expect the switch to stop remembering addresses that the 
>>>> host is no longer using. Let's assume that most processes on the host 
>>>> are using a certain one, allocated yesterday using SLAAC properly. But 
>>>> some rogue process (virus/whatever) starts chewing through addresses at 
>>>> a time that none of those other processes happen to be "speaking". This 
>>>> becomes a DOS on the other processes on the system - the SAVI switch 
>>>> will not accept their traffic.
>>>>
>>>> IMHO, there is no real solution here; it should simply be noted as a 
>>>> "Security Consideration".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Note that if we conclude that it is not possible to build a decent 
>>>> binding tbale by snooping whatever traffic the solution is not to fix 
>>>> DAD  to make it snoopable. DAD is not a broken protocol as far as I 
>>>> know. Instead we need savi to have its own protocol (not snooping 
>>>> anymore).
>>>> Eric
>>>>> BR,
>>>>> Guang
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf 
>>>>>> Of
>>>>>>
>>>>> Eric
>>>>>
>>>>>> Levy-Abegnoli
>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 5:11 PM
>>>>>> To: Bi Jun
>>>>>> Cc: Greg Daley; savi@ietf.org; Suresh Krishnan
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>>>>> SAVI
>>>>>>
>>>>> "
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Jun,
>>>>>> Bi Jun a écrit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Suresh,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks for the comment.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think some problem are brought because of the problem of SLAAC
>>>>>>> itself, not savi-slaac.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> The probablity that is is causing trouble with SLACC alone is 
>>>>>> extremely
>>>>>> low, as it is the combination of DAD packet loss AND a duplicated
>>>>>> address. That is, SLACC could live with it happily. By blocking 
>>>>>> traffic
>>>>>> just because the DAD was lost, we are actually making it a much 
>>>>>> bigger
>>>>>> issue (basically 2**64 more likely to be an issue, and since the loss 
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> a DAD is quite probable, it become an issue substancially probable)..
>>>>>> So it's a savi problem, not a slacc problem.
>>>>>> Eric
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Savi-slaac may have to face to the limitation of SLAAC for
>>>>>>>
>>>>> anti-spoofing.
>>>>>
>>>>>>> To find an ideal solution, there might be two alternative ways:
>>>>>>> 1 propose sth to enhance SLAAC, or
>>>>>>> 2 re-chartering SAVI WG to have a new protocol to coordinate the
>>>>>>> SLAAC-state in the host the savi-device. (currently the new protocol
>>>>>>> and host change are not permitted).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Otherwise, as stated by Jole during the WG meeting, the minimal
>>>>>>> requirement might be that the admin need a way to figure out there 
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> a problem when this none-0 possibility event happens. For this 
>>>>>>> reason,
>>>>>>> then I think a counter-triggered alert might be considered as a 
>>>>>>> MUST.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 1:15 AM
>>>>>>> To: "Fred Baker" <fred@cisco.com>
>>>>>>> Cc: "Greg Daley" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> SAVI "
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Fred,
>>>>>>>>    Responding just to one of your scenarios
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 10-04-06 10:23 AM, Fred Baker wrote:
>>>>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I assert that if a host starts using an address, it is not 
>>>>>>>>> statically
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  > configured, and the host has not performed a duplicate address
>>>>>>>>  > detection step, it has not correctly implemented SLAAC
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I agree. But, I think the problematic case is the case where the 
>>>>>>>> host
>>>>>>>> DID actually perform DAD but the savi device did not see the
>>>>>>>> DAD message. I know from usage that this has a non-zero probability 
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> happening. e.g. host interface comes up and performs DAD on the
>>>>>>>> link-local address before the DSL line becomes active and hence the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> savi
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> device in the DSL network does not see the DAD message. I would be 
>>>>>>>> very
>>>>>>>> unhappy if there is no mandated way for the host to ever recover 
>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>>>> Suresh
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Fri Apr  9 08:26:19 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 897FC28C0DE for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 08:26:19 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.855
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.855 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.744,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RsMW2N2dmU3y for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 08:26:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 680E13A6874 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 08:26:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 352303228417; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 08:26:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-50-141.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.50.141]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DEEA732358B0; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 08:25:59 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 11:25:57 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com> <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org, 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 15:26:19 -0000

I believe that there is a miscommunication here.

Counter based triggering is a way of implementing data-triggered action.
If we define the data trigger requirements properly, then direct 
trigger, counter trigger, or some other mechanism that I am not clever 
enough to invent are all valid ways of implementing the spec.  RFCs 
generally try NOT to constrain implementation, but only to constrain the 
on-the-wire behavior.

As such, I beleive that Fred, Marcelo, and Eric are all willing to 
include data-triggered behavior as one of the alternatives that a device 
may use to address providing reliable support for SAVI-SLAAC.  (The 
question of whether that specific behavior is to be a singular MUST, or 
whether there is a list of alternatives at least one of which MUST be 
supported is not fully determined because we have not agreed on the full 
list of problems and their detectability.)

It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is 
legitimate for devices to rate-limit their control response (either 
directly or indirectly) as that is something many devices will need to 
do, and that is externally observable.

If we want to describe the counter method, it would be in an informative 
  appendix discussing the various ways of supporting data plane 
triggered behavior.

Yours,
Joel


Bi Jun wrote:
>...
>> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and snooping 
>> data traffic is the only solution for addresses not assigned with DHCP.
> 
> No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
> counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative way and 
> more feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped at the switch 
> then the switch can send probe to detect
> (it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving the 
> binding in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as a MUST is 
> realist for most vendors we consulted.

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Fri Apr  9 09:10:35 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 902CA3A6828 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:10:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.112
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.112 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.015,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iYGGV+s73faK for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:10:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id AA56A3A69CA for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:10:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.184]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm104bbf5994; Sat, 10 Apr 2010 00:10:21 +0800
Message-ID: <43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com> <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO> <4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Apr 2010 00:10:08 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: fujmQAYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org, 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 16:10:35 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 11:25 PM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>; <fred@cisco.com>; "'Greg 
Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" 
<yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
<suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> I believe that there is a miscommunication here.
>
> Counter based triggering is a way of implementing data-triggered action.
> If we define the data trigger requirements properly, then direct trigger, 
> counter trigger, or some other mechanism that I am not clever enough to 
> invent are all valid ways of implementing the spec.  RFCs generally try 
> NOT to constrain implementation, but only to constrain the on-the-wire 
> behavior.

Hi Joel,

We may need to discuss this. I said in my past email, this counter triggered 
is not
the original data triggered actions. At least this counter triggered is not 
FCFS mode because it doesn't assume first come first serve rule. This 
counter triggered is a supplement on top of the principle of control 
triggered binding (works for most cases) to handle some unexpected cases (to 
enhance the robustness).
Moreover, the counter triggered alert is OK to be be MUST (so that the admin 
knows
there might be unexpected cases happen), but the counter triggered probe to 
recover binding is still a open issue (can the switch find the right source 
address of the packet to send a probe when the CPU action is triggered by 
counter ? please see "section 24. Counter Triggered Binding" in 
savi-dhcp-02).


>
> As such, I beleive that Fred, Marcelo, and Eric are all willing to include 
> data-triggered behavior as one of the alternatives that a device may use 
> to address providing reliable support for SAVI-SLAAC.  (The question of 
> whether that specific behavior is to be a singular MUST, or whether there 
> is a list of alternatives at least one of which MUST be supported is not 
> fully determined because we have not agreed on the full list of problems 
> and their detectability.)

>From my point, the control based binding should be a MUST (you can say it is 
a base).
Then we have multiple ways to handle unexpected cases (although I still 
doubt
if those cases will happen in real deployment or do harms to operators. I 
think Fred Baker also said so. At least we didn't see it is a serious 
problem in our campus deployment). In savi-dhcp-02, we have made saving 
binding in NV-ram as MUST, and counter-triggered alert as MUST (those are 
implementable and can handle most of the unexpected cases and 
implementable). For others, IMHO, if we ask the vendor to MUST implement any 
of others, then I am afraid that no one real vendor will deliver the 
product.


>
> It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is legitimate 
> for devices to rate-limit their control response (either directly or 
> indirectly) as that is something many devices will need to do, and that is 
> externally observable.

I really think this is not acceptable. IMHO, maybe you didn't really get the 
problem of rate limiting I mentioned in my past email. If you do rate 
limiting, then EVERY packet(including both control and data packet) will be 
affected. It means the access switch (not router) will failed to deliver the 
control packet to CPU. Then the manager system has to resend the control 
packet by TCP retransmit or timeout, then I have to wait a long time to get 
telnet response or snmp response. In the worse case, the retransmitted 
packet will be failed to deliver to the switch CPU again. Then in the 
management plan, that savi-switch can be considered as dead. I do think the 
loss of important management info is more more serious problem for 
operators. As an operator, a robust management plan is very important, I can 
not image to deploy a savi switch without a robust management plan.

thanks,
Jun Bi

>
> If we want to describe the counter method, it would be in an informative 
> appendix discussing the various ways of supporting data plane triggered 
> behavior.
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
>
> Bi Jun wrote:
>>...
>>> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and snooping 
>>> data traffic is the only solution for addresses not assigned with DHCP.
>>
>> No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
>> counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative way and 
>> more feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped at the switch then 
>> the switch can send probe to detect
>> (it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving the 
>> binding in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as a MUST is 
>> realist for most vendors we consulted.
> 

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Fri Apr  9 09:30:37 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D2403A68AE for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:30:37 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.961
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.961 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.638,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id zABcWP-7dGzs for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:30:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E7E403A680E for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:30:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id B22D032358C0; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:30:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-50-141.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.50.141]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2082532358B0; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:30:31 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BBF5625.1020802@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 12:30:29 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com> <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO> <4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com> <43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 16:30:37 -0000

Commenting on one piece of Jun Bi's reply, retained below.

When I checked with the guys I work with who might well be asked to 
support this, and I asked about data plane triggered behavior, their 
response was that it was doable, as long as I was prepared to rate limit 
the behavior.  WHich was rather what I expected.

Hence, a spec that does not permit sensible rate limiting seems a very 
BAD idea.

I am not requiring that every vendor implement rate limiting.
If you can find a vendor who can build a low end box that does not 
perform rate limiting and that does not fall over under deliberately 
hostile load, then go ahead and use them.
But I do expect that SAVI will be deployed in situations where some 
stations will be deliberately hostile.  And as such, I want to make sure 
the device is allowed to do sensible things to protect itself.

Yours,
Joel

Bi Jun wrote:
...
>>
>> It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is 
>> legitimate for devices to rate-limit their control response (either 
>> directly or indirectly) as that is something many devices will need to 
>> do, and that is externally observable.
> 
> I really think this is not acceptable. IMHO, maybe you didn't really get 
> the problem of rate limiting I mentioned in my past email. If you do 
> rate limiting, then EVERY packet(including both control and data packet) 
> will be affected. It means the access switch (not router) will failed to 
> deliver the control packet to CPU. Then the manager system has to resend 
> the control packet by TCP retransmit or timeout, then I have to wait a 
> long time to get telnet response or snmp response. In the worse case, 
> the retransmitted packet will be failed to deliver to the switch CPU 
> again. Then in the management plan, that savi-switch can be considered 
> as dead. I do think the loss of important management info is more more 
> serious problem for operators. As an operator, a robust management plan 
> is very important, I can not image to deploy a savi switch without a 
> robust management plan.
> 
> thanks,
> Jun Bi

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Fri Apr  9 09:40:17 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95B503A6A0A for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:40:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.041
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.041 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.558,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qXvfFOrUK2UZ for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:40:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3531B3A6838 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:40:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id F219132358DC; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:40:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-50-141.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.50.141]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6E8723228417; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:40:06 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BBF5864.3040400@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 12:40:04 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com> <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO> <4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com> <43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org, 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 16:40:17 -0000

Commenting on the semantics of the counter mechanism, or data triggered 
processing, as retained below.

Yes, we could get very specific in how we write the behavior, such that 
counter based behavior was not permitted.
However, we don't need to.
It is perfectly reasoanble that although we call the system FCFS, that 
in fact it is only approximately FCFS.  We could even rename it FPFS 
(First Processed, First Served) if we wanted.  Allowing a range of 
implementations that still meet the overall goal (which is not the 
specific FCFS, but rather the prevention of certain improper behaviors) 
is a good thing.

Yes, we could write the MIB to require the counter.  And to have a 
trigger value for the counter.
But we shouldn't.  Being that specific does not do us any good at all.
Clearly defining the required behavior (including not perpetually 
blocking legitimate users) is necessary.
Describing the interaction with the protocol messages that we expect to 
achieve that is what we need to do here.  (And yes, that gets into 
something closer to implementation than we really like.)

But lets try to stay away from the actual details where we can.

Yours,
Joel


Bi Jun wrote:
> 
> 
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 11:25 PM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>; <fred@cisco.com>; "'Greg 
> Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" 
> <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
> SAVI "
> 
>> I believe that there is a miscommunication here.
>>
>> Counter based triggering is a way of implementing data-triggered action.
>> If we define the data trigger requirements properly, then direct 
>> trigger, counter trigger, or some other mechanism that I am not clever 
>> enough to invent are all valid ways of implementing the spec.  RFCs 
>> generally try NOT to constrain implementation, but only to constrain 
>> the on-the-wire behavior.
> 
> Hi Joel,
> 
> We may need to discuss this. I said in my past email, this counter 
> triggered is not
> the original data triggered actions. At least this counter triggered is 
> not FCFS mode because it doesn't assume first come first serve rule. 
> This counter triggered is a supplement on top of the principle of 
> control triggered binding (works for most cases) to handle some 
> unexpected cases (to enhance the robustness).
> Moreover, the counter triggered alert is OK to be be MUST (so that the 
> admin knows
> there might be unexpected cases happen), but the counter triggered probe 
> to recover binding is still a open issue (can the switch find the right 
> source address of the packet to send a probe when the CPU action is 
> triggered by counter ? please see "section 24. Counter Triggered 
> Binding" in savi-dhcp-02).
> 
> 
>>
>> As such, I beleive that Fred, Marcelo, and Eric are all willing to 
>> include data-triggered behavior as one of the alternatives that a 
>> device may use to address providing reliable support for SAVI-SLAAC.  
>> (The question of whether that specific behavior is to be a singular 
>> MUST, or whether there is a list of alternatives at least one of which 
>> MUST be supported is not fully determined because we have not agreed 
>> on the full list of problems and their detectability.)
> 
>> From my point, the control based binding should be a MUST (you can say 
>> it is 
> a base).
> Then we have multiple ways to handle unexpected cases (although I still 
> doubt
> if those cases will happen in real deployment or do harms to operators. 
> I think Fred Baker also said so. At least we didn't see it is a serious 
> problem in our campus deployment). In savi-dhcp-02, we have made saving 
> binding in NV-ram as MUST, and counter-triggered alert as MUST (those 
> are implementable and can handle most of the unexpected cases and 
> implementable). For others, IMHO, if we ask the vendor to MUST implement 
> any of others, then I am afraid that no one real vendor will deliver the 
> product.
> 
> 
>>
>> It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is 
>> legitimate for devices to rate-limit their control response (either 
>> directly or indirectly) as that is something many devices will need to 
>> do, and that is externally observable.
> 
> I really think this is not acceptable. IMHO, maybe you didn't really get 
> the problem of rate limiting I mentioned in my past email. If you do 
> rate limiting, then EVERY packet(including both control and data packet) 
> will be affected. It means the access switch (not router) will failed to 
> deliver the control packet to CPU. Then the manager system has to resend 
> the control packet by TCP retransmit or timeout, then I have to wait a 
> long time to get telnet response or snmp response. In the worse case, 
> the retransmitted packet will be failed to deliver to the switch CPU 
> again. Then in the management plan, that savi-switch can be considered 
> as dead. I do think the loss of important management info is more more 
> serious problem for operators. As an operator, a robust management plan 
> is very important, I can not image to deploy a savi switch without a 
> robust management plan.
> 
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
> 
>>
>> If we want to describe the counter method, it would be in an 
>> informative appendix discussing the various ways of supporting data 
>> plane triggered behavior.
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>>
>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>> ...
>>>> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and 
>>>> snooping data traffic is the only solution for addresses not 
>>>> assigned with DHCP.
>>>
>>> No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
>>> counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative way 
>>> and more feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped at the 
>>> switch then the switch can send probe to detect
>>> (it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving the 
>>> binding in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as a MUST 
>>> is realist for most vendors we consulted.
>>
> 

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Fri Apr  9 09:56:28 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FA783A68AC for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:56:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.603
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.603 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.017,  BAYES_05=-1.11, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rpvKIQIim+0Y for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:56:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 6545C3A6452 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 09:56:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.184]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bbf6459; Sat, 10 Apr 2010 00:56:18 +0800
Message-ID: <2DFC6008E0AD4A5B8E7252CB012D5D63@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com> <645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO> <4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com> <43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO> <4BBF5625.1020802@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBF5625.1020802@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Apr 2010 00:56:09 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: fwM5RAYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 16:56:28 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2010 12:30 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> Commenting on one piece of Jun Bi's reply, retained below.
>
> When I checked with the guys I work with who might well be asked to 
> support this, and I asked about data plane triggered behavior, their

Hi Joel,

Could you please clarify that which "data plane" you mean here?
The reality is that we arranged FCFS for two years, we didn't really see a
FCFS switch. The savi-switch based on control snooping binding is already 
running
at our IPv6 network for half a year (multiple vendors implemented).
If there is a FCFS switch, I'd like to test it in our network.


> response was that it was doable, as long as I was prepared to rate limit 
> the behavior.  WHich was rather what I expected.
>
> Hence, a spec that does not permit sensible rate limiting seems a very BAD 
> idea.
>
> I am not requiring that every vendor implement rate limiting.
> If you can find a vendor who can build a low end box that does not perform 
> rate limiting and that does not fall over under deliberately hostile load, 
> then go ahead and use them.
> But I do expect that SAVI will be deployed in situations where some 
> stations will be deliberately hostile.  And as such, I want to make sure 
> the device is allowed to do sensible things to protect itself.

But the reality is that we really can't find a low-end switch can do 
data-triggered  without that problem. The SAVI WG wanted to promote savi to 
be widely deployed, right?
The most useful place to enable savi is that enable it at the first hop 
access switch,
so that one host can be strictly traced back at one port (then as an 
operator I can exactly bill to the right host based on the traffic of source 
address. if multiple hosts share one port, one can forge the source address 
of another, because the MAC address is also spoofable, then I will have less 
incentive to deploy savi). This grade is low-end, we could not bring too 
much cost to it by a MUST. If the savi switch is very expensive layer 3 
switch then many address sharing one port, does it meaningful for an 
operator? I'd like to just simply enable ingress filtering at this layer 3 
switch to do prefix level anti-spoofing, which is low cost and work for many 
hosts sharing one port.

thanks,
Jun Bi


>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> Bi Jun wrote:
> ...
>>>
>>> It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is 
>>> legitimate for devices to rate-limit their control response (either 
>>> directly or indirectly) as that is something many devices will need to 
>>> do, and that is externally observable.
>>
>> I really think this is not acceptable. IMHO, maybe you didn't really get 
>> the problem of rate limiting I mentioned in my past email. If you do rate 
>> limiting, then EVERY packet(including both control and data packet) will 
>> be affected. It means the access switch (not router) will failed to 
>> deliver the control packet to CPU. Then the manager system has to resend 
>> the control packet by TCP retransmit or timeout, then I have to wait a 
>> long time to get telnet response or snmp response. In the worse case, the 
>> retransmitted packet will be failed to deliver to the switch CPU again. 
>> Then in the management plan, that savi-switch can be considered as dead. 
>> I do think the loss of important management info is more more serious 
>> problem for operators. As an operator, a robust management plan is very 
>> important, I can not image to deploy a savi switch without a robust 
>> management plan.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
> 

From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Fri Apr  9 10:08:11 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E69113A6A50 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 10:08:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.294
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.294 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.810,  BAYES_00=-2.599, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lp07dooZaR7K for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 10:08:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1C82D3A699D for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 10:08:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024184.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.184] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O0HgR-0006iF-VE; Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:07:56 +0800
Message-ID: <A8D9F137C0C84E1CA6EB30D8B16D359E@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com><645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO><4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com><43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO> <4BBF5864.3040400@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBF5864.3040400@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:07:57 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 17:08:12 -0000

Hi Jole,

I am confused. In the history of SAVI WG, there are two basic modes: one is 
FCFS, another is CPS (control plan snooping). FCFS (or you say FPFS) is quit 
different principle from control based snooping (CPS). In FCFS mode, the 
switch has to watch the data packet to setup binding table. In CPS mode, the 
switch watch control packet to setup binding table. So FCFS or FPFS is not 
the counter-triggered (because counter is used to report packet loss). The 
counter-triggered mode itself can't work to setup the initial binding table 
(I can't image EVERY binding entry is set up by after losing some data 
packet), so the counter-triggered has to be used in combination with other 
base solutions to resolve unexpected event (unexpected means it is not the 
most cases) after losing some packets. In savi-dhcp-02, it works so.

thanks,
Jun

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2010 12:40 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "'Greg Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang 
Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
<suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> Commenting on the semantics of the counter mechanism, or data triggered 
> processing, as retained below.
>
> Yes, we could get very specific in how we write the behavior, such that 
> counter based behavior was not permitted.
> However, we don't need to.
> It is perfectly reasoanble that although we call the system FCFS, that in 
> fact it is only approximately FCFS.  We could even rename it FPFS (First 
> Processed, First Served) if we wanted.  Allowing a range of 
> implementations that still meet the overall goal (which is not the 
> specific FCFS, but rather the prevention of certain improper behaviors) is 
> a good thing.
>
> Yes, we could write the MIB to require the counter.  And to have a trigger 
> value for the counter.
> But we shouldn't.  Being that specific does not do us any good at all.
> Clearly defining the required behavior (including not perpetually blocking 
> legitimate users) is necessary.
> Describing the interaction with the protocol messages that we expect to 
> achieve that is what we need to do here.  (And yes, that gets into 
> something closer to implementation than we really like.)
>
> But lets try to stay away from the actual details where we can.
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
>
> Bi Jun wrote:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 11:25 PM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>; <fred@cisco.com>; "'Greg 
>> Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" 
>> <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
>> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>> SAVI "
>>
>>> I believe that there is a miscommunication here.
>>>
>>> Counter based triggering is a way of implementing data-triggered action.
>>> If we define the data trigger requirements properly, then direct 
>>> trigger, counter trigger, or some other mechanism that I am not clever 
>>> enough to invent are all valid ways of implementing the spec.  RFCs 
>>> generally try NOT to constrain implementation, but only to constrain the 
>>> on-the-wire behavior.
>>
>> Hi Joel,
>>
>> We may need to discuss this. I said in my past email, this counter 
>> triggered is not
>> the original data triggered actions. At least this counter triggered is 
>> not FCFS mode because it doesn't assume first come first serve rule. This 
>> counter triggered is a supplement on top of the principle of control 
>> triggered binding (works for most cases) to handle some unexpected cases 
>> (to enhance the robustness).
>> Moreover, the counter triggered alert is OK to be be MUST (so that the 
>> admin knows
>> there might be unexpected cases happen), but the counter triggered probe 
>> to recover binding is still a open issue (can the switch find the right 
>> source address of the packet to send a probe when the CPU action is 
>> triggered by counter ? please see "section 24. Counter Triggered Binding" 
>> in savi-dhcp-02).
>>
>>
>>>
>>> As such, I beleive that Fred, Marcelo, and Eric are all willing to 
>>> include data-triggered behavior as one of the alternatives that a device 
>>> may use to address providing reliable support for SAVI-SLAAC.  (The 
>>> question of whether that specific behavior is to be a singular MUST, or 
>>> whether there is a list of alternatives at least one of which MUST be 
>>> supported is not fully determined because we have not agreed on the full 
>>> list of problems and their detectability.)
>>
>>> From my point, the control based binding should be a MUST (you can say 
>>> it is
>> a base).
>> Then we have multiple ways to handle unexpected cases (although I still 
>> doubt
>> if those cases will happen in real deployment or do harms to operators. I 
>> think Fred Baker also said so. At least we didn't see it is a serious 
>> problem in our campus deployment). In savi-dhcp-02, we have made saving 
>> binding in NV-ram as MUST, and counter-triggered alert as MUST (those are 
>> implementable and can handle most of the unexpected cases and 
>> implementable). For others, IMHO, if we ask the vendor to MUST implement 
>> any of others, then I am afraid that no one real vendor will deliver the 
>> product.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is 
>>> legitimate for devices to rate-limit their control response (either 
>>> directly or indirectly) as that is something many devices will need to 
>>> do, and that is externally observable.
>>
>> I really think this is not acceptable. IMHO, maybe you didn't really get 
>> the problem of rate limiting I mentioned in my past email. If you do rate 
>> limiting, then EVERY packet(including both control and data packet) will 
>> be affected. It means the access switch (not router) will failed to 
>> deliver the control packet to CPU. Then the manager system has to resend 
>> the control packet by TCP retransmit or timeout, then I have to wait a 
>> long time to get telnet response or snmp response. In the worse case, the 
>> retransmitted packet will be failed to deliver to the switch CPU again. 
>> Then in the management plan, that savi-switch can be considered as dead. 
>> I do think the loss of important management info is more more serious 
>> problem for operators. As an operator, a robust management plan is very 
>> important, I can not image to deploy a savi switch without a robust 
>> management plan.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>>>
>>> If we want to describe the counter method, it would be in an informative 
>>> appendix discussing the various ways of supporting data plane triggered 
>>> behavior.
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>>
>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>> ...
>>>>> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and snooping 
>>>>> data traffic is the only solution for addresses not assigned with 
>>>>> DHCP.
>>>>
>>>> No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
>>>> counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative way and 
>>>> more feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped at the switch 
>>>> then the switch can send probe to detect
>>>> (it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving the 
>>>> binding in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as a MUST is 
>>>> realist for most vendors we consulted.
>>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Fri Apr  9 11:50:36 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AE0A3A689F for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 11:50:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.103
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.103 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.496,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BWxCZwsBRGIb for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 11:50:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 018F33A689B for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 11:50:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3A933235892; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 11:50:31 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-50-141.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.50.141]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B45483235934; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 11:50:24 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BBF76EE.9070403@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 14:50:22 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com><645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO><4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com><43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO> <4BBF5864.3040400@joelhalpern.com> <A8D9F137C0C84E1CA6EB30D8B16D359E@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <A8D9F137C0C84E1CA6EB30D8B16D359E@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 18:50:36 -0000

The two documents under evaluation are DHCP based and DAD based.
In other words, as far as I know, all of the mechanisms assume that the 
primary goal is to provide control based admission and validation of users.

For both control modes, there have been arguments made that under some 
circumstances, we may miss the control packet, or forget the control 
state.  We then need to restore that state.
Again, for both control modes, folks have argued that we can not mandate 
sufficient simple control based mechanisms.

So we are trying to figure out what additional mechanisms we can offer 
such that the switch can provide SAVI enforcement without permanently 
(or for an extended period of time) blocking legitimate service usage.

This has lead folks to ask that even pure control devices have some form 
of additional data plane admission response.  One way of achieving that 
is through the counter on denials.  Another way is to cause all denials 
to be processed by the control plane.  There are more choices.
My concern is two-fold
1) We should specify as much as possible the external behavior, not the 
internal mechanism
2) We should allow behavior that allows the box to limit the rate at 
which the control processor has to handle events.

The only reason I mentioned FCFS is that it came up in one of your 
comments.  It is in fact the case that control message processing is 
probably subject to some disordering in the event of a collision.  So 
what.

If someone really thinks we need to mandate a coutner based behavior in 
some situation, please state explicitly which scenario, and why it needs 
to be mandated.

Yours,
Joel

Jun Bi wrote:
> Hi Jole,
> 
> I am confused. In the history of SAVI WG, there are two basic modes: one 
> is FCFS, another is CPS (control plan snooping). FCFS (or you say FPFS) 
> is quit different principle from control based snooping (CPS). In FCFS 
> mode, the switch has to watch the data packet to setup binding table. In 
> CPS mode, the switch watch control packet to setup binding table. So 
> FCFS or FPFS is not the counter-triggered (because counter is used to 
> report packet loss). The counter-triggered mode itself can't work to 
> setup the initial binding table (I can't image EVERY binding entry is 
> set up by after losing some data packet), so the counter-triggered has 
> to be used in combination with other base solutions to resolve 
> unexpected event (unexpected means it is not the most cases) after 
> losing some packets. In savi-dhcp-02, it works so.
> 
> thanks,
> Jun
> 
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
> Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2010 12:40 AM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "'Greg Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; 
> "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
> SAVI "
> 
>> Commenting on the semantics of the counter mechanism, or data 
>> triggered processing, as retained below.
>>
>> Yes, we could get very specific in how we write the behavior, such 
>> that counter based behavior was not permitted.
>> However, we don't need to.
>> It is perfectly reasoanble that although we call the system FCFS, that 
>> in fact it is only approximately FCFS.  We could even rename it FPFS 
>> (First Processed, First Served) if we wanted.  Allowing a range of 
>> implementations that still meet the overall goal (which is not the 
>> specific FCFS, but rather the prevention of certain improper 
>> behaviors) is a good thing.
>>
>> Yes, we could write the MIB to require the counter.  And to have a 
>> trigger value for the counter.
>> But we shouldn't.  Being that specific does not do us any good at all.
>> Clearly defining the required behavior (including not perpetually 
>> blocking legitimate users) is necessary.
>> Describing the interaction with the protocol messages that we expect 
>> to achieve that is what we need to do here.  (And yes, that gets into 
>> something closer to implementation than we really like.)
>>
>> But lets try to stay away from the actual details where we can.
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>>
>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 11:25 PM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>; <fred@cisco.com>; 
>>> "'Greg Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" 
>>> <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
>>> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>> SAVI "
>>>
>>>> I believe that there is a miscommunication here.
>>>>
>>>> Counter based triggering is a way of implementing data-triggered 
>>>> action.
>>>> If we define the data trigger requirements properly, then direct 
>>>> trigger, counter trigger, or some other mechanism that I am not 
>>>> clever enough to invent are all valid ways of implementing the 
>>>> spec.  RFCs generally try NOT to constrain implementation, but only 
>>>> to constrain the on-the-wire behavior.
>>>
>>> Hi Joel,
>>>
>>> We may need to discuss this. I said in my past email, this counter 
>>> triggered is not
>>> the original data triggered actions. At least this counter triggered 
>>> is not FCFS mode because it doesn't assume first come first serve 
>>> rule. This counter triggered is a supplement on top of the principle 
>>> of control triggered binding (works for most cases) to handle some 
>>> unexpected cases (to enhance the robustness).
>>> Moreover, the counter triggered alert is OK to be be MUST (so that 
>>> the admin knows
>>> there might be unexpected cases happen), but the counter triggered 
>>> probe to recover binding is still a open issue (can the switch find 
>>> the right source address of the packet to send a probe when the CPU 
>>> action is triggered by counter ? please see "section 24. Counter 
>>> Triggered Binding" in savi-dhcp-02).
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> As such, I beleive that Fred, Marcelo, and Eric are all willing to 
>>>> include data-triggered behavior as one of the alternatives that a 
>>>> device may use to address providing reliable support for 
>>>> SAVI-SLAAC.  (The question of whether that specific behavior is to 
>>>> be a singular MUST, or whether there is a list of alternatives at 
>>>> least one of which MUST be supported is not fully determined because 
>>>> we have not agreed on the full list of problems and their 
>>>> detectability.)
>>>
>>>> From my point, the control based binding should be a MUST (you can 
>>>> say it is
>>> a base).
>>> Then we have multiple ways to handle unexpected cases (although I 
>>> still doubt
>>> if those cases will happen in real deployment or do harms to 
>>> operators. I think Fred Baker also said so. At least we didn't see it 
>>> is a serious problem in our campus deployment). In savi-dhcp-02, we 
>>> have made saving binding in NV-ram as MUST, and counter-triggered 
>>> alert as MUST (those are implementable and can handle most of the 
>>> unexpected cases and implementable). For others, IMHO, if we ask the 
>>> vendor to MUST implement any of others, then I am afraid that no one 
>>> real vendor will deliver the product.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is 
>>>> legitimate for devices to rate-limit their control response (either 
>>>> directly or indirectly) as that is something many devices will need 
>>>> to do, and that is externally observable.
>>>
>>> I really think this is not acceptable. IMHO, maybe you didn't really 
>>> get the problem of rate limiting I mentioned in my past email. If you 
>>> do rate limiting, then EVERY packet(including both control and data 
>>> packet) will be affected. It means the access switch (not router) 
>>> will failed to deliver the control packet to CPU. Then the manager 
>>> system has to resend the control packet by TCP retransmit or timeout, 
>>> then I have to wait a long time to get telnet response or snmp 
>>> response. In the worse case, the retransmitted packet will be failed 
>>> to deliver to the switch CPU again. Then in the management plan, that 
>>> savi-switch can be considered as dead. I do think the loss of 
>>> important management info is more more serious problem for operators. 
>>> As an operator, a robust management plan is very important, I can not 
>>> image to deploy a savi switch without a robust management plan.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>>>
>>>> If we want to describe the counter method, it would be in an 
>>>> informative appendix discussing the various ways of supporting data 
>>>> plane triggered behavior.
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>> ...
>>>>>> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and 
>>>>>> snooping data traffic is the only solution for addresses not 
>>>>>> assigned with DHCP.
>>>>>
>>>>> No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
>>>>> counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative way 
>>>>> and more feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped at the 
>>>>> switch then the switch can send probe to detect
>>>>> (it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving the 
>>>>> binding in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as a MUST 
>>>>> is realist for most vendors we consulted.
>>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
> 

From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Fri Apr  9 20:15:51 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0BB13A69E4 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 20:15:50 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.471
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.471 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.225,  BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495, J_CHICKENPOX_21=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_66=0.6]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AHowY8R+LYHY for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 20:15:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 353993A695D for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri,  9 Apr 2010 20:15:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024184.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.184] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O0RAS-0006QE-8Q; Sat, 10 Apr 2010 11:15:32 +0800
Message-ID: <DA09B5DB935D496A8CD654AE6E38ECF0@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com><645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO><4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com><43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO> <4BBF5864.3040400@joelhalpern.com> <A8D9F137C0C84E1CA6EB30D8B16D359E@junbiVAIO> <4BBF76EE.9070403@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BBF76EE.9070403@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Apr 2010 11:15:25 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00A3_01CAD89F.1EA3A040"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: 'Greg Daley' <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>, Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>, savi@ietf.org, 'Suresh Krishnan' <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 10 Apr 2010 03:15:51 -0000

ÕâÊÇÒ»·â MIME ¸ñÊ½µÄ¶à·½ÓÊ¼þ¡£

------=_NextPart_000_00A3_01CAD89F.1EA3A040
Content-Type: text/plain;
	format=flowed;
	charset="iso-8859-1";
	reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit



--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2010 2:50 AM
To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Greg Daley'" 
<gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; 
"'Suresh Krishnan'" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "

> The two documents under evaluation are DHCP based and DAD based.

Hi Joel,

No, the two documents were: FCFS (is data triggered based) and CPS (is NDP 
snooping based). See the attachment.

> In other words, as far as I know, all of the mechanisms assume that the 
> primary goal is to provide control based admission and validation of 
> users.

If your statement is true, then the following statement should be removed 
from
savi-fcfs-02, and get rid of the name of FCFS, then rename the solution to a 
popper name, e.g. savi-slaac, then I'd like to see the merge of cps-02 with 
the fcfs-02 as one same state machine. You know
I tried many times.

   section 2.3 of savi-fcfs-02:
   "In FCFS SAVI the address ownership proof is based in the First-Come 
first
   Serve approach.  This means that the first host that claims a given
   source address is the owner of the address until further notice.
   More precisely, whenever a source address is used for the first time,
   a state is created in the device that is performing the FCFS SAVI
   function binding the source address to the layer-2 information that
   the FCFS SAVI box has available (e.g. the port in a switched LAN)."

    This does mean the savi-switch has to watch the data traffic and set up
the binding trigged by data, which is not implementable as a MUST for 
savi-switch.


>
> For both control modes, there have been arguments made that under some 
> circumstances, we may miss the control packet, or forget the control 
> state.  We then need to restore that state.
> Again, for both control modes, folks have argued that we can not mandate 
> sufficient simple control based mechanisms.
>
> So we are trying to figure out what additional mechanisms we can offer 
> such that the switch can provide SAVI enforcement without permanently (or 
> for an extended period of time) blocking legitimate service usage.
>
> This has lead folks to ask that even pure control devices have some form 
> of additional data plane admission response.  One way of achieving that is 
> through the counter on denials.  Another way is to cause all denials to be 
> processed by the control plane.  There are more choices.
> My concern is two-fold
> 1) We should specify as much as possible the external behavior, not the 
> internal mechanism

But what we say MUST in a draft should be implementable by most switches, 
right?
I am fine with the counter-based, the NV-ram saving as MUST or SHOULD.
For data-triggered like FCFS, it should be SHOULD, because it has problem.

> 2) We should allow behavior that allows the box to limit the rate at which 
> the control processor has to handle events.

I am not against to make this as a SHOULD, but it cant' to be a MUST, 
because it has problem.

>
> The only reason I mentioned FCFS is that it came up in one of your 
> comments.  It is in fact the case that control message processing is 
> probably subject to some disordering in the event of a collision.  So 
> what.
>
> If someone really thinks we need to mandate a coutner based behavior in 
> some situation, please state explicitly which scenario, and why it needs 
> to be mandated.
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> Jun Bi wrote:
>> Hi Jole,
>>
>> I am confused. In the history of SAVI WG, there are two basic modes: one 
>> is FCFS, another is CPS (control plan snooping). FCFS (or you say FPFS) 
>> is quit different principle from control based snooping (CPS). In FCFS 
>> mode, the switch has to watch the data packet to setup binding table. In 
>> CPS mode, the switch watch control packet to setup binding table. So FCFS 
>> or FPFS is not the counter-triggered (because counter is used to report 
>> packet loss). The counter-triggered mode itself can't work to setup the 
>> initial binding table (I can't image EVERY binding entry is set up by 
>> after losing some data packet), so the counter-triggered has to be used 
>> in combination with other base solutions to resolve unexpected event 
>> (unexpected means it is not the most cases) after losing some packets. In 
>> savi-dhcp-02, it works so.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>> Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2010 12:40 AM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "'Greg Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang 
>> Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
>> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>> SAVI "
>>
>>> Commenting on the semantics of the counter mechanism, or data triggered 
>>> processing, as retained below.
>>>
>>> Yes, we could get very specific in how we write the behavior, such that 
>>> counter based behavior was not permitted.
>>> However, we don't need to.
>>> It is perfectly reasoanble that although we call the system FCFS, that 
>>> in fact it is only approximately FCFS.  We could even rename it FPFS 
>>> (First Processed, First Served) if we wanted.  Allowing a range of 
>>> implementations that still meet the overall goal (which is not the 
>>> specific FCFS, but rather the prevention of certain improper behaviors) 
>>> is a good thing.
>>>
>>> Yes, we could write the MIB to require the counter.  And to have a 
>>> trigger value for the counter.
>>> But we shouldn't.  Being that specific does not do us any good at all.
>>> Clearly defining the required behavior (including not perpetually 
>>> blocking legitimate users) is necessary.
>>> Describing the interaction with the protocol messages that we expect to 
>>> achieve that is what we need to do here.  (And yes, that gets into 
>>> something closer to implementation than we really like.)
>>>
>>> But lets try to stay away from the actual details where we can.
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>>
>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 11:25 PM
>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>; <fred@cisco.com>; "'Greg 
>>>> Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" 
>>>> <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
>>>> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
>>>> SAVI "
>>>>
>>>>> I believe that there is a miscommunication here.
>>>>>
>>>>> Counter based triggering is a way of implementing data-triggered 
>>>>> action.
>>>>> If we define the data trigger requirements properly, then direct 
>>>>> trigger, counter trigger, or some other mechanism that I am not clever 
>>>>> enough to invent are all valid ways of implementing the spec.  RFCs 
>>>>> generally try NOT to constrain implementation, but only to constrain 
>>>>> the on-the-wire behavior.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>
>>>> We may need to discuss this. I said in my past email, this counter 
>>>> triggered is not
>>>> the original data triggered actions. At least this counter triggered is 
>>>> not FCFS mode because it doesn't assume first come first serve rule. 
>>>> This counter triggered is a supplement on top of the principle of 
>>>> control triggered binding (works for most cases) to handle some 
>>>> unexpected cases (to enhance the robustness).
>>>> Moreover, the counter triggered alert is OK to be be MUST (so that the 
>>>> admin knows
>>>> there might be unexpected cases happen), but the counter triggered 
>>>> probe to recover binding is still a open issue (can the switch find the 
>>>> right source address of the packet to send a probe when the CPU action 
>>>> is triggered by counter ? please see "section 24. Counter Triggered 
>>>> Binding" in savi-dhcp-02).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As such, I beleive that Fred, Marcelo, and Eric are all willing to 
>>>>> include data-triggered behavior as one of the alternatives that a 
>>>>> device may use to address providing reliable support for SAVI-SLAAC. 
>>>>> (The question of whether that specific behavior is to be a singular 
>>>>> MUST, or whether there is a list of alternatives at least one of which 
>>>>> MUST be supported is not fully determined because we have not agreed 
>>>>> on the full list of problems and their detectability.)
>>>>
>>>>> From my point, the control based binding should be a MUST (you can say 
>>>>> it is
>>>> a base).
>>>> Then we have multiple ways to handle unexpected cases (although I still 
>>>> doubt
>>>> if those cases will happen in real deployment or do harms to operators. 
>>>> I think Fred Baker also said so. At least we didn't see it is a serious 
>>>> problem in our campus deployment). In savi-dhcp-02, we have made saving 
>>>> binding in NV-ram as MUST, and counter-triggered alert as MUST (those 
>>>> are implementable and can handle most of the unexpected cases and 
>>>> implementable). For others, IMHO, if we ask the vendor to MUST 
>>>> implement any of others, then I am afraid that no one real vendor will 
>>>> deliver the product.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is 
>>>>> legitimate for devices to rate-limit their control response (either 
>>>>> directly or indirectly) as that is something many devices will need to 
>>>>> do, and that is externally observable.
>>>>
>>>> I really think this is not acceptable. IMHO, maybe you didn't really 
>>>> get the problem of rate limiting I mentioned in my past email. If you 
>>>> do rate limiting, then EVERY packet(including both control and data 
>>>> packet) will be affected. It means the access switch (not router) will 
>>>> failed to deliver the control packet to CPU. Then the manager system 
>>>> has to resend the control packet by TCP retransmit or timeout, then I 
>>>> have to wait a long time to get telnet response or snmp response. In 
>>>> the worse case, the retransmitted packet will be failed to deliver to 
>>>> the switch CPU again. Then in the management plan, that savi-switch can 
>>>> be considered as dead. I do think the loss of important management info 
>>>> is more more serious problem for operators. As an operator, a robust 
>>>> management plan is very important, I can not image to deploy a savi 
>>>> switch without a robust management plan.
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If we want to describe the counter method, it would be in an 
>>>>> informative appendix discussing the various ways of supporting data 
>>>>> plane triggered behavior.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and 
>>>>>>> snooping data traffic is the only solution for addresses not 
>>>>>>> assigned with DHCP.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
>>>>>> counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative way 
>>>>>> and more feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped at the 
>>>>>> switch then the switch can send probe to detect
>>>>>> (it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving the 
>>>>>> binding in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as a MUST 
>>>>>> is realist for most vendors we consulted.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
> 
------=_NextPart_000_00A3_01CAD89F.1EA3A040
Content-Type: text/plain;
	format=flowed;
	name="draft-bi-savi-cps-02.txt";
	reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename="draft-bi-savi-cps-02.txt"

SAVI                                              J. Bi, G. Yao, J. Wu
Internet Draft                                                 CERNET
Intended status: Standard Tracks                             F. Baker
Expires: April 2010                                   October 27, 2009



                        SAVI Solution for DHCPv4/v6
                         draft-bi-savi-cps-02.txt


Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, except to publish it
   as an RFC and to translate it into languages other than English.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November =
10,
   2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as =
Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2009.





Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 1]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Abstract

   This document specifies the procedure of setting up bindings between
   DHCPv4 [RFC2131]/DHCPv6 [RFC3315] assigned source IP address and
   anchor (refer to [SAVI-framework]) on SAVI (Source Address Validation
   Improvements) device. The bindings can be used to filter packets with
   forged IP addresses.

Table of Contents


   1. Introduction ................................................ 3
   2. Conventions used in this document............................ 4
   3. Mechanism Overview .......................................... 4
   4. Background and Related Protocols............................. 4
   5. Terminology ................................................. 5
   6. Conceptual Data Structures................................... 5
      6.1. Binding State Table (BST)............................... 5
      6.2. Filtering Table (FT).................................... 5
   7. Binding States Description................................... 6
   8. DHCP Scenario ............................................... 6
   9. Anchor Attributes ........................................... 7
      9.1. SAVI-Host Attribute..................................... 7
      9.2. SAVI-Poly Attribute..................................... 7
      9.3. SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute............................... 7
      9.4. SAVI-RA-Trust Attribute................................. 8
   10. Prefix Configuration........................................ 8
   11. Binding Set Up ............................................. 9
      11.1. Process of DHCP Snooping............................... 9
         11.1.1. Initialization.................................... 9
            11.1.1.1. Trigger Event................................ 9
            11.1.1.2. Message Validation........................... 9
            11.1.1.3. Following Actions............................ 9
         11.1.2. From START to LIVE............................... 10
            11.1.2.1. Trigger Event............................... 10
            11.1.2.2. Message Validation.......................... 10


Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 2]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


            11.1.2.3. Following Actions........................... 10
         11.1.3. From LIVE to DETECTION........................... 11
            11.1.3.2. Message Validation.......................... 11
            11.1.3.3. Following Actions........................... 11
         11.1.4. From DETECTION to BOUND.......................... 12
            11.1.4.1. Trigger Event............................... 12
            11.1.4.2. Following Actions........................... 12
         11.1.5. After BOUND...................................... 12
      11.2. State Machine of DHCP Snooping ....................... 12
   12. Filtering Specification.................................... 13
      12.1. Filter Data Packet.................................... 13
      12.2. Filter Control Packet................................. 13
   13. Handle port UP/DOWN event.................................. 14
      13.1. On port DOWN event.................................... 14
      13.2. On port UP event...................................... 14
   14. About Collision in Detection............................... 14
      14.1. Whether to notify the DHCP server .................... 15
      14.2. The result of detection without host aware ........... 15
   15. Filtering during detection................................. 15
   16. Binding Number Limitation.................................. 15
   17. Constants ................................................. 15
   18. Summary of to-be-removed sections and open issues ......... 16
   19. Security Considerations.................................... 16
   20. IANA Considerations........................................ 16
   21. References ................................................ 17
      21.1. Normative References.................................. 17
      21.2. Informative References................................ 17
   22. Acknowledgments ........................................... 17

1. Introduction

   This document describes the procedure of setting up bindings between
   DHCP assigned address and anchor (refer to [savi-framework]). Other
   related details about this procedure are also specified in this
   document.

   These bindings can be used to filter packets with forged IP =
addresses.
   How to use these bindings is specified in [savi-framework], depending
   on the environment and configuration. The definition and examples of
   anchor is also specified in [savi-framework].

   The binding process is inspired by the work of IP source guard. This
   specification is different from IP source guard on the specification
   on collision detection, which is quite useful in an environment with
   multiple address assignment methods.




Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 3]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


2. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Mechanism Overview

   The mechanism specified in this document is designed to provide a
   host level source IP address validation granularity, as a supplement
   of BCP38 [BCP38]. This mechanism is deployed on the access device
   (including access switch, wireless access point/controller, etc), and
   performs DHCPv4/v6 snooping to set up bindings between DHCP assigned
   IP address and corresponding anchors. The bindings can be used to
   validate the source address in the packets.

4. Background and Related Protocols

   This mechanism is an instance of SAVI [savi-framework] solution,
   specialized for addresses assign through DHCP protocol.

   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 4 [RFC2131] and Dynamic
   Host Configuration Protocol version 6 [RFC3315] specify the
   procedures of providing a client with assigned address and other
   configuration information from a DHCP server. If a client gets an
   address through DHCP protocol, the address should be regarded as a
   potential "authorized" or "registered" address of the client.

   In IPv6, IPv6 Stateless Autoconfiguration [RFC4862] is used as
   another address assignment mechanism. A node can use this mechanism
   to auto-configure an IPv6 address. A DHCPv6 client may use a
   stateless address to send message to DHCP server. Even in a DHCPv6
   only environment, a node must assign its link-local address through
   this mechanism. [RFC4862] also clearly requires that duplicated
   address detection must be performed on any IPv6 address, including
   DHCPv6 address.

   [RFC4861] specifies the Neighbor Discovery protocol, which is an
   essential part of IPv6 address assignment.

   [RFC5227] specifies the procedure to detect IPv4 address collision.
   It is not enforcement currently. However, this feature is useful to
   determine the uniqueness of an IPv4 address on the link.






Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 4]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


5. Terminology

   The terms used in this document are described in [savi-framework],
   [RFC2131] and [RFC3315].

6. Conceptual Data Structures

   (To be removed and merged with data structures used by other
   mechanisms in [savi-framework] if possible)

   This section describes the possible conceptual data structures used
   in this mechanism.

   Two main data structures are used to record bindings and their states
   respectively. There are redundancy between the two structures, for
   the consideration of separation of data plane and control plane.

6.1.  Binding State Table (BST)

   This table contains this state of binding between source address and
   anchor. Entries are keyed on the anchor and source IP address. Each
   entry has a lifetime item recording the remaining lifetime of this
   entry, a state item recording the state of this binding and an item
   recording other information.

   +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime  |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
   | A       | IP_1     | Bound |  65535    |       |
   +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
   | A       | IP_2     | Bound |  10000    |       |
   +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
   | B       | IP_3     |_Start |      1    |       |
   +---------+----------+-------+-----------+-------+
                         Figure 1 Instance of BST


6.2.  Filtering Table (FT)

   This table contains the bindings between anchor and address, keyed on
   anchor. This table doesn't contain any state of the binding. This
   table is only used to filter packet. Access Control List can be
   regarded as a practical instance of this table.






Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 5]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


   +---------+----------+
   |Anchor   |Address   |
   +---------+----------+
   |A        |IP_1      |
   +---------+----------+
   |A        |IP_2      |
   +---------+----------+
                          Figure 2 Instance of FT

7. Binding States Description

   This section describes the binding states of this mechanism.

   START        A DHCP request (or a DHCPv6 Confirm) is received from
   host, and it may trigger a new binding.

   LIVE       A DHCP address is acknowledged by a DHCP server.

   DETECTION    A gratuitous ARP or Duplicate Address Detection NSOL
   has been sent by the host (or the SAVI device).

   BOUND       The address has passed duplicate detection and
             it is bound with the anchor.

8. DHCP Scenario

   (This section should be removed and merged with other scenarios in
   [savi-framework])

   This section specifies the deployment scenarios of this mechanism.


















Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 6]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


   +--------+
   | DHCP   |
   | Server |
   +-------,+
            `.
              `.
                `.
             +----'-----+
             |  SAVI    |
             |  Device  |
             +-/------/-+
               |      |
          +----\-+   +\-----+
          |DHCP  |   |Client|
          |Relay |   |      |
          +------+   +------+
                          Figure 3 DHCP Scenario

9. Anchor Attributes

   This section specifies the anchor attributes involved in this
   mechanism.

9.1. SAVI-Host Attribute

    (This attribute should be described in the [savi-framework])

   If and only if an anchor is exclusively associated with a single =
host,
   this anchor can be set to have SAVI-Host attribute.

9.2. SAVI-Poly Attribute

   (This attribute should be described in the [savi-framework])

   If an anchor is associated with a small number of hosts through a
   converge device, this anchor can be set to have SAVI-Poly attribute.
   SAVI-Poly attribute is a conflict attribute of SAVI-Host attribute.

   The main different process on anchor with SAVI-Poly attribute from
   that with SAVI-Host attribute is the policy of binding consistence.

9.3. SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute

   If and only if an anchor is associated with a trustable DHCP
   server/relay, it can be set to have this attribute.




Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 7]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


   If DHCP is used to assign address in the network, there MUST be at
   least one anchor with this attribute. DHCP Reply message not from
   such ports MUST be dropped.

9.4. SAVI-RA-Trust Attribute

   (This attribute should be described in the [savi-framework])

   If and only if an anchor is associated with a trustable router, it
   can be set to have this attribute.

   There MAY be no SAVI-RA-Trust anchor on a SAVI device.

   Router Advertisement received not from SAVI-RA-Trust anchor MUST be
   discarded.

10. Prefix Configuration

   (This section should be included in [SAVI-framework] but not this
   document.)

   Before setting up a host-level granularity binding table, it is
   important to configure correct prefixes on the SAVI device. At least
   two prefix scopes must be set: the IPv4 prefix and IPv6 prefixes.
   This document suggests set 3 prefix scopes:

  IPv4 Prefix:

         The allowed scope of any kind of IPv4 addresses. It can be set
         manually.

   IPv6 SLAAC Prefixes:

         The allowed scope of SLAAC and manually configured IPv6
         addresses. It can be set through snooping RA message from port
         with SAVI-RA-Trust attribute, or manual configuration.

         FE80::/64 MUST be set to a feasible prefix.

   IPv6 DHCPv6 Prefixes:

         The allowed scope of DHCPv6 addresses. It can be set through
         DHCP-PD protocol, or manual configuration.

   If some of the prefix scope is set to have non prefix, it implies
   corresponding address assignment method is not allowed in the =
network.



Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 8]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


   There is no need to explicitly present these prefix scopes. But these
   restrictions MUST be used as premier check in binding set up.

11. Binding Set Up

   This section specifies the procedure of setting up bindings based on
   control packet snooping.

11.1. Process of DHCP Snooping

11.1.1. Initialization

   (Whether to keep this section is left for future discussion)

11.1.1.1. Trigger Event

   A DHCPv4/v6 Request or a DHCPv6 Confirm is received with an anchor
   which has the attribute of SAVI-Host or SAVI-Poly.

11.1.1.2. Message Validation

   The SAVI device checks the Request or Confirm as follows:

   1. Whether the limitation on binding entry number of this anchor will
      be exceeded.

11.1.1.3. Following Actions

   Forward the REQUEST message.

   Generate an entry in the Binding State Table (BST), and set the state
   field to be START. The lifetime of this entry is set to be
   MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME. The Transaction ID (Refer to Section 2 in
   [RFC2131] and Section 4.2 in [RFC3315]) field of the request packet
   is also recorded in the entry.

   +---------+----------+-------+-----------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime              |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-------+-----------------------+-------+
   | A       |          | Start |MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME | TID   |
   +---------+----------+-------+-----------------------+-------+
              Figure 4 Binding entry in BST on initialization

   The TID is kept for assurance that the response from DHCP server can
   be delivered to the request host. This is left as an open issue for
   future discussion.



Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                 [Page 9]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


11.1.2. From START to LIVE

11.1.2.1. Trigger Event

   A DHCPv4 DHCPACK or DHCPv6 REPLY message is received.

11.1.2.2. Message Validation

   The SAVI device checks the message as follows:

   1. Whether the message is received with an anchor which has SAVI-
      DHCP-Trust attribute;

   2. Whether the entry in the BST with corresponding TID is in state of
      START.

11.1.2.3. Following Actions

   Deliver the message to the destination.

   Set the state of the corresponding entry to be LIVE. The lifetime of
   the entry is set to be MAX_ARP_PREPARE_DELAY or MAX_DAD_PREPARE_DELAY
   respectively. The lease time is also recorded in the entry.

   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime               |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | LIVE  |MAX_ARP_PREPARE_DELAY or| Lease |
   |         |          |       |MAX_DAD_PREPARE_DELAY   | Time  |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
                Figure 5 Binding entry in BST on assignment

   Or set the state of the corresponding entry to be DETECTION, and send
   an ARP Request or NSOL for the assigned address.

   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State      | Lifetime       |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | DETECTION  |MAX_ARP_DELAY or| Lease |
   |         |          |            |MAX_DAD_DELAY   | Time  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
         Figure 6 Binding entry in BST on assignment: another case

   Insert an entry into the Filtering Table if the assigned address is
   not bound with another anchor.




Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 10]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


   +---------+----------+
   |Anchor   |Address   |
   +---------+----------+
   |A        |Addr      |
   +---------+----------+
                Figure 7 Binding entry in FT on assignment

11.1.3. From LIVE to DETECTION

   (This section should be removed or modified if all the DAD related
   procedures are to be described in SLAAC document)

11.1.3.1. Trigger Event

   A gratuitous ARP Request or Duplicate Address Detection Neighbor
   Solicitation is received from the host. Or a timeout event of an
   entry with state LIVE happens.

11.1.3.2. Message Validation

   The SAVI device checks the message as follows:

   1. Whether the Target IP address field of the ARP Request or Neighbor
      Solicitation has been bound with the corresponding anchor in BST
      or FT.

11.1.3.3. Following Actions

   If timeout event of an entry with state LIVE happens, send an ARP
   Request or a DAD NSOL, with target address set to the recorded
   address in the entry.

   Set the state of the entry to be DETECTION. The lifetime of the entry
   is set to be MAX_ARP_DELAY or MAX_DAD_DELAY respectively.

   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State      | Lifetime       |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | DETECTION  |MAX_ARP_DELAY or| Lease |
   |         |          |            |MAX_DAD_DELAY   | Time  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+-----------------+-------+
                Figure 8 Binding entry in BST on detection







Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 11]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


11.1.4. From DETECTION to BOUND

11.1.4.1. Trigger Event

   A timeout event of an entry with state DETECTION happens or an ARP
   Response or NA for an address in BST with state DETECTION is =
received.

11.1.4.2. Following Actions

   If a timeout event of an entry with state DETECTION happens, set the
   state of the entry to be BOUND. The lifetime of the entry is set to
   be the Lease time acknowledged by DHCP server.

   +---------+----------+-----------+----------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State     | Lifetime       |Other  |
   +---------+----------+-----------+----------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | BOUND     | Lease time     |       |
   +---------+----------+-----------+----------------+-------+
               Figure 9 Binding entry in BST on finalization

   If an ARP Response or NA for an address in BST with state DETECTION
   is received, remove the corresponding entry in BST and FT.

11.1.5. After BOUND

   Whenever a DHCP Decline is received from the host, delete the entry
   in BST and FT.

   Whenever a DHCP Release is received from the host, if the state of
   the entry is BOUND, delete the entry in BST and FT.

   If a DHCPv4 Acknowledgement or DHCPv6 Reply with Renew/Rebind sign is
   received from the server, set lifetime of the entry in BST to be the
   new lease time.

   If the lifetime of an entry with state BOUND expires, delete the
   entry in BST and Filter Table.

11.2. State Machine of DHCP Snooping

   State     Packet/Event      Action                 Next State

   -         REQUEST/CONFIRM   Set up new entry                  START

   START      ACK                Record lease tim                   LIVE

   START      Timeout            Remove entry                          -


Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 12]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


   LIVE       Gra ARP REQ/DAD NS    -                          DETECTION

   LIVE       DECLINE             Remove entry                         -

   LIVE       Timeout            Send ARP Req/DAD NS         DETECTION

   DETECTION  Timeout             -                                BOUND

   DETECTION  ARP RESPONSE        Remove entry                         -

   DETECTION  DECLINE             Remove entry                         -

   BOUND      RELEASE/DECLINE     Remove entry                         -

   BOUND      Timeout             Remove entry                         -

   BOUND      RENEW/REBOUND       Set new lifetime                 BOUND

12. Filtering Specification

   This section specifies how to use bindings to filtering packets.

12.1. Filter Data Packet

   Data packets with anchor which has attribute SAVI-Host or SAVI-Poly
   are filtered. There can be anchor with neither attributes.

   If the source of a packet associated with its anchor is in the FT,
   this packet will be forwarded; or else the packet MUST be discarded.

12.2. Filter Control Packet

   The source address of DHCPv4 Request/Discovery must be all zero
   address.

   The source address of DHCPv6 Request/Confirm must be an address
   associated with the corresponding anchor in FT.

   The source address of IPv6 DAD NS and IPv6 gratuitous ARP must pass
   the check on FT.

   All DHCP Reply/Ack packets MUST be from anchor with SAVI-DHCP-Trust
   attribute.

   The target address and source address in all the Neighbor
   Advertisement packets and ARP relies must also pass the checks on FT,



Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 13]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


   if they are associated with anchors which have SAVI-Host or SAVI-Poly
   attribute.

13. Handle port UP/DOWN event

   These events must be handled when port is used as anchor.

13.1. On port DOWN event

   Whenever a port with attribute SAVI-Poly or SAVI-Host turns down, the
   bindings with the anchor SHOULD be

   1: removed immediately;

   2: or kept until lease time expires;

   3: or kept for a short time.

   The reason for why three choices are made here is there is no perfect
   solution.

   If bindings are removed immediately when port turns down, the device
   may discard legal packets when the link is very flappy. However, this
   solution has the lightest overhead and simplest design.

   If bindings are kept until lease time expires, the device can handle
   the flappy link problem. The device then should make a choice whether
   to keep the bindings or give up them whenever a Duplicate Address
   Detection Neighbor Solicitation for the bound address arrives. Either
   choice actually may lead to some problem.

   If bindings are kept just for a short time, the flappy link problem
   can also be handled. Also the device would seldom face the DAD NS for
   the bound address in that short time. The main problem of this
   solution is how to set the length of this time.

13.2. On port UP event

   Whenever a port turns UP, the device can choose either to restore the
   bindings not removed, or restore the bindings whenever the node uses
   the address.

14. About Collision in Detection

   The SAVI device may receive a response in detection. Some related
   details are specified here.



Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 14]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


14.1. Whether to notify the DHCP server

   It is unnecessary for the SAVI device to notify the DHCP server,
   because the host will send a DECLINE message to it once it finds the
   advertised address is conflict.

14.2. The result of detection without host aware

   In case the SAVI device send detection packet instead of the host,
   the host will not get aware of the detection result. If the detection
   succeeds, there is no trouble. However, if the detection fails, the
   packets from the host with the assigned address will be filtered out.
   This result can be regarded as a reasonable punishment for not
   performing duplicate detection and using a collision address.

15. Filtering during detection

   In this mechanism, whenever the DHCP server replies an address, this
   address will be allowed immediately even before duplicate detection
   is completed. This design is in consideration of a host may start to
   send packets straightway without detection. Also this design is to be
   compatible with optimistic DAD [RFC4429].

   However, this feature may allow an attacker to send quantities of
   packets with source addresses already assigned to other nodes. A
   practical solution for this vulnerability is configuring the address
   pool and allocation algorithm of the DHCP server carefully.

16. Binding Number Limitation

   It is suggested to configure some mechanism in order to prevent a
   single node from exhausting the binding table entries on the SAVI
   device. Either of the following mechanism is sufficient to prevent
   such attack.

   1. Set the upper bound of binding number for each anchor with SAVI-
      Host or SAVI-Poly attribute.

   2. Reserve a number of binding entries for each anchor with SAVI-Host
      or SAVI-Poly attribute and all anchors share a pool of the other
      binding entries.

17. Constants

   MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME     120s

   MAX_ARP_PREPARE_DELAY      Default 1s but configurable


Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 15]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


   MAX_ARP_DELAY              Default 1s but configurable

   MAX_DAD_PREPARE_DELAY      Default 1s but configurable

   MAX_DAD_DELAY              Default 1s but configurable

18. Summary of to-be-removed sections and open issues

   To-be-removed sections:

   1. Section 6: Conceptual data structures

   2. Section 8: DHCP scenario

   3. Part of Section 9: Anchor attributes

   4. Section 10: Prefix configuration

   Open issues (discussed but not finished):

   1. Whether to keep state START

      Should the procedure be initialized based on client request or
      server response?

      From Eric Levy-Abegnoli and Christian Vogt.

   2. Whether to keep state DETECTION

      Should DHCP interact with NDP to detect collision or should all
      the collision detection be left to NDP and the DHCP solution just
      snoop DHCP only?

      From Eric Levy-Abegnoli.

19. Security Considerations

   There are no security considerations currently.

20. IANA Considerations

   There is no IANA consideration currently.







Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 16]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


21. References

21.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T. and Jinmei, T., "IPv6 Stateless
             Autoconfiguration", RFC4862, September, 2007.

   [RFC5227] S. Cheshire, "IPv4 Address Conflict Detection", RFC5227,
             July 2008.



21.2. Informative References

22. Acknowledgments

Thanks to Christian Vogt, Eric Nordmark, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun, Alberto
Garcia, Eric Levy-Abegnoli, Jari Arkko, David Harrington, Pekka Savola,
Xing Li, Lixia Zhang, Robert Raszuk, Greg Daley, Joel M. Halpern and Tao
Lin for their valuable contributions.

























Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 17]
=0C
Internet-Draft                savi-dhcp                   October 2009


Authors' Addresses

   Jun Bi
   CERNET
   Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
   Beijing 100084
   China
   Email: junbi@cernet.edu.cn

   Guang Yao
   CERNET
   Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
   Beijing 100084
   China
   Email: yaog@netarchlab.tsinghua.edu.cn

   Jianping Wu
   CERNET
   Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing 100084
   China
   Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn

   Fred Baker
   Cisco Systems
   Email: fred@cisco.com






















Bi                     Expires April 27, 2010                [Page 18]
=0C

------=_NextPart_000_00A3_01CAD89F.1EA3A040
Content-Type: text/plain;
	format=flowed;
	name="draft-ietf-savi-fcfs-02.txt";
	reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename="draft-ietf-savi-fcfs-02.txt"


Network Working Group                                        E. Nordmark
Internet-Draft                                                       Sun
Intended status: Standards Track                              M. Bagnulo
Expires: April 29, 2010                                             UC3M
                                                        E. Levy-Abegnoli
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                        October 26, 2009


FCFS-SAVI: First-Come First-Serve Source-Address Validation for Locally
                           Assigned Addresses
                        draft-ietf-savi-fcfs-02

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.





Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 1]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


Abstract

   This memo describes FCFS SAVI a mechanism to provide source address
   validation for IPv6 networks using the First-Come First-Serve
   approach.  The proposed mechanism is intended to complement ingress
   filtering techniques to provide a higher granularity on the control
   of the source addresses used.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Design considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Scope of FCFS SAVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.2.  Constraints for FCFS SAVI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  Address ownership proof  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.4.  Layer-2 Anchor considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.5.  Special cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  SAVI topology and port configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  SAVI enforcement perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  SAVI port configuration guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  VLAN support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  FCFS SAVI specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.1.  FCFS SAVI Data structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.2.  FCFS SAVI algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.1.  Processing of transit traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.2.  Processing of local traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18



















Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 2]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


1.  Introduction

   This memo describes FCFS SAVI, a mechanism to provide source address
   validation for IPv6 networks using the First-Come First-Serve
   approach.  The proposed mechanism is intended to complement ingress
   filtering techniques to provide a higher granularity on the control
   of the source addresses used.


2.  Design considerations

2.1.  Scope of FCFS SAVI

   The application scenario for FCFS SAVI is limited to the local-link.
   This means that the goal of FCFS SAVI is verify that the source
   address of the packets generated by the hosts attached to the local
   link have not been spoofed.

   In any link there usually are hosts and routers attached.  Hosts
   generate packets with their own address as the source address.  This
   is the so-called local traffic. while routers send packets containing
   a source address other than their own, since they are forwarding
   packets generated by other hosts (usually located in a different
   link).  This what the so-called transit traffic.

   The applicability of FCFS SAVI is limited to the local traffic i.e.
   to verify if the traffic generated by the hosts attached to the local
   link contains a valid source address.  The verification of the source
   address of the transit traffic is out of the scope of FCFS SAVI.
   Other techniques, like ingress filtering [RFC2827], are recommended
   to validate transit traffic.  In that sense, FCFS SAVI complements
   ingress filtering, since it relies on ingress filtering to validate
   transit traffic but is provides validation of local traffic, which is
   not provided by ingress filtering.  Hence, the security level is
   increased by using these two techniques.

   In addition, FCFS SAVI is designed to be used with locally assigned
   addresses, in particular with address configured through stateless
   address autoconfiguration [RFC4862].  Manually configured addresses
   can be supported by FCFS SAVI, but manual configuration of the
   binding on the SAVI device provides higher security and seems
   compatible with manual address management.  Additional considerations
   about how to use FCFS SAVI depending on the type of address
   management used and the nature of the addresses is discussed in the
   framework document (add reference when available).






Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 3]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


2.2.  Constraints for FCFS SAVI

   FCFS SAVI is designed to be deployed in existing networks requiring a
   minimum set of changes.  For that reason, FCFS SAVI does not require
   any changes in the hosts which source address is to be verified.  Any
   verification must solely rely in the usage of already available
   protocols.  This means that FCFS SAVI cannot define a new protocol
   nor define any new message on existing protocols nor require that a
   host uses an existent protocol message in a different way.  In other
   words, the requirement is no host changes.

   FCFS SAVI validation is performed by the FSFC SAVI function.  Such
   function can be placed in different type of devices, including a
   router or a layer-2 bridge.  The basic idea is that the FCFS SAVI
   function is located in the points of the topology that can enforce
   the correct usage of source address by dropping the non-compliant
   packets.

2.3.  Address ownership proof

   The main function performed by FCFS SAVI is to verify that the source
   address used in data packets actually belongs to the originator of
   the packet.  Since FCFS SAVI scope is limited to the local link, the
   originator of the packet is attached to the local link.  In order to
   define any source address validation solution, we need to define some
   address ownership proof concept i.e. what it means to be able to
   proof that a given host owns a given address in the sense that the
   host is entitled to send packet with that source address.

   Since no host changes are acceptable, we need to find the means to
   proof address ownership without requiring a new protocol.  In FCFS
   SAVI the address ownership proof is based in the First-Come first
   Serve approach.  This means that the first host that claims a given
   source address is the owner of the address until further notice.
   More precisely, whenever a source address is used for the first time,
   a state is created in the device that is performing the FCFS SAVI
   function binding the source address to the layer-2 information that
   the FCFS SAVI box has available (e.g. the port in a switched LAN).
   Following data packets containing that IP source address must use the
   same layer-2 information in order to be compliant.

   There are however additional considerations to be taken into account.
   For instance, consider the case of a host that moves from one segment
   of a LAN to another segment of the same subnetwork and it keeps the
   same IP address.  In this case, the host is still the owner of the IP
   address, but the associated layer-2 information has changed.  In
   order to cope with this case, the defined FCFS SAVI behaviour implies
   the verification whether the host is still reachable using the



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 4]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   previous layer-2 information.  In order to do that FCFS SAVI uses ND
   protocol.  If the host is no longer reachable at the previously
   recorded layer-2 information, FCFS SAVI assumes that the new location
   is valid and creates a new binding using the new layer-2 information.
   In case the host is still reachable using the previously recorded
   information, the packets coming from the new layer-2 information are
   dropped.

   Note that this only applies to local traffic.  Transit traffic
   generated by a router would be verified using alternative techniques,
   such as ingress filtering.  SAVI checks would not be fulfilled by the
   transit traffic, since the router is not the owner of the source
   address contained in the packets.

2.4.  Layer-2 Anchor considerations

   Any SAVI solution is not stronger than the Layer-2 anchor it uses.
   If the Layer-2 anchor is easily spoofable (e.g. a MAC address), then
   the resulting solution will be weak.  The treatment of non-compliant
   packets needs to be tuned accordingly.  In particular, if the Layer-2
   anchor is easily spoofable and the SAVI device is configured to drop
   no compliant packets, then the usage of SAVI may open a new vector of
   Denial of Service attacks, based on spoofed Layer-2 anchors.  For
   that reason, in this document, we assume that the Layer-2 anchors
   used by the SAVI solution are not easily spoofable (e.g. ports of a
   switched network) and that the SAVI device MAY be configured to drop
   non- compliant packets.  If the SAVI solution proposed in this
   document is to be used with weaker Layer-2 anchors (such as MAC
   addresses), logging is RECOMMENDED instead of dropping non-compliant
   packets.  For the rest of the document, we will assume that the
   Layer-2 anchors are ports of a switched network.

2.5.  Special cases

   The following special cases that need to be considered
   o  Hosts with multiple physical interfaces connected to the same
      link.
   o  Anycast i.e. multiple hosts using the same source address to send
      packets.
   o  Proxy ND i.e. host sending packets on behalf of other, in a
      layer-3 transparent manner.


3.  SAVI topology and port configuration







Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 5]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


3.1.  SAVI enforcement perimeter

   SAVI provides perimetrical security.  This means that the SAVI
   devices form what can be called a SAVI enforcement perimeter and they
   verify that any packet that crosses the perimeter is compliant (i.e.
   the source address related information is validated).  Once the
   packet is inside the perimeter, no further validations are performed
   to the packet.  This model has implications both on how SAVI devices
   are deployed in the topology and on the configuration of the SAVI
   boxes.

   The implication of this perimetrical security approach, is that there
   is part of the topology that is inside the perimeter and part of the
   topology that is outside the perimeter.  This means that while
   packets coming from interfaces connected to the external part of the
   topology need to be validated by the SAVI device, packets coming from
   interfaces connected to the the internal part of the topology do not
   need to be validated.  This significantly reduces the processing
   requirements of the SAVI device.  It also implies that each SAVI
   device that is part of the perimeter, must be able to verify the
   source addresses of the packets coming from the interfaces connected
   to the external part of the perimeter.  In order to do so, the SAVI
   device binds the source address to a layer-2 anchor.

   One possible approach would be for every SAVI device to store binding
   information about every source addresses in the subnetwork This means
   that every SAVI device would store binding for each source address to
   the local layer-2 anchor through packets with that source address can
   be received through.  The problem with this approach is that it
   imposes significant memory burden on the SAVI devices.  In order to
   reduce the memory requirements imposed to each device, the SAVI
   solution described in this specification distributes the storage of
   SAVI binding information among the multiple SAVI devices of a
   subnetwork.  The SAVI binding state is distributed across the SAVI
   devices according to the following criteria: each SAVI device will
   store binding information about the source addresses bound to layer-2
   anchors corresponding to the interfaces that connect to the part of
   the topology that is outside of the SAVI enforcement perimeter.
   Since all the untrusted packet sources are by definition in the
   external part of the perimeter, this means that the packets generated
   by each of the untrusted sources will reach the perimeter through one
   interface of a SAVI device.  The binding information for that
   particular source address will be stored in this first SAVI device
   the packet reaches to.

   This means the SAVI binding information will be distributed across
   multiple devices.  In order to provide proper source address
   validation, it is critical that the information distributed among the



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 6]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   different SAVI devices is coherent.  In particular, it is important
   to avoid that the same source address is bound to different layer-2
   anchors in different SAVI devices.  Should that occur, then it would
   mean that two hosts are allowed to send packets with the same source
   address, which is what we are trying to prevent.  In order to
   preserve the coherency of the SAVI bindings distributed among the
   SAVI devices within a realm, the Neighbour Discovery (ND) protocol is
   used, in particular the Neighbour Solicitation (NSOL) and Neighbour
   Advertisement (NADV) messages.  Before creating a SAVI binding in the
   local SAVI database, the SAVI device will send a NSOL message
   querying for the address involved.  Should any host reply to that
   message with a NADV message, the SAVI device that sent the NADV will
   infer that a binding for that address exists in another SAVI device
   and will not create a local binding for it.  If no NADV message is
   received as a reply to the NSOL, then the local SAVI device will
   infer that no binding for that address exists in other SAVI device
   and will create the local SAVI binding for that address.  (NOTE that
   the description included here is overly simplified to illustrate the
   mechanism used to preserve the coherency of the binding databases of
   the different SAVI devices.  The actual SAVI mechanism as described
   below varies in the fact that in some cases it is the SAVI device
   that generates the NSOL while in other cases it simply forwards the
   NSOL generated by the end host, and that the SAVI device will send
   multiple copies of the NSOL in order to improve the reliability of
   the message exchange).

   So, summarizing, the proposed SAVI approach relies on the following
   design choices:
   o  SAVI provides perimetrical security, so some interfaces of a SAVI
      device will connect to the internal (trusted) part of the topology
      and other interfaces will connect to the external (untrusted) part
      of the topology.
   o  A SAVI device only verifies packets coming though one interface
      connected to the untrusted part of the topology.
   o  A SAVI device only stores binding information for the source
      addresses that are bound to layer-2 anchors that correspond to
      interfaces that connect to the untrusted part of the topology.
   o  SAVI uses the NSOL and NADV messages to preserve the coherency of
      the SAVI binding state distributed among the SAVI devices within a
      realm.

   So, in a link that is constituted of multiple L2 devices, some of
   which are SAVI capable and some of which are not, the SAVI capable
   devices SHOULD be deployed forming a connected perimeter (i.e. that
   no data packet can get inside the perimeter without passing through a
   SAVI device).  Packets that cross the perimeter will be validated
   while packets that do no cross the perimeter are not validated (hence
   SAVI protection is not provided for these packets).  Consider the



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 7]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   deployment of SAVI in the topology depicted in the following picture:

      +--+   +--+                          +--+   +--+
      |H1|   |H2|                          |H3|   |R1|
      +--+   +--+                          +--+   +--+
        |     |                              |     |
   +-------------SAVI-ENFORCEMENT-PERIMETER--------------+
   |    |     |                              |     |     |
   |  +-1-----2-+                          +-1-----2-+   |
   |  |  SAVI1  |                          |  SAVI2  |   |
   |  +-3--4----+                          +--3------+   |
   |    |  |          +--------------+        |          |
   |    |  +----------|              |--------+          |
   |    |             |   SWITCH-A   |                   |
   |    |  +----------|              |--------+          |
   |    |  |          +--------------+        |          |
   |  +-1--2----+                          +--1------+   |
   |  |  SAVI3  |                          |  SAVI4  |   |
   |  +-3---4---+                          +----4----+   |
   |    |   |                                   |        |
   +-------------SAVI-ENFORCEMENT-PERIMETER--------------+
        |   |                                   |
      +--+ +--+                            +---------+
      |R2| |H4|                            |SWICTH-B |
      +--+ +--+                            +---------+
                                                 |    |
                                           +--+  +--+
                                           |H5|  |H6|
                                           +--+  +--+


   In the figure above, the SAVI enforcement perimeter is provided by 4
   SAVI devices, namely SAVI1, SAVI2, SAVI3 and SAVI4.  These devices
   verify information related to the source address both in data and in
   ND packets and filter packets accordingly.

   SAVI devices then have two types of ports: trusted ports and
   validating ports.
   o  Validating ports (VPs) are those in which SAVI processing is
      performed.  This means that when a packet is received through one
      of the validating ports, the SAVI processing and filtering will be
      executed.
   o  Trusted ports (TPs) are those in which SAVI processing is not
      performed.  So, packets received through trusted ports are not
      validated and no SAVI processing is performed in them.

   Trusted ports are used for connections with trusted infrastructure,
   including the communication between SAVI devices, the communication



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 8]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   with routers and the communication of other switches that while they
   are not SAVI devices, they only connect to trusted infrastructure
   (i.e. other SAVI devices, routers or other trusted nodes).  So, in
   the figure above, Port 3 of SAVI1 and port 1 of SAVI3 are trusted
   because the connect two SAVI devices.  Port 4 of SAVI1, port 3 of
   SAVI2, port 2 of SAVI3 and port 1 of SAVI4 are trusted because the
   connect to SWITCH-A to which only trusted nodes are connected.  In
   the figure above, port 2 of SAVI2 and port 3 of SAVI3 are trusted
   ports because they connect to routers.

   Validating ports are used for connection with non-trusted
   infrastructure.  In particular, hosts are normally connected to
   validating ports.  Non-SAVI switches that are outside of the SAVI
   enforcement perimeter also are connected through validating port.  In
   particular, non-SAVI devices that connect directly to hosts or that
   have no SAVI capable device between themselves and the hosts are
   connected through a validating port.  So, in the figure above, ports
   1 and 2 of SAVI1, port 1 of SAVI2, port 4 of SAVI 3 are validating
   ports because they connect to hosts.  Port 4 of SAVI4 is also a
   validating port because it is connected to SWITCH-B which is a non-
   SAVI capable switch which is connected to hosts H5 and H6.

3.2.  SAVI port configuration guidelines

   The guidelines for port configuration in SAVI devices are:
   o  Ports that are connected to another SAVI device SHOULD be
      configured as Trusted ports.  Not doing so will at least
      significantly increase the memory consumption in the SAVI devices.
   o  Ports connected to hosts SHOULD be configured as Validating ports.
      Not doing so will allow the host connected to that port to send
      packets with spoofed source address.
   o  Ports connected to routers SHOULD be configured as Trusted ports.
      Configuring them as Validating ports would increase the signaling
      due to SAVI.  The implication is that a router can generate
      traffic with any source address as they are assumed to be part of
      the trusted infrastructure.
   o  Ports connected to a chain of one or more legacy switches that
      have hosts connected SHOULD be configured as Validating ports.
      Not doing so will allow the host connected to any of these
      switches to send packets with spoofed source address.
   o  Ports connected to a chain of one or more legacy switches that
      have other SAVI devices and/or routers connected but had no hosts
      attached to them SHOULD be configured as Trusted ports.  Not doing
      so will at least significantly increase the memory consumption in
      the SAVI devices and increase the signaling traffic due to SAVI
      validation.





Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                 [Page 9]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   o  Ports connected to a chain of one or more legacy switches that
      have a mix of SAVI devices and/or routers with hosts, SHOULD be
      configured as Validating ports.  Not doing so will allow the host
      connected to that port to send packets with spoofed source
      address.  Nevertheless, this topology will result in increased
      SAVI signaling and memory consumption compared to a topology where
      SAVI-hosts communications and inter SAVI communications are kept
      through different legacy switches.

3.3.  VLAN support

   In the case the SAVI device is a switch that supports VLANs, the SAVI
   implementation will behave as if there was one SAVI process per VLAN.
   The SAVI process of each VLAN will store the binding information
   corresponding the the nodes attached to that particular VLAN.


4.  FCFS SAVI specification

4.1.  FCFS SAVI Data structures

   FCFS SAVI function relies on state information binding the source
   address used in data packets to the layer-2 information that
   contained the first packet that used that source IP address.  Such
   information is stored in FCFS SAVI Data Base (DB).  The FCFS SAVI DB
   will contain a set of entries about the currently used IP source
   addresses.  So each entry will contain the following information:
   o  IP source address
   o  Layer-2 information, such as Layer-2 address, port through which
      the packet was received, etc
   o  Lifetime
   o  Status:either tentative or valid
   o  Creation time: the value of the local clock when the entry was
      firstly created

   In addition to this, FCFS SAVI need to know what are the prefixes
   that are directly connected, so it maintains a data structure called
   the the FCFS SAVI prefix list, which contains:
   o  Prefix
   o  Interface where prefix is directly connected

4.2.  FCFS SAVI algorithm

4.2.1.  Processing of transit traffic

   The FCFS SAVI function is located in a forwarding device, such as a
   router or a layer-2 bridge.  The following processing is performed
   depending on the type of port the packet has been received through:



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 10]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   o  If the data packet is received through a Trusted port, the data
      packet is forwarded and no SAVI processing performed to the
      packet.
   o  If the data packet is received through a Validating port, then the
      SAVI function checks whether the received data packet is local
      traffic or transit traffic.  It does so by verifying if the source
      address of the packet belongs to one of the directly connected
      prefixes available in the receiving interface.  It does so by
      searching the FCFS SAVI Prefix List.
      *  If the IP source address does not belong to one of the local
         prefixes of the receiving interface, this means that the dat
         packet is transit traffic and the packet SHOULD be discarded.
         The FCFS SAVI function MAY send an ICMP Destination Unreachable
         Error back to the source address of the data packet.  (ICMPv6,
         code 5 (Source address failed ingress/egress policy) should be
         used).
      *  If the source address of the packet does belong to one of the
         prefixes available in the the receiving port, then the SAVI
         local traffic validation processes is executed as described
         below.

4.2.2.  Processing of local traffic.

   We describe next how the local traffic, including both control and
   data packets are processed by the SAVI device using a state machine
   approach.

   The state machine described is for the binding of a given source IP
   address in a given SAVI device.  So this means that all the packets
   described as inputs in the state machine above refer to that given IP
   address.  The key attribute is the IP address.  The full state
   information is:
   o  IP ADDRESS: IPAddr
   o  LAYER_2 ANCHOR: P
   o  LIFETIME: LT

   The possible states are:
   o  NO_BIND
   o  TENTATIVE
   o  VALID
   o  TESTING_TP
   o  TESTING_VP
   o  TESTING_LIFETIME

   We will use VP for Validating Port and TP for Trusted Port.

   After bootstrapping (when no binding exists), the state for all
   source IP address is NO-BIND i.e. there is no binding for the IP



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 11]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   address to any Layer-2 anchor.

   NO_BIND: The binding for a source IP address entry is in this state
   when it does not have any binding to a Layer 2 anchor.  All addresses
   are in this state by default after bootstrapping, unless bindings
   were created for it.

   TENTATIVE: The binding for a source address is in this state during
   the waiting period during which the DAD procedure is being executed
   (either directly by the host itself or by the SAVI device on its
   behalf).

   VALID: The binding for the source address has been verified, it is
   valid and usable for filtering traffic.

   TESTING_TP: A binding for a source address enters in this sate when a
   DAD_NSOL has been received through a Trusted port. this implies that
   another host is performing the DAD procedure for that source address
   in another switch. this may due to an attack or to the fact that the
   host may have moved.  The binding in this state is then being tested
   to determine which is the situation.

   TESTING_TP: A binding for a source address enters in this sate when a
   DAD_NSOL or a data packet has been received through a Validating
   port. this implies that another host is performing the DAD procedure
   for that source address in another switch. this may due to an attack
   or to the fact that the host may have moved.  The binding in this
   state is then being tested to determine which is the situation.

   TESTING_LIFETIME: A binding for a source address is in this state
   cause the lifetime of the entry is about to expire. this is due to
   the fact that no packets has been seen by the SAVI device for the
   LIFETIME period. this may be due to the host simply being silent or
   because the host has left the location.  In order to determine which
   is the case, a test is performed, in order to determine if the
   binding information should be discarded.

   We describe next how the different inputs are processed depending on
   the state of the binding of the IP address.

   A simplified figure of the state machine can be found at
   http://www.it.uc3m.es/~marcelo/SAVI_state_machine.pdf

   NO_BIND

   o  Upon the reception through a Validating Port (VP) of a Neighbour
      Solicitation (NSOL) generated by the Duplicate Address Detection
      (DAD) procedure (hereafter named DAD_NSOL) containing Target



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 12]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


      Address IPAddr, or after the reception of a DATA packet containing
      IPAddr as the source address, the SAVI device will execute the
      process of sending Neighbour Solicitation (NSOL) messages of the
      Duplicate Address Detection process as described in section 5.4.2
      of [RFC4862] for the IPAddr using the following default
      parameters: DupAddrDetectTransmits set to 2 (i.e. 2 Neighbour
      Solicitation messages for that address will be sent by the SAVI
      device) and RetransTimer set to 500 milliseconds (i.e. the time
      between two Neighbour Solicitation messages is 500 millisecs and
      also the wait time for replies in the form of Neighbour
      Advertisement for the queried address).  The NSOL messages are not
      sent through any of the ports configured as Validating Ports.  The
      NSOL messages are sent through the proper Trusted Ports (as
      defined by the switch behaviour that will depend on whether it
      performs MLD snooping or not) The SAVI device MAY discard the data
      packet while the DAD procedure is being executed.
      *  EDITOR NOTE: We need to rate limit the emission of NSOL of the
         SAVI device as a whole.
      *  EDITOR NOTE 2: should we send the NSOL through the port the
         packet was received through?
      The state is moved to TENTATIVE.  The LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT
      (i.e.  LT=3D=3DTENT_LT) and the LAYER_2 ANCHOR is set to VP (i.e.
      P=3D=3DVP)
   o  Data packets containing IPAddr as the source address received
      through Trusted ports are processed and forwarded as usual (i.e.
      no special SAVI processing)
   o  DAD_NSOL packets containing IPAddr as the target address received
      through a Trusted port are NOT forwarded through any of the
      Validating ports but they are sent through the proper Trusted
      Ports (as defined by the switch behaviour that will depend on
      whether it performs MLD snooping or not)
   o  Neighbor Advertisement packets sent to all nodes as a reply to the
      DAD_NSOL (hereafter called DAD_NADV) containing IPAddr as the
      target address coming through a Validating port are discarded.
   o  Other signaling packets are processed and forwarded as usual (i.e.
      no SAVI processing)

   TENTATIVE

   o  If the LIFETIME times out, the state is moved to VALID.  The
      LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT (i.e.  LT=3D=3D DEFAULT_LT).  Stored
      data packets are forwarded (if any).
   o  If a Neighbour Advertisement (NADV) is received through a Trusted
      Port with Target Address set to IPAddr, then state is set to
      NO_BIND and the LAYER_2 ANCHOR and the LIFETIME are cleared.  Data
      packets stored corresponding to this binding are discarded.





Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 13]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   o  If a NADV is received through a Validating Port with Target
      Address set to IPAddr, the NADV packet is discarded
   o  If a data packet with source address IPAddr is received with
      Layer_2 anchor equal to P, then the packet is either stored or
      discarded.
      *  EDITOR NOTE: we need to define a maximum storage space for the
         data packets.  Having a single default value may be hard since
         it will heavily depend on the capability of the device.  Maybe
         it would be enough that the device has a maximum and that the
         value can be configured?
   o  If a data packet with source address IPAddr is received through a
      Trusted port, the data packet is forwarded. the state is
      unchanged. ( waiting for the NADV?)
   o  If a data packet with source address IPAddr is received through a
      Validating port other than P, the data packet is discarded.
   o  Other signaling packets are processed and forwarded as usual (i.e.
      no SAVI processing)
      *  EDITOR NOTE: this may need more thought

   VALID

   o  If a data packet containing IPAddr as a source address arrives
      from Validating port P, then the LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT and
      the packet is forwarded as usual.
      *  EDITOR NOTE: Is this feasible? i.e. to reset a timer each time
         a data packet arrives?  We could just have a long lifetime and
         actively check for the host when the lifetime is about to
         expire.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Trusted port, then the DAD_NSOL
      message is forwarded to port P and it is also forwarded to the
      proper Trusted Ports (as defined by the switch behaviour that will
      depend on whether it performs MLD snooping or not).  The state is
      changed to TESTING_TP.  The LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT.
   o  If a data packet containing source address IPAddr or a DAD_NSOL
      packet with target address set to IPAddr is received through a
      Validating port P' other than P, then the SAVI device will execute
      the process of sending DAD_NSOL messages as described in section
      5.4.2 of [RFC4862] for the IPAddr using the following default
      parameters: DupAddrDetectTransmits set to 2 (i.e. 2 NSOL messages
      for that address will be sent by the SAVI device) and RetransTimer
      set to 500 milliseconds (i.e. the time between two NSOL messages
      is 500 millisecs and also the wait time for replies in the form of
      Neighbour Advertisement for the queried address).  The DAD_NSOL
      message will be forwarded to the port P.
      *  EDITOR NOTE: should we also forward it though the TP?
         Theoretically, there shouldn't be another binding in any other
         SAVI device, so there should not be a need for this.
      The state is moved to TESTING_VP.  The LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT.



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 14]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


      The SAVI device MAY discard the data packet while the DAD
      procedure is being executed.
   o  If the LIFETIME expires, then the SAVI device will execute the
      process of sending DAD_NSOL messages as described in section 5.4.2
      of [RFC4862] for the IPAddr using the following default
      parameters: DupAddrDetectTransmits set to 2 (i.e. 2 NSOL messages
      for that address will be sent by the SAVI device) and RetransTimer
      set to 500 milliseconds (i.e. the time between two NSOL messages
      is 500 millisecs and also the wait time for replies in the form of
      Neighbour Advertisement for the queried address).  The DAD_NSOL
      messages will be forwarded to the port P. The state is changed to
      TESTING_LIFETIME and the LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT.
   o  If a data packet containing IPAddr as a source address arrives
      from Trusted port, the packet is discarded.
      *  EDITOR NOTE: receiving such a packet means that another SAVI
         device has created a binding for this address, or that the
         perimeter has been breached.  This should be logged?
   o  Other signaling packets are processed and forwarded as usual (i.e.
      no SAVI processing).  In particular DAD_NADV containing IPAddr as
      the target address are forwarded as usual.

   TESTING_TP

   o  If the LIFETIME expires, the LAYER_2 ANCHOR is cleared and the
      state is changed to NO_BIND
   o  If a NADV message containing the IPAddr as target address is
      received through the Validating port P as a reply to the DAD_NSOL
      message, then the NADV is forwarded as usual and the state is
      changed to VALID.  The LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT
   o  If a data packet containing IPAddr as the source address is
      received through port P, then the packet is forwarded.
      *  EDITOR NOTE: should we move back to VALID?
   o  If a data packet is received through a port that is other than
      port P, then the packet is discarded.

   TESTING_VP

   o  If the LIFETIME expires, the LAYER_2 ANCHOR set to P' (i.e.
      P=3D=3DP'), the LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT and the state is =
changed
      to VALID.  Data packet stored coming from P' are forwarded.
   o  If a NADV message containing the IPAddr as target address is
      received through the Validating port P as a reply to the DAD_NSOL
      message, then the NADV is forwarded as usual and the state is
      changed to VALID.  The LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT
   o  If a data packet containing IPAddr as the source address is
      received through port P, then the packet is forwarded.





Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 15]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


      *  EDITOR NOTE: should we move back to VALID?
   o  If a data packet is received through a port that is other than
      port P, then the packet is discarded.

   TESTING_LIFETIME

   o  If the LIFETIME expires, the LAYER_2 ANCHOR is cleared and the
      state is changed to NO_BIND
   o  If a NADV message containing the IPAddr as target address is
      received through the Validating port P as a reply to the DAD_NSOL
      message, then the NADV is forwarded as usual and the state is
      changed to VALID.  The LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT
   o  If a data packet containing IPAddr as the source address is
      received through port P, then the packet is forwarded and the
      state is changed to VALID.  The LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT

   Rate limiting of messages: TBD

   MLD considerations

   The SAVI device must join the Solicited Node Multicast group for all
   the addresses which state is other than NO_BIND. this is needed to
   make sure that the SAVI device will receive the DAD_NSOL for those
   addresses.  Please note that it may not be enough to relay on the
   host behind the Validating port doing so, since the node may move and
   after a while, the packets for that particular solicited node
   multicast group will no longer be forwarded to the SAVI device.  So,
   the SAVI device SHOULD join the solicited node multicast groups for
   all the addresses that are in a state other than NO_BIND


5.  Security Considerations

   First of all, it should be noted that any SAVI solution will be as
   strong as the lower layer anchor that it uses.  In particular, if the
   lower layer anchor is forgeable, then the resulting SAVI solution
   will be weak.  For example, if the lower layer anchor is a MAC
   address that can be easily spoofed, then the resulting SAVI will not
   be stronger than that.  On the other hand, if we use switch ports as
   lower layer anchors (and there is only one host connected to each
   port) it is likely that the resulting SAVI solution will be
   considerably more secure.

   Denial of service attacks

   There are two types of DoS attacks that can be envisaged in a SAVI
   environment.  On one hand, we can envision attacks against the SAVI
   device resources.  On the other hand, we can envision DoS attacks



Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 16]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   against the hosts connected to the network where SAVI is running.

   The attacks against the SAVI device basically consist on making the
   SAVI device to consume its resource until it runs out of them.  For
   instance, a possible attack would be to send packets with different
   source addresses, making the SAVI device to create state for each of
   the addresses and waste memory.  At some point the SAVI device runs
   out of memory and it needs to decide how to react in this situation.
   The result is that some form of garbage collection is needed to prune
   the entries.  It is recommended that when the SAVI device runs out of
   the memory allocated for the SAVI DB, it creates new entries by
   deleting the entries which Creation Time is higher.  This implies
   that older entries are preserved and newer entries overwrite each
   other.  In an attack scenario where the attacker sends a batch of
   data packets with different source address, each new source address
   is likely to rewrite another source address created by the attack
   itself.  It should be noted that entries are also garbage collected
   using the LIFETIME, which is updated using data packets.  The result
   is that in order for an attacker to actually fill the SAVI DB with
   false source addresses, it needs to continuously send data packets
   for all the different source addresses, in order for the entries to
   grow old and compete with the legitimate entries.  The result is that
   the cost of the attack for the attacker is highly increased.

   The other type of attack is when an attacker manages to create state
   in the SAVI device that will result in blocking the data packets sent
   by the legitimate owner of the address.  In IPv6 these attacks are
   not an issue thanks to the 2^64 addresses available in each link.

   Compare with Threat analysis and identify residual threats: TBD


6.  Contributors

      Jun Bi
      CERNET
      Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
      Beijing 100084
      China
      Email: junbi@cernet.edu.cn

      Guang Yao
      CERNET
      Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
      Beijing 100084
      China





Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 17]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


      Email: yaog@netarchlab.tsinghua.edu.cn

      Fred Baker
      Cisco Systems
      Email: fred@cisco.com

      Alberto Garcia Martinez
      University Carlos III of Madrid
      Email: alberto@it.uc3m.es


7.  Acknowledgments

   This draft benefited from the input from: Christian Vogt, Dong Zhang,
   Frank Xia and Lin Tao.

   Marcelo Bagnulo is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project
   supported by the European Commission under its Seventh Framework
   Program.


8.  Normative References

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.


Authors' Addresses

   Erik Nordmark
   Sun Microsystems, Inc.
   17 Network Circle
   Menlo Park, CA  94025
   USA

   Phone: +1 650 786 2921
   Email: Erik.Nordmark@Sun.COM






Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 18]
=0C
Internet-Draft                  FCFS SAVI                   October 2009


   Marcelo Bagnulo
   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
   Av. Universidad 30
   Leganes, Madrid  28911
   SPAIN

   Phone: 34 91 6248814
   Email: marcelo@it.uc3m.es
   URI:   http://www.it.uc3m.es


   Eric Levy-Abegnoli
   Cisco Systems
   Village d'Entreprises Green Side - 400, Avenue Roumanille
   Biot-Sophia Antipolis - 06410
   France

   Email: elevyabe@cisco.com

































Nordmark, et al.         Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 19]
=0C


------=_NextPart_000_00A3_01CAD89F.1EA3A040--


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 11 07:35:14 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0762B3A67FE for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 07:35:14 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -104.658
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-104.658 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.259, BAYES_50=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_41=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id eiNqrwH1nv2X for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 07:35:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25F1F3A68BD for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 07:35:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (189.102.218.87.dynamic.jazztel.es [87.218.102.189]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 779C06C6699 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 16:34:58 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BC1DE11.7060405@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2010 16:34:57 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: savi@ietf.org
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com><645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO><4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com><43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF5864.3040400@joelhalpern.com>	<A8D9F137C0C84E1CA6EB30D8B16D359E@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF76EE.9070403@joelhalpern.com> <DA09B5DB935D496A8CD654AE6E38ECF0@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <DA09B5DB935D496A8CD654AE6E38ECF0@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2010 14:35:14 -0000

just to clarify this...

El 10/04/10 5:15, Jun Bi escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
> Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2010 2:50 AM
> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Greg Daley'" 
> <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; 
> "'Suresh Krishnan'" <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in 
> SAVI "
>
>> The two documents under evaluation are DHCP based and DAD based.
>
> Hi Joel,
>
> No, the two documents were: FCFS (is data triggered based) and CPS (is 
> NDP snooping based). See the attachment.
>
not really, when the CPS document was written (april 2009 - see 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bi-savi-cps-00), the fcfs was already a 
WG document since january 2009 (see 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-savi-fcfs-00) and also, the fcfs 
document already triggered the binding creation procedure upon the 
recpetion of either control packets and data packets for which it didn't 
have a valid binding for.


>> In other words, as far as I know, all of the mechanisms assume that 
>> the primary goal is to provide control based admission and validation 
>> of users.
>
> If your statement is true, then the following statement should be 
> removed from
> savi-fcfs-02, and get rid of the name of FCFS, then rename the 
> solution to a popper name,
FCFS is the ownership principle the SLAAC SAVI works on.
(fwiw, i have no problem in chaning the name, i just want to clairfy the 
concepts that seems to be a bit confused here)

We have two very different cases here:
The DHCP case, where there is a central auhtority that decides who owns 
which address. In this case,t he ownership is defined by this auhtority 
i.e the dhcp server.
In the slaac case we don't have such authority, so we need an 
alternative mechanism to determine ownership. This mechanisms if the 
FCFS. The first one that claims the address is the one that owns it.
This means that the  SLAAC Savi device will create a binding the first 
time it sees a host using a given address. This is what fcfs stands for.


> e.g. savi-slaac, then I'd like to see the merge of cps-02 with the 
> fcfs-02 as one same state machine. You know
> I tried many times.
>
>   section 2.3 of savi-fcfs-02:
>   "In FCFS SAVI the address ownership proof is based in the First-Come 
> first
>   Serve approach.  This means that the first host that claims a given
>   source address is the owner of the address until further notice.
>   More precisely, whenever a source address is used for the first time,
>   a state is created in the device that is performing the FCFS SAVI
>   function binding the source address to the layer-2 information that
>   the FCFS SAVI box has available (e.g. the port in a switched LAN)."

exactly, this is what i described above. Please note that the paragrpah 
above doesn't say in any place the the address is contained in the 
source address field of a data packet. THe host may be claiming an 
address by performing DAD for that address and this is supported by the 
fcfs draft that you kindly attached.

>
>    This does mean the savi-switch has to watch the data traffic and 
> set up
> the binding trigged by data, which is not implementable as a MUST for 
> savi-switch.
>
>
AFAICT, the counter based trigger is a way to implement the triggering 
of a binding creation procedure upon the recpetion of a data packet for 
which the savi device does not have a binding for.


>>
>> For both control modes, there have been arguments made that under 
>> some circumstances, we may miss the control packet, or forget the 
>> control state.  We then need to restore that state.
>> Again, for both control modes, folks have argued that we can not 
>> mandate sufficient simple control based mechanisms.
>>
>> So we are trying to figure out what additional mechanisms we can 
>> offer such that the switch can provide SAVI enforcement without 
>> permanently (or for an extended period of time) blocking legitimate 
>> service usage.
>>
>> This has lead folks to ask that even pure control devices have some 
>> form of additional data plane admission response.  One way of 
>> achieving that is through the counter on denials.  Another way is to 
>> cause all denials to be processed by the control plane.  There are 
>> more choices.
>> My concern is two-fold
>> 1) We should specify as much as possible the external behavior, not 
>> the internal mechanism
>
> But what we say MUST in a draft should be implementable by most 
> switches, right?
> I am fine with the counter-based,
as mentioned above, the counter based is a way to implemnet the 
triggering of the binding creation procedure upon the recpetion of a 
data packet for which source address the savi does not have a binding for.
As people have repeatedly corrected me (and i agree) we should not 
mandate implementations, but we shoudl mandate external behaviour i.e. 
the functionality.

The other way we could do this is to provide a possible implementation 
(the counter based triggering if you want) and say that any other 
implementation which external behaviour is the same is accetpable.


> the NV-ram saving as MUST or SHOULD.
> For data-triggered like FCFS, it should be SHOULD, because it has 
> problem.
>
>> 2) We should allow behavior that allows the box to limit the rate at 
>> which the control processor has to handle events.
>
> I am not against to make this as a SHOULD, but it cant' to be a MUST, 
> because it has problem.
>

I think that what needs to be a MUST is that the box MUST protect itself 
agaisnt DoS attacks. One possible way of doing this would be to rate 
limit, but if someone is able to procude a box that cannot be DoSed, 
then it should need to implement it.

Regards, marcelo


>>
>> The only reason I mentioned FCFS is that it came up in one of your 
>> comments.  It is in fact the case that control message processing is 
>> probably subject to some disordering in the event of a collision.  So 
>> what.
>>
>> If someone really thinks we need to mandate a coutner based behavior 
>> in some situation, please state explicitly which scenario, and why it 
>> needs to be mandated.
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>> Hi Jole,
>>>
>>> I am confused. In the history of SAVI WG, there are two basic modes: 
>>> one is FCFS, another is CPS (control plan snooping). FCFS (or you 
>>> say FPFS) is quit different principle from control based snooping 
>>> (CPS). In FCFS mode, the switch has to watch the data packet to 
>>> setup binding table. In CPS mode, the switch watch control packet to 
>>> setup binding table. So FCFS or FPFS is not the counter-triggered 
>>> (because counter is used to report packet loss). The 
>>> counter-triggered mode itself can't work to setup the initial 
>>> binding table (I can't image EVERY binding entry is set up by after 
>>> losing some data packet), so the counter-triggered has to be used in 
>>> combination with other base solutions to resolve unexpected event 
>>> (unexpected means it is not the most cases) after losing some 
>>> packets. In savi-dhcp-02, it works so.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>> Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2010 12:40 AM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>; "'Greg Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; 
>>> "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
>>> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>> in SAVI "
>>>
>>>> Commenting on the semantics of the counter mechanism, or data 
>>>> triggered processing, as retained below.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, we could get very specific in how we write the behavior, such 
>>>> that counter based behavior was not permitted.
>>>> However, we don't need to.
>>>> It is perfectly reasoanble that although we call the system FCFS, 
>>>> that in fact it is only approximately FCFS.  We could even rename 
>>>> it FPFS (First Processed, First Served) if we wanted.  Allowing a 
>>>> range of implementations that still meet the overall goal (which is 
>>>> not the specific FCFS, but rather the prevention of certain 
>>>> improper behaviors) is a good thing.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, we could write the MIB to require the counter.  And to have a 
>>>> trigger value for the counter.
>>>> But we shouldn't.  Being that specific does not do us any good at all.
>>>> Clearly defining the required behavior (including not perpetually 
>>>> blocking legitimate users) is necessary.
>>>> Describing the interaction with the protocol messages that we 
>>>> expect to achieve that is what we need to do here.  (And yes, that 
>>>> gets into something closer to implementation than we really like.)
>>>>
>>>> But lets try to stay away from the actual details where we can.
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 11:25 PM
>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: "Eric Levy-Abegnoli" <elevyabe@cisco.com>; <fred@cisco.com>; 
>>>>> "'Greg Daley'" <gdaley@netstarlogicalis.com>; "Guang Yao" 
>>>>> <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>; <savi@ietf.org>; "'Suresh Krishnan'" 
>>>>> <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues 
>>>>> in SAVI "
>>>>>
>>>>>> I believe that there is a miscommunication here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Counter based triggering is a way of implementing data-triggered 
>>>>>> action.
>>>>>> If we define the data trigger requirements properly, then direct 
>>>>>> trigger, counter trigger, or some other mechanism that I am not 
>>>>>> clever enough to invent are all valid ways of implementing the 
>>>>>> spec.  RFCs generally try NOT to constrain implementation, but 
>>>>>> only to constrain the on-the-wire behavior.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>
>>>>> We may need to discuss this. I said in my past email, this counter 
>>>>> triggered is not
>>>>> the original data triggered actions. At least this counter 
>>>>> triggered is not FCFS mode because it doesn't assume first come 
>>>>> first serve rule. This counter triggered is a supplement on top of 
>>>>> the principle of control triggered binding (works for most cases) 
>>>>> to handle some unexpected cases (to enhance the robustness).
>>>>> Moreover, the counter triggered alert is OK to be be MUST (so that 
>>>>> the admin knows
>>>>> there might be unexpected cases happen), but the counter triggered 
>>>>> probe to recover binding is still a open issue (can the switch 
>>>>> find the right source address of the packet to send a probe when 
>>>>> the CPU action is triggered by counter ? please see "section 24. 
>>>>> Counter Triggered Binding" in savi-dhcp-02).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As such, I beleive that Fred, Marcelo, and Eric are all willing 
>>>>>> to include data-triggered behavior as one of the alternatives 
>>>>>> that a device may use to address providing reliable support for 
>>>>>> SAVI-SLAAC. (The question of whether that specific behavior is to 
>>>>>> be a singular MUST, or whether there is a list of alternatives at 
>>>>>> least one of which MUST be supported is not fully determined 
>>>>>> because we have not agreed on the full list of problems and their 
>>>>>> detectability.)
>>>>>
>>>>>> From my point, the control based binding should be a MUST (you 
>>>>>> can say it is
>>>>> a base).
>>>>> Then we have multiple ways to handle unexpected cases (although I 
>>>>> still doubt
>>>>> if those cases will happen in real deployment or do harms to 
>>>>> operators. I think Fred Baker also said so. At least we didn't see 
>>>>> it is a serious problem in our campus deployment). In 
>>>>> savi-dhcp-02, we have made saving binding in NV-ram as MUST, and 
>>>>> counter-triggered alert as MUST (those are implementable and can 
>>>>> handle most of the unexpected cases and implementable). For 
>>>>> others, IMHO, if we ask the vendor to MUST implement any of 
>>>>> others, then I am afraid that no one real vendor will deliver the 
>>>>> product.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems a necessary to include in the base document that it is 
>>>>>> legitimate for devices to rate-limit their control response 
>>>>>> (either directly or indirectly) as that is something many devices 
>>>>>> will need to do, and that is externally observable.
>>>>>
>>>>> I really think this is not acceptable. IMHO, maybe you didn't 
>>>>> really get the problem of rate limiting I mentioned in my past 
>>>>> email. If you do rate limiting, then EVERY packet(including both 
>>>>> control and data packet) will be affected. It means the access 
>>>>> switch (not router) will failed to deliver the control packet to 
>>>>> CPU. Then the manager system has to resend the control packet by 
>>>>> TCP retransmit or timeout, then I have to wait a long time to get 
>>>>> telnet response or snmp response. In the worse case, the 
>>>>> retransmitted packet will be failed to deliver to the switch CPU 
>>>>> again. Then in the management plan, that savi-switch can be 
>>>>> considered as dead. I do think the loss of important management 
>>>>> info is more more serious problem for operators. As an operator, a 
>>>>> robust management plan is very important, I can not image to 
>>>>> deploy a savi switch without a robust management plan.
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we want to describe the counter method, it would be in an 
>>>>>> informative appendix discussing the various ways of supporting 
>>>>>> data plane triggered behavior.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>> just not realistic to drop traffic when no binding exist, and 
>>>>>>>> snooping data traffic is the only solution for addresses not 
>>>>>>>> assigned with DHCP.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, this unfeasible solution is not the only way. At least the 
>>>>>>> counter-triggered  proposed by Fred Baker can be an alternative 
>>>>>>> way and more feasible. Guang Yao also said if a NUD is snooped 
>>>>>>> at the switch then the switch can send probe to detect
>>>>>>> (it is only a potential idea, need some test to verify). Saving 
>>>>>>> the binding in NV-ram immediately after the binding is set up as 
>>>>>>> a MUST is realist for most vendors we consulted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>    


From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Sun Apr 11 19:31:16 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EEAD3A6811 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 19:31:16 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.574
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.574 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.425,  BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_41=0.6]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id n7yknYGUY8O9 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 19:31:15 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-iw0-f189.google.com (mail-iw0-f189.google.com [209.85.223.189]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 933973A67FA for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 19:31:15 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by iwn27 with SMTP id 27so4260730iwn.5 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 19:31:08 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=QT1GANrRoAFSqznrd2sXm5eiGV3IhuZi8u2XK47G8QY=; b=N6jRJYB6o+oIXUEihlUOSNt2Cf4hCmiYR/VR7EYSbaXjh0aZxEWYy0vEbo071uGnl+ zENb1beNEoO5Zsh6a+HZzSPpjJJ2tPXLVSlOw0QRAoCleGFMO1GrHuX4mQJtdfPkYOai 4yPjrn2zFjzQMr6y0XXnL3ooMGN9/N0kim7CQ=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=bVEQOoEdbkpsC4HJ0BPjg07TBtRNy9zWXI2U0F5AWgwXZUUTizMWBSUI4EOYAA9mJa xHEYMz4EKzilykIgENn/RtxrFETP7eCxzDXI14ylg1VcJtmGy88TRYYrpQd8wRUPrG6v XtIKYNYTjGHuDFXYbMrIIZbeS5gsQ5i8A9qTs=
Received: by 10.231.153.69 with SMTP id j5mr1585772ibw.33.1271039467880; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 19:31:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (tu132201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.132.201]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id j42sm1725557ibr.13.2010.04.11.19.31.04 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Sun, 11 Apr 2010 19:31:06 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'marcelo bagnulo braun'" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com><645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO><4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com><43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF5864.3040400@joelhalpern.com>	<A8D9F137C0C84E1CA6EB30D8B16D359E@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF76EE.9070403@joelhalpern.com>	<DA09B5DB935D496A8CD654AE6E38ECF0@junbiVAIO> <4BC1DE11.7060405@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BC1DE11.7060405@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 10:30:57 +0800
Message-ID: <4bc285ea.2a7ae70a.7237.7684@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcrZg9wYME0fI07DRziRT0onKNouzQAYtIKg
Content-Language: zh-cn
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 02:31:16 -0000

> FCFS is the ownership principle the SLAAC SAVI works on.
> (fwiw, i have no problem in chaning the name, i just want to clairfy the
> concepts that seems to be a bit confused here)
> 
> We have two very different cases here:
> The DHCP case, where there is a central auhtority that decides who owns
> which address. In this case,t he ownership is defined by this auhtority
> i.e the dhcp server.
> In the slaac case we don't have such authority, so we need an
> alternative mechanism to determine ownership. This mechanisms if the
> FCFS. The first one that claims the address is the one that owns it.
> This means that the  SLAAC Savi device will create a binding the first
> time it sees a host using a given address. This is what fcfs stands for.

[Guang Yao] 
"The first one that claims the address is the one that owns it." : It's
right, I agree.

"SLAAC Savi device will create a binding the first time it sees a host using
a given address.": This sentence doesn't have exactly the same meaning of
the above, and I don't agree.

And I wonder how you can handle movement on local link? And layer 2 path
change? The savi device will find a second host using the bound address.

BR,
Guang


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 11 23:36:43 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F17783A6841 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 23:36:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -105.778
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-105.778 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.221, BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_41=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0LLSwulZ3YGV for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 23:36:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9BA1A3A68AE for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 11 Apr 2010 23:36:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (189.102.218.87.dynamic.jazztel.es [87.218.102.189]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 233696C66FB; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 08:36:19 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BC2BF62.8000506@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 08:36:18 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
References: <4BBD9DAE.9090504@cisco.com>	<4bbda331.5a2be50a.171a.07f4@mx.google.com>	<4BBEE40D.8090607@cisco.com>	<01DFBAE7E8E9479B808329249BAD949C@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF2010.3060504@cisco.com><645DEED1A73B4210A390BC252D4B0751@junbiVAIO><4BBF4705.4000905@joelhalpern.com><43C20C061EC243A68F0CF65FD88D2BFC@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF5864.3040400@joelhalpern.com>	<A8D9F137C0C84E1CA6EB30D8B16D359E@junbiVAIO>	<4BBF76EE.9070403@joelhalpern.com>	<DA09B5DB935D496A8CD654AE6E38ECF0@junbiVAIO> <4BC1DE11.7060405@it.uc3m.es> <4bc285ea.2a7ae70a.7237.7684@mx.google.com>
In-Reply-To: <4bc285ea.2a7ae70a.7237.7684@mx.google.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 06:36:43 -0000

El 12/04/10 4:30, Guang Yao escribió:
>> FCFS is the ownership principle the SLAAC SAVI works on.
>> (fwiw, i have no problem in chaning the name, i just want to clairfy the
>> concepts that seems to be a bit confused here)
>>
>> We have two very different cases here:
>> The DHCP case, where there is a central auhtority that decides who owns
>> which address. In this case,t he ownership is defined by this auhtority
>> i.e the dhcp server.
>> In the slaac case we don't have such authority, so we need an
>> alternative mechanism to determine ownership. This mechanisms if the
>> FCFS. The first one that claims the address is the one that owns it.
>> This means that the  SLAAC Savi device will create a binding the first
>> time it sees a host using a given address. This is what fcfs stands for.
>>      
> [Guang Yao]
> "The first one that claims the address is the one that owns it." : It's
> right, I agree.
>
> "SLAAC Savi device will create a binding the first time it sees a host using
> a given address.": This sentence doesn't have exactly the same meaning of
> the above, and I don't agree.
>    
ok, if you have an alternative phrasing that you think would better 
describe the behaviour, please propose it and i we can try to add it to 
the document

> And I wonder how you can handle movement on local link? And layer 2 path
> change? The savi device will find a second host using the bound address.
>
>    
Right, in order to take into account that, we should rephrase it as:

This means that the  SLAAC Savi device will trigger the procedure to create a binding the first
time it sees a host using a given address.

makes sense?

Regards, marcelo




> BR,
> Guang
>
>
>    


From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Mon Apr 12 01:14:56 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFB1B3A67CF for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 01:14:56 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.016
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.016 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.583,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id i8ybK3Koc4RI for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 01:14:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pz0-f187.google.com (mail-pz0-f187.google.com [209.85.222.187]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA78F28C0E8 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 01:14:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pzk17 with SMTP id 17so52423pzk.5 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 01:14:28 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:subject:date :message-id:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding :x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=FJW4xc1qWHHctR5EvaOp+yaJGDk/6I2hQlQm56LlCis=; b=D8FMlZ8Sm9V8R5ZK8hMNFAyHR56brQrCNXWA3QNJuMslubSrOuPiYtHlGThTqo7OsK RiPW9tVXihlWpvFIFvRz7IymD3MhM1pJ+3Z8UG+ye/ifrC+zEVTgrgySeE7wH2kdFoir 0x/nj6aXv4XCOomWEuuBRY39iqzphZVOkmjEc=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; b=CE2iFA5GyIMqdLnAlJqC4Qbbv+vi62jDxFVkuBMGU/yrjslRIzS9MTU/8jrxa8DuGo DEaRIgX9B5uZHdjdtPHpR5Q/aKvVBjI+mbGUhJtWH+k7cp5UgmzBjltf3+EeQ8yf3mpq Fggmyj0L3geOFncIWWDPxoD54DPC/bMzgnB8I=
Received: by 10.141.124.3 with SMTP id b3mr2792351rvn.123.1271060068548; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 01:14:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (tu132201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.132.201]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 20sm3859230pzk.15.2010.04.12.01.14.25 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Mon, 12 Apr 2010 01:14:27 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: <savi@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 16:14:18 +0800
Message-ID: <4bc2d663.9413f30a.2984.239d@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcraCiw53NFtfXZHTFu0NhUn9gamUQAA+D7QAAKC75A=
Content-Language: zh-cn
Subject: [savi] FW: One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 08:14:56 -0000

> This means that the  SLAAC Savi device will trigger the procedure to
create a
> binding the first
> time it sees a host using a given address.

[Guang Yao] 
Although I agree with this sentence, the result is that an attacker can send
packets with the source addresses of other nodes, and the savi device cannot
drop them, instead, it must perform trigger procedure for each address to
check if the address satisfies binding requirements. 

This actually means, if savi wants to drop a packet, it must send 2 or more
packets first. 

And I don't think the movement and layer 2 path change problem is solved.
The node sharing same former anchor with the moving node can answer the
probe, and prevent the binding.

BR,
Guang


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Mon Apr 12 05:22:59 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27B7F3A6999 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 05:22:59 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.166
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.166 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.433, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BIuuavqDEGsp for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 05:22:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9FDA23A694A for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 05:22:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (wlap005.it.uc3m.es [163.117.139.108]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 64E41B4894D for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 14:22:32 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BC31087.9000702@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 14:22:31 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: savi@ietf.org
References: <4bc2d663.9413f30a.2984.239d@mx.google.com>
In-Reply-To: <4bc2d663.9413f30a.2984.239d@mx.google.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Subject: Re: [savi] FW: One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 12:22:59 -0000

El 12/04/10 10:14, Guang Yao escribió:
>> This means that the  SLAAC Savi device will trigger the procedure to
>>      
> create a
>    
>> binding the first
>> time it sees a host using a given address.
>>      
> [Guang Yao]
> Although I agree with this sentence, the result is that an attacker can send
> packets with the source addresses of other nodes, and the savi device cannot
> drop them, instead, it must perform trigger procedure for each address to
> check if the address satisfies binding requirements.
>
> This actually means, if savi wants to drop a packet, it must send 2 or more
> packets first.
>    
Right, this si why this must be rate limited, in order to prevent this 
to become a DoS attack gainst the switch.

> And I don't think the movement and layer 2 path change problem is solved.
> The node sharing same former anchor with the moving node can answer the
> probe, and prevent the binding.
>
>    
Sure, but that is inherent to the nature of the first come first serve 
primciple of ownership. IMHO, this is the best you can accomplish in 
this space

Regards, marcelo


> BR,
> Guang
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>
>    


From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Mon Apr 12 07:38:23 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA5BD28C0D8 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 07:38:23 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.153
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.153 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.446,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Zx017tGmVaWW for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 07:38:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C4FA3A6818 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 07:38:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AB3A32358DE; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 07:38:18 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-50-141.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.50.141]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9CA0632358DC; Mon, 12 Apr 2010 07:38:17 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BC33058.3090500@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 10:38:16 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
References: <4bc2d663.9413f30a.2984.239d@mx.google.com>
In-Reply-To: <4bc2d663.9413f30a.2984.239d@mx.google.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] FW: One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 14:38:24 -0000

With a little work by us, and a little flexibility in the wording we 
choose, we can allow for a reasoanble behavior in a pure SLAAC-DAD 
environment.

First, a caveat.  The result will not be perfect.  Some communication 
may take longer to establish than it should.  In some corner cases, the 
SAVE device might pick the wrong winner.  Given the constraints of 
SLAAC, we have to live with that.

Suppose we write that SAVI devices will recognize the first successful 
claimant of an address.  We then note that a properly received DAD is 
the most effective form of claim.  Since DAD messages may be lost, SAVI 
devices MUST use additional measures to ensure that a properly 
functioning client is not permanently blocked from valid communication.

We need to also note that SAVI devices must ensure that they are robust 
in the presence of denial of service events, since having one user 
prevent communication from all other users on a SAVI device would be 
unacceptable.

With that much, we can then describe somewhere techniques that can be 
used for this additional robustness.

The big difference is that we do not pretend that a SAVI device is 
required to allocate an address on the first data packet, since it 
sometimes won't be able to.  But we still allow communication to occur, 
possibly with loss of a few packets.  (And it is clearly legitimate to 
simply block a particular port if that port is performing a denial of 
service attack on the SAVI device.)

Yours,
Joel M. Halpern


Guang Yao wrote:
>> This means that the  SLAAC Savi device will trigger the procedure to
> create a
>> binding the first
>> time it sees a host using a given address.
> 
> [Guang Yao] 
> Although I agree with this sentence, the result is that an attacker can send
> packets with the source addresses of other nodes, and the savi device cannot
> drop them, instead, it must perform trigger procedure for each address to
> check if the address satisfies binding requirements. 
> 
> This actually means, if savi wants to drop a packet, it must send 2 or more
> packets first. 
> 
> And I don't think the movement and layer 2 path change problem is solved.
> The node sharing same former anchor with the moving node can answer the
> probe, and prevent the binding.
> 
> BR,
> Guang
> 
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Tue Apr 13 01:35:05 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B660C3A68C2 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 01:35:05 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.417
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.417 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.307, BAYES_05=-1.11]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cdGEggF0RyG7 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 01:35:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pz0-f191.google.com (mail-pz0-f191.google.com [209.85.222.191]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D7C1C3A6889 for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 01:35:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pzk29 with SMTP id 29so5526398pzk.29 for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 01:34:55 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=tAV1443C0aG3gn555YzfEH/Ir67dcrh+AC57cn1RqJE=; b=CSvqXzM5QR2KIWduMh/PwJEjjQK+g80mF7wLNgwpxJo48M+KsvTUAIvp/tdNgKS05l 8pCbIUCPEWuvdekWzyDBQLeloJE9m9wR5PlI1VhtEnolDxY69/v+pZldNnG7eLnG6Psc eaaJxVVvai82NDpdxjn4QONyPWNvrgUnAJg9I=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=M8iAm4AwrA8bQFkfeuF8maWaHn2e4DheONi+mVMIka9YhD0FUbeB5IkPaMPNWYFwTJ HCmFvlhcn0yAl14hgcKZTiai49eiAgYzy49Ae7MzHE/j68GqXebnQjne+IRCRIi7u2Wd Vu+DvEN8ZegexA1o1e2a2aEIn2a7XcDzzZkkE=
Received: by 10.115.103.40 with SMTP id f40mr4919523wam.38.1271147695107; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 01:34:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (tu132201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.132.201]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 22sm4807853pzk.5.2010.04.13.01.34.52 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Tue, 13 Apr 2010 01:34:53 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'Joel M. Halpern'" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <4bc2d663.9413f30a.2984.239d@mx.google.com> <4BC33058.3090500@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BC33058.3090500@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2010 16:34:44 +0800
Message-ID: <4bc42cad.9613f30a.1d55.73a7@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcraTcszsgj1Nmu6QI6B6H9iOmUefwAktCew
Content-Language: zh-cn
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] FW: One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2010 08:35:05 -0000

> Suppose we write that SAVI devices will recognize the first successful
> claimant of an address.  We then note that a properly received DAD is
> the most effective form of claim.  Since DAD messages may be lost, SAVI
> devices MUST use additional measures to ensure that a properly
> functioning client is not permanently blocked from valid communication.
[Guang Yao] 
I want to make sure if I fully understand your comments. The following is
actually my proposal.

1. DAD snooping is premier as a basis;

2. To handle DAD loss and avoid permanently blocking, at least one of
additional measures MUST be used, but not limited to data trigger.
	The possible measures include:
	(a) rate limited data trigger
	(b) counter trigger
	(c) still control plane focused, snoop other control packets,
including address resolution NS, NA, MLD, NUD, etc, to trigger binding
procedure.
	(d) other possible solutions that can avoid permanently blocking.

	As no measure is perfect (at least no experiment has shown the
reality), the possible security problem and limitation of each measure must
be clarified. Experimental draft(s) may be written in the future to evaluate
the measures.

I hope this proposal can be agreed in the group.

BR,
Guang


From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Tue Apr 13 05:14:58 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56CB23A6B06 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 05:14:58 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.482
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.482 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.372, BAYES_05=-1.11]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id diM-yB-DIauo for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 05:14:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3A833A69A6 for <savi@ietf.org>; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 05:14:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id B58E532358B5; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 05:14:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-50-141.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.50.141]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 15C8532358DE; Tue, 13 Apr 2010 05:14:03 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BC46009.4050901@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2010 08:14:01 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
References: <4bc2d663.9413f30a.2984.239d@mx.google.com> <4BC33058.3090500@joelhalpern.com> <4bc42cad.9613f30a.1d55.73a7@mx.google.com>
In-Reply-To: <4bc42cad.9613f30a.1d55.73a7@mx.google.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] FW: One minor comments on "Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI "
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2010 12:14:58 -0000

I mostly agree with this.
The requirement for point 2 is that the SAVI device MUST robustly 
recover from a series of known error conditions.

I think that for the second bullet you list, we should list the set of 
conditions that must be covered, and a set of techniques that MAY be used.
At this level of granularity, rate limited data trigger and counter 
trigger are indistinguishable.
And we need some analysis before we can say that use of some other 
control plane mechanism is acceptable, as I do not know of a combination 
of other control mechanisms that provide sufficient robustness.

Yours,
Joel

Guang Yao wrote:
>> Suppose we write that SAVI devices will recognize the first successful
>> claimant of an address.  We then note that a properly received DAD is
>> the most effective form of claim.  Since DAD messages may be lost, SAVI
>> devices MUST use additional measures to ensure that a properly
>> functioning client is not permanently blocked from valid communication.
> [Guang Yao] 
> I want to make sure if I fully understand your comments. The following is
> actually my proposal.
> 
> 1. DAD snooping is premier as a basis;
> 
> 2. To handle DAD loss and avoid permanently blocking, at least one of
> additional measures MUST be used, but not limited to data trigger.
> 	The possible measures include:
> 	(a) rate limited data trigger
> 	(b) counter trigger
> 	(c) still control plane focused, snoop other control packets,
> including address resolution NS, NA, MLD, NUD, etc, to trigger binding
> procedure.
> 	(d) other possible solutions that can avoid permanently blocking.
> 
> 	As no measure is perfect (at least no experiment has shown the
> reality), the possible security problem and limitation of each measure must
> be clarified. Experimental draft(s) may be written in the future to evaluate
> the measures.
> 
> I hope this proposal can be agreed in the group.
> 
> BR,
> Guang
> 
> 

From zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com  Wed Apr 14 19:52:42 2010
Return-Path: <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8B56C28C0F7 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 14 Apr 2010 19:52:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 4.458
X-Spam-Level: ****
X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.458 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, J_CHICKENPOX_57=0.6, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hoxharuXx7qT for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 14 Apr 2010 19:52:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mta2.huaweisymantec.com (unknown [218.17.155.15]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7726328C0CF for <savi@ietf.org>; Wed, 14 Apr 2010 19:52:41 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=gb2312
Received: from hstml02-in.huaweisymantec.com ([172.26.3.42]) by hstga02-in.huaweisymantec.com (Sun Java(tm) System Messaging Server 6.3-8.03 (built Apr 24 2009; 32bit)) with ESMTP id <0L0W007M8DBCH520@hstga02-in.huaweisymantec.com> for savi@ietf.org; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 10:52:25 +0800 (CST)
Received: from z90001956 ([10.27.154.67]) by hstml02-in.huaweisymantec.com (Sun Java(tm) System Messaging Server 6.3-8.03 (built Apr 24 2009; 32bit)) with ESMTPA id <0L0W00MFWDBC2520@hstml02-in.huaweisymantec.com> for savi@ietf.org; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 10:52:24 +0800 (CST)
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 10:52:24 +0800
From: Dong Zhang <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
To: savi <savi@ietf.org>
Message-id: <201004151052240835910@huaweisymantec.com>
X-Mailer: Foxmail 6, 10, 201, 20 [cn]
Content-transfer-encoding: base64
Subject: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 02:52:42 -0000
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From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Thu Apr 15 00:39:53 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDDB73A6AE3 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:39:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.601
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.601 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_57=0.6]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dTD9pIYX2WKm for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:39:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pw0-f44.google.com (mail-pw0-f44.google.com [209.85.160.44]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57CDB3A692A for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:39:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pwj2 with SMTP id 2so868912pwj.31 for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:39:43 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=JLiIM38Pvf8n69NnEY8z5mtPucHzsCuCLuQCxAUTByY=; b=PiDGO6VoQGXsDTZedwJnlLBXEN5Ta8Lx8WGXlzTSxqdFNiK1gfu9tLtIg/CcBaRHnq 5RCcQdUpwcOk0JLl53HUu5w7XRlukpGVpsUnf4nEts8OAu6N7E/WS1nEu0/43WsCavyC ZRicNQzG85TatWPFFpm0BWPxEHrKf0rP76yCM=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=IOAY8iUvC4jiEqo2nwhFUevewJND21v/IXCaz6IwL2XMnRDuLkx9OX0F9AKajT9bUu jNDdOGxhVD1SO8/t5sTtmV5CKF0AwQ3vWgbqpTjac8bt5F+Io7teTIX4Msh5W0ay6yJd l8I2p/atDJWbSiyq5qezLmBXolnxid8GxuMXM=
Received: by 10.141.1.1 with SMTP id d1mr2311341rvi.89.1271317183239; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:39:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (th024196.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [59.66.24.196]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 22sm1031144pzk.1.2010.04.15.00.39.40 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:39:42 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'Dong Zhang'" <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
References: <201004151052240835910@huaweisymantec.com>
In-Reply-To: <201004151052240835910@huaweisymantec.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 15:39:27 +0800
Message-ID: <4bc6c2be.9613f30a.238a.48b6@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="gb2312"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcrcRrg4CbWa6rvISBiD6F/ga415DQAJgfLw
Content-Language: zh-cn
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 07:39:53 -0000

Hi, Dong

Thanks for your comments. Corresponding clarifications will be made in =
the
next edition.

I will try to answer some of the questions.

> In section 6,
> >Entries are keyed on the anchor and source IP address.
> I do not understand why using the anchor and source IP address =
together as
> the
> key value. My understanding is when savi device receives a packet, it =
will
use
> the source IP as the index to look for the responding entry. After =
finding
the
> right entry, it could check the anchor and the state. Since the =
mapping
for
> the IP address to the anchor is 1:1 (while the mapping for the anchor =
to
IP
> address may be 1:N), so only useing the source IP as the key is =
enough. Is
that
> ture? If it is, the IP address should be put into the first column in =
the
BST and
> the FT.

One problem is, if the address has not been assigned, the anchor is =
needed
to search. For example, a request is sent, but reply has not been =
received.

> In section 17,
> >   However, this feature may allow an attacker to send quantities of
> >   packets with source addresses already assigned to other nodes. A
> >   practical solution for this vulnerability is configuring the =
address
> >   pool and allocation algorithm of the DHCP server carefully.
> By controling the behavior of DHCP server could prevent the attacker =
to
send
> packets with spoofed source address? I am not quite sure. Could you =
please
> explain it?

This problem is stated in consideration that DHCP servers may assign the
same address to different nodes, or assign an address configured by =
other
mechanisms, e.g., slaac, static configuration. And DAD detection may not =
be
helpful because it is unreliable. This may allow the node to use a =
duplicate
address and may be exploited by attackers. The best solution is =
configure
DHCP address pool to avoid this vulnerability.

BR,
Guang

> -----Original Message-----
> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of
Dong
> Zhang
> Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2010 10:52 AM
> To: savi
> Subject: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> I read the draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01. And I have some comments.
>=20
> In section 1,
> >The binding process is inspired by the work of IP Source Guard.
> For IP Source Guard, it needs a reference I suoppose.
>=20
> In section 4,
> >Considering not all the operating systems support [RFC5227], this
solution is
> >designed to be compatible with operating systems not complying with
> [RFC5227].
> Does it mean the OSs which support rfc5227 will have a different =
procedure
for
> this savi-dhcp solution? If so, pointing out the differences =
obviously,
maybe
> in a separate section, will be more clear at least for me.
>=20
> In section 6,
> >Entries are keyed on the anchor and source IP address.
> I do not understand why using the anchor and source IP address =
together as
> the
> key value. My understanding is when savi device receives a packet, it =
will
use
> the source IP as the index to look for the responding entry. After =
finding
the
> right entry, it could check the anchor and the state. Since the =
mapping
for
> the IP address to the anchor is 1:1 (while the mapping for the anchor =
to
IP
> address may be 1:N), so only useing the source IP as the key is =
enough. Is
that
> ture? If it is, the IP address should be put into the first column in =
the
BST and
> the FT.
>=20
> In section 11.1.1.3,
> >The TID is kept for assurance that the assigned address can be bound =
with
> anchor
> >securely.
> What does it mean *securely*?
> Transaction ID is used to associate messages and responses.
>=20
> In section 11.1.2.3,
> >   assigned address is not bound with another anchor in current BST. =
If
> >   the address has been bound with another anchor in current BST, the
> >   SAVI device MUST check if the node associated with that anchor is
> >   off-line. If yes, bind the address with the new entry and delete =
the
> >   original binding; if no, keep the original entry and delete the =
new
> >   entry in BST.
> Generally, check should happen before create a new entry. While =
creating a
> new
> entry first before checking whether the binding has already existed is =
not
a
> conventional behavior. I guess, the START state could be combined with
LIVE
> state
> perhaps. Thus, the state machine is a little bit simple.
>=20
> In section 15,
> >   Whenever an anchor with attribute SAVI-Validation turns down, the
> >   bindings with the anchor MUST be kept for a short time.
> A short time may be more obscure. Is it a concrete value for
recommendation?
>=20
> In section 17,
> >   However, this feature may allow an attacker to send quantities of
> >   packets with source addresses already assigned to other nodes. A
> >   practical solution for this vulnerability is configuring the =
address
> >   pool and allocation algorithm of the DHCP server carefully.
> By controling the behavior of DHCP server could prevent the attacker =
to
send
> packets with spoofed source address? I am not quite sure. Could you =
please
> explain it?
>=20
>=20
> Thank you very much.
>=20
> 2010-04-15
>=20
> Dong Zhang
> Huawei Symantec Technologies Co., Ltd
> TEL=A3=BA86-10-62721287
> FAX=A3=BA86-10-62721347
> ADDRESS=A3=BA3rd Floor,Section D, Keshi Building, No.28, Xinxi Rd., =
Shangdi,
Haidian
> Dist., Beijing, China. 100085
>=20
> ****************************************************************
> *******************
> This email and its attachments contain confidential information from
HUAWEI
> SYMANTEC, which is intended only for the person or
> entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the information =
contained
> herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total
> or partial disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons =
other
than the
> intended recipient(s) is prohibited. If you
> receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by phone or =
email
> immediately and delete it!
> ****************************************************************
> ******************
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi


From jeanmichel.combes@gmail.com  Thu Apr 15 00:55:12 2010
Return-Path: <jeanmichel.combes@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F6463A68F8 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:55:12 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.999
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.000, BAYES_50=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id x7cQ-GgMKjGf for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:55:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-wy0-f172.google.com (mail-wy0-f172.google.com [74.125.82.172]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3650F3A6863 for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:55:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by wyb35 with SMTP id 35so481536wyb.31 for <savi@ietf.org>; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:55:00 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:mime-version:received:date:received:message-id :subject:from:to:cc:content-type:content-transfer-encoding; bh=JII1xPdakgzeL89LWnVsdq5UfSLr+O9YN8+KuqfWtwo=; b=oMls6tipnGQvXFKkY+LQH1eCWN9dEElfFK8a5o20vplUe02dvyMdk0uVRYGFEj7iII JWRjIQL6DXh9o0EVqotz6/h/GwWwot1nW4r9xOOhkl9an4aDv8m6RxBE2GX+npPS1ED/ KjiUSt5540qJhCjvE5/szcXcMBkcPWH4WqjwU=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; b=fI73bRIYUCWLpx6OXx4MPichVtoyzW1heAEes+j7KMOzXwHwwzAzI8rAdtt48WR628 /8ZNJMHSoJ6hVqIpJWMekW/rwNrfDnjO6zTreg/nRBplYH3x2UtM38EfZPHKTbi0sX7A /XR9r3PyxZxilOvEEPo/lcfgR0Ro73Ulki0xA=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.216.229.82 with HTTP; Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:55:00 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 09:55:00 +0200
Received: by 10.216.172.202 with SMTP id t52mr6318742wel.21.1271318100589;  Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:55:00 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <n2v729b68be1004150055nab963dd3r7cf5ccd52cb2b5a1@mail.gmail.com>
From: Jean-Michel Combes <jeanmichel.combes@gmail.com>
To: SAVI Mailing List <savi@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: Christian Vogt <christian.vogt@ericsson.com>
Subject: [savi] Draft Minutes - IETF 77 meeting
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 07:55:12 -0000

Folks,

Here are the draft minutes regarding the last IETF meeting (thanks
again John for the notes).

Please review the minutes and send additions/corrections before April 23.

Thanks in advance.

Christian & JMC.


17:40  Introduction and Administrativa ................ Christian
Vogt, Jean-Michel Combes

Christian: BBF liaison on IPv6 security. BBF wants to avoid dad
traffic between customer premises. Multiple customer premises maybe
within the same broadcast domain.

Alan: BBF is not asking to solve this. BBF wants to solve duplicates
N:1VLAN case.

DAD traffic is addressed in BBF using split horizon.

Christian: what is the problem BBF that asks

Alan: N:1 VLAN scenario duplicates - how to solve that.

Christian: solution with proxy DAD. - will be specified in 6man.

Plan is to sketch a solution and see if BBF approves

Alan:  need to clearly state the problem to be solved

Christian: would like to move forward and respond to BBF.


Status update on Framework doc:

Christian: not much progress since last meeting. B

<explanation of concepts in Framework>


17:50  SAVI for DHCP ............................Jun Bi
(draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01)

<presentation of updates>

Eric: if hub attached in the network behind a savi switch crashes, the
savi device is not going to do anything. Do we have to deal with hub
state recovery

Jun: this draft deals with savi device recovery.

Marcelo:  first, mechanisms for restoring state is good.

Second, we have 3 flavors of savi - slaac, send, dhcp - it would be
good to have the same terminology.

Questions like how to handle lifetimes, etc. - we may need to unify
these. Provide rationale for this in the framework document. Would
this make sense

Christian: good comment. We should do this for terminology.

Regarding other fine grained things - we should discuss this on a case
by case basis.

Marcelo: Interaction between these aspects need to be considered

Christian: prioritization? Or is it something else

Marcelo: I don't know

Christian: wait for eric's presentation

Eric: go back to binding removal: why is the host removed - local link move=
ment

Jun: if the lifetime is not over, keep the binding - good suggestion

Alan: slide 22. data trigger procedure.

Why is RS not used.

Jun: SAVI device is going to send a DAD to the host on the link

Joel: how to sort out knowable and unknowable conditions -

Christian: question is what is configurable and what is not

Joel: asking the user to recover a connection is not a good idea.

Jun: use a trigger to indicate to the host.

Eric: specific conditions for each kind of network / deployment model
makes it complex.

Christian: explain on ml why this procedure / pros/cons - manual
configs are worth the cost

Marcelo: do not agree

Christian: some issues with auto config will summarized on ml

Woj: clarification how does the savi device know  that the host is using dh=
cp

Jun: it is configured in the savi device.



18:10  Analysis of Open Issues in SAVI .................... Marcelo
Bagnulo (draft-bagnulo-savi-analysis-02)

Jun: discussion on ml that rate limitation cannot be handled

Eric: need to software process at rate limitation and tend to lose more pac=
kets.

Marcelo: dhcp packets will not be lost

Jun: packet loss is not a problem for some cases

Eric: is the rate limit global.

Jean-Michel: optimistic IPv6 address - are they using DAD packets to start

Suresh: DAD in parallel with control packets

Jun: topology change can be handle by NS downstream

Joel: should we depend on an IEEE protocol to handle this?

Frank: clarification - nvram to store state?

Joel: he is proposing not to do this

Jun: for data triggered, any difference in handling between low-end,
high-end switch?

Marcelo: It should be a matter of configuration

Jun: MUST requirement for nvram - vendors will not implement it

Marcelo: qualified should - explain what will break if procedure in
rfc is not followed

Christian: use qualified should

Eric L: we solved this a few meetings back. Triggering a binding is a
strong issue

Eric: lot of legacy switch is operation - servers, laptops etc. ,
non-compliant switches

We need data triggered support.

Christian: to Marcelo - send a summary to ml to start discussion.



18:50  Coexistence of Address Assignment Methods ............Eric
Levy-Abegnoli (draft-levy-abegnoli-savi-plbt-02)

Eric Vyncke: send over human operator - change some priority

Eric L: operator should configure one way

Eric V: if we learn for e.g a binding through SLAAC, and then we
rebind with slaac - will the timing of that rebind have some priority?

Marcelo: ---

Marcelo: any other changes needed in the protocol to implement this?
Concern that some aspects may change

Eric V: not done this yet. Cga is there

Hub: what happens when there is roaming cases - wireless case.

Eric L: no definition yet about when binding is removed

   1. check if user has moved
   2. ---

Christian: fairly detailed analysis - how could this be simplified.
Will these various mech compete?

Eric L: needed to make a good decision

Guang: are these priorities pre-defined

Eric L: configurable, but default should be defined.

Christian: next step will be to see how to add this to the framework doc




19:10  CNGI-CERNET2 SAVI Deployment Update .................... Jun Bi

Christian: good progress. =85





19:30  SAVI for Delegated IPv6 Prefixes ..................... John
Kaippallimalil (draft-kaippallimalil-savi-dhcp-pd-01)

Alan: why is this necessary - since in BBF 2 DSLAMs do not talk to
each other, thus there is no interworking.

John: we may need interworking to handle state recovery. Non-volatile
memory is not a good solution

Frank: The solution is to satisfy requirements in WT-177. BBF does not
outline solution details, and this draft addresses the solution.

Woj: Agree with solution, but why is this necessary.

Christian: Post problem statement on savi to ml

-- missed the other on

From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Fri Apr 16 00:58:07 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA3293A67FE for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 00:58:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.047
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.047 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.450,  BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FnxnfrOPzvsh for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 00:58:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E5B0B3A6359 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 00:58:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024113.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.113] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O2gR1-0003mq-3n; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 15:57:55 +0800
Message-ID: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 15:58:03 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0EA4_01CADD7D.98A0B580"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Subject: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 07:58:07 -0000

ÕâÊÇÒ»·â MIME ¸ñÊ½µÄ¶à·½ÓÊ¼þ¡£

------=_NextPart_000_0EA4_01CADD7D.98A0B580
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="gb2312"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi Joel,

We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it =
mean?=20

Thanks,
Jun Bi:

You wrote:
8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative conclusion =
about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper =
address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate =
limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that the =
answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, but =
merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)

 
------=_NextPart_000_0EA4_01CADD7D.98A0B580
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="gb2312"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML xmlns:o =3D "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"><HEAD>
<META content=3Dtext/html;charset=3Dgb2312 http-equiv=3DContent-Type>
<META name=3DGENERATOR content=3D"MSHTML 8.00.7600.16535"></HEAD>
<BODY style=3D"PADDING-LEFT: 10px; PADDING-RIGHT: 10px; PADDING-TOP: =
15px"=20
id=3DMailContainerBody leftMargin=3D0 topMargin=3D0 =
CanvasTabStop=3D"true"=20
name=3D"Compose message area">
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US>Hi =
Joel,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US>We have&nbsp;a question =
about your=20
comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it mean? </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US>Thanks,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US>Jun Bi:</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US>You =
wrote:</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US>8) As currently written, =
there is no=20
way to record a negative conclusion about filtering.&nbsp; This means =
that if a=20
host is using an improper address, every data packet will trigger=20
validation.&nbsp; Even with rate limiting, this seems unfortunate, given =
that we=20
have determined that the answer is no.&nbsp; (This is not a protection =
against a=20
malicious host, but merely more effective handling of a host with a=20
problem.)</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN lang=3DEN-US></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><SPAN=20
lang=3DEN-US><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV></BODY></HTML>

------=_NextPart_000_0EA4_01CADD7D.98A0B580--


From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Fri Apr 16 01:24:45 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92DB03A6AC1 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 01:24:45 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.155
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.155 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.543,  BAYES_50=0.001, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696, STOX_REPLY_TYPE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1yyO5oQ-nHyy for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 01:24:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 6AABB3A6B42 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 01:23:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.113]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jmf4bc85016; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 16:23:37 +0800
Message-ID: <2399C4D7019049A08243ED1B47B539E9@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 16:23:43 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="utf-8"; reply-type=original
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: bvtpgCYB
Subject: [savi] Fw: I-D Submitter Authentication for draft-ietf-savi-dhcp
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 08:24:45 -0000

Hi WG members,

The WG chairs asked we submit the savi-dhcp-02 to IETF repository.

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-savi-dhcp/

This submitted 02-version revised based on some comments recently discussed,
please provide your further comments.



thanks,
Jun Bi

 


From root@core3.amsl.com  Fri Apr 16 01:30:03 2010
Return-Path: <root@core3.amsl.com>
X-Original-To: savi@ietf.org
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id D16373A6853; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 01:30:02 -0700 (PDT)
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <20100416083002.D16373A6853@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 01:30:02 -0700 (PDT)
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: [savi] I-D Action:draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 08:30:03 -0000

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Source Address Validation Improvements Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : SAVI Solution for DHCP
	Author(s)       : J. Bi, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt
	Pages           : 27
	Date            : 2010-04-16

This document specifies the procedure for creating bindings between a
DHCPv4 [RFC2131]/DHCPv6 [RFC3315] assigned source IP address and a
binding anchor (refer to [SAVI-framework]) on SAVI (Source Address
Validation Improvements) device. The bindings can be used to filter
packets generated on the local link with forged IP addresses.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID: <2010-04-16011747.I-D@ietf.org>


--NextPart--

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Fri Apr 16 08:31:51 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5469C28C1F3 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 08:31:51 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.201
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.461, BAYES_20=-0.74]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XATWKuYsgtTc for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 08:31:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E3E728C20B for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 08:28:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 86B5E32359F4; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 08:28:21 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-51-173.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.51.173]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7754032283C4; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 08:28:20 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 11:28:18 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=GB2312
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: SAVI Mailing List <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 15:31:51 -0000

The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
resolutions.

As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of information.
 This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown source
Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.

Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that anchor
A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it will be
ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control traffic.

One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting that
the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
such things forever.)

Yours,
Joel

Jun Bi wrote:
> 
> Hi Joel,
>  
> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it mean?
>  
> Thanks,
> Jun Bi:
>  
> You wrote:
> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative conclusion 
> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper 
> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate 
> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that the 
> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, but 
> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>  
>  

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Fri Apr 16 21:24:11 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C1393A68CB for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 21:24:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.246
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.246 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.452,  BAYES_50=0.001, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696, STOX_REPLY_TYPE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZyRyQTR83Fss for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 21:24:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id D5B7F3A6908 for <savi@ietf.org>; Fri, 16 Apr 2010 21:24:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bc9b3e8; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 12:24:00 +0800
Message-ID: <2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO> <4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 12:22:36 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=original
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: IK89zCYB
Cc: SAVI Mailing List <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 04:24:11 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
> resolutions.
>
> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of information.
> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown source
> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>
> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that anchor
> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it will be
> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
> traffic.

Hi Joel,

That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you didn't 
agree it like Marcelo)
That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology with 
counter-triggered.

thanks,
Jun


>
> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting that
> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
> such things forever.)
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> Jun Bi wrote:
>>
>> Hi Joel,
>>
>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it mean?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Jun Bi:
>>
>> You wrote:
>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative conclusion
>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that the
>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, but
>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sat Apr 17 00:27:43 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC5E73A63D3 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 00:27:43 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -105.299
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-105.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.300, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Licv5HNzvAvc for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 00:27:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 689E63A690C for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 00:27:40 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (9.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.9]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE5136C6A22 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 09:27:31 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 09:27:32 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: savi@ietf.org
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com> <2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:27:43 -0000

El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>> resolutions.
>>
>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of information.
>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown source
>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>
>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that anchor
>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it will be
>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>> traffic.
>
> Hi Joel,
>
> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology with 
> counter-triggered.
>
i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or even 
some cases of control triggered.
I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not only 
to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in order to 
avoid doing the verification operation again).
This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
(for some time).
the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess the 
question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the re-verification 
or the negative cache.

Regards, marcelo


> thanks,
> Jun
>
>
>>
>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting that
>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
>> such things forever.)
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Joel,
>>>
>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it 
>>> mean?
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Jun Bi:
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>> conclusion
>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that 
>>> the
>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, but
>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>


From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Sat Apr 17 07:19:24 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57B2F3A68D8 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:19:23 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.153
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.153 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.446,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id P2YlLXeWrptY for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:19:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A38C3A680D for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:19:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E49C3235875; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:18:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-51-173.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.51.173]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 945E43228415; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:18:52 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 10:18:51 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO> <4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 14:19:24 -0000

Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased the 
question I was raising.

Yours,
Joel

marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>> resolutions.
>>>
>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of information.
>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown source
>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>
>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that anchor
>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it will be
>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>>> traffic.
>>
>> Hi Joel,
>>
>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology with 
>> counter-triggered.
>>
> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or even 
> some cases of control triggered.
> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
> results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not only 
> to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in order to 
> avoid doing the verification operation again).
> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
> (for some time).
> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess the 
> question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the re-verification 
> or the negative cache.
> 
> Regards, marcelo
> 
> 
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>>>
>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting that
>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
>>> such things forever.)
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>
>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it 
>>>> mean?
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>
>>>> You wrote:
>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>> conclusion
>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that 
>>>> the
>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, but
>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
> 
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sat Apr 17 07:38:45 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8B2E3A68A5 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:38:45 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -105.949
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-105.949 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.650, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tPBHfG8cnkaz for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:38:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25FD93A680D for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:38:43 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (9.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.9]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id CCDEC7F74AE; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 16:38:32 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 16:38:32 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO> <4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es> <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 14:38:45 -0000

after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
partially address this issue.
I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra verification 
implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By rate lmiting, we 
eventually reduce both. But probably this needs more thought...

El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased the 
> question I was raising.
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>> resolutions.
>>>>
>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>> information.
>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown source
>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>
>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>> anchor
>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>> will be
>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>>>> traffic.
>>>
>>> Hi Joel,
>>>
>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>
>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>> even some cases of control triggered.
>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
>> results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not 
>> only to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in 
>> order to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
>> (for some time).
>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess 
>> the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting 
>>>> that
>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>
>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does 
>>>>> it mean?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>
>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>> conclusion
>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>> that the
>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, 
>>>>> but
>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
>


From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sat Apr 17 10:02:08 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9642F3A6943 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 10:02:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.217
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.217 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.294,  BAYES_40=-0.185, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6FDQWa6n9GYN for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 10:02:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id E086F3A6812 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 10:02:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bca658d; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 01:01:57 +0800
Message-ID: <E95D064EB9734AB6808C94E8731A022B@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es> <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 01:01:53 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: IqDZLDYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 17:02:08 -0000

Hi Marcelo and Joel,

I am confused. Even the switch only record the positive binding,
it actually implies the negative binding is also stored:
the negative binding = the full address space - addresses in positive 
binding table.
In implementation, the positive binding is the "permit entry at ACL", the 
negative binding is "deny all at ACL". It seems that there is no extra 
action.

IMHO, I think the more fine-granularity negative binding (than deny all) is 
not useful. The finding of a host (e.g positive binding is address A) 
attached to a port currently is spoofing address B doesn't means the 
spoofing host can not spoof address C in next packet. The host can use any 
random source address on its spoofing traffic. So the savi switch should 
only permit the traffic of address A (positive binding) then drop all the 
packet not using address A. (certainly, the supplement functions are needed 
be recover the binding in the case of positive binding is missing possibly 
by loss of control packet, but the data-triggered can not be the only MUST 
function to recover, due to the issues/problems Fred Baker and others has 
discussed).

thanks,
Jun Bi


--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:18 PM
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased the 
> question I was raising.
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>> resolutions.
>>>>
>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>> information.
>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown source
>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>
>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that anchor
>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it will be
>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>>>> traffic.
>>>
>>> Hi Joel,
>>>
>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology with 
>>> counter-triggered.
>>>
>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or even 
>> some cases of control triggered.
>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
>> results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not only 
>> to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in order to 
>> avoid doing the verification operation again).
>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well (for 
>> some time).
>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess the 
>> question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the re-verification 
>> or the negative cache.
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting 
>>>> that
>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>
>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it 
>>>>> mean?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>
>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>> conclusion
>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that 
>>>>> the
>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, but
>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sat Apr 17 10:05:52 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E08A3A6851 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 10:05:52 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.254
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.254 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.257,  BAYES_40=-0.185, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id pz3zqBfKNlor for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 10:05:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 315833A682F for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 10:05:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm334bca666b; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 01:05:39 +0800
Message-ID: <5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es> <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 01:05:52 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: ICd2LDYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 17:05:52 -0000

Hi Marcelo,

The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only solution 
it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in most switches (as 
discussed in past weeks).

thanks,
Jun Bi

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't partially 
> address this issue.
> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra verification 
> implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By rate lmiting, we 
> eventually reduce both. But probably this needs more thought...
>
> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased the 
>> question I was raising.
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>
>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>> information.
>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown source
>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>> anchor
>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it will 
>>>>> be
>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>>>>> traffic.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>
>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>>>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology with 
>>>> counter-triggered.
>>>>
>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or even 
>>> some cases of control triggered.
>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
>>> results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not only 
>>> to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in order to 
>>> avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
>>> (for some time).
>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess the 
>>> question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the re-verification 
>>> or the negative cache.
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting 
>>>>> that
>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it 
>>>>>> mean?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, 
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sat Apr 17 11:13:41 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C31203A692E for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:13:41 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.166
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.166 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.433, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DKFYWxden5Fe for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:13:40 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 890283A6926 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:13:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (9.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.9]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F0AE6C7717; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 20:13:22 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 20:13:23 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es> <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es> <5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 18:13:41 -0000

Jun,

As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered and 
counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach that 
would suffice.

Regards, marcelo


El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in most 
> switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>> partially address this issue.
>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By 
>> rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this needs more 
>> thought...
>>
>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased 
>>> the question I was raising.
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>> information.
>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>> source
>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>>> anchor
>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>>> will be
>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>
>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought 
>>>>> you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>>
>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>>>> even some cases of control triggered.
>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as 
>>>> well (for some time).
>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess 
>>>> the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, 
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>> would
>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>> remember
>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does 
>>>>>>> it mean?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
>


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sat Apr 17 11:23:25 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3BEF53A67A2 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:23:25 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.274
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.274 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.325, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4d-Xvc1lJnnx for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:23:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95AEB3A695F for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:22:50 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (9.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.9]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD62C7F822A; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 20:22:37 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BC9FC6F.8050303@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 20:22:39 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es> <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <E95D064EB9734AB6808C94E8731A022B@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <E95D064EB9734AB6808C94E8731A022B@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 18:23:25 -0000

I understand that what Joel was after would be something like the following:
A SAVI device can have essentially 3 types of addresses:
- An address for which it has a binding with a given lower layer anchor.
- an address for which it has no lower layer an anchor and has never 
received any packets related to that address
- an address for which it has no binding, but for which it has trigger 
the binding creation procedure and the procedure has failed. (an example 
of this is suppose that a savi switch receives one or more data packets 
fro a given source address for which it has no binding and that results 
in triggering the binding creation procedure. Suppose that the address 
is actually defended by some other host that is connected to another 
SAVI device. The result is that no binding will be created for this 
address in the initial SAVI device. The question i understnad Joel is 
asking is whether this SAVI device caches info realted tot he failed 
binding creation procedure.

I don't know the answer to that one, i haven't made my mind just yet.
As i said, it is a tradeoff between using memory (for the negative 
caching) versus bandwidth (re doing the binding creation procedure)
That is why i think rate limiting may help (for the latter, of course)

Regards, marcelo


El 17/04/10 19:01, Bi Jun escribió:
> Hi Marcelo and Joel,
>
> I am confused. Even the switch only record the positive binding,
> it actually implies the negative binding is also stored:
> the negative binding = the full address space - addresses in positive 
> binding table.
> In implementation, the positive binding is the "permit entry at ACL", 
> the negative binding is "deny all at ACL". It seems that there is no 
> extra action.
>
> IMHO, I think the more fine-granularity negative binding (than deny 
> all) is not useful. The finding of a host (e.g positive binding is 
> address A) attached to a port currently is spoofing address B doesn't 
> means the spoofing host can not spoof address C in next packet. The 
> host can use any random source address on its spoofing traffic. So the 
> savi switch should only permit the traffic of address A (positive 
> binding) then drop all the packet not using address A. (certainly, the 
> supplement functions are needed be recover the binding in the case of 
> positive binding is missing possibly by loss of control packet, but 
> the data-triggered can not be the only MUST function to recover, due 
> to the issues/problems Fred Baker and others has discussed).
>
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:18 PM
> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased 
>> the question I was raising.
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>
>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>> information.
>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>> source
>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>> anchor
>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>> will be
>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>
>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>>>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>
>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>>> even some cases of control triggered.
>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
>>> (for some time).
>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess 
>>> the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>> noting that
>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does 
>>>>>> it mean?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>>> that the
>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
>


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sat Apr 17 11:24:36 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 425463A683C for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:24:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.547
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.547 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.162,  BAYES_05=-1.11, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1okxVlmbCweo for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:24:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDA633A683A for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:24:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th053201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.53.201] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O3Cgp-0002pJ-Q1; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:24:23 +0800
Message-ID: <5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO> <4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:24:33 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 18:24:36 -0000

Hi Marcelo,

But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit different,
depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.

thanks,
Jun


--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> Jun,
>
> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered and 
> counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach that 
> would suffice.
>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in most 
>> switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>> partially address this issue.
>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra verification 
>>> implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By rate lmiting, we 
>>> eventually reduce both. But probably this needs more thought...
>>>
>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased the 
>>>> question I was raising.
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>>> source
>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>>>> anchor
>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it will 
>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>>>>>>> traffic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>>>>>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology with 
>>>>>> counter-triggered.
>>>>>>
>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>>>>> even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
>>>>> results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not 
>>>>> only to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in order 
>>>>> to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
>>>>> (for some time).
>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess 
>>>>> the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, 
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting 
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it 
>>>>>>>> mean?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, 
>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sat Apr 17 11:40:42 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 213633A6885 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:40:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.005
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.005 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.049,  BAYES_20=-0.74, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fkfHE3eZ+nj7 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:40:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 15E093A683E for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:40:39 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bca7ca7; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:40:31 +0800
Message-ID: <1E69FA5AE1AF4EB6AB36A7FF30D16A3B@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es> <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <E95D064EB9734AB6808C94E8731A022B@junbiVAIO> <4BC9FC6F.8050303@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BC9FC6F.8050303@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:40:35 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: IP1wMDYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 18:40:42 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:22 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> I understand that what Joel was after would be something like the 
> following:
> A SAVI device can have essentially 3 types of addresses:
> - An address for which it has a binding with a given lower layer anchor.
> - an address for which it has no lower layer an anchor and has never 
> received any packets related to that address
> - an address for which it has no binding, but for which it has trigger the 
> binding creation procedure and the procedure has failed.

Hi Marcelo,

Assuming the host is using address A, B, C in the above 3 cases.
Then may I know what't the difference between situation B and C ?

The problem is there is no explicit address exit mechanism in SLAAC. Then 
even the binding of address C was failed by the savi-switch sending out a 
probe at time t, then the host can still use address C at time t' if the new 
probe shows that the old "legal user" of C has given up the using of address 
C by without reply NA to that probe.
Then the B and C will need the same processing and there is no difference.

That's one of the problem we said SLAAC has problems to get a very idal savi 
solution, unless:
1 we can change SLAAC, or
2 the savi WG can allow the host to install a client and have a new protocol 
to sync the state of host and savi-switch.

thanks,
Jun


>(an example of this is suppose that a savi switch receives one or more data 
>packets fro a given source address for which it has no binding and that 
>results in triggering the binding creation procedure. Suppose that the 
>address is actually defended by some other host that is connected to 
>another SAVI device. The result is that no binding will be created for this 
>address in the initial SAVI device. The question i understnad Joel is 
>asking is whether this SAVI device caches info realted tot he failed 
>binding creation procedure.
>
> I don't know the answer to that one, i haven't made my mind just yet.
> As i said, it is a tradeoff between using memory (for the negative 
> caching) versus bandwidth (re doing the binding creation procedure)
> That is why i think rate limiting may help (for the latter, of course)
>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
> El 17/04/10 19:01, Bi Jun escribió:
>> Hi Marcelo and Joel,
>>
>> I am confused. Even the switch only record the positive binding,
>> it actually implies the negative binding is also stored:
>> the negative binding = the full address space - addresses in positive 
>> binding table.
>> In implementation, the positive binding is the "permit entry at ACL", the 
>> negative binding is "deny all at ACL". It seems that there is no extra 
>> action.
>>
>> IMHO, I think the more fine-granularity negative binding (than deny all) 
>> is not useful. The finding of a host (e.g positive binding is address A) 
>> attached to a port currently is spoofing address B doesn't means the 
>> spoofing host can not spoof address C in next packet. The host can use 
>> any random source address on its spoofing traffic. So the savi switch 
>> should only permit the traffic of address A (positive binding) then drop 
>> all the packet not using address A. (certainly, the supplement functions 
>> are needed be recover the binding in the case of positive binding is 
>> missing possibly by loss of control packet, but the data-triggered can 
>> not be the only MUST function to recover, due to the issues/problems Fred 
>> Baker and others has discussed).
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:18 PM
>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased the 
>>> question I was raising.
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>> information.
>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>> source
>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>>> anchor
>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it will 
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>>>>>> traffic.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>
>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>>>>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology with 
>>>>> counter-triggered.
>>>>>
>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or even 
>>>> some cases of control triggered.
>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
>>>> results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not only 
>>>> to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in order to 
>>>> avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
>>>> (for some time).
>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess the 
>>>> question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, and
>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I would
>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting 
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not remember
>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does it 
>>>>>>> mean?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with rate
>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined that 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, 
>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
> 

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sat Apr 17 11:42:52 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0C563A683E for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:42:52 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.277
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.277 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.234,  BAYES_40=-0.185, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gn1sBy+fvLgi for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:42:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 145753A68E7 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:42:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm284bca7d2a; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:42:42 +0800
Message-ID: <920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO> <4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es> <5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:42:55 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: IS8yMDYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 18:42:52 -0000

Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using the 
data-triggered as the fundamental principle).

thanks,
Jun Bi

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
<junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> Hi Marcelo,
>
> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit different,
> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>
> thanks,
> Jun
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> Jun,
>>
>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered and 
>> counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach that 
>> would suffice.
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in most 
>>> switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By 
>>>> rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this needs more 
>>>> thought...
>>>>
>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased the 
>>>>> question I was raising.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>>>> source
>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>>>>> anchor
>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>>>>>>>> traffic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>>>>>>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>>>>>> even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
>>>>>> results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not 
>>>>>> only to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in 
>>>>>> order to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
>>>>>> (for some time).
>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess 
>>>>>> the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>>>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, 
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting 
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does 
>>>>>>>>> it mean?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with 
>>>>>>>>> rate
>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, 
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sat Apr 17 11:53:42 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 903903A6891 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:53:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.339
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.339 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.260, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id b8QNvLTMnNwX for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:53:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E86163A6885 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:53:40 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (9.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.9]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2570EBAB20C; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 20:53:25 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 20:53:04 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO> <4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es> <5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO> <920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 18:53:42 -0000

Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered approach, where 
the threshold of the counter to trigger the binding creation process is 
set to 1, then the result is what you call the data triggered approach.
So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is one 
special subcase of the more general approach which is the counter based.
 From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether the SAVI 
binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the recepttion of 1 packet, 
or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, from the specificacion 
perspective, it would be to change a 1 to a n.

Regards, marcelo


El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using the 
> data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit different,
>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> Jun,
>>>
>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered 
>>> and counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach 
>>> that would suffice.
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>>>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in 
>>>> most switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. 
>>>>> By rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this 
>>>>> needs more thought...
>>>>>
>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and 
>>>>>> paraphrased the question I was raising.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with 
>>>>>>>>> unknown source
>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows 
>>>>>>>>> that anchor
>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that 
>>>>>>>>> it will be
>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But 
>>>>>>>>> it is
>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought 
>>>>>>>> you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some 
>>>>>>>> technology with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered 
>>>>>>> or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>>>>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>>>>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation 
>>>>>>> again).
>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as 
>>>>>>> well (for some time).
>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i 
>>>>>>> guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in 
>>>>>>> the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, 
>>>>>>>>> I would
>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It 
>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what 
>>>>>>>>>> does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even 
>>>>>>>>>> with rate
>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
>


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sat Apr 17 11:56:09 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E72623A66B4 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:56:09 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.382
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.382 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.217, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id F926w3reJN3I for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:56:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70C483A6885 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 11:56:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (9.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.9]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 00FDC7F8220; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 20:55:57 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCA043D.10108@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 20:55:57 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es> <4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <E95D064EB9734AB6808C94E8731A022B@junbiVAIO> <4BC9FC6F.8050303@it.uc3m.es> <1E69FA5AE1AF4EB6AB36A7FF30D16A3B@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <1E69FA5AE1AF4EB6AB36A7FF30D16A3B@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 18:56:10 -0000

El 17/04/10 20:40, Bi Jun escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:22 AM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> I understand that what Joel was after would be something like the 
>> following:
>> A SAVI device can have essentially 3 types of addresses:
>> - An address for which it has a binding with a given lower layer anchor.
>> - an address for which it has no lower layer an anchor and has never 
>> received any packets related to that address
>> - an address for which it has no binding, but for which it has 
>> trigger the binding creation procedure and the procedure has failed.
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> Assuming the host is using address A, B, C in the above 3 cases.
> Then may I know what't the difference between situation B and C ?
>
> The problem is there is no explicit address exit mechanism in SLAAC. 
> Then even the binding of address C was failed by the savi-switch 
> sending out a probe at time t, then the host can still use address C 
> at time t' if the new probe shows that the old "legal user" of C has 
> given up the using of address C by without reply NA to that probe.
> Then the B and C will need the same processing and there is no 
> difference.
right, the question is whether we impose a minimum time between t and 
t', in order to protect the SAVI switch from DoS attacks.
I mean, if the SAVI swithc has verified that the address is the C case 
at time t, then wheter it make sense to verify the same thing at t'=t+1 ms.
It seems it would make sense to make the verification process again at 
t'=t+1 day.
Regards, marcelo



>
> That's one of the problem we said SLAAC has problems to get a very 
> idal savi solution, unless:
> 1 we can change SLAAC, or
> 2 the savi WG can allow the host to install a client and have a new 
> protocol to sync the state of host and savi-switch.
>
> thanks,
> Jun
>
>
>> (an example of this is suppose that a savi switch receives one or 
>> more data packets fro a given source address for which it has no 
>> binding and that results in triggering the binding creation 
>> procedure. Suppose that the address is actually defended by some 
>> other host that is connected to another SAVI device. The result is 
>> that no binding will be created for this address in the initial SAVI 
>> device. The question i understnad Joel is asking is whether this SAVI 
>> device caches info realted tot he failed binding creation procedure.
>>
>> I don't know the answer to that one, i haven't made my mind just yet.
>> As i said, it is a tradeoff between using memory (for the negative 
>> caching) versus bandwidth (re doing the binding creation procedure)
>> That is why i think rate limiting may help (for the latter, of course)
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>> El 17/04/10 19:01, Bi Jun escribió:
>>> Hi Marcelo and Joel,
>>>
>>> I am confused. Even the switch only record the positive binding,
>>> it actually implies the negative binding is also stored:
>>> the negative binding = the full address space - addresses in 
>>> positive binding table.
>>> In implementation, the positive binding is the "permit entry at 
>>> ACL", the negative binding is "deny all at ACL". It seems that there 
>>> is no extra action.
>>>
>>> IMHO, I think the more fine-granularity negative binding (than deny 
>>> all) is not useful. The finding of a host (e.g positive binding is 
>>> address A) attached to a port currently is spoofing address B 
>>> doesn't means the spoofing host can not spoof address C in next 
>>> packet. The host can use any random source address on its spoofing 
>>> traffic. So the savi switch should only permit the traffic of 
>>> address A (positive binding) then drop all the packet not using 
>>> address A. (certainly, the supplement functions are needed be 
>>> recover the binding in the case of positive binding is missing 
>>> possibly by loss of control packet, but the data-triggered can not 
>>> be the only MUST function to recover, due to the issues/problems 
>>> Fred Baker and others has discussed).
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:18 PM
>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased 
>>>> the question I was raising.
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>>> source
>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>>>> anchor
>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought 
>>>>>> you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>
>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>>>>> even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as 
>>>>> well (for some time).
>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i 
>>>>> guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what 
>>>>>>>> does it mean?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with 
>>>>>>>> rate
>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>
>


From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Sat Apr 17 14:33:07 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A0383A6A3A for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 14:33:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.173
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.173 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.426,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ByCV0sHjmhmY for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 14:33:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 652F53A69FB for <savi@ietf.org>; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 14:33:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 276773235892; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 14:32:58 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-51-173.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.51.173]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0B9023235875; Sat, 17 Apr 2010 14:32:56 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BCA2907.2080508@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 17:32:55 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com>	<4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO>	<4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es>	<5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO> <920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2010 21:33:07 -0000

So lets rephrase FCFS as FAFS, meaning "First Admittedx, First Served." 
  We are not concerned with matching a mathematical interpretation of 
the draft name, but rather in achieing a useful service which recognizes 
the realities of what can be done.

As such, it seems to me that we can and should write our descriptions 
such that pure packet triggered and counter trigger are both allowed. 
It would be fine if we achieved that by writing the description in such 
  in terms of the measures we claim matter.

Yes, we could put ourselves in a box by writing the descriptions in a 
way that makes it unimplementable.  But taht would not be a sensible 
choice for the working group.

Yours,
Joel

Bi Jun wrote:
> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using the 
> data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
> 
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
> 
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
> 
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit different,
>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> Jun,
>>>
>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered 
>>> and counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach that 
>>> would suffice.
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>>>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in most 
>>>> switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By 
>>>>> rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this needs 
>>>>> more thought...
>>>>>
>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased 
>>>>>> the question I was raising.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>>>>> source
>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows 
>>>>>>>>> that anchor
>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought 
>>>>>>>> you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>>>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered 
>>>>>>> or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>>>>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>>>>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as 
>>>>>>> well (for some time).
>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i 
>>>>>>> guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in 
>>>>>>> the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It 
>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what 
>>>>>>>>>> does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with 
>>>>>>>>>> rate
>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 02:34:32 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B7923A6965 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:34:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.216
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.216 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.888,  BAYES_00=-2.599, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8mfI2eT6f5tA for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:34:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61EE13A6A77 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:34:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th053201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.53.201] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O3QtC-0003KH-QM; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:34:06 +0800
Message-ID: <CE20F274DD07480E8A563E3B91239F95@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><E95D064EB9734AB6808C94E8731A022B@junbiVAIO><4BC9FC6F.8050303@it.uc3m.es><1E69FA5AE1AF4EB6AB36A7FF30D16A3B@junbiVAIO> <4BCA043D.10108@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCA043D.10108@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:32:51 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 09:34:32 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:55 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 17/04/10 20:40, Bi Jun escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:22 AM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> I understand that what Joel was after would be something like the 
>>> following:
>>> A SAVI device can have essentially 3 types of addresses:
>>> - An address for which it has a binding with a given lower layer anchor.
>>> - an address for which it has no lower layer an anchor and has never 
>>> received any packets related to that address
>>> - an address for which it has no binding, but for which it has trigger 
>>> the binding creation procedure and the procedure has failed.
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> Assuming the host is using address A, B, C in the above 3 cases.
>> Then may I know what't the difference between situation B and C ?
>>
>> The problem is there is no explicit address exit mechanism in SLAAC. Then 
>> even the binding of address C was failed by the savi-switch sending out a 
>> probe at time t, then the host can still use address C at time t' if the 
>> new probe shows that the old "legal user" of C has given up the using of 
>> address C by without reply NA to that probe.
>> Then the B and C will need the same processing and there is no 
>> difference.
> right, the question is whether we impose a minimum time between t and t', 
> in order to protect the SAVI switch from DoS attacks.
> I mean, if the SAVI swithc has verified that the address is the C case at 
> time t, then wheter it make sense to verify the same thing at t'=t+1 ms.
> It seems it would make sense to make the verification process again at 
> t'=t+1 day.
> Regards, marcelo

Hi Marcelo,

IMHO, this t'=t+1day theory proposed by you really sounds ridiculous for me.
What we can obey strictly is only RFC4862, did SLAAC said once an address 
DADed and find it is currently used by host X, then host Y can only use it 1 
days later?

I know it's the problem of RFC4862, but you can not make a new address 
assignment method not conform to RFC4862 when you design an savi solution. 
The only way you can change an address assignment method is to change 
RFC4862 (as I and Guang Yao stated many times in the past emails).

thanks,
Jun Bi


>
>
>
>>
>> That's one of the problem we said SLAAC has problems to get a very idal 
>> savi solution, unless:
>> 1 we can change SLAAC, or
>> 2 the savi WG can allow the host to install a client and have a new 
>> protocol to sync the state of host and savi-switch.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>>> (an example of this is suppose that a savi switch receives one or more 
>>> data packets fro a given source address for which it has no binding and 
>>> that results in triggering the binding creation procedure. Suppose that 
>>> the address is actually defended by some other host that is connected to 
>>> another SAVI device. The result is that no binding will be created for 
>>> this address in the initial SAVI device. The question i understnad Joel 
>>> is asking is whether this SAVI device caches info realted tot he failed 
>>> binding creation procedure.
>>>
>>> I don't know the answer to that one, i haven't made my mind just yet.
>>> As i said, it is a tradeoff between using memory (for the negative 
>>> caching) versus bandwidth (re doing the binding creation procedure)
>>> That is why i think rate limiting may help (for the latter, of course)
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>> El 17/04/10 19:01, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>> Hi Marcelo and Joel,
>>>>
>>>> I am confused. Even the switch only record the positive binding,
>>>> it actually implies the negative binding is also stored:
>>>> the negative binding = the full address space - addresses in positive 
>>>> binding table.
>>>> In implementation, the positive binding is the "permit entry at ACL", 
>>>> the negative binding is "deny all at ACL". It seems that there is no 
>>>> extra action.
>>>>
>>>> IMHO, I think the more fine-granularity negative binding (than deny 
>>>> all) is not useful. The finding of a host (e.g positive binding is 
>>>> address A) attached to a port currently is spoofing address B doesn't 
>>>> means the spoofing host can not spoof address C in next packet. The 
>>>> host can use any random source address on its spoofing traffic. So the 
>>>> savi switch should only permit the traffic of address A (positive 
>>>> binding) then drop all the packet not using address A. (certainly, the 
>>>> supplement functions are needed be recover the binding in the case of 
>>>> positive binding is missing possibly by loss of control packet, but the 
>>>> data-triggered can not be the only MUST function to recover, due to the 
>>>> issues/problems Fred Baker and others has discussed).
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:18 PM
>>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased the 
>>>>> question I was raising.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>>>> source
>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>>>>> anchor
>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it is
>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of control 
>>>>>>>> traffic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought you 
>>>>>>> didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>>>>>> even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of binding 
>>>>>> results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be useful not 
>>>>>> only to record positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in 
>>>>>> order to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as well 
>>>>>> (for some time).
>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess 
>>>>>> the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>>>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, 
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, noting 
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It will
>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does 
>>>>>>>>> it mean?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with 
>>>>>>>>> rate
>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious host, 
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 02:50:51 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A54983A6BA9 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:50:51 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.021
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.021 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.065,  BAYES_20=-0.74, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GcLlC1Bh7f8j for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:50:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 6EDC53A68DF for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:50:48 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jmf4bcb127a; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:50:39 +0800
Message-ID: <52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO> <4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es> <5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO> <920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO> <4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:25:40 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: zCNJ1DYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 09:50:51 -0000

Hi marcelo,

Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.

There is one more argument:
The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows the source 
address of the data packet directly.

The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU has no way 
to know the source address the data packet. Then it's perfectly to rely the 
counter-triggered actions for alert, not ideal for setting-up new binding.

thanks,
Jun



thanks,
Jun

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered approach, where 
> the threshold of the counter to trigger the binding creation process is 
> set to 1, then the result is what you call the data triggered approach.
> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is one 
> special subcase of the more general approach which is the counter based.
> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether the SAVI 
> binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the recepttion of 1 packet, 
> or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, from the specificacion 
> perspective, it would be to change a 1 to a n.
>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using the 
>> data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit different,
>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> Jun,
>>>>
>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered and 
>>>> counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach that 
>>>> would suffice.
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>>>>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in most 
>>>>> switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By 
>>>>>> rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this needs more 
>>>>>> thought...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased 
>>>>>>> the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>>>>>> source
>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>>>>>>> anchor
>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it 
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought 
>>>>>>>>> you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>>>>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>>>>>>>> even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>>>>>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>>>>>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation 
>>>>>>>> again).
>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as 
>>>>>>>> well (for some time).
>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess 
>>>>>>>> the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>>>>>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, 
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It 
>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does 
>>>>>>>>>>> it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with 
>>>>>>>>>>> rate
>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>
> 

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 02:51:01 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C59BF3A6BA9 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:51:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.831
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.831 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.245,  BAYES_05=-1.11, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yb9oPnnfm4oE for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:51:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 9FD8E3A68DF for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 02:50:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm244bcb1284; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:50:49 +0800
Message-ID: <56CEDF1012FC4F32ADA62401705D23E2@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com>	<4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO>	<4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es>	<5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO> <920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO> <4BCA2907.2080508@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BCA2907.2080508@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:50:01 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: zEXJ1DYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 09:51:01 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 5:32 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> So lets rephrase FCFS as FAFS, meaning "First Admittedx, First Served." We 
> are not concerned with matching a mathematical interpretation of the draft 
> name, but rather in achieing a useful service which recognizes the 
> realities of what can be done.
>
> As such, it seems to me that we can and should write our descriptions such 
> that pure packet triggered and counter trigger are both allowed.

Hi Joel,

But allowed for what? It could not be the fundamental principle of a savi 
binding,
it can only be a supplement for recovering the binding for not-quit frequent 
case (e.g. the control packet loss).

We have to follow RFC4862. It says that the host must finish DAD first, 
before that, the address is only a "tentative address"), then the 
fundamental binding set-up rule should be control packet snooping (by 
savi-swtich watching the DAD procedure, as stated in savi-cps or savi-dhcp 
and savi-slaac which we are using at CNGI-CERNET real deployment), not FCFS. 
That's my point repeated many times. The problem is that the RFC4862 doesn't 
make the DAD procedure more reliable, then we need a supplement binding 
recovering mechanism in SAVI. But those supplement actions are not ideal 
yet(especially among them, data-triggered is a solution with more serious 
potential problem in implementation) . To seek an ideal savi solution is to 
either to make SLAAC more reliable or re-charter SAVI to permit a new 
protocol between host and savi-switch to sync states.

People can see some WG members are still be against using the data-triggered 
or counter-triggered, although personally I am OK with using one of them as 
one of the MUSTs (please see recently officially submitted savi-dhcp-02).

thanks,
Jun


> It would be fine if we achieved that by writing the description in such in 
> terms of the measures we claim matter.
>
> Yes, we could put ourselves in a box by writing the descriptions in a way 
> that makes it unimplementable.  But taht would not be a sensible choice 
> for the working group.
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> Bi Jun wrote:
>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using the 
>> data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit different,
>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> Jun,
>>>>
>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered and 
>>>> counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach that 
>>>> would suffice.
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>>>>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in most 
>>>>> switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By 
>>>>>> rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this needs more 
>>>>>> thought...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased 
>>>>>>> the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive DHCP
>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>>>>>> source
>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows that 
>>>>>>>>>> anchor
>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to the
>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it 
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought 
>>>>>>>>> you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>>>>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered or 
>>>>>>>> even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>>>>>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>>>>>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation 
>>>>>>>> again).
>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as 
>>>>>>>> well (for some time).
>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i guess 
>>>>>>>> the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in the 
>>>>>>>> re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local optimization, 
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It 
>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what does 
>>>>>>>>>>> it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an improper
>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with 
>>>>>>>>>>> rate
>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have determined 
>>>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 18 04:06:10 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 920A13A6B1E for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:06:10 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.413
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.413 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.186, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Fxryw2GyH1g3 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:06:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B9E763A69D8 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:06:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (107.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.107]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 552346C2A09; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 13:05:53 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 13:05:53 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com> <4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO> <4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es> <5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO> <920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO> <4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es> <52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:06:10 -0000

El 18/04/10 11:25, Bi Jun escribió:
> Hi marcelo,
>
> Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.
>
> There is one more argument:
> The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows the 
> source address of the data packet directly.
>
Here you are referring about how to implement it and not about the 
external behaviour, which is what is described int he specifications.
 From the specification perspective, what we need to describe is the 
external behaviour which is that upon the recpetion of one or more data 
packets containing a source address for which there is no binding, the 
SAVI device will trigger the binding creation procedure. Whether this is 
done by inspecting the packets in the data path, or by incrementing a 
counter that triggers the procedure, it is completelly transparent to 
the specification imho

> The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU has no 
> way to know the source address the data packet. Then it's perfectly to 
> rely the counter-triggered actions for alert, not ideal for setting-up 
> new binding.
>
I understnad you mean that the counter can trigger a procedure, such as 
the binding creation procedure, right?

Regards, marcelo


> thanks,
> Jun
>
>
>
> thanks,
> Jun
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered approach, 
>> where the threshold of the counter to trigger the binding creation 
>> process is set to 1, then the result is what you call the data 
>> triggered approach.
>> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is one 
>> special subcase of the more general approach which is the counter based.
>> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether the 
>> SAVI binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the recepttion of 1 
>> packet, or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, from the 
>> specificacion perspective, it would be to change a 1 to a n.
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using 
>>> the data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit 
>>>> different,
>>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> Jun,
>>>>>
>>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data 
>>>>> triggered and counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach 
>>>>> that would suffice.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>>>>>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in 
>>>>>> most switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. 
>>>>>>> By rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this 
>>>>>>> needs more thought...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and 
>>>>>>>> paraphrased the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive 
>>>>>>>>>>> DHCP
>>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with 
>>>>>>>>>>> unknown source
>>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows 
>>>>>>>>>>> that anchor
>>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that 
>>>>>>>>>>> it will be
>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start 
>>>>>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But 
>>>>>>>>>>> it is
>>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I 
>>>>>>>>>> thought you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some 
>>>>>>>>>> technology with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter 
>>>>>>>>> triggered or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would 
>>>>>>>>> be useful not only to record positive bindings, but also 
>>>>>>>>> negative bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification 
>>>>>>>>> operation again).
>>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings 
>>>>>>>>> as well (for some time).
>>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i 
>>>>>>>>> guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in 
>>>>>>>>> the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that 
>>>>>>>>>>> case, I would
>>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  
>>>>>>>>>>> (It will
>>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what 
>>>>>>>>>>>> does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a 
>>>>>>>>>>>> negative conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an 
>>>>>>>>>>>> improper
>>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even 
>>>>>>>>>>>> with rate
>>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a 
>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious host, but
>>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 18 04:16:32 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F7A33A69D8 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:16:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.437
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.437 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.163, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id QGfNn9vwD0FK for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:16:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B4233A6BB1 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:16:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (107.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.107]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BB736C2C13; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 13:16:07 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCAE9F6.6040603@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 13:16:06 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><E95D064EB9734AB6808C94E8731A022B@junbiVAIO><4BC9FC6F.8050303@it.uc3m.es><1E69FA5AE1AF4EB6AB36A7FF30D16A3B@junbiVAIO> <4BCA043D.10108@it.uc3m.es> <CE20F274DD07480E8A563E3B91239F95@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <CE20F274DD07480E8A563E3B91239F95@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:16:32 -0000

El 18/04/10 11:32, Jun Bi escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:55 AM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 17/04/10 20:40, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:22 AM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> I understand that what Joel was after would be something like the 
>>>> following:
>>>> A SAVI device can have essentially 3 types of addresses:
>>>> - An address for which it has a binding with a given lower layer 
>>>> anchor.
>>>> - an address for which it has no lower layer an anchor and has 
>>>> never received any packets related to that address
>>>> - an address for which it has no binding, but for which it has 
>>>> trigger the binding creation procedure and the procedure has failed.
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> Assuming the host is using address A, B, C in the above 3 cases.
>>> Then may I know what't the difference between situation B and C ?
>>>
>>> The problem is there is no explicit address exit mechanism in SLAAC. 
>>> Then even the binding of address C was failed by the savi-switch 
>>> sending out a probe at time t, then the host can still use address C 
>>> at time t' if the new probe shows that the old "legal user" of C has 
>>> given up the using of address C by without reply NA to that probe.
>>> Then the B and C will need the same processing and there is no 
>>> difference.
>> right, the question is whether we impose a minimum time between t and 
>> t', in order to protect the SAVI switch from DoS attacks.
>> I mean, if the SAVI swithc has verified that the address is the C 
>> case at time t, then wheter it make sense to verify the same thing at 
>> t'=t+1 ms.
>> It seems it would make sense to make the verification process again 
>> at t'=t+1 day.
>> Regards, marcelo
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> IMHO, this t'=t+1day theory proposed by you really sounds ridiculous 
> for me.

FWIW, i wasn't proposing anything, i was merely trying to describe to 
you what i understood previous comments made in the list were. It seems 
i didn't make a very good job, so i will abstain to make additional 
clarifications on other people comments on this issue.

I personally don't have an opinion on this one yet.

Regards, marcelo



From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 04:16:53 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5167E3A6B4A for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:16:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.304
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.304 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.800,  BAYES_00=-2.599, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 86F37RSPqKSz for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:16:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75F393A6957 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:16:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th053201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.53.201] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O3SUG-0004vh-Gi; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:16:28 +0800
Message-ID: <2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO> <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:16:40 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:16:53 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:05 PM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 18/04/10 11:25, Bi Jun escribió:
>> Hi marcelo,
>>
>> Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.
>>
>> There is one more argument:
>> The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows the 
>> source address of the data packet directly.
>>
> Here you are referring about how to implement it and not about the 
> external behaviour, which is what is described int he specifications.
> From the specification perspective, what we need to describe is the 
> external behaviour which is that upon the recpetion of one or more data 
> packets containing a source address for which there is no binding, the 
> SAVI device will trigger the binding creation procedure. Whether this is 
> done by inspecting the packets in the data path, or by incrementing a 
> counter that triggers the procedure, it is completelly transparent to the 
> specification imho

Hi Marcelo,

But you need to consider the feasibility when you ask a MUST in the 
specification, right ?

>
>> The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU has no 
>> way to know the source address the data packet. Then it's perfectly to 
>> rely the counter-triggered actions for alert, not ideal for setting-up 
>> new binding.
>>
> I understnad you mean that the counter can trigger a procedure, such as 
> the binding creation procedure, right?

I meant there is a difference between data plan and counter. Counter can be 
used to trigger an alert perfectly, but because it's not a data plan 
function, then it has some problem to trigger the binding creation in 
implementation.

thanks,
Jun
>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered approach, where 
>>> the threshold of the counter to trigger the binding creation process is 
>>> set to 1, then the result is what you call the data triggered approach.
>>> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is one 
>>> special subcase of the more general approach which is the counter based.
>>> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether the SAVI 
>>> binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the recepttion of 1 packet, 
>>> or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, from the specificacion 
>>> perspective, it would be to change a 1 to a n.
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using the 
>>>> data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>>>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit 
>>>>> different,
>>>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jun,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered 
>>>>>> and counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach that 
>>>>>> would suffice.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>>>>>>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in most 
>>>>>>> switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>>>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. By 
>>>>>>>> rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this needs 
>>>>>>>> more thought...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and paraphrased 
>>>>>>>>> the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive 
>>>>>>>>>>>> DHCP
>>>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with unknown 
>>>>>>>>>>>> source
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows 
>>>>>>>>>>>> that anchor
>>>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that it 
>>>>>>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host is
>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But it 
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I thought 
>>>>>>>>>>> you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some technology 
>>>>>>>>>>> with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered 
>>>>>>>>>> or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>>>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>>>>>>>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>>>>>>>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation 
>>>>>>>>>> again).
>>>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as 
>>>>>>>>>> well (for some time).
>>>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i 
>>>>>>>>>> guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in 
>>>>>>>>>> the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, I 
>>>>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  (It 
>>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a negative 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> improper
>>>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> rate
>>>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 18 04:21:28 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 393513A6BB7 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:21:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.455
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.455 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.144, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id piZi6v6mvrPp for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:21:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B8C83A6BBE for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:20:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (107.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.107]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95A287F751C; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 13:20:04 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 13:20:03 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO> <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es> <2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:21:28 -0000

El 18/04/10 13:16, Jun Bi escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:05 PM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 18/04/10 11:25, Bi Jun escribió:
>>> Hi marcelo,
>>>
>>> Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.
>>>
>>> There is one more argument:
>>> The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows the 
>>> source address of the data packet directly.
>>>
>> Here you are referring about how to implement it and not about the 
>> external behaviour, which is what is described int he specifications.
>> From the specification perspective, what we need to describe is the 
>> external behaviour which is that upon the recpetion of one or more 
>> data packets containing a source address for which there is no 
>> binding, the SAVI device will trigger the binding creation procedure. 
>> Whether this is done by inspecting the packets in the data path, or 
>> by incrementing a counter that triggers the procedure, it is 
>> completelly transparent to the specification imho
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> But you need to consider the feasibility when you ask a MUST in the 
> specification, right ?

right,
so, it has been stated several times in this ml that the data triggered 
can be implemneted in some of the architectures and it seems that the 
counter triggered can be implemented in most of the architectures (i 
haven't heard anyone saying that it cannot be implemented so far).
So, mandating  external behaviour which can be implemented in either of 
the apprpaches should be no problem.

regards, marcelo

>
>>
>>> The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU has 
>>> no way to know the source address the data packet. Then it's 
>>> perfectly to rely the counter-triggered actions for alert, not ideal 
>>> for setting-up new binding.
>>>
>> I understnad you mean that the counter can trigger a procedure, such 
>> as the binding creation procedure, right?
>
> I meant there is a difference between data plan and counter. Counter 
> can be used to trigger an alert perfectly, but because it's not a data 
> plan function, then it has some problem to trigger the binding 
> creation in implementation.
>

> thanks,
> Jun
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered approach, 
>>>> where the threshold of the counter to trigger the binding creation 
>>>> process is set to 1, then the result is what you call the data 
>>>> triggered approach.
>>>> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is 
>>>> one special subcase of the more general approach which is the 
>>>> counter based.
>>>> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether the 
>>>> SAVI binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the recepttion of 
>>>> 1 packet, or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, from the 
>>>> specificacion perspective, it would be to change a 1 to a n.
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using 
>>>>> the data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>>>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>>>>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit 
>>>>>> different,
>>>>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jun,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data 
>>>>>>> triggered and counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>>>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach 
>>>>>>> that would suffice.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the 
>>>>>>>> only solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU 
>>>>>>>> actions in most switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting 
>>>>>>>>> doesn't partially address this issue.
>>>>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI 
>>>>>>>>> switch. By rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But 
>>>>>>>>> probably this needs more thought...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and 
>>>>>>>>>> paraphrased the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> positive DHCP
>>>>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of information.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknown source
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows that anchor
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> host is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I 
>>>>>>>>>>>> thought you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some 
>>>>>>>>>>>> technology with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter 
>>>>>>>>>>> triggered or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification 
>>>>>>>>>>> of binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it 
>>>>>>>>>>> would be useful not only to record positive bindings, but 
>>>>>>>>>>> also negative bindings (in order to avoid doing the 
>>>>>>>>>>> verification operation again).
>>>>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings 
>>>>>>>>>>> as well (for some time).
>>>>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so 
>>>>>>>>>>> i guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce 
>>>>>>>>>>> spent in the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> case, I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> update, noting that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (It will
>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> not remember
>>>>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> negative conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> improper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with rate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious host, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
>


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 04:34:30 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71BEE3A6905 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:34:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.367
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.367 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.018,  BAYES_05=-1.11, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id A0LZpEKqzmj4 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:34:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2B6EA3A6876 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:34:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th053201.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.53.201] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O3SlW-0001pV-1E; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:34:18 +0800
Message-ID: <80410A2F485344A38ADF1DF6FFE803C0@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><E95D064EB9734AB6808C94E8731A022B@junbiVAIO><4BC9FC6F.8050303@it.uc3m.es><1E69FA5AE1AF4EB6AB36A7FF30D16A3B@junbiVAIO> <4BCA043D.10108@it.uc3m.es> <CE20F274DD07480E8A563E3B91239F95@junbiVAIO> <4BCAE9F6.6040603@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCAE9F6.6040603@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:34:30 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:34:30 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:16 PM
To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 18/04/10 11:32, Jun Bi escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:55 AM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 17/04/10 20:40, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:22 AM
>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> I understand that what Joel was after would be something like the 
>>>>> following:
>>>>> A SAVI device can have essentially 3 types of addresses:
>>>>> - An address for which it has a binding with a given lower layer 
>>>>> anchor.
>>>>> - an address for which it has no lower layer an anchor and has never 
>>>>> received any packets related to that address
>>>>> - an address for which it has no binding, but for which it has trigger 
>>>>> the binding creation procedure and the procedure has failed.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> Assuming the host is using address A, B, C in the above 3 cases.
>>>> Then may I know what't the difference between situation B and C ?
>>>>
>>>> The problem is there is no explicit address exit mechanism in SLAAC. 
>>>> Then even the binding of address C was failed by the savi-switch 
>>>> sending out a probe at time t, then the host can still use address C at 
>>>> time t' if the new probe shows that the old "legal user" of C has given 
>>>> up the using of address C by without reply NA to that probe.
>>>> Then the B and C will need the same processing and there is no 
>>>> difference.
>>> right, the question is whether we impose a minimum time between t and 
>>> t', in order to protect the SAVI switch from DoS attacks.
>>> I mean, if the SAVI swithc has verified that the address is the C case 
>>> at time t, then wheter it make sense to verify the same thing at t'=t+1 
>>> ms.
>>> It seems it would make sense to make the verification process again at 
>>> t'=t+1 day.
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> IMHO, this t'=t+1day theory proposed by you really sounds ridiculous for 
>> me.
>
> FWIW, i wasn't proposing anything, i was merely trying to describe to you 
> what i understood previous comments made in the list were. It seems i 
> didn't make a very good job, so i will abstain to make additional 
> clarifications on other people comments on this issue.
>
> I personally don't have an opinion on this one yet.
>
> Regards, marcelo
>

Hi Marcelo,

Thank you for letting me know.

Best Regards,
Jun



>
> 

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 04:40:09 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 187133A694D for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:40:09 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.067
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.067 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.970,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cCtlNnBkbzSD for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:40:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 681423A6905 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 04:40:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bcb2c16; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:39:55 +0800
Message-ID: <46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO> <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es> <2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO> <4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:40:04 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: zSxq2DYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:40:09 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:20 PM
To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 18/04/10 13:16, Jun Bi escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:05 PM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 18/04/10 11:25, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>> Hi marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.
>>>>
>>>> There is one more argument:
>>>> The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows the 
>>>> source address of the data packet directly.
>>>>
>>> Here you are referring about how to implement it and not about the 
>>> external behaviour, which is what is described int he specifications.
>>> From the specification perspective, what we need to describe is the 
>>> external behaviour which is that upon the recpetion of one or more data 
>>> packets containing a source address for which there is no binding, the 
>>> SAVI device will trigger the binding creation procedure. Whether this is 
>>> done by inspecting the packets in the data path, or by incrementing a 
>>> counter that triggers the procedure, it is completelly transparent to 
>>> the specification imho
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> But you need to consider the feasibility when you ask a MUST in the 
>> specification, right ?
>
> right,
> so, it has been stated several times in this ml that the data triggered 
> can be implemneted in some of the architectures

Hi Marcelo,

IMHO, I doubt this. Maybe I missed some discussion. By whom it was stated 
the data-triggered is feasible? I recalled Fred Baker's comments on the 
problem of data-triggered on the mailing-list days ago, and I see nobody 
disagree with him.

thanks,
Jun Bi

> and it seems that the counter triggered can be implemented in most of the 
> architectures (i haven't heard anyone saying that it cannot be implemented 
> so far).
> So, mandating  external behaviour which can be implemented in either of 
> the apprpaches should be no problem.
>
> regards, marcelo
>
>>
>>>
>>>> The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU has no 
>>>> way to know the source address the data packet. Then it's perfectly to 
>>>> rely the counter-triggered actions for alert, not ideal for setting-up 
>>>> new binding.
>>>>
>>> I understnad you mean that the counter can trigger a procedure, such as 
>>> the binding creation procedure, right?
>>
>> I meant there is a difference between data plan and counter. Counter can 
>> be used to trigger an alert perfectly, but because it's not a data plan 
>> function, then it has some problem to trigger the binding creation in 
>> implementation.
>>
>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered approach, 
>>>>> where the threshold of the counter to trigger the binding creation 
>>>>> process is set to 1, then the result is what you call the data 
>>>>> triggered approach.
>>>>> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is one 
>>>>> special subcase of the more general approach which is the counter 
>>>>> based.
>>>>> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether the 
>>>>> SAVI binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the recepttion of 1 
>>>>> packet, or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, from the specificacion 
>>>>> perspective, it would be to change a 1 to a n.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using the 
>>>>>> data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>>>>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>>>>>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit 
>>>>>>> different,
>>>>>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jun,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data triggered 
>>>>>>>> and counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>>>>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach 
>>>>>>>> that would suffice.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the only 
>>>>>>>>> solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU actions in 
>>>>>>>>> most switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>>>>>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>>>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI switch. 
>>>>>>>>>> By rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But probably this 
>>>>>>>>>> needs more thought...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and 
>>>>>>>>>>> paraphrased the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DHCP
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknown source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that anchor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means that 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  But 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thought you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only MUST.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> technology with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter triggered 
>>>>>>>>>>>> or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>>>>>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would be 
>>>>>>>>>>>> useful not only to record positive bindings, but also negative 
>>>>>>>>>>>> bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification operation 
>>>>>>>>>>>> again).
>>>>>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings as 
>>>>>>>>>>>> well (for some time).
>>>>>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i 
>>>>>>>>>>>> guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent in 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that case, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table update, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (It will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to not 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, what 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> negative conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> improper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with rate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a malicious 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> host, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 18 05:24:13 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B1DC3A6981 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 05:24:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.469
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.469 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.130, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id HFVF8s5FenIz for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 05:24:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F11B83A68B3 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 05:24:10 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (107.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.107]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5FAF67F751D; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 14:24:00 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 14:23:59 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO> <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es> <2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO> <4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es> <46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 12:24:13 -0000

El 18/04/10 13:40, Bi Jun escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:20 PM
> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 18/04/10 13:16, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:05 PM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> El 18/04/10 11:25, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>> Hi marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.
>>>>>
>>>>> There is one more argument:
>>>>> The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows 
>>>>> the source address of the data packet directly.
>>>>>
>>>> Here you are referring about how to implement it and not about the 
>>>> external behaviour, which is what is described int he specifications.
>>>> From the specification perspective, what we need to describe is the 
>>>> external behaviour which is that upon the recpetion of one or more 
>>>> data packets containing a source address for which there is no 
>>>> binding, the SAVI device will trigger the binding creation 
>>>> procedure. Whether this is done by inspecting the packets in the 
>>>> data path, or by incrementing a counter that triggers the 
>>>> procedure, it is completelly transparent to the specification imho
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> But you need to consider the feasibility when you ask a MUST in the 
>>> specification, right ?
>>
>> right,
>> so, it has been stated several times in this ml that the data 
>> triggered can be implemneted in some of the architectures
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> IMHO, I doubt this. Maybe I missed some discussion. By whom it was 
> stated the data-triggered is feasible?
By you.
Many times you stated that high end switches can implement the data 
triggered.


For instance, in  15/03/10 13:26, Bi Jun wrote:
Hi Marcelo,

We can guide the users in this document or in framework,
if you want to put a hub between savi-device or your host, please buy an 
more expensive savi-device that implemented the xxx options functions 
(e.g the data triggered functions listed in savi-dhcp-02, or another 
solution document).

thanks,
Jun

Later on the 15/03/10 15:48, Bi Jun wrote:
  Hi Marcelo,

  Hi, Marcelo,

  Here we are actually talking about the trade-off between cost and the
  benefits (forgive me that I explained this option many times). If the
  solution is just a couple of lines of code, whey not we make it MUST?
  But the truth is that the data-triggered actions are heavy burden to
  device especially low end access switch. If you make them MUST, then
  you forbid those access switches implementing SAVI (those access switch
  could be more than 90% of potential savi-switches).

But in any case, this is irrelevant.
Then thing is that if we specify the external behaviour (whcih is what a 
spec should describe) we have different ways whch can be implemented, 
and it seems that that everybody seem to agree that ther is at least one 
possible way to implement the behaviour whcih can be externally descibed as:
- If the SAVI device recieves one or more data packets for whcih it has 
no binding, then it triggers the binding creation procedure.

Regards, marcelo




> I recalled Fred Baker's comments on the problem of data-triggered on 
> the mailing-list days ago, and I see nobody disagree with him.
>
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
>> and it seems that the counter triggered can be implemented in most of 
>> the architectures (i haven't heard anyone saying that it cannot be 
>> implemented so far).
>> So, mandating  external behaviour which can be implemented in either 
>> of the apprpaches should be no problem.
>>
>> regards, marcelo
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU 
>>>>> has no way to know the source address the data packet. Then it's 
>>>>> perfectly to rely the counter-triggered actions for alert, not 
>>>>> ideal for setting-up new binding.
>>>>>
>>>> I understnad you mean that the counter can trigger a procedure, 
>>>> such as the binding creation procedure, right?
>>>
>>> I meant there is a difference between data plan and counter. Counter 
>>> can be used to trigger an alert perfectly, but because it's not a 
>>> data plan function, then it has some problem to trigger the binding 
>>> creation in implementation.
>>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered 
>>>>>> approach, where the threshold of the counter to trigger the 
>>>>>> binding creation process is set to 1, then the result is what you 
>>>>>> call the data triggered approach.
>>>>>> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is 
>>>>>> one special subcase of the more general approach which is the 
>>>>>> counter based.
>>>>>> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether 
>>>>>> the SAVI binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the 
>>>>>> recepttion of 1 packet, or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, 
>>>>>> from the specificacion perspective, it would be to change a 1 to 
>>>>>> a n.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS 
>>>>>>> (using the data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>>>>>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>>>>>>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit 
>>>>>>>> different,
>>>>>>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Jun,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data 
>>>>>>>>> triggered and counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>>>>>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered 
>>>>>>>>> approach that would suffice.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the 
>>>>>>>>>> only solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU 
>>>>>>>>>> actions in most switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting 
>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't partially address this issue.
>>>>>>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI 
>>>>>>>>>>> switch. By rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But 
>>>>>>>>>>> probably this needs more thought...
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and 
>>>>>>>>>>>> paraphrased the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positive DHCP
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of information.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknown source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows that anchor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> start to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> host is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thought you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> MUST.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> technology with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> triggered or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be useful not only to record positive bindings, but 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> also negative bindings (in order to avoid doing the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification operation again).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> bindings as well (for some time).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> so i guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> spent in the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> case, I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> update, noting that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> validations. (It will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not remember
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> negative conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> improper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Even with rate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious host, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>
>


From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 06:13:27 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75DEF3A69F2 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 06:13:27 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.998
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.901,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id H55v9X1RIgaf for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 06:13:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 169BC3A6915 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 06:13:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bcb41f3; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 21:13:12 +0800
Message-ID: <6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO> <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es> <2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO> <4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es> <46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO> <4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 21:13:13 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: zFOT4DYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 13:13:27 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 8:23 PM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 18/04/10 13:40, Bi Jun escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:20 PM
>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 18/04/10 13:16, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:05 PM
>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> El 18/04/10 11:25, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>> Hi marcelo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is one more argument:
>>>>>> The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows the 
>>>>>> source address of the data packet directly.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Here you are referring about how to implement it and not about the 
>>>>> external behaviour, which is what is described int he specifications.
>>>>> From the specification perspective, what we need to describe is the 
>>>>> external behaviour which is that upon the recpetion of one or more 
>>>>> data packets containing a source address for which there is no 
>>>>> binding, the SAVI device will trigger the binding creation procedure. 
>>>>> Whether this is done by inspecting the packets in the data path, or by 
>>>>> incrementing a counter that triggers the procedure, it is completelly 
>>>>> transparent to the specification imho
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> But you need to consider the feasibility when you ask a MUST in the 
>>>> specification, right ?
>>>
>>> right,
>>> so, it has been stated several times in this ml that the data triggered 
>>> can be implemneted in some of the architectures
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> IMHO, I doubt this. Maybe I missed some discussion. By whom it was stated 
>> the data-triggered is feasible?
> By you.
> Many times you stated that high end switches can implement the data 
> triggered.
>

Hi Marcelo,

Oh, you meant me. But you know what I really meant for those messages at 
that time: the data-triggered could not be the MUST.
(1)The high-end switch is very few among savi-switches, especially from 
deployers' viewpoint.
(2)it was an assuming, it was not been supported by any vendors yet.

>
> For instance, in  15/03/10 13:26, Bi Jun wrote:
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> We can guide the users in this document or in framework,
> if you want to put a hub between savi-device or your host, please buy an 
> more expensive savi-device that implemented the xxx options functions (e.g 
> the data triggered functions listed in savi-dhcp-02, or another solution 
> document).
>
> thanks,
> Jun
>
> Later on the 15/03/10 15:48, Bi Jun wrote:
>  Hi Marcelo,
>
>  Hi, Marcelo,
>
>  Here we are actually talking about the trade-off between cost and the
>  benefits (forgive me that I explained this option many times). If the
>  solution is just a couple of lines of code, whey not we make it MUST?
>  But the truth is that the data-triggered actions are heavy burden to
>  device especially low end access switch. If you make them MUST, then
>  you forbid those access switches implementing SAVI (those access switch
>  could be more than 90% of potential savi-switches).
>
> But in any case, this is irrelevant.
> Then thing is that if we specify the external behaviour (whcih is what a 
> spec should describe) we have different ways whch can be implemented, and 
> it seems that that everybody seem to agree that ther is at least one 
> possible way to implement the behaviour whcih can be externally descibed 
> as:
> - If the SAVI device recieves one or more data packets for whcih it has no 
> binding, then it triggers the binding creation procedure.

But it's relevant to the principle of solution, if you make the 
data-triggered actions as the principle of SAVI like FCFS (First Comes First 
Serves), then I am against because it is not conform to address assignment 
mechanism and not realistic. Moreover, it seems that you didn't really 
understand why the data-triggered and counter triggered is different. Please 
see my last reply or read savi-dhcp-02.

thanks,
Jun Bi


>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
>
>
>> I recalled Fred Baker's comments on the problem of data-triggered on the 
>> mailing-list days ago, and I see nobody disagree with him.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>>> and it seems that the counter triggered can be implemented in most of 
>>> the architectures (i haven't heard anyone saying that it cannot be 
>>> implemented so far).
>>> So, mandating  external behaviour which can be implemented in either of 
>>> the apprpaches should be no problem.
>>>
>>> regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU has 
>>>>>> no way to know the source address the data packet. Then it's 
>>>>>> perfectly to rely the counter-triggered actions for alert, not ideal 
>>>>>> for setting-up new binding.
>>>>>>
>>>>> I understnad you mean that the counter can trigger a procedure, such 
>>>>> as the binding creation procedure, right?
>>>>
>>>> I meant there is a difference between data plan and counter. Counter 
>>>> can be used to trigger an alert perfectly, but because it's not a data 
>>>> plan function, then it has some problem to trigger the binding creation 
>>>> in implementation.
>>>>
>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered approach, 
>>>>>>> where the threshold of the counter to trigger the binding creation 
>>>>>>> process is set to 1, then the result is what you call the data 
>>>>>>> triggered approach.
>>>>>>> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is one 
>>>>>>> special subcase of the more general approach which is the counter 
>>>>>>> based.
>>>>>>> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether the 
>>>>>>> SAVI binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the recepttion of 
>>>>>>> 1 packet, or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, from the 
>>>>>>> specificacion perspective, it would be to change a 1 to a n.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using 
>>>>>>>> the data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>>>>>>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>>>>>>>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit 
>>>>>>>>> different,
>>>>>>>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Jun,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data 
>>>>>>>>>> triggered and counter triggered approaches are indistinguishable.
>>>>>>>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered approach 
>>>>>>>>>> that would suffice.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the 
>>>>>>>>>>> only solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU 
>>>>>>>>>>> actions in most switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting doesn't 
>>>>>>>>>>>> partially address this issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>>>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI 
>>>>>>>>>>>> switch. By rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But 
>>>>>>>>>>>> probably this needs more thought...
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> paraphrased the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record positive 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DHCP
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss of 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknown source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now knows 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that anchor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another start 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the host 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts of 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thought you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> MUST.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> technology with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> triggered or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification of 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it would 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be useful not only to record positive bindings, but also 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> negative bindings (in order to avoid doing the verification 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operation again).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative bindings 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as well (for some time).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so i 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce spent 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> case, I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> update, noting that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (It will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not remember
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> negative conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> improper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  Even 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with rate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious host, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 18 08:46:19 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E4DE3A680E for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 08:46:19 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.481
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.481 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.118, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Aa-ozMZnojqL for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 08:46:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 50B753A67CF for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 08:46:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (107.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.107]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04010B493F1; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:46:06 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:45:46 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO> <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es> <2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO> <4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es> <46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO> <4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es> <6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 15:46:19 -0000

El 18/04/10 15:13, Bi Jun escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 8:23 PM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 18/04/10 13:40, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:20 PM
>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> El 18/04/10 13:16, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:05 PM
>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> El 18/04/10 11:25, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>> Hi marcelo,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is one more argument:
>>>>>>> The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows 
>>>>>>> the source address of the data packet directly.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here you are referring about how to implement it and not about 
>>>>>> the external behaviour, which is what is described int he 
>>>>>> specifications.
>>>>>> From the specification perspective, what we need to describe is 
>>>>>> the external behaviour which is that upon the recpetion of one or 
>>>>>> more data packets containing a source address for which there is 
>>>>>> no binding, the SAVI device will trigger the binding creation 
>>>>>> procedure. Whether this is done by inspecting the packets in the 
>>>>>> data path, or by incrementing a counter that triggers the 
>>>>>> procedure, it is completelly transparent to the specification imho
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> But you need to consider the feasibility when you ask a MUST in 
>>>>> the specification, right ?
>>>>
>>>> right,
>>>> so, it has been stated several times in this ml that the data 
>>>> triggered can be implemneted in some of the architectures
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> IMHO, I doubt this. Maybe I missed some discussion. By whom it was 
>>> stated the data-triggered is feasible?
>> By you.
>> Many times you stated that high end switches can implement the data 
>> triggered.
>>
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> Oh, you meant me. But you know what I really meant for those messages 
> at that time: the data-triggered could not be the MUST.
> (1)The high-end switch is very few among savi-switches, especially 
> from deployers' viewpoint.
> (2)it was an assuming, it was not been supported by any vendors yet.
>
>>
>> For instance, in  15/03/10 13:26, Bi Jun wrote:
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> We can guide the users in this document or in framework,
>> if you want to put a hub between savi-device or your host, please buy 
>> an more expensive savi-device that implemented the xxx options 
>> functions (e.g the data triggered functions listed in savi-dhcp-02, 
>> or another solution document).
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>> Later on the 15/03/10 15:48, Bi Jun wrote:
>>  Hi Marcelo,
>>
>>  Hi, Marcelo,
>>
>>  Here we are actually talking about the trade-off between cost and the
>>  benefits (forgive me that I explained this option many times). If the
>>  solution is just a couple of lines of code, whey not we make it MUST?
>>  But the truth is that the data-triggered actions are heavy burden to
>>  device especially low end access switch. If you make them MUST, then
>>  you forbid those access switches implementing SAVI (those access switch
>>  could be more than 90% of potential savi-switches).
>>
>> But in any case, this is irrelevant.
>> Then thing is that if we specify the external behaviour (whcih is 
>> what a spec should describe) we have different ways whch can be 
>> implemented, and it seems that that everybody seem to agree that ther 
>> is at least one possible way to implement the behaviour whcih can be 
>> externally descibed as:
>> - If the SAVI device recieves one or more data packets for whcih it 
>> has no binding, then it triggers the binding creation procedure.
>
> But it's relevant to the principle of solution, if you make the 
> data-triggered actions as the principle of SAVI like FCFS (First Comes 
> First Serves), then I am against because it is not conform to address 
> assignment mechanism and not realistic.

Well, it seems we need to agree to disagree.
The principle of the solution is exactly the same, we are only talking 
about the implementation of the solution.
As i stated earlier, the only difference from the specification 
perspective, would be to change that instead of receiving one data 
packet, the triggering of the binding creation procedure is upon the 
reception of n packets (where n can be one).

Regards, marcelo


> Moreover, it seems that you didn't really understand why the 
> data-triggered and counter triggered is different. Please see my last 
> reply or read savi-dhcp-02.
>



> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
>
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> I recalled Fred Baker's comments on the problem of data-triggered on 
>>> the mailing-list days ago, and I see nobody disagree with him.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>>> and it seems that the counter triggered can be implemented in most 
>>>> of the architectures (i haven't heard anyone saying that it cannot 
>>>> be implemented so far).
>>>> So, mandating  external behaviour which can be implemented in 
>>>> either of the apprpaches should be no problem.
>>>>
>>>> regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU 
>>>>>>> has no way to know the source address the data packet. Then it's 
>>>>>>> perfectly to rely the counter-triggered actions for alert, not 
>>>>>>> ideal for setting-up new binding.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I understnad you mean that the counter can trigger a procedure, 
>>>>>> such as the binding creation procedure, right?
>>>>>
>>>>> I meant there is a difference between data plan and counter. 
>>>>> Counter can be used to trigger an alert perfectly, but because 
>>>>> it's not a data plan function, then it has some problem to trigger 
>>>>> the binding creation in implementation.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered 
>>>>>>>> approach, where the threshold of the counter to trigger the 
>>>>>>>> binding creation process is set to 1, then the result is what 
>>>>>>>> you call the data triggered approach.
>>>>>>>> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered 
>>>>>>>> is one special subcase of the more general approach which is 
>>>>>>>> the counter based.
>>>>>>>> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether 
>>>>>>>> the SAVI binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the 
>>>>>>>> recepttion of 1 packet, or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, 
>>>>>>>> from the specificacion perspective, it would be to change a 1 
>>>>>>>> to a n.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS 
>>>>>>>>> (using the data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>>>>>>>>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit 
>>>>>>>>>> different,
>>>>>>>>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data 
>>>>>>>>>>> triggered and counter triggered approaches are 
>>>>>>>>>>> indistinguishable.
>>>>>>>>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered 
>>>>>>>>>>> approach that would suffice.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the only solution it could not help is the data-triggered 
>>>>>>>>>>>> CPU actions in most switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't partially address this issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> extra verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> SAVI switch. By rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But probably this needs more thought...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paraphrased the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positive DHCP
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> loss of information.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with unknown source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows that anchor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means that it will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> start to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> host is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> confused. But it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> amounts of control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thought you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only MUST.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> technology with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> triggered or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification of binding results in the SAVI switch doing 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something, it would be useful not only to record 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positive bindings, but also negative bindings (in order 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to avoid doing the verification operation again).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bindings as well (for some time).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so i guess the question is whether it is worse the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resurce spent in the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that case, I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> update, noting that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> validations. (It will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not remember
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02, what does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> negative conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an improper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Even with rate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious host, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>


From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 09:47:40 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A4283A6901 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 09:47:40 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.938
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.938 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.841,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id CTHWgz8m9BFd for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 09:47:39 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id C18FE3A6783 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 09:47:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bcb742b; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 00:47:28 +0800
Message-ID: <31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO> <4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es> <2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO> <4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es> <46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO> <4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es> <6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO> <4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 00:47:40 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: zXae7DYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 16:47:40 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 11:45 PM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 18/04/10 15:13, Bi Jun escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 8:23 PM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 18/04/10 13:40, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:20 PM
>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> El 18/04/10 13:16, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 7:05 PM
>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> El 18/04/10 11:25, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>> Hi marcelo,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Now you see the data-triggered is an extreme case.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There is one more argument:
>>>>>>>> The data-triggered is an action at data plan, then the CPU knows 
>>>>>>>> the source address of the data packet directly.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here you are referring about how to implement it and not about the 
>>>>>>> external behaviour, which is what is described int he 
>>>>>>> specifications.
>>>>>>> From the specification perspective, what we need to describe is the 
>>>>>>> external behaviour which is that upon the recpetion of one or more 
>>>>>>> data packets containing a source address for which there is no 
>>>>>>> binding, the SAVI device will trigger the binding creation 
>>>>>>> procedure. Whether this is done by inspecting the packets in the 
>>>>>>> data path, or by incrementing a counter that triggers the procedure, 
>>>>>>> it is completelly transparent to the specification imho
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But you need to consider the feasibility when you ask a MUST in the 
>>>>>> specification, right ?
>>>>>
>>>>> right,
>>>>> so, it has been stated several times in this ml that the data 
>>>>> triggered can be implemneted in some of the architectures
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> IMHO, I doubt this. Maybe I missed some discussion. By whom it was 
>>>> stated the data-triggered is feasible?
>>> By you.
>>> Many times you stated that high end switches can implement the data 
>>> triggered.
>>>
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> Oh, you meant me. But you know what I really meant for those messages at 
>> that time: the data-triggered could not be the MUST.
>> (1)The high-end switch is very few among savi-switches, especially from 
>> deployers' viewpoint.
>> (2)it was an assuming, it was not been supported by any vendors yet.
>>
>>>
>>> For instance, in  15/03/10 13:26, Bi Jun wrote:
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> We can guide the users in this document or in framework,
>>> if you want to put a hub between savi-device or your host, please buy an 
>>> more expensive savi-device that implemented the xxx options functions 
>>> (e.g the data triggered functions listed in savi-dhcp-02, or another 
>>> solution document).
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>> Later on the 15/03/10 15:48, Bi Jun wrote:
>>>  Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>>  Hi, Marcelo,
>>>
>>>  Here we are actually talking about the trade-off between cost and the
>>>  benefits (forgive me that I explained this option many times). If the
>>>  solution is just a couple of lines of code, whey not we make it MUST?
>>>  But the truth is that the data-triggered actions are heavy burden to
>>>  device especially low end access switch. If you make them MUST, then
>>>  you forbid those access switches implementing SAVI (those access switch
>>>  could be more than 90% of potential savi-switches).
>>>
>>> But in any case, this is irrelevant.
>>> Then thing is that if we specify the external behaviour (whcih is what a 
>>> spec should describe) we have different ways whch can be implemented, 
>>> and it seems that that everybody seem to agree that ther is at least one 
>>> possible way to implement the behaviour whcih can be externally descibed 
>>> as:
>>> - If the SAVI device recieves one or more data packets for whcih it has 
>>> no binding, then it triggers the binding creation procedure.
>>
>> But it's relevant to the principle of solution, if you make the 
>> data-triggered actions as the principle of SAVI like FCFS (First Comes 
>> First Serves), then I am against because it is not conform to address 
>> assignment mechanism and not realistic.
>
> Well, it seems we need to agree to disagree.
> The principle of the solution is exactly the same, we are only talking 
> about the implementation of the solution.
> As i stated earlier, the only difference from the specification 
> perspective, would be to change that instead of receiving one data packet, 
> the triggering of the binding creation procedure is upon the reception of 
> n packets (where n can be one).

Hi Marcelo,

It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the counter-triggered 
is not same as data-triggered, because the counter-triggered is not a data 
plan solution,
say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet to CPU of 
savi-switch.

thanks,
Jun



>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
>> Moreover, it seems that you didn't really understand why the 
>> data-triggered and counter triggered is different. Please see my last 
>> reply or read savi-dhcp-02.
>>
>
>
>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I recalled Fred Baker's comments on the problem of data-triggered on 
>>>> the mailing-list days ago, and I see nobody disagree with him.
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>>> and it seems that the counter triggered can be implemented in most of 
>>>>> the architectures (i haven't heard anyone saying that it cannot be 
>>>>> implemented so far).
>>>>> So, mandating  external behaviour which can be implemented in either 
>>>>> of the apprpaches should be no problem.
>>>>>
>>>>> regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The counter-triggered is not an action at data plan, so the CPU has 
>>>>>>>> no way to know the source address the data packet. Then it's 
>>>>>>>> perfectly to rely the counter-triggered actions for alert, not 
>>>>>>>> ideal for setting-up new binding.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I understnad you mean that the counter can trigger a procedure, such 
>>>>>>> as the binding creation procedure, right?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I meant there is a difference between data plan and counter. Counter 
>>>>>> can be used to trigger an alert perfectly, but because it's not a 
>>>>>> data plan function, then it has some problem to trigger the binding 
>>>>>> creation in implementation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:53 AM
>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Well, as i see it, if you have a counter based triggered approach, 
>>>>>>>>> where the threshold of the counter to trigger the binding creation 
>>>>>>>>> process is set to 1, then the result is what you call the data 
>>>>>>>>> triggered approach.
>>>>>>>>> So, let me rephrase my previous statement, the data triggered is 
>>>>>>>>> one special subcase of the more general approach which is the 
>>>>>>>>> counter based.
>>>>>>>>> From the specification perspecitve, the difference, is whether the 
>>>>>>>>> SAVI binding triggers the bindiong procedure upon the recepttion 
>>>>>>>>> of 1 packet, or upon the recpetion of n packets. So, from the 
>>>>>>>>> specificacion perspective, it would be to change a 1 to a n.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 20:42, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>> Say it more clearly, the counter-based does not means FCFS (using 
>>>>>>>>>> the data-triggered as the fundamental principle).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:24 AM
>>>>>>>>>> To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; "Bi Jun" 
>>>>>>>>>> <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But I think the data-triggered and counter triggered are quit 
>>>>>>>>>>> different,
>>>>>>>>>>> depending on the fundamental principle of the specification.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2010 2:13 AM
>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> As i see it, from the specification perspective, the data 
>>>>>>>>>>>> triggered and counter triggered approaches are 
>>>>>>>>>>>> indistinguishable.
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, if this can be implemented in the counter triggered 
>>>>>>>>>>>> approach that would suffice.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 19:05, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The rate limit could help many solutions, unfortunately, the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> only solution it could not help is the data-triggered CPU 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> actions in most switches (as discussed in past weeks).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2010 10:38 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after thinking it a bit more, i wonder if rate limiting 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't partially address this issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I mean, negative caching implies memory consution and extra 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification implies extra traffic geenrated by the SAVI 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> switch. By rate lmiting, we eventually reduce both. But 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably this needs more thought...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 16:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just for clarity, Marcelo has correctly understood and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paraphrased the question I was raising.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> El 17/04/10 6:22, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:28 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The set of tables described in the document record 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positive DHCP
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resolutions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed, there are provisions for dealing with loss 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of information.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This may cause the SAVI device to react to packets with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknown source
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ipv6 addresses by undertaking verification transactions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose the verification fails.  The SAVI devices now 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knows that anchor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A is not allowed to use IPv6 source address B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But there is no place to record this fact.  Which means 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and the next data packet will cause another 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> start to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification cycle.  This can occur either because the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> host is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious, or more likely because the host is confused. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undesirable for a confused host to trigger large amounts 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of control traffic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's exactly the problem of data-triggered actions.(I 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thought you didn't agree it like Marcelo)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's why I insist the data-triggered can't be the only 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> MUST.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In reality, I believe the vendors will implement some 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> technology with counter-triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> i believe this is orthogonal to data trigger, counter 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> triggered or even some cases of control triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I understnad that Joel's point is that if the verification 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of binding results in the SAVI switch doing something, it 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be useful not only to record positive bindings, but 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also negative bindings (in order to avoid doing the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification operation again).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This seems to simply require to record the negative 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bindings as well (for some time).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the issue that negative caching also requires resources, so 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> i guess the question is whether it is worse the resurce 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> spent in the re-verification or the negative cache.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can argue tghat what I am asking for is a local 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> optimization, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not need to be described in teh standard.  In that 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> case, I would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> want simply a few words in the text, without a table 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> update, noting that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAVI device may chose to remember failed validations. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (It will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably take more than one sentence, as we also need to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not remember
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such things forever.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what does it mean?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) As currently written, there is no way to record a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> negative conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about filtering.  This means that if a host is using an 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> improper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> address, every data packet will trigger validation. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Even with rate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limiting, this seems unfortunate, given that we have 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> answer is no.  (This is not a protection against a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious host, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely more effective handling of a host with a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
> 

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Sun Apr 18 11:18:42 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 860163A6B7D for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:18:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.192
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.192 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.407,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LaFI-SQLzTlt for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:18:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hgblob.mail.tigertech.net (hgblob.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.71]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60B143A6872 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:18:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id C693632288FF; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:18:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hgblob.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-51-173.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.51.173]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hgblob.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 16FAB32283D7; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:18:32 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 14:18:31 -0400
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (Windows/20100228)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>	<2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>	<46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>	<6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es> <31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 18:18:42 -0000

Two important points:
1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would expect 
and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on DAD.
2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English words, a 
data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data plane, without 
any need for control packet events.

Yours,
Joel M. Halpern

Bi Jun wrote:
>
> Hi Marcelo,
> 
> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet to CPU 
> of savi-switch.
> 
> thanks,
> Jun

From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 11:57:12 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9DD2A28C126 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:57:12 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.185
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.185 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.512,  BAYES_50=0.001, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uv4uEMNdrxHK for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:57:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 3940E3A6B78 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 11:57:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.53.201]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bcb9288; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:57:01 +0800
Message-ID: <1EA9F570441C4C00A2BE6D2BE3EAFB36@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>	<2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>	<46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>	<6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es> <31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO> <4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:56:57 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: zuxf9DYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 18:57:12 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> Two important points:
> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would expect and 
> hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on DAD.

thanks,
Jun

> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English words, a 
> data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data plane, without 
> any need for control packet events.

Hi Joel,

but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan concept 
because the counter can only inform the CPU the statistics, but can not 
deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
thanks,
Jun

>
> Yours,
> Joel M. Halpern
>
> Bi Jun wrote:
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet to CPU 
>> of savi-switch.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 18 12:35:37 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23E6328C14F for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 12:35:37 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.491
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.491 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.108, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id HMwoZK3kYhcz for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 12:35:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E91A828C143 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 12:35:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (107.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.107]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66936BA669C; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 21:35:21 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 21:35:00 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>	<2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>	<46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>	<6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es> <31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO> <4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com> <1EA9F570441C4C00A2BE6D2BE3EAFB36@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <1EA9F570441C4C00A2BE6D2BE3EAFB36@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:35:37 -0000

El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> Two important points:
>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
>> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would expect 
>> and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on DAD.
>
> thanks,
> Jun
>
>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English 
>> words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data 
>> plane, without any need for control packet events.
>
> Hi Joel,
>
> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan concept 
> because the counter can only inform the CPU the statistics, but can 
> not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any case?
all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no binding 
is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.

Regards, marcelo


> thanks,
> Jun
>
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel M. Halpern
>>
>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet to 
>>> CPU of savi-switch.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>
>


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 18 12:35:59 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94F8D28C14F for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 12:35:59 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.499
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.499 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.100, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id X+asZbzV3kIT for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 12:35:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E0F628C143 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 12:35:58 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (107.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.107]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 359C5BA669C; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 21:35:49 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCB5F00.5080900@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 21:35:28 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>	<2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>	<46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>	<6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es> <31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO> <4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:35:59 -0000

i certainly agree with both points.
regards, marcelo



El 18/04/10 20:18, Joel M. Halpern escribió:
> Two important points:
> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would expect 
> and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on DAD.
> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English words, 
> a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data plane, 
> without any need for control packet events.
>
> Yours,
> Joel M. Halpern
>
> Bi Jun wrote:
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet to 
>> CPU of savi-switch.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Sun Apr 18 19:49:02 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D1343A6992 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:49:02 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.369
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.369 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.016,  BAYES_05=-1.11, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gq1CXt9XcfTZ for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:49:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E0C63A6923 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:49:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024208.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.208] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O3h2X-0005vD-Oz; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 10:48:49 +0800
Message-ID: <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>	<2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>	<46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>	<6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es><31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO><4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com><1EA9F570441C4C00A2BE6D2BE3EAFB36@junbiVAIO> <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 10:49:04 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:49:02 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> Two important points:
>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
>>> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would expect 
>>> and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on DAD.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English words, a 
>>> data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data plane, without 
>>> any need for control packet events.
>>
>> Hi Joel,
>>
>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan concept 
>> because the counter can only inform the CPU the statistics, but can not 
>> deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any case?
> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no binding is 
> received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.

Hi Marcelo,

In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch for binding 
creation procedure. That's why.

thanks,
Jun Bi


>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>
>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet to 
>>>> CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> 

From zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com  Sun Apr 18 20:29:19 2010
Return-Path: <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 761EC3A6985 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 20:29:19 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 3.582
X-Spam-Level: ***
X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.582 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.877,  BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,  J_CHICKENPOX_75=0.6, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id K+9S0+NWO2BG for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 20:29:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mta1.huaweisymantec.com (unknown [218.17.155.14]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6CA0A3A6968 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 20:29:18 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Content-type: text/plain; charset=gb2312
Received: from hstml01-in.huaweisymantec.com ([172.26.3.41]) by hstga01-in.huaweisymantec.com (Sun Java(tm) System Messaging Server 6.3-8.03 (built Apr 24 2009; 32bit)) with ESMTP id <0L13003KATOBS170@hstga01-in.huaweisymantec.com> for savi@ietf.org; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 11:28:59 +0800 (CST)
Received: from z90001956 ([10.27.154.67]) by hstml01-in.huaweisymantec.com (Sun Java(tm) System Messaging Server 6.3-8.03 (built Apr 24 2009; 32bit)) with ESMTPA id <0L13005AJTO7ZQ10@hstml01-in.huaweisymantec.com> for savi@ietf.org; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 11:28:56 +0800 (CST)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 11:28:58 +0800
From: Dong Zhang <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
To: Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
References: <201004151052240835910@huaweisymantec.com> <4bc6c2be.9613f30a.238a.48b6@mx.google.com>
Message-id: <201004191128584105173@huaweisymantec.com>
X-Mailer: Foxmail 6, 10, 201, 20 [cn]
Cc: "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 03:29:19 -0000

Hi,

Guang Yao 2010-04-15 Wrote:
>Hi, Dong
>
>Thanks for your comments. Corresponding clarifications will be made in the
>next edition.
>
>I will try to answer some of the questions.
>
>> In section 6,
>> >Entries are keyed on the anchor and source IP address.
>> I do not understand why using the anchor and source IP address together as
>> the
>> key value. My understanding is when savi device receives a packet, it will
>use
>> the source IP as the index to look for the responding entry. After finding
>the
>> right entry, it could check the anchor and the state. Since the mapping
>for
>> the IP address to the anchor is 1:1 (while the mapping for the anchor to
>IP
>> address may be 1:N), so only useing the source IP as the key is enough. Is
>that
>> ture? If it is, the IP address should be put into the first column in the
>BST and
>> the FT.
>
>One problem is, if the address has not been assigned, the anchor is needed
>to search. For example, a request is sent, but reply has not been received.
I have found this problem. So I mentioned in my another comment,which said the 
START state could be combined with LIVE state perhaps. Imho, the binding 
procedure can start when receiving a DHCPv4 DHCPACK or DHCPv6 REPLY message. 
Then, create the BST or FT. Thus, the IP address is able to be filled into the 
table as the key value. 

>> 
>> In section 11.1.2.3,
>> >   assigned address is not bound with another anchor in current BST. If
>> >   the address has been bound with another anchor in current BST, the
>> >   SAVI device MUST check if the node associated with that anchor is
>> >   off-line. If yes, bind the address with the new entry and delete the
>> >   original binding; if no, keep the original entry and delete the new
>> >   entry in BST.
>> Generally, check should happen before create a new entry. While creating a
>> new
>> entry first before checking whether the binding has already existed is not
>a
>> conventional behavior. I guess, the START state could be combined with
>LIVE
>> state
>> perhaps. Thus, the state machine is a little bit simple.
>> 

Thanks.
------------------				 
Dong Zhang

2010-04-19


From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sun Apr 18 23:27:18 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4BD2A3A68CB for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 23:27:18 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.506
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.506 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.093, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Y4MPA9bmic5m for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 23:27:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2BA963A6813 for <savi@ietf.org>; Sun, 18 Apr 2010 23:27:16 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (107.31.18.95.dynamic.jazztel.es [95.18.31.107]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id E48CBBA8610; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:27:03 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:27:03 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>	<2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>	<46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>	<6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es><31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO><4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com><1EA9F570441C4C00A2BE6D2BE3EAFB36@junbiVAIO> <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 06:27:18 -0000

El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> Two important points:
>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
>>>> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would 
>>>> expect and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on 
>>>> DAD.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English 
>>>> words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data 
>>>> plane, without any need for control packet events.
>>>
>>> Hi Joel,
>>>
>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan 
>>> concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the statistics, 
>>> but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any case?
>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no 
>> binding is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch for 
> binding creation procedure. That's why.
>

no
both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception of one 
or more data packets that trigger the binding creation procedure.

There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information other than 
the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given source address, 
which is what is needed both for data triggered and for counter triggered.

As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference is that 
in one case it is only one data packet, while in the other case it can 
be one or more

Regards, marcelo


> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
>
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>
>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet 
>>>>> to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>
>


From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Mon Apr 19 01:27:51 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAE2D3A67AB for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:27:51 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.845
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.845 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.111,  BAYES_20=-0.74, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ysA0B-J0ASPV for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:27:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 079203A6810 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:27:49 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.208]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm54bcc21fa; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 16:27:39 +0800
Message-ID: <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>	<2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>	<46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>	<6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es><31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO><4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com><1EA9F570441C4C00A2BE6D2BE3EAFB36@junbiVAIO> <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 16:27:52 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: nj1UmDYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:27:51 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
>>>>> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would expect 
>>>>> and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on DAD.
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English words, 
>>>>> a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data plane, 
>>>>> without any need for control packet events.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>
>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan concept 
>>>> because the counter can only inform the CPU the statistics, but can not 
>>>> deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any case?
>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no binding 
>>> is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch for 
>> binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>
>
> no
> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception of one 
> or more data packets that trigger the binding creation procedure.
>
> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information other than 
> the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given source address, 
> which is what is needed both for data triggered and for counter triggered.
>
> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference is that in 
> one case it is only one data packet, while in the other case it can be one 
> or more
>
> Regards, marcelo
>

Hi Marcelo,

If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control triggered 
solution),
then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that data packet 
to create the binding? I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not 
implmentable.

thanks,
Jun



>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>
>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet to 
>>>>>> CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> savi mailing list
>>> savi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>
>>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Mon Apr 19 01:40:12 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDAE43A68CD for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:40:12 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.274
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.274 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.325, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kgwyq3-2AObT for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:40:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BAF73A68C0 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:40:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (wlap005.it.uc3m.es [163.117.139.108]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DC7E6C6A2A; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 10:40:01 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 10:39:59 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <12D1F09E021B4345A64490FE03B04C40@junbiVAIO>	<4BC88212.2030708@joelhalpern.com>	<2F7E4D407B19494F9BEEC003C100275D@junbiVAIO><4BC962E4.5010104@it.uc3m.es><4BC9C34B.4010809@joelhalpern.com><4BC9C7E8.3090603@it.uc3m.es><5296EE4CFC97401CB222AC27B87975FE@junbiVAIO><4BC9FA43.5070406@it.uc3m.es><5811B32822CA439AA17F56BFFA241546@junbiVAIO><920F7BE2A92C482EBE468F841BD6B121@junbiVAIO><4BCA0390.5030309@it.uc3m.es><52E2C682E725431DAEB1AA5A4F4C743F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAE791.6020902@it.uc3m.es>	<2851D6692E33452CB7F20AC91498462B@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAEAE3.2020401@it.uc3m.es>	<46B27678E80247EFAE1154473D27B42E@junbiVAIO>	<4BCAF9DF.50008@it.uc3m.es>	<6E55DFBF8A58411ABDA1829EF3CCA62F@junbiVAIO>	<4BCB292A.8040206@it.uc3m.es><31B22F3ADA944A0FA59670C970735D46@junbiVAIO><4BCB4CF7.8060103@joelhalpern.com><1EA9F570441C4C00A2BE6D2BE3EAFB36@junbiVAIO> <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es> <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:40:13 -0000

El 19/04/10 10:27, Bi Jun escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
>>>>>> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would 
>>>>>> expect and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based 
>>>>>> on DAD.
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English 
>>>>>> words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the 
>>>>>> data plane, without any need for control packet events.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>
>>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan 
>>>>> concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the 
>>>>> statistics, but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any case?
>>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no 
>>>> binding is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch for 
>>> binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>>
>>
>> no
>> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception of 
>> one or more data packets that trigger the binding creation procedure.
>>
>> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information other 
>> than the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given source 
>> address, which is what is needed both for data triggered and for 
>> counter triggered.
>>
>> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference is 
>> that in one case it is only one data packet, while in the other case 
>> it can be one or more
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control triggered 
> solution),
> then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that data 
> packet to create the binding?
In a counter triggered solution, how does the counter is incremented for 
a given source address? It would also need the source address, right?

In other words, the counter is an indirection level that allows to 
implement the triggering of actions upon the reception of a data packet, 
which is exactly what is needed for the data triggered.

As i mentioned earlier, a counter based is a particular way to implement 
the data triggered (and can also be used to implement a more general 
case, where the process of binding creation upon the recpetion of more 
than one packet.)

Regards, marcelo




> I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not implmentable.
>
> thanks,
> Jun
>
>
>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data 
>>>>>>> packet to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> savi mailing list
>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>
>>>
>>
>


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Mon Apr 19 01:41:30 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 164253A6838 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:41:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.926
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.926 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.570,  BAYES_50=0.001, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0emWXudgS64b for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:41:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 122703A67CC for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:41:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024208.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.208] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O3mXe-000639-1b for savi@ietf.org; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 16:41:18 +0800
Message-ID: <D9E6464012FC4A2BB7D74A976619E58C@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "SAVI Mailing List" <savi@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 16:41:33 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="gb2312"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Subject: [savi] savi-stateless-00
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:41:30 -0000

Dear WG members,

The savi-stateless-00 was posted to the WG mailing-list.
Now based on the recommendation of WG chairs, it is submitted to IETF 
repository.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bi-savi-stateless-00.

As I reported in SAVI WG on the deployment report, it has been implemented 
by multiple vendors and deployed at CNGI-CERNET2.

Many thanks to Joel Halpern's valuable suggestion on the binding recovery.

Best Regards,
Jun Bi


 


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Mon Apr 19 01:43:23 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A015A3A6838 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:43:23 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.873
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.873 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.437,  BAYES_40=-0.185, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tK3aPzFqv4XN for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:43:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63A253A67CC for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:43:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024208.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.208] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O3mZT-0002Df-FD; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 16:43:11 +0800
Message-ID: <03E6BE67B3C349709638807E1B5CACD4@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es> <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO> <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 16:43:26 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:43:23 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:39 PM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 19/04/10 10:27, Bi Jun escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
>>>>>>> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would 
>>>>>>> expect and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on 
>>>>>>> DAD.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English 
>>>>>>> words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data 
>>>>>>> plane, without any need for control packet events.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan 
>>>>>> concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the statistics, 
>>>>>> but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any case?
>>>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no 
>>>>> binding is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch for 
>>>> binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>>>
>>>
>>> no
>>> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception of one 
>>> or more data packets that trigger the binding creation procedure.
>>>
>>> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information other than 
>>> the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given source address, 
>>> which is what is needed both for data triggered and for counter 
>>> triggered.
>>>
>>> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference is that 
>>> in one case it is only one data packet, while in the other case it can 
>>> be one or more
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control triggered 
>> solution),
>> then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that data 
>> packet to create the binding?
> In a counter triggered solution, how does the counter is incremented for a 
> given source address? It would also need the source address, right?

Hi Marcelo,

I wonder if you have real experience to investigate the counter in switches,
it is only the port-based, not source address based.

thanks,
Jun Bi



>
> In other words, the counter is an indirection level that allows to 
> implement the triggering of actions upon the reception of a data packet, 
> which is exactly what is needed for the data triggered.
>
> As i mentioned earlier, a counter based is a particular way to implement 
> the data triggered (and can also be used to implement a more general case, 
> where the process of binding creation upon the recpetion of more than one 
> packet.)
>
> Regards, marcelo
>
>
>
>
>> I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not implmentable.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet 
>>>>>>>> to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Mon Apr 19 01:55:22 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8ECE63A6A71 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:55:22 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.382
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.382 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.217, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZFlbrIuS0RGo for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:55:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (smtp02.uc3m.es [163.117.176.132]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDB243A696A for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:50:29 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (wlap005.it.uc3m.es [163.117.139.108]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60C306C3486; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 10:50:16 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCC1947.5000003@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 10:50:15 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Jun Bi <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es> <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO> <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es> <03E6BE67B3C349709638807E1B5CACD4@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <03E6BE67B3C349709638807E1B5CACD4@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:55:22 -0000

El 19/04/10 10:43, Jun Bi escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:39 PM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 19/04/10 10:27, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually 
>>>>>>>> no requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I 
>>>>>>>> would expect and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily 
>>>>>>>> based on DAD.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English 
>>>>>>>> words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the 
>>>>>>>> data plane, without any need for control packet events.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan 
>>>>>>> concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the 
>>>>>>> statistics, but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>>>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any case?
>>>>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no 
>>>>>> binding is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch 
>>>>> for binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> no
>>>> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception 
>>>> of one or more data packets that trigger the binding creation 
>>>> procedure.
>>>>
>>>> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information other 
>>>> than the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given source 
>>>> address, which is what is needed both for data triggered and for 
>>>> counter triggered.
>>>>
>>>> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference is 
>>>> that in one case it is only one data packet, while in the other 
>>>> case it can be one or more
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control 
>>> triggered solution),
>>> then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that data 
>>> packet to create the binding?
>> In a counter triggered solution, how does the counter is incremented 
>> for a given source address? It would also need the source address, 
>> right?
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> I wonder if you have real experience to investigate the counter in 
> switches,
> it is only the port-based, not source address based.
>From draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt

12.2.2. Counter Triggered Process

    In this process, a counter is used to record the number of filtered
    packets by this solution or all the enabled SAVI solutions on anchor
    with SAVI-CounterTrigger attribute. A constant TRIGGER_COUNT is set
    with the counter.

    Whenever the counter reaches TRIGGER_COUNT, this event MUST be
    handled by the SAVI device. The SAVI device performs following steps:

    1. Set the counter to 0;

    2. If the SAVI device is a layer-3 device, it MUST perform LEASEQUERY
       to check whether the source address of the triggering packet can
       be bound with the triggering anchor.

So, the SAVI device will perform a check whether the source address can 
be bound to the anchor, hence it needs the source address.

Regards, marcelo




>
> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
>
>
>>
>> In other words, the counter is an indirection level that allows to 
>> implement the triggering of actions upon the reception of a data 
>> packet, which is exactly what is needed for the data triggered.
>>
>> As i mentioned earlier, a counter based is a particular way to 
>> implement the data triggered (and can also be used to implement a 
>> more general case, where the process of binding creation upon the 
>> recpetion of more than one packet.)
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not implmentable.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data 
>>>>>>>>> packet to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>


From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Mon Apr 19 01:57:16 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5DA583A692E for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:57:16 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.129
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.129 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.382,  BAYES_40=-0.185, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aPb5aYH-uqNR for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:57:15 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 972033A6A1D for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 01:55:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.208]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm254bcc286b; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 16:55:08 +0800
Message-ID: <EC1072C0848946AF80BBA94E7B3B15E5@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
References: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es> <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO> <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es> <03E6BE67B3C349709638807E1B5CACD4@junbiVAIO> <4BCC1947.5000003@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCC1947.5000003@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 16:55:20 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: nbClmDYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:57:16 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:50 PM
To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 19/04/10 10:43, Jun Bi escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:39 PM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 19/04/10 10:27, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually no 
>>>>>>>>> requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I would 
>>>>>>>>> expect and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily based on 
>>>>>>>>> DAD.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English 
>>>>>>>>> words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the data 
>>>>>>>>> plane, without any need for control packet events.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan 
>>>>>>>> concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the statistics, 
>>>>>>>> but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>>>>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any case?
>>>>>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no 
>>>>>>> binding is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch for 
>>>>>> binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> no
>>>>> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception of 
>>>>> one or more data packets that trigger the binding creation procedure.
>>>>>
>>>>> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information other 
>>>>> than the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given source 
>>>>> address, which is what is needed both for data triggered and for 
>>>>> counter triggered.
>>>>>
>>>>> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference is 
>>>>> that in one case it is only one data packet, while in the other case 
>>>>> it can be one or more
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control triggered 
>>>> solution),
>>>> then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that data 
>>>> packet to create the binding?
>>> In a counter triggered solution, how does the counter is incremented for 
>>> a given source address? It would also need the source address, right?
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> I wonder if you have real experience to investigate the counter in 
>> switches,
>> it is only the port-based, not source address based.
> From draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt
>
> 12.2.2. Counter Triggered Process
>
>    In this process, a counter is used to record the number of filtered
>    packets by this solution or all the enabled SAVI solutions on anchor
>    with SAVI-CounterTrigger attribute. A constant TRIGGER_COUNT is set
>    with the counter.
>
>    Whenever the counter reaches TRIGGER_COUNT, this event MUST be
>    handled by the SAVI device. The SAVI device performs following steps:
>
>    1. Set the counter to 0;
>
>    2. If the SAVI device is a layer-3 device, it MUST perform LEASEQUERY
>       to check whether the source address of the triggering packet can
>       be bound with the triggering anchor.
>
> So, the SAVI device will perform a check whether the source address can be 
> bound to the anchor, hence it needs the source address.
>
> Regards, marcelo

Hi Marcelo,

Does it mean the counter is based on source address?
No. the counter is still based on port. For layer 3 switch, there is a 
neighbor table, then the layer 3 switch uses the neighbor table to send 
probe.

thanks,
Jun Bi




>
>
>
>
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> In other words, the counter is an indirection level that allows to 
>>> implement the triggering of actions upon the reception of a data packet, 
>>> which is exactly what is needed for the data triggered.
>>>
>>> As i mentioned earlier, a counter based is a particular way to implement 
>>> the data triggered (and can also be used to implement a more general 
>>> case, where the process of binding creation upon the recpetion of more 
>>> than one packet.)
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not implmentable.
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data packet 
>>>>>>>>>> to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Mon Apr 19 02:31:23 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6374C3A69E2 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:31:23 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.413
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.413 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.186, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vKjwpiJurk4l for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:31:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp03.uc3m.es (smtp03.uc3m.es [163.117.176.133]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9B573A68E0 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:31:14 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (wlap005.it.uc3m.es [163.117.139.108]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp03.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id B64657316C7; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 11:31:02 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCC22D6.6050904@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 11:31:02 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es> <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO> <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es> <03E6BE67B3C349709638807E1B5CACD4@junbiVAIO> <4BCC1947.5000003@it.uc3m.es> <EC1072C0848946AF80BBA94E7B3B15E5@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <EC1072C0848946AF80BBA94E7B3B15E5@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 09:31:23 -0000

El 19/04/10 10:55, Bi Jun escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:50 PM
> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 19/04/10 10:43, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:39 PM
>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> El 19/04/10 10:27, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>>>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is 
>>>>>>>>>> actually no requirement for a data plane solution.  In 
>>>>>>>>>> particular, I would expect and hope that the SLAAC solution 
>>>>>>>>>> will be primarily based on DAD.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the 
>>>>>>>>>> English words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events 
>>>>>>>>>> from the data plane, without any need for control packet events.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan 
>>>>>>>>> concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the 
>>>>>>>>> statistics, but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>>>>>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any 
>>>>>>>> case?
>>>>>>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no 
>>>>>>>> binding is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch 
>>>>>>> for binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> no
>>>>>> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception 
>>>>>> of one or more data packets that trigger the binding creation 
>>>>>> procedure.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information 
>>>>>> other than the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given 
>>>>>> source address, which is what is needed both for data triggered 
>>>>>> and for counter triggered.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference 
>>>>>> is that in one case it is only one data packet, while in the 
>>>>>> other case it can be one or more
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control 
>>>>> triggered solution),
>>>>> then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that 
>>>>> data packet to create the binding?
>>>> In a counter triggered solution, how does the counter is 
>>>> incremented for a given source address? It would also need the 
>>>> source address, right?
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> I wonder if you have real experience to investigate the counter in 
>>> switches,
>>> it is only the port-based, not source address based.
>> From draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt
>>
>> 12.2.2. Counter Triggered Process
>>
>>    In this process, a counter is used to record the number of filtered
>>    packets by this solution or all the enabled SAVI solutions on anchor
>>    with SAVI-CounterTrigger attribute. A constant TRIGGER_COUNT is set
>>    with the counter.
>>
>>    Whenever the counter reaches TRIGGER_COUNT, this event MUST be
>>    handled by the SAVI device. The SAVI device performs following steps:
>>
>>    1. Set the counter to 0;
>>
>>    2. If the SAVI device is a layer-3 device, it MUST perform LEASEQUERY
>>       to check whether the source address of the triggering packet can
>>       be bound with the triggering anchor.
>>
>> So, the SAVI device will perform a check whether the source address 
>> can be bound to the anchor, hence it needs the source address.
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> Does it mean the counter is based on source address?
> No. the counter is still based on port. For layer 3 switch, there is a 
> neighbor table, then the layer 3 switch uses the neighbor table to 
> send probe.
>
What if you have more than one address in your neighbour table for a 
given port? (liek in IPv6, where you are likely to have many addresses 
even if you have a single host?)

Regards, marcelo


> thanks,
> Jun Bi
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> In other words, the counter is an indirection level that allows to 
>>>> implement the triggering of actions upon the reception of a data 
>>>> packet, which is exactly what is needed for the data triggered.
>>>>
>>>> As i mentioned earlier, a counter based is a particular way to 
>>>> implement the data triggered (and can also be used to implement a 
>>>> more general case, where the process of binding creation upon the 
>>>> recpetion of more than one packet.)
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not implmentable.
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data 
>>>>>>>>>>> packet to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>


From junbi@cernet.edu.cn  Mon Apr 19 02:43:10 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 454283A67D1 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:43:10 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.871
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.871 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.085,  BAYES_20=-0.74, FH_HAS_XAIMC=2.696]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id P15j2LYhZXQl for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:43:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from cernet.edu.cn (sea.net.edu.cn [202.112.3.66]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 8CEB03A69BA for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:43:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from junbiVAIO([59.66.24.208]) by cernet.edu.cn(AIMC 3.2.0.0) with SMTP id jm1d4bcc33a0; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 17:42:57 +0800
Message-ID: <F03A4F5A067143B0A7F40199474FD631@junbiVAIO>
From: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
References: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es> <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO> <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es> <03E6BE67B3C349709638807E1B5CACD4@junbiVAIO> <4BCC1947.5000003@it.uc3m.es> <EC1072C0848946AF80BBA94E7B3B15E5@junbiVAIO> <4BCC22D6.6050904@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCC22D6.6050904@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 17:43:13 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
X-AIMC-AUTH: junbi
X-AIMC-MAILFROM: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
X-AIMC-Msg-ID: nlT5nDYB
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 09:43:10 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 5:31 PM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 19/04/10 10:55, Bi Jun escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:50 PM
>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 19/04/10 10:43, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:39 PM
>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> El 19/04/10 10:27, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>>>>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually 
>>>>>>>>>>> no requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I 
>>>>>>>>>>> would expect and hope that the SLAAC solution will be primarily 
>>>>>>>>>>> based on DAD.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the English 
>>>>>>>>>>> words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events from the 
>>>>>>>>>>> data plane, without any need for control packet events.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan 
>>>>>>>>>> concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the 
>>>>>>>>>> statistics, but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>>>>>>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any 
>>>>>>>>> case?
>>>>>>>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no 
>>>>>>>>> binding is received, the binding creation procedure is triggered.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch 
>>>>>>>> for binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception of 
>>>>>>> one or more data packets that trigger the binding creation 
>>>>>>> procedure.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information other 
>>>>>>> than the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given source 
>>>>>>> address, which is what is needed both for data triggered and for 
>>>>>>> counter triggered.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference is 
>>>>>>> that in one case it is only one data packet, while in the other case 
>>>>>>> it can be one or more
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control 
>>>>>> triggered solution),
>>>>>> then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that data 
>>>>>> packet to create the binding?
>>>>> In a counter triggered solution, how does the counter is incremented 
>>>>> for a given source address? It would also need the source address, 
>>>>> right?
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> I wonder if you have real experience to investigate the counter in 
>>>> switches,
>>>> it is only the port-based, not source address based.
>>> From draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt
>>>
>>> 12.2.2. Counter Triggered Process
>>>
>>>    In this process, a counter is used to record the number of filtered
>>>    packets by this solution or all the enabled SAVI solutions on anchor
>>>    with SAVI-CounterTrigger attribute. A constant TRIGGER_COUNT is set
>>>    with the counter.
>>>
>>>    Whenever the counter reaches TRIGGER_COUNT, this event MUST be
>>>    handled by the SAVI device. The SAVI device performs following steps:
>>>
>>>    1. Set the counter to 0;
>>>
>>>    2. If the SAVI device is a layer-3 device, it MUST perform LEASEQUERY
>>>       to check whether the source address of the triggering packet can
>>>       be bound with the triggering anchor.
>>>
>>> So, the SAVI device will perform a check whether the source address can 
>>> be bound to the anchor, hence it needs the source address.
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> Does it mean the counter is based on source address?
>> No. the counter is still based on port. For layer 3 switch, there is a 
>> neighbor table, then the layer 3 switch uses the neighbor table to send 
>> probe.
>>
> What if you have more than one address in your neighbour table for a given 
> port? (liek in IPv6, where you are likely to have many addresses even if 
> you have a single host?)
>
> Regards, marcelo

Hi Marcelo,

Is there any problem? There is savi binding table set up by control packet 
snooping, we just need to recover those address in the neighbor list but not 
in the savi list if the number of packet loss pass the threadhold. Because 
in the normal cases the bind is setup by control packet snooping, then it is 
not a heavy burden for this binding recovering (but if fundamental binding 
set up is based on data packet, then it will be too heavy burden to the 
device).

thanks,
Jun


>
>
>> thanks,
>> Jun Bi
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In other words, the counter is an indirection level that allows to 
>>>>> implement the triggering of actions upon the reception of a data 
>>>>> packet, which is exactly what is needed for the data triggered.
>>>>>
>>>>> As i mentioned earlier, a counter based is a particular way to 
>>>>> implement the data triggered (and can also be used to implement a more 
>>>>> general case, where the process of binding creation upon the recpetion 
>>>>> of more than one packet.)
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not implmentable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>>>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data 
>>>>>>>>>>>> packet to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
> 

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Mon Apr 19 02:49:08 2010
Return-Path: <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF29C3A68A9 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:49:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.437
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.437 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.163, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id NqWQno2DcYZr for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:49:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp01.uc3m.es (smtp01.uc3m.es [163.117.176.131]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4276C3A67D7 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:49:06 -0700 (PDT)
X-uc3m-safe: yes
Received: from marcelo-bagnulos-macbook-pro.local (wlap005.it.uc3m.es [163.117.139.108]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp01.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 214BABAB1A2; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 11:48:57 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <4BCC2707.5060104@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 11:48:55 +0200
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; es-ES; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100317 Thunderbird/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bi Jun <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es> <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO> <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es> <03E6BE67B3C349709638807E1B5CACD4@junbiVAIO> <4BCC1947.5000003@it.uc3m.es> <EC1072C0848946AF80BBA94E7B3B15E5@junbiVAIO> <4BCC22D6.6050904@it.uc3m.es> <F03A4F5A067143B0A7F40199474FD631@junbiVAIO>
In-Reply-To: <F03A4F5A067143B0A7F40199474FD631@junbiVAIO>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: IMSS-7.0.0.3116-6.0.0.1038-17162.002
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 09:49:09 -0000

El 19/04/10 11:43, Bi Jun escribió:
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 5:31 PM
> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>
>> El 19/04/10 10:55, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:50 PM
>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>
>>>> El 19/04/10 10:43, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:39 PM
>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>
>>>>>> El 19/04/10 10:27, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; 
>>>>>>>>>>> <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is 
>>>>>>>>>>>> actually no requirement for a data plane solution.  In 
>>>>>>>>>>>> particular, I would expect and hope that the SLAAC solution 
>>>>>>>>>>>> will be primarily based on DAD.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the 
>>>>>>>>>>>> English words, a data plane solution.  It is based on 
>>>>>>>>>>>> events from the data plane, without any need for control 
>>>>>>>>>>>> packet events.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data 
>>>>>>>>>>> plan concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the 
>>>>>>>>>>> statistics, but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>>>>>>>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in 
>>>>>>>>>> any case?
>>>>>>>>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is 
>>>>>>>>>> no binding is received, the binding creation procedure is 
>>>>>>>>>> triggered.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of 
>>>>>>>>> savi-switch for binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the 
>>>>>>>> reception of one or more data packets that trigger the binding 
>>>>>>>> creation procedure.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information 
>>>>>>>> other than the fact that a data packet arrived containing a 
>>>>>>>> given source address, which is what is needed both for data 
>>>>>>>> triggered and for counter triggered.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference 
>>>>>>>> is that in one case it is only one data packet, while in the 
>>>>>>>> other case it can be one or more
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control 
>>>>>>> triggered solution),
>>>>>>> then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that 
>>>>>>> data packet to create the binding?
>>>>>> In a counter triggered solution, how does the counter is 
>>>>>> incremented for a given source address? It would also need the 
>>>>>> source address, right?
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>
>>>>> I wonder if you have real experience to investigate the counter in 
>>>>> switches,
>>>>> it is only the port-based, not source address based.
>>>> From draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt
>>>>
>>>> 12.2.2. Counter Triggered Process
>>>>
>>>>    In this process, a counter is used to record the number of filtered
>>>>    packets by this solution or all the enabled SAVI solutions on 
>>>> anchor
>>>>    with SAVI-CounterTrigger attribute. A constant TRIGGER_COUNT is set
>>>>    with the counter.
>>>>
>>>>    Whenever the counter reaches TRIGGER_COUNT, this event MUST be
>>>>    handled by the SAVI device. The SAVI device performs following 
>>>> steps:
>>>>
>>>>    1. Set the counter to 0;
>>>>
>>>>    2. If the SAVI device is a layer-3 device, it MUST perform 
>>>> LEASEQUERY
>>>>       to check whether the source address of the triggering packet can
>>>>       be bound with the triggering anchor.
>>>>
>>>> So, the SAVI device will perform a check whether the source address 
>>>> can be bound to the anchor, hence it needs the source address.
>>>>
>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>
>>> Does it mean the counter is based on source address?
>>> No. the counter is still based on port. For layer 3 switch, there is 
>>> a neighbor table, then the layer 3 switch uses the neighbor table to 
>>> send probe.
>>>
>> What if you have more than one address in your neighbour table for a 
>> given port? (liek in IPv6, where you are likely to have many 
>> addresses even if you have a single host?)
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> Is there any problem?
> There is savi binding table set up by control packet snooping, we just 
> need to recover those address in the neighbor list but not in the savi 
> list if the number of packet loss pass the threadhold. 

So, you have a way that given that data packet is received for which 
there is no binding, you can associate a source address to it, which is 
exactly what is needed.

Regards, marcelo


> Because in the normal cases the bind is setup by control packet 
> snooping, then it is not a heavy burden for this binding recovering 
> (but if fundamental binding set up is based on data packet, then it 
> will be too heavy burden to the device).
>
> thanks,
> Jun
>
>
>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Jun Bi
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In other words, the counter is an indirection level that allows 
>>>>>> to implement the triggering of actions upon the reception of a 
>>>>>> data packet, which is exactly what is needed for the data triggered.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As i mentioned earlier, a counter based is a particular way to 
>>>>>> implement the data triggered (and can also be used to implement a 
>>>>>> more general case, where the process of binding creation upon the 
>>>>>> recpetion of more than one packet.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not implmentable.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> packet to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>


From junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn  Mon Apr 19 02:57:47 2010
Return-Path: <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDFD93A68EC for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:57:47 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.305
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.305 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.799,  BAYES_00=-2.599, DNS_FROM_RFC_DSN=1.495]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rmyt4-lXWPRi for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:57:46 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn (smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn [166.111.8.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B846F3A68BB for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 02:57:25 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from th024208.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn ([59.66.24.208] helo=junbiVAIO) by smtp.tsinghua.edu.cn with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>) id 1O3nj7-0005d4-5G; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 17:57:13 +0800
Message-ID: <E2F984E1EE9444B0AA94999F247A1F32@junbiVAIO>
From: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
To: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
References: <4BCB5EE4.9040406@it.uc3m.es> <A357491F99494D99AC2A032C6D757E7F@junbiVAIO> <4BCBF7B7.7040903@it.uc3m.es> <EC70412633C34552A3D4B83AF81C88B0@junbiVAIO> <4BCC16DF.20107@it.uc3m.es> <03E6BE67B3C349709638807E1B5CACD4@junbiVAIO> <4BCC1947.5000003@it.uc3m.es> <EC1072C0848946AF80BBA94E7B3B15E5@junbiVAIO> <4BCC22D6.6050904@it.uc3m.es> <F03A4F5A067143B0A7F40199474FD631@junbiVAIO> <4BCC2707.5060104@it.uc3m.es>
In-Reply-To: <4BCC2707.5060104@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 17:57:28 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="ISO-8859-1"; reply-type=response
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
Importance: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Live Mail 14.0.8064.206
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V14.0.8064.206
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 09:57:48 -0000

--------------------------------------------------
From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 5:48 PM
To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02

> El 19/04/10 11:43, Bi Jun escribió:
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 5:31 PM
>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>
>>> El 19/04/10 10:55, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:50 PM
>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>
>>>>> El 19/04/10 10:43, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:39 PM
>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>> Cc: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> El 19/04/10 10:27, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:27 PM
>>>>>>>> To: "Jun Bi" <junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>> Cc: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>; <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> El 19/04/10 4:49, Jun Bi escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> From: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 3:35 AM
>>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>> Cc: <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> El 18/04/10 20:56, Bi Jun escribió:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 2:18 AM
>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "Bi Jun" <junbi@cernet.edu.cn>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: "marcelo bagnulo braun" <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>; 
>>>>>>>>>>>> <savi@ietf.org>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [savi] a question about your comment on 
>>>>>>>>>>>> savi-dhcp-02
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Two important points:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) The requirement is for a SLAAC solution.  There is actually 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> no requirement for a data plane solution.  In particular, I 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would expect and hope that the SLAAC solution will be 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> primarily based on DAD.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) The counter based mechanism, is, as I understand the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> English words, a data plane solution.  It is based on events 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> from the data plane, without any need for control packet 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> events.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> but the difference is that the counter is not a full data plan 
>>>>>>>>>>>> concept because the counter can only inform the CPU the 
>>>>>>>>>>>> statistics, but can not deliver the data packet  to the CPU.
>>>>>>>>>>> and why delivering the data packet to the CPU is needed in any 
>>>>>>>>>>> case?
>>>>>>>>>>> all it is needed is that if a data packet for which there is no 
>>>>>>>>>>> binding is received, the binding creation procedure is 
>>>>>>>>>>> triggered.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In data-triggered, the data packet is used by CPU of savi-switch 
>>>>>>>>>> for binding creation procedure. That's why.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>>> both in data triggered and counter triggered, it is the reception 
>>>>>>>>> of one or more data packets that trigger the binding creation 
>>>>>>>>> procedure.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is absolutelly no need of other data packet information 
>>>>>>>>> other than the fact that a data packet arrived containing a given 
>>>>>>>>> source address, which is what is needed both for data triggered 
>>>>>>>>> and for counter triggered.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As a matter of fact, as i have been saying, the only difference is 
>>>>>>>>> that in one case it is only one data packet, while in the other 
>>>>>>>>> case it can be one or more
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If the data packet is not delivered to CPU (like the control 
>>>>>>>> triggered solution),
>>>>>>>> then how the CPU knows the source address which is used in that 
>>>>>>>> data packet to create the binding?
>>>>>>> In a counter triggered solution, how does the counter is incremented 
>>>>>>> for a given source address? It would also need the source address, 
>>>>>>> right?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I wonder if you have real experience to investigate the counter in 
>>>>>> switches,
>>>>>> it is only the port-based, not source address based.
>>>>> From draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-02.txt
>>>>>
>>>>> 12.2.2. Counter Triggered Process
>>>>>
>>>>>    In this process, a counter is used to record the number of filtered
>>>>>    packets by this solution or all the enabled SAVI solutions on 
>>>>> anchor
>>>>>    with SAVI-CounterTrigger attribute. A constant TRIGGER_COUNT is set
>>>>>    with the counter.
>>>>>
>>>>>    Whenever the counter reaches TRIGGER_COUNT, this event MUST be
>>>>>    handled by the SAVI device. The SAVI device performs following 
>>>>> steps:
>>>>>
>>>>>    1. Set the counter to 0;
>>>>>
>>>>>    2. If the SAVI device is a layer-3 device, it MUST perform 
>>>>> LEASEQUERY
>>>>>       to check whether the source address of the triggering packet can
>>>>>       be bound with the triggering anchor.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, the SAVI device will perform a check whether the source address 
>>>>> can be bound to the anchor, hence it needs the source address.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>
>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>
>>>> Does it mean the counter is based on source address?
>>>> No. the counter is still based on port. For layer 3 switch, there is a 
>>>> neighbor table, then the layer 3 switch uses the neighbor table to send 
>>>> probe.
>>>>
>>> What if you have more than one address in your neighbour table for a 
>>> given port? (liek in IPv6, where you are likely to have many addresses 
>>> even if you have a single host?)
>>>
>>> Regards, marcelo
>>
>> Hi Marcelo,
>>
>> Is there any problem?
>> There is savi binding table set up by control packet snooping, we just 
>> need to recover those address in the neighbor list but not in the savi 
>> list if the number of packet loss pass the threadhold.
>
> So, you have a way that given that data packet is received for which there 
> is no binding, you can associate a source address to it, which is exactly 
> what is needed.
>

Hi Marcelo,

I tell you how the process it works as a supplement to the control packet 
snooping based solution, but it doesn't mean I agree it's a pure 
data-triggered solution. You can see many control plan stuff is involved in 
the whole process.

thanks,
Jun Bi


> Regards, marcelo
>
>
>> Because in the normal cases the bind is setup by control packet snooping, 
>> then it is not a heavy burden for this binding recovering (but if 
>> fundamental binding set up is based on data packet, then it will be too 
>> heavy burden to the device).
>>
>> thanks,
>> Jun
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> thanks,
>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In other words, the counter is an indirection level that allows to 
>>>>>>> implement the triggering of actions upon the reception of a data 
>>>>>>> packet, which is exactly what is needed for the data triggered.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As i mentioned earlier, a counter based is a particular way to 
>>>>>>> implement the data triggered (and can also be used to implement a 
>>>>>>> more general case, where the process of binding creation upon the 
>>>>>>> recpetion of more than one packet.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I talked with many vendors, they told me it is not implmentable.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Jun Bi
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bi Jun wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you still doesn't understand why I said the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not same as data-triggered, because the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> counter-triggered is not a data plan solution,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say it clearly: the counter event can not deliver the data 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> packet to CPU of savi-switch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jun
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> savi mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> savi@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
> 

From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Mon Apr 26 01:35:40 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFE5B3A684F for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 01:35:40 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.601
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.601 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_75=0.6]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qQaFmYmqy0FV for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 01:35:40 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pw0-f44.google.com (mail-pw0-f44.google.com [209.85.160.44]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2836A3A69A1 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 01:35:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pwj2 with SMTP id 2so8176858pwj.31 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 01:35:17 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=GgUkAvcb6h0eTC05Im/KklzYU4jW+5ZIIpSWjcjr9aE=; b=FVrlYfsPINJGRV30u8ZaTKoGH700dxhOXIE80bvEerWvowT5fd537LXpTtBnzhUHAJ ZeQzNOODT8XEfQklhJ6nwqi/W6eIWFJasWThIDEj4McwRcyF+Va69JTiTwCtwlYR6MIm fswcht4q301eXfixsnx29fYCw7wi9bSsL464w=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=U6x5qZYC2U/AE20e9dGnkmrAAgmu7hEvE3/s2SxJ4ugn6Re3Vf5utfGwoUoxV5KnBo /nJ3WEgaekyz/tjAyiTOuOGCrQ9iH+LiRvoiN0Z9xTB/oygIX/pEPCwxoGVkOs3IX0N2 wq8/ktURt2p5jlek7SjeW8bIoi3IpKogUictg=
Received: by 10.114.188.31 with SMTP id l31mr3653262waf.32.1272270916617; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 01:35:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC (th024011.ip.tsinghua.edu.cn [59.66.24.11]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 20sm2966760iwn.13.2010.04.26.01.35.13 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Mon, 26 Apr 2010 01:35:15 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'Dong Zhang'" <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
References: <201004151052240835910@huaweisymantec.com>	<4bc6c2be.9613f30a.238a.48b6@mx.google.com> <201004191128584105173@huaweisymantec.com>
In-Reply-To: <201004191128584105173@huaweisymantec.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2010 16:35:07 +0800
Message-ID: <4bd55043.5444f10a.4ffa.ffffac06@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcrfcHLevFQ0Elf0Ss+MoiSSMwrLaAFqduxA
Content-Language: zh-cn
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2010 08:35:41 -0000

Hi, Dong

Sorry for late reply.

In the new edition, a new binding can be triggered on reply (but not
suggested).

The reason is the binding procedure triggered by reply may not be secure.
The mapping from link layer address to anchor on savi device may be
attacked(typically, the port-mac mapping can be flooded.). Thus we suggest
if reply is used to trigger binding, supplemental mechanism should be used
to ensure the security of the mapping. This point is discussed in the draft.
Actually, it was also discussed on the mailing list previously.

BR,
Guang

> -----Original Message-----
> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Dong
> Zhang
> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 11:29 AM
> To: Guang Yao
> Cc: savi@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Guang Yao 2010-04-15 Wrote:
> >Hi, Dong
> >
> >Thanks for your comments. Corresponding clarifications will be made in
the
> >next edition.
> >
> >I will try to answer some of the questions.
> >
> >> In section 6,
> >> >Entries are keyed on the anchor and source IP address.
> >> I do not understand why using the anchor and source IP address together
as
> >> the
> >> key value. My understanding is when savi device receives a packet, it
will
> >use
> >> the source IP as the index to look for the responding entry. After
finding
> >the
> >> right entry, it could check the anchor and the state. Since the mapping
> >for
> >> the IP address to the anchor is 1:1 (while the mapping for the anchor
to
> >IP
> >> address may be 1:N), so only useing the source IP as the key is enough.
Is
> >that
> >> ture? If it is, the IP address should be put into the first column in
the
> >BST and
> >> the FT.
> >
> >One problem is, if the address has not been assigned, the anchor is
needed
> >to search. For example, a request is sent, but reply has not been
received.
> I have found this problem. So I mentioned in my another comment,which said
> the
> START state could be combined with LIVE state perhaps. Imho, the binding
> procedure can start when receiving a DHCPv4 DHCPACK or DHCPv6 REPLY
> message.
> Then, create the BST or FT. Thus, the IP address is able to be filled into
the
> table as the key value.
> 
> >>
> >> In section 11.1.2.3,
> >> >   assigned address is not bound with another anchor in current BST.
If
> >> >   the address has been bound with another anchor in current BST, the
> >> >   SAVI device MUST check if the node associated with that anchor is
> >> >   off-line. If yes, bind the address with the new entry and delete
the
> >> >   original binding; if no, keep the original entry and delete the new
> >> >   entry in BST.
> >> Generally, check should happen before create a new entry. While
creating a
> >> new
> >> entry first before checking whether the binding has already existed is
not
> >a
> >> conventional behavior. I guess, the START state could be combined with
> >LIVE
> >> state
> >> perhaps. Thus, the state machine is a little bit simple.
> >>
> 
> Thanks.
> ------------------
> Dong Zhang
> 
> 2010-04-19
> 
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi


From zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com  Mon Apr 26 20:10:55 2010
Return-Path: <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 495AB28C0F7 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 20:10:55 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 3.143
X-Spam-Level: ***
X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.143 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.438,  BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,  J_CHICKENPOX_75=0.6, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FmWtnZb2aL6m for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 20:10:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mta1.huaweisymantec.com (unknown [218.17.155.14]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5DA143A6C25 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 20:10:49 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Content-type: text/plain; charset=gb2312
Received: from hstml01-in.huaweisymantec.com ([172.26.3.41]) by hstga01-in.huaweisymantec.com (Sun Java(tm) System Messaging Server 6.3-8.03 (built Apr 24 2009; 32bit)) with ESMTP id <0L1I008XOM5BN240@hstga01-in.huaweisymantec.com> for savi@ietf.org; Tue, 27 Apr 2010 11:10:23 +0800 (CST)
Received: from z90001956 ([10.27.154.67]) by hstml01-in.huaweisymantec.com (Sun Java(tm) System Messaging Server 6.3-8.03 (built Apr 24 2009; 32bit)) with ESMTPA id <0L1I006AOM590210@hstml01-in.huaweisymantec.com> for savi@ietf.org; Tue, 27 Apr 2010 11:10:22 +0800 (CST)
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 11:10:23 +0800
From: Dong Zhang <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
To: Guang Yao <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
References: <201004151052240835910@huaweisymantec.com> <4bc6c2be.9613f30a.238a.48b6@mx.google.com> <201004191128584105173@huaweisymantec.com> <4bd55043.5444f10a.4ffa.ffffac06@mx.google.com>
Message-id: <201004271110231663393@huaweisymantec.com>
X-Mailer: Foxmail 6, 10, 201, 20 [cn]
Cc: "savi@ietf.org" <savi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 03:10:55 -0000

Hi Guang,

I can't see the check whether a address binding has already existed in the BST or not in the new version draft. Maybe I miss. Acturally, what I am really concerned is that the check above would better be processed before creating the entry in any table. That's why I pointed out the issue of combining the Start state and Live state together.

BTW, for savi-dhcp-02, I have seen the diff with 01. It seems that savi-dhcp-02 has a number of changes. I am not quite sure whether there is a consensus for *each* change. At least, a chang log would be provided.


Thanks a lot.

Guang Yao 2010-04-26 Wrote:
>Hi, Dong
>
>Sorry for late reply.
>
>In the new edition, a new binding can be triggered on reply (but not
>suggested).
>
>The reason is the binding procedure triggered by reply may not be secure.
>The mapping from link layer address to anchor on savi device may be
>attacked(typically, the port-mac mapping can be flooded.). Thus we suggest
>if reply is used to trigger binding, supplemental mechanism should be used
>to ensure the security of the mapping. This point is discussed in the draft.
>Actually, it was also discussed on the mailing list previously.
>
>BR,
>Guang
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>Dong
>> Zhang
>> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 11:29 AM
>> To: Guang Yao
>> Cc: savi@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
>> 
>> Hi,
>> 
>> Guang Yao 2010-04-15 Wrote:
>> >Hi, Dong
>> >
>> >Thanks for your comments. Corresponding clarifications will be made in
>the
>> >next edition.
>> >
>> >I will try to answer some of the questions.
>> >
>> >> In section 6,
>> >> >Entries are keyed on the anchor and source IP address.
>> >> I do not understand why using the anchor and source IP address together
>as
>> >> the
>> >> key value. My understanding is when savi device receives a packet, it
>will
>> >use
>> >> the source IP as the index to look for the responding entry. After
>finding
>> >the
>> >> right entry, it could check the anchor and the state. Since the mapping
>> >for
>> >> the IP address to the anchor is 1:1 (while the mapping for the anchor
>to
>> >IP
>> >> address may be 1:N), so only useing the source IP as the key is enough.
>Is
>> >that
>> >> ture? If it is, the IP address should be put into the first column in
>the
>> >BST and
>> >> the FT.
>> >
>> >One problem is, if the address has not been assigned, the anchor is
>needed
>> >to search. For example, a request is sent, but reply has not been
>received.
>> I have found this problem. So I mentioned in my another comment,which said
>> the
>> START state could be combined with LIVE state perhaps. Imho, the binding
>> procedure can start when receiving a DHCPv4 DHCPACK or DHCPv6 REPLY
>> message.
>> Then, create the BST or FT. Thus, the IP address is able to be filled into
>the
>> table as the key value.
>> 
>> >>
>> >> In section 11.1.2.3,
>> >> >   assigned address is not bound with another anchor in current BST.
>If
>> >> >   the address has been bound with another anchor in current BST, the
>> >> >   SAVI device MUST check if the node associated with that anchor is
>> >> >   off-line. If yes, bind the address with the new entry and delete
>the
>> >> >   original binding; if no, keep the original entry and delete the new
>> >> >   entry in BST.
>> >> Generally, check should happen before create a new entry. While
>creating a
>> >> new
>> >> entry first before checking whether the binding has already existed is
>not
>> >a
>> >> conventional behavior. I guess, the START state could be combined with
>> >LIVE
>> >> state
>> >> perhaps. Thus, the state machine is a little bit simple.
>> >>
>> 
>> Thanks.
>> ------------------
>> Dong Zhang
>> 
>> 2010-04-19
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> savi mailing list
>> savi@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
>


------------------				 
Dong Zhang
2010-04-27


From yaoguang.china@gmail.com  Mon Apr 26 22:49:43 2010
Return-Path: <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: savi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78A5E3A6C45 for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 22:49:43 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.601
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.601 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_75=0.6]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vOyHPEXsKd0B for <savi@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 22:49:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-px0-f172.google.com (mail-px0-f172.google.com [209.85.212.172]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5D9193A6C39 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 22:49:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pxi19 with SMTP id 19so2165265pxi.31 for <savi@ietf.org>; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 22:49:27 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:from:to:cc:references :in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer:thread-index:content-language; bh=OdNQAwhCrz1NCSVLaicKQ9q6+2SwRH7Up5JSodC7caY=; b=BoNoZbZPLPb8rizG2f/fwe0++ZhcRUyErt95PEY7YqpBuvUbLvCIKIc2BHTpPVfk/r qGYaX9ncD39J7SGn5NXEIC7muLkRN1dlno1PESEMLsHYw7bywaEOsKWYgcdH6Xkg1rm1 +7fypxWYgTjBxQ+b1xVO8w4bB4wMn8yjtG36s=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-mailer :thread-index:content-language; b=qs0yLDLw387SqrMsEa1/ughVMl8LG5shkEG3B44rCGpnwGeDqWrDvxSqdXMCgMIo98 qeQXgjM9XLZnIUhhvaQB5nMmI21gH6nAqrD9tca6C+X7xghBp+w679b0ixkOOtVQb4y4 8r+e0djw/nWZZxq467yzzESaYFflTNeRB9pMQ=
Received: by 10.141.2.6 with SMTP id e6mr1167980rvi.64.1272347366871; Mon, 26 Apr 2010 22:49:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from yaoguangPC ([219.224.99.223]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id l29sm242802rvb.16.2010.04.26.22.49.24 (version=SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5); Mon, 26 Apr 2010 22:49:26 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Guang Yao" <yaoguang.china@gmail.com>
To: "'Dong Zhang'" <zhangdong_rh@huaweisymantec.com>
References: <201004151052240835910@huaweisymantec.com>	<4bc6c2be.9613f30a.238a.48b6@mx.google.com>	<201004191128584105173@huaweisymantec.com>	<4bd55043.5444f10a.4ffa.ffffac06@mx.google.com> <201004271110231663393@huaweisymantec.com>
In-Reply-To: <201004271110231663393@huaweisymantec.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 13:49:17 +0800
Message-ID: <4bd67ae6.1d588c0a.4994.1ef9@mx.google.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcrltxeH3UhhA7X3QA2p4Fcz4p2tWAAFHLEA
Content-Language: zh-cn
Cc: savi@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
X-BeenThere: savi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Mailing list for the SAVI working group at IETF <savi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi>
List-Post: <mailto:savi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi>, <mailto:savi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 05:49:43 -0000

Hi Dong,

Thank you for your comments.

The reason why a binding is setup even the address is in the BST is that it
is hard to determine whether to
1. keep the old one: it will prohibit movement
Or 2. delete the old one, setup the new one: a node may have multiple
anchors on the link

It is discussed in section 25. Thus we decide to
1. set up a binding if the procedure is finished;
2. keep a binding until the address is abandoned explicitly:
declined/released/anchor off-link. 

Change log will be added in a modified edition. Thanks for this advice.

BR,
Guang

> -----Original Message-----
> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Dong
> Zhang
> Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2010 11:10 AM
> To: Guang Yao
> Cc: savi@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
> 
> Hi Guang,
> 
> I can't see the check whether a address binding has already existed in the
BST
> or not in the new version draft. Maybe I miss. Acturally, what I am really
> concerned is that the check above would better be processed before
creating
> the entry in any table. That's why I pointed out the issue of combining
the Start
> state and Live state together.
> 
> BTW, for savi-dhcp-02, I have seen the diff with 01. It seems that
savi-dhcp-02
> has a number of changes. I am not quite sure whether there is a consensus
for
> *each* change. At least, a chang log would be provided.
> 
> 
> Thanks a lot.
> 
> Guang Yao 2010-04-26 Wrote:
> >Hi, Dong
> >
> >Sorry for late reply.
> >
> >In the new edition, a new binding can be triggered on reply (but not
> >suggested).
> >
> >The reason is the binding procedure triggered by reply may not be secure.
> >The mapping from link layer address to anchor on savi device may be
> >attacked(typically, the port-mac mapping can be flooded.). Thus we
suggest
> >if reply is used to trigger binding, supplemental mechanism should be
used
> >to ensure the security of the mapping. This point is discussed in the
draft.
> >Actually, it was also discussed on the mailing list previously.
> >
> >BR,
> >Guang
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: savi-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:savi-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> >Dong
> >> Zhang
> >> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 11:29 AM
> >> To: Guang Yao
> >> Cc: savi@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [savi] Comments on draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-01
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> Guang Yao 2010-04-15 Wrote:
> >> >Hi, Dong
> >> >
> >> >Thanks for your comments. Corresponding clarifications will be made in
> >the
> >> >next edition.
> >> >
> >> >I will try to answer some of the questions.
> >> >
> >> >> In section 6,
> >> >> >Entries are keyed on the anchor and source IP address.
> >> >> I do not understand why using the anchor and source IP address
together
> >as
> >> >> the
> >> >> key value. My understanding is when savi device receives a packet,
it
> >will
> >> >use
> >> >> the source IP as the index to look for the responding entry. After
> >finding
> >> >the
> >> >> right entry, it could check the anchor and the state. Since the
mapping
> >> >for
> >> >> the IP address to the anchor is 1:1 (while the mapping for the
anchor
> >to
> >> >IP
> >> >> address may be 1:N), so only useing the source IP as the key is
enough.
> >Is
> >> >that
> >> >> ture? If it is, the IP address should be put into the first column
in
> >the
> >> >BST and
> >> >> the FT.
> >> >
> >> >One problem is, if the address has not been assigned, the anchor is
> >needed
> >> >to search. For example, a request is sent, but reply has not been
> >received.
> >> I have found this problem. So I mentioned in my another comment,which
> said
> >> the
> >> START state could be combined with LIVE state perhaps. Imho, the
binding
> >> procedure can start when receiving a DHCPv4 DHCPACK or DHCPv6 REPLY
> >> message.
> >> Then, create the BST or FT. Thus, the IP address is able to be filled
into
> >the
> >> table as the key value.
> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> In section 11.1.2.3,
> >> >> >   assigned address is not bound with another anchor in current
BST.
> >If
> >> >> >   the address has been bound with another anchor in current BST,
the
> >> >> >   SAVI device MUST check if the node associated with that anchor
is
> >> >> >   off-line. If yes, bind the address with the new entry and delete
> >the
> >> >> >   original binding; if no, keep the original entry and delete the
new
> >> >> >   entry in BST.
> >> >> Generally, check should happen before create a new entry. While
> >creating a
> >> >> new
> >> >> entry first before checking whether the binding has already existed
is
> >not
> >> >a
> >> >> conventional behavior. I guess, the START state could be combined
with
> >> >LIVE
> >> >> state
> >> >> perhaps. Thus, the state machine is a little bit simple.
> >> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks.
> >> ------------------
> >> Dong Zhang
> >>
> >> 2010-04-19
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> savi mailing list
> >> savi@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi
> >
> 
> 
> ------------------
> Dong Zhang
> 2010-04-27
> 
> _______________________________________________
> savi mailing list
> savi@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/savi

