Subject: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-pcp-proxy-08

From: Samuel Weiler <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2015 20:53:40 -0400 (EDT)

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

Summary: document is ready for publication (with mild reservation).

My thanks to the document editors for producing a readable document.

Mild reservation: when I look at the use cases for PCP Proxy in this 
document (e.g. a consumer router doing NAT, connected to hotel NAT, 
connected to carrier NAT), it's hard to imagine that operational 
environment often fitting within the description of PCP's "simple 
threat model" (RFC6887, section 18.1).  And once you reject the 
simplifying assumptions in that "simple threat model", RFC6877 says 
PCP needs a security mechanism (section 18.2 of RFC6877).  Maybe this 
document should explicity reinforce that need, perhaps citing and 
blocking on draft-ietf-pcp-authentication?

---

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 05:48:32 +0000

Dear Samuel,

Many thanks for the review. 

FWIW, PCP auth is not cited in this document because we followed the same approach as in RFC6887 and RFC6970. 

Blocking on draft-ietf-pcp-authentication is not justified IMHO because the proxy can be enabled with ACLs enabled at the client, server and the network in between. 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Samuel Weiler [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Envoyé : lundi 6 juillet 2015 02:54
> À : [email-masked]; [email-masked]; [email-masked]
> Objet : secdir review of draft-ietf-pcp-proxy-08
>