From mailman-bounces@core3.amsl.com Fri Feb 1 05:35:43 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F49428D3C9 for ; Fri, 1 Feb 2008 05:35:05 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.589 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.589 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.010, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id CYV9m-3ULwkm for ; Fri, 1 Feb 2008 05:35:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB35528D8A7 for ; Fri, 1 Feb 2008 05:09:24 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: ietf.org mailing list memberships reminder From: mailman-owner@ietf.org To: sidr-archive@megatron.ietf.org X-No-Archive: yes Message-ID: Date: Fri, 01 Feb 2008 05:03:10 -0800 Precedence: bulk X-BeenThere: mailman@core3.amsl.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 List-Id: X-List-Administrivia: yes Sender: mailman-bounces@core3.amsl.com Errors-To: mailman-bounces@core3.amsl.com This is a reminder, sent out once a month, about your ietf.org mailing list memberships. It includes your subscription info and how to use it to change it or unsubscribe from a list. You can visit the URLs to change your membership status or configuration, including unsubscribing, setting digest-style delivery or disabling delivery altogether (e.g., for a vacation), and so on. In addition to the URL interfaces, you can also use email to make such changes. For more info, send a message to the '-request' address of the list (for example, mailman-request@ietf.org) containing just the word 'help' in the message body, and an email message will be sent to you with instructions. If you have questions, problems, comments, etc, send them to mailman-owner@ietf.org. Thanks! http://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidr/sidr-archive%40megatron.ietf.org From mailman-bounces@core3.amsl.com Fri Feb 1 05:36:41 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EB27294FC9 for ; Fri, 1 Feb 2008 05:34:57 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.589 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.589 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.010, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2eD2xC4HQ9q2 for ; Fri, 1 Feb 2008 05:34:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 053CD28C4CB for ; Fri, 1 Feb 2008 05:09:14 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: ietf.org mailing list memberships reminder From: mailman-owner@ietf.org To: sidr-archive@megatron.ietf.org X-No-Archive: yes Message-ID: Date: Fri, 01 Feb 2008 05:03:08 -0800 Precedence: bulk X-BeenThere: mailman@core3.amsl.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 List-Id: X-List-Administrivia: yes Sender: mailman-bounces@core3.amsl.com Errors-To: mailman-bounces@core3.amsl.com This is a reminder, sent out once a month, about your ietf.org mailing list memberships. It includes your subscription info and how to use it to change it or unsubscribe from a list. You can visit the URLs to change your membership status or configuration, including unsubscribing, setting digest-style delivery or disabling delivery altogether (e.g., for a vacation), and so on. In addition to the URL interfaces, you can also use email to make such changes. For more info, send a message to the '-request' address of the list (for example, mailman-request@ietf.org) containing just the word 'help' in the message body, and an email message will be sent to you with instructions. If you have questions, problems, comments, etc, send them to mailman-owner@ietf.org. Thanks! http://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidr/sidr-archive%40megatron.ietf.org From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 7 18:44:36 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D4C03A7F03; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 18:44:36 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.599 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Nutc5JK2IRfi; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 18:44:35 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6200D3A7DA8; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 18:44:35 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69A0A3A7DA8 for ; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 18:44:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FteQsJst5AD1 for ; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 18:44:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from mint.apnic.net (mint.apnic.net [202.12.29.58]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 959073A6FD5 for ; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 18:44:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.94.63.74] (dhcp074.yarralumla.aarnet.edu.au [192.94.63.74]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mint.apnic.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79FE5D5F33; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 12:46:00 +1000 (EST) Message-ID: <47ABC25A.5060002@apnic.net> Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2008 13:45:46 +1100 From: Geoff Huston User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (Windows/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "sidr@ietf.org" Cc: sidr-chairs@tools.ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-01 X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org WG Chair hat _off_: I'd like to submit this draft to the SIDR working group for consideration for adoption as a working group document thanks, Geoff -------- Original Message -------- Subject: New Version Notification for draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-01 Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2008 17:16:04 -0800 (PST) A new version of I-D, draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-01.txt has been successfuly submitted by Geoff Huston and posted to the IETF repository. Filename: draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct Revision: 01 Title: A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure Creation_date: 2008-02-08 WG ID: Independent Submission Number_of_pages: 10 Abstract: This document defines a profile for the structure of repositories that contain X.509 / PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile contains the proposed object naming scheme for the contents of Resource Certificate Repositories and the proposed internal structure of a Repository Cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repositories and facilitate certificate path construction. The IETF Secretariat. _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 7 21:14:32 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D20E13A8175; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 21:14:32 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.599 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8RTz3f11V8Dq; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 21:14:31 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CCF023A814E; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 21:14:31 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F38203A814E for ; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 21:14:30 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YvQODLu-fP+p for ; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 21:14:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from mint.apnic.net (mint.apnic.net [202.12.29.58]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 274263A8145 for ; Thu, 7 Feb 2008 21:14:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.94.63.74] (dhcp074.yarralumla.aarnet.edu.au [192.94.63.74]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mint.apnic.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 209CCD5F34; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 15:15:58 +1000 (EST) Message-ID: <47ABE581.3070700@apnic.net> Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2008 16:15:45 +1100 From: Geoff Huston User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (Windows/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "sidr@ietf.org" Cc: sidr-chairs@tools.ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] draft-huston-sidr-roa-validation-00.txt X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org WG Chair hat _off_: George Michaelson and I have submitted this draft - its a preliminary set of thoughts about how to combine the RPKI, ROAs and the operation of BGP to perform origin validation in a fashion that meets the RPSEC requirements as much as possible. Geoff -------- Original Message -------- Subject: New Version Notification for draft-huston-sidr-roa-validation-00 Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2008 20:27:31 -0800 (PST) From: IETF I-D Submission Tool A new version of I-D, draft-huston-sidr-roa-validation-00.txt has been successfuly submitted by Geoff Huston and posted to the IETF repository. Filename: draft-huston-sidr-roa-validation Revision: 00 Title: Validation of Route Origin Authorizations in BGP using the Resource Certificate PKI Creation_date: 2008-02-08 WG ID: Independent Submission Number_of_pages: 11 Abstract: This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of BGP. The IETF Secretariat. _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Fri Feb 8 07:19:37 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78BCB28C305; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 07:19:37 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.46 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.46 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.139, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9q5nTSJqOkoI; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 07:19:36 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 836F328C2D3; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 07:19:36 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB20328C282 for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 07:19:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id C1DtzbQomFvB for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 07:19:31 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx12.bbn.com (mx12.bbn.com [128.33.0.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B87D3A6FDE for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 07:19:31 -0800 (PST) Received: from dhcp89-089-071.bbn.com ([128.89.89.71]) by mx12.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1JNV2B-0000Ux-3N; Fri, 08 Feb 2008 10:20:59 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: <47ABC25A.5060002@apnic.net> References: <47ABC25A.5060002@apnic.net> Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2008 10:17:06 -0500 To: Geoff Huston From: Stephen Kent Cc: sidr-chairs@tools.ietf.org, "sidr@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [Sidr] draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-01 X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org I support adoption of this document as a WG item. The repository system is an essential element in the overall RPKI architecture. We need a document describing the repository system to complement the architecture I-D that is in process in the WG. Steve _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Fri Feb 8 09:52:30 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5FF2C28C3CC; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 09:52:30 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.599 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4] Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2KM8uSUU7Ayi; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 09:52:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8593228C3AB; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 09:52:29 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F05B028C2EE for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 09:52:27 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ESCfOhg5dlhO for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 09:52:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from nutshell.tislabs.com (sentry.gw.tislabs.com [192.94.214.100]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 929D328C3F3 for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 09:51:54 -0800 (PST) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by nutshell.tislabs.com (8.12.9/8.12.9) id m18HoNZq005634 for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 12:50:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from pecan.tislabs.com(10.66.1.30) by nutshell.tislabs.com via csmap (V6.0) id srcAAA2Hai4k; Fri, 8 Feb 08 12:49:22 -0500 Received: by pecan.tislabs.com (Postfix, from userid 2005) id E440C3F460; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 12:48:54 -0500 (EST) To: sidr@ietf.org Message-Id: <20080208174854.E440C3F460@pecan.tislabs.com> Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2008 12:48:54 -0500 (EST) From: sandy@tislabs.com (Sandy Murphy) Cc: sandy@tislabs.com Subject: [Sidr] IETF-71: important meeting dates X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org If you are intending to submit an internet-draft for the IETF-71 meeting, please keep the following deadlines in mind: February 18, Monday - Internet Draft Cut-off for initial document (-00) submission by 17:00 ET (22:00 UTC/GMT) February 25, Monday - Internet Draft final submission cut-off by 17:00 ET (22:00 UTC/GMT) Furthermore, if you believe that you will be submitting a -00 version wg draft (draft-ietf-sidr-....), then you should contact the wg chairs ASAP, as the wg chairs must approve any -00 submissions. Finally, if you believe that you will have a topic to present at the upcoming meeting, please inform the wg chairs. The wg draft agenda deadline is coming up in a few weeks: February 27, Wednesday - Draft Working Group agendas due by 17:00 ET (22:00 UTC/GMT) --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Fri Feb 8 10:00:41 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6D8B28C408; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 10:00:41 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.599 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1JzhAIE8FMy6; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 10:00:41 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DBECE28C3C0; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 10:00:40 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6804D28C3C0 for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 10:00:39 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from core3.amsl.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rsZHZlxEeAlV for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 10:00:38 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx11.bbn.com (mx11.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71AFF28C3B4 for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2008 10:00:38 -0800 (PST) Received: from dhcp89-089-119.bbn.com ([128.89.89.119] helo=[127.0.0.1]) by mx11.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1JNXY7-0002rm-3a; Fri, 08 Feb 2008 13:02:07 -0500 Message-ID: <47AC9888.90808@bbn.com> Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2008 12:59:36 -0500 From: Matt Lepinski Organization: BBN User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (Windows/20050317) X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Geoff Huston References: <47ABC25A.5060002@apnic.net> In-Reply-To: <47ABC25A.5060002@apnic.net> Cc: "sidr@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [Sidr] draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-01 X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org I support the adoption of this draft as a working group document. - Matt Lepinski Geoff Huston wrote: >WG Chair hat _off_: > >I'd like to submit this draft to the SIDR working group for >consideration for adoption as a working group document > >thanks, > > Geoff > > >-------- Original Message -------- >Subject: New Version Notification for draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-01 >Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2008 17:16:04 -0800 (PST) > > >A new version of I-D, draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-01.txt has been >successfuly submitted by Geoff Huston and posted to the IETF repository. > >Filename: draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct >Revision: 01 >Title: A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure >Creation_date: 2008-02-08 >WG ID: Independent Submission >Number_of_pages: 10 > >Abstract: >This document defines a profile for the structure of repositories >that contain X.509 / PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate >Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile contains the >proposed object naming scheme for the contents of Resource >Certificate Repositories and the proposed internal structure of a >Repository Cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization >across a distributed collection of repositories and facilitate >certificate path construction. > > > > >The IETF Secretariat. > > >_______________________________________________ >Sidr mailing list >Sidr@ietf.org >http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr > > > _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Tue Feb 12 01:33:41 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D4D33A6E2C; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 01:33:41 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -3.923 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.923 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-3.486, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Zj2kIC2tSQbE; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 01:33:40 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F2C828C11A; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 01:33:40 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42CBB3A6E2C for ; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 01:33:39 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id VgsFG-6oEO2H for ; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 01:33:38 -0800 (PST) Received: from postman.ripe.net (postman.ripe.net [193.0.19.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8048D28C100 for ; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 01:33:38 -0800 (PST) Received: by postman.ripe.net (Postfix, from userid 4008) id 42D8823FD3; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 10:35:02 +0100 (CET) Received: from herring.ripe.net (herring.ripe.net [193.0.1.203]) by postman.ripe.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 673B123F14 for ; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 10:35:01 +0100 (CET) Received: from guest-wv-52.ripe.net (gw.office.nsrp.ripe.net [193.0.1.126]) by herring.ripe.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62DCB2F583; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 10:35:01 +0100 (CET) Message-ID: <47B167A7.3090403@ripe.net> Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2008 10:32:23 +0100 From: Andrei Robachevsky User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (Macintosh/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: sidr@ietf.org X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.6 X-RIPE-Spam-Level: X-RIPE-Spam-Tests: ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_00 X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.006814 / -4.4 X-RIPE-Signature: 753b4784d45cc84815895299a2374e37 Subject: [Sidr] CP and CPS drafts X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Hi, I see that CP and CPS drafts have expired. Are there any plans to re-submit them, or is the general feeling that we should drop it from the WG item list? If we want to stimulate feedback, especially from the RIR communities, we need live documents. Thanks, Andrei _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Tue Feb 12 11:05:58 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E8D83A6E74; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 11:05:58 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.605 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.605 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.168, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lrvmlg+QGXXh; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 11:05:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2ECDC28C3C3; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 11:05:57 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B20853A6E87 for ; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 11:05:54 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IBb7femd42Fl for ; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 11:05:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx12.bbn.com (mx12.bbn.com [128.33.0.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE0E428C43F for ; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 11:04:24 -0800 (PST) Received: from dommiel.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15] helo=[192.168.5.16]) by mx12.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1JP0Rw-0005pb-4i; Tue, 12 Feb 2008 14:05:48 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: <47B167A7.3090403@ripe.net> References: <47B167A7.3090403@ripe.net> Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2008 13:55:55 -0500 To: Andrei Robachevsky From: Stephen Kent Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] CP and CPS drafts X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org At 10:32 AM +0100 2/12/08, Andrei Robachevsky wrote: >Hi, > >I see that CP and CPS drafts have expired. Are there any plans to >re-submit them, or is the general feeling that we should drop it from >the WG item list? > >If we want to stimulate feedback, especially from the RIR communities, >we need live documents. > >Thanks, > >Andrei Andrei, Both documents will be resubmitted, shortly. Also, I am working with APNIC on a tailored CPS for their implementation of an RPKI CA. As a result, I think we will be able to fill in more of the sections of the CPS, IF the RIRs all agree that they will be using the "up/down" protocol. Even more of the CPS can be standardized if all the RIRs also adopt a business PKI. Steve _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Wed Feb 13 05:24:54 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F05928C7EC; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 05:24:54 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.815 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.815 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-2.378, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id U04U4mTUhs2y; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 05:24:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 505283A6F74; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 05:24:53 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B5583A6F65 for ; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 05:24:51 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dXUURrIWPD3g for ; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 05:24:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from postboy.ripe.net (postboy.ripe.net [193.0.19.3]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE47D28C7C8 for ; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 05:24:07 -0800 (PST) Received: by postboy.ripe.net (Postfix, from userid 4008) id 2AAF76A17C; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 14:25:30 +0100 (CET) Received: from herring.ripe.net (herring.ripe.net [193.0.1.203]) by postboy.ripe.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5976F6A14C; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 14:25:27 +0100 (CET) Received: from guest-wv-52.ripe.net (unknown [193.0.2.98]) by herring.ripe.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5434C2F583; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 14:25:27 +0100 (CET) Message-ID: <47B2EF29.9000201@ripe.net> Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 14:22:49 +0100 From: Andrei Robachevsky User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (Macintosh/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Stephen Kent References: <47B167A7.3090403@ripe.net> In-Reply-To: X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.6 X-RIPE-Spam-Level: X-RIPE-Spam-Tests: BAYES_00 X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.003082 / -2.6 X-RIPE-Signature: 58213217336f8400170305e43ffe6e7f Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] CP and CPS drafts X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Stephen Kent wrote on 12-02-2008 19:55: > At 10:32 AM +0100 2/12/08, Andrei Robachevsky wrote: >> Hi, >> >> I see that CP and CPS drafts have expired. Are there any plans to >> re-submit them, or is the general feeling that we should drop it from >> the WG item list? >> >> If we want to stimulate feedback, especially from the RIR communities, >> we need live documents. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Andrei > > Andrei, > > Both documents will be resubmitted, shortly. > > Also, I am working with APNIC on a tailored CPS for their implementation > of an RPKI CA. As a result, I think we will be able to fill in more of > the sections of the CPS, IF the RIRs all agree that > they will be using the "up/down" protocol. Even more of the CPS can be > standardized if all the RIRs also adopt a business PKI. > This is good news Steve. Please let us know when the documents are published again. > Steve Thanks, Andrei _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Wed Feb 13 11:25:35 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 101163A6D6B; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:25:35 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 4.335 X-Spam-Level: **** X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.335 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.247, BAYES_40=-0.185, DEAR_SOMETHING=1.605, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, HTML_MESSAGE=1, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sl1bxjgb6Tgi; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:25:34 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08C6A3A685D; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:25:34 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 175073A680E for ; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:25:33 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4toShqMIkdr5 for ; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:25:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from web38212.mail.mud.yahoo.com (web38212.mail.mud.yahoo.com [209.191.124.155]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 0EDBD3A685D for ; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:25:32 -0800 (PST) Received: (qmail 81710 invoked by uid 60001); 13 Feb 2008 19:26:54 -0000 X-YMail-OSG: .1ZWKJgVM1lHJjnHuY2M4bBYFb9tpkToxDhI41ZKCupDM7Ur15QJeqN8o84TyOyPjYpBIAuLuYfA5ANpLZCMziBqYgJtAv5DG5zYoTyTEKqeh6DESWL.5Jo.UWB6jQ-- Received: from [210.212.49.25] by web38212.mail.mud.yahoo.com via HTTP; Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:26:54 PST Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:26:54 -0800 (PST) From: Karan Singh To: Andrei Robachevsky , sidr@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <47B2EF29.9000201@ripe.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <864842.81221.qm@web38212.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Subject: Re: [Sidr] CP and CPS drafts X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============0454433955==" Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org --===============0454433955== Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-1171479612-1202930814=:81221" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --0-1171479612-1202930814=:81221 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Dear Sir I am research scholar and have some problem related to implement work in Ns-2. My work is going on Multicast Security. If there is any appropriate gridline which may be provide by you. Please provide me the guideline. I am waiting yours helpful support and hopeful response. I will acknowledge yours support in my life. Thank you!! Karan Singh Andrei Robachevsky wrote: Stephen Kent wrote on 12-02-2008 19:55: > At 10:32 AM +0100 2/12/08, Andrei Robachevsky wrote: >> Hi, >> >> I see that CP and CPS drafts have expired. Are there any plans to >> re-submit them, or is the general feeling that we should drop it from >> the WG item list? >> >> If we want to stimulate feedback, especially from the RIR communities, >> we need live documents. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Andrei > > Andrei, > > Both documents will be resubmitted, shortly. > > Also, I am working with APNIC on a tailored CPS for their implementation > of an RPKI CA. As a result, I think we will be able to fill in more of > the sections of the CPS, IF the RIRs all agree that > they will be using the "up/down" protocol. Even more of the CPS can be > standardized if all the RIRs also adopt a business PKI. > This is good news Steve. Please let us know when the documents are published again. > Steve Thanks, Andrei _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr --------------------------------- Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast with Yahoo! Search. --0-1171479612-1202930814=:81221 Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Dear Sir
 
    I am research scholar and have some problem related to implement work in Ns-2. My work is going on Multicast Security. If there is any appropriate gridline which may be provide by you. Please provide me the guideline. I am waiting yours helpful support and hopeful response. I will acknowledge yours support in my life.
 
Thank you!!
 
Karan Singh
 
Andrei Robachevsky <andrei@ripe.net> wrote:
Stephen Kent wrote on 12-02-2008 19:55:
> At 10:32 AM +0100 2/12/08, Andrei Robachevsky wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> I see that CP and CPS drafts have expired. Are there any plans to
>> re-submit them, or is the general feeling that we should drop it from
>> the WG item list?
>>
>> If we want to stimulate feedback, especially from the RIR communities,
>> we need live documents.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Andrei
>
> Andrei,
>
> Both documents will be resubmitted, shortly.
>
> Also, I am working with APNIC on a tailored CPS for their implementation
> of an RPKI CA. As a result, I think we will be able to fill in more of
> the sections of the CPS, IF the RIRs all agree that
> they will be using the "up/down" protocol. Even more of the CPS can be
> standardized if all the RIRs also adopt a business PKI.
>

This is good news Steve. Please let us know when the documents are
published again.

> Steve

Thanks,

Andrei
_______________________________________________
Sidr mailing list
Sidr@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr

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Search. --0-1171479612-1202930814=:81221-- --===============0454433955== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr --===============0454433955==-- From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Fri Feb 15 08:29:58 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 90EB928D2A6; Fri, 15 Feb 2008 08:29:58 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -3.133 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.133 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-2.696, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1Tma-vPTQjNW; 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Fri, 15 Feb 08 11:24:41 -0500 Received: by pecan.tislabs.com (Postfix, from userid 2005) id 2864D3F45D; Fri, 15 Feb 2008 11:03:50 -0500 (EST) To: sidr@ietf.org Message-Id: <20080215160350.2864D3F45D@pecan.tislabs.com> Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2008 11:03:50 -0500 (EST) From: sandy@tislabs.com (Sandy Murphy) Cc: sandy@tislabs.com Subject: [Sidr] draft deadlines: Monday 2/18 for -00, Monday 2/25 for others X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Please keed in mind the draft deadlines that are fast approaching: February 18, Monday - Internet Draft Cut-off for initial document (-00) submission by 17:00 ET (22:00 UTC/GMT) February 25, Monday - Internet Draft final submission cut-off by 17:00 ET (22:00 UTC/GMT) --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Tue Feb 19 15:23:24 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1166D28C73E; 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Tue, 19 Feb 2008 15:23:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5C3E28C700 for ; Tue, 19 Feb 2008 15:23:17 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1JNN6W1027515; Tue, 19 Feb 2008 17:23:07 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1JNN68w004292; Tue, 19 Feb 2008 17:23:07 -0600 Received: from localhost ([157.185.81.122]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Tue, 19 Feb 2008 18:23:06 -0500 Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2008 18:23:06 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: Matt Lepinski , sidr@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <478F6BFA.8090301@bbn.com> Message-ID: References: <478F6BFA.8090301@bbn.com> X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 19 Feb 2008 23:23:06.0542 (UTC) FILETIME=[61CB5CE0:01C8734E] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Tue, 19 Feb 2008 17:23:07 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: [Sidr] Multiple Signatures on a ROA: Proposal X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org There was a lot of comment at the mike at the last IETF about the proposal to allow multiple signatures on a ROA. Matt volunteered to provide a discussion requested at the mike. His message came out a month ago, and there have been no comments on his message. This issue needs to be settled so we can proceed. So please pay attention, folks. To hopefully start things off, I have a few comments, maybe enticing you all go take a look at what was written on Jan 17. --Sandy On Thu, 17 Jan 2008, Matt Lepinski wrote: > At IETF 70, Geoff and I agreed to put together a concrete proposal for how > multiple signatures on a ROA would work. > > The attached file outlines our proposed changes to > draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format. > > Comments, suggestions or clarifying questions would greatly appreciated. > - Matt Lepinski > (Commenting as a wg member, not wg chair) >The proposed solution is to alter the ROA format to allow for a ROA that >includes signatures from multiple signers. In essence, this provides a >way for a subject of the certificate containing 10.0/16 to state "I, as >the owner of 10.0/16, authorize AS 123 to advertise the aggregate prefix >10.0/15". I think I'd quibble about the wording here. The owner of just 10.0/16 can not in this format authorize the origination of the aggregate. (And be careful of the word "owner" :-)) It is the "owner" of both parts of the aggregate who is authorizing the origination of the aggregate. So maybe "I, as the holder (:-)) of 10.0/16 and 10.1/16, authorize AS 123 ...." would work better. > By now mandating support for multiple SignerInfo >objects, we ensure that such a future hash function migration can be >performed in a backwards compatible fashion. Good point. I hadn't realized that about the SignerInfo. (But see below.) > In the degenerate case where >there are multiple signatures that correspond to the same address range, >then the authorization is only considered valid if all signatures are >valid. I would think that this would be the case for any ROA, not just the degenerate case. (I think you are just trying to point out that using multiple signatures with overlapping ranges does not make it more likely that the ROA validation will succeed.) But if so, what happens if in the case of multiple hash algorithm signatures - would not one of them be likely to fail, invalidating the ROA? (unless the recipient supported both hash algorithms) >The instructions for ROA validation in Section 3 of draft-ietf-sidr-roa- >format would then be changed to the following: I think that the comments at the last meeting specifically asked for discussion of the error cases, which aren't addressed in what follows. > 2.B Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the > signature on the ROA. If a signature does not validate, then the loop is terminated at that point, because that constitutes failure of the ROA verification, right? Even if the all remaining signatures validate and cover the aggregate? > 2.C Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity > certificate in the resource PKI by constructing a valid > certificate path to a trust anchor. (See > draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs for more details.) Do all the signatures have to be validated with EE certificates that can be traced to the *same* trust anchor? (I would think not, but that question came to mind. Someone pointed out on the list (George Michaelson, I think) that due to the ERX transfer of addresses between RIRs, there are some sequences of aggregatable addresses that are not in the same RIR. A ROA with such an aggregate address might potentially have certificate paths that ended in separate trust anchors. Depending on how the root of the RPKI ends up being handled.) > 3. Compute the union of addresses in the list of prefixes > corresponding to verified signatures by aggregating adjacent > prefixes to the greatest possible extent. If this union exactly > matches the IP address prefix(es) in the ROA, then the ROA is > valid. Exactly matches? A covering match will not suffice? >Note on the additional complexity introduced by this proposal: >... > Additionally, >this proposal requires an implementation to create a list of prefixes >and then aggregate the prefixes to the greatest possible extent. No words here on how complex that code would be. I presume no problem. --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Mon Feb 25 08:14:01 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6742F28C518; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 08:14:01 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.71 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.71 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-2.752, BAYES_00=-2.599, FB_CIALIS_LEO3=3.899, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id K5rgzy+Sjw4r; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 08:14:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DE2E28C58F; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 08:12:34 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83C9928C553 for ; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 08:12:29 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wI0g9VLhRSGf for ; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 08:12:25 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx11.bbn.com (mx11.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 946393A6DC8 for ; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 08:10:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from dhcp89-089-119.bbn.com ([128.89.89.119] helo=[127.0.0.1]) by mx11.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1JTfuH-0007X1-4y; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 11:10:21 -0500 Message-ID: <47C2E7C9.4090306@bbn.com> Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 11:07:37 -0500 From: Matt Lepinski Organization: BBN User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (Windows/20050317) X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Sandra Murphy References: <478F6BFA.8090301@bbn.com> In-Reply-To: Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] Multiple Signatures on a ROA: Proposal X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Sandy, Thanks a lot for the comments. Let me first introduce the (informal) terminology that a signature on a ROA is "GOOD" if it can be verified using an EE certificate that is valid (according to the draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs), and the signature is "BAD" otherwise. Then when validating a ROA there seem to be the following cases: A) All signatures on a ROA are "BAD" B) All signatures on the ROA are "GOOD", but the ROA contains an IP address prefix that is not covered by a "GOOD" signature C) The ROA contains both "GOOD" and "BAD" signatures, but the ROA contains an IP address prefix that is not covered by a "GOOD" signature D) The ROA contains both "GOOD" and "BAD" signatrues, and all IP address prefixes in the ROA are covered by a "GOOD" signature E) All signatures on the ROA are "GOOD", and all IP address prefixes in the ROA are covered by a "GOOD" signature In cases A, B and C, the ROA is declared invalid. (Invalid ROAs should be handled in the same way regardless of which case they fall under) In case E, the ROA is declared valid. As you indicate in your comments, the proposal was unclear as to the handling of ROAs in case D. Personally, I believe that the proposal is reasonable whether Case-D ROAs are deemed valid or invalid. If Case-D ROAs are deemed valid, then there is a possibility for a backwards-compatible mechanism for hash-function migration (if needed in the future). However, it is possible that Case-D ROAs should be deemed invalid to improve safety or to reduce complexity. Please let me know if there are other cases that I have missed which need to be clarified. >> The proposed solution is to alter the ROA format to allow for a ROA that >> includes signatures from multiple signers. In essence, this provides a >> way for a subject of the certificate containing 10.0/16 to state "I, as >> the owner of 10.0/16, authorize AS 123 to advertise the aggregate prefix >> 10.0/15". > > > I think I'd quibble about the wording here. The owner of just 10.0/16 > can not in this format authorize the origination of the aggregate. > (And be careful of the word "owner" :-)) It is the "owner" of both > parts of the aggregate who is authorizing the origination of the > aggregate. So maybe "I, as the holder (:-)) of 10.0/16 and 10.1/16, > authorize AS 123 ...." would work better. > I completely agree that "owner" was a poor choice of words. Also, upon re-reading I realize that the quoted informal text doesn't really say what I want it to say. The important thing is that everyone understands the proposal at a high level. In essence, we are giving the holder of 10.0/16 a mechanism to give concent for AS 123 to originate the aggregate prefix. If both the holder of 10.0/16 and the holder of 10.1/16 give concent (by each signing the ROA) then the ROA is valid and authorizes AS 123 to orginate the aggregate prefix. >> By now mandating support for multiple SignerInfo >> objects, we ensure that such a future hash function migration can be >> performed in a backwards compatible fashion. > > > Good point. I hadn't realized that about the SignerInfo. (But see > below.) > >> In the degenerate case where >> there are multiple signatures that correspond to the same address range, >> then the authorization is only considered valid if all signatures are >> valid. > > > I would think that this would be the case for any ROA, not just the > degenerate case. (I think you are just trying to point out that using > multiple signatures with overlapping ranges does not make it more likely > that the ROA validation will succeed.) > > But if so, what happens if in the case of multiple hash algorithm > signatures - would not one of them be likely to fail, invalidating the > ROA? (unless the recipient supported both hash algorithms) > Clearly I suggested that this mechanism might be used for hash function migration without fully thinking through the ramifications. On the question of how to handle the case where a particular IP address prefix is covered by two signatures (one valid and one invalid), I think the working group could reasonably go either way. Allowing validation to succeed when a particular prefix is covered by two signatures (one valid and one invalid) provides a possible backwards-compatible mechanism for future hash function migration. However, perhaps it is safer (or less complex to implement?) to mandate that validation fail in the case where any signature on the ROA cannot be verified. Alternatively, we could differentiate between the following two cases of signature verification failure: (1) Verification fails because of an unsupported algorithm; vs (2) The algorithm is supported but the signature value is incorrect. >> The instructions for ROA validation in Section 3 of draft-ietf-sidr-roa- >> format would then be changed to the following: > > > I think that the comments at the last meeting specifically asked for > discussion of the error cases, which aren't addressed in what follows. Please let me know if there are any cases (other than those discussed above) that need clarification. >> 2.B Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the >> signature on the ROA. > > > If a signature does not validate, then the loop is terminated at that > point, because that constitutes failure of the ROA verification, right? > > Even if the all remaining signatures validate and cover the aggregate? This is the issue of a particular IP address prefix being covered by both a valid and an invalid signature. Personally, as indicated above, I think that either answer results in a reasonable path forward. >> 2.C Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity >> certificate in the resource PKI by constructing a valid >> certificate path to a trust anchor. (See >> draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs for more details.) > > > Do all the signatures have to be validated with EE certificates that can > be traced to the *same* trust anchor? > > (I would think not, but that question came to mind. Someone pointed out > on the list (George Michaelson, I think) that due to the ERX transfer of > addresses between RIRs, there are some sequences of aggregatable > addresses that are not in the same RIR. A ROA with such an aggregate > address might potentially have certificate paths that ended in separate > trust anchors. Depending on how the root of the RPKI ends up being > handled.) No, my intent certainly was *not* to require each EE certificate is validated using the same trust anchor. My intent was to say that each EE certificate should be (independently) validated as per draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs. >> 3. Compute the union of addresses in the list of prefixes >> corresponding to verified signatures by aggregating adjacent >> prefixes to the greatest possible extent. If this union exactly >> matches the IP address prefix(es) in the ROA, then the ROA is >> valid. > > > Exactly matches? A covering match will not suffice? We've had this discussion before with regards to a single signature on a ROA. If an entity has a CA certificate for the prefix 10.128/16 and wants to issue a ROA for 10.128.0/20, then the CA would issue an EE certificate for 10.128.0/20 and use this EE certificate to sign the ROA. Therefore, the current text of sidr-roa-format indicates that (in the case of a single signature) the IP address prefix in the ROA should indicate exactly the same set of IP addresses as the RFC 3779 extension in the corresponding EE certificate. Similarly, with regards to multiple signatures, two CAs holding a covering range of IP addresses can each issue EE certificates so that the IP addresses in the union of addresses ranges of the EE certificates exactly match the IP addresses in the ROA. Certainly, we could allow the addresses in an EE certificate to be a super-set of the addresses in the corresponding ROA, but I think its important that we use the same approach regardless of the number of signatures on the ROA. > > _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Mon Feb 25 16:51:34 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9052028D092; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:51:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.588 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.588 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.011, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gCfOeE5uAmDt; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:51:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E75733A6E2B; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:45:07 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@ietf.org Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id C4C503A6DE1; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:45:01 -0800 (PST) Mime-Version: 1.0 To: i-d-announce@ietf.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Message-Id: <20080226004501.C4C503A6DE1@core3.amsl.com> Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:45:01 -0800 (PST) Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: [Sidr] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-03.txt X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of the IETF. Title : Template for an Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Internet IP Address and AS Number (PKI) Author(s) : S. Kent Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-03.txt Pages : 45 Date : 2008-2-25 This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-03.txt To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce to change your subscription settings. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-03.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Mon Feb 25 16:51:41 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3930828D16E; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:51:41 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.588 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.588 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.011, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 3DtxzjOOLnVM; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:51:39 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6A183A6E56; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:45:16 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@ietf.org Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id 01D833A6DF2; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:45:02 -0800 (PST) Mime-Version: 1.0 To: i-d-announce@ietf.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Message-Id: <20080226004503.01D833A6DF2@core3.amsl.com> Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 16:45:02 -0800 (PST) Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: [Sidr] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-sidr-cp-03.txt X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of the IETF. Title : Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI Author(s) : K. Seo Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-cp-03.txt Pages : 45 Date : 2008-2-25 This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to support improved routing security. Each organization that allocates IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this policy are employed, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-cp-03.txt To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce to change your subscription settings. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-sidr-cp-03.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Mon Feb 25 17:38:17 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 140B53A6E96; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:38:17 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.588 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.588 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.011, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jt0guUsydIYX; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:38:16 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B9EF28C3AA; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:30:05 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@ietf.org Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id C3AD528C244; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:30:01 -0800 (PST) Mime-Version: 1.0 To: i-d-announce@ietf.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Message-Id: <20080226013001.C3AD528C244@core3.amsl.com> Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:30:01 -0800 (PST) Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: [Sidr] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-sidr-arch-03.txt X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of the IETF. Title : An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing Author(s) : M. Lepinski, S. Kent, R. Barnes Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-arch-03.txt Pages : 26 Date : 2008-2-25 This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support secure Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a public key infrastructure (PKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System Numbers; certificates from this PKI are used to verify signed objects that authorize autonomous systems to originate routes for specified IP address prefixes. The data objects that comprise the PKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for secure routing, are stored and disseminated through a distributed repository system. This document also describes at a high level how this architecture can be used to add security features to common operations such as IP address space allocation and route filter construction. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-arch-03.txt To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce to change your subscription settings. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-sidr-arch-03.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Mon Feb 25 17:46:20 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5DE1028C8E2; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:46:20 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.588 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.588 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.011, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kKZlsFPm9m11; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:46:19 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DB8528C7C5; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:00:05 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@ietf.org Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id BBD1628C762; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:00:01 -0800 (PST) Mime-Version: 1.0 To: i-d-announce@ietf.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Message-Id: <20080226010001.BBD1628C762@core3.amsl.com> Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 17:00:01 -0800 (PST) Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: [Sidr] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-02.txt X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of the IETF. Title : Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI) Author(s) : D. Kong Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-02.txt Pages : 48 Date : 2008-2-25 This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry (LIR) or Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-02.txt To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce to change your subscription settings. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-02.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Mon Feb 25 18:05:33 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 12B9F28C869; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 18:05:33 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.588 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.588 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.011, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cWWrAjPcZLnH; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 18:05:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CB2E28C344; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 18:00:03 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@ietf.org Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id CE90D28C153; Mon, 25 Feb 2008 18:00:01 -0800 (PST) Mime-Version: 1.0 To: i-d-announce@ietf.org From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org Message-Id: <20080226020001.CE90D28C153@core3.amsl.com> Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 18:00:01 -0800 (PST) Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: [Sidr] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-02.txt X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of the IETF. Title : A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) Author(s) : S. Kent Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-02.txt Pages : 12 Date : 2008-2-25 This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to that one or more prefixes within the address block. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-02.txt To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message. You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce to change your subscription settings. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-02.txt". A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Tue Feb 26 11:35:45 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3425928C4A3; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 11:35:45 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.211 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.211 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.226, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, GB_I_LETTER=-2, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0jiiahgVsND1; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 11:35:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 624E828C372; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 11:35:39 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C72128C2C1 for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 11:35:38 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id w+AyDIv0IJ5I for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 11:35:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D10FB28C743 for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 11:32:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1QJWi2d031703 for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 13:32:44 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1QJWhNE004033 for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 13:32:44 -0600 Received: from localhost ([157.185.81.198]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Tue, 26 Feb 2008 14:32:43 -0500 Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2008 14:32:43 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: sidr@ietf.org Message-ID: X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 26 Feb 2008 19:32:43.0869 (UTC) FILETIME=[5BBB18D0:01C878AE] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Tue, 26 Feb 2008 13:32:44 -0600 (CST) Subject: [Sidr] need agenda topics for the next meeting X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Please send me any topics for the next meeting, as I'm putting together the agenda. Draft agendas are due Wednesday (tomorrow) at 17:00 ET, so I'd appreciate getting word of any topics as soon as possible. That will help flesh out what I submit with a bit of reality. A bit more advance notice: revised agendas are due 3 Mar. Keep those cards and letters coming! --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Tue Feb 26 15:15:44 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3961828C205; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 15:15:44 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.837 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.837 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.360, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, GB_I_LETTER=-2, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET=1.96, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5Va2cfGPG0dz; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 15:15:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0A553A697B; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 15:15:42 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16E8A3A697B for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 15:15:41 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YAi1YRgPbYjT for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 15:15:40 -0800 (PST) Received: from mint.apnic.net (mint.apnic.net [202.12.29.58]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34CA13A68BD for ; Tue, 26 Feb 2008 15:15:39 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.100.121] (61-220-70-180.HINET-IP.hinet.net [61.220.70.180]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mint.apnic.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id D924CD5F2D; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 09:15:31 +1000 (EST) Message-ID: <47C49D86.1070704@apnic.net> Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2008 10:15:18 +1100 From: Geoff Huston User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (Windows/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Sandra Murphy References: In-Reply-To: Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] need agenda topics for the next meeting X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Hi Sandy, We've submitted 3 drafts in recent weeks that we'd like to present at this session: 1 - Validation of Route Origin Authorizations in BGP using the RPKI (draft-huston-sidr-roa-validation) presented by George Michaelson 2 - RPKI Repository structure (draft-huston-sidr-repos-structure) presented by George Michaelson 3 - Using the RPKI for Bogon Origination detection ( draft-huston-sidr-bogons-00) presented by Geoff Huston thanks, George & Geoff Sandra Murphy wrote: > Please send me any topics for the next meeting, as I'm putting together > the agenda. > > Draft agendas are due Wednesday (tomorrow) at 17:00 ET, so I'd appreciate > getting word of any topics as soon as possible. That will help flesh out > what I submit with a bit of reality. > > A bit more advance notice: revised agendas are due 3 Mar. > > Keep those cards and letters coming! > > > --Sandy > _______________________________________________ > Sidr mailing list > Sidr@ietf.org > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr > _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Wed Feb 27 07:20:32 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 170D73A6D6D; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 07:20:32 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.996 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.996 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.559, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BZCBLdDebnCf; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 07:20:28 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 058CE3A698E; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 07:20:28 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 025F33A698E for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 07:20:27 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hDpCwCfr+fK8 for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 07:20:24 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DB503A68C8 for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 07:20:24 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1RFKElD004114; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 09:20:14 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1RFKBiW014130; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 09:20:11 -0600 Received: from localhost ([157.185.81.198]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Wed, 27 Feb 2008 10:20:10 -0500 Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2008 10:20:09 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: Geoff Huston In-Reply-To: <47C49D86.1070704@apnic.net> Message-ID: References: <47C49D86.1070704@apnic.net> X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 27 Feb 2008 15:20:10.0608 (UTC) FILETIME=[3E18B700:01C87954] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Wed, 27 Feb 2008 09:20:14 -0600 (CST) Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] need agenda topics for the next meeting X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Are there any changes between the provisioning and manifest draft versions you presented in Dec and the ones posted in Jan? That you'd need time to talk about? --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Wed Feb 27 13:29:14 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D3BC3A6CD6; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 13:29:14 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.722 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.722 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.285, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jg9iWHzshTS3; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 13:29:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E884D3A691A; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 13:29:11 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB55E3A691A for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 13:29:10 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xUiz-gJ4arS5 for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 13:29:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from mint.apnic.net (mint.apnic.net [202.12.29.58]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 667063A679C for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 13:29:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.100.121] (61-220-70-183.HINET-IP.hinet.net [61.220.70.183]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mint.apnic.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF935D5F33; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 07:28:57 +1000 (EST) Message-ID: <47C5D60B.5040705@apnic.net> Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:28:43 +1100 From: Geoff Huston User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (Windows/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Sandra Murphy References: <47C49D86.1070704@apnic.net> In-Reply-To: Cc: sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] need agenda topics for the next meeting X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org they were essentially changes to make then WG documents rather than individual submissions - no content change. So no, no need for time to talk about any changes geoff Sandra Murphy wrote: > Are there any changes between the provisioning and manifest draft > versions you presented in Dec and the ones posted in Jan? That you'd > need time to talk about? > > --Sandy > > > _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Wed Feb 27 20:04:35 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0EC883A68C8; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:35 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.742 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.742 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.305, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ea7KGLFv-ztd; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 86C243A6E78; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:32 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 50DA53A6E5F for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:31 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GBOnOp-K68SB for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from ug-out-1314.google.com (ug-out-1314.google.com [66.249.92.172]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 456543A6E6B for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:29 -0800 (PST) Received: by ug-out-1314.google.com with SMTP id u2so259101uge.46 for ; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:21 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:mime-version:content-type; bh=jTHtWARk74wlSqaqfFsE+NyYnn7NxweLKG0NFDtMsIo=; b=w0Vz+YwTeAfvq3sIY7tQgS0eujZ63jw7O0zBDPVfrbi5oKRAgh13h/+2jd4WQCCo0KWGJ5czTSu4FGTabKBkR+bj6eqVrFRJTfuargalW8mS2R1mpWyx39292KtjZi4/4izfTqVePjAQu3mvFNxzm2lYxxhwO4I5RV0zsPhcxno= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=message-id:date:from:to:subject:mime-version:content-type; b=nPX5LHKWZF4BdOKoCqZJ9s32QXhqYpyHIx9vB3Gle69wpga/TaZH7Jd9ZAbT9xEZTclWGQAmseFxzOkQ5hpVrZ93Dzdy4/7biPLjy4mWOWIMyb5ekSHZNk60IiJciXZYfrO8j79+PtpsGvT2C6d42aozTUuB1Pg5/2jv5xL1j+0= Received: by 10.114.81.1 with SMTP id e1mr8567734wab.11.1204171455879; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:15 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.114.241.4 with HTTP; Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:15 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <77ead0ec0802272004r776fec76yb80df62b8f7b684b@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:04:15 -0800 From: "Vishwas Manral" To: idr , sidr MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_31239_5771214.1204171455873" Subject: [Sidr] Issues with SIDR X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org ------=_Part_31239_5771214.1204171455873 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline Hi folks, As part of the discussion in OPSEC with Stephen Kent and others, I looked at the SIDR infrastructure as well as soBGP document. I found easy ways to just get over all the security infrastructure(PKI) and still being able to do all the attacks as we can currently. Please have a look at the discussion below and let me know your comments. Thanks, Vishwas ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Vishwas Manral Date: Wed, Feb 27, 2008 at 7:13 PM Subject: Re: [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... To: Stephen Kent Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list Hi Steve, Thanks a lot for the comments. I agree it can be a good first step but not sure what the future holds. I am not sure if a heavy solution like this is required which only gives reasonable security. What about the CPU DoS attacks that can be result when new random routes are injected into a domain. Thanks again, Vishwas On Wed, Feb 27, 2008 at 7:07 PM, Stephen Kent wrote: > At 5:12 PM -0800 2/27/08, Vishwas Manral wrote: > >Hi folks, > > > >I looked at the SIDR documents in brief. It can probably be used to > >help prevent any attacks caused due to non-malicious intent. > > > >I found easy ways to get over the SIDR security when done with a > >malicious intent. SIDR just tells the mapping between AFI, AF and AS > >number which can originate the same. However the choosing of a route > >by BGP does not depend on these fields alone. So if a malicious router > >changed the attributes attached to an NLRI update so that it becomes > >the chosen AS to the prefix (of course without changing the > >originating AS field). It can still redirect all the traffic to itself > >for the prefix and then do whatever malicious it wants to do, > >including just drop the packet. > > > >In this way still achieving the attack, but this time for sure with > >malicious intent. > > > >Thanks, > >Vishwas > > > Your example of how an AS can tamper with a route, without changing > the origin AS assertion is correct. I think the SIDR WG participants > understand that. > The work so far i SIDR focuses on establishing an infrastructure that > will enable more comprehensive routing security capabilities in the > future. Both the soBGP and SBGP proposal need this sort of > infrastructure, so it is viewed as a reasonable initial effort. > > I also agree with your observation that the infrastructure makes it > potentially easier to distinguish between some forms of attacks vs. > accidental routing errors, and that, in itself, seems valuable too. > > Steve > ------=_Part_31239_5771214.1204171455873 Content-Type: text/plain; name=draft-manral-sidr-limitations-00.txt Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 X-Attachment-Id: f_fd6shs8j0 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=draft-manral-sidr-limitations-00.txt ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIA0KSW50ZXJuZXQgRW5naW5lZXJpbmcgVGFzayBGb3JjZSAgICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIFZpc2h3YXMgTWFucmFsDQpJbnRlcm5ldC1EcmFmdCAgICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBJUEluZnVzaW9uIEluYy4NCklu dGVuZGVkIHN0YXR1czogU3RhbmRhcmRzIFRyYWNrICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg ICAgICANCkV4cGlyZXM6IEF1Z3VzdCAyNywgMjAwOCAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg 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-0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.017 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.017 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.580, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, HTML_MESSAGE=1, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rlqz6batlhr9; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 03:35:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7AFB28C7DA; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 03:35:43 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C1AB3A6847; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 03:35:42 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aR1uWm5mUucH; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 03:35:41 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx11.bbn.com (mx11.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14FB028C730; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 03:35:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from dommiel.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15] helo=[169.223.13.71]) by mx11.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1JUh2q-0000CD-4F; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:35:25 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <77ead0ec0802262134q6ac2e497m91ca3e8237e021e4@mail.gmail.com> <158FF097-65BB-49BF-B8A1-1191281F2F93@cisco.com> <77ead0ec0802262229wd5e695ag95021040d7492828@mail.gmail.com> <3DD63532-9442-4B12-B1DF-5EA70A66C87D@cisco.com> <77ead0ec0802271712m53e8a1d4sc9cae09ee75686f7@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:35:20 -0500 To: "Vishwas Manral" From: Stephen Kent Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============1993930803==" Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org --===============1993930803== Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="============_-1007923971==_ma============" --============_-1007923971==_ma============ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" At 8:31 PM -0800 2/27/08, Vishwas Manral wrote: >Hi Stephen, > >The point I raise is that there is a cost associated with this, using >certificates has a CPU cost associated with it. > >I may be missing the point but even if you leave aside the cost of an >off line server to do this check but if the checks are done on each >new prefix we can still overload the off line server. If we do things >like rate limiting we can still have an attacks, or cause delays in >the convergence times. > >Thanks, >Vishwas I think you are missing the point. So long as the processing is done as an offline operation, not as a gating item in routing, it does not strike me as a DoS concern. The initial use of the infrastructure is analogous to downloading IRR databases and processing the RPSL assertions, an operation many ISPs perform today on a daily basis. More to the point, folks have implemented the necessary software and tested it with about 20K certs and CRLs and 10K ROAs, a reasonable starting point. I don't have the precise figures in front of me now, but I believe their results show that the time to do all the processing (on a laptop) is about 20-30 minutes, and the time is dominated by the retrieval of the data from online repositories, not by the crypto operations per se. For a once daily, offline operations, this seems quite reasonable. Steve --============_-1007923971==_ma============ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Re: [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak...
At 8:31 PM -0800 2/27/08, Vishwas Manral wrote:
Hi Stephen,

The point I raise is that there is a cost associated with this, using
certificates has a CPU cost associated with it.

I may be missing the point but even if you leave aside the cost of an
off line server to do this check but if the checks are done on each
new prefix we can still overload the off line server. If we do things
like rate limiting we can still have an attacks, or cause delays in
the convergence times.

Thanks,
Vishwas

I think you are missing the point. So long as the processing is done as an offline operation, not as a gating item in routing, it does not strike me as a DoS concern. The initial use of the infrastructure is analogous to downloading IRR databases and processing the RPSL assertions, an operation many ISPs perform today on a daily basis.

More to the point, folks have implemented the necessary software and tested it with about 20K certs and CRLs and 10K ROAs, a reasonable starting point. I don't have the precise figures in front of me now, but I believe their results show that the time to do all the processing (on a laptop) is about 20-30 minutes, and the time is dominated by the retrieval of the data from online repositories, not by the crypto operations per se. For a once daily, offline operations, this seems quite reasonable.

Steve
--============_-1007923971==_ma============-- --===============1993930803== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr --===============1993930803==-- From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 06:49:19 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3A1928C1BB; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:19 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.312 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.312 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.494, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RCVD_IN_SORBS_WEB=0.619, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LwZuyR1-v46Y; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:14 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65E313A6EC2; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:14 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23F683A6EC2 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:13 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EyDtsLAexUin for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:12 -0800 (PST) Received: from wf-out-1314.google.com (wf-out-1314.google.com [209.85.200.175]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 578433A6916 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:12 -0800 (PST) Received: by wf-out-1314.google.com with SMTP id 25so3097721wfa.31 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:04 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; bh=2LMqDnRhvtGFCnWRT3C5RJ7jv08T5vrohuF7JpwZQNw=; b=dsjhhhrY6s0R9B2S4UzL9RrqWlu+b/yswNsPKbw9YLW1e5IgjsVsYGXHv5um9rJYwpyLLaxrTDEv3kq5kDFJBV7HC+OrWMcwu8uXkFQbgdeXnGIJ6N3Wg9+Sof578B6czCsv0S3+R2cE9BOmhM16qw99ETG4sNSOOHQrMKr9aEc= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=XJfK7ZaRJZr2ICoc9qzEHuZUa5b7aa91lNYeRTBMgKnEwiV9c5PPjiseO5cthYxd0OGamHvd4zKLkXuDQJO4iXPm8fiYrvGEcJWqWuov9RVexuFVPp28ratVppFnWFlPBzkqa/+QmQqexyEl8/49R2DqR4ShmWOls3ToUA3f0ew= Received: by 10.142.114.15 with SMTP id m15mr6337766wfc.235.1204210144900; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:04 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.143.164.14 with HTTP; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:04 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:49:04 -0800 From: "Vishwas Manral" To: "Stephen Kent" In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <77ead0ec0802262229wd5e695ag95021040d7492828@mail.gmail.com> <3DD63532-9442-4B12-B1DF-5EA70A66C87D@cisco.com> <77ead0ec0802271712m53e8a1d4sc9cae09ee75686f7@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Hi Stephen, Ok, I understand the model you talk about now. Yes the CPU may not be the biggest concern as the server is verifying the Cert's offline. I guess this would also lead to models like CRL's for revocation. Like I said earlier as SIDR does not stop malicious attacks, but only ones caused unintentionally, is it not possible to actually use a simpler mechanism to get over such errors? Thanks, Vishwas On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 3:35 AM, Stephen Kent wrote: > > > At 8:31 PM -0800 2/27/08, Vishwas Manral wrote: > Hi Stephen, > > The point I raise is that there is a cost associated with this, using > certificates has a CPU cost associated with it. > > I may be missing the point but even if you leave aside the cost of an > off line server to do this check but if the checks are done on each > new prefix we can still overload the off line server. If we do things > like rate limiting we can still have an attacks, or cause delays in > the convergence times. > > Thanks, > Vishwas > > > I think you are missing the point. So long as the processing is done as an > offline operation, not as a gating item in routing, it does not strike me as > a DoS concern. The initial use of the infrastructure is analogous to > downloading IRR databases and processing the RPSL assertions, an operation > many ISPs perform today on a daily basis. > > > More to the point, folks have implemented the necessary software and tested > it with about 20K certs and CRLs and 10K ROAs, a reasonable starting point. > I don't have the precise figures in front of me now, but I believe their > results show that the time to do all the processing (on a laptop) is about > 20-30 minutes, and the time is dominated by the retrieval of the data from > online repositories, not by the crypto operations per se. For a once daily, > offline operations, this seems quite reasonable. > > > Steve _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 08:35:42 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7FBFD3A6C6A; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:35:42 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.867 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.867 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.430, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gPk-bYpEEiyq; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:35:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05E6A28C1CC; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:35:37 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C54B28C29D; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:35:36 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yBe3yFjoImCS; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:35:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAEA828C1CC; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:35:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1SGYviS029835; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:34:57 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1SGYZmi013181; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:34:56 -0600 Received: from SANDYM-LT.columbia.ads.sparta.com ([157.185.81.104]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:34:52 -0500 Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:34:48 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: Vishwas Manral In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <77ead0ec0802262229wd5e695ag95021040d7492828@mail.gmail.com> <3DD63532-9442-4B12-B1DF-5EA70A66C87D@cisco.com> <77ead0ec0802271712m53e8a1d4sc9cae09ee75686f7@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Feb 2008 16:34:52.0240 (UTC) FILETIME=[D7C53D00:01C87A27] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:34:57 -0600 (CST) Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > Hi Stephen, > > Ok, I understand the model you talk about now. Yes the CPU may not be > the biggest concern as the server is verifying the Cert's offline. I > guess this would also lead to models like CRL's for revocation. > > Like I said earlier as SIDR does not stop malicious attacks, but only > ones caused unintentionally, is it not possible to actually use a > simpler mechanism to get over such errors? > > Thanks, > Vishwas > Vishwas, the current SIDR work is focused on preventing attacks (faulty/misconfigured/subverted/malicious/whatever) against the origination of routing advertisements, by providing strong assurance of who holds what prefixes, and therefore who can authorize origination of a prefix. (And in the leak that is the subject of this email chain, the fully deployed system would indeed have detected the mis-origination, in any AS that had received the mis-origination, not just the direct link up from the customer.) The concerns you raise are recognized subjects for further work. But all of the very many proposals for securing BGP (see: S-BGP, soBGP, psBGP, SPV, etc., etc.) rely on protecting this initial bit of routing information: originating a route to a prefix. So defining this work is a basis for defining future fuller protection techniques as well. All simpler mechanisms I have ever heard of for protecting origination of routing advertisements are either much lower assurance, or based on data with similar strong protections but not more assurance, or not extensible to protecting more features of BGP exchanges. --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 09:56:42 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F9B128C8AB; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:42 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.484, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RCVD_IN_SORBS_WEB=0.619, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id VB1tPvSGAzPT; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:36 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDC6428C62E; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:36 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E20853A69D9 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:35 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Pi7K4wAXm2WK for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from wf-out-1314.google.com (wf-out-1314.google.com [209.85.200.175]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78AD73A68E1 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:30 -0800 (PST) Received: by wf-out-1314.google.com with SMTP id 25so3232652wfa.31 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:23 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; bh=e5qlXvwcpsaWBQEAKyqzbIRI8x3fMOA1tM+Q9pxW3uE=; b=gLEZ9TsCIPM0RytDz9+0XndFriEiwfPiVhSlKsOgInCxo1IijF4urDx1Bys3x8LpPORuVe3KnkdcyzwOWtaHgici58d5P7gDlAmpIMJ4A1l956w9BRC8JThrExbJZYSCydDc7/Q1R95z7qidBvN96Uhlg2exyrAczxFWKsMRp08= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=e68fTfVLzH+TafDJAFzTHxClhqcFGX4sbS3XBTZ9HVhQcsxkA+qqh0JUvTu6JO4Sy1ZqKSBJr0MEKZr5AOyf+C14ssbE50qeEDlV3uG5kTKFOrbFQUBlh54RWqZhoT/+r+wmkUxtCsNJrui5EqFgekwdyX/YqnQXeWJcyUiFUf8= Received: by 10.143.40.18 with SMTP id s18mr2624271wfj.156.1204221383592; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:23 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.143.164.14 with HTTP; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:23 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:56:23 -0800 From: "Vishwas Manral" To: "Sandra Murphy" In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <3DD63532-9442-4B12-B1DF-5EA70A66C87D@cisco.com> <77ead0ec0802271712m53e8a1d4sc9cae09ee75686f7@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Hi Sandra, Thanks for the reply. You put forward the all the points correctly and precisely. My concern is that, unlike the normal PKI model where the final output is to authenticate the user using the just the certificate, the Routing based model we are now talking about verifying just a small bit of information which is used for the BGP Best Path selection - the sanity of which we are trying to protect, and protecting just the Origin does not make sense in a malicious case at all. Though you may say that it protects in case the malicious person plays with the Origin attribute, it however does not protect much as with the same amount of effort a malicious person can still cause the same attacks. What increases is the over head in each of the domains to maintain the new PKI information. After reading a bit through what Pekka/ Danny/ Joe Abely said away in which we could update the filters between peers automatically(only relating to routes originated by the peer), from the RIR, we may achieve the very same functionality. Thanks, Vishwas On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 8:34 AM, Sandra Murphy wrote: > > > On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > > > Hi Stephen, > > > > > Ok, I understand the model you talk about now. Yes the CPU may not be > > the biggest concern as the server is verifying the Cert's offline. I > > guess this would also lead to models like CRL's for revocation. > > > > Like I said earlier as SIDR does not stop malicious attacks, but only > > ones caused unintentionally, is it not possible to actually use a > > simpler mechanism to get over such errors? > > > > Thanks, > > Vishwas > > > > Vishwas, the current SIDR work is focused on preventing attacks > (faulty/misconfigured/subverted/malicious/whatever) against the > origination of routing advertisements, by providing strong assurance of > who holds what prefixes, and therefore who can authorize origination of > a prefix. > > (And in the leak that is the subject of this email chain, the fully > deployed system would indeed have detected the mis-origination, in any AS > that had received the mis-origination, not just the direct link up from > the customer.) > > The concerns you raise are recognized subjects for further work. > > But all of the very many proposals for securing BGP (see: S-BGP, soBGP, > psBGP, SPV, etc., etc.) rely on protecting this initial bit of routing > information: originating a route to a prefix. So defining this work is a > basis for defining future fuller protection techniques as well. > > All simpler mechanisms I have ever heard of for protecting origination of > routing advertisements are either much lower assurance, or based on data > with similar strong protections but not more assurance, or not extensible > to protecting more features of BGP exchanges. > > > --Sandy > _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 10:18:38 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5108528C994; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:18:38 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.828 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.828 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.391, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dkXP0IkA8wZI; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:18:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A331B28C9AF; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:17:12 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 26EAC28C9AB; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:17:11 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qed2Kx3ALFbU; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:17:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A0AE28C9D9; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:13:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1SIDSkG003371; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:13:28 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1SIDScQ019850; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:13:28 -0600 Received: from SANDYM-LT.columbia.ads.sparta.com ([157.185.81.104]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:13:28 -0500 Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:13:27 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: Vishwas Manral In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <3DD63532-9442-4B12-B1DF-5EA70A66C87D@cisco.com> <77ead0ec0802271712m53e8a1d4sc9cae09ee75686f7@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Feb 2008 18:13:28.0256 (UTC) FILETIME=[9DFDA400:01C87A35] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:13:28 -0600 (CST) Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > Hi Sandra, > > After reading a bit through what Pekka/ Danny/ Joe Abely said away in > which we could update the filters between peers automatically(only > relating to routes originated by the peer), from the RIR, we may > achieve the very same functionality. > Generating filters from IRR (not RIR, a point it took me a while to learn) data is indeed similar, with the following differences: (a) Security (authenticity, integrity and authorization) of IRR data varies widely among IRR's. And there are quite a few IRRs. (b) Even those IRRs associated with RIRs can protect authn/int/authr of only that data that comes from their own members. (c) RIPE uses the strongest security model among the many IRRs, but their system relies on protection of the communication with the user (and the protection varies from user to user) and the protection of communication to the person accessing the data. The protection is not stored with the data, so the reader must rely on the IRR to get it right. I don't think the reader can tell what protection was used to put the data in there, so there's no way for the reader to judge the assurance in the data. (d) This is not a mechanism that could extent to protection of the other BGP features that you have mentioned. So if/when we decide to work on those features, we'd have to start over with the system we are building now anyway. --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 10:35:22 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFBE728C5AC; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:35:22 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.825 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.825 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.388, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YfmRolSN-CIL; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:35:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 03FFC3A6E69; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:35:22 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28E4D3A67C0; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:35:21 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ExemVKMSlbdB; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:35:15 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C2723A688D; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:35:15 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1SIYouj004699; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:34:50 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1SIYox4021289; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:34:51 -0600 Received: from SANDYM-LT.columbia.ads.sparta.com ([157.185.81.104]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:34:50 -0500 Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:34:49 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: Vishwas Manral In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <3DD63532-9442-4B12-B1DF-5EA70A66C87D@cisco.com> <77ead0ec0802271712m53e8a1d4sc9cae09ee75686f7@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Feb 2008 18:34:50.0117 (UTC) FILETIME=[9A0A1B50:01C87A38] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:34:50 -0600 (CST) Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > Hi Sandra, > > Thanks for the reply. You put forward the all the points correctly and > precisely. > > My concern is that, unlike the normal PKI model where the final output > is to authenticate the user using the just the certificate, the > Routing based model we are now talking about verifying just a small > bit of information which is used for the BGP Best Path selection - the > sanity of which we are trying to protect, and protecting just the > Origin does not make sense in a malicious case at all. Though you may > say that it protects in case the malicious person plays with the > Origin attribute, it however does not protect much as with the same > amount of effort a malicious person can still cause the same attacks. > What increases is the over head in each of the domains to maintain the > new PKI information. > (Yes, I know I already replied to this message, but to a different point and I wanted to keep them separate.) When I say origination of route advertisements, I am not talking about the ORIGIN attribute in the BGP Update. I am talking about an ISP that creates a BGP Update that has an AS_PATH containing only its AS number. That is the point at which a route is first advertised into the BGP system. I'm talking about an action, not a protocol field. It is indeed possible for a route to modify attributes other than the AS_PATH. But many of those (local preference, community strings, etc) have only local significance. And as we have seen, bogus AS_PATHs have a whole lot of impact. --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 10:57:13 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0B8B28C790; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:57:12 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.294 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.294 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.476, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RCVD_IN_SORBS_WEB=0.619, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7-qDjuMjUIJb; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:57:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B135F3A6EEA; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:57:11 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4ACDE28C738 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:57:11 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id appqoh9bJipx for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:57:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from wf-out-1314.google.com (wf-out-1314.google.com [209.85.200.168]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CCFBA3A6EC9 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:57:05 -0800 (PST) Received: by wf-out-1314.google.com with SMTP id 25so3279004wfa.31 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:56:58 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; bh=HsFtt+h6/44TEdl/CDk4g4uSdlnKISnTJpgBSfZjjp0=; b=khmex5Y6BCLWkkSsd6R3tIJDjDdWVQoFEe8x1MOvIgfniWqww/yqtYQldcLgxGfgxQ5OrZXB0MzJxAqIg1Mn54ud9zlQ4GvNGgpAPZIxeWkd+96PUIJLAG75Dx+WtOaXwbULVzRsfy6H86a6a1swMIwj87Ih0Abg1DYlFjpC/1E= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=S5ER9s9/nFXDiCJ3RprIYF6ALdO/kuvxYdNPqdyOiSGbgU7yG+hnjxxGailK9J6Nr9ZsBpKuWRb0qT+5pZT+Sj4Xk4JBfMSuerO3Sqjq9n8FkMfz8fS5nNLA04j5+JcXURHEER1IWeEqjZwO9BFUnG6tNrvjZ04ndM/+ea0f6oY= Received: by 10.143.37.20 with SMTP id p20mr6509032wfj.236.1204225018500; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:56:58 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.143.164.14 with HTTP; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:56:58 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <77ead0ec0802281056y2862d71dt8b753f5f3f3b0df9@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:56:58 -0800 From: "Vishwas Manral" To: "Sandra Murphy" In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Hi Sandra, Thanks again for the information in both the mails. I got to read the differences between the RIR and the IRR. I also agree to the fact that in case we have some mechanism which can verify all the attributes of a route, then such a certificate which does this would be helpful, and then the infrastructure you talk about would be helpful too. I understand the fact that we are talking about a NLRI and the AS element in the AS_PATH. I still look very interestingly at differences we have between AS_SEQUENCE and AS_SET (if we are to verify an update more than one hop away which element in the AS-SET to verify it against - not much difference though if we have only one AS number in the AS_PATH). The only point I want to add to the discussion is because we have to verify the Origin only in the first hop peer, we do not need a global database (as I mentioned we are not saving against malicious attacks in any case). Thanks, Vishwas On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 10:13 AM, Sandra Murphy wrote: > > On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > > > Hi Sandra, > > > > > After reading a bit through what Pekka/ Danny/ Joe Abely said away in > > which we could update the filters between peers automatically(only > > relating to routes originated by the peer), from the RIR, we may > > achieve the very same functionality. > > > > Generating filters from IRR (not RIR, a point it took me a while to learn) > data is indeed similar, with the following differences: > > (a) Security (authenticity, integrity and authorization) of IRR data > varies widely among IRR's. And there are quite a few IRRs. > > (b) Even those IRRs associated with RIRs can protect authn/int/authr of > only that data that comes from their own members. > > (c) RIPE uses the strongest security model among the many IRRs, but their > system relies on protection of the communication with the user (and the > protection varies from user to user) and the protection of communication > to the person accessing the data. The protection is not stored with the > data, so the reader must rely on the IRR to get it right. I don't think > the reader can tell what protection was used to put the data in there, so > there's no way for the reader to judge the assurance in the data. > > (d) This is not a mechanism that could extent to protection of the other > BGP features that you have mentioned. So if/when we decide to work on > those features, we'd have to start over with the system we are building > now anyway. > > --Sandy > > > > _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 11:03:29 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 248183A6F15; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:03:29 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.281 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.281 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.463, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RCVD_IN_SORBS_WEB=0.619, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uqwKxZzDbZUk; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:03:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F39B93A6EEF; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:03:24 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B7B83A6EF7 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:03:23 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id n+RmzDbedojB for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:03:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from wf-out-1314.google.com (wf-out-1314.google.com [209.85.200.169]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 961E53A6EF1 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:02:39 -0800 (PST) Received: by wf-out-1314.google.com with SMTP id 25so3283433wfa.31 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:02:32 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; bh=rz+9/Z6n3hdvng+CQR5MTZAPcxfRZxD9OgWwfWN1ZaM=; b=prG8C/X6PY6oO+qM5k+CGT/O1s0XtisBw7+d6y6yKXgu3y6at9swNeqjRYYqipzMOGbH0wmAHOQIVMkLFvuSC2yZluFxRuyqQ8gPhvTs5Y6kjAL61833LsK8l0NDE6ov7Yp+8RAyakSa9CAVaCWcZZMBZNJXpdqQ2I2GugXVy/w= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=aeGL6qwPYtPhW9TJgqNP1YFQDxgur/xrq+AS/MopP9S+wuh0DEEJfMaYa8OPQ42JbLJ0dR6UAkjihf/qY14idvDYyXaal+1ODvXoOhax7yMNa2yfGWncR+eBtAHQmGoEKTcQEZXk44H+2CnqBo6NMkUCv+Ve2IztlfbLM8N3kSY= Received: by 10.142.133.15 with SMTP id g15mr6528061wfd.9.1204225352404; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:02:32 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.143.164.14 with HTTP; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:02:31 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <77ead0ec0802281102o3e2efedl479ff6351dca0f63@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:02:31 -0800 From: "Vishwas Manral" To: "Sandra Murphy" In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0802281056y2862d71dt8b753f5f3f3b0df9@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802281056y2862d71dt8b753f5f3f3b0df9@mail.gmail.com> Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Hi Sandra, To further clarify, > The only point I want to add to the discussion is because we have to > verify the Origin only in the first hop peer, we do not need a global > database (as I mentioned we are not saving against malicious attacks > in any case). This would mean for someone who gets the information from RIPE does not need to necessarily use the mechanism the way it currently stands. Thanks, Vishwas On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 10:56 AM, Vishwas Manral wrote: > Hi Sandra, > > Thanks again for the information in both the mails. I got to read the > differences between the RIR and the IRR. I also agree to the fact that > in case we have some mechanism which can verify all the attributes of > a route, then such a certificate which does this would be helpful, and > then the infrastructure you talk about would be helpful too. > > I understand the fact that we are talking about a NLRI and the AS > element in the AS_PATH. I still look very interestingly at differences > we have between AS_SEQUENCE and AS_SET (if we are to verify an update > more than one hop away which element in the AS-SET to verify it > against - not much difference though if we have only one AS number in > the AS_PATH). > > The only point I want to add to the discussion is because we have to > verify the Origin only in the first hop peer, we do not need a global > database (as I mentioned we are not saving against malicious attacks > in any case). > > Thanks, > Vishwas > > > > On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 10:13 AM, Sandra Murphy wrote: > > > > On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > > > > > Hi Sandra, > > > > > > > > After reading a bit through what Pekka/ Danny/ Joe Abely said away in > > > which we could update the filters between peers automatically(only > > > relating to routes originated by the peer), from the RIR, we may > > > achieve the very same functionality. > > > > > > > Generating filters from IRR (not RIR, a point it took me a while to learn) > > data is indeed similar, with the following differences: > > > > (a) Security (authenticity, integrity and authorization) of IRR data > > varies widely among IRR's. And there are quite a few IRRs. > > > > (b) Even those IRRs associated with RIRs can protect authn/int/authr of > > only that data that comes from their own members. > > > > (c) RIPE uses the strongest security model among the many IRRs, but their > > system relies on protection of the communication with the user (and the > > protection varies from user to user) and the protection of communication > > to the person accessing the data. The protection is not stored with the > > data, so the reader must rely on the IRR to get it right. I don't think > > the reader can tell what protection was used to put the data in there, so > > there's no way for the reader to judge the assurance in the data. > > > > (d) This is not a mechanism that could extent to protection of the other > > BGP features that you have mentioned. So if/when we decide to work on > > those features, we'd have to start over with the system we are building > > now anyway. > > > > --Sandy > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 12:07:08 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A53FD28C73D; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:07:08 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.78 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.78 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.343, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 03drDDwUh4vb; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:07:03 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27D1628C1BC; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:06:39 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9BD6728C12C; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:06:38 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oNQ30Wu4Y-SL; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:06:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E0C6828C9B8; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 12:03:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1SK3FbM009828; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 14:03:16 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1SK3Do8027336; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 14:03:13 -0600 Received: from SANDYM-LT.columbia.ads.sparta.com ([157.185.81.104]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 15:03:13 -0500 Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 15:03:12 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: Vishwas Manral In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0802281056y2862d71dt8b753f5f3f3b0df9@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802281056y2862d71dt8b753f5f3f3b0df9@mail.gmail.com> X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Feb 2008 20:03:13.0697 (UTC) FILETIME=[F3383110:01C87A44] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 14:03:16 -0600 (CST) Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > Hi Sandra, > > Thanks again for the information in both the mails. I got to read the > differences between the RIR and the IRR. I also agree to the fact that > in case we have some mechanism which can verify all the attributes of > a route, then such a certificate which does this would be helpful, and > then the infrastructure you talk about would be helpful too. > > I understand the fact that we are talking about a NLRI and the AS > element in the AS_PATH. I still look very interestingly at differences > we have between AS_SEQUENCE and AS_SET (if we are to verify an update > more than one hop away which element in the AS-SET to verify it > against - not much difference though if we have only one AS number in > the AS_PATH). You are right that we have not considered how you validate an AS_PATH where the origination is an AS_SET. That has been looked at before, and it is complicated and the possibilities of providing some protection aren't good, even on the theoretical level. Keep in mind that the number of BGP Updates that contain AS_SET anywhere in the AS_PATH are a tiny, tiny, percentage (one figure I saw recently was 10K out of a base of 91M updates - .01%). As a wg, we decided not to work on this right now. > > The only point I want to add to the discussion is because we have to > verify the Origin only in the first hop peer, we do not need a global > database (as I mentioned we are not saving against malicious attacks > in any case). As long as *every* first hop peer does the appropriate strong verification, you would be good. But this system allows ASs beyond the first hop to verify the origination of the route. So, for example, UUNET could have verified the announcements it saw from PCCW even if PCCW did no check and propogated the bogus announcement. (As "Origin" is a BGP attribute with a different semantics, perhaps we should avoid using that term in this context to avoid confusion.) And, finally, yes we *are* protecting against malicious attacks (as well as accidental attacks) on those features we *are* intending to protect. No, we are not protecting against malicious attacks (or accidental attacks) on features we are *not* intending to protect. The difference is not malicious vs accidental, the difference is scope of protection. You think we haven't gone far enough, I'm saying what we're building is the basis for any further protection. --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Thu Feb 28 13:13:30 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B91A3A6AE1; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:13:30 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.743 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.743 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.306, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lsVraoyN6jvf; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:13:24 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A18A228C0F8; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:13:23 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3FF428C1BE; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:13:21 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id CTALd5LDcs4L; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:13:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2A7428C776; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 13:12:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1SLCEn0013681; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 15:12:14 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1SLCE9i031585; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 15:12:14 -0600 Received: from SANDYM-LT.columbia.ads.sparta.com ([157.185.81.104]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 16:12:14 -0500 Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 16:12:13 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: Vishwas Manral In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0802281102o3e2efedl479ff6351dca0f63@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802281056y2862d71dt8b753f5f3f3b0df9@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802281102o3e2efedl479ff6351dca0f63@mail.gmail.com> X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Feb 2008 21:12:14.0275 (UTC) FILETIME=[97324130:01C87A4E] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Thu, 28 Feb 2008 15:12:14 -0600 (CST) Cc: Roland Dobbins , opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > Hi Sandra, > > To further clarify, >> The only point I want to add to the discussion is because we have to >> verify the Origin only in the first hop peer, we do not need a global >> database (as I mentioned we are not saving against malicious attacks >> in any case). > This would mean for someone who gets the information from RIPE does > not need to necessarily use the mechanism the way it currently stands. > As long as: (a) you were interested in protecting only those prefixes that are managed by RIPE - data in RIPE about other prefixes doesn't fall under the protection of their security model, and the RIPE database does not contain all prefixes, and (b) you were comfortable with the trust model of RIPE (they authenticate the upload of the data with varying strength of authentication and you must get the data, whose aussurance you can not yourself verify, from them and only them with a protected transport they support). As an additional wrinkle, I believe that RIPE does allocate prefixes to LIRs. I do not know if the LIRs are required to maintain the RIPE security model in their allocations. --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Fri Feb 29 07:03:47 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 45F433A6D22; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 07:03:47 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.748 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.748 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.311, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Nii4VmBhuXOb; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 07:03:41 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 598243A6A02; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 07:03:35 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2827428C299; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 07:03:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7MoHV9Z795nG; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 07:03:28 -0800 (PST) Received: from mailgw3.ericsson.se (mailgw3.ericsson.se [193.180.251.60]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B65728C3C9; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 07:02:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from mailgw3.ericsson.se (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by mailgw3.ericsson.se (Symantec Mail Security) with ESMTP id 2F71D20FE8; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:47:44 +0100 (CET) X-AuditID: c1b4fb3c-ae8bcbb000007e19-c6-47c81b106d61 Received: from esealmw127.eemea.ericsson.se (unknown [153.88.254.122]) by mailgw3.ericsson.se (Symantec Mail Security) with ESMTP id 164A220FDD; 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Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:02:32 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.143.164.14 with HTTP; Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:02:31 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <77ead0ec0802281102o3e2efedl479ff6351dca0f63@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:02:31 -0800 From: "Vishwas Manral" To: "Sandra Murphy" In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0802281056y2862d71dt8b753f5f3f3b0df9@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline References: <47C4E38E.1070105@bogus.com> <77ead0ec0802271913u2c032ec2y2d03b73cb36de37f@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802272031j6d958279tf3028c4096093020@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280649k66671fc9s9fc24314963c68a0@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802280956s3dcff81cx25fd152ea1c798fb@mail.gmail.com> <77ead0ec0802281056y2862d71dt8b753f5f3f3b0df9@mail.gmail.com> X-BeenThere: opsec@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA== X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Feb 2008 19:03:39.0355 (UTC) FILETIME=[A0BEE2B0:01C87A3C] Cc: opsec wg mailing list , sidr@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak... X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Hi Sandra, To further clarify, > The only point I want to add to the discussion is because we have to > verify the Origin only in the first hop peer, we do not need a global > database (as I mentioned we are not saving against malicious attacks > in any case). This would mean for someone who gets the information from RIPE does not need to necessarily use the mechanism the way it currently stands. Thanks, Vishwas On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 10:56 AM, Vishwas Manral wrote: > Hi Sandra, > > Thanks again for the information in both the mails. I got to read the > differences between the RIR and the IRR. I also agree to the fact that > in case we have some mechanism which can verify all the attributes of > a route, then such a certificate which does this would be helpful, and > then the infrastructure you talk about would be helpful too. > > I understand the fact that we are talking about a NLRI and the AS > element in the AS_PATH. I still look very interestingly at differences > we have between AS_SEQUENCE and AS_SET (if we are to verify an update > more than one hop away which element in the AS-SET to verify it > against - not much difference though if we have only one AS number in > the AS_PATH). > > The only point I want to add to the discussion is because we have to > verify the Origin only in the first hop peer, we do not need a global > database (as I mentioned we are not saving against malicious attacks > in any case). > > Thanks, > Vishwas > > > > On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 10:13 AM, Sandra Murphy wrote: > > > > On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote: > > > > > Hi Sandra, > > > > > > > > After reading a bit through what Pekka/ Danny/ Joe Abely said away in > > > which we could update the filters between peers automatically(only > > > relating to routes originated by the peer), from the RIR, we may > > > achieve the very same functionality. > > > > > > > Generating filters from IRR (not RIR, a point it took me a while to learn) > > data is indeed similar, with the following differences: > > > > (a) Security (authenticity, integrity and authorization) of IRR data > > varies widely among IRR's. And there are quite a few IRRs. > > > > (b) Even those IRRs associated with RIRs can protect authn/int/authr of > > only that data that comes from their own members. > > > > (c) RIPE uses the strongest security model among the many IRRs, but their > > system relies on protection of the communication with the user (and the > > protection varies from user to user) and the protection of communication > > to the person accessing the data. The protection is not stored with the > > data, so the reader must rely on the IRR to get it right. I don't think > > the reader can tell what protection was used to put the data in there, so > > there's no way for the reader to judge the assurance in the data. > > > > (d) This is not a mechanism that could extent to protection of the other > > BGP features that you have mentioned. So if/when we decide to work on > > those features, we'd have to start over with the system we are building > > now anyway. > > > > --Sandy > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ OPSEC mailing list OPSEC@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Fri Feb 29 10:43:24 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DD293A6E22; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 10:43:24 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.641 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.641 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.204, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oy+1TILDIVA0; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 10:43:23 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20BBA3A6D98; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 10:43:23 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37B133A6DE0 for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 10:43:22 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id JCI6VMfS7h3l for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 10:43:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from M4.sparta.com (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 45E9B3A6EAD for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 10:43:15 -0800 (PST) Received: from Beta5.sparta.com (beta5.sparta.com [157.185.63.21]) by M4.sparta.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m1TIh7Gm027116 for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 12:43:07 -0600 Received: from nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com (nemo.columbia.sparta.com [157.185.80.75]) by Beta5.sparta.com (8.12.11/8.13.1) with ESMTP id m1TIh7Bs014915 for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 12:43:07 -0600 Received: from localhost ([157.185.81.104]) by nemo.columbia.ads.sparta.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Fri, 29 Feb 2008 13:43:06 -0500 Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 13:43:05 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) From: Sandra Murphy To: sidr@ietf.org Message-ID: X-X-Sender: sandy@nemo.columbia.sparta.com MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 29 Feb 2008 18:43:06.0760 (UTC) FILETIME=[EC799080:01C87B02] X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-3.0 (M4.sparta.com [157.185.61.2]); Fri, 29 Feb 2008 12:43:07 -0600 (CST) Subject: [Sidr] agenda uploaded X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Somehow my upload of the agenda did not "take". I've re-uploaded it. Even though the draft agenda page is behind (it still says "Updated as of 2008-02-27 08:36:07 (ET)"), you can see the agenda at http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/08mar/agenda/sidr.html Send any needed changes or additions to me or to Geoff. --Sandy _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr From sidr-bounces@ietf.org Fri Feb 29 15:43:39 2008 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-sidr-archive@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F57A3A6D8E; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:43:39 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.864 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.864 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.427, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611, RDNS_NONE=0.1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id u5I7syz9M69H; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:43:38 -0800 (PST) Received: from core3.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38C6D28C6A4; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:43:34 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@core3.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17E1528C220 for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:43:33 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oASX3m8r79nl for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:43:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from cyteen.hactrn.net (cyteen.hactrn.net [66.92.66.68]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3836D3A6D41 for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:43:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from thrintun.hactrn.net (thrintun.hactrn.net [IPv6:2002:425c:4242:0:219:d1ff:fe12:5d30]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "thrintun.hactrn.net", Issuer "Grunchweather Associates" (verified OK)) by cyteen.hactrn.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 907022846E for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:42:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from thrintun.hactrn.net (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by thrintun.hactrn.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 502D222808 for ; Fri, 29 Feb 2008 18:42:46 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 18:42:46 -0500 From: Rob Austein To: sidr@ietf.org In-Reply-To: <478F6BFA.8090301@bbn.com> References: <478F6BFA.8090301@bbn.com> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Message-Id: <20080229234246.502D222808@thrintun.hactrn.net> Subject: Re: [Sidr] Multiple Signatures on a ROA: Proposal X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: sidr-bounces@ietf.org Errors-To: sidr-bounces@ietf.org I remain quite skeptical about the need for this, but will suspend disbelief on that point for the remainder of this message. The proposal is too complicated for the stated purpose, mostly because it allows overlapping resource sets. That drags in all sorts of fun topics, such as partial overlaps, overlaps with multiple algorithms, downgrade attacks, deciding how many good signatures is enough, etcetera ad nauseum. Complicated decision trees means multiple code paths. Rarely used code paths will be buggy. Buggy code paths will be an attack vector. This is supposed to be security software. Keep it simple. If you must support multiple signatures, do it as simply as possible: - All signatures must be good, if any are bad, so is the ROA. Full stop. - Overlaps are not allowed, full stop. - If the ROA's exactMatch field is true, the prefixes listed in the ROA must be an exact match for the union of the set of prefixes covered by the certs; otherwise, the prefixes listed in the ROA must be a subset (possibly improper) of the union of the resources in the cert. _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list Sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr