Subject: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-softwire-mesh-framework-05.txt

From: Tero Kivinen <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 13:24:30 +0200

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments.

I have already reviewed 04 version of this document at 2008-06-04 and
the -05 version seems to take my comments in to account.

I noticed one other comment. The current draft says:

   Since the softwires are set up dynamically as a byproduct of passing
   routing information, key distribution MUST be done automatically by
   means of IKEv2 [RFC4306], operating in main mode with preshared keys.

First of all, the IKEv2 does not have "main mode" anymore, that term
is from IKEv1. It would be best to remove that completely.

Also this text seems to say that implementations MUST use preshared
keys, i.e. certificates are not allowed, and I do not think that was
what was meant. Especially as the next sentence says:

   If a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) is not available, the IPsec
   Tunnel Authenticator sub-TLV described in [ENCAPS-IPSEC] MUST be used
   and validated before setting up an SA.

So it is no clear what is mandated. The IKEv2 protocol already
specifies that both RSA signatures and shared keys are mandatory to
implement. This text here seems to mandate the operation part, and
that sounds bit too strict.

It might be better to just remove the ", operating in main mode with
preshared keys." part completely and simply say that IKEv2 MUST be
used.
-- 
[email-masked]
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