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TIME & DATE:
  THURSDAY, November 10, 2005
  0900-1130 Morning Session I

AGENDA:

INTRO AND BACKGROUND (15 min)

o  Agenda bashing, notes takers, blue sheets (Chairs, 5 min)

o  Background and relation to past SECMECH BOF and EAP WG
   work (Sam Hartman, 5 min)

o  EAP methods market situation (chairs, 5 min)

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS (25 min)

o  EAP methods technical requirements (Bernard Aboba 15 min)

o  EAP methods, IEEE requirements (TBD & unconfirmed, 10 min)

METHODS AND CLASSES OF METHODS (70 min)

o  Overview of proposed methods, credential types, and uses
    (Pasi Eronen, 20 min)

o  EAP TLS issues and limitations (Aboba, 10 min)

o  PSK and IKEv2 (Hannes Tschofenig, 15 min)

o  PAX update, channel bindings (Charles Clancy, 15 min)

o  POTP (David Mitton, 10 min)

DISCUSSION AND WAY FORWARD (40 min)

o  Proposed charter (chairs, 10 min)

o  Discussion (30 min)


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Subject: [SECMECH] FW: [eap] EMU BOF
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Thomas Otto wrote:

>Hi all!
>
>Regarding the EMU BOF on Thursday. 
>
>It is widely accepted that there is need for more standardized EAP 
>methods. Also for an pre-shared key based method.
>
>Florent Bersani has done a lot of work in this direction, and although 
>this has been in early 2004, the analysis is still up-to-date.
>
>The respective I-Ds are  
>
>1) draft-bersani-eap-synthesis-sharedkeymethods-00.txt 
>e.g. available here:
>http://ietfreport.isoc.org/idref/draft-bersani-eap-synthesis-sharedkeymethods/
>
>2) draft-bersani-eap-sharedkeymethods-doctemplate-00.txt
>e.g. available here:
>ietfreport.isoc.org/idref/draft-bersani-eap-sharedkeymethods-doctemplate/
>
>A second note. Although we agree that a pre-shared key EAP method must
>be standardized, it is to discuss which features this method has to offer.
>
>I have collected my thoughts on this issue and put them into slides,
>available here
>http://www.tu-bs.de/~y0013790/IETF64-EMU-PresharedKeyMethods.pdf
>and the source
>http://www.tu-bs.de/~y0013790/IETF64-EMU-PresharedKeyMethods.ppt
>
>Probably they motivate a discussion at the EMU BOF. 
>
>Thomas
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>eap mailing list
>eap@lists.frascone.com
>http://lists.frascone.com/mailman/listinfo/eap
>
>
>  
>


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Subject: [SECMECH] PSK-based EAP methods (correction)
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The slides about preshared key methods,
http://www.tu-bs.de/~y0013790/IETF64-EMU-PresharedKeyMethods.pdf
do not mention EAP-MAKE2. I apologize for this, and updated them just now.

Thomas



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From secmech-bounces@lists.ietf.org Wed Nov 09 21:42:09 2005
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We have most of our presentation materials for tomorrow's
meeting up at the IETF proceedings site. The URL is

https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/meeting_materials.cgi?meeting_num=64

We also have reorganized the agenda a little bit.
Here's the latest agenda:

INTRO AND BACKGROUND (15 min)

o  Agenda bashing, notes takers, blue sheets (Chairs, 5 min)

o  Background and relation to past SECMECH BOF and EAP WG
   work (Sam Hartman, 5 min)

o  Goals for the BoF (chairs, 5 min)

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS (45 min)

o  EAP methods technical requirements (Bernard Aboba 15 min)

o  EAP methods, IEEE requirements (Chairs channeling Dorothy Stanley,
   10 min)

o  Overview of proposed methods, credential types, and uses
   (Pasi Eronen, 20 min)

DISCUSSION (40 min)

o  Discussion - Work Needed? (40 min)

METHODS AND CLASSES OF METHODS (50 min)

o  EAP TLS issues and limitations (Aboba, 10 min)

o  PSK and IKEv2 (Hannes Tschofenig, 10 min)

o  PAX update, channel bindings (Charles Clancy, 15 min)

o  Shared secret methods (Thomas Otto, 5 min)

o  POTP (David Mitton, 10 min)


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Oh. Some errors were still in the previous agenda.
Here's the one that we intend to use:

INTRO AND BACKGROUND (15 min)

o  Agenda bashing, notes takers, blue sheets (Chairs, 5 min)

o  Background and relation to past SECMECH BOF and EAP WG
   work (Sam Hartman, 5 min)

o  Goals for the BoF (chairs, 5 min)

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS (45 min)

o  EAP methods technical requirements (Bernard Aboba 15 min)

o  EAP methods, IEEE requirements (Chairs channeling Dorothy Stanley,
   10 min)

o  Overview of proposed methods, credential types, and uses
   (Pasi Eronen, 20 min)

DISCUSSION (40 min)

o  Discussion - Work Needed? (40 min)

METHODS AND CLASSES OF METHODS (50 min)

o  EAP TLS issues and limitations (Aboba, 10 min)

o  PSK and IKEv2 (Hannes Tschofenig, 10 min)

o  PAX update, channel bindings (Charles Clancy, 15 min)

o  MAKE2 (Michaela Vanderveen, 5 min)

o  POTP (David Mitton, 10 min)


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Hi Everybody,

   The TLS resume mode (RFC 2246, section 7.3) is a nice candidate for the 
PSK authentication class.
   The pre shared key is equal to the master secret, and is associated to a 
session-id that works like a login
   (EAP-ID,...).

    From a cryptographic point of view, some security proof are available, 
see for example
   http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/lcp/papers/Auth/tls.pdf  (4.6 Session 
Resumption)

    According to TLS properties many crypto suites can be used in order to 
proof the knowledge
    of the PSK (e.g the master secret), like RC4, DES, 3xDES, AES, ECC, .

    Because no certificates are used,.the number of exchanged bytes is 
quite small, around 200 bytes

    So what is wrong with EAP-TLS, with resume mode as PSK EAP method ?

    In EAP-TLS, EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA it's very easy to get, with no 
protection, the user ID,
    for example its permanent EAP-ID, certificates or full identity. It's 
mean that even when these protocols
    claim anonymity properties, it's possible to collect user's identities, 
which in many case is an issue for privacy. concerns.

    Are EAP methods really dealing today with user's privacy (from its 
identity protection point of view)?
    It seems that many EAP methods work like RFIDs.

    In 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-badra-eap-double-tls-04.txt we 
propose to re-used the TLS
    resume mode, and we are focused on anonymity rather than introducing a 
new cryptographic issues.

    It doesn't look easy to conciliate mutual authentication and identity 
protection. On the peer side this
    should imply the secure storage of some information (like next 
identity, next EAP-ID, next protection key,...)
    computed during the last EAP session.

    As an illustration this secure storage could be assumed by smartcards, 
like described in
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-eap-smartcard-09.txt

    In my opinion there is strong need to ensure anonymity in  EAP context. 
Do we intend to work
    on that subject ?

  Pascal 


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Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2005 11:41:38 -0500 (EST)
From: "T. Charles Clancy" <clancy@cs.umd.edu>
To: Pascal Urien <urienp@tele2.fr>
Subject: Re: [SECMECH] Are EAP-Methods RFIDs ?
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On Thu, 10 Nov 2005, Pascal Urien wrote:

> The TLS resume mode (RFC 2246, section 7.3) is a nice candidate for the 
> PSK authentication class. The pre shared key is equal to the master 
> secret, and is associated to a session-id that works like a login 
> (EAP-ID,...).
>
> ...
>
> So what is wrong with EAP-TLS, with resume mode as PSK EAP method ?

Perhaps TLS-PSK would be a more conventional way of doing about the same 
thing?

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-psk-09.txt

> In EAP-TLS, EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA it's very easy to get, with no 
> protection, the user ID, for example its permanent EAP-ID, certificates 
> or full identity. It's mean that even when these protocols claim 
> anonymity properties, it's possible to collect user's identities, which 
> in many case is an issue for privacy. concerns.
>
> ...
>
> Are EAP methods really dealing today with user's privacy (from its 
> identity protection point of view)? It seems that many EAP methods work 
> like RFIDs.

EAP-TLS does not provide identity protection.  SIM and AKA use 
pseudonym-based approaches which have known faults.

The tunneling methods PEAP, TTLS, and FAST all provide secure identity 
protection via public-key approaches, as does PAX.

> It doesn't look easy to conciliate mutual authentication and identity 
> protection. On the peer side this should imply the secure storage of 
> some information (like next identity, next EAP-ID, next protection 
> key,...) computed during the last EAP session.
>
> ...
>
> In my opinion there is strong need to ensure anonymity in EAP context. 
> Do we intend to work on that subject ?

I don't see what the issue is... we have several methods already that 
accomplish mutual authentication and identity protection.

If you want to do secure identity protection *without* public key 
computations, it gets a little tricker.  You'll have to use a 
pseudonym-type scheme, which has desynchronization problems.  I don't see 
how adding smartcards really changes anything.  In the IETF we're focused 
on protocols, not secure data storage.  Distinguising smartcard use would 
be like having a different EAP method depending on whether you were 
authenticating from a laptop vs a desktop.

[ t. charles clancy ]--[ tcc@umd.edu ]--[ www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy ]
[ computer science ]-----[ university of maryland | college park ]

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EAP Method Update (EMU) BOF
Thursday, November 10, 2005
9:00 - 11:00 AM

This was a continuation of the SECMECH BOF from last IETF, but it
focused on the EAP method standardization work item.  The goal of the
BOF was to determine if there was interest to work on the
standardization of a small number of EAP methods.  There were
presentations on requirements for EAP methods and different types of
methods.  We had a discussion on the different types of credentials and
authentication infrastructures that methods can support.  In the end we
reached consensus to create a working group to look at three things:=20

(1) an update of EAP-TLS for certificate-based infrastructure=20
(2) a method based on strong shared secrets
(3) a method based on using existing password infrastructure such as AAA
servers password databases

It would be better if some of these requirements could be combined into
one mechanism, however it was brought up that this may not be possible
to do and still maintain compact mechanism implementations that are
usable in constrained environments.  After these work items are done it
will be possible to add additional items to the working group charter to
work on additional methods.  The meeting concluded with presentations on
several EAP method drafts.



=20

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