Subject: draft-daley-send-spnd-prob-00 comments

From: Pekka Savola <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 2004 17:58:41 +0300 (EEST)

Hi,

(this is out of scope for the WG for now I recall, but seeming the 
list is quite, there shouldn't be any harm..)

Thanks for writing this out.  It's still a bit sketchy, of course, but
hopefully could be used to focuse the thinking wrt. whether there is any
hope for Proxy Neighbor Discovery security.

Just two comments:

 - You implicitly assume only Proxy ND in the traditional (MIPv6) sense, but
it could be applied in more general with the Proxy-ND spec as well (esp. if
the rbrigde effort doesn't get going).

 - section 7.2 on Certificate Transport could use a bit more context.  I was
confused about which scenario you are considering here -- whether the node
is roaming, but is coming home; or at home but leaving (or already left); or
both (or something else). Two unboiled thoughts: 

   1) if the MN knows HA's
address and public key using mechanisms which are out of scope from here
(based on the associating with the HA in the first place), what's still
missing here -- couldn't the MN send its signed authorization along with the
Binding Update, the HA could take it to use, and then send BA?  

  2) can this
be simplified if one could assume that MN has to be at home at first (or at
least get its certificate to the HA configured at HA somehow), before moving
or coming home?  This would assume that such certificates could be
sufficiently long-lived.

-- 
Pekka Savola                 "You each name yourselves king, yet the
Netcore Oy                    kingdom bleeds."
Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings

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