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From: "Sashank Dara (sadara)" <sadara@cisco.com>
To: "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>, "Frank Brockners (fbrockne)" <fbrockne@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] Question regarding Proof of Transit draft
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Cc: "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>, "opsawg@ietf.org" <opsawg@ietf.org>, "nvo3@ietf.org" <nvo3@ietf.org>, "draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" <draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>, Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>
Subject: Re: [sfc] Question regarding Proof of Transit draft
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Hi Diego ,

Thanks for bringing up an excellent point on the computational complexity.
Fortunately the algorithm takes a cumulative approach which is agnostic of =
the path length.

  1.  Controller performs few trivial steps like choosing long term secrets=
, calculating the LPC values for each node and provisioning.
  2.  Each node only performs 2 additions, 1 multiplication and 1 mod(prime=
) operation per packet .
  3.  Verifier also performs step (2) and additionally performs 1 addition,=
 1 mod(prime) and comparison to verify !

The above steps hold good for any length of nodes.

A detailed example is provided for illustrative purposes in our draft<https=
://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brockners-proof-of-transit-01#section-3.3>  (s=
ection 3.3) that explains above operations.

Would be happy to discuss more on the above, if needed.

Regards,
Sashank


From: "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com<mailto:diego.r.lopez@t=
elefonica.com>>
Date: Friday, 26 August 2016 at 6:21 PM
To: "Frank Brockners (fbrockne)" <fbrockne@cisco.com<mailto:fbrockne@cisco.=
com>>
Cc: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com<mailto:talmi@marvell.com>>, sashank dara=
 <sadara@cisco.com<mailto:sadara@cisco.com>>, "draft-brockners-proof-of-tra=
nsit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>=
" <draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-p=
roof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>>, "opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>"=
 <opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>>, "nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf=
.org>" <nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>>, "sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf=
.org>" <sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [sfc] Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Hi Frank,

This is a really interesting piece of work, and I must say we have been dis=
cussing the PoT issue with some customers (though we used to call it =93ass=
ured path traversal=94) and we have been exploring possible solutions, tryi=
ng to combine good-enough security with a reasonable amount of computationa=
l complexity, and I am glad to see a practical proposal addressing this pro=
blem. I had a brief conversation with Carlos while in Berlin, but I am afra=
id that the IETF week was too hectic for a detailed discussion.

Let me add to Tal=92s analysis a third issue to consider. My understanding =
of Shamir=92s polynomials is that they can be used to reconstruct a secret =
from N pieces you need a polynomial of degree N-1, so that implies that the=
 verification is limited to a certain number of SFs (or SFFs), depending on=
 the degree of the applied polynomial. We=92d need and assessment on the co=
mputational complexity associated with path length and the requirements for=
 adaptation of the PoT nodes (I guess SDN/NFV could play a role there=85)

Be goode,

On 20 Jul 2016, at 09:16 , Frank Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com<m=
ailto:fbrockne@cisco.com>> wrote:

Hi Tal,

well... if you could protect the integrity of the data stream between sourc=
e and destination, you would not be able to swap the content of a packet =
=96 which is what your attack is all about. Rather than continue arguing th=
e point, let=92s acknowledge that it is a valid attack and let=92s look for=
 a solution :-). We=92ll need to couple POT to integrity protection of the =
packet.

Hence, I=92d like to come back to my question asked below:
Do you (and the entire SFC team here) think it is worthwhile to provide a s=
olution for a deployment which is expected to *not* alter the packet payloa=
d?

Thanks, Frank

From: Tal Mizrahi [mailto:talmi@marvell.com]
Sent: Dienstag, 19. Juli 2016 18:15
To: Frank Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com<mailto:fbrockne@cisco.co=
m>>; Sashank Dara (sadara) <sadara@cisco.com<mailto:sadara@cisco.com>>; dra=
ft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-o=
f-transit@tools.ietf.org>
Cc: sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>; opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.o=
rg>; nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Hi Frank,

The POT replacement attack (1.) is not an attack on the integrity. It is an=
 attack on the path verification.
This simple attack can cause the verifier to accept a packet that did not g=
o through the firewall SF (even though it should). I believe this is exactl=
y the problem you were aiming to address in this draft.

Thanks,
Tal.

From: Frank Brockners (fbrockne) [mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 6:00 PM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Sashank Dara (sadara); draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@to=
ols.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>
Cc: sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>; opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.o=
rg>; nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Hi Tal,

thanks for the summary. We=92ll provide more details on 2. Per my earlier p=
oint =96 1. is an interesting discussion, given that we don=92t claim to pr=
ovide integrity protection for the packet payload. Or in other terms =96 to=
 be exact: What POT provides is a proof that the POT-header/meta-data trans=
ited all the required nodes. There is no association (and thus proof) provi=
ded for the additional data carried along with the POT-header =96 neither h=
eader nor payload. As a consequence, attacks which change the packet payloa=
d won=92t be detected/mitigated. We=92ll explicitly state this in the secur=
ity considerations in the next rev of the document.
What we could consider is linking the RND number to CRC across the packet p=
ayload or similar =96 but that way we=92d restrict the applicability to dep=
loyments where the packet payload isn=92t changed across the path (which mi=
ght not apply to certain deployment =96 e.g. WAN optimization / compression=
 schemes).
Do you think it is worthwhile to provide a solution for a deployment which =
is expected to not alter the packet payload?

Thanks,
Frank

From: Tal Mizrahi [mailto:talmi@marvell.com]
Sent: Dienstag, 19. Juli 2016 17:44
To: Sashank Dara (sadara) <sadara@cisco.com<mailto:sadara@cisco.com>>; Fran=
k Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com<mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com>>; dra=
ft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-o=
f-transit@tools.ietf.org>
Cc: sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>; opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.o=
rg>; nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Hi,

To summarize my take on this thread:
The proposed mechanism has two significant vulnerabilities that (in my unde=
rstanding) are currently not addressed:
1.       A man-in-the-middle can replace the POT of packet A with the POT o=
f packet B.
2.       It is possible to replay POTs within a certain time window, whose =
length is determined by the timestamp resolution.

Sashank, thanks for agreeing to look into it further. I am looking forward =
to your insights on this.

Regards,
Tal.

Link to the draft: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brockners-proof-of-tra=
nsit-01



From: Sashank Dara (sadara) [mailto:sadara@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 12:20 PM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-proof-of-trans=
it@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>; =
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft



I want to ask a simple question:
If the attacker attaches the POT of packet A (indicating the path through 1=
,3,5,6) to packet B, will the verifier accept packet B and believe that its=
 path was indeed (1,3,5,6)?

[SD] If the verifier is programmed to just validate the POT meta data again=
st {1,3,5,6} then yes it accepts it.
If the verifier is programmed to consult a policy database to cross check i=
f the reconstructed path {1,3,5,6} is as per the policies then no , it drop=
s it .

But I see your point , that the parameters used in POT data donot consider =
the path or node-ids etc . We shall discuss this internally and get back.

Also, We shall get back with more concrete numbers of the timestamp resolut=
ion and cache sizes (or other better approaches).

Thank you so much for all the inputs.



From: Tal Mizrahi
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 10:28 AM
To: 'Sashank Dara (sadara)'; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-pr=
oof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools=
.ietf.org>; sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Dear Sashank,

I really appreciate the quick and detailed responses.

>>>Lets take correct path taken by Packet A  to be Path1 - ( 1,3,5,6) nodes=
.
>>>Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e. Path2 -  (1,2,3,6).
>>>
>>>If the attacker could take values from Path1 and reattach them to Path2 =
,
>>>the reconstruction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2=
,3,6).
>>>This could be compared with topology/policy db information for any polic=
y
>>>violations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be taken.
>>So packet B skipped node 5 (e.g. the firewall SF), but the verifier belie=
ves it went through the correct path.
>>Would you agree?
>[SD] The verifier only constructs the path the packet took accurately, it =
is upto
>the application to determine whether it violates any policies (I.e missing=
 any function)
>The bottom line is , an attacker taking a different path cannot get away w=
ith it !
>The whole intent of =93proof-of-transit=94 is to prove the path packet has=
 taken exactly.
>POT does not define whether it good/bad path. It is upto high level applic=
ations on what
>do with =93reconstructed=94 path.



I want to ask a simple question:
If the attacker attaches the POT of packet A (indicating the path through 1=
,3,5,6) to packet B, will the verifier accept packet B and believe that its=
 path was indeed (1,3,5,6)?


>>Hmmm=85 Let=92s say we are talking about traffic at 10 Gbps, which is rou=
ghly
>>1 million packets per second. That would mean the verifier has to store a=
 million values of RND-2.
>>Moreover, every time a packet arrives, the verifier would have to compare=
 its
>>RND-2 value with the 1 million stored values, in order to verify there is=
 no replay.
>>That does not sound feasible.
>>Am I missing something here?
>[SD] Second level precision is only an example, we could use as much preci=
sion as we want to reduce the number of values to be cached !

My point is that assuming reasonable resources are used, the mechanism is v=
ulnerable to a replay attack.
In order to prove me wrong, can you present concrete numbers of the timesta=
mp resolution and the cache size?
Otherwise, you may consider using a sequence number + sliding window (e.g.,=
 as in IPsec).


Thanks,
Tal.



From: Sashank Dara (sadara) [mailto:sadara@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 9:56 AM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-proof-of-trans=
it@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>; =
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft




>[SD] Ok. This is an interesting attack.
>
>Lets take correct path taken by Packet A  to be Path1 - ( 1,3,5,6) nodes.
>Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e. Path2 -  (1,2,3,6).
>
>If the attacker could take values from Path1 and reattach them to Path2 ,
>the reconstruction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2,3=
,6).
>This could be compared with topology/policy db information for any policy
>violations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be taken.

So packet B skipped node 5 (e.g. the firewall SF), but the verifier believe=
s it went through the correct path.
Would you agree?

[SD] The verifier only constructs the path the packet took accurately, it i=
s upto the application to determine whether it violates any policies (I.e m=
issing any function)
The bottom line is , an attacker taking a different path cannot get away wi=
th it ! The whole intent of =93proof-of-transit=94 is to prove the path pac=
ket has taken exactly.
POT does not define whether it good/bad path. It is upto high level applica=
tions on what do with =93reconstructed=94 path.


Hmmm=85 Let=92s say we are talking about traffic at 10 Gbps, which is rough=
ly 1 million packets per second. That would mean the verifier has to store =
a million values of RND-2.
Moreover, every time a packet arrives, the verifier would have to compare i=
ts RND-2 value with the 1 million stored values, in order to verify there i=
s no replay.
That does not sound feasible.
Am I missing something here?

[SD] Second level precision is only an example, we could use as much precis=
ion as we want to reduce the number of values to be cached !


Sashank



From: Sashank Dara (sadara) [mailto:sadara@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 8:33 AM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-proof-of-trans=
it@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>; =
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Inline ..


We have two consecutive packets, A and B:
- Packet A that went through the correct path and has a correct POT.
- Packet B that did not go through the correct path and does not have a cor=
rect POT.
 Now the attacker performs a =91mix and match=92 attack, by taking the corr=
ect POT from packet A and attaching it to packet B.
The attacker also terminates packet A.
There is no replay here, because the verifier receives the correct POT only=
 once. The problem is that the correct POT happens to arrive with packet B.=
 :(
Thus, packet B appears okay to the verifier, even though it did not go thro=
ugh the correct path.

Is there a way to mitigate this attack?

[SD] Ok. This is an interesting attack.

Lets take correct path taken by Packet A  to be Path1 - ( 1,3,5,6) nodes.
Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e. Path2 -  (1,2,3,6).

If the attacker could take values from Path1 and reattach them to Path2 , t=
he reconstruction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2,3,6=
).
This could be compared with topology/policy db information for any policy v=
iolations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be taken.
 It just reconstructs the particular path taken by the packets.

Do you mean that there is a one-second-vulnerability for replay attacks?
One second is practically forever.

[SD] Not really , the verifier could cache the RND-2 numbers used in the ti=
me slice of one second and flush off after every second. There is no one-se=
cond-vulnerability as such, if the verifier caches those values.

Effective replay prevention is typically performed using a sequence number,=
 with a sliding window to allow out-of-order packets. Wouldn=92t it be poss=
ible to incorporate such a sequence number into your mechanism?

[SD] Time stamp is essentially at high level sequence number (at seconds le=
vel)! The challenge with using complete RND-2 as sequence number is that th=
e differential analysis of CML values (across packets) becomes very easy  a=
nd predictable.
that=92s reason we recommend using  ( Timestamp(/ sequence number) + RND )




From: Sashank Dara (sadara) [mailto:sadara@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 1:11 AM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-proof-of-trans=
it@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>; =
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Dear Tal,
Thank you for your interest in our work. More inline with [SD] ..


Right, I am referring to the former. The integrity check is not the issue.
Let=92s say we have:
- Packet A that went through the correct path and has a correct POT.
- Packet B that did not go through the correct path and does not have a cor=
rect POT.

The attacker can =91launder=92 packet B by replacing the (incorrect) POT of=
 packet B with the correct POT of packet A (and drop packet A).
Thus, packet B is verified correctly, even though it did not go through the=
 correct path.

[SD] This is valid scenario and we have certain in-built mitigation techniq=
ues and recommendations for the same.
There are two scenarios here

Partial Replay of POT data (Replaying intermediate CMLs)

Attacker cannot reuse few intermediate node=92s POT values (from older pack=
et traces) as it would disrupt the POLY-3 construction.
On the other hand if the attacker tries to replay entire sequence of CML va=
lues, he cannot still , because notice that verifier also has a secret shar=
e of RND-1 and participates in the reconstruction of RND-3.
Verifier=92s share of RND-3 is never on wire , so attacker cannot just obse=
rve the packet traces to reuse and replay it.

Total Replay of POT data (Replaying complete RND-2)

Another trick, attacker could do is by completely reusing RND-2 (but not in=
termediate CML values)
In order to prevent the =93Reply Attacks=94 , we recommend that the RND-2 (=
generated per packet) be a combination (I.e. RND2 =3D =93Time Stamp + RND n=
umber=94)
So in case a passive attacker tries to replay one of the correct but older =
RND-2, the verifier first could check the current timestamp against the tim=
estamp retrieved from RND-2.
If the retrieved timestamp is older than current timestamp we drop/raise a =
flag !

There is still a small window , where the attacker could replay it within t=
he valid time slice itself but by carefully choosing the time slice we can =
make it nearly impossible for the attacker to replay.
For example , if the Time Stamp chosen is 32 bits , we could get one second=
s level precision in the time window . So it is highly impossible for the a=
ttacker to replay within such a small time at such a high packet rates.

Also , the verifier could cache, if needed, certain number of previously us=
ed RND-2 to mitigate replay attacks.

Hope this clarifies.

_______________________________________________
sfc mailing list
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc

--
"Esta vez no fallaremos, Doctor Infierno"

Dr Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
http://people.tid.es/diego.lopez/

e-mail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com<mailto:diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>
Tel:    +34 913 129 041
Mobile: +34 682 051 091
----------------------------------


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--_000_D3EE23757D65Bsadaraciscocom_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-ID: <BA76EA99A1163B4B9337DD3AA958C4A3@emea.cisco.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 14px; font-fami=
ly: Calibri, sans-serif;">
<div>
<div>Hi Diego ,&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks for bringing up an excellent point on the computational complex=
ity.&nbsp;</div>
<div>Fortunately the algorithm takes a cumulative approach which is agnosti=
c of the path length.&nbsp;</div>
<ol>
<li>Controller performs few trivial steps like choosing long term secrets, =
calculating the LPC values for each node and provisioning.</li><li>Each nod=
e only performs 2 additions, 1 multiplication and 1 mod(prime) operation pe=
r packet .&nbsp;</li><li>Verifier also performs step (2) and additionally p=
erforms 1 addition, 1 mod(prime) and comparison to verify !&nbsp;</li></ol>
<div>The above steps hold good for any length of nodes.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>A detailed example is provided for illustrative purposes in our <a hre=
f=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brockners-proof-of-transit-01#sectio=
n-3.3">
draft</a>&nbsp; (section 3.3) that explains above operations.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Would be happy to discuss more on the above, if needed.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>Regards,</div>
<div>Sashank</div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" color=3D"rgb(0, 0, 0)"><font class=3D=
"Apple-style-span" face=3D"Calibri"><br>
</font></font></div>
</div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:b=
lack; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM:=
 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;=
 BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt">
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span>&quot;Diego R. Lopez&quot; &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com">diego.r.lopez@telefonica.=
com</a>&gt;<br>
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span>Friday, 26 August 2016 at 6:2=
1 PM<br>
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span>&quot;Frank Brockners (fbrockne=
)&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com">fbrockne@cisco.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span>Tal Mizrahi &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:talmi@marvell.com">talmi@marvell.com</a>&gt;, sashank dara &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com">sadara@cisco.com</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org">draft-brockners-proof-=
of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>&quot;
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org">dra=
ft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mail=
to:opsawg@ietf.org">opsawg@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:opsawg@=
ietf.org">opsawg@ietf.org</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org">n=
vo3@ietf.org</a>&quot;
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org">nvo3@ietf.org</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=
=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org">sfc@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sfc@i=
etf.org">sfc@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span>Re: [sfc] Question regardi=
ng Proof of Transit draft<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line=
-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">
Hi Frank,
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">This is a really interesting piece of work, and I must say =
we have been discussing the PoT issue with some customers (though we used t=
o call it =93assured path traversal=94) and we have been exploring possible=
 solutions, trying to combine good-enough
 security with a reasonable amount of computational complexity, and I am gl=
ad to see a practical proposal addressing this problem. I had a brief conve=
rsation with Carlos while in Berlin, but I am afraid that the IETF week was=
 too hectic for a detailed discussion.</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">Let me add to Tal=92s analysis a third issue to consider. M=
y understanding of Shamir=92s polynomials is that they can be used to recon=
struct a secret from N pieces you need a polynomial of degree N-1, so that =
implies that the verification is limited
 to a certain number of SFs (or SFFs), depending on the degree of the appli=
ed polynomial. We=92d need and assessment on the computational complexity a=
ssociated with path length and the requirements for adaptation of the PoT n=
odes (I guess SDN/NFV could play a
 role there=85)</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">Be goode,</div>
<div class=3D"">&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On 20 Jul 2016, at 09:16 , Frank Brockners (fbrockne) &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" class=3D"">fbrockne@cisco.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; font-family: Lucid=
aGrande; font-size: 11px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-we=
ight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; t=
ext-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: norm=
al; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hi Tal,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">well... if you could protect the=
 integrity of the data stream between source and destination, you would not=
 be able to swap the content of a packet
 =96 which is what your attack is all about. Rather than continue arguing t=
he point, let=92s acknowledge that it is a valid attack and let=92s look fo=
r a solution :-). We=92ll need to couple POT to integrity protection of the=
 packet.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hence, I=92d like to come back t=
o my question asked below: &nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Do you (and the entire SFC team =
here) think it is worthwhile to provide a solution for a deployment which i=
s expected to *<b class=3D"">not</b>* alter
 the packet payload?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thanks, Frank<o:p class=3D""></o=
:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(225, 225=
, 225); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: C=
alibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cl=
ass=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal Mizrahi
 [<a href=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" style=3D"color: purple; text-decorat=
ion: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:talmi@marvell.com</a>]<span class=3D"App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>D=
ienstag, 19. Juli 2016 18:15<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Fra=
nk Brockners (fbrockne) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" style=3D"=
color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">fbrockne@cisco.com</=
a>&gt;; Sashank Dara (sadara) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=
=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sadara@cisco.com=
</a>&gt;;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mail=
to:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple;=
 text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@t=
ools.ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: under=
line;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&n=
bsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:opsawg@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-=
decoration: underline;" class=3D"">opsawg@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple=
-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org" style=3D"co=
lor: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">nvo3@ietf.org</a><br c=
lass=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hi Frank,<o:p class=3D""></o:p><=
/span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">The POT replacement attack (1.) =
is not an attack on the integrity. It is an attack on the path verification=
.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">This simple attack can cause the=
 verifier to accept a packet that did not go through the firewall SF (even =
though it should). I believe this is exactly
 the problem you were aiming to address in this draft.<o:p class=3D""></o:p=
></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Tal.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Frank Brockners
 (fbrockne) [<a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; =
text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com</a>]<span=
 class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 6:00 PM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Sashank Dara (sadara);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp=
;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-brock=
ners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: under=
line;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&n=
bsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:opsawg@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-=
decoration: underline;" class=3D"">opsawg@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple=
-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org" style=3D"co=
lor: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">nvo3@ietf.org</a><br c=
lass=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hi Tal,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">thanks for the summary. We=92ll =
provide more details on 2. Per my earlier point =96 1. is an interesting di=
scussion, given that we don=92t claim to provide
 integrity protection for the packet payload. Or in other terms =96 to be e=
xact: What POT provides is a proof that the POT-header/meta-data transited =
all the required nodes. There is no association (and thus proof) provided f=
or the additional data carried along
 with the POT-header =96 neither header nor payload. As a consequence, atta=
cks which change the packet payload won=92t be detected/mitigated. We=92ll =
explicitly state this in the security considerations in the next rev of the=
 document.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">What we could consider is linkin=
g the RND number to CRC across the packet payload or similar =96 but that w=
ay we=92d restrict the applicability to deployments
 where the packet payload isn=92t changed across the path (which might not =
apply to certain deployment =96 e.g. WAN optimization / compression schemes=
).<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Do you think it is worthwhile to=
 provide a solution for a deployment which is expected to not alter the pac=
ket payload?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Frank<o:p class=3D""></o:p></spa=
n></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(225, 225=
, 225); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: C=
alibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cl=
ass=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal Mizrahi
 [<a href=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" style=3D"color: purple; text-decorat=
ion: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:talmi@marvell.com</a>]<span class=3D"App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>D=
ienstag, 19. Juli 2016 17:44<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sas=
hank Dara (sadara) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: =
purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sadara@cisco.com</a>&gt;; F=
rank Brockners (fbrockne) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" style=
=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">fbrockne@cisco.c=
om</a>&gt;;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"ma=
ilto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-brockners-proof-of-transit=
@tools.ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: under=
line;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&n=
bsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:opsawg@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-=
decoration: underline;" class=3D"">opsawg@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple=
-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org" style=3D"co=
lor: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">nvo3@ietf.org</a><br c=
lass=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hi,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span>=
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">To summarize my take on this thr=
ead:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">The proposed mechanism has two s=
ignificant vulnerabilities that (in my understanding) are currently not add=
ressed:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 36pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
'Times New Roman', serif; text-indent: -18pt;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">1.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" st=
yle=3D"font-size: 7pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sa=
ns-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">A
 man-in-the-middle can replace the POT of packet A with the POT of packet B=
.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 36pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
'Times New Roman', serif; text-indent: -18pt;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">2.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" st=
yle=3D"font-size: 7pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sa=
ns-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">It
 is possible to replay POTs within a certain time window, whose length is d=
etermined by the timestamp resolution.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Sashank, thanks for agreeing to =
look into it further. I am looking forward to your insights on this.<o:p cl=
ass=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Regards,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></=
span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Tal.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Link to the draft:<span class=3D=
"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html=
/draft-brockners-proof-of-transit-01" style=3D"color: purple; text-decorati=
on: underline;" class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brockners-proo=
f-of-transit-01</a><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></b></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sashank Dara
 (sadara) [<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; text=
-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:sadara@cisco.com</a>]<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 12:20 PM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.=
org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-=
brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">I want to ask a simple question:=
</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">If the attacker attaches the POT=
 of packet A (indicating the path through 1,3,5,6) to packet B, will the ve=
rifier accept packet B and believe that
 its path was indeed (1,3,5,6)?</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] If the verifier is programmed to just validate the=
 POT meta data against {1,3,5,6} then yes it accepts it.&nbsp;<o:p class=3D=
""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">If the verifier is programmed to consult a policy datab=
ase to cross check if the reconstructed path {1,3,5,6} is as per the polici=
es then no , it drops it .&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">But I see your point , that the parameters used in POT =
data donot consider the path or node-ids etc . We shall discuss this intern=
ally and get back.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Also, We shall get back with more concrete numbers of t=
he timestamp resolution and cache sizes (or other better approaches).&nbsp;=
<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Thank you so much for all the inputs.&nbsp;<o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></b></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></b></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></b></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal Mizrahi<span class=3D"Apple-c=
onverted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 10:28 AM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>'Sa=
shank Dara (sadara)'; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-conve=
rted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit=
@tools.ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=
=3D"">draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Ap=
ple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"=
color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Dear Sashank,<o:p class=3D""></o=
:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">I really appreciate the quick an=
d detailed responses.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;Lets take correct path taken by Packet A &n=
bsp;to be<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">P=
ath1</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- ( 1,3,5,6)
 nodes.&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e.<span class=3D"Ap=
ple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path2</b><span class=3D"App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- &nbsp;(1,2,3,6).<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;If the attacker could take values from<span class=3D"Apple-conv=
erted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b><span class=3D"Apple-conve=
rted-space">&nbsp;</span>and reattach them to&nbsp;<b class=3D"">Path2 ,<sp=
an class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
</b>&gt;&gt;&gt;the&nbsp;reconstruction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,=
6) instead of (1,2,3,6).&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;This could be compared with topology/policy db information for =
any policy<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D""=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt;violations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be taken.=
</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&gt;&gt;So packet B skipped node=
 5 (e.g. the firewall SF), but the verifier believes it went through the co=
rrect path.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><br class=3D""=
>
</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri,=
 sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&gt;&gt;Would you agree?<=
/span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></sp=
an></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;[SD] The verifier only constructs the path the pack=
et took accurately, it is upto<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;the application to determine whether it violates an=
y policies (I.e missing any function)&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></d=
iv>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;The bottom line is , an attacker taking a different=
 path cannot get away with it !<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;The whole intent of =93proof-of-transit=94 is to pr=
ove the path packet has taken exactly.&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></=
div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;POT does not define whether it good/bad path. It is=
 upto high level applications on what<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;do with =93reconstructed=94 path.&nbsp;<o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">I want to ask a simple question:=
<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">If the attacker attaches the POT=
 of packet A (indicating the path through 1,3,5,6) to packet B, will the ve=
rifier accept packet B and believe that
 its path was indeed (1,3,5,6)?<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;=
</span><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&gt;&gt;Hmmm=85 Let=92s say we a=
re talking about traffic at 10 Gbps, which is roughly<span class=3D"Apple-c=
onverted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;1 million packets per second. That would mean the verifier has to s=
tore a million values of RND-2.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;Moreover, every time a packet arrives, the verifier would have to c=
ompare its<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D""=
>
&gt;&gt;RND-2 value with the 1 million stored values, in order to verify th=
ere is no replay.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;That does not sound feasible.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;Am I missing something here?</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"fo=
nt-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""=
>&gt;[SD]&nbsp;Second level precision is only an example, we could use as m=
uch precision as we want to reduce the number of values to be cached !</spa=
n><span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">My point is that assuming reason=
able resources are used, the mechanism is vulnerable to a replay attack.<o:=
p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">In order to prove me wrong, can =
you present concrete numbers of the timestamp resolution and the cache size=
?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Otherwise, you may consider usin=
g a sequence number &#43; sliding window (e.g., as in IPsec).<o:p class=3D"=
"></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Tal.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sashank Dara
 (sadara) [<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; text=
-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:sadara@cisco.com</a>]<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 9:56 AM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.=
org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-=
brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;[SD] Ok. This is an interesting attack. &nbsp;</spa=
n><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span><=
/div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;Lets take correct path taken by Packet A &nbsp;to b=
e<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b>=
<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- ( 1,3,5,6)
 nodes.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e.<span=
 class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path2</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- &nbsp;(1,2,3,6).</span><span=
 lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;If the attacker could take values from<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b><span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>and reattach them to&nbsp;<b class=
=3D"">Path2
 ,<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b></span><span lang=
=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;the&nbsp;reconstruction for PacketB would result in=
 (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2,3,6).&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"=
" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;This could be compared with topology/policy db info=
rmation for any policy</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:=
p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;violations. POT does not enforce a particular path =
to be taken.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D=
""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">So packet B skipped node 5 (e.g.=
 the firewall SF), but the verifier believes it went through the correct pa=
th.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p>=
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Would you agree?</span><span lan=
g=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] The verifier only constructs the path the packet t=
ook accurately, it is upto the application to determine whether it violates=
 any policies (I.e missing any function)&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span>=
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">The bottom line is , an attacker taking a different pat=
h cannot get away with it ! The whole intent of =93proof-of-transit=94 is t=
o prove the path packet has taken exactly.&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></spa=
n></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">POT does not define whether it good/bad path. It is upt=
o high level applications on what do with =93reconstructed=94 path.&nbsp;<o=
:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></di=
v>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hmmm=85 Let=92s say we are talki=
ng about traffic at 10 Gbps, which is roughly 1 million packets per second.=
 That would mean the verifier has to store
 a million values of RND-2.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: =
10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Moreover, every time a packet ar=
rives, the verifier would have to compare its RND-2 value with the 1 millio=
n stored values, in order to verify there
 is no replay.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" clas=
s=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">That does not sound feasible.</s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Am I missing something here?</sp=
an><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></di=
v>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""=
>[SD]&nbsp;Second level precision is only an example, we could use as much =
precision as we want to reduce the number of values to be cached !</span><s=
pan lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></=
o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""=
>&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;" class=3D"">Sashank&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sashank Dara
 (sadara) [<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; text=
-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:sadara@cisco.com</a>]<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 8:33 AM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.=
org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-=
brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D"">&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></sp=
an></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Inline ..&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" c=
lass=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">We have two consecutive packets,=
 A and B:</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">=
</o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">- Packet A that went through the=
 correct path and has a correct POT.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">- Packet B that did not go throu=
gh the correct path and does not have a correct POT.</span><span lang=3D"EN=
-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;Now the attacker performs =
a =91mix and match=92 attack, by taking the correct POT from packet A and a=
ttaching it to packet B.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><=
o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">The attacker also terminates pac=
ket A.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o=
:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">There is no replay here, because=
 the verifier receives the correct POT only once. The problem is that the c=
orrect POT happens to arrive with packet
 B.<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><span lang=3D"=
EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Wingdings; color: rgb(31, 73,=
 125);" class=3D"">L</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thus, packet B appears okay to t=
he verifier, even though it did not go through the correct path.</span><spa=
n lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Is there a way to mitigate this =
attack?</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></=
o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] Ok. This is an interesting attack. &nbsp;</span><s=
pan lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div=
>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Lets take correct path taken by Packet A &nbsp;to be<sp=
an class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- ( 1,3,5,6)
 nodes.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e.<span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path2</b><span clas=
s=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- &nbsp;(1,2,3,6).</span><span lan=
g=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">If the attacker could take values from<span class=3D"Ap=
ple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b><span class=3D"App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>and reattach them to&nbsp;<b class=3D"">Pa=
th2
 ,<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>the&nbsp;reconstru=
ction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2,3,6).&nbsp;</sp=
an><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span>=
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">This could be compared with topology/policy db informat=
ion for any policy violations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be=
 taken.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></=
o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;It just reconstructs the particular path taken by=
 the packets.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p c=
lass=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Do you mean that there is a one-=
second-vulnerability for replay attacks?</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">One second is practically foreve=
r.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p><=
/span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] Not really , the verifier could cache the RND-2 nu=
mbers used in the time slice of one second and flush off after every second=
. There is no one-second-vulnerability
 as such, if the verifier caches those values.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN=
-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Effective replay prevention is t=
ypically performed using a sequence number, with a sliding window to allow =
out-of-order packets. Wouldn=92t it be possible
 to incorporate such a sequence number into your mechanism?</span><span lan=
g=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] Time stamp is essentially at high level sequence n=
umber (at seconds level)! The challenge with using complete RND-2 as sequen=
ce number is that the differential analysis
 of CML values (across packets) becomes very easy &nbsp;and predictable.</s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">that=92s reason we recommend using &nbsp;( Timestamp(/ =
sequence number) &#43; RND )</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D=
""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sashank Dara
 (sadara) [<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; text=
-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:sadara@cisco.com</a>]<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 1:11 AM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.=
org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-=
brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D"">&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></sp=
an></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Dear Tal,</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Thank you for your interest in our work. More inline wi=
th [SD] ..&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p clas=
s=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Right, I am referring to the for=
mer. The integrity check is not the issue.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Let=92s say we have:</span><span=
 lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">- Packet A that went through the=
 correct path and has a correct POT.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">- Packet B that did not go throu=
gh the correct path and does not have a correct POT.</span><span lang=3D"EN=
-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">The attacker can =91launder=92 p=
acket B by replacing the (incorrect) POT of packet B with the correct POT o=
f packet A (and drop packet A).</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thus, packet B is verified corre=
ctly, even though it did not go through the correct path.</span><span lang=
=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] This is valid scenario and we have certain in-buil=
t mitigation techniques and recommendations for the same.&nbsp;</span><span=
 lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">There are two scenarios here&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"=
EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family:=
 Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Partial Replay of POT data (Replaying int=
ermediate CMLs)</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p c=
lass=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Attacker cannot reuse few intermediate node=92s POT val=
ues (from older packet traces) as it would disrupt the POLY-3 construction.=
&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o=
:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">On the other hand if the attacker tries to replay entir=
e sequence of CML values, he cannot still , because notice that verifier al=
so has a secret share of RND-1 and participates
 in the reconstruction of RND-3.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" clas=
s=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Verifier=92s share of RND-3 is never on wire , so attac=
ker cannot just observe the packet traces to reuse and replay it.&nbsp;</sp=
an><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span>=
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family:=
 Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Total Replay of POT data (Replaying compl=
ete RND-2)</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Another trick, attacker could do is by completely reusi=
ng RND-2 (but not intermediate CML values)</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">In order to prevent the =93Reply Attacks=94 , we recomm=
end that the RND-2 (generated per packet) be a combination (I.e. RND2 =3D =
=93Time Stamp &#43; RND number=94)</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" cl=
ass=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">So in case a passive attacker tries to replay one of th=
e correct but older RND-2, the verifier first could check the current times=
tamp against the timestamp retrieved from
 RND-2.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></=
o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">If the retrieved timestamp is older than current timest=
amp we drop/raise a flag !&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" clas=
s=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">There is still a small window , where the attacker coul=
d replay it within the valid time slice itself but by carefully choosing th=
e time slice we can make it nearly impossible
 for the attacker to replay.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D=
""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">For example , if the Time Stamp chosen is 32 bits , we =
could get one seconds level precision in the time window . So it is highly =
impossible for the attacker to replay
 within such a small time at such a high packet rates.&nbsp;</span><span la=
ng=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Also , the verifier could cache, if needed, certain num=
ber of previously used RND-2 to mitigate replay attacks.&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Hope this clarifies.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" s=
tyle=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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From nobody Tue Sep  6 03:55:37 2016
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From: Shunsuke Homma <homma.shunsuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sfc/c17RVXl1ZPVZxldRmttFzQwiQxQ>
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Hi Jim and editors,

I've read the latest nsh draft, and I have a comment for the section 4.
I think that "Update NSH" would be correct as sub-title of the third 
action in this section because the sentence includes an action related 
with update of context headers. Also, "Update NSH" is used in Figure 8.

Best regards,
Shunsuke

On 2016/08/24 1:48, Jim Guichard (jguichar) wrote:
> Dear WG:
>
> Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure that your comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.
>
> Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the next two weeks so that this work can be progressed.
>
> As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold an interim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues
>
>
> Thanks!
>
> Jim, Martin, & Thomas
>
>
>
>
> On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>>
>>        Title           : Network Service Header
>>        Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>                          Uri Elzur
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>> 	Pages           : 37
>> 	Date            : 2016-08-23
>>
>> Abstract:
>>   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>
>>
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>
>


-- 
----------------------------------
Shunsuke Homma
<homma.shunsuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
TEL: +81 422 59 3486
FAX: +81 422 60 7460

NTT Network Service Systems Labs.
Musashino city, Tokyo, Japan
----------------------------------



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To: "Jim Guichard (jguichar)" <jguichar@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
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I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
The document says,=20
    The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howeve=
r the=09
    control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...

If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD set =
the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to do.
It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane tel=
ls it to, but that's not what the words say.

I think wording like this might help:
    The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by config=
uration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOULD=
 default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other =
SI values.

Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the classifi=
er in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
    The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome.

Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assuming a =
control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about control=
 plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUST se=
t the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classificatio=
n."


-Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jguichar=
)
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
To: sfc@ietf.org
Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt

Dear WG:

Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure that y=
our comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20

Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the nex=
t two weeks so that this work can be progressed.

As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold an i=
nterim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues


Thanks!

Jim, Martin, & Thomas




On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-boun=
ces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directo=
ries.
>This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>
>        Title           : Network Service Header
>        Authors         : Paul Quinn
>                          Uri Elzur
>	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>	Pages           : 37
>	Date            : 2016-08-23
>
>Abstract:
>   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>
>
>The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>
>There's also a htmlized version available at:
>https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>
>A diff from the previous version is available at:
>https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>
>
>Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissi=
on
>until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
>Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
>_______________________________________________
>sfc mailing list
>sfc@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
_______________________________________________
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc


From nobody Tue Sep  6 11:24:52 2016
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From: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>
To: "mohamed.boucadair@orange.com" <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>, "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
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Do the authors have a response to this question?
I'm also wondering about whether the 'C' flag might be for the administrato=
r vs. IANA.


-----Original Message-----
From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of mohamed.boucadair@oran=
ge.com
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 11:40 AM
To: Paul Quinn (paulq); sfc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sfc] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt

Hi Paul,

I have a comment about this text:

   Type: the Type field is split into two ranges - 0 to 127 for non-
   critical options and 128-255 for critical options.  While the value
   allocation is the responsibility of the MD Class owner, critical
   options MUST NOT be allocated from the 0 to 127 range and non-
   critical options MUST NOT be allocated from the 128-255 range.

* Do you have an example of metadata that is critical for all chains, all d=
eployments?
* Wouldn't be more appropriate to have one single registry for "type" with =
C-bit be a configurable parameter to be set by the administrator of the SFC=
-enabled domain?

Thank you.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] De la part de Paul Quinn (paulq)
> Envoy=E9=A0: mardi 23 ao=FBt 2016 16:02
> =C0=A0: sfc@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: [sfc] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
>=20
> Dear WG,
>=20
> This version includes much of the feedback/review/comments from this list=
.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> > Begin forwarded message:
> >
> > From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> > Subject: [sfc] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
> > Date: August 23, 2016 at 9:54:21 AM EDT
> > To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> > Cc: sfc@ietf.org
> >
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> > This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
> >
> >        Title           : Network Service Header
> >        Authors         : Paul Quinn
> >                          Uri Elzur
> > 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
> > 	Pages           : 37
> > 	Date            : 2016-08-23
> >
> > Abstract:
> >   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
> >   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
> >   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
> >   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
> >   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
> >
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
> >
> > There's also a htmlized version available at:
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06
> >
> > A diff from the previous version is available at:
> > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06
> >
> >
> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > sfc mailing list
> > sfc@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc

_______________________________________________
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From: "Duarte Cardoso, Igor" <igor.duarte.cardoso@intel.com>
To: "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Hi SFC WG,

I have some comments and trivial corrections to provide to draft-ietf-sfc-n=
sh-07.

- "confidentially" should be "confidentiality" in both of its occurrences;

- At the end of section 9:
	- "describe in" should be "described in"
	- "MD-2" should be "MD-Type 2"

- Also consider converging to either "MD Type" or "MD-Type", as both seem t=
o be used throughout the draft;


- Section 3.3:

- "SI SHOULD be used in conjunction with SPI for SFP selection and for dete=
rmining the next SFF/SF in the path":

	Two comments:

		- The statement (and the rest of the paragraph) seems to be about the for=
warding side of NSH (forwarding/SFFs) However, it also seems to be about th=
e classification side of NSH (classification/Classifiers) as they are the l=
ogical elements which, with the influence of different SPI+SI, choose the n=
ext SFP (specifically, the next SPI). Can this perhaps be clarified?

		- Assuming SFP is the concrete network path that will be taken to reach t=
he next SF, which may be 1 of many possible SFPs for the same SPI/SI combin=
ation, then the statement seems to imply that SI+SPI allow for SFP selectio=
n AND determining the next SFF/SF. However, the latter is a consequence of =
the former. I believe the following would better reflect the intended objec=
tive of  the original statement:

		"SI SHOULD be used in conjunction with SPI for SFP selection and, consequ=
ently, determining the next SFF/SF in the path".

- "When an SPI and SI do not correspond to a valid next Service Function pa=
th"

	If my above assumption regarding 1 of many possible SFPs being possible fo=
r the same SPI/SI combination is incorrect, then this statement seems to im=
ply that SPI and SIs together map to a SFP, but in reality they together ma=
p to a SF.
	If so, I believe that the following would better reflect the intended obje=
ctive of the original statement:

	"When an SPI and SI do not correspond to a valid next hop of a Service Fun=
ction".


Any questions or requests for clarifications, just ask.

Best regards,
Igor.


-----Original Message-----
From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dave Dolson
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 7:21 PM
To: Jim Guichard (jguichar) <jguichar@cisco.com>; sfc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt

I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
The document says,=20
    The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howeve=
r the=09
    control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...

If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD set =
the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to do.
It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane tel=
ls it to, but that's not what the words say.

I think wording like this might help:
    The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by config=
uration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOULD=
 default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other =
SI values.

Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the classifi=
er in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
    The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome.

Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assuming a =
control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about control=
 plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUST se=
t the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classificatio=
n."


-Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jguichar=
)
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
To: sfc@ietf.org
Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt

Dear WG:

Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure that y=
our comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20

Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the nex=
t two weeks so that this work can be progressed.

As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold an i=
nterim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues


Thanks!

Jim, Martin, & Thomas




On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-boun=
ces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directo=
ries.
>This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>
>        Title           : Network Service Header
>        Authors         : Paul Quinn
>                          Uri Elzur
>	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>	Pages           : 37
>	Date            : 2016-08-23
>
>Abstract:
>   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>
>
>The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>
>There's also a htmlized version available at:
>https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>
>A diff from the previous version is available at:
>https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>
>
>Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of=20
>submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf=
.org.
>
>Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
>_______________________________________________
>sfc mailing list
>sfc@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
_______________________________________________
sfc mailing list
sfc@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc

_______________________________________________
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc


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From: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
To: "mohamed.boucadair@orange.com" <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Med,

Med, as always, thank you for your review.


> On Aug 26, 2016, at 5:31 AM, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
>=20
> Hi Jim, all,
>=20
> Likewise, I would like to see this document progress as well.=20
>=20
> In addition to the comment raised in a separate message about the C-bit o=
f TLVs, I have the following comments:
>=20
> (1) Section 2: I suggest to delete the following sentence:=20
>=20
>   NSH is designed to be easy to implement across a range of devices,
>   both physical and virtual, including hardware platforms.
>=20
> Reason: the use of "easy to implement" should be justified if that text i=
s maintained. Otherwise, this is subjective.=20
>=20
> or to reword it as follows:=20
>=20
>   "NSH can be implemented in both physical and virtual platforms."

PQ>  The "easy to implement" is a reference to the nature of type-1 and how=
, as noted by hardware implementors, this vastly simplifies implementation.=
  Further, the language is widely used in RFCs (e.g. 7321, 3160, etc.).

>=20
> (2) Section 2.3: I suggest to change this OLD text:
>=20
> The semantics of
>       the shared metadata is communicated via a control plane, which is
>       outside the scope of this document, to participating nodes.
>=20
> NEW:
>=20
> The semantics of=20
> the shared metadata is communicated via a control plane (Section 3.3 of [=
I-D.ietf-sfc-control-plane]).
>=20

PQ>  Proposed text: "The semantics of the shared metadata is communicated v=
ia a control plane, which is outside the scope of this document, to partici=
pating nodes.  [ietf-sfc-control-plane] provides an example of such in sect=
ion 3.3.


> (3) Section 2.3- Not sure I would maintain this text:=20
>=20
>   5.  NSH offers a common and standards-based header for service
>       chaining to all network and service nodes.
>=20
> "to all" is not accurate as "legacy" nodes are still there. =20
>=20

PQ>  Given that "legacy" nodes are supported via proxy, this is indeed true=
.


> (4) Section 2.3:
>=20
> OLD:
> Transport Agnostic: NSH is transport independent and is often
>       carried via a network transport protocol,
>=20
> NEW:
> Transport Agnostic: NSH is transport independent. Any network transport p=
rotocol can be used to transport NSH-encapsulated traffic.


PQ>  Proposed text: NSH is transport independent. An appropriate (for a giv=
en deployment) network transport protocol can be used to transport NSH-enca=
psulated traffic.


>=20
> (5) Section 3.2:
>=20
>   NSH implementations MUST support MD-Type =3D 0x1, and SHOULD support
>   MD- Type =3D 0x2.
>=20
> Because:
> * of potential interoperability issues.
> * MD#2 is more compact when no metadata is to be supplied
> * MD#2 allows to convey more information compared to MD#1
>=20
> I suggest we revisit that sentence to have MD#2 be mandatory to be suppor=
ted (my favorite option), or at least require that both MDs defined in this=
 spec MUST be supported.=20
>=20
PQ>  As per the previous discussion, this MUST/SHOULD reflect the practical=
 reality of implementation and helps ensure deployability. =20



> (6) Section 3.2:
>=20
>   C bit: Indicates that a critical metadata TLV is present.  This bit
>   acts as an indication for hardware implementers to decide how to
>   handle the presence of a critical TLV without necessarily needing to
>   parse all TLVs present.  For an MD Type of 0x1 (i.e. no variable
>   length metadata is present), the C bit MUST be set to 0x0.
>=20
> 6.1. What is the behavior of the implementation if C-bit is set but not c=
ritical metadata is found in the payload?
> 6.2. What is the behavior of the implementation if C-bit is unset but a c=
ritical metadata is found in the payload?
> 6.3. What is the behavior of the implementation with regards to this bit =
if a critical metadata is added in-path?
> 6.4. What is the behavior of the implementation with regards to this bit =
if a critical metadata is stripped in-path?  =20
> 6.5. Should the specification recommend an order of metadata so that crit=
ical metadata are always positioned first?

PQ> =20

6.1: essentially continue "as is" with an optional warning message
6.2: generate an warning error, possibly set C
6.3: the adder sets C
6.4: the remover clears C
6.5: no, this creates too many limitations/complexity.  An implementation m=
ight opt to optimize. =20


>=20
> (7) Section 3.3: The following text=20
>=20
> " ... however the
>   control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate
>   (i.e. taking into account the length of the service function path). "
>=20
> is not aligned with the outcome of the discussion we had during the WG LC=
 of draft-ietf-sfc-control-plane (https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sfc=
/current/msg04594.html):
>=20
>   The control plane must instruct the classifier about the initial
>   values of the Service Index (SI).
>=20

PQ>  The control plane can assign but NSH provides a default value recommen=
dation, I'm not sure there's a conflict.


> 7.1. I suggest to modify NSH draft accordingly.=20

PQ>  I'm not clear what you are suggesting?

> 7.2. Please consider adding a reference to draft-ietf-sfc-control-plane

PQ>  I'll update.

>=20
> (8) Section 3.4: I still do think this section is underspecified. E.g.,=20
>=20
> 8.1. The use of "Mandatory Context Header" conflicts with this text in Se=
ction 3:
>=20
>   A Network Service Header (NSH) contains service path information and
>   optionally metadata that are added to a packet or frame and used to
>   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>   create a service plane.
>=20
> 8.2. The specification does not forbid that all context headers are set t=
o zero. Otherwise, MD#2 should be used instead.


PQ>  In either care, 1 or 2, no metadata is valid: all zeroes in type 1 or =
no data in type 2. =20


> 8.3. The specification does not specify how these context headers are to =
be validated.=20

PQ>  By validated, so you mean cryptographically asserted, or simply compar=
ed to known value?  In either case, that is outside of the scope of this dr=
aft.


> 8.4. I still don't understand why four headers are chosen. =20

PQ>  As per previous discussions, based experience, use case and implementa=
tion, four strikes a balance. The widespread implementations of type 1 supp=
ort this.


>=20
> (9) Section 3.5.1:
>=20
> The length of "Metadata Class" is over-dimensioned. I suggest to reduce t=
he length of this field and increase the length of "Type".
>=20
> For example, let's consider the proposal in https://tools.ietf.org/html/d=
raft-napper-sfc-nsh-broadband-allocation-00#section-4.2:=20
>=20
>    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>   |     TLV Class =3D 3GPP          |C|    Type     |R|R|R|   Len   |
>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>   |    Data ...
>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>=20
>                         Figure 5: TLV Allocation
>=20
>   The intended use of the header is for TLVs associated with 3GPP Radio
>   Access Networks as described in [TS.29.230].  This TLV can be used by
>   3GPP to extend the metadata as per use cases.  Having this TLV helps
>   to carry more information that does not fit within the MD Type 0x01.
>=20
> The list of codes in Table 7.1 of TS.29.230 cannot be conveyed with a "Ty=
pe" field of 7 bits.

PQ>  At this point, the allocation seems reasonable, provides for a large r=
ange of "owners", and the TLV schemes proposed work within this scope.

>=20
> (10) Section 4:=20
>=20
> OLD:
>=20
> +---------------+------------------+-------+----------------+---------+
> |                |  Insert         |Select |   Update       |Service  |
> |                |  or remove NSH  |Service|    NSH         |policy   |
> |                |                 |Function|               |selection|
> | Component      +--------+--------+Path   +----------------+         |
> |                |        |        |       | Dec.   |Update |         |
> |                | Insert | Remove |       |Service |Context|         |
> |                |        |        |       | Index  |Header |         |
> +----------------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> |                |   +    |   +    |       |        |   +   |         |
> |Classifier      |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> |Service Function|        |   +    |  +    |        |       |         |
> |Forwarder(SFF)  |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> |Service         |        |        |       |   +    |   +   |   +     |
> |Function  (SF)  |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> |SFC Proxy       |   +    |   +    |       |   +    |       |         |
> +----------------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
>=20
> NEW:
>=20
> +---------------+------------------+-------+----------------+---------+
> |                |  Insert         |Select |   Update       |Service  |
> |                |  or remove NSH  |Service|    NSH         |policy   |
> |                |                 |Function|               |selection|
> | Component      +--------+--------+Path   +----------------+         |
> |                |        |        |       | Dec.   |Update |         |
> |                | Insert | Remove |       |Service |Context|         |
> |                |        |        |       | Index  |Header |         |
> +----------------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> |                |   +    |   +    |       |        |   +   |         |
> |Classifier      |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> |Service Function|        |   +    |  +    |        |       |         |
> |Forwarder(SFF)  |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> |Service         |        |        |       |   +    |   +   |   +     |
> |Function  (SF)  |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> |SFC Proxy       |   +    |   +    |       |   +    |   +   |         |
> +----------------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+

PQ>  Just to be clear (formatting was a bit off in the email):

In the last line, SFC Proxy, add "Update Context Header"?

>=20
> (11) Section 7.2: Please consider adding an IPv6 example.

PQ>  Happily.  =


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.

        Title           : Hierarchical Service Function Chaining (hSFC)
        Authors         : David Dolson
                          Shunsuke Homma
                          Diego R. Lopez
                          Mohamed Boucadair
                          Dapeng Liu
                          Ting Ao
                          Vu Anh Vu
	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-hierarchical-01.txt
	Pages           : 25
	Date            : 2016-09-13

Abstract:
   Hierarchical Service Function Chaining (hSFC) is a network
   architecture allowing an organization to compartmentalize a large-
   scale network into multiple domains of administration.

   The goals of hSFC are to make a large-scale network easier to reason
   about, simpler to control and to able support independent functional
   groups within large operators.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-hierarchical/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-hierarchical-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sfc-hierarchical-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
To: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Cc: "Jim Guichard \(jguichar\)" <jguichar@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Dave,

Thanks for these suggestions/clarifications, I can see how this might be mi=
sinterpreted.

My concern is with the work "configuration" in the first sentence since it =
might imply the need for configuration vs default.  So a minor tweak:

"The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values for a gi=
ven classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD default to =
255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other SI values."

Paul

> On Sep 6, 2016, at 2:21 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>=20
> I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
> The document says,=20
>    The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howev=
er the=09
>    control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...
>=20
> If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD se=
t the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to do=
.
> It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane t=
ells it to, but that's not what the words say.
>=20
> I think wording like this might help:
>    The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values.
>=20
> Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the classi=
fier in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
>    The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by conf=
iguration for the classification outcome.
>=20
> Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assuming =
a control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about contr=
ol plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUST =
set the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classificat=
ion."
>=20
>=20
> -Dave
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jguich=
ar)
> Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
> To: sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> Dear WG:
>=20
> Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure that=
 your comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20
>=20
> Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the n=
ext two weeks so that this work can be progressed.
>=20
> As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold an=
 interim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues
>=20
>=20
> Thanks!
>=20
> Jim, Martin, & Thomas
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-bo=
unces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direc=
tories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>>=20
>>       Title           : Network Service Header
>>       Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>                         Uri Elzur
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>> 	Pages           : 37
>> 	Date            : 2016-08-23
>>=20
>> Abstract:
>>  This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>  packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>  provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>  service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>  Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>=20
>>=20
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>=20
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>=20
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>=20
>>=20
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submis=
sion
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>=20
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20
> _______________________________________________
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From: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
To: "Duarte Cardoso, Igor" <igor.duarte.cardoso@intel.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Igor,

Thank you for your comments.  Please see inline.

> On Sep 7, 2016, at 12:31 PM, Duarte Cardoso, Igor <igor.duarte.cardoso@in=
tel.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi SFC WG,
>=20
> I have some comments and trivial corrections to provide to draft-ietf-sfc=
-nsh-07.
>=20
> - "confidentially" should be "confidentiality" in both of its occurrences=
;
>=20
> - At the end of section 9:
> 	- "describe in" should be "described in"
> 	- "MD-2" should be "MD-Type 2"
>=20
> - Also consider converging to either "MD Type" or "MD-Type", as both seem=
 to be used throughout the draft;
>=20

PQ> Thank you, all of the above have been updated.


>=20
> - Section 3.3:
>=20
> - "SI SHOULD be used in conjunction with SPI for SFP selection and for de=
termining the next SFF/SF in the path":
>=20
> 	Two comments:
>=20
> 		- The statement (and the rest of the paragraph) seems to be about the f=
orwarding side of NSH (forwarding/SFFs) However, it also seems to be about =
the classification side of NSH (classification/Classifiers) as they are the=
 logical elements which, with the influence of different SPI+SI, choose the=
 next SFP (specifically, the next SPI). Can this perhaps be clarified?
>=20
> 		- Assuming SFP is the concrete network path that will be taken to reach=
 the next SF, which may be 1 of many possible SFPs for the same SPI/SI comb=
ination, then the statement seems to imply that SI+SPI allow for SFP select=
ion AND determining the next SFF/SF. However, the latter is a consequence o=
f the former. I believe the following would better reflect the intended obj=
ective of  the original statement:
>=20
> 		"SI SHOULD be used in conjunction with SPI for SFP selection and, conse=
quently, determining the next SFF/SF in the path".

PQ>  I'm fine with this clarification. =20



>=20
> - "When an SPI and SI do not correspond to a valid next Service Function =
path"
>=20
> 	If my above assumption regarding 1 of many possible SFPs being possible =
for the same SPI/SI combination is incorrect, then this statement seems to =
imply that SPI and SIs together map to a SFP, but in reality they together =
map to a SF.
> 	If so, I believe that the following would better reflect the intended ob=
jective of the original statement:
>=20
> 	"When an SPI and SI do not correspond to a valid next hop of a Service F=
unction".

PQ>  I think this has a slightly different meaning but I do see your point.=
  Perhaps:

"When an SPI and SI do not correspond to a valid next hop in a SFP"




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From: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>
To: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Yes, that is good. How do you feel about adding another "configured"?

"The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values configur=
ed for a given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD =
default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other S=
I values."


-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 12:34 PM
To: Dave Dolson
Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt

Dave,

Thanks for these suggestions/clarifications, I can see how this might be mi=
sinterpreted.

My concern is with the work "configuration" in the first sentence since it =
might imply the need for configuration vs default.  So a minor tweak:

"The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values for a gi=
ven classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD default to =
255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other SI values."

Paul

> On Sep 6, 2016, at 2:21 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>=20
> I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
> The document says,=20
>    The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howev=
er the=09
>    control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...
>=20
> If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD se=
t the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to do=
.
> It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane t=
ells it to, but that's not what the words say.
>=20
> I think wording like this might help:
>    The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values.
>=20
> Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the classi=
fier in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
>    The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by conf=
iguration for the classification outcome.
>=20
> Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assuming =
a control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about contr=
ol plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUST =
set the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classificat=
ion."
>=20
>=20
> -Dave
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jguich=
ar)
> Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
> To: sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> Dear WG:
>=20
> Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure that=
 your comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20
>=20
> Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the n=
ext two weeks so that this work can be progressed.
>=20
> As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold an=
 interim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues
>=20
>=20
> Thanks!
>=20
> Jim, Martin, & Thomas
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-bo=
unces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direc=
tories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>>=20
>>       Title           : Network Service Header
>>       Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>                         Uri Elzur
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>> 	Pages           : 37
>> 	Date            : 2016-08-23
>>=20
>> Abstract:
>>  This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>  packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>  provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>  service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>  Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>=20
>>=20
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>=20
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>=20
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>=20
>>=20
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submis=
sion
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>=20
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc


From nobody Wed Sep 14 10:18:27 2016
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From: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>
To: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>, "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Sorry, I see I didn't properly read your concern about "configuration" in t=
he first sentence.  I guess I don't understand your concern. Surely the SPI=
 and SI are configured, although SI may default to 255.

-Dave


-----Original Message-----
From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dave Dolson
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:16 PM
To: Paul Quinn (paulq)
Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt

Yes, that is good. How do you feel about adding another "configured"?

"The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values configur=
ed for a given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD =
default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other S=
I values."


-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 12:34 PM
To: Dave Dolson
Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt

Dave,

Thanks for these suggestions/clarifications, I can see how this might be mi=
sinterpreted.

My concern is with the work "configuration" in the first sentence since it =
might imply the need for configuration vs default.  So a minor tweak:

"The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values for a gi=
ven classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD default to =
255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other SI values."

Paul

> On Sep 6, 2016, at 2:21 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>=20
> I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
> The document says,=20
>    The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howev=
er the=09
>    control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...
>=20
> If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD se=
t the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to do=
.
> It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane t=
ells it to, but that's not what the words say.
>=20
> I think wording like this might help:
>    The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values.
>=20
> Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the classi=
fier in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
>    The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by conf=
iguration for the classification outcome.
>=20
> Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assuming =
a control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about contr=
ol plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUST =
set the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classificat=
ion."
>=20
>=20
> -Dave
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jguich=
ar)
> Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
> To: sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> Dear WG:
>=20
> Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure that=
 your comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20
>=20
> Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the n=
ext two weeks so that this work can be progressed.
>=20
> As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold an=
 interim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues
>=20
>=20
> Thanks!
>=20
> Jim, Martin, & Thomas
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-bo=
unces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direc=
tories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>>=20
>>       Title           : Network Service Header
>>       Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>                         Uri Elzur
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>> 	Pages           : 37
>> 	Date            : 2016-08-23
>>=20
>> Abstract:
>>  This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>  packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>  provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>  service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>  Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>=20
>>=20
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>=20
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>=20
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>=20
>>=20
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submis=
sion
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>=20
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc

_______________________________________________
sfc mailing list
sfc@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc


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From: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
To: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
Thread-Index: AQHR/V4l7FibCE2gCkSX9qAjBx/2X6Bs1tLAgAzNy4D//7c6oIAAAQNggABVt4A=
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 17:23:44 +0000
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References: <98638C8E-3C9D-4C87-AA1F-90E95A3F001C@cisco.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310A3520@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <7BF086FE-BE2A-4CB6-9C8C-67432F40C414@cisco.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310B5A75@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310B5A9A@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com>
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Cc: "Jim Guichard \(jguichar\)" <jguichar@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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I suggest omitting that "configured" (i.e. the one in the first sentence) s=
ince it implies an explicit configuration vs. a default (by which I mean be=
havior absent of an explicit configuration).  For SPI this isn't true (i.e.=
 you need explicit config) but the point the original text was trying to ma=
ke was that, for SI, no explicitly config is needed, although it can be sup=
plied.




> On Sep 14, 2016, at 1:18 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>=20
> Sorry, I see I didn't properly read your concern about "configuration" in=
 the first sentence.  I guess I don't understand your concern. Surely the S=
PI and SI are configured, although SI may default to 255.
>=20
> -Dave
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dave Dolson
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:16 PM
> To: Paul Quinn (paulq)
> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> Yes, that is good. How do you feel about adding another "configured"?
>=20
> "The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values config=
ured for a given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values."
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 12:34 PM
> To: Dave Dolson
> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> Dave,
>=20
> Thanks for these suggestions/clarifications, I can see how this might be =
misinterpreted.
>=20
> My concern is with the work "configuration" in the first sentence since i=
t might imply the need for configuration vs default.  So a minor tweak:
>=20
> "The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values for a =
given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD default t=
o 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other SI values.=
"
>=20
> Paul
>=20
>> On Sep 6, 2016, at 2:21 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
>> The document says,=20
>>   The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howev=
er the=09
>>   control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...
>>=20
>> If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD s=
et the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to d=
o.
>> It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane =
tells it to, but that's not what the words say.
>>=20
>> I think wording like this might help:
>>   The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values.
>>=20
>> Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the class=
ifier in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
>>   The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by conf=
iguration for the classification outcome.
>>=20
>> Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assuming=
 a control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about cont=
rol plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUST=
 set the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classifica=
tion."
>>=20
>>=20
>> -Dave
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jguic=
har)
>> Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
>> To: sfc@ietf.org
>> Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>=20
>> Dear WG:
>>=20
>> Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure tha=
t your comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20
>>=20
>> Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the =
next two weeks so that this work can be progressed.
>>=20
>> As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold a=
n interim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues
>>=20
>>=20
>> Thanks!
>>=20
>> Jim, Martin, & Thomas
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-b=
ounces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dire=
ctories.
>>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>>>=20
>>>      Title           : Network Service Header
>>>      Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>>                        Uri Elzur
>>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>> 	Pages           : 37
>>> 	Date            : 2016-08-23
>>>=20
>>> Abstract:
>>> This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>> packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>> provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>> service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>> Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>>=20
>>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>=20
>>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submi=
ssion
>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>=20
>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sfc mailing list
>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc


From nobody Wed Sep 14 10:28:57 2016
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From: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>
To: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
Thread-Index: AQHR/V4l7FibCE2gCkSX9qAjBx/2X6Bs1tLAgAzNy4D//7c6oIAAAQNggABVt4D//6zJ0A==
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 17:28:51 +0000
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References: <98638C8E-3C9D-4C87-AA1F-90E95A3F001C@cisco.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310A3520@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <7BF086FE-BE2A-4CB6-9C8C-67432F40C414@cisco.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310B5A75@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310B5A9A@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <E44761AA-AD99-407A-9C36-0F53F3D32609@cisco.com>
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Cc: "Jim Guichard \(jguichar\)" <jguichar@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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OK, I see, yes. This is in the paragraph describing the SI.

Will you update the SPI section ?



-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:24 PM
To: Dave Dolson
Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt

I suggest omitting that "configured" (i.e. the one in the first sentence) s=
ince it implies an explicit configuration vs. a default (by which I mean be=
havior absent of an explicit configuration).  For SPI this isn't true (i.e.=
 you need explicit config) but the point the original text was trying to ma=
ke was that, for SI, no explicitly config is needed, although it can be sup=
plied.




> On Sep 14, 2016, at 1:18 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>=20
> Sorry, I see I didn't properly read your concern about "configuration" in=
 the first sentence.  I guess I don't understand your concern. Surely the S=
PI and SI are configured, although SI may default to 255.
>=20
> -Dave
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dave Dolson
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:16 PM
> To: Paul Quinn (paulq)
> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> Yes, that is good. How do you feel about adding another "configured"?
>=20
> "The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values config=
ured for a given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values."
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 12:34 PM
> To: Dave Dolson
> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> Dave,
>=20
> Thanks for these suggestions/clarifications, I can see how this might be =
misinterpreted.
>=20
> My concern is with the work "configuration" in the first sentence since i=
t might imply the need for configuration vs default.  So a minor tweak:
>=20
> "The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values for a =
given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD default t=
o 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other SI values.=
"
>=20
> Paul
>=20
>> On Sep 6, 2016, at 2:21 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
>> The document says,=20
>>   The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howev=
er the=09
>>   control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...
>>=20
>> If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD s=
et the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to d=
o.
>> It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane =
tells it to, but that's not what the words say.
>>=20
>> I think wording like this might help:
>>   The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values.
>>=20
>> Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the class=
ifier in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
>>   The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by conf=
iguration for the classification outcome.=09
>>=20
>> Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assuming=
 a control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about cont=
rol plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUST=
 set the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classifica=
tion."
>>=20
>>=20
>> -Dave
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jguic=
har)
>> Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
>> To: sfc@ietf.org
>> Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>=20
>> Dear WG:
>>=20
>> Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure tha=
t your comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20
>>=20
>> Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the =
next two weeks so that this work can be progressed.
>>=20
>> As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold a=
n interim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues
>>=20
>>=20
>> Thanks!
>>=20
>> Jim, Martin, & Thomas
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-b=
ounces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dire=
ctories.
>>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>>>=20
>>>      Title           : Network Service Header
>>>      Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>>                        Uri Elzur
>>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>> 	Pages           : 37
>>> 	Date            : 2016-08-23
>>>=20
>>> Abstract:
>>> This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>> packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>> provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>> service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>> Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>>=20
>>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>=20
>>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submi=
ssion
>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>=20
>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sfc mailing list
>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc


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From: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
To: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Cc: "Jim Guichard \(jguichar\)" <jguichar@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Yes, I think it's reasonable to add similar text there as well:

"The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI for a given classifica=
tion result."

I believe that encompasses configured vs. default which is appropriate, IMO=
, in this section.


> On Sep 14, 2016, at 1:28 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>=20
> OK, I see, yes. This is in the paragraph describing the SI.
>=20
> Will you update the SPI section ?
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:24 PM
> To: Dave Dolson
> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> I suggest omitting that "configured" (i.e. the one in the first sentence)=
 since it implies an explicit configuration vs. a default (by which I mean =
behavior absent of an explicit configuration).  For SPI this isn't true (i.=
e. you need explicit config) but the point the original text was trying to =
make was that, for SI, no explicitly config is needed, although it can be s=
upplied.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Sep 14, 2016, at 1:18 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> Sorry, I see I didn't properly read your concern about "configuration" i=
n the first sentence.  I guess I don't understand your concern. Surely the =
SPI and SI are configured, although SI may default to 255.
>>=20
>> -Dave
>>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dave Dolson
>> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:16 PM
>> To: Paul Quinn (paulq)
>> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>=20
>> Yes, that is good. How do you feel about adding another "configured"?
>>=20
>> "The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values confi=
gured for a given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOU=
LD default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of othe=
r SI values."
>>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
>> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 12:34 PM
>> To: Dave Dolson
>> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>=20
>> Dave,
>>=20
>> Thanks for these suggestions/clarifications, I can see how this might be=
 misinterpreted.
>>=20
>> My concern is with the work "configuration" in the first sentence since =
it might imply the need for configuration vs default.  So a minor tweak:
>>=20
>> "The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values for a=
 given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD default =
to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other SI values=
."
>>=20
>> Paul
>>=20
>>> On Sep 6, 2016, at 2:21 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
>>> The document says,=20
>>>  The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howev=
er the=09
>>>  control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...
>>>=20
>>> If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD =
set the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to =
do.
>>> It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane=
 tells it to, but that's not what the words say.
>>>=20
>>> I think wording like this might help:
>>>  The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values.
>>>=20
>>> Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the clas=
sifier in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
>>>  The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by conf=
iguration for the classification outcome.=09
>>>=20
>>> Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assumin=
g a control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about con=
trol plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUS=
T set the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classific=
ation."
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> -Dave
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jgui=
char)
>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
>>> To: sfc@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>>=20
>>> Dear WG:
>>>=20
>>> Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure th=
at your comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20
>>>=20
>>> Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the=
 next two weeks so that this work can be progressed.
>>>=20
>>> As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold =
an interim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Thanks!
>>>=20
>>> Jim, Martin, & Thomas
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-=
bounces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dir=
ectories.
>>>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF=
.
>>>>=20
>>>>     Title           : Network Service Header
>>>>     Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>>>                       Uri Elzur
>>>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>>> 	Pages           : 37
>>>> 	Date            : 2016-08-23
>>>>=20
>>>> Abstract:
>>>> This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>>> packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>>> provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>>> service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>>> Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>>>=20
>>>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>>=20
>>>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of subm=
ission
>>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>>=20
>>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> sfc mailing list
>>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sfc mailing list
>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sfc mailing list
>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20


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From: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>
To: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 17:37:57 +0000
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References: <98638C8E-3C9D-4C87-AA1F-90E95A3F001C@cisco.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310A3520@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <7BF086FE-BE2A-4CB6-9C8C-67432F40C414@cisco.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310B5A75@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310B5A9A@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <E44761AA-AD99-407A-9C36-0F53F3D32609@cisco.com> <E8355113905631478EFF04F5AA706E98310B5B6C@wtl-exchp-2.sandvine.com> <AEC9D471-B8FF-4137-93D7-5F68C29A54CC@cisco.com>
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Cc: "Jim Guichard \(jguichar\)" <jguichar@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:35 PM
To: Dave Dolson
Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt

Yes, I think it's reasonable to add similar text there as well:

"The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI for a given classifica=
tion result."

I believe that encompasses configured vs. default which is appropriate, IMO=
, in this section.


> On Sep 14, 2016, at 1:28 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>=20
> OK, I see, yes. This is in the paragraph describing the SI.
>=20
> Will you update the SPI section ?
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:24 PM
> To: Dave Dolson
> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> I suggest omitting that "configured" (i.e. the one in the first sentence)=
 since it implies an explicit configuration vs. a default (by which I mean =
behavior absent of an explicit configuration).  For SPI this isn't true (i.=
e. you need explicit config) but the point the original text was trying to =
make was that, for SI, no explicitly config is needed, although it can be s=
upplied.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Sep 14, 2016, at 1:18 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> Sorry, I see I didn't properly read your concern about "configuration" i=
n the first sentence.  I guess I don't understand your concern. Surely the =
SPI and SI are configured, although SI may default to 255.
>>=20
>> -Dave
>>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dave Dolson
>> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 1:16 PM
>> To: Paul Quinn (paulq)
>> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>=20
>> Yes, that is good. How do you feel about adding another "configured"?
>>=20
>> "The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values confi=
gured for a given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOU=
LD default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of othe=
r SI values."
>>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]=20
>> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 12:34 PM
>> To: Dave Dolson
>> Cc: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>=20
>> Dave,
>>=20
>> Thanks for these suggestions/clarifications, I can see how this might be=
 misinterpreted.
>>=20
>> My concern is with the work "configuration" in the first sentence since =
it might imply the need for configuration vs default.  So a minor tweak:
>>=20
>> "The initial classifier MUST set the appropriate SPI and SI values for a=
 given classification result.  The initial SI configuration SHOULD default =
to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other SI values=
."
>>=20
>> Paul
>>=20
>>> On Sep 6, 2016, at 2:21 PM, Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> I have a comment on the specification of Service Index (SI).
>>> The document says,=20
>>>  The initial classifier for a given SFP SHOULD set the SI to 255, howev=
er the=09
>>>  control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate...
>>>=20
>>> If you read this literally, it seems to say that the classifier SHOULD =
set the initial SI to 255 regardless of what the control plane tells it to =
do.
>>> It is perhaps implied that the classifier MAY do what the control plane=
 tells it to, but that's not what the words say.
>>>=20
>>> I think wording like this might help:
>>>  The initial classifier MUST set the SI to the value specified by confi=
guration for the classification outcome. The initial SI configuration SHOUL=
D default to 255. However, the classifier MUST allow configuration of other=
 SI values.
>>>=20
>>> Similar wording should apply to the SPI; nothing is said about the clas=
sifier in the paragraph about SPI. I suggest:
>>>  The initial classifier MUST set the SPI to the value specified by conf=
iguration for the classification outcome.=09
>>>=20
>>> Note, I've said "configuration" instead of "control plane". I'm assumin=
g a control plane will do configuration. If you just want to talk about con=
trol plane, then there is no need for any default, just "The classifier MUS=
T set the SET to the value specified by the control plane for the classific=
ation."
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> -Dave
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim Guichard (jgui=
char)
>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 12:48 PM
>>> To: sfc@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>>=20
>>> Dear WG:
>>>=20
>>> Please review this new version of the SFC encapsulation to make sure th=
at your comments from the previous WGLC have been addressed.=20
>>>=20
>>> Any comments and/or concerns please post to the mailing list within the=
 next two weeks so that this work can be progressed.
>>>=20
>>> As a heads up, if there are still substantive comments we plan to hold =
an interim meeting on September 15th to address any outstanding issues
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Thanks!
>>>=20
>>> Jim, Martin, & Thomas
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On 8/23/16, 11:47 AM, "sfc on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org" <sfc-=
bounces@ietf.org on behalf of internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dir=
ectories.
>>>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF=
.
>>>>=20
>>>>     Title           : Network Service Header
>>>>     Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>>>                       Uri Elzur
>>>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>>> 	Pages           : 37
>>>> 	Date            : 2016-08-23
>>>>=20
>>>> Abstract:
>>>> This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>>> packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>>> provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>>> service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>>> Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>>>=20
>>>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>>=20
>>>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of subm=
ission
>>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>>=20
>>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> sfc mailing list
>>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sfc mailing list
>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sfc mailing list
>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> sfc mailing list
>> sfc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.

        Title           : Network Service Header
        Authors         : Paul Quinn
                          Uri Elzur
	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.txt
	Pages           : 37
	Date            : 2016-09-15

Abstract:
   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
To: "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.txt
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Dear WG and chairs,

This version reflects comments received during last call.

Thank you.

> Begin forwarded message:
>=20
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: [sfc] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.txt
> Date: September 15, 2016 at 11:12:19 AM EDT
> To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> Cc: sfc@ietf.org
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : Network Service Header
>        Authors         : Paul Quinn
>                          Uri Elzur
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.txt
> 	Pages           : 37
> 	Date            : 2016-09-15
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submiss=
ion
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc


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Subject: [sfc] Ignored comments regarding draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
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Paul,

I made several comments on the list regarding draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07 that
were neither responded to nor fixed in draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.

1. I noticed an editing error, at the bottom of p. 12 it still discusses
three reserved bits in fig. 6, but now there=E2=80=99s only one bit.

[Note that this comment now pertains to p.13 of draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.]

2. In draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07, draft-ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap-01 is referenced
three times, but is not in the list of references.

Also, section 6 of draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07 specifically references section 6
of draft-ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap-01. I suspect that section 9 is what was
actually intended. In any case, section 6 is obviously incorrect.

[These comments still pertain to draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.]

Thanks,
Andy

--94eb2c04d9c2824a96053c8f1cdb
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Paul,<div><br></div><div>I made several comments on the li=
st regarding=C2=A0draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07 that were neither responded to nor =
fixed in=C2=A0draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.</div><div><br></div><div><div>1. I not=
iced an editing error, at the bottom of p. 12 it still discusses three rese=
rved bits in fig. 6, but now there=E2=80=99s only one bit.</div><div><br></=
div><div>[Note that this comment now pertains to p.13 of draft-ietf-sfc-nsh=
-08.]</div><div><br></div><div>2. In draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07, draft-ietf-rtgw=
g-dt-encap-01 is referenced three times, but is not in the list of referenc=
es.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Also, section 6 of draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07=
 specifically references section 6 of draft-ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap-01. I suspe=
ct that section 9 is what was actually intended. In any case, section 6 is =
obviously incorrect.</div><div><br></div><div>[These comments still pertain=
 to draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.]</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div></div><di=
v>Andy</div><div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c04d9c2824a96053c8f1cdb--


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.

        Title           : Network Service Header
        Authors         : Paul Quinn
                          Uri Elzur
	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-09.txt
	Pages           : 37
	Date            : 2016-09-15

Abstract:
   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-09

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-09


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Paul,

I think this document is coming along quite nicely, one question though.

The document say:

3.5.1.  Optional Variable Length Metadata

    The format of the optional variable length context headers, is as
    described below.

         0                   1                   2                   3
         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
        +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
        |          Metadata Class       |C|    Type     |R|       Len   |
        +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
        |                      Variable Metadata                        |
        +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


Do I understand you correctly if I say that the "Variable Length TLV", 
starts from bit 16 in the "Optional Variable Length Metadata" and the
reason that you want to define that TLV is that anyone that specifies
"Variable Length Metadata Class" needds to define at least one "Variable
Length TLV"?

/Loa

On 2016-09-15 20:05, Paul Quinn (paulq) wrote:
> Linda,
>
> This example is simply meant to be illustrative.  The exact mechanism for transport load balancing is dependent on the implementer and the transport, the NSH draft is not prescriptive in this area to avoid confusion and per transport discussion.
>
> Thank you,
> Paul
>
>> On Aug 31, 2016, at 4:19 AM, wang.cui1@zte.com.cn wrote:
>>
>> Hi editors,
>>
>>  I have a clarification comment about the following text:
>>
>>     Section 7.2 Mapping NSH to Network Transport
>>     ......
>>     2. Next SF is located at SFFc with multiple network locators for load distribution purposes:
>>         SFFb mapping: SPI=10 --> VXLAN-gpe, dst_ip:203.0.113.1,203.0.113.2,203.0.113.3, equal cost
>>
>> Could you add some text or add a figure to illustrate this example clearly ? It seem kind of confusing how a SFFc has multiple network locators for LB.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> BRs,
>> Linda Wang
>>
>> "sfc" <sfc-bounces@ietf.org> 写于 2016/08/23 23:47:32:
>>
>>> internet-drafts@ietf.org
>>> 发件人:  "sfc" <sfc-bounces@ietf.org>
>>>
>>> 2016/08/23 23:47
>>>
>>> 收件人
>>>
>>> <i-d-announce@ietf.org>,
>>>
>>> 抄送
>>>
>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>>
>>> 主题
>>>
>>> [sfc] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>>
>>>
>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>>> directories.
>>> This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.
>>>
>>>         Title           : Network Service Header
>>>         Authors         : Paul Quinn
>>>                           Uri Elzur
>>>    Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>>>    Pages           : 37
>>>    Date            : 2016-08-23
>>>
>>> Abstract:
>>>    This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
>>>    packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
>>>    provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
>>>    service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
>>>    Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
>>>
>>>
>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
>>>
>>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>
>>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07
>>>
>>>
>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>
>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sfc mailing list
>>> sfc@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>

-- 


Loa Andersson                        email: loa@mail01.huawei.com
Senior MPLS Expert                          loa@pi.nu
Huawei Technologies (consultant)     phone: +46 739 81 21 64


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--001a113dcc823b0683053c9f86ed
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Paul,

I=E2=80=99m just looking at -09. Thanks for incorporating my comments, howe=
ver on
p. 13 you fixed the the reserved bit in the first instance but left =E2=80=
=9Cbits=E2=80=9D
on the next line:

   Reserved bit: one reserved bit is present for future use.  The
   reserved bits MUST be set to 0x0.


You can mark removing the extra =E2=80=9Cs=E2=80=9D for your next update.

Cheers,
Andy





On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:34 PM, Paul Quinn (paulq) <paulq@cisco.com> wrote=
:

> Thank you for your careful review.  My sincere apologies, this is my
> fault, and likely due to some local version tracking.  -09, to be posted
> shortly, will address these.
>
>
>
> Paul
>
> > On Sep 15, 2016, at 1:23 PM, Andrew G. Malis <agmalis@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Paul,
> >
> > I made several comments on the list regarding draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07 tha=
t
> were neither responded to nor fixed in draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.
> >
> > 1. I noticed an editing error, at the bottom of p. 12 it still discusse=
s
> three reserved bits in fig. 6, but now there=E2=80=99s only one bit.
> >
> > [Note that this comment now pertains to p.13 of draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.]
> >
> > 2. In draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07, draft-ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap-01 is referenced
> three times, but is not in the list of references.
> >
> > Also, section 6 of draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07 specifically references sectio=
n
> 6 of draft-ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap-01. I suspect that section 9 is what was
> actually intended. In any case, section 6 is obviously incorrect.
> >
> > [These comments still pertain to draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.]
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Andy
> >
>
>

--001a113dcc823b0683053c9f86ed
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Paul,<div><br></div><div>I=E2=80=99m just looking at -09. =
Thanks for incorporating my comments, however on p. 13 you fixed the the re=
served bit in the first instance but left =E2=80=9Cbits=E2=80=9D on the nex=
t line:</div><div><br></div><div><pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size:=
13px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)">   Reserved bit: on=
e reserved bit is present for future use.  The
   reserved bits MUST be set to 0x0.
</pre></div><div><br></div><div>You can mark removing the extra =E2=80=9Cs=
=E2=80=9D for your next update.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>=
Andy</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 15, =
2016 at 1:34 PM, Paul Quinn (paulq) <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:paulq@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">paulq@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<b=
r><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Thank you for your careful review.=C2=A0 M=
y sincere apologies, this is my fault, and likely due to some local version=
 tracking.=C2=A0 -09, to be posted shortly, will address these.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
<br>
Paul<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; On Sep 15, 2016, at 1:23 PM, Andrew G. Malis &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:agm=
alis@gmail.com">agmalis@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Paul,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I made several comments on the list regarding draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07 th=
at were neither responded to nor fixed in draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1. I noticed an editing error, at the bottom of p. 12 it still discuss=
es three reserved bits in fig. 6, but now there=E2=80=99s only one bit.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [Note that this comment now pertains to p.13 of draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.=
]<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2. In draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07, draft-ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap-01 is reference=
d three times, but is not in the list of references.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Also, section 6 of draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07 specifically references secti=
on 6 of draft-ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap-01. I suspect that section 9 is what was =
actually intended. In any case, section 6 is obviously incorrect.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [These comments still pertain to draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-08.]<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; Andy<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113dcc823b0683053c9f86ed--


From nobody Tue Sep 20 11:07:13 2016
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the IETF.

        Title           : Network Service Header
        Authors         : Paul Quinn
                          Uri Elzur
	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-10.txt
	Pages           : 37
	Date            : 2016-09-20

Abstract:
   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted onto
   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-10

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-10


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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From: "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>
To: "Sashank Dara (sadara)" <sadara@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] Question regarding Proof of Transit draft
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Cc: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>, "nvo3@ietf.org" <nvo3@ietf.org>, "Frank Brockners \(fbrockne\)" <fbrockne@cisco.com>, "draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" <draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>, "opsawg@ietf.org" <opsawg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sfc] Question regarding Proof of Transit draft
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--_000_2CF6090E89DE482389D7A0867DC92A8Atelefonicacom_
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Hi Sashank,

(coming back to this as soon as my holidays and the backlog they caused all=
ow me)

Thanks! I must confess I attended Frank=92s presentation and went directly =
to my interpretation of Shamir=92s polynomials, overlooking some of the opt=
imizations you propose. And coming back to what Frank asked a couple of mes=
sages before in the thread I fully agree it is worthwhile to pursue this in=
 SFC. I can think of applications in NFV-space, and in the scenario of the =
hierarchical SFC some of us are proposing. In fact, I=92ve been discussing =
this with other colleagues at the ETSI NFV meeting I am attending now.

Be goode,


On 1 Sep 2016, at 15:22 , Sashank Dara (sadara) <sadara@cisco.com<mailto:sa=
dara@cisco.com>> wrote:

Hi Diego ,

Thanks for bringing up an excellent point on the computational complexity.
Fortunately the algorithm takes a cumulative approach which is agnostic of =
the path length.

  1.  Controller performs few trivial steps like choosing long term secrets=
, calculating the LPC values for each node and provisioning.
  2.  Each node only performs 2 additions, 1 multiplication and 1 mod(prime=
) operation per packet .
  3.  Verifier also performs step (2) and additionally performs 1 addition,=
 1 mod(prime) and comparison to verify !

The above steps hold good for any length of nodes.

A detailed example is provided for illustrative purposes in our draft<https=
://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brockners-proof-of-transit-01#section-3.3>  (s=
ection 3.3) that explains above operations.

Would be happy to discuss more on the above, if needed.

Regards,
Sashank


From: "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com<mailto:diego.r.lopez@t=
elefonica.com>>
Date: Friday, 26 August 2016 at 6:21 PM
To: "Frank Brockners (fbrockne)" <fbrockne@cisco.com<mailto:fbrockne@cisco.=
com>>
Cc: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com<mailto:talmi@marvell.com>>, sashank dara=
 <sadara@cisco.com<mailto:sadara@cisco.com>>, "draft-brockners-proof-of-tra=
nsit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>=
" <draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-p=
roof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>>, "opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>"=
 <opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>>, "nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf=
.org>" <nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>>, "sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf=
.org>" <sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [sfc] Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Hi Frank,

This is a really interesting piece of work, and I must say we have been dis=
cussing the PoT issue with some customers (though we used to call it =93ass=
ured path traversal=94) and we have been exploring possible solutions, tryi=
ng to combine good-enough security with a reasonable amount of computationa=
l complexity, and I am glad to see a practical proposal addressing this pro=
blem. I had a brief conversation with Carlos while in Berlin, but I am afra=
id that the IETF week was too hectic for a detailed discussion.

Let me add to Tal=92s analysis a third issue to consider. My understanding =
of Shamir=92s polynomials is that they can be used to reconstruct a secret =
from N pieces you need a polynomial of degree N-1, so that implies that the=
 verification is limited to a certain number of SFs (or SFFs), depending on=
 the degree of the applied polynomial. We=92d need and assessment on the co=
mputational complexity associated with path length and the requirements for=
 adaptation of the PoT nodes (I guess SDN/NFV could play a role there=85)

Be goode,

On 20 Jul 2016, at 09:16 , Frank Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com<m=
ailto:fbrockne@cisco.com>> wrote:

Hi Tal,

well... if you could protect the integrity of the data stream between sourc=
e and destination, you would not be able to swap the content of a packet =
=96 which is what your attack is all about. Rather than continue arguing th=
e point, let=92s acknowledge that it is a valid attack and let=92s look for=
 a solution :-). We=92ll need to couple POT to integrity protection of the =
packet.

Hence, I=92d like to come back to my question asked below:
Do you (and the entire SFC team here) think it is worthwhile to provide a s=
olution for a deployment which is expected to *not* alter the packet payloa=
d?

Thanks, Frank

From: Tal Mizrahi [mailto:talmi@marvell.com]
Sent: Dienstag, 19. Juli 2016 18:15
To: Frank Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com<mailto:fbrockne@cisco.co=
m>>; Sashank Dara (sadara) <sadara@cisco.com<mailto:sadara@cisco.com>>; dra=
ft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-o=
f-transit@tools.ietf.org>
Cc: sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>; opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.o=
rg>; nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Hi Frank,

The POT replacement attack (1.) is not an attack on the integrity. It is an=
 attack on the path verification.
This simple attack can cause the verifier to accept a packet that did not g=
o through the firewall SF (even though it should). I believe this is exactl=
y the problem you were aiming to address in this draft.

Thanks,
Tal.

From: Frank Brockners (fbrockne) [mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 6:00 PM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Sashank Dara (sadara); draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@to=
ols.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>
Cc: sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>; opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.o=
rg>; nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Hi Tal,

thanks for the summary. We=92ll provide more details on 2. Per my earlier p=
oint =96 1. is an interesting discussion, given that we don=92t claim to pr=
ovide integrity protection for the packet payload. Or in other terms =96 to=
 be exact: What POT provides is a proof that the POT-header/meta-data trans=
ited all the required nodes. There is no association (and thus proof) provi=
ded for the additional data carried along with the POT-header =96 neither h=
eader nor payload. As a consequence, attacks which change the packet payloa=
d won=92t be detected/mitigated. We=92ll explicitly state this in the secur=
ity considerations in the next rev of the document.
What we could consider is linking the RND number to CRC across the packet p=
ayload or similar =96 but that way we=92d restrict the applicability to dep=
loyments where the packet payload isn=92t changed across the path (which mi=
ght not apply to certain deployment =96 e.g. WAN optimization / compression=
 schemes).
Do you think it is worthwhile to provide a solution for a deployment which =
is expected to not alter the packet payload?

Thanks,
Frank

From: Tal Mizrahi [mailto:talmi@marvell.com]
Sent: Dienstag, 19. Juli 2016 17:44
To: Sashank Dara (sadara) <sadara@cisco.com<mailto:sadara@cisco.com>>; Fran=
k Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com<mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com>>; dra=
ft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-o=
f-transit@tools.ietf.org>
Cc: sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>; opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.o=
rg>; nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Hi,

To summarize my take on this thread:
The proposed mechanism has two significant vulnerabilities that (in my unde=
rstanding) are currently not addressed:
1.       A man-in-the-middle can replace the POT of packet A with the POT o=
f packet B.
2.       It is possible to replay POTs within a certain time window, whose =
length is determined by the timestamp resolution.

Sashank, thanks for agreeing to look into it further. I am looking forward =
to your insights on this.

Regards,
Tal.

Link to the draft: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brockners-proof-of-tra=
nsit-01



From: Sashank Dara (sadara) [mailto:sadara@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 12:20 PM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-proof-of-trans=
it@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>; =
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft



I want to ask a simple question:
If the attacker attaches the POT of packet A (indicating the path through 1=
,3,5,6) to packet B, will the verifier accept packet B and believe that its=
 path was indeed (1,3,5,6)?

[SD] If the verifier is programmed to just validate the POT meta data again=
st {1,3,5,6} then yes it accepts it.
If the verifier is programmed to consult a policy database to cross check i=
f the reconstructed path {1,3,5,6} is as per the policies then no , it drop=
s it .

But I see your point , that the parameters used in POT data donot consider =
the path or node-ids etc . We shall discuss this internally and get back.

Also, We shall get back with more concrete numbers of the timestamp resolut=
ion and cache sizes (or other better approaches).

Thank you so much for all the inputs.



From: Tal Mizrahi
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 10:28 AM
To: 'Sashank Dara (sadara)'; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-pr=
oof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools=
.ietf.org>; sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Dear Sashank,

I really appreciate the quick and detailed responses.

>>>Lets take correct path taken by Packet A  to be Path1 - ( 1,3,5,6) nodes=
.
>>>Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e. Path2 -  (1,2,3,6).
>>>
>>>If the attacker could take values from Path1 and reattach them to Path2 =
,
>>>the reconstruction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2=
,3,6).
>>>This could be compared with topology/policy db information for any polic=
y
>>>violations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be taken.
>>So packet B skipped node 5 (e.g. the firewall SF), but the verifier belie=
ves it went through the correct path.
>>Would you agree?
>[SD] The verifier only constructs the path the packet took accurately, it =
is upto
>the application to determine whether it violates any policies (I.e missing=
 any function)
>The bottom line is , an attacker taking a different path cannot get away w=
ith it !
>The whole intent of =93proof-of-transit=94 is to prove the path packet has=
 taken exactly.
>POT does not define whether it good/bad path. It is upto high level applic=
ations on what
>do with =93reconstructed=94 path.



I want to ask a simple question:
If the attacker attaches the POT of packet A (indicating the path through 1=
,3,5,6) to packet B, will the verifier accept packet B and believe that its=
 path was indeed (1,3,5,6)?


>>Hmmm=85 Let=92s say we are talking about traffic at 10 Gbps, which is rou=
ghly
>>1 million packets per second. That would mean the verifier has to store a=
 million values of RND-2.
>>Moreover, every time a packet arrives, the verifier would have to compare=
 its
>>RND-2 value with the 1 million stored values, in order to verify there is=
 no replay.
>>That does not sound feasible.
>>Am I missing something here?
>[SD] Second level precision is only an example, we could use as much preci=
sion as we want to reduce the number of values to be cached !

My point is that assuming reasonable resources are used, the mechanism is v=
ulnerable to a replay attack.
In order to prove me wrong, can you present concrete numbers of the timesta=
mp resolution and the cache size?
Otherwise, you may consider using a sequence number + sliding window (e.g.,=
 as in IPsec).


Thanks,
Tal.



From: Sashank Dara (sadara) [mailto:sadara@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 9:56 AM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-proof-of-trans=
it@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>; =
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft




>[SD] Ok. This is an interesting attack.
>
>Lets take correct path taken by Packet A  to be Path1 - ( 1,3,5,6) nodes.
>Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e. Path2 -  (1,2,3,6).
>
>If the attacker could take values from Path1 and reattach them to Path2 ,
>the reconstruction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2,3=
,6).
>This could be compared with topology/policy db information for any policy
>violations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be taken.

So packet B skipped node 5 (e.g. the firewall SF), but the verifier believe=
s it went through the correct path.
Would you agree?

[SD] The verifier only constructs the path the packet took accurately, it i=
s upto the application to determine whether it violates any policies (I.e m=
issing any function)
The bottom line is , an attacker taking a different path cannot get away wi=
th it ! The whole intent of =93proof-of-transit=94 is to prove the path pac=
ket has taken exactly.
POT does not define whether it good/bad path. It is upto high level applica=
tions on what do with =93reconstructed=94 path.


Hmmm=85 Let=92s say we are talking about traffic at 10 Gbps, which is rough=
ly 1 million packets per second. That would mean the verifier has to store =
a million values of RND-2.
Moreover, every time a packet arrives, the verifier would have to compare i=
ts RND-2 value with the 1 million stored values, in order to verify there i=
s no replay.
That does not sound feasible.
Am I missing something here?

[SD] Second level precision is only an example, we could use as much precis=
ion as we want to reduce the number of values to be cached !


Sashank



From: Sashank Dara (sadara) [mailto:sadara@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 8:33 AM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-proof-of-trans=
it@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>; =
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Inline ..


We have two consecutive packets, A and B:
- Packet A that went through the correct path and has a correct POT.
- Packet B that did not go through the correct path and does not have a cor=
rect POT.
 Now the attacker performs a =91mix and match=92 attack, by taking the corr=
ect POT from packet A and attaching it to packet B.
The attacker also terminates packet A.
There is no replay here, because the verifier receives the correct POT only=
 once. The problem is that the correct POT happens to arrive with packet B.=
 :(
Thus, packet B appears okay to the verifier, even though it did not go thro=
ugh the correct path.

Is there a way to mitigate this attack?

[SD] Ok. This is an interesting attack.

Lets take correct path taken by Packet A  to be Path1 - ( 1,3,5,6) nodes.
Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e. Path2 -  (1,2,3,6).

If the attacker could take values from Path1 and reattach them to Path2 , t=
he reconstruction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2,3,6=
).
This could be compared with topology/policy db information for any policy v=
iolations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be taken.
 It just reconstructs the particular path taken by the packets.

Do you mean that there is a one-second-vulnerability for replay attacks?
One second is practically forever.

[SD] Not really , the verifier could cache the RND-2 numbers used in the ti=
me slice of one second and flush off after every second. There is no one-se=
cond-vulnerability as such, if the verifier caches those values.

Effective replay prevention is typically performed using a sequence number,=
 with a sliding window to allow out-of-order packets. Wouldn=92t it be poss=
ible to incorporate such a sequence number into your mechanism?

[SD] Time stamp is essentially at high level sequence number (at seconds le=
vel)! The challenge with using complete RND-2 as sequence number is that th=
e differential analysis of CML values (across packets) becomes very easy  a=
nd predictable.
that=92s reason we recommend using  ( Timestamp(/ sequence number) + RND )




From: Sashank Dara (sadara) [mailto:sadara@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 1:11 AM
To: Tal Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne); draft-brockners-proof-of-trans=
it@tools.ietf.org<mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org>; =
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft

Dear Tal,
Thank you for your interest in our work. More inline with [SD] ..


Right, I am referring to the former. The integrity check is not the issue.
Let=92s say we have:
- Packet A that went through the correct path and has a correct POT.
- Packet B that did not go through the correct path and does not have a cor=
rect POT.

The attacker can =91launder=92 packet B by replacing the (incorrect) POT of=
 packet B with the correct POT of packet A (and drop packet A).
Thus, packet B is verified correctly, even though it did not go through the=
 correct path.

[SD] This is valid scenario and we have certain in-built mitigation techniq=
ues and recommendations for the same.
There are two scenarios here

Partial Replay of POT data (Replaying intermediate CMLs)

Attacker cannot reuse few intermediate node=92s POT values (from older pack=
et traces) as it would disrupt the POLY-3 construction.
On the other hand if the attacker tries to replay entire sequence of CML va=
lues, he cannot still , because notice that verifier also has a secret shar=
e of RND-1 and participates in the reconstruction of RND-3.
Verifier=92s share of RND-3 is never on wire , so attacker cannot just obse=
rve the packet traces to reuse and replay it.

Total Replay of POT data (Replaying complete RND-2)

Another trick, attacker could do is by completely reusing RND-2 (but not in=
termediate CML values)
In order to prevent the =93Reply Attacks=94 , we recommend that the RND-2 (=
generated per packet) be a combination (I.e. RND2 =3D =93Time Stamp + RND n=
umber=94)
So in case a passive attacker tries to replay one of the correct but older =
RND-2, the verifier first could check the current timestamp against the tim=
estamp retrieved from RND-2.
If the retrieved timestamp is older than current timestamp we drop/raise a =
flag !

There is still a small window , where the attacker could replay it within t=
he valid time slice itself but by carefully choosing the time slice we can =
make it nearly impossible for the attacker to replay.
For example , if the Time Stamp chosen is 32 bits , we could get one second=
s level precision in the time window . So it is highly impossible for the a=
ttacker to replay within such a small time at such a high packet rates.

Also , the verifier could cache, if needed, certain number of previously us=
ed RND-2 to mitigate replay attacks.

Hope this clarifies.

_______________________________________________
sfc mailing list
sfc@ietf.org<mailto:sfc@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc

--
"Esta vez no fallaremos, Doctor Infierno"

Dr Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
http://people.tid.es/diego.lopez/

e-mail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com<mailto:diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>
Tel:    +34 913 129 041
Mobile: +34 682 051 091
----------------------------------


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--
"Esta vez no fallaremos, Doctor Infierno"

Dr Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
http://people.tid.es/diego.lopez/

e-mail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
Tel:    +34 913 129 041
Mobile: +34 682 051 091
----------------------------------


--_000_2CF6090E89DE482389D7A0867DC92A8Atelefonicacom_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-ID: <61EA7CB7DC031F43945BC55FBEC7BBCD@eurprd06.prod.outlook.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">
Hi Sashank,
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">(coming back to this as soon as my holidays and the backlog=
 they caused allow me)</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div>Thanks! I must confess I attended Frank=92s presentation and went dire=
ctly to my interpretation of Shamir=92s polynomials, overlooking some of th=
e optimizations you propose. And coming back to what Frank asked a couple o=
f messages before in the thread I fully
 agree it is worthwhile to pursue this in SFC. I can think of applications =
in NFV-space, and in the scenario of the hierarchical SFC some of us are pr=
oposing. In fact, I=92ve been discussing this with other colleagues at the =
ETSI NFV meeting I am attending now.</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div>Be goode,</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div><br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On 1 Sep 2016, at 15:22 , Sashank Dara (sadara) &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" class=3D"">sadara@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:</di=
v>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line=
-break: after-white-space; font-size: 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-seri=
f;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">Hi Diego ,&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">Thanks for bringing up an excellent point on the computatio=
nal complexity.&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"">Fortunately the algorithm takes a cumulative approach which=
 is agnostic of the path length.&nbsp;</div>
<ol class=3D"">
<li class=3D"">Controller performs few trivial steps like choosing long ter=
m secrets, calculating the LPC values for each node and provisioning.</li><=
li class=3D"">Each node only performs 2 additions, 1 multiplication and 1 m=
od(prime) operation per packet .&nbsp;</li><li class=3D"">Verifier also per=
forms step (2) and additionally performs 1 addition, 1 mod(prime) and compa=
rison to verify !&nbsp;</li></ol>
<div class=3D"">The above steps hold good for any length of nodes.&nbsp;</d=
iv>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">A detailed example is provided for illustrative purposes in=
 our <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brockners-proof-of-transi=
t-01#section-3.3" class=3D"">
draft</a>&nbsp; (section 3.3) that explains above operations.&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">Would be happy to discuss more on the above, if needed.&nbs=
p;</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">Regards,</div>
<div class=3D"">Sashank</div>
<div class=3D""><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" color=3D"rgb(0, 0, 0)"><fo=
nt class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"Calibri"><br class=3D"">
</font></font></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri; font-size: 11pt; text-align: left; bord=
er-width: 1pt medium medium; border-style: solid none none; padding: 3pt 0i=
n 0in; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196, 223);" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold" class=3D"">From: </span>&quot;Diego R. Lop=
ez&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com" class=3D"">die=
go.r.lopez@telefonica.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold" class=3D"">Date: </span>Friday, 26 August =
2016 at 6:21 PM<br class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold" class=3D"">To: </span>&quot;Frank Brockner=
s (fbrockne)&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" class=3D"">fbr=
ockne@cisco.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold" class=3D"">Cc: </span>Tal Mizrahi &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" class=3D"">talmi@marvell.com</a>&gt;, sash=
ank dara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" class=3D"">sadara@cisco.co=
m</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.i=
etf.org" class=3D"">draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>&quo=
t;
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" cla=
ss=3D"">draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>&gt;, &quot;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:opsawg@ietf.org" class=3D"">opsawg@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:opsawg@ietf.org" class=3D"">opsawg@ietf.org</a>&gt;,
 &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org" class=3D"">nvo3@ietf.org</a>&quot; =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org" class=3D"">nvo3@ietf.org</a>&gt;, &quo=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold" class=3D"">Subject: </span>Re: [sfc] Quest=
ion regarding Proof of Transit draft<br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line=
-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">
Hi Frank,
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">This is a really interesting piece of work, and I must say =
we have been discussing the PoT issue with some customers (though we used t=
o call it =93assured path traversal=94) and we have been exploring possible=
 solutions, trying to combine good-enough
 security with a reasonable amount of computational complexity, and I am gl=
ad to see a practical proposal addressing this problem. I had a brief conve=
rsation with Carlos while in Berlin, but I am afraid that the IETF week was=
 too hectic for a detailed discussion.</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">Let me add to Tal=92s analysis a third issue to consider. M=
y understanding of Shamir=92s polynomials is that they can be used to recon=
struct a secret from N pieces you need a polynomial of degree N-1, so that =
implies that the verification is limited
 to a certain number of SFs (or SFFs), depending on the degree of the appli=
ed polynomial. We=92d need and assessment on the computational complexity a=
ssociated with path length and the requirements for adaptation of the PoT n=
odes (I guess SDN/NFV could play a
 role there=85)</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">Be goode,</div>
<div class=3D"">&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On 20 Jul 2016, at 09:16 , Frank Brockners (fbrockne) &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" class=3D"">fbrockne@cisco.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; font-family: Lucid=
aGrande; font-size: 11px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-we=
ight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; t=
ext-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: norm=
al; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hi Tal,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">well... if you could protect the=
 integrity of the data stream between source and destination, you would not=
 be able to swap the content of a packet
 =96 which is what your attack is all about. Rather than continue arguing t=
he point, let=92s acknowledge that it is a valid attack and let=92s look fo=
r a solution :-). We=92ll need to couple POT to integrity protection of the=
 packet.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hence, I=92d like to come back t=
o my question asked below: &nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Do you (and the entire SFC team =
here) think it is worthwhile to provide a solution for a deployment which i=
s expected to *<b class=3D"">not</b>* alter
 the packet payload?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thanks, Frank<o:p class=3D""></o=
:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(225, 225=
, 225); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: C=
alibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cl=
ass=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal Mizrahi
 [<a href=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" style=3D"color: purple; text-decorat=
ion: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:talmi@marvell.com</a>]<span class=3D"App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>D=
ienstag, 19. Juli 2016 18:15<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Fra=
nk Brockners (fbrockne) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" style=3D"=
color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">fbrockne@cisco.com</=
a>&gt;; Sashank Dara (sadara) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=
=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sadara@cisco.com=
</a>&gt;;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mail=
to:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple;=
 text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@t=
ools.ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: under=
line;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&n=
bsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:opsawg@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-=
decoration: underline;" class=3D"">opsawg@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple=
-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org" style=3D"co=
lor: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">nvo3@ietf.org</a><br c=
lass=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hi Frank,<o:p class=3D""></o:p><=
/span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">The POT replacement attack (1.) =
is not an attack on the integrity. It is an attack on the path verification=
.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">This simple attack can cause the=
 verifier to accept a packet that did not go through the firewall SF (even =
though it should). I believe this is exactly
 the problem you were aiming to address in this draft.<o:p class=3D""></o:p=
></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Tal.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Frank Brockners
 (fbrockne) [<a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; =
text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com</a>]<span=
 class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 6:00 PM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Sashank Dara (sadara);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp=
;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-brock=
ners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: under=
line;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&n=
bsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:opsawg@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-=
decoration: underline;" class=3D"">opsawg@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple=
-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org" style=3D"co=
lor: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">nvo3@ietf.org</a><br c=
lass=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hi Tal,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">thanks for the summary. We=92ll =
provide more details on 2. Per my earlier point =96 1. is an interesting di=
scussion, given that we don=92t claim to provide
 integrity protection for the packet payload. Or in other terms =96 to be e=
xact: What POT provides is a proof that the POT-header/meta-data transited =
all the required nodes. There is no association (and thus proof) provided f=
or the additional data carried along
 with the POT-header =96 neither header nor payload. As a consequence, atta=
cks which change the packet payload won=92t be detected/mitigated. We=92ll =
explicitly state this in the security considerations in the next rev of the=
 document.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">What we could consider is linkin=
g the RND number to CRC across the packet payload or similar =96 but that w=
ay we=92d restrict the applicability to deployments
 where the packet payload isn=92t changed across the path (which might not =
apply to certain deployment =96 e.g. WAN optimization / compression schemes=
).<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Do you think it is worthwhile to=
 provide a solution for a deployment which is expected to not alter the pac=
ket payload?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Frank<o:p class=3D""></o:p></spa=
n></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(225, 225=
, 225); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: C=
alibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cl=
ass=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal Mizrahi
 [<a href=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" style=3D"color: purple; text-decorat=
ion: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:talmi@marvell.com</a>]<span class=3D"App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>D=
ienstag, 19. Juli 2016 17:44<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sas=
hank Dara (sadara) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: =
purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sadara@cisco.com</a>&gt;; F=
rank Brockners (fbrockne) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:fbrockne@cisco.com" style=
=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">fbrockne@cisco.c=
om</a>&gt;;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"ma=
ilto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-brockners-proof-of-transit=
@tools.ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: under=
line;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&n=
bsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:opsawg@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-=
decoration: underline;" class=3D"">opsawg@ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple=
-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:nvo3@ietf.org" style=3D"co=
lor: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">nvo3@ietf.org</a><br c=
lass=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hi,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span>=
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">To summarize my take on this thr=
ead:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">The proposed mechanism has two s=
ignificant vulnerabilities that (in my understanding) are currently not add=
ressed:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 36pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
'Times New Roman', serif; text-indent: -18pt;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">1.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" st=
yle=3D"font-size: 7pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sa=
ns-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">A
 man-in-the-middle can replace the POT of packet A with the POT of packet B=
.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 36pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
'Times New Roman', serif; text-indent: -18pt;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">2.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" st=
yle=3D"font-size: 7pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sa=
ns-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">It
 is possible to replay POTs within a certain time window, whose length is d=
etermined by the timestamp resolution.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Sashank, thanks for agreeing to =
look into it further. I am looking forward to your insights on this.<o:p cl=
ass=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Regards,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></=
span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Tal.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Link to the draft:<span class=3D=
"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html=
/draft-brockners-proof-of-transit-01" style=3D"color: purple; text-decorati=
on: underline;" class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brockners-proo=
f-of-transit-01</a><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></b></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sashank Dara
 (sadara) [<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; text=
-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:sadara@cisco.com</a>]<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 12:20 PM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.=
org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-=
brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">I want to ask a simple question:=
</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">If the attacker attaches the POT=
 of packet A (indicating the path through 1,3,5,6) to packet B, will the ve=
rifier accept packet B and believe that
 its path was indeed (1,3,5,6)?</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] If the verifier is programmed to just validate the=
 POT meta data against {1,3,5,6} then yes it accepts it.&nbsp;<o:p class=3D=
""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">If the verifier is programmed to consult a policy datab=
ase to cross check if the reconstructed path {1,3,5,6} is as per the polici=
es then no , it drops it .&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">But I see your point , that the parameters used in POT =
data donot consider the path or node-ids etc . We shall discuss this intern=
ally and get back.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Also, We shall get back with more concrete numbers of t=
he timestamp resolution and cache sizes (or other better approaches).&nbsp;=
<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Thank you so much for all the inputs.&nbsp;<o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></b></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></b></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></b></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal Mizrahi<span class=3D"Apple-c=
onverted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 10:28 AM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>'Sa=
shank Dara (sadara)'; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-conve=
rted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit=
@tools.ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=
=3D"">draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Ap=
ple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"=
color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>RE: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Dear Sashank,<o:p class=3D""></o=
:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">I really appreciate the quick an=
d detailed responses.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;Lets take correct path taken by Packet A &n=
bsp;to be<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">P=
ath1</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- ( 1,3,5,6)
 nodes.&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e.<span class=3D"Ap=
ple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path2</b><span class=3D"App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- &nbsp;(1,2,3,6).<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;If the attacker could take values from<span class=3D"Apple-conv=
erted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b><span class=3D"Apple-conve=
rted-space">&nbsp;</span>and reattach them to&nbsp;<b class=3D"">Path2 ,<sp=
an class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
</b>&gt;&gt;&gt;the&nbsp;reconstruction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,=
6) instead of (1,2,3,6).&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;This could be compared with topology/policy db information for =
any policy<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D""=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt;violations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be taken.=
</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&gt;&gt;So packet B skipped node=
 5 (e.g. the firewall SF), but the verifier believes it went through the co=
rrect path.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><br class=3D""=
>
</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri,=
 sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&gt;&gt;Would you agree?<=
/span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></sp=
an></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;[SD] The verifier only constructs the path the pack=
et took accurately, it is upto<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;the application to determine whether it violates an=
y policies (I.e missing any function)&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></d=
iv>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;The bottom line is , an attacker taking a different=
 path cannot get away with it !<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;The whole intent of =93proof-of-transit=94 is to pr=
ove the path packet has taken exactly.&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></=
div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;POT does not define whether it good/bad path. It is=
 upto high level applications on what<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;do with =93reconstructed=94 path.&nbsp;<o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">I want to ask a simple question:=
<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">If the attacker attaches the POT=
 of packet A (indicating the path through 1,3,5,6) to packet B, will the ve=
rifier accept packet B and believe that
 its path was indeed (1,3,5,6)?<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;=
</span><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&gt;&gt;Hmmm=85 Let=92s say we a=
re talking about traffic at 10 Gbps, which is roughly<span class=3D"Apple-c=
onverted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;1 million packets per second. That would mean the verifier has to s=
tore a million values of RND-2.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;Moreover, every time a packet arrives, the verifier would have to c=
ompare its<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D""=
>
&gt;&gt;RND-2 value with the 1 million stored values, in order to verify th=
ere is no replay.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;That does not sound feasible.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;Am I missing something here?</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"fo=
nt-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""=
>&gt;[SD]&nbsp;Second level precision is only an example, we could use as m=
uch precision as we want to reduce the number of values to be cached !</spa=
n><span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">My point is that assuming reason=
able resources are used, the mechanism is vulnerable to a replay attack.<o:=
p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">In order to prove me wrong, can =
you present concrete numbers of the timestamp resolution and the cache size=
?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Otherwise, you may consider usin=
g a sequence number &#43; sliding window (e.g., as in IPsec).<o:p class=3D"=
"></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Tal.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sashank Dara
 (sadara) [<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; text=
-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:sadara@cisco.com</a>]<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 9:56 AM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.=
org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-=
brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;[SD] Ok. This is an interesting attack. &nbsp;</spa=
n><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span><=
/div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;Lets take correct path taken by Packet A &nbsp;to b=
e<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b>=
<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- ( 1,3,5,6)
 nodes.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e.<span=
 class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path2</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- &nbsp;(1,2,3,6).</span><span=
 lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;If the attacker could take values from<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b><span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>and reattach them to&nbsp;<b class=
=3D"">Path2
 ,<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b></span><span lang=
=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;the&nbsp;reconstruction for PacketB would result in=
 (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2,3,6).&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"=
" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;This could be compared with topology/policy db info=
rmation for any policy</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:=
p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&gt;violations. POT does not enforce a particular path =
to be taken.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D=
""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">So packet B skipped node 5 (e.g.=
 the firewall SF), but the verifier believes it went through the correct pa=
th.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p>=
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Would you agree?</span><span lan=
g=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] The verifier only constructs the path the packet t=
ook accurately, it is upto the application to determine whether it violates=
 any policies (I.e missing any function)&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span>=
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">The bottom line is , an attacker taking a different pat=
h cannot get away with it ! The whole intent of =93proof-of-transit=94 is t=
o prove the path packet has taken exactly.&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></spa=
n></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">POT does not define whether it good/bad path. It is upt=
o high level applications on what do with =93reconstructed=94 path.&nbsp;<o=
:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></di=
v>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Hmmm=85 Let=92s say we are talki=
ng about traffic at 10 Gbps, which is roughly 1 million packets per second.=
 That would mean the verifier has to store
 a million values of RND-2.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: =
10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Moreover, every time a packet ar=
rives, the verifier would have to compare its RND-2 value with the 1 millio=
n stored values, in order to verify there
 is no replay.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" clas=
s=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">That does not sound feasible.</s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Am I missing something here?</sp=
an><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></di=
v>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""=
>[SD]&nbsp;Second level precision is only an example, we could use as much =
precision as we want to reduce the number of values to be cached !</span><s=
pan lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></=
o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""=
>&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;" class=3D"">Sashank&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sashank Dara
 (sadara) [<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; text=
-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:sadara@cisco.com</a>]<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 8:33 AM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.=
org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-=
brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D"">&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></sp=
an></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Inline ..&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" c=
lass=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">We have two consecutive packets,=
 A and B:</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">=
</o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">- Packet A that went through the=
 correct path and has a correct POT.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">- Packet B that did not go throu=
gh the correct path and does not have a correct POT.</span><span lang=3D"EN=
-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;Now the attacker performs =
a =91mix and match=92 attack, by taking the correct POT from packet A and a=
ttaching it to packet B.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><=
o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">The attacker also terminates pac=
ket A.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o=
:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">There is no replay here, because=
 the verifier receives the correct POT only once. The problem is that the c=
orrect POT happens to arrive with packet
 B.<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><span lang=3D"=
EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Wingdings; color: rgb(31, 73,=
 125);" class=3D"">L</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thus, packet B appears okay to t=
he verifier, even though it did not go through the correct path.</span><spa=
n lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Is there a way to mitigate this =
attack?</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></=
o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] Ok. This is an interesting attack. &nbsp;</span><s=
pan lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div=
>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Lets take correct path taken by Packet A &nbsp;to be<sp=
an class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- ( 1,3,5,6)
 nodes.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Lets assume incorrect path to be Packet B i.e.<span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path2</b><span clas=
s=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>- &nbsp;(1,2,3,6).</span><span lan=
g=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">If the attacker could take values from<span class=3D"Ap=
ple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">Path1</b><span class=3D"App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>and reattach them to&nbsp;<b class=3D"">Pa=
th2
 ,<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>the&nbsp;reconstru=
ction for PacketB would result in (1,3,5,6) instead of (1,2,3,6).&nbsp;</sp=
an><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span>=
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">This could be compared with topology/policy db informat=
ion for any policy violations. POT does not enforce a particular path to be=
 taken.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></=
o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;It just reconstructs the particular path taken by=
 the packets.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p c=
lass=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Do you mean that there is a one-=
second-vulnerability for replay attacks?</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">One second is practically foreve=
r.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p><=
/span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] Not really , the verifier could cache the RND-2 nu=
mbers used in the time slice of one second and flush off after every second=
. There is no one-second-vulnerability
 as such, if the verifier caches those values.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN=
-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Effective replay prevention is t=
ypically performed using a sequence number, with a sliding window to allow =
out-of-order packets. Wouldn=92t it be possible
 to incorporate such a sequence number into your mechanism?</span><span lan=
g=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] Time stamp is essentially at high level sequence n=
umber (at seconds level)! The challenge with using complete RND-2 as sequen=
ce number is that the differential analysis
 of CML values (across packets) becomes very easy &nbsp;and predictable.</s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span=
></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">that=92s reason we recommend using &nbsp;( Timestamp(/ =
sequence number) &#43; RND )</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D=
""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-color: blue; =
border-left-width: 1.5pt; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196=
, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sashank Dara
 (sadara) [<a href=3D"mailto:sadara@cisco.com" style=3D"color: purple; text=
-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">mailto:sadara@cisco.com</a>]<span class=
=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>T=
uesday, July 19, 2016 1:11 AM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tal=
 Mizrahi; Frank Brockners (fbrockne);<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:draft-brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.=
org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">draft-=
brockners-proof-of-transit@tools.ietf.org</a>;<span class=3D"Apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purpl=
e; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">sfc@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</spa=
n>Re: Question regarding Proof of Transit draft</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D"">&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></sp=
an></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Dear Tal,</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Thank you for your interest in our work. More inline wi=
th [SD] ..&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p clas=
s=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Right, I am referring to the for=
mer. The integrity check is not the issue.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Let=92s say we have:</span><span=
 lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">- Packet A that went through the=
 correct path and has a correct POT.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">- Packet B that did not go throu=
gh the correct path and does not have a correct POT.</span><span lang=3D"EN=
-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US=
" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">The attacker can =91launder=92 p=
acket B by replacing the (incorrect) POT of packet B with the correct POT o=
f packet A (and drop packet A).</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=
=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; orphans: auto; text-align: start; widows: auto; -webki=
t-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);" class=3D"">Thus, packet B is verified corre=
ctly, even though it did not go through the correct path.</span><span lang=
=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">[SD] This is valid scenario and we have certain in-buil=
t mitigation techniques and recommendations for the same.&nbsp;</span><span=
 lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">There are two scenarios here&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"=
EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family:=
 Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Partial Replay of POT data (Replaying int=
ermediate CMLs)</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p c=
lass=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Attacker cannot reuse few intermediate node=92s POT val=
ues (from older packet traces) as it would disrupt the POLY-3 construction.=
&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o=
:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">On the other hand if the attacker tries to replay entir=
e sequence of CML values, he cannot still , because notice that verifier al=
so has a secret share of RND-1 and participates
 in the reconstruction of RND-3.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" clas=
s=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Verifier=92s share of RND-3 is never on wire , so attac=
ker cannot just observe the packet traces to reuse and replay it.&nbsp;</sp=
an><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span>=
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family:=
 Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Total Replay of POT data (Replaying compl=
ete RND-2)</span></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=
=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Another trick, attacker could do is by completely reusi=
ng RND-2 (but not intermediate CML values)</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=
=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">In order to prevent the =93Reply Attacks=94 , we recomm=
end that the RND-2 (generated per packet) be a combination (I.e. RND2 =3D =
=93Time Stamp &#43; RND number=94)</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" cl=
ass=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">So in case a passive attacker tries to replay one of th=
e correct but older RND-2, the verifier first could check the current times=
tamp against the timestamp retrieved from
 RND-2.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></=
o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">If the retrieved timestamp is older than current timest=
amp we drop/raise a flag !&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" clas=
s=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">There is still a small window , where the attacker coul=
d replay it within the valid time slice itself but by carefully choosing th=
e time slice we can make it nearly impossible
 for the attacker to replay.</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D=
""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">For example , if the Time Stamp chosen is 32 bits , we =
could get one seconds level precision in the time window . So it is highly =
impossible for the attacker to replay
 within such a small time at such a high packet rates.&nbsp;</span><span la=
ng=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Also , the verifier could cache, if needed, certain num=
ber of previously used RND-2 to mitigate replay attacks.&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">Hope this clarifies.&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" s=
tyle=3D"" class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;" class=3D"">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"" class=3D""=
><o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<span style=3D"font-family: LucidaGrande; font-size: 11px; font-style: norm=
al; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line=
-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-t=
ransform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webk=
it-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline !important;" class=
=3D"">_______________________________________________</span><br style=3D"fo=
nt-family: LucidaGrande; font-size: 11px; font-style: normal; font-variant:=
 normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; w=
hite-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-wi=
dth: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-family: LucidaGrande; font-size: 11px; font-style: norm=
al; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line=
-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-t=
ransform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webk=
it-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline !important;" class=
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 mailing list</span><br style=3D"font-family: LucidaGrande; font-size: 11px=
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ndent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-s=
pacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:sfc@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: un=
derline; font-family: LucidaGrande; font-size: 11px; font-style: normal; fo=
nt-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-heigh=
t: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transfo=
rm: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-tex=
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LucidaGrande; font-size: 11px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; fo=
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to; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space:=
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<div style=3D"letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; tex=
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d-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-wrap: break-word; -web=
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--<br class=3D"">
&quot;Esta vez no fallaremos, Doctor Infierno&quot;<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Dr Diego R. Lopez<br class=3D"">
Telefonica I&#43;D<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"http://people.tid.es/diego.lopez/" class=3D"">http://people.tid.=
es/diego.lopez/</a><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
e-mail: <a href=3D"mailto:diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com" class=3D"">diego.r.=
lopez@telefonica.com</a><br class=3D"">
Tel: &nbsp; &nbsp;&#43;34 913 129 041<br class=3D"">
Mobile: &#43;34 682 051 091<br class=3D"">
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</blockquote>
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<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; t=
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--<br class=3D"">
&quot;Esta vez no fallaremos, Doctor Infierno&quot;<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
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To: sfc@ietf.org
From: Martin Stiemerling <mls.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 13:14:38 +0200
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Subject: [sfc] SFC virtual interim about Security and Metadata
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Hi all,

The SFC chairs are planning to hold a virtual interim meeting about the 
topics of SFC Security and Metadata.

There is no fixed date yet, as I would like to get a poll from you about 
what date might be the best.

Time-wise we will start at 10am EST which is
- 10 pm Beijing
- 4 pm Central Europe
- 7 am US east coast.

We have planned for 2 hours of meeting time and we will use Webex to run 
the meeting.

Please use the doodle to indidcate what date is preferable by you until 
09/29 10 am EST:

http://doodle.com/poll/9sv9btwt3sgs8uin


Regards,

   Martin


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From: "Carlos Pignataro (cpignata)" <cpignata@cisco.com>
To: Martin Stiemerling <mls.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] SFC virtual interim about Security and Metadata
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From nobody Tue Sep 27 05:50:57 2016
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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Cc: "Jim Guichard \(jguichar\)" <jguichar@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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Hi Paul,=20

Please see inline.

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Paul Quinn (paulq) [mailto:paulq@cisco.com]
> Envoy=E9=A0: samedi 10 septembre 2016 19:30
> =C0=A0: BOUCADAIR Mohamed IMT/OLN
> Cc=A0: Jim Guichard (jguichar); sfc@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: Re: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
>=20
> Med,
>=20
> Med, as always, thank you for your review.
>=20
>=20
> > On Aug 26, 2016, at 5:31 AM, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> >
> > Hi Jim, all,
> >
> > Likewise, I would like to see this document progress as well.
> >
> > In addition to the comment raised in a separate message about the C-bit
> of TLVs, I have the following comments:
> >
> > (1) Section 2: I suggest to delete the following sentence:
> >
> >   NSH is designed to be easy to implement across a range of devices,
> >   both physical and virtual, including hardware platforms.
> >
> > Reason: the use of "easy to implement" should be justified if that text
> is maintained. Otherwise, this is subjective.
> >
> > or to reword it as follows:
> >
> >   "NSH can be implemented in both physical and virtual platforms."
>=20
> PQ>  The "easy to implement" is a reference to the nature of type-1 and
> how, as noted by hardware implementors, this vastly simplifies
> implementation.  Further, the language is widely used in RFCs (e.g. 7321,
> 3160, etc.).

[Med] Unless that statement is backed with citations or arguments, I still =
consider it as subjective.

>=20
> >
> > (2) Section 2.3: I suggest to change this OLD text:
> >
> > The semantics of
> >       the shared metadata is communicated via a control plane, which is
> >       outside the scope of this document, to participating nodes.
> >
> > NEW:
> >
> > The semantics of
> > the shared metadata is communicated via a control plane (Section 3.3 of
> [I-D.ietf-sfc-control-plane]).
> >
>=20
> PQ>  Proposed text: "The semantics of the shared metadata is communicated
> via a control plane, which is outside the scope of this document, to
> participating nodes.  [ietf-sfc-control-plane] provides an example of suc=
h
> in section 3.3.
>=20

[Med] Works for me.=20

>=20
> > (3) Section 2.3- Not sure I would maintain this text:
> >
> >   5.  NSH offers a common and standards-based header for service
> >       chaining to all network and service nodes.
> >
> > "to all" is not accurate as "legacy" nodes are still there.
> >
>=20
> PQ>  Given that "legacy" nodes are supported via proxy, this is indeed
> true.
>=20

[Med] Please update the text to mention the proxy case. Thank you.

>=20
> > (4) Section 2.3:
> >
> > OLD:
> > Transport Agnostic: NSH is transport independent and is often
> >       carried via a network transport protocol,
> >
> > NEW:
> > Transport Agnostic: NSH is transport independent. Any network transport
> protocol can be used to transport NSH-encapsulated traffic.
>=20
>=20
> PQ>  Proposed text: NSH is transport independent. An appropriate (for a
> given deployment) network transport protocol can be used to transport NSH=
-
> encapsulated traffic.
>=20

[Med] OK. Thanks.=20

>=20
> >
> > (5) Section 3.2:
> >
> >   NSH implementations MUST support MD-Type =3D 0x1, and SHOULD support
> >   MD- Type =3D 0x2.
> >
> > Because:
> > * of potential interoperability issues.
> > * MD#2 is more compact when no metadata is to be supplied
> > * MD#2 allows to convey more information compared to MD#1
> >
> > I suggest we revisit that sentence to have MD#2 be mandatory to be
> supported (my favorite option), or at least require that both MDs defined
> in this spec MUST be supported.
> >
> PQ>  As per the previous discussion, this MUST/SHOULD reflect the
> practical reality of implementation and helps ensure deployability.
>=20

[Med] the SHOULD for MD#2 does not help interoperability. I reiterate my co=
mment to update the language to use MUST for MD#2.

>=20
>=20
> > (6) Section 3.2:
> >
> >   C bit: Indicates that a critical metadata TLV is present.  This bit
> >   acts as an indication for hardware implementers to decide how to
> >   handle the presence of a critical TLV without necessarily needing to
> >   parse all TLVs present.  For an MD Type of 0x1 (i.e. no variable
> >   length metadata is present), the C bit MUST be set to 0x0.
> >
> > 6.1. What is the behavior of the implementation if C-bit is set but not
> critical metadata is found in the payload?
> > 6.2. What is the behavior of the implementation if C-bit is unset but a
> critical metadata is found in the payload?
> > 6.3. What is the behavior of the implementation with regards to this bi=
t
> if a critical metadata is added in-path?
> > 6.4. What is the behavior of the implementation with regards to this bi=
t
> if a critical metadata is stripped in-path?
> > 6.5. Should the specification recommend an order of metadata so that
> critical metadata are always positioned first?
>=20
> PQ>
>=20
> 6.1: essentially continue "as is" with an optional warning message
> 6.2: generate an warning error, possibly set C
> 6.3: the adder sets C
> 6.4: the remover clears C
> 6.5: no, this creates too many limitations/complexity.  An implementation
> might opt to optimize.
>=20

[Med] This should be reflected in the specification.

>=20
> >
> > (7) Section 3.3: The following text
> >
> > " ... however the
> >   control plane MAY configure the initial value of SI as appropriate
> >   (i.e. taking into account the length of the service function path). "
> >
> > is not aligned with the outcome of the discussion we had during the WG
> LC of draft-ietf-sfc-control-plane (https://www.ietf.org/mail-
> archive/web/sfc/current/msg04594.html):
> >
> >   The control plane must instruct the classifier about the initial
> >   values of the Service Index (SI).
> >
>=20
> PQ>  The control plane can assign but NSH provides a default value
> recommendation, I'm not sure there's a conflict.

[Med] The default value in the text is a SHOULD not a MUST.  =20

>=20
>=20
> > 7.1. I suggest to modify NSH draft accordingly.
>=20
> PQ>  I'm not clear what you are suggesting?

[Med] The proposal is to use the same wording proposed by Jim for the CP dr=
aft.=20

>=20
> > 7.2. Please consider adding a reference to draft-ietf-sfc-control-plane
>=20
> PQ>  I'll update.
>=20
> >
> > (8) Section 3.4: I still do think this section is underspecified. E.g.,
> >
> > 8.1. The use of "Mandatory Context Header" conflicts with this text in
> Section 3:
> >
> >   A Network Service Header (NSH) contains service path information and
> >   optionally metadata that are added to a packet or frame and used to
> >   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >   create a service plane.
> >
> > 8.2. The specification does not forbid that all context headers are set
> to zero. Otherwise, MD#2 should be used instead.
>=20
>=20
> PQ>  In either care, 1 or 2, no metadata is valid: all zeroes in type 1 o=
r
> no data in type 2.
>=20
>=20
> > 8.3. The specification does not specify how these context headers are t=
o
> be validated.
>=20
> PQ>  By validated, so you mean cryptographically asserted, or simply
> compared to known value?  In either case, that is outside of the scope of
> this draft.

[Med] No. My concern is how an implementation will consider that a given ma=
ndatory header is conveying what is supposed to include. Some validation ch=
ecks are required.

>=20
>=20
> > 8.4. I still don't understand why four headers are chosen.
>=20
> PQ>  As per previous discussions, based experience, use case and
> implementation, four strikes a balance. The widespread implementations of
> type 1 support this.

[Med] I'm not aware of any public use case that requires 4 mandatory contex=
t headers. Can you please provide a public link to a document where this is=
 discussed?

>=20
>=20
> >
> > (9) Section 3.5.1:
> >
> > The length of "Metadata Class" is over-dimensioned. I suggest to reduce
> the length of this field and increase the length of "Type".
> >
> > For example, let's consider the proposal in
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-napper-sfc-nsh-broadband-allocation-
> 00#section-4.2:
> >
> >    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> >   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> >   |     TLV Class =3D 3GPP          |C|    Type     |R|R|R|   Len   |
> >   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> >   |    Data ...
> >   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> >
> >                         Figure 5: TLV Allocation
> >
> >   The intended use of the header is for TLVs associated with 3GPP Radio
> >   Access Networks as described in [TS.29.230].  This TLV can be used by
> >   3GPP to extend the metadata as per use cases.  Having this TLV helps
> >   to carry more information that does not fit within the MD Type 0x01.
> >
> > The list of codes in Table 7.1 of TS.29.230 cannot be conveyed with a
> "Type" field of 7 bits.
>=20
> PQ>  At this point, the allocation seems reasonable, provides for a large
> range of "owners", and the TLV schemes proposed work within this scope.

[Med] "reasonable" compared to what? The example I provided above for the 3=
GPP case shows clearly that 7-bits are not sufficient for TS.29.230. Furthe=
r, 2^^16 is over dimensioned for owners.

>=20
> >
> > (10) Section 4:
> >
> > OLD:
> >
> > +---------------+------------------+-------+----------------+---------+
> > |                |  Insert         |Select |   Update       |Service  |
> > |                |  or remove NSH  |Service|    NSH         |policy   |
> > |                |                 |Function|               |selection|
> > | Component      +--------+--------+Path   +----------------+         |
> > |                |        |        |       | Dec.   |Update |         |
> > |                | Insert | Remove |       |Service |Context|         |
> > |                |        |        |       | Index  |Header |         |
> > +----------------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> > |                |   +    |   +    |       |        |   +   |         |
> > |Classifier      |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> > +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> > |Service Function|        |   +    |  +    |        |       |         |
> > |Forwarder(SFF)  |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> > +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> > |Service         |        |        |       |   +    |   +   |   +     |
> > |Function  (SF)  |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> > +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> > |SFC Proxy       |   +    |   +    |       |   +    |       |         |
> > +----------------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> >
> > NEW:
> >
> > +---------------+------------------+-------+----------------+---------+
> > |                |  Insert         |Select |   Update       |Service  |
> > |                |  or remove NSH  |Service|    NSH         |policy   |
> > |                |                 |Function|               |selection|
> > | Component      +--------+--------+Path   +----------------+         |
> > |                |        |        |       | Dec.   |Update |         |
> > |                | Insert | Remove |       |Service |Context|         |
> > |                |        |        |       | Index  |Header |         |
> > +----------------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> > |                |   +    |   +    |       |        |   +   |         |
> > |Classifier      |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> > +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> > |Service Function|        |   +    |  +    |        |       |         |
> > |Forwarder(SFF)  |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> > +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> > |Service         |        |        |       |   +    |   +   |   +     |
> > |Function  (SF)  |        |        |       |        |       |         |
> > +--------------- +--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
> > |SFC Proxy       |   +    |   +    |       |   +    |   +   |         |
> > +----------------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------+
>=20
> PQ>  Just to be clear (formatting was a bit off in the email):
>=20
> In the last line, SFC Proxy, add "Update Context Header"?

[Med] Yes.

>=20
> >
> > (11) Section 7.2: Please consider adding an IPv6 example.
>=20
> PQ>  Happily.

[Med] Thank you.


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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Dave Dolson <ddolson@sandvine.com>, "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>, "sfc@ietf.org" <sfc@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] Fwd:  I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
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Subject: Re: [sfc] Fwd:  I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
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Re-,

Unless I'm mistaken, I didn't see any follow-up for this issue.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Dave Dolson [mailto:ddolson@sandvine.com]
> Envoy=E9=A0: mardi 6 septembre 2016 20:25
> =C0=A0: BOUCADAIR Mohamed IMT/OLN; Paul Quinn (paulq); sfc@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: RE: [sfc] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
>=20
> Do the authors have a response to this question?
> I'm also wondering about whether the 'C' flag might be for the
> administrator vs. IANA.
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 11:40 AM
> To: Paul Quinn (paulq); sfc@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [sfc] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
>=20
> Hi Paul,
>=20
> I have a comment about this text:
>=20
>    Type: the Type field is split into two ranges - 0 to 127 for non-
>    critical options and 128-255 for critical options.  While the value
>    allocation is the responsibility of the MD Class owner, critical
>    options MUST NOT be allocated from the 0 to 127 range and non-
>    critical options MUST NOT be allocated from the 128-255 range.
>=20
> * Do you have an example of metadata that is critical for all chains, all
> deployments?
> * Wouldn't be more appropriate to have one single registry for "type" wit=
h
> C-bit be a configurable parameter to be set by the administrator of the
> SFC-enabled domain?
>=20
> Thank you.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Med
>=20
> > -----Message d'origine-----
> > De=A0: sfc [mailto:sfc-bounces@ietf.org] De la part de Paul Quinn (paul=
q)
> > Envoy=E9=A0: mardi 23 ao=FBt 2016 16:02
> > =C0=A0: sfc@ietf.org
> > Objet=A0: [sfc] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
> >
> > Dear WG,
> >
> > This version includes much of the feedback/review/comments from this
> list.
> >
> >
> >
> > > Begin forwarded message:
> > >
> > > From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> > > Subject: [sfc] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
> > > Date: August 23, 2016 at 9:54:21 AM EDT
> > > To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> > > Cc: sfc@ietf.org
> > >
> > >
> > > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> > directories.
> > > This draft is a work item of the Service Function Chaining of the
> IETF.
> > >
> > >        Title           : Network Service Header
> > >        Authors         : Paul Quinn
> > >                          Uri Elzur
> > > 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06.txt
> > > 	Pages           : 37
> > > 	Date            : 2016-08-23
> > >
> > > Abstract:
> > >   This document describes a Network Service Header (NSH) inserted ont=
o
> > >   packets or frames to realize service function paths.  NSH also
> > >   provides a mechanism for metadata exchange along the instantiated
> > >   service path.  NSH is the SFC encapsulation required to support the
> > >   Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture (defined in RFC7665).
> > >
> > >
> > > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh/
> > >
> > > There's also a htmlized version available at:
> > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06
> > >
> > > A diff from the previous version is available at:
> > > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sfc-nsh-06
> > >
> > >
> > > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> > submission
> > > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> > >
> > > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > sfc mailing list
> > > sfc@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > sfc mailing list
> > sfc@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> sfc mailing list
> sfc@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc


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From: "Jim Guichard (jguichar)" <jguichar@cisco.com>
To: "mohamed.boucadair@orange.com" <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>, "Paul Quinn (paulq)" <paulq@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [sfc] WG review for draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-07.txt
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From: "Jim Guichard (jguichar)" <jguichar@cisco.com>
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To: sfc@ietf.org
References: <71aca9e7-ae20-e63a-33a0-1e52ec515ba9@gmail.com>
From: Martin Stiemerling <mls.ietf@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <581388b8-3f5f-87ec-0033-63e8a7d0b4f3@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 15:04:44 +0200
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Subject: Re: [sfc] SFC virtual interim about Security and Metadata
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Hi all,

Up to today we only have 12 people in the doodle...

Please check your availability for the interim and enter your 
availability in the doodle until Wednesday, October 5th, 8 pm UTC.

At this point, Friday Oct 14th looks like a good date, but let's see how 
many add their availability.


Thanks,

   Martin




Am 24.09.16 um 13:14 schrieb Martin Stiemerling:
> Hi all,
>
> The SFC chairs are planning to hold a virtual interim meeting about the
> topics of SFC Security and Metadata.
>
> There is no fixed date yet, as I would like to get a poll from you about
> what date might be the best.
>
> Time-wise we will start at 10am EST which is
> - 10 pm Beijing
> - 4 pm Central Europe
> - 7 am US east coast.
>
> We have planned for 2 hours of meeting time and we will use Webex to run
> the meeting.
>
> Please use the doodle to indidcate what date is preferable by you until
> 09/29 10 am EST:
>
> http://doodle.com/poll/9sv9btwt3sgs8uin
>
>
> Regards,
>
>   Martin


From nobody Fri Sep 30 06:25:03 2016
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Subject: [sfc] sfc - New Meeting Session Request for IETF 97
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A new meeting session request has just been submitted by Martin Stiemerling, a Chair of the sfc working group.


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Working Group Name: Service Function Chaining
Area Name: Routing Area
Session Requester: Martin Stiemerling

Number of Sessions: 1
Length of Session(s):  2 Hours
Number of Attendees: 200
Conflicts to Avoid: 
 First Priority: spring sdnrg rtgwg nvo3 mpls lisp idr i2rs bess 




Special Requests:
  Please add the quic bof (if approved to the 1st priority conflict list)
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