Subject: [sidr] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidr-publication-10: (with COMMENT)

From: "Kathleen Moriarty" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 10:17:00 -0800

Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidr-publication-10: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thanks for addressing the security directorate review.

As for Alissa's comment on transport, more language added to the Security
Considerations section would be helpful to explain why the CMS signature
is sufficient.  I am assuming that the only exposure would be to public
information during transport that is protected from tampering, unless I
missed something in reading the draft (I don't think you are transferring
private keys and didn't see that in the text).

Security controls being managed according to the CA policy mentioned
earlier in the document is appropriate, having run CAs before - there are
strict requirements already depending on the level you plan to run the
CA.

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From: Rob Austein <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2017 20:01:57 -0500

At Wed, 18 Jan 2017 10:17:00 -0800, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
...

Correct, no private keys in flight here.  Everything being transferred
is a signed object intended for public consumption.

Will try to come up with something for security considerations (I
would say "suggestions welcome" but I think you just did...).

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2017 21:00:39 -0500

Hi Rob,

> is a signed object intended for public consumption.

OK, my response here was tied to my text following that considered CA
policies.  Having run CAs and reviewed many policies, most are strict
enough that I would think the session encryption would be mandated by
policy assurance level.  This would mean something like only those
operating under a rudimentary assurance level might not have session
encryption... but knowing where that line is drawn would be helpful.
I believe Stephen put a discuss on this and I agree with that since I
was making assumptions on the policy assurance requirements.  If the
assurance requirements cover the need for session encryption, that
should be stated or a stronger requirement in this draft per Stephen's
discuss.

Thank you,
Kathleen

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Best regards,
Kathleen