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To: Christopher Morrow <christopher.morrow@gmail.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: SIDROps Chairs <sidrops-chairs@ietf.org>, SIDR Operations WG <sidrops@ietf.org>, Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Eric Vyncke <evyncke@cisco.com>, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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From: Adianto Wibisono <awibisono@ripe.net>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops]  =?utf-8?q?=C3=89ric_Vyncke=27s_No_Objection_on_draft-i?= =?utf-8?q?etf-sidrops-6486bis-09=3A_=28with_COMMENT=29?=
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Hi all,

It is indeed a better text.

Minor nit however, we will have 'in-flight modification' that only 
appears in the abstract, but not elaborated further on the draft.
The old abstract is elaborated nicely on the first paragraph of the 
draft, explaining that we have the manifest to protect against replay 
attacks and unauthorized deletions.

             However, digital signatures provide no protection against 
attacks that
             substitute "stale" versions of signed objects (i.e., 
objects that were
             valid and have not expired, but have since been superseded) 
or attacks
             that remove an object that should be present in the 
repository.

             To assist in the detection of such attacks, the RPKI 
repository system can
             make use of a signed object called a "manifest".

Perhaps if we want to keep in-flight modification in the abstract, we 
need to elaborate further in the draft,
since usually I expect abstract to be a compressed version of what will 
be elaborated later.

Cheers,

Adianto

On 31/01/2022 18:56, Christopher Morrow wrote:
> oh yea, that's nice :) I was struggling with the sentence myself (upon 
> re-reading eric's question) .. since it seems to be talking about:
>   "you have a remote copy (the RP) and your copy, the manifest helps 
> you tell what's going to change in the local copy"
>   (missing the context of local/remote copy correlation did me in)
>
> anyway, yay! better text.
>
> On Mon, Jan 31, 2022 at 11:38 AM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> 
> wrote:
>
>     I think this is an improvement.
>
>     Russ
>
>     > On Jan 31, 2022, at 11:16 AM, Job Snijders
>     <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>     >
>     > Dear Éric,
>     >
>     > I think you raise a "valid" concern (no pun intended ;-))
>     >
>     > I think something along the following lines might help clarify the
>     > purpose of RPKI Manifests.
>     >
>     > OLD:
>     >    Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the
>     >    signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point,
>     then
>     >    the RP can detect "stale" (valid) data and deletion of signed
>     objects.
>     >
>     > NEW:
>     >    Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the
>     >    signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point,
>     then
>     >    the RP can detect replay attacks, in-flight modification, or
>     >    unauthorized deletion of signed objects.
>     >
>     > What do others think?
>     >
>     > Kind regards,
>     >
>     > Job
>     >
>     > On Mon, Jan 31, 2022 at 02:59:31AM -0800, Éric Vyncke via
>     Datatracker wrote:
>     >> Éric Vyncke has entered the following ballot position for
>     >> draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: No Objection
>     >>
>     >> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply
>     to all
>     >> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to
>     cut this
>     >> introductory paragraph, however.)
>     >>
>     >>
>     >> Please refer to
>     https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-iesg-ballot-positions/
>     >> for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT
>     positions.
>     >>
>     >>
>     >> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>     >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>     >> COMMENT:
>     >>
>     ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>     >>
>     >> Thank you for the work put into this document.
>     >>
>     >> Please find below one non-blocking COMMENT points.
>     >>
>     >> Special thanks to Chris Morrow for the shepherd's write-up
>     including the
>     >> section about the WG consensus (even if I would have appreciated a
>     >> justification for the PS status).
>     >>
>     >> I hope that this helps to improve the document,
>     >>
>     >> Regards,
>     >>
>     >> -éric
>     >>
>     >> -- Abstract --
>     >> In "then the RP can detect "stale" (valid) data", is "valid"
>     really the right
>     >> word to use ? I would naively expect "invalid". Or is it just
>     an indication
>     >> that the data *was* valid and is stale? The use of "(.*)" in
>     the abstract was
>     >> more to explain the previous word and this use is different and
>     could confuse
>     >> the reader.
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     >> _______________________________________________
>     >> Sidrops mailing list
>     >> Sidrops@ietf.org
>     >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>     >
>     > _______________________________________________
>     > Sidrops mailing list
>     > Sidrops@ietf.org
>     > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Sidrops mailing list
>     Sidrops@ietf.org
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
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    <p>Hi all,<br>
    </p>
    <p>It is indeed a better text. <br>
    </p>
    <p>Minor nit however, we will have 'in-flight modification' that
      only appears in the abstract, but not elaborated further on the
      draft. <br>
      The old abstract is elaborated nicely on the first paragraph of
      the draft, explaining that we have the manifest to protect against
      replay attacks and unauthorized deletions.<br>
      <br>
                  However, digital signatures provide no protection
      against attacks that<br>
                  substitute "stale" versions of signed objects (i.e.,
      objects that were<br>
                  valid and have not expired, but have since been
      superseded) or attacks<br>
                  that remove an object that should be present in the
      repository.  <br>
      <br>
                  To assist in the detection of such attacks, the RPKI
      repository system can<br>
                  make use of a signed object called a "manifest".<br>
      <br>
      Perhaps if we want to keep in-flight modification in the abstract,
      we need to elaborate further in the draft, <br>
      since usually I expect abstract to be a compressed version of what
      will be elaborated later.<br>
    </p>
    <p>Cheers,<br>
      <br>
      Adianto</p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 31/01/2022 18:56, Christopher Morrow
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAL9jLaay0NMSoiFwr6CSdbz3TkWOPuuK5GbG5yFWE_+Dr8s+xw@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">oh yea, that's nice :) I was struggling with the
        sentence myself (upon re-reading eric's question) .. since it
        seems to be talking about:<br>
          "you have a remote copy (the RP) and your copy, the manifest
        helps you tell what's going to change in the local copy"<br>
          (missing the context of local/remote copy correlation did me
        in)
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>anyway, yay! better text.</div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Jan 31, 2022 at 11:38
          AM Russ Housley &lt;<a href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com"
            moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I
          think this is an improvement.<br>
          <br>
          Russ<br>
          <br>
          &gt; On Jan 31, 2022, at 11:16 AM, Job Snijders &lt;job=<a
            href="mailto:40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target="_blank"
            moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; Dear Éric,<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; I think you raise a "valid" concern (no pun intended ;-))<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; I think something along the following lines might help
          clarify the<br>
          &gt; purpose of RPKI Manifests.<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; OLD:<br>
          &gt;    Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents
          against the<br>
          &gt;    signed objects retrieved from a repository publication
          point, then<br>
          &gt;    the RP can detect "stale" (valid) data and deletion of
          signed objects.<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; NEW:<br>
          &gt;    Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents
          against the<br>
          &gt;    signed objects retrieved from a repository publication
          point, then<br>
          &gt;    the RP can detect replay attacks, in-flight
          modification, or<br>
          &gt;    unauthorized deletion of signed objects.<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; What do others think?<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; Kind regards,<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; Job<br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; On Mon, Jan 31, 2022 at 02:59:31AM -0800, Éric Vyncke via
          Datatracker wrote:<br>
          &gt;&gt; Éric Vyncke has entered the following ballot position
          for<br>
          &gt;&gt; draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: No Objection<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; When responding, please keep the subject line intact
          and reply to all<br>
          &gt;&gt; email addresses included in the To and CC lines.
          (Feel free to cut this<br>
          &gt;&gt; introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; Please refer to <a
            href="https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-iesg-ballot-positions/"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
            class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-iesg-ballot-positions/</a><br>
          &gt;&gt; for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and
          COMMENT positions.<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; The document, along with other ballot positions, can
          be found here:<br>
          &gt;&gt; <a
            href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
            class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/</a><br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt;
          ----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
          &gt;&gt; COMMENT:<br>
          &gt;&gt;
          ----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; Thank you for the work put into this document.<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; Please find below one non-blocking COMMENT points.<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; Special thanks to Chris Morrow for the shepherd's
          write-up including the<br>
          &gt;&gt; section about the WG consensus (even if I would have
          appreciated a<br>
          &gt;&gt; justification for the PS status).<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; I hope that this helps to improve the document,<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; Regards,<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; -éric<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; -- Abstract --<br>
          &gt;&gt; In "then the RP can detect "stale" (valid) data", is
          "valid" really the right<br>
          &gt;&gt; word to use ? I would naively expect "invalid". Or is
          it just an indication<br>
          &gt;&gt; that the data *was* valid and is stale? The use of
          "(.*)" in the abstract was<br>
          &gt;&gt; more to explain the previous word and this use is
          different and could confuse<br>
          &gt;&gt; the reader.<br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; <br>
          &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
          &gt;&gt; Sidrops mailing list<br>
          &gt;&gt; <a href="mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org" target="_blank"
            moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">Sidrops@ietf.org</a><br>
          &gt;&gt; <a
            href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
            class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a><br>
          &gt; <br>
          &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
          &gt; Sidrops mailing list<br>
          &gt; <a href="mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org" target="_blank"
            moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">Sidrops@ietf.org</a><br>
          &gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
            class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a><br>
          <br>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          Sidrops mailing list<br>
          <a href="mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org" target="_blank"
            moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">Sidrops@ietf.org</a><br>
          <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
            class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a><br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="moz-mime-attachment-header"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
Sidrops mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org">Sidrops@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
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From nobody Tue Feb  1 22:43:16 2022
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Subject: [Sidrops] Murray Kucherawy's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Murray Kucherawy has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: No Objection

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
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Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-iesg-ballot-positions/
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The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The response to question 7 of the shepherd writeup doesn't really answer the
question being asked.  Also, please tidy up the stuff identified in the answer
to question 11.

Section 4.2.1:

* "... this field is more recent any previously-generated ..." --
s/recent/recent than/

Appendix B:

* Since this is obsoleting, not updating, RFC 6486, I think this is more like
"Changes Since RFC 6486".




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Zaheduzzaman Sarker has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: No Objection

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for the efforts on this specification. It was a good read.

After reading the shepherd's writeup I was expecting an update to 6486 but the
document actually obsoletes 6486. Something happened between when the shepherd
writeup was written and when this doc went for publication, not captured. Not a
big deal I guess, would have been better to get this captured.

Nits:

   Section 4.2.1 : "The issuer MUST ensure that the value of this field is more
   recent any previously-generated Manifest", missing "than" ?




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Subject: [Sidrops] Francesca Palombini's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for the work on this document

I have an easy to fix point that should be address before publication (although
it probably does not rise to the level of DISCUSS). I also have a number of
minor comments (answers will be appreciated) and nits.

Francesca

# Major

1. -----

   objects from a successful fetch.  This implies that the RP MUST not

FP: This should be "MUST NOT" (rather than "MUST not")

# Minor

2. -----

FP: as noted by the shepherd, there are some references to fix:

  * RFC 6485 needs to be replaced with RFC 7935

The following references need to be removed as they are not used.

  == Unused Reference: 'RFC6482'
  == Unused Reference: 'RFC6493'
  == Unused Reference: 'RFC8209'
  == Unused Reference: 'RFC8488'  (this was even last called as downref)

3. -----

      monotonically for each newly-generated Manifest.  Each RP MUST
      verify that a purported "new" Manifest contains a higher
      manifestNumber than previously-validated Manifests.

FP: This should contain a sentence about what the RP has to do if verification
fails (I expect ignore the "new" Manifest). Same comment for the thisUpdate
field:

      Manifest.  Each RP MUST verify that this field value is greater
      (more recent) than the most recent Manifest it has validated.

And for the text in Section 5.1:

       Note: An RP MUST verify all mandated syntactic constraints, i.e.,
       constraints imposed on a CA via a "MUST".

       publication point that is described by the manifest.  (RPs are
       required to verify the CMS signature.)

4. ------

      nextUpdate time.  Each manifest encompasses a CRL, and the
      nextUpdate field of the manifest SHOULD match that of the CRL's
      nextUpdate field, as the manifest will be re-issued when a new CRL

FP: What are the exception cases where it is expected not to match (i.e. what
is the reason for the SHOULD here)?

5. -----

   The RP MUST check that the current time (translated to UTC) is
   between thisUpdate and nextUpdate.  If the current time lies within

FP: I am not sure the parenthesis needs to be there - this seems like an
unnecessary implementation detail.

# Nits

6. -----

  *  all published signed objects that are verifiable using EE

FP: Please expand all acronyms (EE, OID) on first use

7. -----

   termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate [RFC6487]

FP: missing period




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From: "Borchert, Oliver (Fed)" <oliver.borchert@nist.gov>
To: Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Keyur Patel <keyur@arrcus.com>
CC: "sidrops@ietf.org" <sidrops@ietf.org>, "Borchert, Oliver (Fed)" <oliver.borchert@nist.gov>
Thread-Topic: [Sidrops] Closed -- [WGLC] draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-05 - Ends 31/January/2022
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Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 16:24:03 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Closed -- [WGLC] draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-05 - Ends 31/January/2022
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Closed -- [WGLC] draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-05 - Ends 31/January/2022
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> I would have re-requested one more editorial change that I pointed out
> during the previous WLC. The issue is the Flags field, which is
> defined twice, Once $B!H(Bglobally$B!I(B in chapter 5.1 Fields of PDU which
> contains the explanation on what to do for the ROA and Key
> handling. Then one more time in chapter 5.12 ASPA PDU.
> 
> I mentioned that already in November or December that for completeness
> it would make sense to add the text from 5.12 into 5.1 as it is done
> with the other PDU$B!G(Bs.

easy hack with no semantic impact.  anybody object if i do it?  might
wait to see if there are other bugs.

randy


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Subject: [Sidrops] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: No Objection

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I support Ben Kaduk's DISCUSS position.

** Section 8.  The Section 4.2.1 guidance that “Each RP MUST verify that a
purported "new" Manifest contains a higher manifestNumber than
previously-validated Manifests” is crucial to prevent a replay-like attack. 
What is the recovery procedure if an RP loses that state (i.e., “forgets” what
the last manifestNumber was for a given publication point)?  Should it be TOFU
(trust whatever is the first value it downloads next)?

** Editorial
-- Section 1.  In the spirit of inclusive language consider replacing
“man-in-the-middle”.  For example, s/man-in-the-middle attack on the
retrieval/an on-path attack during the retrieval/

-- Section 4.2.1.  Editorial.  In the thisUpdate field, s/is recent any/is more
recent than any/




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Subject: [Sidrops] Lars Eggert's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Lars Eggert has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: No Objection

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Using lowercase "not" together with an uppercase RFC2119 keyword is not
acceptable usage. Found: "MUST not"

Found terminology that should be reviewed for inclusivity; see
https://www.rfc-editor.org/part2/#inclusive_language for background and more
guidance:

 * Term "man"; alternatives might be "individual", "people", "person".

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All comments below are about very minor potential issues that you may choose to
address in some way - or ignore - as you see fit. Some were flagged by
automated tools (via https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool), so there
will likely be some false positives. There is no need to let me know what you
did with these suggestions.

Section 5.2. , paragraph 5, nit:
> ion point to effect this operation. Thus the term "fetch" refers to an operat
>                                     ^^^^
A comma may be missing after the conjunctive/linking adverb "Thus".

Section 11.1. , paragraph 11, nit:
> Appendix B. Changes to RFC 6486 In 2019 it came to light that multiple Relyin
>                                    ^^^^
A comma is probably missing here.

Uncited references: [RFC6493], [RFC6482], [RFC8209], and [RFC8488].

Reference [RFC6485] to RFC6485, which was obsoleted by RFC7935 (this may be on
purpose).




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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for this document, just a couple of minor comments:

1) Section 4.2.1. Manifest

   nextUpdate:
      This field contains the time at which the next scheduled manifest
      will be issued.  The value of nextUpdate MUST be later than the
      value of thisUpdate.  The specification of the GeneralizedTime
      value is the same as required for the thisUpdate field.

      If the authority alters any of the items that it has published in
      the repository publication point, then the authority MUST issue a
      new manifest.  Even if no changes are made to objects at a
      publication point, a new manifest MUST be issued before the
      nextUpdate time.  Each manifest encompasses a CRL, and the
      nextUpdate field of the manifest SHOULD match that of the CRL's
      nextUpdate field, as the manifest will be re-issued when a new CRL
      is published.  When a new manifest is issued before the time
      specified in nextUpdate of the current manifest, the CA MUST also
      issue a new CRL that revokes the EE certificate corresponding to
      the old manifest.

Although this last sentence is not wrong, am I right in thinking that this
sentence isn't specific to when the manifest is issued, i.e., isn't it the case
that that CA MUST issue a new CRL whenever a new manifest is issues for any
reason (e.g., as per 5.1, step 2)?  If so, perhaps this sentence could be
tweaked to make that clearer.

2) 5.2.  Considerations for Manifest Generation

   A new manifest MUST be issued and published before the nextUpdate
   time.

Should any guidance be given about how far before the nextUpdate time a new
manifest should be issued.  E.g., is publishing right at the nextUpdate time
(e.g., 1 millisecond before) sufficient , or does it make sense to publish it a
bit earlier than the nextUpdate time?

Nits:

4.1.  eContentType

   The eContentType for a manifest is defined as id-ct-rpkiManifest and
   has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26.

Would numerical object identifier, or numerical OID, be better than numerical
value here?

4.2.  eContent

I would have preferred for "file" to be "filename" in the structure, but I
presume that this can't be changed at this stage anyway ...

Regards,
Rob




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Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 15:43:02 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Adianto Wibisono <awibisono@ripe.net>
Cc: Christopher Morrow <christopher.morrow@gmail.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, SIDROps Chairs <sidrops-chairs@ietf.org>, SIDR Operations WG <sidrops@ietf.org>, Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Eric Vyncke <evyncke@cisco.com>, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Dear IESG, SIDROPS, other interested parties,

Logistics: In consultation with the authors & wg chairs I now hold the
editoral token for this draft. I've uploaded the draft XML to github and
adhere to a 'one sentence per line' style to make diff reading easier.

Adianto - thank you for pointing out that the abstract and introduction
didn't connect well. I've adjusted both slightly in hopes readability is
improved.

https://github.com/job/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/commit/ce3c5bae1b8e6fdd6c1f55718fb86c7db44c313e

A copy of the changeset for archival purposes is avaliable below:

Kind regards,

Job

commit ce3c5bae1b8e6fdd6c1f55718fb86c7db44c313e
Author: Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net>
Date:   Thu Feb 3 14:36:47 2022 +0000

    Incorporate feedback from Adianto
    
    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/38TER8ns8vGqTgfBObwYRg7gSos/

diff --git draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
index f059e20..d262f29 100644
--- draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
+++ draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
    A manifest is a signed object (file) that contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the repository publication point (directory) associated with an authority responsible for publishing in the repository.
    For each certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of signed objects issued by the authority that are published at this repository publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content.
    Manifests are intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect certain forms of attacks against a repository.
-   Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point, then the RP can detect "stale" (valid) data and deletion of signed objects.
+   Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point, then the RP can detect replay attacks, and unauthorized in-flight modification or deletion of signed objects.
    This document obsoletes RFC 6486.
    </t>
 
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@
 	<section title="Introduction" anchor="sect-1"><t>
    The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) <xref target="RFC6480"/> makes use of a distributed repository system <xref target="RFC6481"/> to make available a variety of objects needed by relying parties (RPs).
    Because all of the objects stored in the repository system are digitally signed by the entities that created them, attacks that modify these published objects are detectable by RPs.
-   However, digital signatures provide no protection against attacks that substitute "stale" versions of signed objects (i.e., objects that were valid and have not expired, but have since been superseded) or attacks that remove an object that should be present in the repository.
-   To assist in the detection of such attacks, the RPKI repository system can make use of a signed object called a "manifest".
+   However, digital signatures alone provide no protection against attacks that substitute "stale" versions of signed objects (i.e., objects that were valid and have not yet expired, but have since been superseded), or in-flight attacks that remove an object that should be present in the repository.
+   To assist in the detection of such attacks, RPKI repository systems make use of a signed object called a "manifest".
    </t>
 
 	<t>
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@
 	<section title="Acknowledgements" anchor="sect-10"><t>
    The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from George Michelson and Randy Bush in the preparation of the manifest specification.
    Additionally, the authors would like to thank Mark Reynolds and Christopher Small for assistance in clarifying manifest validation and RP behavior.
-   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, and Sean Turner for their helpful review of this document.</t>
+   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, and Adianto Wibisono for their helpful review of this document.</t>
 	</section>
 
 	</middle>


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Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 16:05:57 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Murray Kucherawy <superuser@gmail.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Murray Kucherawy's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Dear Murray,

Thank you for the review!

On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 10:42:36PM -0800, Murray Kucherawy via Datatracker wrote:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> The response to question 7 of the shepherd writeup doesn't really answer the
> question being asked.

I searched through the archives and found this 2011 message:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidr/qIH6oAeWpeHzYmE783oK-rKi6ck/

    "No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D."

In the interest of progressing this document it seems prudent to obtain
stronger assurances that the -bis document does not introduce new IPR concerns.

Through the sidrops@ietf.org mailing list I'll publicly request whether the
authors know of any IPR related to this document, once all four responded I'll
circle back to this thread to tidy up that aspect. Stay tuned.

> Also, please tidy up the stuff identified in the answer to question 11.

Thanks for pointing this out. I've resolved all nits.

> Section 4.2.1:
> 
> * "... this field is more recent any previously-generated ..." --
> s/recent/recent than/
> 
> Appendix B:
> 
> * Since this is obsoleting, not updating, RFC 6486, I think this is more like
> "Changes Since RFC 6486".

Thanks, these two have been changed.

A diff is viewable here, or below as patch(1) formatted changeset:

    https://github.com/job/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/commit/f9663bd4f24046fab9e0bb361259af7c42c39cc6

Kind regards,

Job

-- 

commit f9663bd4f24046fab9e0bb361259af7c42c39cc6
Author: Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net>
Date:   Thu Feb 3 14:47:42 2022 +0000

    Incorporate feedback from Murray Kucherawy
    
    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/xWHUPInYdZhNKaQe7RF6RAInNI0/

diff --git draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
index f59546d..dac779f 100644
--- draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
+++ draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
@@ -7,17 +7,14 @@
 <!ENTITY RFC6485 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6485.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6487 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6487.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6488 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6488.xml">
-<!ENTITY RFC6493 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6493.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC8174 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
-<!ENTITY RFC8209 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8209.xml">
-<!ENTITY RFC8488 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8488.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC3370 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3370.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC3779 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3779.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6480 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6480.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6486 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6486.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6489 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6489.xml">
 ]>
-<rfc submissionType="IETF" docName="draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09" category="std" obsoletes="6486" ipr="trust200902">
+<rfc submissionType="IETF" docName="draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09" category="std" obsoletes="6486" ipr="trust200902" consensus="true">
 	<!-- Generated by id2xml 1.5.0 on 2021-05-31T14:49:22Z -->
 	<?rfc strict="yes"?>
 	<?rfc compact="yes"?>
@@ -108,7 +105,7 @@
    are similar to those for CRLs.  The syntax of the manifest payload
    differs from CRLs, since RPKI repositories contain objects not
    covered by CRLs, e.g., digitally signed objects, such as Route
-   Origination Authorizations (ROAs).</t>
+   Origination Authorizations (ROAs) <xref target="RFC6482"/>.</t>
 
    <t>This document obsoletes <xref target="RFC6486"/>.</t>
 
@@ -252,7 +249,7 @@
 	<vspace blankLines="0"/>
       This field contains the time when the manifest was created.
       This field has the same format constraints as specified in <xref target="RFC5280"/> for the CRL field of the same name.
-      The issuer MUST ensure that the value of this field is more recent any previously-generated Manifest. 
+      The issuer MUST ensure that the value of this field is more recent than any previously-generated Manifest.
       Each RP MUST verify that this field value is greater (more recent) than the most recent Manifest it has validated.
 	</t>
 
@@ -633,7 +630,7 @@
 	<section title="Acknowledgements" anchor="sect-10"><t>
    The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from George Michelson and Randy Bush in the preparation of the manifest specification.
    Additionally, the authors would like to thank Mark Reynolds and Christopher Small for assistance in clarifying manifest validation and RP behavior.
-   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, and Adianto Wibisono for their helpful review of this document.</t>
+   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, Adianto Wibisono, and Murray Kucherawy for their helpful review of this document.</t>
 	</section>
 
 	</middle>
@@ -657,10 +654,7 @@
 	&RFC6486;
 	&RFC6487;
 	&RFC6488;
-	&RFC6493;
 	&RFC8174;
-	&RFC8209;
-	&RFC8488;
     
     <reference anchor="X.690" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-199511-S!Cor1">
         <front>
@@ -684,51 +678,51 @@
 ]]></artwork>
     </figure>
     <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
-        DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
-           BEGIN
-           
-           -- EXPORTS ALL --
+    DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
+       BEGIN
+       
+       -- EXPORTS ALL --
 
-           IMPORTS
+       IMPORTS
 
-             CONTENT-TYPE
-             FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
-               { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
-                 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
+         CONTENT-TYPE
+         FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
+           { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
+             pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
 
-           -- Manifest Content Type
+       -- Manifest Content Type
 
-           ct-rpkiManifest CONTENT-TYPE ::=
-               { TYPE Manifest IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-rpkiManifest }
+       ct-rpkiManifest CONTENT-TYPE ::=
+           { TYPE Manifest IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-rpkiManifest }
 
-           id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
-               us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
+       id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
+           us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
 
-           id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
+       id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
 
-           id-ct-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 26 }
+       id-ct-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 26 }
 
-           Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
-              version        [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
-              manifestNumber     INTEGER (0..MAX),
-              thisUpdate         GeneralizedTime,
-              nextUpdate         GeneralizedTime,
-              fileHashAlg        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
-              fileList           SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF FileAndHash
-              }
+       Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
+          version        [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+          manifestNumber     INTEGER (0..MAX),
+          thisUpdate         GeneralizedTime,
+          nextUpdate         GeneralizedTime,
+          fileHashAlg        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+          fileList           SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF FileAndHash
+          }
 
-           FileAndHash ::= SEQUENCE {
-              file  IA5String,
-              hash  BIT STRING
-              }
+       FileAndHash ::= SEQUENCE {
+          file  IA5String,
+          hash  BIT STRING
+          }
 
-           END
+       END
 
 ]]></artwork>
     </figure>
     </section>
 
-    <section title="Changes to RFC 6486" anchor="sect-b">
+    <section title="Changes since RFC 6486" anchor="sect-b">
     <t>
        In 2019 it came to light that multiple Relying Party implementations
        were in a vulnerable position, possibly due to perceived ambiguity in


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Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 16:12:36 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: sidrops@ietf.org, sra@hactrn.net, stkent@verizon.net, gih@apnic.net, mlepinski@ncf.edu
Cc: superuser@gmail.com
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Subject: [Sidrops] IPR call for draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09
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Dear authors of draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis,

IPR statements related to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis

Murray Kucherawy pointed out that the shepherd write-up on IPR
statements felt a bit off. See: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/xWHUPInYdZhNKaQe7RF6RAInNI0/

I searched the archives but couldn't find recent unambigious statements.
The simplest remedy is to issue a call, which is this very email.

I ask that the authors respond ('reply-all') to this email with a
message indicating whether they know about IPR related to this draft.

Thanks!

Kind regards,

Job


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Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 16:16:21 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Zaheduzzaman Sarker <Zaheduzzaman.Sarker@ericsson.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Zaheduzzaman Sarker's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Dear Zaheduzzaman Sarker,

Thank you for the review.

On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 02:04:21AM -0800, Zaheduzzaman Sarker via Datatracker wrote:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thanks for the efforts on this specification. It was a good read.
> 
> After reading the shepherd's writeup I was expecting an update to 6486 but the
> document actually obsoletes 6486. Something happened between when the shepherd
> writeup was written and when this doc went for publication, not captured. Not a
> big deal I guess, would have been better to get this captured.

You are right that something happened: after shepherd write-up during
IETF Last-Call the observation was made that the document should
obsolete 6486 as it is a complete replacement. See the emails
before/after this message https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/_Ys3mNuBs4AIDEi7aT4CkRj94ic/
for more context about the change.

> Nits:
> 
>    Section 4.2.1 : "The issuer MUST ensure that the value of this field is more
>    recent any previously-generated Manifest", missing "than" ?

This nit was addressed through
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/EYxcUtZLF7go2UBnOoOXqwn6bRY/

Kind regards,

Job


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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] IPR call for draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09
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I am aware on no IPR related to this document.

Steve
> Dear authors of draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis,
>
> IPR statements related to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis
>
> Murray Kucherawy pointed out that the shepherd write-up on IPR
> statements felt a bit off. See: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/xWHUPInYdZhNKaQe7RF6RAInNI0/
>
> I searched the archives but couldn't find recent unambigious statements.
> The simplest remedy is to issue a call, which is this very email.
>
> I ask that the authors respond ('reply-all') to this email with a
> message indicating whether they know about IPR related to this draft.
>
> Thanks!
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Job



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Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 17:19:04 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Francesca Palombini <francesca.palombini@ericsson.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Francesca Palombini's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Dear Francesca Palombini,

On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 05:06:54AM -0800, Francesca Palombini via Datatracker wrote:
> # Major
> 
> 1. -----
> 
>    objects from a successful fetch.  This implies that the RP MUST not
> 
> FP: This should be "MUST NOT" (rather than "MUST not")

You are right, a small oversight on proper capitalisation. I've updated
this for -10:

https://github.com/job/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/commit/27928105481a16ef097ae69681950135ba23349f

> # Minor
> 
> 2. -----
> 
> FP: as noted by the shepherd, there are some references to fix:
> 
>   * RFC 6485 needs to be replaced with RFC 7935
> 
> The following references need to be removed as they are not used.
> 
>   == Unused Reference: 'RFC6482'
>   == Unused Reference: 'RFC6493'
>   == Unused Reference: 'RFC8209'
>   == Unused Reference: 'RFC8488'  (this was even last called as downref)

The above has been addressed through
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/EYxcUtZLF7go2UBnOoOXqwn6bRY/

> 3. -----
> 
>       monotonically for each newly-generated Manifest.  Each RP MUST
>       verify that a purported "new" Manifest contains a higher
>       manifestNumber than previously-validated Manifests.
> 
> FP: This should contain a sentence about what the RP has to do if verification
> fails (I expect ignore the "new" Manifest).

To resolve this comment I propose to add the following sentence to that
paragraph:

ADD:
    If the purported "new" Manifest contains an equal or lower manifestNumber than previously-validated Manifests, the RP SHOULD use locally cached versions of objects, as described in <xref target="sect-6.6"/>.

> Same comment for the thisUpdate field:
> 
>       Manifest.  Each RP MUST verify that this field value is greater
>       (more recent) than the most recent Manifest it has validated.

To resolve this comment I propose to add the following sentence to that
paragraph:

ADD:
    If this field in a purported "new" Manifest is smaller (less recent) than previously-validated Manifests, the RP SHOULD use locally cached versions of objects, as described in <xref target="sect-6.6"/>.

> And for the text in Section 5.1:
> 
>        Note: An RP MUST verify all mandated syntactic constraints, i.e.,
>        constraints imposed on a CA via a "MUST".
> 
>        publication point that is described by the manifest.  (RPs are
>        required to verify the CMS signature.)

I am not entirely sure what the question or comment is in the above
paragraph about section 5.1 - can you elaborate?

> 4. ------
> 
>       nextUpdate time.  Each manifest encompasses a CRL, and the
>       nextUpdate field of the manifest SHOULD match that of the CRL's
>       nextUpdate field, as the manifest will be re-issued when a new CRL
> 
> FP: What are the exception cases where it is expected not to match (i.e. what
> is the reason for the SHOULD here)?

The RPKI is a globally deployed production system; this means the RPKI
operator community to be careful about what it can mandate from RPs
versus what it can mandate from CAs. Putting in a stronger mandate was
discussed in the working group: For example, I observed some time window
alignment issues in the wild. Detailed discussion in this thread
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/VNG77j05I2JXOwv4qkSy-DCgRNE/

Aligning the Manifests eContent nextUpdate with the Manifest's EE
certificate's "Not After" with the associated CRL's "nextUpdate"
optimizes operations (it thwarts needless CRL growth); but deviation
from this recommendation for alignment does not negatively impact
cryptographic robustness. Hence, I believe a softer 'SHOULD' is
appropriate.

Does my elaboration help?

> 5. -----
> 
>    The RP MUST check that the current time (translated to UTC) is
>    between thisUpdate and nextUpdate.  If the current time lies within
> 
> FP: I am not sure the parenthesis needs to be there - this seems like an
> unnecessary implementation detail.

I believe this implementation detail is useful: in this context the
ASN.1 Type "GeneralizedTime" is used, which allows specification of an
timezone offset. There are some seemingly thorny complications
related to Validity Time windows as described in
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.5
Therefor I believe it is useful to remind implementers to normalize
towards Zulu.

> # Nits
> 
> 6. -----
> 
>   *  all published signed objects that are verifiable using EE
> 
> FP: Please expand all acronyms (EE, OID) on first use

Thanks! EE already was expanded, but I added capitaliation to improve
readability; I added expansion for OID. Did I miss any others?

> 7. -----
> 
>    termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate [RFC6487]
> 
> FP: missing period

thanks, added.

An overview of the changes related to this feedback can be found here:
https://github.com/job/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/commit/124c15569a991083cf8b8ca3ac249d98c49d41ef

The changeset in patch(1) format is also available below.

Kind regards,

Job

commit 27928105481a16ef097ae69681950135ba23349f
Author: Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net>
Date:   Thu Feb 3 15:22:38 2022 +0000

    MUST not -> MUST NOT
    
    Feedback from Francesca Palombini
    
    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/chrDRb2twlBi4zwOw6qG__SBYnk/

diff --git draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
index ed7de68..bd07ae4 100644
--- draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
+++ draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@
 
 	<t>
         Termination of processing means that the RP SHOULD continue to use cached versions of the objects associated with this CA instance, until such time as they become stale or they can be replaced by objects from a successful fetch.
-        This implies that the RP MUST not try to acquire and validate subordinate signed objects, e.g., subordinate CA certificates, until the next interval when the RP is scheduled to fetch and process data for this CA instance.
+        This implies that the RP MUST NOT try to acquire and validate subordinate signed objects, e.g., subordinate CA certificates, until the next interval when the RP is scheduled to fetch and process data for this CA instance.
         </t>
 
 	</section>

commit 124c15569a991083cf8b8ca3ac249d98c49d41ef
Author: Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net>
Date:   Thu Feb 3 15:38:59 2022 +0000

    Add a sentence about what to do when the manifestNumber verification shows a lower or equal manifestNumber compared to previously-validated Manifests
    Add a sentence about what to do when the manifest validity window is older compared to previously-validated Manifests
    Expand acronyms
    Add missing period.
    
    Feedback from Francesca Palombini
    
    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/chrDRb2twlBi4zwOw6qG__SBYnk/

diff --git draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
index d8b545c..3a5df83 100644
--- draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
+++ draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
    Authority (CA) publication points in repositories (directories
    containing files that are subordinate certificates and Certificate
    Revocation Lists (CRLs) issued by this CA and other signed objects
-   that are verified by end-entity (EE) certificates issued by this CA).</t>
+   that are verified by End-Entity (EE) certificates issued by this CA).</t>
 
 	<t>
    Manifests are modeled on CRLs, as the issues involved in detecting
@@ -153,11 +153,11 @@
 	<section title="Manifest Signing" anchor="sect-3"><t>
    A CA's manifest is verified using an EE certificate.  The
    SubjectInfoAccess (SIA) field of this EE certificate contains the
-   access method OID of id-ad-signedObject.</t>
+   access method Object Identifier (OID) of id-ad-signedObject.</t>
 
 	<t>
    The CA MUST sign only one manifest with each generated private key, and MUST generate a new key pair for each new version of the manifest.
-   This form of use of the associated EE certificate is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate <xref target="RFC6487"/></t>
+   This form of use of the associated EE certificate is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate <xref target="RFC6487"/>.</t>
 
 	</section>
 
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@
       Conforming manifest issuers MUST NOT use number values longer than 20 octets.
       The issuer MUST increase the value of this field monotonically for each newly-generated Manifest.
       Each RP MUST verify that a purported "new" Manifest contains a higher manifestNumber than previously-validated Manifests.
+      If the purported "new" Manifest contains an equal or lower manifestNumber than previously-validated Manifests, the RP SHOULD use locally cached versions of objects, as described in <xref target="sect-6.6"/>.
 	</t>
 
 	<t hangText="thisUpdate:">
@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@
       This field has the same format constraints as specified in <xref target="RFC5280"/> for the CRL field of the same name.
       The issuer MUST ensure that the value of this field is more recent than any previously-generated Manifest.
       Each RP MUST verify that this field value is greater (more recent) than the most recent Manifest it has validated.
+      If this field in a purported "new" Manifest is smaller (less recent) than previously-validated Manifests, the RP SHOULD use locally cached versions of objects, as described in <xref target="sect-6.6"/>.
 	</t>
 
 	<t hangText="nextUpdate:">
@@ -617,7 +619,7 @@
 	<section title="Acknowledgements" anchor="sect-10"><t>
    The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from George Michelson and Randy Bush in the preparation of the manifest specification.
    Additionally, the authors would like to thank Mark Reynolds and Christopher Small for assistance in clarifying manifest validation and RP behavior.
-   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, Adianto Wibisono, and Murray Kucherawy for their helpful review of this document.</t>
+   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, Adianto Wibisono, Murray Kucherawy, and Francesca Palombini for their helpful review of this document.</t>
 	</section>
 
 	</middle>


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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] draft-kwvanhove-sidrops-rpki-tree-hints-01
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> On 13 Dec 2021, at 17:00, Ties de Kock <tdekock@ripe.net> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Hi Koen,
>=20
>> On 13 Dec 2021, at 16:36, Koen van Hove =
<k.w.vanhove@student.utwente.nl <mailto:k.w.vanhove@student.utwente.nl>> =
wrote:
>>=20
>> Dear all,
>> =20
>> Based on your feedback I hereby present the second version of the =
tree hints draft [1].=20
>> =20
>> Russ Housley rightly pointed out to me that whilst additional fields =
cannot be added to the PKIX certificate profile, non-critical extensions =
can be added. I believe adding the hints to the certificate directly, =
rather than using a separate object, reduces operational complexity, =
might simplify some issues with =E2=80=9Cwhat if the limits change=E2=80=9D=
 (as that now only happens when the certificates change). I hope it also =
makes the political problem less troubling. Additionally, I reduced the =
limits to the two main ones, although others can be added in a similar =
fashion. Apart from that, the main concept was left unchanged.
>=20
> That is a significant realisation. I think this will need some testing =
to see
> what implementations are intolerant to additional extensions, but that =
should be
> quick --- but if this works, this is much easier to implement, both =
for RPs and
> CAs.
>=20
> This also specifies the exceptions much more naturally :).

Recent versions of Fort, OctoRPKI, routinator, rpki-client, rpki-prover, =
and
rpstir2 accepted non-critical certificate extensions on a CA certificate =
during
interoperability testing.

The RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3 was not tested but should also accept such
certificates. Due to the lack of a testing environment, rpstir, and =
rcynic were
not tested.

This means we have a limited but interoperable path to extend resource
certificates.

Kind regards,
Ties

---
>=20
> Kind regards,
> Ties
>=20
> ---
>> =20
>> Koen van Hove
>> =20
>> [1] =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kwvanhove-sidrops-rpki-tree-hints/ =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kwvanhove-sidrops-rpki-tree-hints/=
>_______________________________________________
>> Sidrops mailing list
>> Sidrops@ietf.org <mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops>
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org <mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops>

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On =
13 Dec 2021, at 17:00, Ties de Kock &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tdekock@ripe.net" class=3D"">tdekock@ripe.net</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta =
charset=3D"UTF-8" class=3D""><div style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">Hi Koen,</div><div =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On 13 =
Dec 2021, at 16:36, Koen van Hove &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:k.w.vanhove@student.utwente.nl" =
class=3D"">k.w.vanhove@student.utwente.nl</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; caret-color: rgb(0, =
0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><div class=3D"" style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" =
class=3D"">Dear all,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span =
lang=3D"EN-GB" class=3D"">Based on your feedback I hereby present the =
second version of the tree hints draft [1].<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" class=3D"">Russ Housley rightly =
pointed out to me that whilst additional fields cannot be added to the =
PKIX certificate profile, non-critical extensions can be added. I =
believe adding the hints to the certificate directly, rather than using =
a separate object, reduces operational complexity, might simplify some =
issues with =E2=80=9Cwhat if the limits change=E2=80=9D (as that now =
only happens when the certificates change). I hope it also makes the =
political problem less troubling. Additionally, I reduced the limits to =
the two main ones, although others can be added in a similar fashion. =
Apart from that, the main concept was left =
unchanged.</span></div></div></div></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">That is a significant =
realisation. I think this will need some testing to see</div><div =
class=3D"">what implementations are intolerant to additional extensions, =
but that should be</div><div class=3D"">quick --- but if this works, =
this is much easier to implement, both for RPs and</div><div =
class=3D"">CAs.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">This also specifies the exceptions much more naturally =
:).</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Recent versions of Fort, OctoRPKI, routinator, =
rpki-client, rpki-prover, and</div><div>rpstir2 accepted non-critical =
certificate extensions on a CA certificate =
during</div><div>interoperability testing.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>The RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3 was not tested but =
should also accept such</div><div>certificates. Due to the lack of a =
testing environment, rpstir, and rcynic were</div><div>not =
tested.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>This means we have a limited =
but interoperable path to extend =
resource</div><div>certificates.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Kind =
regards,</div><div>Ties</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">---</div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Kind regards,</div><div =
class=3D"">Ties</div></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">---</div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; =
caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" class=3D"">Koen van Hove<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" class=3D"">[1]<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kwvanhove-sidrops-rpki-tree=
-hints/" class=3D"" style=3D"color: rgb(5, 99, 193); text-decoration: =
underline;"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kwvanhove-sidrops-rpki-t=
ree-hints/</span></a><span lang=3D"EN-GB" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><span class=3D"" style=3D"caret-color:=
 rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline =
!important;">_______________________________________________</span><br =
class=3D"" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;"><span class=3D"" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none; float: none; display: inline !important;">Sidrops mailing =
list</span><br class=3D"" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><a href=3D"mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org" class=3D"" =
style=3D"color: rgb(5, 99, 193); text-decoration: underline; =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;">Sidrops@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops" class=3D"" =
style=3D"color: rgb(5, 99, 193); text-decoration: underline; =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a></div></blockquote>=
</div><br class=3D"" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;"><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________</span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
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Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 17:37:22 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Dear Roman,

Thank you for this review!

On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 05:44:34PM -0800, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker wrote:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> I support Ben Kaduk's DISCUSS position.
> 
> ** Section 8.  The Section 4.2.1 guidance that “Each RP MUST verify that a
> purported "new" Manifest contains a higher manifestNumber than
> previously-validated Manifests” is crucial to prevent a replay-like attack. 
> What is the recovery procedure if an RP loses that state (i.e., “forgets” what
> the last manifestNumber was for a given publication point)?  Should it be TOFU
> (trust whatever is the first value it downloads next)?

Through this update I made an attempt to clarify
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/NzCcNzcN46FD7RgV3D5ULMnEhxs/

If the RP has "forgotten" what the last manifestNumber was (for example,
a brand new RP instance which only has a Trust Anchor Locator in its
trust store, and an empty cache), there obviously is notthing for the RP
to compare the purported "new" Manifest against.

It is not entirely TOFU, in the sene that the cryptographic validity
through signatures is checked, and the Manifest's eContent, EE
certificate, and CRL all contain pointers to determine whether the
object at hand is is valid within the set of constraints outlined in
both the original RFC and this -bis document. 

> ** Editorial
> -- Section 1.  In the spirit of inclusive language consider replacing
> “man-in-the-middle”.  For example, s/man-in-the-middle attack on the
> retrieval/an on-path attack during the retrieval/

Updated:
https://github.com/job/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/commit/83ade7f35d6e7b8379cb798e258c3cbb86278fee

> -- Section 4.2.1.  Editorial.  In the thisUpdate field, s/is recent any/is more
> recent than any/

Thanks, this was already addressed through
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/EYxcUtZLF7go2UBnOoOXqwn6bRY/

Kind regards,

Job

commit 83ade7f35d6e7b8379cb798e258c3cbb86278fee
Author: Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net>
Date:   Thu Feb 3 16:36:14 2022 +0000

    Add more inclusive language
    
    Feedback from Roman Danyliw
    
    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/VFKYHp2WdsJ7yVt8fHY3hBSJnzY/

diff --git draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
index d103cf4..97db9fd 100644
--- draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
+++ draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
     A manifest is a signed object that enumerates all the signed objects (files) in the repository publication point (directory) that are associated with an authority responsible for publishing at that publication point.
     Each manifest contains both the name of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content, for every signed object issued by an authority that is published at the authority's repository publication point.
     A manifest is intended to allow an RP to detect unauthorized object removal or the substitution of stale versions of objects at a publication point.
-    A manifest also is intended to allow an RP to detect similar outcomes that may result from a man-in-the-middle attack on the retrieval of objects from the repository.
+    A manifest also is intended to allow an RP to detect similar outcomes that may result from an on-path attack during the retrieval of objects from the repository.
     Manifests are intended to be used in Certification Authority (CA) publication points in repositories (directories containing files that are subordinate certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) issued by this CA and other signed objects that are verified by End-Entity (EE) certificates issued by this CA).
    </t>
 
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@
 	<section title="Acknowledgements" anchor="sect-10"><t>
    The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from George Michelson and Randy Bush in the preparation of the manifest specification.
    Additionally, the authors would like to thank Mark Reynolds and Christopher Small for assistance in clarifying manifest validation and RP behavior.
-   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, Adianto Wibisono, Murray Kucherawy, and Francesca Palombini for their helpful review of this document.</t>
+   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, Adianto Wibisono, Murray Kucherawy, Francesca Palombini, and Roman Danyliw for their helpful review of this document.</t>
 	</section>
 
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Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 17:45:35 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Lars Eggert's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Dear Lars,

Many thanks for your review of this document!

On Thu, Feb 03, 2022 at 02:43:17AM -0800, Lars Eggert via Datatracker wrote:
> Using lowercase "not" together with an uppercase RFC2119 keyword is not
> acceptable usage. Found: "MUST not"

This was addressed after Francesca's feedback, see
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/NzCcNzcN46FD7RgV3D5ULMnEhxs/
for resolution

> Found terminology that should be reviewed for inclusivity; see
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/part2/#inclusive_language for background and more
> guidance:
> 
>  * Term "man"; alternatives might be "individual", "people", "person".

This was addressed after Roman's feedback, see
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/4rlNabm2w9r6vD3r-2oY5ezr6Fs/
for resolution

> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> All comments below are about very minor potential issues that you may choose to
> address in some way - or ignore - as you see fit. Some were flagged by
> automated tools (via https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool), so there
> will likely be some false positives. There is no need to let me know what you
> did with these suggestions.
> 
> Section 5.2. , paragraph 5, nit:
> > ion point to effect this operation. Thus the term "fetch" refers to an operat
> >                                     ^^^^
> A comma may be missing after the conjunctive/linking adverb "Thus".

My mastering of the English language is insufficient. I propose to leave
this up to the RFC Editor (I will request the RFC Editor to pay
attention to this sentence)

> Section 11.1. , paragraph 11, nit:
> > Appendix B. Changes to RFC 6486 In 2019 it came to light that multiple Relyin
> >                                    ^^^^
> A comma is probably missing here.

Added.

> Uncited references: [RFC6493], [RFC6482], [RFC8209], and [RFC8488].

This was fixed through
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/EYxcUtZLF7go2UBnOoOXqwn6bRY/

> Reference [RFC6485] to RFC6485, which was obsoleted by RFC7935 (this may be on
> purpose).

I have no reason to believe this was done on purpose. Updated!

Full overview of the diff based on your feedback: https://github.com/job/draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis/commit/f862be520c37c956e839f1770371d799d8fd8295

Kind regards,

Job



commit f862be520c37c956e839f1770371d799d8fd8295
Author: Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net>
Date:   Thu Feb 3 16:43:40 2022 +0000

    Update reference and add missing comma
    
    Feedback from Lars Eggert
    
    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/HeKoTC1AKAOGLM7CtBKx-1allSw/

diff --git draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
index 97db9fd..c1268a7 100644
--- draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
+++ draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis.xml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 <!ENTITY RFC5280 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6481 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6481.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6482 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6482.xml">
-<!ENTITY RFC6485 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6485.xml">
+<!ENTITY RFC7935 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7935.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6487 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6487.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC6488 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6488.xml">
 <!ENTITY RFC8174 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@
 	This field contains the OID of the hash algorithm used to hash the
       files that the authority has placed into the repository.  The hash
       algorithm used MUST conform to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size
-      Profile specification <xref target="RFC6485"/>.
+      Profile specification <xref target="RFC7935"/>.
 	</t>
 
 	<t hangText="fileList:">
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@
 	<section title="Acknowledgements" anchor="sect-10"><t>
    The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from George Michelson and Randy Bush in the preparation of the manifest specification.
    Additionally, the authors would like to thank Mark Reynolds and Christopher Small for assistance in clarifying manifest validation and RP behavior.
-   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, Adianto Wibisono, Murray Kucherawy, Francesca Palombini, and Roman Danyliw for their helpful review of this document.</t>
+   The authors also wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, Sean Turner, Adianto Wibisono, Murray Kucherawy, Francesca Palombini, Roman Danyliw, and Lars Eggert for their helpful review of this document.</t>
 	</section>
 
 	</middle>
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@
 	&RFC5280;
 	&RFC6481;
 	&RFC6482;
-	&RFC6485;
+	&RFC7935;
 	&RFC6486;
 	&RFC6487;
 	&RFC6488;
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@
 
     <section title="Changes since RFC 6486" anchor="sect-b">
     <t>
-       In 2019 it came to light that multiple Relying Party implementations
+       In 2019, it came to light that multiple Relying Party implementations
        were in a vulnerable position, possibly due to perceived ambiguity in
        the original <xref target="RFC6486"/> specification.
        This document attempts to clarify the innovative concept and application


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Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2022 12:35:58 -0500
From: Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>
To: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] IPR call for draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09
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I am not aware of any IPR claims related to this draft.


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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Murray Kucherawy's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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--000000000000a8e46b05d71eaa0d
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

On Thu, Feb 3, 2022 at 7:06 AM Job Snijders <job@fastly.com> wrote:

> > The response to question 7 of the shepherd writeup doesn't really answer
> the
> > question being asked.
>
> I searched through the archives and found this 2011 message:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidr/qIH6oAeWpeHzYmE783oK-rKi6ck/
>
>     "No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D."
>

Right, but question 7 asks whether the authors have affirmed they know of
no IPR claims that still need to be filed.  The IESG last call includes a
declaration that none have been filed, but that answers a slightly
different question.


> In the interest of progressing this document it seems prudent to obtain
> stronger assurances that the -bis document does not introduce new IPR
> concerns.
>
> Through the sidrops@ietf.org mailing list I'll publicly request whether
> the
> authors know of any IPR related to this document, once all four responded
> I'll
> circle back to this thread to tidy up that aspect. Stay tuned.
>

Good stuff, thank you!

-MSK

--000000000000a8e46b05d71eaa0d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Feb 3, 2022 at 7:06 AM Job Snijde=
rs &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:job@fastly.com">job@fastly.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex">&gt; The response to question 7 of the shepherd writeup doesn&#39;t =
really answer the<br>
&gt; question being asked.<br>
<br>
I searched through the archives and found this 2011 message:<br>
<a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidr/qIH6oAeWpeHzYmE783oK-=
rKi6ck/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/=
arch/msg/sidr/qIH6oAeWpeHzYmE783oK-rKi6ck/</a><br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on thi=
s I-D.&quot;<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Right, but question 7 asks=
 whether the authors have affirmed they know of no IPR claims that still ne=
ed to be filed.=C2=A0 The IESG last call includes a declaration that none h=
ave been filed, but that answers a slightly different question.<br></div><d=
iv>=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
In the interest of progressing this document it seems prudent to obtain<br>
stronger assurances that the -bis document does not introduce new IPR conce=
rns.<br>
<br>
Through the <a href=3D"mailto:sidrops@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">sidrops@i=
etf.org</a> mailing list I&#39;ll publicly request whether the<br>
authors know of any IPR related to this document, once all four responded I=
&#39;ll<br>
circle back to this thread to tidy up that aspect. Stay tuned.<br></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>Good stuff, thank you!</div><div><br></div><div>-MS=
K</div><br></div></div>

--000000000000a8e46b05d71eaa0d--


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From: Zaheduzzaman Sarker <zaheduzzaman.sarker@ericsson.com>
To: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
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Thread-Topic: [Sidrops] Zaheduzzaman Sarker's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Zaheduzzaman Sarker's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Thanks for the pointer and fix. Great to see IETF last call making =
things better.

//Zahed

> On 3 Feb 2022, at 16:16, Job Snijders <job@fastly.com> wrote:
>=20
> Dear Zaheduzzaman Sarker,
>=20
> Thank you for the review.
>=20
> On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 02:04:21AM -0800, Zaheduzzaman Sarker via =
Datatracker wrote:
>> =
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> COMMENT:
>> =
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>=20
>> Thanks for the efforts on this specification. It was a good read.
>>=20
>> After reading the shepherd's writeup I was expecting an update to =
6486 but the
>> document actually obsoletes 6486. Something happened between when the =
shepherd
>> writeup was written and when this doc went for publication, not =
captured. Not a
>> big deal I guess, would have been better to get this captured.
>=20
> You are right that something happened: after shepherd write-up during
> IETF Last-Call the observation was made that the document should
> obsolete 6486 as it is a complete replacement. See the emails
> before/after this message =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/_Ys3mNuBs4AIDEi7aT4CkRj94ic/=

> for more context about the change.
>=20
>> Nits:
>>=20
>>   Section 4.2.1 : "The issuer MUST ensure that the value of this =
field is more
>>   recent any previously-generated Manifest", missing "than" ?
>=20
> This nit was addressed through
> =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/EYxcUtZLF7go2UBnOoOXqwn6bRY/=

>=20
> Kind regards,
>=20
> Job


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From nobody Mon Feb  7 01:23:45 2022
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Subject: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
        Authors         : Randy Bush
                          Jay Borkenhagen
                          Tim Bruijnzeels
                          Job Snijders
	Filename        : draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-06.txt
	Pages           : 10
	Date            : 2022-02-07

Abstract:
   This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure publication of ROV data, their
   propagation, and their use in Relying Parties, caches, and routers.



The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-06


Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts



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From: Alberto Leiva <ydahhrk@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 16:49:45 -0600
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Subject: [Sidrops] What should an RP do on different public key, same subject name?
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Hi. I'm maintaining FORT, an RP implementation. I found a validation
FORT seems to be implementing incorrectly, and the RFCs are giving me
trouble. Can I have some advice?

RFC 6487:

> Each distinct subordinate CA and
> EE certified by the issuer MUST be identified using a subject name
> that is unique per issuer. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as
> an entity and a given public key.

Bit awkward for my taste. Removing some redundancy:

> Each distinct subordinate CA and EE certified by the issuer MUST have
> a unique subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as an
> entity and a given public key.

Trimming fat:

> Each distinct child certified by the issuer MUST have a unique
> subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as an entity and
> a given public key.

Translation:

> Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
> parent's children, siblings are identified by their [entity, public
> key] tuple.

("Entity" is seemingly not defined by any relevant glossaries [if
you're going to update these documents at some point, might I suggest
this gets fixed], but from RFC 6484, we can surmise it means "INR
Holder.")

The requirement is kind of circular because an entity would normally
be identified by its parent certificate and subject name... right? How
else would an RPKI consumer identify the entity?

Educated guess:

> Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
> parent's children, siblings are identified by their [parent, subject
> name, public key] tuple.

Given that we've established that we're talking about siblings, the
parent is always the same, so it becomes

> Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
> parent's children, siblings are identified by their [subject name,
> public key] tuple.

Circular because of the double "subject name":

> Given two siblings, if their [subject name, public key] is different,
> then their subject names MUST also be different.

In other words, given sibling certificates A and B, subject names a
and b, public keys m and n, a != b and m != n, then

- If A = [a, m] and B = [a, m], then no constraints must be imposed. (A = B)
- If A = [a, m] and B = [a, n], then a != a. This makes no sense, and
is thus illegal.
- If A = [a, m] and B = [b, m], then a != b. Self-evident.
- If A = [a, m] and B = [b, n], then a != b. Self-evident.

So... assuming my several flights of fancy have so far been correct,
the requirement can be reduced to

> If two sibling certificates have different public keys, then they
> MUST have different subject names as well.

ie. this whole mess is just a reword of the (infinitely more
comfortably articulated) immediately following RFC 6487 sentence:

> An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the subject's key
> pair has changed (i.e., when the CA issues a certificate as part of
> re-keying the subject.)

Except... the two requirements are actually contradicting each other:
The former is defined as a MUST and the latter is a SHOULD.

------------------------------

Ok. That established, here's the point:

Would it be reasonable for an RP implementation to trim branches off
the tree if they violate the above rule?
The point of this rule is to prevent broken key rollovers... right? I
think? So, is a bad key rollover grounds to chop pieces off the
Internet?
Does this requirement exist to somehow simplify the work of RPs, or to
be enforced by RPs? Are RPs supposed to care?

I'm thinking about dumping a warning on syslog and keep going, but I'm
not sure there'd be a point to it.

(And which is it? MUST or SHOULD?)

Thanks in advance,
Alberto


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Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 18:09:00 +0800
From: "Di Ma" <madi@juicybun.cn>
To: "Alberto Leiva" <ydahhrk@gmail.com>,  sidrops <sidrops@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] What should an RP do on different public key, same subject name?
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X19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fXw0KU2lkcm9wcyBtYWls
aW5nIGxpc3QNClNpZHJvcHNAaWV0Zi5vcmcNCmh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LmlldGYub3JnL21haWxtYW4v
bGlzdGluZm8vc2lkcm9wcw0KIA0K

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charse=
t=3Dus-ascii"><style>body { line-height: 1.5; }blockquote { margin-top: 0p=
x; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0.5em; }body { font-size: 14px; font-f=
amily: "Microsoft YaHei UI"; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); line-height: 1.5; }</sty=
le></head><body>=0A<div><span style=3D"background-color: transparent;">Alb=
eto,</span><span></span></div><div><br></div><div>Good catch of inconsiste=
nce of requiements on subject name of RPKI certificate.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>As far as I am concerned,&nbsp;<span style=3D"background-color: tra=
nsparent;">subject name of&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"background-color: tr=
ansparent;">RPKI certificate is not used for identification, which is diff=
erent from those in web PKI.</span></div><div><span style=3D"background-co=
lor: transparent;"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: =
transparent;">With this understanding, FYI, RPSTIR2 currently does not che=
ck the uniqueness of&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"background-color: transpar=
ent;">subject name neither.</span></div><div><span style=3D"background-col=
or: transparent;"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: t=
ransparent;">Di</span></div><div><br></div>=0A<blockquote style=3D"margin-=
Top: 0px; margin-Bottom: 0px; margin-Left: 0.5em; margin-Right: inherit"><=
div>&nbsp;</div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;p=
adding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm"><div style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 8px; PADDING-LEFT: =
8px; FONT-SIZE: 12px;FONT-FAMILY:tahoma;COLOR:#000000; BACKGROUND: #efefef=
; PADDING-BOTTOM: 8px; PADDING-TOP: 8px"><div><b>From:</b>&nbsp;<a href=3D=
"mailto:ydahhrk@gmail.com">Alberto Leiva</a></div><div><b>Date:</b>&nbsp;2=
022-02-08&nbsp;06:49</div><div><b>To:</b>&nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:sidrops@i=
etf.org">sidrops</a></div><div><b>Subject:</b>&nbsp;[Sidrops] What should =
an RP do on different public key, same subject name?</div></div></div><div=
><div>Hi. I'm maintaining FORT, an RP implementation. I found a validation=
</div>=0A<div>FORT seems to be implementing incorrectly, and the RFCs are =
giving me</div>=0A<div>trouble. Can I have some advice?</div>=0A<div>&nbsp=
;</div>=0A<div>RFC 6487:</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&gt; Each distin=
ct subordinate CA and</div>=0A<div>&gt; EE certified by the issuer MUST be=
 identified using a subject name</div>=0A<div>&gt; that is unique per issu=
er. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as</div>=0A<div>&gt; an entity =
and a given public key.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Bit awkward for m=
y taste. Removing some redundancy:</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&gt; E=
ach distinct subordinate CA and EE certified by the issuer MUST have</div>=
=0A<div>&gt; a unique subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined=
 as an</div>=0A<div>&gt; entity and a given public key.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp=
;</div>=0A<div>Trimming fat:</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&gt; Each di=
stinct child certified by the issuer MUST have a unique</div>=0A<div>&gt; =
subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as an entity and</div=
>=0A<div>&gt; a given public key.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Transla=
tion:</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&gt; Sibling certificates MUST have=
 different subject names. Among a</div>=0A<div>&gt; parent's children, sib=
lings are identified by their [entity, public</div>=0A<div>&gt; key] tuple=
.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>("Entity" is seemingly not defined by a=
ny relevant glossaries [if</div>=0A<div>you're going to update these docum=
ents at some point, might I suggest</div>=0A<div>this gets fixed], but fro=
m RFC 6484, we can surmise it means "INR</div>=0A<div>Holder.")</div>=0A<d=
iv>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>The requirement is kind of circular because an enti=
ty would normally</div>=0A<div>be identified by its parent certificate and=
 subject name... right? How</div>=0A<div>else would an RPKI consumer ident=
ify the entity?</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Educated guess:</div>=0A<=
div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&gt; Sibling certificates MUST have different subj=
ect names. Among a</div>=0A<div>&gt; parent's children, siblings are ident=
ified by their [parent, subject</div>=0A<div>&gt; name, public key] tuple.=
</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Given that we've established that we're =
talking about siblings, the</div>=0A<div>parent is always the same, so it =
becomes</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&gt; Sibling certificates MUST ha=
ve different subject names. Among a</div>=0A<div>&gt; parent's children, s=
iblings are identified by their [subject name,</div>=0A<div>&gt; public ke=
y] tuple.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Circular because of the double =
"subject name":</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&gt; Given two siblings, =
if their [subject name, public key] is different,</div>=0A<div>&gt; then t=
heir subject names MUST also be different.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<di=
v>In other words, given sibling certificates A and B, subject names a</div=
>=0A<div>and b, public keys m and n, a !=3D b and m !=3D n, then</div>=0A<=
div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>- If A =3D [a, m] and B =3D [a, m], then no constr=
aints must be imposed. (A =3D B)</div>=0A<div>- If A =3D [a, m] and B =3D =
[a, n], then a !=3D a. This makes no sense, and</div>=0A<div>is thus illeg=
al.</div>=0A<div>- If A =3D [a, m] and B =3D [b, m], then a !=3D b. Self-e=
vident.</div>=0A<div>- If A =3D [a, m] and B =3D [b, n], then a !=3D b. Se=
lf-evident.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>So... assuming my several fli=
ghts of fancy have so far been correct,</div>=0A<div>the requirement can b=
e reduced to</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&gt; If two sibling certific=
ates have different public keys, then they</div>=0A<div>&gt; MUST have dif=
ferent subject names as well.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>ie. this wh=
ole mess is just a reword of the (infinitely more</div>=0A<div>comfortably=
 articulated) immediately following RFC 6487 sentence:</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;=
</div>=0A<div>&gt; An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the su=
bject's key</div>=0A<div>&gt; pair has changed (i.e., when the CA issues a=
 certificate as part of</div>=0A<div>&gt; re-keying the subject.)</div>=0A=
<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Except... the two requirements are actually contr=
adicting each other:</div>=0A<div>The former is defined as a MUST and the =
latter is a SHOULD.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>---------------------=
---------</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Ok. That established, here's th=
e point:</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Would it be reasonable for an RP=
 implementation to trim branches off</div>=0A<div>the tree if they violate=
 the above rule?</div>=0A<div>The point of this rule is to prevent broken =
key rollovers... right? I</div>=0A<div>think? So, is a bad key rollover gr=
ounds to chop pieces off the</div>=0A<div>Internet?</div>=0A<div>Does this=
 requirement exist to somehow simplify the work of RPs, or to</div>=0A<div=
>be enforced by RPs? Are RPs supposed to care?</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=
=0A<div>I'm thinking about dumping a warning on syslog and keep going, but=
 I'm</div>=0A<div>not sure there'd be a point to it.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</=
div>=0A<div>(And which is it? MUST or SHOULD?)</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=
=0A<div>Thanks in advance,</div>=0A<div>Alberto</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=
=0A<div>_______________________________________________</div>=0A<div>Sidro=
ps mailing list</div>=0A<div>Sidrops@ietf.org</div>=0A<div>https://www.iet=
f.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A</div></blockqu=
ote>=0A</body></html>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] What should an RP do on different public key, same subject name?
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Let me provide some context and further explanation.

The requirement that a Subject name be unique on a per-CA basis is 
intrinsic to X.509, modulo re-keying of the Subject, i.e., a Subject can 
acquire a new key pair and keep the same Subject name under the same CA. 
If this requirement were not met there would be obvious, adverse 
security issues. This is what is mandated by X.509 and by IETF PKI 
standards.

In general purpose PKis this requirement cannot be verified by RPs, 
since an RP is not expected to retrieve and verify all certs issued by a 
CA. In the RPKI every RP is expected to retrieve all certs issued by a 
CA, but I don't recall an explicit requirement that an RP check for 
Subject name uniqueness, per se.

RFC 6487, Section 4.5 says that during re-keying a CA SHOULD change the 
Subject name (to preserve uniqueness). I agree that this SHOULD (vs. a 
MUST)  creates confusion. I would prefer a MUST here, but I guess Geoff 
had some reason to allow a CA to not always follow the guidance.  It 
could cause confusion for an RP that encountered two CA certs with the 
same Subject name but different keys, hence the admonition to change 
Subject names during re-key. Because 6487 allows for an exception to 
this general rule, the text you cited later in Section 4.5 qualifies 
uniqueness to include both Subject name and public key. I agree that 
this discussion, all within one paragraph, is confusing.

Steve


>
> Good catch of inconsistence of requiements on subject name of RPKI 
> certificate.
>
> As far as I am concerned, subject name of RPKI certificate is not used 
> for identification, which is different from those in web PKI.
>
> With this understanding, FYI, RPSTIR2 currently does not check the 
> uniqueness of subject name neither.
>
> Di
>
>     *From:* Alberto Leiva <mailto:ydahhrk@gmail.com>
>     *Date:* 2022-02-08 06:49
>     *To:* sidrops <mailto:sidrops@ietf.org>
>     *Subject:* [Sidrops] What should an RP do on different public key,
>     same subject name?
>     Hi. I'm maintaining FORT, an RP implementation. I found a validation
>     FORT seems to be implementing incorrectly, and the RFCs are giving me
>     trouble. Can I have some advice?
>     RFC 6487:
>     > Each distinct subordinate CA and
>     > EE certified by the issuer MUST be identified using a subject name
>     > that is unique per issuer. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as
>     > an entity and a given public key.
>     Bit awkward for my taste. Removing some redundancy:
>     > Each distinct subordinate CA and EE certified by the issuer MUST
>     have
>     > a unique subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as an
>     > entity and a given public key.
>     Trimming fat:
>     > Each distinct child certified by the issuer MUST have a unique
>     > subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as an
>     entity and
>     > a given public key.
>     Translation:
>     > Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
>     > parent's children, siblings are identified by their [entity, public
>     > key] tuple.
>     ("Entity" is seemingly not defined by any relevant glossaries [if
>     you're going to update these documents at some point, might I suggest
>     this gets fixed], but from RFC 6484, we can surmise it means "INR
>     Holder.")
>     The requirement is kind of circular because an entity would normally
>     be identified by its parent certificate and subject name... right? How
>     else would an RPKI consumer identify the entity?
>     Educated guess:
>     > Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
>     > parent's children, siblings are identified by their [parent, subject
>     > name, public key] tuple.
>     Given that we've established that we're talking about siblings, the
>     parent is always the same, so it becomes
>     > Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
>     > parent's children, siblings are identified by their [subject name,
>     > public key] tuple.
>     Circular because of the double "subject name":
>     > Given two siblings, if their [subject name, public key] is
>     different,
>     > then their subject names MUST also be different.
>     In other words, given sibling certificates A and B, subject names a
>     and b, public keys m and n, a != b and m != n, then
>     - If A = [a, m] and B = [a, m], then no constraints must be
>     imposed. (A = B)
>     - If A = [a, m] and B = [a, n], then a != a. This makes no sense, and
>     is thus illegal.
>     - If A = [a, m] and B = [b, m], then a != b. Self-evident.
>     - If A = [a, m] and B = [b, n], then a != b. Self-evident.
>     So... assuming my several flights of fancy have so far been correct,
>     the requirement can be reduced to
>     > If two sibling certificates have different public keys, then they
>     > MUST have different subject names as well.
>     ie. this whole mess is just a reword of the (infinitely more
>     comfortably articulated) immediately following RFC 6487 sentence:
>     > An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the subject's key
>     > pair has changed (i.e., when the CA issues a certificate as part of
>     > re-keying the subject.)
>     Except... the two requirements are actually contradicting each other:
>     The former is defined as a MUST and the latter is a SHOULD.
>     ------------------------------
>     Ok. That established, here's the point:
>     Would it be reasonable for an RP implementation to trim branches off
>     the tree if they violate the above rule?
>     The point of this rule is to prevent broken key rollovers... right? I
>     think? So, is a bad key rollover grounds to chop pieces off the
>     Internet?
>     Does this requirement exist to somehow simplify the work of RPs, or to
>     be enforced by RPs? Are RPs supposed to care?
>     I'm thinking about dumping a warning on syslog and keep going, but I'm
>     not sure there'd be a point to it.
>     (And which is it? MUST or SHOULD?)
>     Thanks in advance,
>     Alberto
>     _______________________________________________
>     Sidrops mailing list
>     Sidrops@ietf.org
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops


--------------vyiwOfuLooJ0owEhAwtkNpF1
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    <p>Let me provide some context and further explanation.<br>
    </p>
    <p>The requirement that a Subject name be unique on a per-CA basis
      is intrinsic to X.509, modulo re-keying of the Subject, i.e., a
      Subject can acquire a new key pair and keep the same Subject name
      under the same CA. If this requirement were not met there would be
      obvious, adverse security issues. This is what is mandated by
      X.509 and by IETF PKI standards.<br>
    </p>
    <p>In general purpose PKis this requirement cannot be verified by
      RPs, since an RP is not expected to retrieve and verify all certs
      issued by a CA. In the RPKI every RP is expected to retrieve all
      certs issued by a CA, but I don't recall an explicit requirement
      that an RP check for Subject name uniqueness, per se. <br>
    </p>
    <p>RFC 6487, Section 4.5 says that during re-keying a CA SHOULD
      change the Subject name (to preserve uniqueness). I agree that
      this SHOULD (vs. a MUST)  creates confusion. I would prefer a MUST
      here, but I guess Geoff had some reason to allow a CA to not
      always follow the guidance.  It could cause confusion for an RP
      that encountered two CA certs with the same Subject name but
      different keys, hence the admonition to change Subject names
      during re-key. Because 6487 allows for an exception to this
      general rule, the text you cited later in Section 4.5 qualifies
      uniqueness to include both Subject name and public key. I agree
      that this discussion, all within one paragraph, is confusing.<br>
    </p>
    <p>Steve<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:202202081808595303458@juicybun.cn%3E+EF2B9598EC4EE51A">
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Good catch of inconsistence of requiements on subject name of
        RPKI certificate.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>As far as I am concerned, <span style="background-color:
          transparent;">subject name of </span><span
          style="background-color: transparent;">RPKI certificate is not
          used for identification, which is different from those in web
          PKI.</span></div>
      <div><span style="background-color: transparent;"><br>
        </span></div>
      <div><span style="background-color: transparent;">With this
          understanding, FYI, RPSTIR2 currently does not check the
          uniqueness of </span><span style="background-color:
          transparent;">subject name neither.</span></div>
      <div><span style="background-color: transparent;"><br>
        </span></div>
      <div><span style="background-color: transparent;">Di</span></div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <blockquote style="margin-Top: 0px; margin-Bottom: 0px;
        margin-Left: 0.5em; margin-Right: inherit">
        <div> </div>
        <div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
          1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm">
          <div style="PADDING-RIGHT: 8px; PADDING-LEFT: 8px; FONT-SIZE:
            12px;FONT-FAMILY:tahoma;COLOR:#000000; BACKGROUND: #efefef;
            PADDING-BOTTOM: 8px; PADDING-TOP: 8px">
            <div><b>From:</b> <a href="mailto:ydahhrk@gmail.com"
                moz-do-not-send="true">Alberto Leiva</a></div>
            <div><b>Date:</b> 2022-02-08 06:49</div>
            <div><b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:sidrops@ietf.org"
                moz-do-not-send="true">sidrops</a></div>
            <div><b>Subject:</b> [Sidrops] What should an RP do on
              different public key, same subject name?</div>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div>
          <div>Hi. I'm maintaining FORT, an RP implementation. I found a
            validation</div>
          <div>FORT seems to be implementing incorrectly, and the RFCs
            are giving me</div>
          <div>trouble. Can I have some advice?</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>RFC 6487:</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; Each distinct subordinate CA and</div>
          <div>&gt; EE certified by the issuer MUST be identified using
            a subject name</div>
          <div>&gt; that is unique per issuer. In this context,
            'distinct' is defined as</div>
          <div>&gt; an entity and a given public key.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Bit awkward for my taste. Removing some redundancy:</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; Each distinct subordinate CA and EE certified by the
            issuer MUST have</div>
          <div>&gt; a unique subject name. In this context, 'distinct'
            is defined as an</div>
          <div>&gt; entity and a given public key.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Trimming fat:</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; Each distinct child certified by the issuer MUST
            have a unique</div>
          <div>&gt; subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined
            as an entity and</div>
          <div>&gt; a given public key.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Translation:</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; Sibling certificates MUST have different subject
            names. Among a</div>
          <div>&gt; parent's children, siblings are identified by their
            [entity, public</div>
          <div>&gt; key] tuple.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>("Entity" is seemingly not defined by any relevant
            glossaries [if</div>
          <div>you're going to update these documents at some point,
            might I suggest</div>
          <div>this gets fixed], but from RFC 6484, we can surmise it
            means "INR</div>
          <div>Holder.")</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>The requirement is kind of circular because an entity
            would normally</div>
          <div>be identified by its parent certificate and subject
            name... right? How</div>
          <div>else would an RPKI consumer identify the entity?</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Educated guess:</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; Sibling certificates MUST have different subject
            names. Among a</div>
          <div>&gt; parent's children, siblings are identified by their
            [parent, subject</div>
          <div>&gt; name, public key] tuple.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Given that we've established that we're talking about
            siblings, the</div>
          <div>parent is always the same, so it becomes</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; Sibling certificates MUST have different subject
            names. Among a</div>
          <div>&gt; parent's children, siblings are identified by their
            [subject name,</div>
          <div>&gt; public key] tuple.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Circular because of the double "subject name":</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; Given two siblings, if their [subject name, public
            key] is different,</div>
          <div>&gt; then their subject names MUST also be different.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>In other words, given sibling certificates A and B,
            subject names a</div>
          <div>and b, public keys m and n, a != b and m != n, then</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>- If A = [a, m] and B = [a, m], then no constraints must
            be imposed. (A = B)</div>
          <div>- If A = [a, m] and B = [a, n], then a != a. This makes
            no sense, and</div>
          <div>is thus illegal.</div>
          <div>- If A = [a, m] and B = [b, m], then a != b.
            Self-evident.</div>
          <div>- If A = [a, m] and B = [b, n], then a != b.
            Self-evident.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>So... assuming my several flights of fancy have so far
            been correct,</div>
          <div>the requirement can be reduced to</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; If two sibling certificates have different public
            keys, then they</div>
          <div>&gt; MUST have different subject names as well.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>ie. this whole mess is just a reword of the (infinitely
            more</div>
          <div>comfortably articulated) immediately following RFC 6487
            sentence:</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>&gt; An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the
            subject's key</div>
          <div>&gt; pair has changed (i.e., when the CA issues a
            certificate as part of</div>
          <div>&gt; re-keying the subject.)</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Except... the two requirements are actually contradicting
            each other:</div>
          <div>The former is defined as a MUST and the latter is a
            SHOULD.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>------------------------------</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Ok. That established, here's the point:</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Would it be reasonable for an RP implementation to trim
            branches off</div>
          <div>the tree if they violate the above rule?</div>
          <div>The point of this rule is to prevent broken key
            rollovers... right? I</div>
          <div>think? So, is a bad key rollover grounds to chop pieces
            off the</div>
          <div>Internet?</div>
          <div>Does this requirement exist to somehow simplify the work
            of RPs, or to</div>
          <div>be enforced by RPs? Are RPs supposed to care?</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>I'm thinking about dumping a warning on syslog and keep
            going, but I'm</div>
          <div>not sure there'd be a point to it.</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>(And which is it? MUST or SHOULD?)</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>Thanks in advance,</div>
          <div>Alberto</div>
          <div> </div>
          <div>_______________________________________________</div>
          <div>Sidrops mailing list</div>
          <div><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated moz-txt-link-freetext"
              href="mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org">Sidrops@ietf.org</a></div>
          <div><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
              href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a></div>
          <div> </div>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="moz-mime-attachment-header"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
Sidrops mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org">Sidrops@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] IPR call for draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09
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> I ask that the authors respond ('reply-all') to this email with a
> message indicating whether they know about IPR related to this draft.



I am not aware of any IPR claims related to this draft.


thanks,

   Geoff


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Hi all,

SIDROPS will meet at IETF-113 (21-25 March 2022).=20
Please forward any SIDROPS agenda items you may have to Keyur, Chris and =
me on sidrops-chairs@ietf.org <mailto:sidrops-chairs@ietf.org>
We'll (hopefully) have a 120 minute slot.=20

Regards,
Chris, Keyur and Nathalie=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class="">Hi all,<br class=""><br class="">SIDROPS will meet at IETF-113 (21-25 March 2022).&nbsp;<div class="">Please forward any SIDROPS agenda items you may have to Keyur, Chris and me on&nbsp;<a href="mailto:sidrops-chairs@ietf.org" class="">sidrops-chairs@ietf.org</a><div class="">We'll (hopefully) have a 120 minute slot.&nbsp;<br class=""><br class="">Regards,<br class="">Chris, Keyur and Nathalie</div></div></body></html>
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From: Matthew Lepinski <mlepinski@ncf.edu>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 07:29:40 -0500
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To: Geoff Huston <gih@apnic.net>
Cc: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>, sidrops@ietf.org, sra@hactrn.net, stkent@verizon.net
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I am not aware of any IPR claims pertaining to this draft.

On Wed, Feb 9, 2022, 12:09 AM Geoff Huston <gih@apnic.net> wrote:

> > I ask that the authors respond ('reply-all') to this email with a
> > message indicating whether they know about IPR related to this draft.
>
>
>
> I am not aware of any IPR claims related to this draft.
>
>
> thanks,
>
>    Geoff
>
>

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<div dir=3D"auto"><div>I am not aware of any IPR claims pertaining to this =
draft.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_at=
tr">On Wed, Feb 9, 2022, 12:09 AM Geoff Huston &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:gih@ap=
nic.net">gih@apnic.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x">&gt; I ask that the authors respond (&#39;reply-all&#39;) to this email =
with a<br>
&gt; message indicating whether they know about IPR related to this draft.<=
br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
I am not aware of any IPR claims related to this draft.<br>
<br>
<br>
thanks,<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Geoff<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

--00000000000098a1fc05d794fd92--


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Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 13:33:49 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Murray Kucherawy's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Dear Murray,

On Thu, Feb 03, 2022 at 07:19:44AM -0800, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 3, 2022 at 7:06 AM Job Snijders <job@fastly.com> wrote:
> > In the interest of progressing this document it seems prudent to
> > obtain stronger assurances that the -bis document does not introduce
> > new IPR concerns.
> >
> > Through the sidrops@ietf.org mailing list I'll publicly request
> > whether the authors know of any IPR related to this document, once
> > all four responded I'll circle back to this thread to tidy up that
> > aspect. Stay tuned.
> 
> Good stuff, thank you!

Closing the loop on the request for IPR statements:

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/oByH03qbEX9T5dGT1qpBLRZTrk8/

Stephen Kent's statement: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/4n4Nv_8nSAG1Ri0RkuK37rMnF7E/
Rob Austein's statement: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/iP9-PDlI32Fp3XS1MzlNk6Oc_JQ/
Geoff Huston's statement: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/_49i9fFPsr9bc85zMXF6D7s9q7Y/
Matthew Lepinski's statement: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/ybG5-PGJdrP4gI1fsXyaA_JckBA/

All authors now have responded.

Kind regards,

Job


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From: Alberto Leiva <ydahhrk@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 13:44:57 -0600
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] What should an RP do on different public key, same subject name?
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Ok. Thank you both, very much.

On Tue, Feb 8, 2022 at 12:20 PM Stephen Kent
<stephen.kent=3D40verizon.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> Let me provide some context and further explanation.
>
> The requirement that a Subject name be unique on a per-CA basis is intrin=
sic to X.509, modulo re-keying of the Subject, i.e., a Subject can acquire =
a new key pair and keep the same Subject name under the same CA. If this re=
quirement were not met there would be obvious, adverse security issues. Thi=
s is what is mandated by X.509 and by IETF PKI standards.
>
> In general purpose PKis this requirement cannot be verified by RPs, since=
 an RP is not expected to retrieve and verify all certs issued by a CA. In =
the RPKI every RP is expected to retrieve all certs issued by a CA, but I d=
on't recall an explicit requirement that an RP check for Subject name uniqu=
eness, per se.
>
> RFC 6487, Section 4.5 says that during re-keying a CA SHOULD change the S=
ubject name (to preserve uniqueness). I agree that this SHOULD (vs. a MUST)=
  creates confusion. I would prefer a MUST here, but I guess Geoff had some=
 reason to allow a CA to not always follow the guidance.  It could cause co=
nfusion for an RP that encountered two CA certs with the same Subject name =
but different keys, hence the admonition to change Subject names during re-=
key. Because 6487 allows for an exception to this general rule, the text yo=
u cited later in Section 4.5 qualifies uniqueness to include both Subject n=
ame and public key. I agree that this discussion, all within one paragraph,=
 is confusing.
>
> Steve
>
>
>
> Good catch of inconsistence of requiements on subject name of RPKI certif=
icate.
>
> As far as I am concerned, subject name of RPKI certificate is not used fo=
r identification, which is different from those in web PKI.
>
> With this understanding, FYI, RPSTIR2 currently does not check the unique=
ness of subject name neither.
>
> Di
>
>
> From: Alberto Leiva
> Date: 2022-02-08 06:49
> To: sidrops
> Subject: [Sidrops] What should an RP do on different public key, same sub=
ject name?
> Hi. I'm maintaining FORT, an RP implementation. I found a validation
> FORT seems to be implementing incorrectly, and the RFCs are giving me
> trouble. Can I have some advice?
>
> RFC 6487:
>
> > Each distinct subordinate CA and
> > EE certified by the issuer MUST be identified using a subject name
> > that is unique per issuer. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as
> > an entity and a given public key.
>
> Bit awkward for my taste. Removing some redundancy:
>
> > Each distinct subordinate CA and EE certified by the issuer MUST have
> > a unique subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as an
> > entity and a given public key.
>
> Trimming fat:
>
> > Each distinct child certified by the issuer MUST have a unique
> > subject name. In this context, 'distinct' is defined as an entity and
> > a given public key.
>
> Translation:
>
> > Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
> > parent's children, siblings are identified by their [entity, public
> > key] tuple.
>
> ("Entity" is seemingly not defined by any relevant glossaries [if
> you're going to update these documents at some point, might I suggest
> this gets fixed], but from RFC 6484, we can surmise it means "INR
> Holder.")
>
> The requirement is kind of circular because an entity would normally
> be identified by its parent certificate and subject name... right? How
> else would an RPKI consumer identify the entity?
>
> Educated guess:
>
> > Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
> > parent's children, siblings are identified by their [parent, subject
> > name, public key] tuple.
>
> Given that we've established that we're talking about siblings, the
> parent is always the same, so it becomes
>
> > Sibling certificates MUST have different subject names. Among a
> > parent's children, siblings are identified by their [subject name,
> > public key] tuple.
>
> Circular because of the double "subject name":
>
> > Given two siblings, if their [subject name, public key] is different,
> > then their subject names MUST also be different.
>
> In other words, given sibling certificates A and B, subject names a
> and b, public keys m and n, a !=3D b and m !=3D n, then
>
> - If A =3D [a, m] and B =3D [a, m], then no constraints must be imposed. =
(A =3D B)
> - If A =3D [a, m] and B =3D [a, n], then a !=3D a. This makes no sense, a=
nd
> is thus illegal.
> - If A =3D [a, m] and B =3D [b, m], then a !=3D b. Self-evident.
> - If A =3D [a, m] and B =3D [b, n], then a !=3D b. Self-evident.
>
> So... assuming my several flights of fancy have so far been correct,
> the requirement can be reduced to
>
> > If two sibling certificates have different public keys, then they
> > MUST have different subject names as well.
>
> ie. this whole mess is just a reword of the (infinitely more
> comfortably articulated) immediately following RFC 6487 sentence:
>
> > An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the subject's key
> > pair has changed (i.e., when the CA issues a certificate as part of
> > re-keying the subject.)
>
> Except... the two requirements are actually contradicting each other:
> The former is defined as a MUST and the latter is a SHOULD.
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Ok. That established, here's the point:
>
> Would it be reasonable for an RP implementation to trim branches off
> the tree if they violate the above rule?
> The point of this rule is to prevent broken key rollovers... right? I
> think? So, is a bad key rollover grounds to chop pieces off the
> Internet?
> Does this requirement exist to somehow simplify the work of RPs, or to
> be enforced by RPs? Are RPs supposed to care?
>
> I'm thinking about dumping a warning on syslog and keep going, but I'm
> not sure there'd be a point to it.
>
> (And which is it? MUST or SHOULD?)
>
> Thanks in advance,
> Alberto
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops


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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 10:13:06 -0500
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Subject: [Sidrops] IETF "leadership pipeline"
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Hi there all,
An ongoing topic in the IETF & IESG is how to grow the IETF "leadership
pipeline", so that when we need new AD and / or chairs, we have good
candidates.

Currently when a new chair needs to be appointed the process goes something
like this (with some added hyperbole):
The AD(s) thinks "Hmmm.. I need a chair for FOOWG, and so I need someone
who understands FOO protocol. Erm.... Oh! Mary! Mary knows FOO, and she's
sane and friendly and organized and will keep things moving. Everyone knows
Mary, she's strong enough to push back on the crazy, she'll keep the
meetings running along... She has the added advantage of not working for
the same company as $other_chair, but gets on well with $other_chair.  Oh!
She's also already chaired BARWG and BAZWG and that went OK... She's
perfect, I'll appoint Mary!".

(In practice there is usually also discussions with the other chair (if
any), a mail to the WG asking for volunteers, some discussions with key WG
participants to see if they have any suggestions, etc, but there is still a
tendency / bias to appoint someone known to the AD / "the obvious"
candidate / people who have already demonstrated competence.  Clearly this
is suboptimal... If  it is a new WG there is usually a BOF and
additional discussions on BOF proponents and chairs, but the general
principle holds)

Often, when appointing a chair, there is a bit of a rush - a meeting is
coming up, a new WG is being formed, etc, and people who would make good
candidates are overlooked, or are not really confident enough to put
themselves forward for a specific role.

So, what I'd like to try is asking for volunteers who'd like to be
considered when we are looking for chairs. In some cases it is important
that the chair(s) are experts in the technology - but a lot of chairing
also involves more general technical knowledge,
"leadership"/diplomacy/mediation, organizational skills, babysitting, etc.

I've created a Google form to record answers / help me keep track of
volunteers: https://forms.gle/P8dZ8diT7Y5kFsNA7

Don't worry, filling in the form isn't a commitment to serve, but rather a
"Hey, I'm interested, please keep me in mind when choosing a new
FOOWG chair".
Information will be shared with the current (and future) Ops & Mgmt ADs,
unless you tick the "Any WG in the IETF", in which case your interest will
be shared with other IESG members.

Obviously, if you are not comfortable filling in the form but still want to
volunteer, just email Warren and/or Rob.

 Also, as always, if you have any questions, comments, etc do the same....
Warren and Rob

-- 
Perhaps they really do strive for incomprehensibility in their specs.
After all, when the liturgy was in Latin, the laity knew their place.
-- Michael Padlipsky

-- 
Perhaps they really do strive for incomprehensibility in their specs.
After all, when the liturgy was in Latin, the laity knew their place.
-- Michael Padlipsky

--00000000000047d40305d7ab6577
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi there all,<br></div><div>An ongoing topic in the I=
ETF &amp; IESG is how to grow the IETF &quot;leadership pipeline&quot;, so =
that when we need new AD and / or chairs, we have good candidates.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>Currently when a new chair needs to be appointed the proce=
ss goes something like this (with some added hyperbole):<br></div><div>The =
AD(s) thinks &quot;Hmmm.. I need a chair for FOOWG, and so I need someone w=
ho understands FOO protocol. Erm.... Oh! Mary! Mary knows FOO, and she&#39;=
s sane and friendly=C2=A0and organized and will keep things moving. Everyon=
e knows Mary, she&#39;s strong=C2=A0enough to push back on the crazy, she&#=
39;ll keep the meetings running along... She has the added advantage of not=
 working for the same company=C2=A0as $other_chair, but gets on well with $=
other_chair.=C2=A0 Oh! She&#39;s also already chaired BARWG and BAZWG=C2=A0=
and that went OK... She&#39;s perfect, I&#39;ll appoint Mary!&quot;.=C2=A0<=
/div><div><br></div><div>(In practice there is usually also discussions wit=
h the other chair (if any), a mail to the WG asking for volunteers, some di=
scussions with key WG participants to see if they have any suggestions, etc=
, but there is still a tendency / bias to appoint someone known to the AD /=
 &quot;the obvious&quot; candidate / people who have already=C2=A0demonstra=
ted competence.=C2=A0 Clearly this is suboptimal... If=C2=A0 it is a new WG=
 there is usually a BOF and additional=C2=A0discussions on BOF proponents a=
nd chairs, but the general principle holds)</div><div><br></div><div>Often,=
 when appointing a chair, there is a bit of a rush - a meeting is coming up=
, a new WG is being formed, etc, and people who would make good candidates=
=C2=A0are overlooked, or are not really confident enough to put themselves =
forward for a specific=C2=A0role.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>So, what I=
&#39;d like to try is asking for volunteers who&#39;d like to be considered=
 when we are looking for chairs. In some cases it is important that the cha=
ir(s) are experts in the technology - but a lot of chairing also involves m=
ore general technical knowledge, &quot;leadership&quot;/diplomacy/mediation=
, organizational skills, babysitting, etc.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I=
&#39;ve created a Google form to record answers / help me keep track of vol=
unteers:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://forms.gle/P8dZ8diT7Y5kFsNA7" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://forms.gle/P8dZ8diT7Y5kFsNA7</a></div><div><br></div><div>Don&#=
39;t worry, filling in the form isn&#39;t a commitment to serve, but rather=
 a &quot;Hey, I&#39;m interested, please keep me in mind when choosing a ne=
w FOOWG=C2=A0chair&quot;.</div><div>Information will be shared with the cur=
rent (and future) Ops &amp; Mgmt ADs, unless you tick the &quot;Any WG in t=
he IETF&quot;, in which case your interest will be shared with other IESG m=
embers.</div><div><br></div><div>Obviously, if you are not comfortable fill=
ing in the form but still want to volunteer, just=C2=A0email Warren and/or =
Rob.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0Also, as always, if you have any questi=
ons, comments, etc do the same....</div><div>Warren and Rob</div><div><br><=
/div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">Per=
haps they really do strive for incomprehensibility in their specs.<br>After=
 all, when the liturgy was in Latin, the laity knew their place.<br>-- Mich=
ael Padlipsky</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gm=
ail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">Perhaps =
they really do strive for incomprehensibility in their specs.<br>After all,=
 when the liturgy was in Latin, the laity knew their place.<br>-- Michael P=
adlipsky<br></div></div></div>

--00000000000047d40305d7ab6577--


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From: Christopher Morrow <christopher.morrow@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 13:15:24 -0500
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Cc: i-d-announce@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08.txt
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is this draft ready for WGLC authors?

On Fri, Dec 17, 2021 at 1:14 AM <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : RPKI Signed Object for Trust Anchor Key
>         Authors         : Carlos Martinez
>                           George G. Michaelson
>                           Tom Harrison
>                           Tim Bruijnzeels
>                           Rob Austein
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08.txt
>         Pages           : 18
>         Date            : 2021-12-16
>
> Abstract:
>    A Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) is used by Relying Parties (RPs) in the
>    Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to locate and validate a
>    Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) certificate used in
>    RPKI validation.  This document defines an RPKI signed object for a
>    Trust Anchor Key (TAK), that can be used by a TA to signal the
>    location(s) of the accompanying CA certificate for the current key to
>    RPs, as well as the successor key and the location(s) of its CA
>    certificate.  This object helps to support both planned and unplanned
>    key rolls without impacting RPKI validation.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal/
>
> There is also an HTML version available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08.html
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08
>
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org:
> :internet-drafts
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">is this draft ready for WGLC authors?</div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Dec 17, 2021=
 at 1:14 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts=
@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 RPKI Signed Object for Trust Anchor Key<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authors=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Carl=
os Martinez<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 George G. Michaelson<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Tom Harrison<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Tim Bruijnzeels<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Rob Austein<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Filename=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : draft-iet=
f-sidrops-signed-tal-08.txt<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Pages=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 18<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 :=
 2021-12-16<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0A Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) is used by Relying Parties (RPs) =
in the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to locate and valida=
te a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) certificate use=
d in<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0RPKI validation.=C2=A0 This document defines an RPKI signed ob=
ject for a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Trust Anchor Key (TAK), that can be used by a TA to signal the=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0location(s) of the accompanying CA certificate for the current=
 key to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0RPs, as well as the successor key and the location(s) of its C=
A<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate.=C2=A0 This object helps to support both planned a=
nd unplanned<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0key rolls without impacting RPKI validation.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal/"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draf=
t-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal/</a><br>
<br>
There is also an HTML version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08=
.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id=
/draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08.html</a><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-sidrops-signed-ta=
l-08" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url=
2=3Ddraft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-dra=
fts<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Sidrops mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Sidrops@ietf.org</a><=
br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000b8eb8405d7adefb8--


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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-00.txt
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Excellent, title change, now.. .WGLC? or do we need to discuss this and see
a presentation at the meeting?

On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 5:58 PM <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : RPKI-Based Policy Without Route Refresh
>         Authors         : Randy Bush
>                           Keyur Patel
>                           Philip Smith
>                           Mark Tinka
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-00.txt
>         Pages           : 7
>         Date            : 2022-01-27
>
> Abstract:
>    A BGP Speaker performing RPKI-based policy should not issue Route
>    Refresh to its neighbors when receiving new RPKI data.  A method for
>    avoiding doing so is described.
>
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr/
>
> There is also an htmlized version available at:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-00
>
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org:
> :internet-drafts
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Excellent, title change, now.. .WGLC? or do we need to dis=
cuss this and see a presentation at the meeting?</div><br><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 5:5=
8 PM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 RPKI-Based Policy Without Route Refresh<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authors=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Rand=
y Bush<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Keyur Patel<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Philip Smith<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Mark Tinka<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Filename=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : draft-iet=
f-sidrops-rov-no-rr-00.txt<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Pages=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 7<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 :=
 2022-01-27<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0A BGP Speaker performing RPKI-based policy should not issue Ro=
ute<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Refresh to its neighbors when receiving new RPKI data.=C2=A0 A=
 method for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0avoiding doing so is described.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr/" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft=
-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr/</a><br>
<br>
There is also an htmlized version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-=
rr-00" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/do=
c/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-00</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-dra=
fts<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Sidrops mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Sidrops@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Sidrops@ietf.org</a><=
br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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> Excellent, title change, now.. .WGLC

please


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Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 13:16:26 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Dear Benjamin,

To me it's always is a pleasure to receive your thorough reviews. Thank
you for sharing your insights!

On Mon, Jan 31, 2022 at 02:22:11PM -0800, Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker wrote:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> It looks like we may have a setup where a compliant RP and compliant
> CA/repository fail to interoperate.  This is sufficiently surprising that
> I want to confirm that it's the intended behavior.  In particular, both
> manifests and CRLs have thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields, and since
> issuing an update to one requires issuing an update to the other (though
> the CRL is always actually generated first), it is only natural for us to
> give guidance that the times in question should match between manifest and
> corresponding CRL.  However, we do this only as RECOMMENDED/SHOULD-level
> guidance, and accompany it by guidance to RPs that they SHOULD NOT reject
> a manifest of the fields do not match the CRL.  Accordingly, when a CA
> violates the first SHOULD and issues manifeset+CRL with mismatched
> thisUpdate/nextUpdate, and an RP violates the second SHOULD (NOT) and
> rejects such a setup, the RP will be unable to get any RPKI data for that
> CA.  (As a tangent, we also have one place where we give related guidance
> that the validity period of the single-use EE cert that signs the manifest
> match the thisUpdate/nextUpdate period, which we might want to keep in
> mind if we make any changes in this space.)
> 
> It looks like RFC 6486 had a conditional MUST-level requirement that *if* a
> manifest encompasses a CRL, then the "nextUpdate" fields MUST match (no
> guidance on thisUpdate), which we change to a statement of fact that each
> manifest does encompass a CRL and guidance that the "nextUpdate"s SHOULD
> match.
> Additionally, RFC 6486 had a MUST-level requirement for the validity
> period of the EE cert to exactly match the thisUpdate/nextUpdate time
> interval of the manifest, which we currently are relaxing to a SHOULD.
> 
> Often in this scenario we would strengthen one of the SHOULDs to be a
> MUST so that interoperability is guaranteed, but I'm not sure that I see a
> clear argument for which requirement is better to make the MUST.

I agree with your analysis and think your suggestion to reinforce one of
the two SHOULDs into a MUST is a reasonable way to resolve this friction.
>From my perspective, upgrading some normative terms in this context
won't be perceived as controversial by the WG, as the current 'watered
down' text is the result of concerns in relationship to retaining
interopability with CAs 'in the field'.

Some background on the ability for RP's to deploy a strict ("MUST") at
this point in time: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/VNG77j05I2JXOwv4qkSy-DCgRNE/

One CA implementation rectified the lack of validity window alignment:
https://github.com/NLnetLabs/krill/commit/51c58ec58b266697dd1843a5504e79bfc385932d
There appears to be agreement enforcing alignment on the CA side 'going
forward', while RPs remain relaxed:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/W-SrezAc5Oa1HoTW0w64EdaD1gk/

Thus, I propose the following adjustments to resolve this DISCUSS.

----- section 4: Manifest Definition ----

OLD section 4.2.1 second paragraph:
   Because a "one-time-use" EE certificate is employed to verify a
   manifest, it is RECOMMENDED that the EE certificate have a validity
   period that coincides with the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate
   in the manifest, to prevent needless growth of the CA's CRL.

NEW Section 4.2.1:
   Because a "one-time-use" EE certificate is employed to verify a
   manifest, the EE certificate MUST be issued with a validity period
   that coincides with the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate in the
   manifest, to prevent needless growth of the CA's CRL.

----- Section 5: Manifest Generation ----

OLD Section 5.1 last paragraph:
       It is RECOMMENDED that the validity interval of the EE
       certificate exactly match the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times of
       the manifest.
       Note: An RP MUST verify all mandated syntactic constraints, i.e.,
       constraints imposed on a CA via a "MUST".

NEW section 5.1:
       The validity interval of the EE certificate MUST exactly match
       the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times specified in the manifest's
       eContent. (An RP MUST NOT consider misalignment of the validity
       interval misalignment in and of itself to be an error.)

> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> My reading of the changes in the diff from RFC 6486 indicate that there is
> something of a fundamental shift in the processing model being made, but
> this does not seem to be mentioned specifically in the list of changes in
> Appendix B (or the introduction/abstract).  Specifically, it seems that
> the old RFC 6486 model involved the manifest being a tool that's useful
> for the RP and SHOULD be used, but that ultimately the RP policy decides
> which signed objects from the repository to use and fundamentally places
> trust in the signatures on those objects; the new model in this draft
> seems to place the manifest as the primary control on what signed objects
> to use, with phrasing like "MUST use the current manifest"/"files not
> listed on the manifest MUST NOT be used" and the error-handling behavior
> in §6.6 being to fall back to the previous cached state (at a SHOULD-level
> requirement), which as I understand it would mean using the previous
> cached manifest.  (Maybe I'm wrong about that last bit.) While the new
> focus doesn't seem problematic per se, and it's perfectly reasonable from
> a process perspective to make that sort of behavior change in a Proposed
> Standard, it seems that if this was a deliberate decision it ought to be
> emphasized a bit more.  The final bullet point in the change list of
> removing the notion of "local policy" is perhaps related to this
> fundamental shift, but seems to only cover part of the shift.

I appreciate the observations in the above text, but don't see an
actionable remark. However, I can provide a bit of background:

A write-up on the /why/ of RPKI Manifests can be found here:
https://blog.apnic.net/2020/11/10/rpki-manifests-securely-declare-contents/

Manifests are the only way to verify the completeness of a SET of signed
objects. The notion of 'local policy' in the original RFC appears to
have been the result of an awkward compromise (this was before my time).
I think by now all implementers understand that just like car seatbelts,
Manifests are not optional, and never were optional.

> Section 3
> 
>    The CA MUST sign only one manifest with each generated private key,
>    and MUST generate a new key pair for each new version of the
>    manifest.  This form of use of the associated EE certificate is
>    termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate [RFC6487]
> 
> Not really a comment on *this* document (6486bis), but since RFC 6487
> generically defines the "sequential use" EE certificate that we are
> disallowing for RPKI Manifest use, it seems reasonable to ask whether the
> issues that cause us to forbid sequential use in this context might also
> apply to other scenarios where "sequential use" certificates might have
> been used.  (I did not make a survey of the RPKI specification corpus to
> investigate whether such scenarios are likely to exist.)

I didn't perform an extensive survey either, but AFAIK the Manifest -bis
document is one of the few places to be so explicit about the use of
one-time-use certificates. I believe the primary motivation for this
requirement is that Manifests / CRLs are the "#1 top churning object"
type in the RPKI ecosystem. CRLs (and thus Manifests) generally have a
validity window measured in hours, whereas other object types such as
ROAs often times have a validity window of 12 to 18 months, or longer.

I expect that going forward, where needed, new object types or -bis
documents will be mor explicit whether to "recycle keypairs" or mandate
one-time-use.

As you highlighted, your above comment is not really a comment on *this*
document.

> Section 4.2.1
> 
>    fileHashAlg:
>       This field contains the OID of the hash algorithm used to hash the
>       files that the authority has placed into the repository.  The hash
>       algorithm used MUST conform to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size
>       Profile specification [RFC6485].
> 
> RFC 6485 has been obsoleted by RFC 7935.

Correct, this has been rectified in my working copy, also noted in
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/NzCcNzcN46FD7RgV3D5ULMnEhxs/

> Section 5.1
> 
>    2.  Issue an EE certificate for this key pair.  The CA MUST revoke
>        the EE certificate used for the manifest being replaced.
> 
> Do the mechanics of revocation still need to be undertaken even if the EE
> certificate in question has expired?

No, in the wild one can observe how the property of expired Manifest EE
certificates is a helpful utility to prevent needless growth of CRLs.
Also, trimming of CRLs is permitted. Do you have suggested text to
capture that in a concise succinct manner? Or leave as-is?

> Section 6.x
> 
> The old RFC 6486 procedures allowed ("MAY") the RP to verify that each
> file at a publication point is listed in exactly one current manifest,
> which is no longer allowed.  I think I can see how this was a problematic
> thing to try, but want to confirm that it is intentionally removed.

Ack.

> Similarly, RFC 6486 wanted a warning produced if there were objects
> present in the repository that are not listed in any manifest, which does
> not seem particularly useful and I do not mind seeing removed.

Ack.

> RFC 6486 also wanted a warning issued if a publication point contained
> both valid and invalid manifests; removing that guidance seems correct to
> me.

Ack.

> Section 6.3
> 
> The two "proceed to Section 6.4"s seem redundant (I suggest removing the
> last one).
> 
> Section 6.5
> 
>    the publication point.  If the computed hash value of a file listed
>    on the manifest does not match the hash value contained in the
>    manifest, then the fetch has failed and the RP MUST proceed to
>    Section 6.6; otherwise proceed to Section 6.6.
> 
> This looks an awful lot like "if X; goto Y; else; goto Y", which could
> just be written as "goto Y".  However, since §6.6 is the "failed fetches"
> processing, in the successful verification case perhaps we don't want to
> do that and should instead proceed to use the content of the files listed
> in the manifest.

Nice catch! I'll remove the last sentnce.

> Section 8
> 
> Perhaps it is sufficiently obvious so as to go without saying, but I trust
> that in a prolonged period of failed fetches, the human operator is
> expected to go figure out (via out of band channels) what's up with the
> CA/repository in question and whether an attack is underway.
> 
>                              The requirement for every repository
>    publication point to contain at least one manifest allows an RP to
>    determine if the manifest itself has been occluded from view.  [...]
> 
> Do we want to say anything about how these properties change during a CA
> key rollover or if multiple "unrelated" CAs are publishing at the same
> publication point (the latter of which would be quite unusual, if I
> understand correctly)?

Multiple 'repositories' can exist in a single rsync directory, akin to
how multiple CA Repositories can be fetched via a single RRDP
publication server. My preference would be to leave this as-is, I do not
recall a perception of ambiguity in the wider CA operator community abou
this aspect.

> Section 9
> 
> I see that the latest update from IANA has the registry (entry) references
> being updated from RFC 6488 to [this document], which is great and
> obviates what I would otherwise have remarked upon.

Ack.

> Section 11.1
> 
> Now that we're obsoleting RFC 6486, that should probably bump it off into
> the Informative References section.

Done!

> RFCs 6482, 6493, 8209, and 8488 appear to not actually be referenced
> from anywhere and thus could probably be removed.

Done, this was addressed in
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/NzCcNzcN46FD7RgV3D5ULMnEhxs/

> Section 11.2
> 
> Do we really want to reference RFC 3370 ("CMS Algorithms") for "the CMS
> wrapper of the object" rather than something like RFC 5652 ("CMS")?

Good suggestion, I've replaced 3370 with 5652.

Please let me know if the suggested changes to Section 4 and 5 seem
appropriate, if so I'll make the changes and share a patchset.

Kind regards,

Job


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Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 14:18:19 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Robert Wilton <rwilton@cisco.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Dear Robert,

Thank you for you review and comments.

On Thu, Feb 03, 2022 at 04:02:45AM -0800, Robert Wilton via Datatracker wrote:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thanks for this document, just a couple of minor comments:
> 
> 1) Section 4.2.1. Manifest
> 
>    nextUpdate:
>       This field contains the time at which the next scheduled manifest
>       will be issued.  The value of nextUpdate MUST be later than the
>       value of thisUpdate.  The specification of the GeneralizedTime
>       value is the same as required for the thisUpdate field.
> 
>       If the authority alters any of the items that it has published in
>       the repository publication point, then the authority MUST issue a
>       new manifest.  Even if no changes are made to objects at a
>       publication point, a new manifest MUST be issued before the
>       nextUpdate time.  Each manifest encompasses a CRL, and the
>       nextUpdate field of the manifest SHOULD match that of the CRL's
>       nextUpdate field, as the manifest will be re-issued when a new CRL
>       is published.  When a new manifest is issued before the time
>       specified in nextUpdate of the current manifest, the CA MUST also
>       issue a new CRL that revokes the EE certificate corresponding to
>       the old manifest.
> 
> Although this last sentence is not wrong, am I right in thinking that this
> sentence isn't specific to when the manifest is issued, i.e., isn't it the case
> that that CA MUST issue a new CRL whenever a new manifest is issues for any
> reason (e.g., as per 5.1, step 2)?  If so, perhaps this sentence could be
> tweaked to make that clearer.

Do you have a suggestion?

> 2) 5.2.  Considerations for Manifest Generation
> 
>    A new manifest MUST be issued and published before the nextUpdate
>    time.
> 
> Should any guidance be given about how far before the nextUpdate time
> a new manifest should be issued.  E.g., is publishing right at the
> nextUpdate time (e.g., 1 millisecond before) sufficient , or does it
> make sense to publish it a bit earlier than the nextUpdate time?

Such guidance is perhaps better provided through the "Timing Parameters"
internet-draft effort which is currently being progressed through the
working group: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing

Compared to RFC 6486, the -bis guidance provides clarity on the aspect
that a new version of the manifest must be issued *before* nextUpdate,
and not on the collapse of the event horizon. CA operators understand
that takes it takes anywhere between 10 minutes and 2 hours to
distribute newly generated signed information to RPs; but this is still
an area of study and active research by R. Bush et al.

> Nits:
> 
> 4.1.  eContentType
> 
>    The eContentType for a manifest is defined as id-ct-rpkiManifest and
>    has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26.
> 
> Would numerical object identifier, or numerical OID, be better than numerical
> value here?

OK! thanks, changed.

> 4.2.  eContent
> 
> I would have preferred for "file" to be "filename" in the structure, but I
> presume that this can't be changed at this stage anyway ...

I too would've preferred that, however...

               https://sobornost.net/~job/ship.gif ;-)

Kind regards,

Job


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From: "Rob Wilton (rwilton)" <rwilton@cisco.com>
To: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
CC: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "sidrops-chairs@ietf.org" <sidrops-chairs@ietf.org>, "morrowc@ops-netman.net" <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, "sidrops@ietf.org" <sidrops@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Sidrops] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with COMMENT)
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From nobody Sat Feb 12 06:56:37 2022
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) object profile for Signed Checklist (RSC)
        Authors         : Job Snijders
                          Tom Harrison
                          Ben Maddison
	Filename        : draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-06.txt
	Pages           : 15
	Date            : 2022-02-12

Abstract:
   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile
   for a general purpose listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use
   with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  The objective is
   to allow an attestation, in the form of a listing of one or more
   checksums of arbitrary digital objects (files), to be signed "with
   resources", and for validation to provide a means to confirm a
   specific Internet Resource Holder produced the Signed Checklist.  The
   profile is intended to provide for the signing of an arbitrary
   checksum listing with a specific set of Internet Number Resources.



The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-06.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-06


Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts



From nobody Sun Feb 13 15:40:43 2022
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Subject: [Sidrops] Publication has been requested for draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-05
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Chris Morrow has requested publication of draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-05 as Proposed Standard on behalf of the SIDROPS working group.

Please verify the document's state at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis/



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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/wVAvpZ4szmjl4y25wBcZ5J7vvyI>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08.txt
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On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 01:15:24PM -0500, Christopher Morrow wrote:
> is this draft ready for WGLC authors?

No, there is still more work to be done here (planning to discuss at
the next meeting).

-Tom


From nobody Mon Feb 14 00:47:59 2022
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From: Ties de Kock <tdekock@ripe.net>
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Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 09:47:47 +0100
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-06.txt
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Hi all,

> On 12 Feb 2022, at 15:56, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) =
object profile for Signed Checklist (RSC)
>        Authors         : Job Snijders
>                          Tom Harrison
>                          Ben Maddison
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-06.txt
> 	Pages           : 15
> 	Date            : 2022-02-12
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile
>   for a general purpose listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use
>   with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  The objective =
is
>   to allow an attestation, in the form of a listing of one or more
>   checksums of arbitrary digital objects (files), to be signed "with
>   resources", and for validation to provide a means to confirm a
>   specific Internet Resource Holder produced the Signed Checklist.  =
The
>   profile is intended to provide for the signing of an arbitrary
>   checksum listing with a specific set of Internet Number Resources.
>=20


While this draft discusses the validity of the RSC object in isolation, =
it would
probably be good to clarify and/or add constraints on when a RSC object =
should
be considered valid.

I think this is especially important because a CA has no visibility into =
what
RSCs are out there for a private key (and there are multiple solutions =
for this,
e.g. certificate transparency for the EE certs or requiring RSC objects =
to be on
a current, valid manifest).

For example, from the current draft, it is not clear if the CA =
certificates that
form the valid certification path from a trust anchor to the EE =
certificate (6488)
need to be on current, valid manifests. I think they do, but =
clarification would
help :).

Furthermore, when evaluating a RSC at a point in time, you need =
assurance that
(a) the RSC itself is not backdated and that (b) the CA path was in =
place at
that point in time.

In practice, it may only be feasible to verify a RSC that "has been =
signed
recently" and is valid at this point [in time]. Only considering the =
current
state of the RPKI tree also solves the problems posed by key-rolls, =
resource
transfers, etc.

Kind regards,
Ties=


From nobody Mon Feb 14 04:02:59 2022
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Closed -- [WGLC] draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-05 - Ends 31/January/2022
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> Said that I am sorry to miss this last call because I would have
> re-requested one more editorial change that I pointed out during the
> previous WLC. The issue is the Flags field, which is defined twice,
> Once $B!H(Bglobally$B!I(B in chapter 5.1 Fields of PDU which contains the
> explanation on what to do for the ROA and Key handling. Then one more
> time in chapter 5.12 ASPA PDU.
> 
> I mentioned that already in November or December that for completeness
> it would make sense to add the text from 5.12 into 5.1 as it is done
> with the other PDU$B!G(Bs.

oliver

i went to hack this and found i did not understand exactly what it is
you want.

exactly what text from 5.12?

5.1 says

The lowest-order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and 0
for a withdrawal

5.12 says

       Bit     Bit Name
       ----    -------------------
        0      AFI (IPv4 == 0, IPv6 == 1)
        1      Announce == 1, Delete == 0
        2-7    Reserved, must be zero

is it that you want 5.1 to change to

The lowest-order bit of the Flags field is 0 for IPv4 and 1 for IPv6,
and the next lowest bit is 1 for an announcement and 0 for a withdrawal

randy


From nobody Mon Feb 14 07:48:36 2022
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Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 16:47:42 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Ties de Kock <tdekock@ripe.net>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-06.txt
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Dear Ties, WG,

Thanks for taking the time to review this draft and provide feedback.

On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 09:47:47AM +0100, Ties de Kock wrote:
> >   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile
> >   for a general purpose listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use
> >   with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  The objective is
> >   to allow an attestation, in the form of a listing of one or more
> >   checksums of arbitrary digital objects (files), to be signed "with
> >   resources", and for validation to provide a means to confirm a
> >   specific Internet Resource Holder produced the Signed Checklist.  The
> >   profile is intended to provide for the signing of an arbitrary
> >   checksum listing with a specific set of Internet Number Resources.
> 
> While this draft discusses the validity of the RSC object in
> isolation, it would probably be good to clarify and/or add constraints
> on when a RSC object should be considered valid.
> 
> I think this is especially important because a CA has no visibility
> into what RSCs are out there for a private key (and there are multiple
> solutions for this, e.g. certificate transparency for the EE certs or
> requiring RSC objects to be on a current, valid manifest).

In my mind the above 'problem' is not too dissimilar from what RPKI
operators already face with all existing object types. So hopefully a CA
keeps track of/keeps tabs on the subordinate CAs it allows to exist, and
is in control of any RSC objects (or other object types) issued under
its auspices? In this sense I see now difference to Manifests or ROAs
(as in, I believe that the problem you describe is not unique to RSC, it
also applies to MFTs or ROAs, no RP has full visibility, a CA could
present different views to different RPs).

As RSCs are distributed out-of-band, this means that - by design -
general visibility is limited. About listing on current valid manifests,
this is explicitly forbidden logically following from Section 2:

"""
   RSC follows the Signed Object Template for the RPKI [RFC6488] with
   one exception.  Because RSCs MUST NOT be distributed through the
   global RPKI Repository system, the Subject Information Access (SIA)
   extension MUST be omitted from the RSC's X.509 End-Entity (EE)
   certificate.
"""
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-06.html#section-2)

It isn't feasible to add Certificate Transparency as a prerequisite to
progress RSC, as CT in context of RPKI still is in its infancy. However,
if in the years to come CT does become available, I suspect operations
related to all Signed Object types could see improvement, including RSC.

> For example, from the current draft, it is not clear if the CA
> certificates that form the valid certification path from a trust
> anchor to the EE certificate (6488) need to be on current, valid
> manifests. I think they do, but clarification would help :).

I'll contrast RTA and RSC to hopefully clarify: the RTA concept has the
notion of carrying a chain of certificates and CRLs in the CMS
Certificates & CRLs Fields, even up to and including the self-signed
trust-anchor. This is a novelty in context of the RPKI ecosystem.

The purported advantage of the RTA object design would be that all an RP
needs to verify the RTA is a "fully populated CMS cert & crl enveloppe",
and the Trust Anchor Locator with the Public Key of the TA certificate
packed in the RTA CMS. However, the RTA Signed Object definition is the
"odd duck" here, because RFC 6488 section 3 clearly stipulates that the
SignedData field only contains one EE certificate.

The RSC internet-draft does not deviate from the Signed Object template
in this regard. RSC is similar to MFT, ROA, GBR: the CA must exist on a
valid current manifest, because an RSC issuer can't put the intermediate
CA certificate in the RSC itself. I'm hesitant to repeat (redundant) RFC
6488 information into the RSC draft.

Consequently, any CA issuing a RSC EE cert, will be present in one or
more of the global RPKI trees, on a valid current manifest. I think this
characteristic makes implementation and debugging easier.

> Furthermore, when evaluating a RSC at a point in time, you need
> assurance that (a) the RSC itself is not backdated and that (b) the CA
> path was in place at that point in time.

I am not sure I follow the above paragraph: the moment a RP performs
verification, the RSC's EE certificate must be 'current' (e.g. RP's
notion of time must be within the RSC's EE certificate's validity
window), and the RSC EE cert must not be revoked. Additional
verification steps are outlined in draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc Section
5.

> In practice, it may only be feasible to verify a RSC that "has been
> signed recently" and is valid at this point [in time]. Only
> considering the current state of the RPKI tree also solves the
> problems posed by key-rolls, resource transfers, etc.

Indeed, that is my understanding as well. This follows from RFC 6488
(mainly section 3). Is there any text in the current RSC -06
internet-draft that would suggest otherwise?

Please let the authors know if the above answers your questions.
Suggestions for text to improve the readability are welcome.

Kind regards,

Job


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Subject: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 2
        Authors         : Randy Bush
                          Rob Austein
	Filename        : draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-06.txt
	Pages           : 38
	Date            : 2022-02-15

Abstract:
   In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems and
   Autonomous System Paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple
   but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure
   (RFC 6480) prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache.
   This document describes a protocol to deliver them.

   This document describes version 2 of the RPKI-Router protocol.  RFC
   6810 describes version 0, and RFC 8210 describes version 1.  This
   document obsoletes and replaces RFC 8210.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-06


Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts



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clearing oliver's issue

randy


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From: "Borchert, Oliver (Fed)" <oliver.borchert@nist.gov>
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From nobody Fri Feb 18 07:21:14 2022
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From: Ties de Kock <tdekock@ripe.net>
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Subject: [Sidrops] Contact details of relying party maintainers
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Hi all,

I have a scenario that I would like to double-check and discuss with relying
party maintainers in private.

If you are a relying party maintainer, please reply to me directly. I will
include all maintainers that get in touch with me by Tuesday in this
conversation.

Kind regards,
Ties


From nobody Mon Feb 21 13:36:05 2022
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Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 13:35:54 -0800
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: [Sidrops] Fwd: [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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i should not have to say this, but ...


From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Subject: [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
To: RIPE Routing WG <routing-wg@ripe.net>
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 13:13:00 -0800

lately, i am getting flak about ROV not providing protection from
this or that malicious attack.  indeed it does not.

in the ROV design, we DELIBERATELY did NOT try to cover malicious
attacks.  we also did not try to solve world hunger.

repeat 20 times: "ROV is not a security mechanism.  it is only meant
to ameliorate accidental misconfigurations."

yes, a screwdriver sucks as a hammer.

we do seem to see that route mis-originations are propagating less
widely; and presume this is due to ROV, especially in top tier
providers.  this is good.

and once more for good luck: "ROV is not a security mechanism.  it
is only meant to ameliorate accidental misconfigurations."

randy


From nobody Mon Feb 21 16:43:45 2022
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From: Di Ma <madi@juicybun.cn>
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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 08:43:26 +0800
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Randy,

I don=E2=80=99t care the way we/they see ROV but the way we use it.

ROV is good as long as it can remedy accidental misconfigurations that =
bring about routing security problem/catastrophe.

If someone doesn't  think ROV is not a security mechanism from =
cryptography perspective, I settle for that.

Di

> 2022=E5=B9=B42=E6=9C=8822=E6=97=A5 05:35=EF=BC=8CRandy Bush =
<randy@psg.com> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>=20
> i should not have to say this, but ...
>=20
>=20
> From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
> Subject: [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
> To: RIPE Routing WG <routing-wg@ripe.net>
> Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 13:13:00 -0800
>=20
> lately, i am getting flak about ROV not providing protection from
> this or that malicious attack.  indeed it does not.
>=20
> in the ROV design, we DELIBERATELY did NOT try to cover malicious
> attacks.  we also did not try to solve world hunger.
>=20
> repeat 20 times: "ROV is not a security mechanism.  it is only meant
> to ameliorate accidental misconfigurations."
>=20
> yes, a screwdriver sucks as a hammer.
>=20
> we do seem to see that route mis-originations are propagating less
> widely; and presume this is due to ROV, especially in top tier
> providers.  this is good.
>=20
> and once more for good luck: "ROV is not a security mechanism.  it
> is only meant to ameliorate accidental misconfigurations."
>=20
> randy
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>=20




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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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di:

> I don=A2t care the way we/they see ROV but the way we use it.
>=20
> ROV is good as long as it can remedy accidental misconfigurations that
> bring about routing security problem/catastrophe.
>=20
> If someone doesn't think ROV is not a security mechanism from
> cryptography perspective, I settle for that.

operationally, it is trivial to subvert/attack ROV; and that has
nothing to do with the cryptography.  it's simple net ops.

randy


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From: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
In-Reply-To: <m28ru3ofyq.wl-randy@psg.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 09:41:36 +0100
Cc: Di Ma <madi@juicybun.cn>, SIDR Operations WG <sidrops@ietf.org>
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/qGnv3vNvDxsEPRcveTif9kH31c8>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Hi,

> On 22 Feb 2022, at 02:19, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
>=20
> di:
>=20
>> I don=E2=80=99t care the way we/they see ROV but the way we use it.
>>=20
>> ROV is good as long as it can remedy accidental misconfigurations =
that
>> bring about routing security problem/catastrophe.
>>=20
>> If someone doesn't think ROV is not a security mechanism from
>> cryptography perspective, I settle for that.
>=20
> operationally, it is trivial to subvert/attack ROV; and that has
> nothing to do with the cryptography.  it's simple net ops.

Which is why I think it would be very good to re-double the WG efforts
on moving ASPA forward.

It was also suggested in the past few months that BGPSec should get
a new impulse by supporting it in the RIPE NCC hosted RPKI:
=
https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2021-September/004410.h=
tml

My responses in that thread were a bit skeptical to the point of being
misunderstood as obstruction to the idea. I am not against BGPSec =
itself.
Far from it. I just want to believe that it can work.

My issue was about how BGPSec can be implemented incrementally and=20
scale *automatically*. I know of the idea that operators turn it on (and =
off?)
because they somehow know (out-of-band?) that it's safe to do so. But,
(1) I don't see this scale, (2) this can result in outages if operators =
get
it wrong (path invalid), and (3) I don't see this work cross-transit -=20=

which is probably where the problem of spoofed origin attacks is worse.

In my view, this comes from the property that BGPSec validated paths can
only be valid or invalid. There is no 'unknown' - because in a nutshell
then adversaries could do a simple downgrade attack.

All that said, if we could have a constructive discussion about solving
the BGPSec deployment challenges then I would welcome it very much. =
Perhaps,
it would be possible to signal (with signed objects in the RPKI) when
BGPSec is applicable - and when a downgrade has happened.. somehow? No, =
I
don't have the answer but we may want to put our minds together.

Tim

>=20
> randy
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops


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From: Di Ma <madi@juicybun.cn>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Tim,

It seems to be a good idea to do signaling and have a sort of signed =
object for policy indicator :-)

Di

>=20
> All that said, if we could have a constructive discussion about =
solving
> the BGPSec deployment challenges then I would welcome it very much. =
Perhaps,
> it would be possible to signal (with signed objects in the RPKI) when
> BGPSec is applicable - and when a downgrade has happened.. somehow? =
No, I
> don't have the answer but we may want to put our minds together.
>=20
> Tim
>=20
>>=20
>> randy
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Sidrops mailing list
>> Sidrops@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops




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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 10:19:23 +0100
Cc: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>, SIDR Operations WG <sidrops@ietf.org>
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References: <m2h78roqbp.wl-randy@psg.com> <7FBC2063-2404-4BF9-836E-210629C4BA63@juicybun.cn> <m28ru3ofyq.wl-randy@psg.com> <3C18BA8C-FA34-4D24-96E4-F85644089513@nlnetlabs.nl> <015C9C28-4230-40D8-A9F2-7420B726C00F@juicybun.cn>
To: Di Ma <madi@juicybun.cn>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/sPxfOF2ZZLStNHA3wM55rEqWMhM>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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> On 22 Feb 2022, at 09:51, Di Ma <madi@juicybun.cn> wrote:
>=20
> Tim,
>=20
> It seems to be a good idea to do signaling and have a sort of signed =
object for policy indicator :-)

I think we need a model where we can have valid/invalid/not-found (or =
equivalent) for paths.

Then we people can turn validation on with much less risk, and people =
can start implementing
BGPSec on their routers independently with more immediate (albeit =
initially small) benefit.

If and how we can get there is another matter. Perhaps a signed policy =
indicator (presence of
router certs?) will help, but it may not be enough.

Note that all this is orthogonal to ASPA. ASPA essentially says whether =
paths are plausible,
and BGPSec (valid path) says what actually happened. Though if ASPA =
informs that an adjacency
is invalid then this could perhaps be valuable input to BGPSec path =
validation with regards
to downgrade detection.

Tim


>=20
> Di
>=20
>>=20
>> All that said, if we could have a constructive discussion about =
solving
>> the BGPSec deployment challenges then I would welcome it very much. =
Perhaps,
>> it would be possible to signal (with signed objects in the RPKI) when
>> BGPSec is applicable - and when a downgrade has happened.. somehow? =
No, I
>> don't have the answer but we may want to put our minds together.
>>=20
>> Tim
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> randy
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Sidrops mailing list
>>> Sidrops@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Sidrops mailing list
>> Sidrops@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops


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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 11:27:47 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
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Subject: [Sidrops] Indeed, we are not done yet (Was:  [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV)
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Hello all,

On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 09:41:36AM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> Which is why I think it would be very good to re-double the WG efforts
> on moving ASPA forward.

It probably bears repeating: ASPA and BGPsec are complementary
technologies. Each attempts to solve a different problem space. There is
no overlap.

> It was also suggested in the past few months that BGPSec should get
> a new impulse by supporting it in the RIPE NCC hosted RPKI:
> https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2021-September/004410.html
> 
> My responses in that thread were a bit skeptical to the point of being
> misunderstood as obstruction to the idea. I am not against BGPSec itself.
> Far from it. I just want to believe that it can work.

At times it is easy to mistake someone's skepticism for a message of
Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt. Especially when considering the finality
of such discussions: would you be the one implementing BGPsec in the
RIPE NCC RPKI dashboard? Are you the one configuring routers to use
BGPsec? Is your personal belief in BGPsec a necessity for the global
deployment of BGPsec?

> My issue was about how BGPSec can be implemented incrementally and
> scale *automatically*. I know of the idea that operators turn it on
> (and off?) because they somehow know (out-of-band?) that it's safe to
> do so. But, (1) I don't see this scale, (2) this can result in outages
> if operators get it wrong (path invalid), and (3) I don't see this
> work cross-transit - which is probably where the problem of spoofed
> origin attacks is worse.

Are you speaking from your own experience deploying BGP security
measures in IP networks, operating the BGP side of an ISP/IXP/CDN?
Phrased differently: is it really important for you to understand how
exactly something scales, if you aren't personally (or as organization)
scaling & deploying a given technology? What is it to you whether BGPsec
is "scalable" or not? How does one even define "scale", what metrics are
used to judge feasibility or value?

For example, has it been contemplated whether BGPsec offers benefits
when deployed at 'small' scale? ('small scale' for example being
third-party CDN caches embedded inside ISP networks which use BGP). I
share Randy Bush's perspective on this matter:
https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-December/217003.html

Another point worth mentioning: many people consider "Internet
Consolidation" [0] to be a detrimental evolution, however there is a
silver lining, an aspect that can be used to the collective's advantage:
because of consolidation, fewer market players need to take action to
positively impact the Internet experience of the masses [1].

> In my view, this comes from the property that BGPSec validated paths
> can only be valid or invalid. There is no 'unknown' - because in a
> nutshell then adversaries could do a simple downgrade attack.

I'd encourage everyone to use more precise wording: The phrase 'unknown'
does not appear in RFC 6811, there is "Not Found". "Not Found" is the
DFZ's starting state, because when the Internet was created there were
no RPKI ROAs. Thus it must be like that - because how else would one
accomplish incrementally deployability for ROV? :-)

If one zooms in, the notion of 'Not Found' as a third state really is a
complicated one: the cryptographic verification process for ROA EE
certificates only has two outcomes: valid or invalid. The origin
validation of BGP routes covered by one or more ROAs only has two
outcomes: valid or invalid. I view the polarity of the outcome of the
BGPsec's verification process in a similar fashion.

> All that said, if we could have a constructive discussion about
> solving the BGPSec deployment challenges then I would welcome it very
> much. Perhaps, it would be possible to signal (with signed objects in
> the RPKI) when BGPSec is applicable - and when a downgrade has
> happened.. somehow? No, I don't have the answer but we may want to put
> our minds together.

I'd like to encourage you (and others) to first focus on implementing
rudimentary support for BGPsec Router Keys "according to current RFCs",
rather than leaping towards defining new signed objects. The definition
of new objects should be informed by operational experience, perhaps
summarized in a gap analysis.

I think that at this stage working towards gathering real world
operational experience is a prerequisite before extending the BGPsec
protocol specifications in one direction or another. Horse before cart
so to speak. :-)

Regards,

Job

[0]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arkko-iab-internet-consolidation
[1]: slide 9 https://storage.googleapis.com/site-media-prod/meetings/NANOG84/2488/20220214_Madory_Measuring_Rpki_Rov_v1.pdf


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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 11:47:53 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: sidrops@ietf.org
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References: <m2h78roqbp.wl-randy@psg.com> <7FBC2063-2404-4BF9-836E-210629C4BA63@juicybun.cn> <m28ru3ofyq.wl-randy@psg.com> <3C18BA8C-FA34-4D24-96E4-F85644089513@nlnetlabs.nl> <015C9C28-4230-40D8-A9F2-7420B726C00F@juicybun.cn> <DF148DA2-C94D-42BF-A37F-668D9B37860B@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 10:19:23AM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> > On 22 Feb 2022, at 09:51, Di Ma <madi@juicybun.cn> wrote:
> > It seems to be a good idea to do signaling and have a sort of signed
> > object for policy indicator :-)
> 
> I think we need a model where we can have valid/invalid/not-found (or
> equivalent) for paths.

Do we really? Slide 10 "BGPsec is protocol, not policy":
https://archive.nanog.org/meetings/nanog52/presentations/Tuesday/Bush-bgpsec.pdf

> Then we people can turn validation on with much less risk, and people
> can start implementing BGPSec on their routers independently with more
> immediate (albeit initially small) benefit.

I am not so sure about the above, it seems the reasoning stems from a
desire to seek compromise without regard for the consequences of such
settlement. The notion of "less risk" needs to be quantified more
precisely to have meaning.

I understand the goal of BGPsec deployment to be to reject
BGPsec-invalid paths, that's all. If the signatures are trash: don't
accept it, I don't see 'middleground'.

Are there any scenarios in which one would want to accept BGPsec invalid
paths? Similarly, RP implementations discard malformed ROAs, network
operators reject RPKI ROV-invalid BGP updates.

If people perceive risk: don't enable BGPsec, let others be the early
adaptors. It is early days, lots of software still has to be written,
lots of testing is required.

> Note that all this is orthogonal to ASPA. ASPA essentially says
> whether paths are plausible, and BGPSec (valid path) says what
> actually happened.

Yes, the above is an accurate summary.

> Though if ASPA informs that an adjacency is invalid then this could
> perhaps be valuable input to BGPSec path validation with regards to
> downgrade detection.

Only time and research can tell whether it is a useful signal to
transfer from one plane to another plane.

Regards,

Job


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From: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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To: Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/LBSaMr_AGCRtpJ8qnwM618lTo7Y>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Hi,

> On 22 Feb 2022, at 11:47, Job Snijders =
<job=3D40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 10:19:23AM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
>>> On 22 Feb 2022, at 09:51, Di Ma <madi@juicybun.cn> wrote:
>>> It seems to be a good idea to do signaling and have a sort of signed
>>> object for policy indicator :-)
>>=20
>> I think we need a model where we can have valid/invalid/not-found (or
>> equivalent) for paths.
>=20
> Do we really? Slide 10 "BGPsec is protocol, not policy":
> =
https://archive.nanog.org/meetings/nanog52/presentations/Tuesday/Bush-bgps=
ec.pdf

I did not say it's policy. I don't know what would be needed. But it
would help if people had an automated way to know that BGPSec validation
can be applied or not for a given path / session etc.

>=20
>> Then we people can turn validation on with much less risk, and people
>> can start implementing BGPSec on their routers independently with =
more
>> immediate (albeit initially small) benefit.
>=20
> I am not so sure about the above, it seems the reasoning stems from a
> desire to seek compromise without regard for the consequences of such
> settlement. The notion of "less risk" needs to be quantified more
> precisely to have meaning.
>=20
> I understand the goal of BGPsec deployment to be to reject
> BGPsec-invalid paths, that's all. If the signatures are trash: don't
> accept it, I don't see 'middleground'.
>=20
> Are there any scenarios in which one would want to accept BGPsec =
invalid
> paths? Similarly, RP implementations discard malformed ROAs, network
> operators reject RPKI ROV-invalid BGP updates.

Currently you need to accept BGPSec invalid path on any path where
at least one ASN does NOT participate in BGPSec. Applying BGPSec path
validation is only safe when you know that ALL ASNs on the path
participate.

> If people perceive risk: don't enable BGPsec, let others be the early
> adaptors. It is early days, lots of software still has to be written,
> lots of testing is required.

What I am hoping for, essentially, is that a partial deployment model
would be more feasible where people are not expected to form islands,
which merge, without specifying how those islands form or merge.

If there would be a 'not-found' like state for the *path* validation,
and reliable way to clearly detect an *invalid* path as opposed to
a path with non BGPSec capable ASNs, then a simple reject *invalid*
policy could be applied.

I understand this is not trivial. =10If it were, it most likely would
have been solved before 2011. Still, it may be useful to think about
this again.

Reject invalid && partial deployment has worked well for ROV. And,
time will tell, but I strongly believe it will work well for ASPA.
I would like something like this to work for BGPSec.

Alternatively - rather than having a 'not-found' it may be an option
to automate a safe decision on accepting only 'valid'. See below.

>=20
>> Note that all this is orthogonal to ASPA. ASPA essentially says
>> whether paths are plausible, and BGPSec (valid path) says what
>> actually happened.
>=20
> Yes, the above is an accurate summary.
>=20
>> Though if ASPA informs that an adjacency is invalid then this could
>> perhaps be valuable input to BGPSec path validation with regards to
>> downgrade detection.
>=20
> Only time and research can tell whether it is a useful signal to
> transfer from one plane to another plane.

The two are orthogonal, but may complement each other very well.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that routers would know (through
validation) that all ASNs on a path are certain to participate in
BGPSec then they could also 'safely' reject any such BGP invalid
paths. If this decision can be automated then operators don't need
to create or destroy the islands manually.

Adversaries could still spoof paths, but if the ASPA 'AS_PATH' is
then invalid - they would presumably be rejected on that basis.

If the ASPA 'AS_PATH' would be valid and accepted, then the addition
of BGPSec validation on that path (provided the ASNs are known to
participate) would give additional security.

As I said I don't know.. I am just trying to look at it from another
angle.


>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> Job
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops


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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 12:43:54 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/5s0Z-aAcQmHBOdnpsVcVvrwi8MY>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 12:38:59PM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> Currently you need to accept BGPSec invalid path on any path where at
> least one ASN does NOT participate in BGPSec. Applying BGPSec path
> validation is only safe when you know that ALL ASNs on the path
> participate.

Are you perhaps confusing 'unsigned' and 'invalid' paths?

Regards,

Job


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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Indeed, we are not done yet (Was:  [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV)
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Hi,

> On 22 Feb 2022, at 11:27, Job Snijders =
<job=3D40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> I'd like to encourage you (and others) to first focus on implementing
> rudimentary support for BGPsec Router Keys "according to current RFCs"

Fyi.. support for this is coming in routinator 0.11. Support can be =
added
to krill as well - if there is operator demand for this.

Tim=


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To: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/shD2HMkgDrXSf7dLI6GAkOuaoKg>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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> On 22 Feb 2022, at 12:43, Job Snijders <job@fastly.com> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 12:38:59PM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
>> Currently you need to accept BGPSec invalid path on any path where at
>> least one ASN does NOT participate in BGPSec. Applying BGPSec path
>> validation is only safe when you know that ALL ASNs on the path
>> participate.
> 
> Are you perhaps confusing 'unsigned' and 'invalid' paths?

Perhaps. It was my understanding that an 'unsigned' path should be
considered 'invalid' because otherwise one can simply strip signatures
on an 'invalid' path to do a downgrade attack.

It would help a lot of that were detectable.

My RFC-searching-fu is abandoning me at the moment but any pointers
would be welcome.

> 
> Regards,
> 
> Job


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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 13:03:05 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
Cc: sidrops@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/ErLAq_PVgVPvj4cIfBGExHSydaM>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Indeed, we are not done yet (Was:  [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV)
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On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 12:48:02PM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> > On 22 Feb 2022, at 11:27, Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >
> > I'd like to encourage you (and others) to first focus on
> > implementing rudimentary support for BGPsec Router Keys "according
> > to current RFCs"
> 
> Fyi.. support for this is coming in routinator 0.11. Support can be
> added to krill as well - if there is operator demand for this.

I for one am very interested in deployment BGPsec in commercial context.
I don't run krill myself, but that's irrelevant: my IETF
standards-compliant RP implementations extract and process information
from Krill instances.

At this very moment you might be in the unfortunate position of being a
gatekeeper hindering BGPsec deployment. Between expressing skepticism
which potentially discourages others from implementing BGPsec support,
and not (yet?) having implemented it yourself in Krill, the needle won't
move itself.

Think of it this way: if Krill supports publication of BGPsec Router
Keys, suddenly the pool of people positioned to experiment with BGPsec
dramatically increases. It is entirely possible that within the krill
user community there are people who (through experimentation) discover
the value and applicability of BGPsec, and maybe even come up with ideas
neither of us forsaw.

Regards,

Job


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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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From nobody Tue Feb 22 13:38:33 2022
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From: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 22:37:43 +0100
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References: <m2h78roqbp.wl-randy@psg.com> <7FBC2063-2404-4BF9-836E-210629C4BA63@juicybun.cn> <m28ru3ofyq.wl-randy@psg.com> <3C18BA8C-FA34-4D24-96E4-F85644089513@nlnetlabs.nl> <015C9C28-4230-40D8-A9F2-7420B726C00F@juicybun.cn> <DF148DA2-C94D-42BF-A37F-668D9B37860B@nlnetlabs.nl> <YhS/WR3czIP3jNLF@snel> <ABE3FA29-6C9D-492B-A72A-68C20176E76D@nlnetlabs.nl> <949277FD-27AF-40E8-B557-AA58C62BFEA7@apnic.net>
To: Geoff Huston <gih@apnic.net>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/T9hV4hbGJ7yncArJh9PvO0APh_Y>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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> On 22 Feb 2022, at 20:13, Geoff Huston <gih@apnic.net> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>>>=20
>>> Are there any scenarios in which one would want to accept BGPsec =
invalid
>>> paths? Similarly, RP implementations discard malformed ROAs, network
>>> operators reject RPKI ROV-invalid BGP updates.
>>=20
>> Currently you need to accept BGPSec invalid path on any path where
>> at least one ASN does NOT participate in BGPSec. Applying BGPSec path
>> validation is only safe when you know that ALL ASNs on the path
>> participate.
>=20
>=20
> I can=E2=80=99t parse these two sentences Tim. They seem to contradict =
each other
> when I read em. The AS signing chain is stripped as soon as an update =
leaves the
> original BGPSEC =E2=80=9Cisland=E2=80=9D. I thought that an AS can=E2=80=
=99t just restart the signing chain
> subsequently.

Let me try to be more clear then. I am not trying to suggest the signing
chain is restarted.

BGPSec path validation procedure results in one of two states: 'Valid' =
and
'Not Valid'. (section 5.1 of 8205).

A BGPSec path as a whole can only be 'Valid' if all signatures are =
present,
and they are all valid.

The absence of any signature, whether it's because the update left a
capable island, or an adversary removed signatures, results in 'Not =
Valid'.

Rejecting 'Not Valid' is therefore only safe on known islands.

Outside of these islands all paths are BGPSec 'Not Valid'. Therefore
validation cannot be enabled outside of known islands. You would accept
'Not Valid' outside of islands, even though you are not checking that =
state
in that context. Sorry if that was cryptic.


>>> If people perceive risk: don't enable BGPsec, let others be the =
early
>>> adaptors. It is early days, lots of software still has to be =
written,
>>> lots of testing is required.
>>=20
>> What I am hoping for, essentially, is that a partial deployment model
>> would be more feasible where people are not expected to form islands,
>> which merge, without specifying how those islands form or merge.
>=20
> This desire seems rather inexplicable to me, in that if one allows =
routes where
> the AS signing chain is broken then it could be broken becuase of
> tampering or other malicious acts as much as they are broken for more
> benign reasons. How would the BGP speaker receiving the route tell the=20=

> difference? And if it can=E2=80=99t, then it seems to me that there is =
no point in
> adding this additional workload to update processing if in fact it is
> incapable of detecting tampered AS Paths.

Although I used the terms 'not found' and 'unknown' somewhat loosely
elsewhere I did not mean to say that broken chains should be acceptable.

One take on this could be that routers can know whether a path consists
of only "participating" ASNs and then treat it as an "island" =
automatically
without the need to be manually enabled. Such automation could allow
operators to opt-in to validation for parties that they don't have a =
direct
relationship with - e.g. cross transit.

If the "island" decision can be automated then stripping of signatures
on them could be interpreted as malicious.

This limits path spoofing option to non-participating ASNs. This will
be harder to do as more ASNs participate in BGPSec *and* ASPA validation
(if deployed) will further limit the adjacency options. This also =
enables
ASNs to protect themselves in two (orthogonal) ways - giving them
immediate benefits to deploy.

Of course the above could only ever work if the router can know that
an ASN "participates". The presence of a router certificate for the
ASN could give a clue - but I am not sure that it is enough. Is creating
such a router certificate a valid pledge? If it is, then that means
much less standards work would be needed.

If it isn't then a separate signed statement by the ASN that they
will do BGPSec whenever they get a signed path could help. This could
be done using a new RPKI signed object type, or by way of an extension
in the existing BGPSec router certificate perhaps. But this would also
require a new RPKI-RTR version as well.


Tim


>=20
> Geoff
>=20
>=20
>=20


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To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
Cc: Geoff Huston <gih@apnic.net>, "sidrops@ietf.org" <sidrops@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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> BGPSec path validation procedure results in one of two states: 'Valid'
> and 'Not Valid'. (section 5.1 of 8205).
> 
> A BGPSec path as a whole can only be 'Valid' if all signatures are
> present, and they are all valid.
> 
> The absence of any signature, whether it's because the update left a
> capable island, or an adversary removed signatures, results in 'Not
> Valid'.

almost.  there is also NotSigned aka BGP4.

as it leaves an island, it becomes Unsigned.  it can not become signed
at any further hop.

> Rejecting 'Not Valid' is therefore only safe on known islands.
> 
> Outside of these islands all paths are BGPSec 'Not Valid'.

not exactly, they are Unsigned

randy


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From: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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> On 23 Feb 2022, at 01:25, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
> 
>> BGPSec path validation procedure results in one of two states: 'Valid'
>> and 'Not Valid'. (section 5.1 of 8205).
>> 
>> A BGPSec path as a whole can only be 'Valid' if all signatures are
>> present, and they are all valid.
>> 
>> The absence of any signature, whether it's because the update left a
>> capable island, or an adversary removed signatures, results in 'Not
>> Valid'.
> 
> almost.  there is also NotSigned aka BGP4.
> 
> as it leaves an island, it becomes Unsigned.  it can not become signed
> at any further hop.

I know they cannot become signed again.

I was talking about 'Valid' and 'Not Valid' paths, not signatures.

> 
>> Rejecting 'Not Valid' is therefore only safe on known islands.
>> 
>> Outside of these islands all paths are BGPSec 'Not Valid'.
> 
> not exactly, they are Unsigned

Am I correct though that if BGPSec *Path* validation were to be applied to
unsigned paths they would be considered 'Not Valid'?

And isn't this what the downgrade issue (for which I cannot find a ref now)
is about? Rather than violating signatures, the signatures can just be
stripped.

Meaning that even if you would call such a path 'not signed', rather than
'not valid' accepting those paths would mean that 'not valid' can be
easily avoided by adversaries.

Hence, I believe, the idea to only accept BGPSec *path* 'Valid' on BGPSec
"islands".

Is there a way that these "islands" can be recognised automatically, and
cross transit (i.e. include unknown parties)? See the second part of the
email I sent earlier.

Tim


> 
> randy
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops


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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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> Am I correct though that if BGPSec *Path* validation were to be
> applied to unsigned paths they would be considered 'Not Valid'?

no.  not validatable, if you wish.  not valid is a result of
validating the signature chain.  as one can not do that with
a non-bgpsec path, it can be neither valid or not valid.

> And isn't this what the downgrade issue (for which I cannot
> find a ref now) is about? Rather than violating signatures, the
> signatures can just be stripped.

the downgrade attack is a router accepting a bgpsec path and
producing a bgp4 path toward the 'victim'.  in a more likely
operational scenario, the router simply refuses bgpsec from its
incoming peer, so that peer sends it bgp4 which it then sends on
to the 'victim'.  though that make a louder signal of the attack.

> Meaning that even if you would call such a path 'not signed',
> rather than 'not valid' accepting those paths would mean that
> 'not valid' can be easily avoided by adversaries.

yes

> Hence, I believe, the idea to only accept BGPSec *path* 'Valid'
> on BGPSec "islands".

no.  routers on those islands still need to reach non-bgpsec
destinations and even bgpsec speaking destinations on other
islands.  this means they must also accept unsigned paths.

> Is there a way that these "islands" can be recognised
> automatically, and cross transit (i.e. include unknown
> parties)?

you could tunnel between islands; but that is operationally
unlikely.  i remember uucp :)

and you can not take an unsigned path and start signing.  to what
are you attesting?

randy


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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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> On 23 Feb 2022, at 13:27, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
> 
>> Am I correct though that if BGPSec *Path* validation were to be
>> applied to unsigned paths they would be considered 'Not Valid'?
> 
> no.  not validatable, if you wish.  not valid is a result of
> validating the signature chain.  as one can not do that with
> a non-bgpsec path, it can be neither valid or not valid.
> 
>> And isn't this what the downgrade issue (for which I cannot
>> find a ref now) is about? Rather than violating signatures, the
>> signatures can just be stripped.
> 
> the downgrade attack is a router accepting a bgpsec path and
> producing a bgp4 path toward the 'victim'.  in a more likely
> operational scenario, the router simply refuses bgpsec from its
> incoming peer, so that peer sends it bgp4 which it then sends on
> to the 'victim'.  though that make a louder signal of the attack.
> 
>> Meaning that even if you would call such a path 'not signed',
>> rather than 'not valid' accepting those paths would mean that
>> 'not valid' can be easily avoided by adversaries.
> 
> yes
> 
>> Hence, I believe, the idea to only accept BGPSec *path* 'Valid'
>> on BGPSec "islands".
> 
> no.  routers on those islands still need to reach non-bgpsec
> destinations and even bgpsec speaking destinations on other
> islands.  this means they must also accept unsigned paths.

Yes, of course.

What I meant here by "accept... on islands" is that the operator
would have to know - somehow - where to enable BGPSec validation.

I believe that the idea was that this would be done on a BGP
session basis. E.g. providers would insist on BGPSec from customers,
or peers between each other etc.

> 
>> Is there a way that these "islands" can be recognised
>> automatically, and cross transit (i.e. include unknown
>> parties)?
> 
> you could tunnel between islands; but that is operationally
> unlikely.  i remember uucp :)
> 
> and you can not take an unsigned path and start signing.  to what
> are you attesting?

That is not what I was trying to suggest.

I wondered if (new) signed statements in the RPKI could be used to
conclude that ASNs have pledged to use BGP Sec when possible. I.e.
such ASNs would sign a path if they are the origin / or if the receive
a signed path.

The receiving router could then conclude that IFF all ASNs in a path
had made these signed statements - BGPSec validation on *that* path
could be performed. It would be an error if signatures were missing
or invalid.

This way operators would not have to enable this manually on a per
session basis, and because it would be based on signed validated
statements they could trust that it would be safe to apply for ASNs who
issued those statements - without the need to know these ASNs first
hand - e.g. across transit.

It would still allow for path spoofing and signature removal by
injecting an ASN that did not sign a statement that they would
do BGPSec. However, the options would become more limited as more
ASNs participate - and ASPA validation would further limit the available
choices.

As for how an ASN could sign such a statement.. one could overload
existing router certificates but I think that is probably a bad
idea - it could very well lead to timing issues when adopting. An
alternative could be to have a new separate signed object for this,
which would allow that BGPSec is tested first, before letting the world
know.

Just an idea.. hoping it might help.

Tim






> 
> randy


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Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 09:31:30 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: sidrops@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Hello Tim, others,

> What I meant here by "accept... on islands" is that the operator would
> have to know - somehow - where to enable BGPSec validation.
> 
> I believe that the idea was that this would be done on a BGP session
> basis. E.g. providers would insist on BGPSec from customers, or peers
> between each other etc.

"In order to indicate that a BGP speaker is willing to send BGPsec
 UPDATE messages (for a particular address family), a BGP speaker
 sends the BGPsec capability"
 source: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8205#section-2.2

Indeed, it is an operator choice whether to enable BGPsec or not, and it
is choosen per-session. Luckily most large operators have automated the
provisioning of BGP sessions.

> I wondered if (new) signed statements in the RPKI could be used to
> conclude that ASNs have pledged to use BGP Sec when possible. I.e.
> such ASNs would sign a path if they are the origin / or if the receive
> a signed path.
> 
> The receiving router could then conclude that IFF all ASNs in a path
> had made these signed statements - BGPSec validation on *that* path
> could be performed. It would be an error if signatures were missing or
> invalid.
> 
> This way operators would not have to enable this manually on a per
> session basis, and because it would be based on signed validated
> statements they could trust that it would be safe to apply for ASNs
> who issued those statements - without the need to know these ASNs
> first hand - e.g. across transit.
> 
> It would still allow for path spoofing and signature removal by
> injecting an ASN that did not sign a statement that they would do
> BGPSec. However, the options would become more limited as more ASNs
> participate - and ASPA validation would further limit the available
> choices.
> 
> As for how an ASN could sign such a statement.. one could overload
> existing router certificates but I think that is probably a bad idea -
> it could very well lead to timing issues when adopting. An alternative
> could be to have a new separate signed object for this, which would
> allow that BGPSec is tested first, before letting the world know.
> 
> Just an idea.. hoping it might help.

I am not sure it is helpful at this stage.

It seems you overlook some deployment aspects, for example: within a
given Autonomous System (during the incremental deployment of BGPsec -
which may take years) there will be ASBRs that support BGPsec and ASBRs
that are unable to negotiate support for BGPsec. For example, it is
entirely possible that at a given moment in time only half the
adjacencies for 206238_15562$ are BGPsec capable, and half are not (yet). 

See this posting for a similar story on RPKI ROV invalids:
https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-April/213346.html

Frankly speaking, wouldn't it make far more sense to implement the
specifications AS SPECIFIED AND PEER-REVIEWED BY MANY PEOPLE,
*before* advocating new object profiles?

Especially since the CA side of BGPsec is so straight-forward and
simple to implement ... ?

Regards,

Job

ps. Since you asked, here are required reading materials:

BGPsec Protocol Specification
	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8205

BGPsec Considerations for Autonomous System (AS) Migration
	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8206

BGPsec Operational Considerations
	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8207

BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats
	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8208

BGPsec Design Choices and Summary of Supporting Discussions
	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8374

Router Keying for BGPsec
	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8635


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To: Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/DcbDU25miO0Rcc9Hbd85kaDvDx0>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Hello Job, others

> On 24 Feb 2022, at 09:31, Job Snijders =
<job=3D40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> Hello Tim, others,
>=20
>> What I meant here by "accept... on islands" is that the operator =
would
>> have to know - somehow - where to enable BGPSec validation.
>>=20
>> I believe that the idea was that this would be done on a BGP session
>> basis. E.g. providers would insist on BGPSec from customers, or peers
>> between each other etc.
>=20
> "In order to indicate that a BGP speaker is willing to send BGPsec
> UPDATE messages (for a particular address family), a BGP speaker
> sends the BGPsec capability"
> source: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8205#section-2.2
>=20
> Indeed, it is an operator choice whether to enable BGPsec or not, and =
it
> is choosen per-session. Luckily most large operators have automated =
the
> provisioning of BGP sessions.
>=20
>> I wondered if (new) signed statements in the RPKI could be used to
>> conclude that ASNs have pledged to use BGP Sec when possible. I.e.
>> such ASNs would sign a path if they are the origin / or if the =
receive
>> a signed path.
>>=20
>> The receiving router could then conclude that IFF all ASNs in a path
>> had made these signed statements - BGPSec validation on *that* path
>> could be performed. It would be an error if signatures were missing =
or
>> invalid.
>>=20
>> This way operators would not have to enable this manually on a per
>> session basis, and because it would be based on signed validated
>> statements they could trust that it would be safe to apply for ASNs
>> who issued those statements - without the need to know these ASNs
>> first hand - e.g. across transit.
>>=20
>> It would still allow for path spoofing and signature removal by
>> injecting an ASN that did not sign a statement that they would do
>> BGPSec. However, the options would become more limited as more ASNs
>> participate - and ASPA validation would further limit the available
>> choices.
>>=20
>> As for how an ASN could sign such a statement.. one could overload
>> existing router certificates but I think that is probably a bad idea =
-
>> it could very well lead to timing issues when adopting. An =
alternative
>> could be to have a new separate signed object for this, which would
>> allow that BGPSec is tested first, before letting the world know.
>>=20
>> Just an idea.. hoping it might help.
>=20
> I am not sure it is helpful at this stage.
>=20
> It seems you overlook some deployment aspects, for example: within a
> given Autonomous System (during the incremental deployment of BGPsec -
> which may take years) there will be ASBRs that support BGPsec and =
ASBRs
> that are unable to negotiate support for BGPsec. For example, it is
> entirely possible that at a given moment in time only half the
> adjacencies for 206238_15562$ are BGPsec capable, and half are not =
(yet).

Not at all - any adjacencies that are not BGPSec capable would not issue
any statement that they are capable. So stripping the signatures there
would be entirely expected.

I am talking about something else: signalling deployment beyond direct
sessions in order to enable detection of downgrade attacks. If router
can detect that the *entire* path is not only capable but also committed
to do BGPSec then removal of signatures can be flagged as an attack.

> See this posting for a similar story on RPKI ROV invalids:
> https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-April/213346.html
>=20
> Frankly speaking, wouldn't it make far more sense to implement the
> specifications AS SPECIFIED AND PEER-REVIEWED BY MANY PEOPLE,
> *before* advocating new object profiles?
>=20
> Especially since the CA side of BGPsec is so straight-forward and
> simple to implement ... ?

There is no need to shout Job..

I was trying to have a discussion about a possible way to help
operational future deployment. This is in no way preventing the
development and deployment of current standards. And should the
idea be useful and accepted then of course it would be handled
as a WG document, be peer-reviewed etc.

I know - it's naive to think that that would be what the IETF
is for. Fine. I will stop here. Discussion once again seems
entirely pointless.

>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> Job
>=20
> ps. Since you asked, here are required reading materials:
>=20
> BGPsec Protocol Specification
> 	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8205
>=20
> BGPsec Considerations for Autonomous System (AS) Migration
> 	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8206
>=20
> BGPsec Operational Considerations
> 	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8207
>=20
> BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats
> 	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8208
>=20
> BGPsec Design Choices and Summary of Supporting Discussions
> 	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8374
>=20
> Router Keying for BGPsec
> 	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8635

Thank you Job - somehow I managed to find these documents myself.

I did not ask about these. I asked about the downgrade issue.
Randy was kind enough to answer.

Tim



>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Sidrops mailing list
> Sidrops@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops


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From: Jeroen Massar <jeroen@massar.ch>
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To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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This will be very off-topic, but is likely also founded into a =
misconception:


> On 20220224, at 10:16, Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:

[..]

> I was trying to have a discussion about a possible way to help
> operational future deployment. [...]
>=20
> I know - it's naive to think that that would be what the IETF
> is for. Fine. I will stop here. Discussion once again seems
> entirely pointless.

Do you want to have a discussion, or do you want to just tell people to =
stop discussing because you are disagreeing with the arguments they are =
providing?

>=20
> [..] was kind enough to answer.

Are you implying that other people are being unkind?

Calling people naive, is not being very kind in my book...

Greets,
 Jeroen


   (who is not technically capable of adding anything to the technical =
discussion because I have not read up properly;
    hence letting the people talk who did read up and have broad =
experience in running actual infrastructure --- running code et al --
    but I hate seeing such comments in a thread.... and actually, we =
should not focus on those and just likely ignore those kind
    of comments completely, but ... hard

    please gentlemen and other ladies, keep things civil and technical =
instead of attacking eachother between lines,
    it does not cause a worthy environment to contribute to.

    Please have a good chill, reconsider why people contribute to the =
IETF, write code and contribute, then come back with arguments.

    I will be adding technical comments when I have actually fully read =
up, likely coded a few things and deployed things though
    but that requires time that is not available at the moment... I will =
be back, and am reading along.



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From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 11:54:44 +0100
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To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 10:16:39AM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> > It seems you overlook some deployment aspects, for example: within a
> > given Autonomous System (during the incremental deployment of BGPsec -
> > which may take years) there will be ASBRs that support BGPsec and ASBRs
> > that are unable to negotiate support for BGPsec. For example, it is
> > entirely possible that at a given moment in time only half the
> > adjacencies for 206238_15562$ are BGPsec capable, and half are not
(yet).
>
> Not at all - any adjacencies that are not BGPSec capable would not issue
> any statement that they are capable. So stripping the signatures there
> would be entirely expected.
>
> I am talking about something else: signalling deployment beyond direct
> sessions in order to enable detection of downgrade attacks. If router
> can detect that the *entire* path is not only capable but also
> committed to do BGPSec then removal of signatures can be flagged as an
> attack.

At the risk of repeating myself: signalling at AS-level granularity
seems too coarse for deployment reality. An AS might be able to do
BGPsec in one part of their network, but not in other parts of their
network. Another consideration: not all Autonomous Systems operate with
a coherent backbone, some AS are "islands".

Imagine AS 65000, 65001, and 65002, who all have half their ASBR
footprint BGPsec enabled; neither of those 3 AS can 'commit' to BGPsec;
other than through per-BGP-session negotation. BGPsec islands connect to
each other by virtue of unbroken valid signature chains.


> > See this posting for a similar story on RPKI ROV invalids:
> > https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-April/213346.html
> >
> > Frankly speaking, wouldn't it make far more sense to implement the
> > specifications AS SPECIFIED AND PEER-REVIEWED BY MANY PEOPLE,
> > *before* advocating new object profiles?
> >
> > Especially since the CA side of BGPsec is so straight-forward and
> > simple to implement ... ?
>
> There is no need to shout Job..
>
> I was trying to have a discussion about a possible way to help
> operational future deployment.

I appreciate all the help you are willing to provide, but I question the
soundness of initiating discussion about 'future deployment' while the
first steps have yet to be set on the path towards deployment. How can
anyone meaningfully comment on future operational deployment challenges
without any operational experience with BGPsec "as is"?

> This is in no way preventing the development and deployment of current
> standards. And should the idea be useful and accepted then of course
> it would be handled as a WG document, be peer-reviewed etc.
>
> I know - it's naive to think that that would be what the IETF
> is for. Fine. I will stop here. Discussion once again seems
> entirely pointless.

At times it seems you look to this WG for help, other times you purport
opinion on what the future direction of RPKI / Secure Routing should be,
and then other times you appear to engage in research/brainstorm
activities. It is hard to tell which is which at times.

The current discussion might appear challenging because your positions
appear inconsistent: first you expressed heavy skepticism to the point
that it might even discourage others to consider BGPsec ("it doesnt
scale"), then you pivot to suggesting new object profiles, all the while
writing messages which contain imprecise terminology.

Here you ask for pointers:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/shD2HMkgDrXSf7dLI6GAkOuaoKg/
Here you reply you could find the documents yourself:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/DcbDU25miO0Rcc9Hbd85kaDvDx0/

Here you ask whether there is 'operator demand':
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/XOHyvcRKH6VOG310jAUppzRXliA/
But already back in October 2021, you yourself noted: "Wrt BGPSec.. I am
actually very happy to see that so many people are in favor of supporting
it.":
https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2021-October/004454.html

It seems to me that one could extrapolate appetite for BGPsec in managed
CA environments to mean that people also would like BGPsec support in
all other CA implementations.

Let's make BGPsec a reality! It all starts by actually making BGPsec
available to operators.

Regards,

Job

--000000000000981fa605d8c16958
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div>On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 10:16:39AM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; It seems you overlook some deployment aspects, for example: withi=
n a<br>
&gt; &gt; given Autonomous System (during the incremental deployment of BGP=
sec -<br>
&gt; &gt; which may take years) there will be ASBRs that support BGPsec and=
 ASBRs<br>
&gt; &gt; that are unable to negotiate support for BGPsec. For example, it =
is<br>
&gt; &gt; entirely possible that at a given moment in time only half the<br=
>
&gt; &gt; adjacencies for 206238_15562$ are BGPsec capable, and half are no=
t (yet).<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Not at all - any adjacencies that are not BGPSec capable would not iss=
ue<br>
&gt; any statement that they are capable. So stripping the signatures there=
<br>
&gt; would be entirely expected.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I am talking about something else: signalling deployment beyond direct=
<br>
&gt; sessions in order to enable detection of downgrade attacks. If router<=
br>
&gt; can detect that the *entire* path is not only capable but also<br>
&gt; committed to do BGPSec then removal of signatures can be flagged as an=
<br>
&gt; attack.<br>
<br></div><div>
At the risk of repeating myself: signalling at AS-level granularity<br>
seems too coarse for deployment reality. An AS might be able to do<br>
BGPsec in one part of their network, but not in other parts of their<br>
network. Another consideration: not all Autonomous Systems operate with<br>
a coherent backbone, some AS are &quot;islands&quot;.<br>
<br>
Imagine AS 65000, 65001, and 65002, who all have half their ASBR<br>
footprint BGPsec enabled; neither of those 3 AS can &#39;commit&#39; to BGP=
sec;<br>
other than through per-BGP-session negotation. BGPsec islands connect to<br=
>
each other by virtue of unbroken valid signature chains.</div><div><br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; See this posting for a similar story on RPKI ROV invalids:<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-April/2=
13346.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailman.nanog.org/=
pipermail/nanog/2021-April/213346.html</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Frankly speaking, wouldn&#39;t it make far more sense to implemen=
t the<br>
&gt; &gt; specifications AS SPECIFIED AND PEER-REVIEWED BY MANY PEOPLE,<br>
&gt; &gt; *before* advocating new object profiles?<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Especially since the CA side of BGPsec is so straight-forward and=
<br>
&gt; &gt; simple to implement ... ?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; There is no need to shout Job..<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I was trying to have a discussion about a possible way to help<br>
&gt; operational future deployment.<br>
<br></div><div>
I appreciate all the help you are willing to provide, but I question the<br=
>
soundness of initiating discussion about &#39;future deployment&#39; while =
the<br>
first steps have yet to be set on the path towards deployment. How can<br>
anyone meaningfully comment on future operational deployment challenges<br>
without any operational experience with BGPsec &quot;as is&quot;?</div><div=
>
<br>
&gt; This is in no way preventing the development and deployment of current=
<br>
&gt; standards. And should the idea be useful and accepted then of course<b=
r>
&gt; it would be handled as a WG document, be peer-reviewed etc.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I know - it&#39;s naive to think that that would be what the IETF<br>
&gt; is for. Fine. I will stop here. Discussion once again seems<br>
&gt; entirely pointless.<br>
<br></div><div>
At times it seems you look to this WG for help, other times you purport<br>
opinion on what the future direction of RPKI / Secure Routing should be,<br=
>
and then other times you appear to engage in research/brainstorm<br>
activities. It is hard to tell which is which at times.<br>
<br>
The current discussion might appear challenging because your positions<br>
appear inconsistent: first you expressed heavy skepticism to the point<br>
that it might even discourage others to consider BGPsec (&quot;it doesnt<br=
>
scale&quot;), then you pivot to suggesting new object profiles, all the whi=
le<br>
writing messages which contain imprecise terminology.<br>
<br>
Here you ask for pointers: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg=
/sidrops/shD2HMkgDrXSf7dLI6GAkOuaoKg/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"=
>https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/shD2HMkgDrXSf7dLI6GAkOuaoKg/=
</a><br>
Here you reply you could find the documents yourself: <a href=3D"https://ma=
ilarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/DcbDU25miO0Rcc9Hbd85kaDvDx0/" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/D=
cbDU25miO0Rcc9Hbd85kaDvDx0/</a><br>
<br>
Here you ask whether there is &#39;operator demand&#39;: <a href=3D"https:/=
/mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/XOHyvcRKH6VOG310jAUppzRXliA/" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrop=
s/XOHyvcRKH6VOG310jAUppzRXliA/</a><br>
But already back in October 2021, you yourself noted: &quot;Wrt BGPSec.. I =
am actually very happy to see that so many people are in favor of supportin=
g it.&quot;:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2021-October/=
004454.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ripe.net/ripe=
/mail/archives/routing-wg/2021-October/004454.html</a><br>
<br>
It seems to me that one could extrapolate appetite for BGPsec in managed<br=
>
CA environments to mean that people also would like BGPsec support in<br>
all other CA implementations.<br>
<br>
Let&#39;s make BGPsec a reality! It all starts by actually making BGPsec<br=
>
available to operators.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Job<br>
</div>

--000000000000981fa605d8c16958--


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From: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
In-Reply-To: <CAMFGGcBhm7bGbAL7CRdmHYJVsOtRGRaPD56Tvi=xSW=+Y=n8Rw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:12:38 +0100
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To: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/4Q4h_Kva05Fu-OHhlPpns7rae-U>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Job,

Thank you for your reply.

I understand your concern about getting the 'basics' deployed first.
I am also willing to implement basic support in krill after 0.10.

I interpreted your use of capitals to mean that you wanted me to stop
the discussion beyond the current set of standards. I feel that you
interpreted my desire to discuss these things as unwillingness to
implement - but I don't see how these things conflict.

With regards to "looking for help".. not the most respectful way
of phrasing it.. but let's move on.. I asked questions about the
downgrade specifically. I don't think that =10I am the only one who was
unclear on this specific issue - and I felt that clarity would help me
and others.

With regards to "inconsistent positions".. This is not a bug, but a
feature of discussions involving listening and learning.

The source of this communication style is that I was trying to have
an open face-to-face-like exchange over email.

Since you and I are both going to the IETF meeting - how about having
a chat there and clearing things up?

Tim



> On 24 Feb 2022, at 11:54, Job Snijders <job@fastly.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 10:16:39AM +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote:
> > > It seems you overlook some deployment aspects, for example: within =
a
> > > given Autonomous System (during the incremental deployment of =
BGPsec -
> > > which may take years) there will be ASBRs that support BGPsec and =
ASBRs
> > > that are unable to negotiate support for BGPsec. For example, it =
is
> > > entirely possible that at a given moment in time only half the
> > > adjacencies for 206238_15562$ are BGPsec capable, and half are not =
(yet).
> >=20
> > Not at all - any adjacencies that are not BGPSec capable would not =
issue
> > any statement that they are capable. So stripping the signatures =
there
> > would be entirely expected.
> >=20
> > I am talking about something else: signalling deployment beyond =
direct
> > sessions in order to enable detection of downgrade attacks. If =
router
> > can detect that the *entire* path is not only capable but also
> > committed to do BGPSec then removal of signatures can be flagged as =
an
> > attack.
>=20
> At the risk of repeating myself: signalling at AS-level granularity
> seems too coarse for deployment reality. An AS might be able to do
> BGPsec in one part of their network, but not in other parts of their
> network. Another consideration: not all Autonomous Systems operate =
with
> a coherent backbone, some AS are "islands".
>=20
> Imagine AS 65000, 65001, and 65002, who all have half their ASBR
> footprint BGPsec enabled; neither of those 3 AS can 'commit' to =
BGPsec;
> other than through per-BGP-session negotation. BGPsec islands connect =
to
> each other by virtue of unbroken valid signature chains.
>=20
>=20
> > > See this posting for a similar story on RPKI ROV invalids:
> > > https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-April/213346.html
> > >=20
> > > Frankly speaking, wouldn't it make far more sense to implement the
> > > specifications AS SPECIFIED AND PEER-REVIEWED BY MANY PEOPLE,
> > > *before* advocating new object profiles?
> > >=20
> > > Especially since the CA side of BGPsec is so straight-forward and
> > > simple to implement ... ?
> >=20
> > There is no need to shout Job..
> >=20
> > I was trying to have a discussion about a possible way to help
> > operational future deployment.
>=20
> I appreciate all the help you are willing to provide, but I question =
the
> soundness of initiating discussion about 'future deployment' while the
> first steps have yet to be set on the path towards deployment. How can
> anyone meaningfully comment on future operational deployment =
challenges
> without any operational experience with BGPsec "as is"?
>=20
> > This is in no way preventing the development and deployment of =
current
> > standards. And should the idea be useful and accepted then of course
> > it would be handled as a WG document, be peer-reviewed etc.
> >=20
> > I know - it's naive to think that that would be what the IETF
> > is for. Fine. I will stop here. Discussion once again seems
> > entirely pointless.
>=20
> At times it seems you look to this WG for help, other times you =
purport
> opinion on what the future direction of RPKI / Secure Routing should =
be,
> and then other times you appear to engage in research/brainstorm
> activities. It is hard to tell which is which at times.
>=20
> The current discussion might appear challenging because your positions
> appear inconsistent: first you expressed heavy skepticism to the point
> that it might even discourage others to consider BGPsec ("it doesnt
> scale"), then you pivot to suggesting new object profiles, all the =
while
> writing messages which contain imprecise terminology.
>=20
> Here you ask for pointers: =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/shD2HMkgDrXSf7dLI6GAkOuaoKg/=

> Here you reply you could find the documents yourself: =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/DcbDU25miO0Rcc9Hbd85kaDvDx0/=

>=20
> Here you ask whether there is 'operator demand': =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/XOHyvcRKH6VOG310jAUppzRXliA/=

> But already back in October 2021, you yourself noted: "Wrt BGPSec.. I =
am actually very happy to see that so many people are in favor of =
supporting it.":
> =
https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2021-October/004454.htm=
l
>=20
> It seems to me that one could extrapolate appetite for BGPsec in =
managed
> CA environments to mean that people also would like BGPsec support in
> all other CA implementations.
>=20
> Let's make BGPsec a reality! It all starts by actually making BGPsec
> available to operators.
>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> Job


From nobody Thu Feb 24 04:34:41 2022
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To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Dear Tim,

> On 20220224, at 13:12, Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
[..]
> With regards to "looking for help".. not the most respectful way
> of phrasing it.. but let's move on..

Is such a sentence needed?

Greets,
 Jeroen





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To: Jeroen Massar <jeroen@massar.ch>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Dear Jeroen

> On 24 Feb 2022, at 13:34, Jeroen Massar <jeroen@massar.ch> wrote:
> 
> Dear Tim,
> 
>> On 20220224, at 13:12, Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
> [..]
>> With regards to "looking for help".. not the most respectful way
>> of phrasing it.. but let's move on..
> 
> Is such a sentence needed?

Is it nice if someone's character is framed a "looking for help"?

Did you not just say: "...instead of attacking eachother between lines"?

Well I noticed the attack and I mentioned that I am letting it pass.
I even proposed to clear things up in person .. in the bit you did
not quote that is.

Tim



From nobody Thu Feb 24 05:09:30 2022
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From: Jeroen Massar <jeroen@massar.ch>
In-Reply-To: <70EEDAD8-D94B-401C-ABF3-8C6520E38123@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 14:09:13 +0100
Cc: sidrops@ietf.org
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References: <015C9C28-4230-40D8-A9F2-7420B726C00F@juicybun.cn> <DF148DA2-C94D-42BF-A37F-668D9B37860B@nlnetlabs.nl> <YhS/WR3czIP3jNLF@snel> <ABE3FA29-6C9D-492B-A72A-68C20176E76D@nlnetlabs.nl> <949277FD-27AF-40E8-B557-AA58C62BFEA7@apnic.net> <E16290C1-77ED-4CB1-8712-F6163304ED45@nlnetlabs.nl> <m2k0dmmntj.wl-randy@psg.com> <6D314C7A-8CEC-4B9B-8F80-6B1AC48037E2@nlnetlabs.nl> <85D947F4-E2A4-4FFE-86AF-2D129C49FB9C@psg.com> <8413F0CA-F50A-42B7-B0DA-19A0A90ABE6F@nlnetlabs.nl> <YhdCYjS+yDVsFgNF@snel> <60B6D863-047D-40A6-80DD-95C05391A0BA@nlnetlabs.nl> <CAMFGGcBhm7bGbAL7CRdmHYJVsOtRGRaPD56Tvi=xSW=+Y=n8Rw@mail.gmail.com> <5AAF971A-CD2C-4D27-B5CB-CE370A7D6E40@nlnetlabs.nl> <C29AFF81-9E65-4EE7-996B-F5E63970C46F@massar.ch> <70EEDAD8-D94B-401C-ABF3-8C6520E38123@nlnetlabs.nl>
To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/aP7hpcCXNcvdGLoyAoPuAn2G-Bk>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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> On 20220224, at 13:53, Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>=20
> Dear Jeroen
>=20
>> On 24 Feb 2022, at 13:34, Jeroen Massar <jeroen@massar.ch> wrote:
>>=20
>> Dear Tim,
>>=20
>>> On 20220224, at 13:12, Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>> [..]
>>> With regards to "looking for help".. not the most respectful way
>>> of phrasing it.. but let's move on..
>>=20
>> Is such a sentence needed?
>=20
> Is it nice if someone's character is framed a "looking for help"?
>=20
> Did you not just say: "...instead of attacking eachother between =
lines"?
>=20
> Well I noticed the attack and I mentioned that I am letting it pass.
> I even proposed to clear things up in person .. in the bit you did
> not quote that is

You mean the section in a different paragraph.

Please realise, that many people who read a sentence like the one I =
quoted above, people stop reading.

Hence, do please avoid those kind of sentences, or the one you use above =
again (not removing them, so that people see context) where you =
effectively blame me for not properly quoting you.


Please, as in my previous, longer message, keep it technical.

I am not part of the discussion, as clearly, there is some kind of =
hostility or other unknown factor that is not part of what should be on =
an IETF list.


As per my previous, longer and ignored mail:

----
   Please have a good chill, reconsider why people contribute to the =
IETF, write code and contribute, then come back with arguments.
----

Greets,
 Jeroen


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Subject: [Sidrops] [WGLC] draft-ietf-sidrops-roa-considerations-01 - Ends 10/March/2022
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Hi Folks:

A working group last call has been issued for draft-ietf-sidrops-roa- consi=
derations-01, =93Problem Statement and Considerations for ROA containing Mu=
ltiple Prefixes=94. Please reply to the list with your comments. The WGLC w=
ill end on March 10th, 2022.

The draft can be found at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr=
ops-roa-considerations/.

Regards,
Nathalie, Chris & Keyur



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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">Hi Folks:<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"font-variant-caps: normal;orphans: auto;tex=
t-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;-webkit-text-stro=
ke-width: 0px;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"font-variant-caps: normal;orphans: auto;tex=
t-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;-webkit-text-stro=
ke-width: 0px;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"color:black">A working group last call has been issued for<s=
pan class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><span style=3D"colo=
r:#070706;background:#FFEE94">draft-ietf-sidrops-roa- considerations-01</sp=
an><span style=3D"color:black">, =93Problem Statement
 and Considerations for ROA containing Multiple Prefixes=94. Please reply t=
o the list with your comments. The<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nb=
sp;</span>WGLC<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>will end o=
n March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2022.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"font-variant-caps: normal;orphans: auto;tex=
t-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;-webkit-text-stro=
ke-width: 0px;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"color:black">The draft can be found at:<span class=3D"apple-=
converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-ietf-sidrops-roa-considerations/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dra=
ft-ietf-sidrops-roa-considerations/</a></span>.<span style=3D"color:black">=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"font-variant-caps: normal;orphans: auto;tex=
t-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;-webkit-text-stro=
ke-width: 0px;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"color:black">Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"font-variant-caps: normal;orphans: auto;tex=
t-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;-webkit-text-stro=
ke-width: 0px;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"color:black">Nathalie, Chris &amp; Keyur<o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"font-variant-caps: normal;orphans: auto;tex=
t-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;-webkit-text-stro=
ke-width: 0px;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
</div>
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From: "Montgomery, Douglas C. (Fed)" <dougm@nist.gov>
To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>, Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
CC: "sidrops@ietf.org" <sidrops@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/GG17Ze1b3kAh8avg499PkB0R6Ws>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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For what it is worth, I have long thought the ability to indicate, in a glo=
bally accessible system, that BGPSec is being used on a given logical peeri=
ng between two ASes is the only way address the down-grade attack on BGPsec=
 as currently specified and would increase the utility of BGPsec over multi=
 hop paths.

I agree with Tim=92s point, as I understood it, that this information can=
=92t just be local to a peering session, as I need to know if I received an=
 unsigned (BGP4 PATH) that appears to come from a sequence of ASes that all=
 stated that they were doing BGPsec with each other.

I get Job=92s (I think) point that a simple mechanism at the AS level can=
=92t deal with the scenario where I do BGPsec on some peering=92s with my n=
eighbor but not on others with the same neighbor.  Given that distinct peer=
ing sessions between the same peers are not visible in BGP downstream of th=
e ASes in question, there is not much to do about this other than wait unti=
l all peering sessions between a given pair of ASes enable BGPsec.

The utility of any optional security mechanism is significantly increased b=
y having secure out of band mechanism to signal that it is operationally en=
abled for use.   Actually, in my mind DMARC is a useful general model becau=
se you can both signal you are using a security mechanism, suggest how rece=
ivers should treat failures, and provide a notification channel to send bac=
k info on failures.  The latter two allowing you to pilot the security mech=
anism (policy=3Dmonitor) before you signal policy=3Dreject.

We seem to create many security mechanisms (e.g., BGPsec, ROAs, MUD profile=
s, etc) that don=92t have a safe means for individual users to globally tes=
t/pilot them before going into production mode.  That increases the risk/ba=
rrier to entry to those who wish to enable the technologies.

dougm
--
DougM @ NIST


From: Sidrops <sidrops-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@=
nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Thursday, February 24, 2022 at 4:19 AM
To: Job Snijders <job=3D40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: sidrops@ietf.org <sidrops@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
Hello Job, others

> On 24 Feb 2022, at 09:31, Job Snijders <job=3D40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org=
> wrote:
>
> Hello Tim, others,
>
>> What I meant here by "accept... on islands" is that the operator would
>> have to know - somehow - where to enable BGPSec validation.
>>
>> I believe that the idea was that this would be done on a BGP session
>> basis. E.g. providers would insist on BGPSec from customers, or peers
>> between each other etc.
>
> "In order to indicate that a BGP speaker is willing to send BGPsec
> UPDATE messages (for a particular address family), a BGP speaker
> sends the BGPsec capability"
> source: https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F=
%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8205%23section-2.2&amp;data=3D04%=
7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa47=
97a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJ=
WIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;=
sdata=3D1BEYOsez4uQzGJ8gu0rkKKHrBS%2BXYtvGWwLEU0V7VFU%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
>
> Indeed, it is an operator choice whether to enable BGPsec or not, and it
> is choosen per-session. Luckily most large operators have automated the
> provisioning of BGP sessions.
>
>> I wondered if (new) signed statements in the RPKI could be used to
>> conclude that ASNs have pledged to use BGP Sec when possible. I.e.
>> such ASNs would sign a path if they are the origin / or if the receive
>> a signed path.
>>
>> The receiving router could then conclude that IFF all ASNs in a path
>> had made these signed statements - BGPSec validation on *that* path
>> could be performed. It would be an error if signatures were missing or
>> invalid.
>>
>> This way operators would not have to enable this manually on a per
>> session basis, and because it would be based on signed validated
>> statements they could trust that it would be safe to apply for ASNs
>> who issued those statements - without the need to know these ASNs
>> first hand - e.g. across transit.
>>
>> It would still allow for path spoofing and signature removal by
>> injecting an ASN that did not sign a statement that they would do
>> BGPSec. However, the options would become more limited as more ASNs
>> participate - and ASPA validation would further limit the available
>> choices.
>>
>> As for how an ASN could sign such a statement.. one could overload
>> existing router certificates but I think that is probably a bad idea -
>> it could very well lead to timing issues when adopting. An alternative
>> could be to have a new separate signed object for this, which would
>> allow that BGPSec is tested first, before letting the world know.
>>
>> Just an idea.. hoping it might help.
>
> I am not sure it is helpful at this stage.
>
> It seems you overlook some deployment aspects, for example: within a
> given Autonomous System (during the incremental deployment of BGPsec -
> which may take years) there will be ASBRs that support BGPsec and ASBRs
> that are unable to negotiate support for BGPsec. For example, it is
> entirely possible that at a given moment in time only half the
> adjacencies for 206238_15562$ are BGPsec capable, and half are not (yet).

Not at all - any adjacencies that are not BGPSec capable would not issue
any statement that they are capable. So stripping the signatures there
would be entirely expected.

I am talking about something else: signalling deployment beyond direct
sessions in order to enable detection of downgrade attacks. If router
can detect that the *entire* path is not only capable but also committed
to do BGPSec then removal of signatures can be flagged as an attack.

> See this posting for a similar story on RPKI ROV invalids:
> https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fmailm=
an.nanog.org%2Fpipermail%2Fnanog%2F2021-April%2F213346.html&amp;data=3D04%7=
C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa479=
7a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJW=
IjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;s=
data=3DTom4cL9nHEw9PVbNGH21p2RkeTdcvo6xdxj57F2sjOQ%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
>
> Frankly speaking, wouldn't it make far more sense to implement the
> specifications AS SPECIFIED AND PEER-REVIEWED BY MANY PEOPLE,
> *before* advocating new object profiles?
>
> Especially since the CA side of BGPsec is so straight-forward and
> simple to implement ... ?

There is no need to shout Job..

I was trying to have a discussion about a possible way to help
operational future deployment. This is in no way preventing the
development and deployment of current standards. And should the
idea be useful and accepted then of course it would be handled
as a WG document, be peer-reviewed etc.

I know - it's naive to think that that would be what the IETF
is for. Fine. I will stop here. Discussion once again seems
entirely pointless.

>
> Regards,
>
> Job
>
> ps. Since you asked, here are required reading materials:
>
> BGPsec Protocol Specification
>        https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%=
2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8205&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40=
nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61=
dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMD=
AiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3D6ruh6AJ=
PkmReg%2BEt5Yh9A7G6KrQJvlpzqXZ%2B%2B%2B9xLvw%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
>
> BGPsec Considerations for Autonomous System (AS) Migration
>        https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%=
2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8206&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40=
nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61=
dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMD=
AiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3Dc0Kh9Yd=
XBICdNgVhka9zVtRMTWgyfjDnwXduHcR6c%2Bc%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
>
> BGPsec Operational Considerations
>        https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%=
2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8207&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40=
nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61=
dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMD=
AiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3D%2F2AQr=
HIqzvReQ0spKjNnMmRNFvmFpfSJayFvDrWDA5c%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
>
> BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats
>        https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%=
2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8208&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40=
nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61=
dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMD=
AiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3DRH8GcLn=
RFf3CafW8%2FTFkaH936M3nE3%2BFlnZVY0IPo7c%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
>
> BGPsec Design Choices and Summary of Supporting Discussions
>        https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%=
2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8374&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40=
nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61=
dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMD=
AiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3DamNinyr=
ayWu0Skqw5TFepEpjS0mKQT6WAiDWuzawuVA%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
>
> Router Keying for BGPsec
>        https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%=
2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8635&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40=
nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61=
dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMD=
AiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3DAQfk6fm=
JvWo1lQPeFjqU61n8n0MWw%2BRjM%2Fun5R9UOpA%3D&amp;reserved=3D0

Thank you Job - somehow I managed to find these documents myself.

I did not ask about these. I asked about the downgrade issue.
Randy was kind enough to answer.

Tim



>
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joiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3DGx6OU7d8kL0qGc=
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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"word-wrap:brea=
k-word">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
>For what it is worth, I have long thought the ability to indicate, in a gl=
obally accessible system, that BGPSec is being used on a given logical peer=
ing between two ASes is the only way
 address the down-grade attack on BGPsec as currently specified and would i=
ncrease the utility of BGPsec over multi hop paths.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
>I agree with Tim=92s point, as I understood it, that this information can=
=92t just be local to a peering session, as I need to know if I received an=
 unsigned (BGP4 PATH) that appears to come
 from a sequence of ASes that all stated that they were doing BGPsec with e=
ach other.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
>I get Job=92s (I think) point that a simple mechanism at the AS level can=
=92t deal with the scenario where I do BGPsec on some peering=92s with my n=
eighbor but not on others with the same neighbor.&nbsp;
 Given that distinct peering sessions between the same peers are not visibl=
e in BGP downstream of the ASes in question, there is not much to do about =
this other than wait until all peering sessions between a given pair of ASe=
s enable BGPsec.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
>The utility of any optional security mechanism is significantly increased =
by having secure out of band mechanism to signal that it is operationally e=
nabled for use.&nbsp;&nbsp; Actually, in my mind
 DMARC is a useful general model because you can both signal you are using =
a security mechanism, suggest how receivers should treat failures, and prov=
ide a notification channel to send back info on failures.&nbsp; The latter =
two allowing you to pilot the security
 mechanism (policy=3Dmonitor) before you signal policy=3Dreject.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
>We seem to create many security mechanisms (e.g., BGPsec, ROAs, MUD profil=
es, etc) that don=92t have a safe means for individual users to globally te=
st/pilot them before going into production
 mode.&nbsp; That increases the risk/barrier to entry to those who wish to =
enable the technologies.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
>dougm<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
>--<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
>DougM @ NIST<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><b><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:12.0pt;color:black">From:
</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">Sidrops &lt;sidrops=
-bounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Tim Bruijnzeels &lt;tim@nlnetlabs.nl&gt;=
<br>
<b>Date: </b>Thursday, February 24, 2022 at 4:19 AM<br>
<b>To: </b>Job Snijders &lt;job=3D40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Cc: </b>sidrops@ietf.org &lt;sidrops@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Hello Job, others<b=
r>
<br>
&gt; On 24 Feb 2022, at 09:31, Job Snijders &lt;job=3D40fastly.com@dmarc.ie=
tf.org&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Hello Tim, others,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; What I meant here by &quot;accept... on islands&quot; is that the =
operator would<br>
&gt;&gt; have to know - somehow - where to enable BGPSec validation.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I believe that the idea was that this would be done on a BGP sessi=
on<br>
&gt;&gt; basis. E.g. providers would insist on BGPSec from customers, or pe=
ers<br>
&gt;&gt; between each other etc.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &quot;In order to indicate that a BGP speaker is willing to send BGPse=
c<br>
&gt; UPDATE messages (for a particular address family), a BGP speaker<br>
&gt; sends the BGPsec capability&quot;<br>
&gt; source: <a href=3D"https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=
=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8205%23section-2.2&=
amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f776719=
6%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown=
%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6=
Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3D1BEYOsez4uQzGJ8gu0rkKKHrBS%2BXYtvGWwLEU0V7VFU=
%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0">
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatra=
cker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8205%23section-2.2&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7=
Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e=
054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiM=
C4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sd=
ata=3D1BEYOsez4uQzGJ8gu0rkKKHrBS%2BXYtvGWwLEU0V7VFU%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0=
</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Indeed, it is an operator choice whether to enable BGPsec or not, and =
it<br>
&gt; is choosen per-session. Luckily most large operators have automated th=
e<br>
&gt; provisioning of BGP sessions.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I wondered if (new) signed statements in the RPKI could be used to=
<br>
&gt;&gt; conclude that ASNs have pledged to use BGP Sec when possible. I.e.=
<br>
&gt;&gt; such ASNs would sign a path if they are the origin / or if the rec=
eive<br>
&gt;&gt; a signed path.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; The receiving router could then conclude that IFF all ASNs in a pa=
th<br>
&gt;&gt; had made these signed statements - BGPSec validation on *that* pat=
h<br>
&gt;&gt; could be performed. It would be an error if signatures were missin=
g or<br>
&gt;&gt; invalid.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; This way operators would not have to enable this manually on a per=
<br>
&gt;&gt; session basis, and because it would be based on signed validated<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; statements they could trust that it would be safe to apply for ASN=
s<br>
&gt;&gt; who issued those statements - without the need to know these ASNs<=
br>
&gt;&gt; first hand - e.g. across transit.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; It would still allow for path spoofing and signature removal by<br=
>
&gt;&gt; injecting an ASN that did not sign a statement that they would do<=
br>
&gt;&gt; BGPSec. However, the options would become more limited as more ASN=
s<br>
&gt;&gt; participate - and ASPA validation would further limit the availabl=
e<br>
&gt;&gt; choices.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; As for how an ASN could sign such a statement.. one could overload=
<br>
&gt;&gt; existing router certificates but I think that is probably a bad id=
ea -<br>
&gt;&gt; it could very well lead to timing issues when adopting. An alterna=
tive<br>
&gt;&gt; could be to have a new separate signed object for this, which woul=
d<br>
&gt;&gt; allow that BGPSec is tested first, before letting the world know.<=
br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Just an idea.. hoping it might help.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I am not sure it is helpful at this stage.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It seems you overlook some deployment aspects, for example: within a<b=
r>
&gt; given Autonomous System (during the incremental deployment of BGPsec -=
<br>
&gt; which may take years) there will be ASBRs that support BGPsec and ASBR=
s<br>
&gt; that are unable to negotiate support for BGPsec. For example, it is<br=
>
&gt; entirely possible that at a given moment in time only half the<br>
&gt; adjacencies for 206238_15562$ are BGPsec capable, and half are not (ye=
t).<br>
<br>
Not at all - any adjacencies that are not BGPSec capable would not issue<br=
>
any statement that they are capable. So stripping the signatures there<br>
would be entirely expected.<br>
<br>
I am talking about something else: signalling deployment beyond direct<br>
sessions in order to enable detection of downgrade attacks. If router<br>
can detect that the *entire* path is not only capable but also committed<br=
>
to do BGPSec then removal of signatures can be flagged as an attack.<br>
<br>
&gt; See this posting for a similar story on RPKI ROV invalids:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps=
%3A%2F%2Fmailman.nanog.org%2Fpipermail%2Fnanog%2F2021-April%2F213346.html&a=
mp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196=
%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%=
7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6M=
n0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3DTom4cL9nHEw9PVbNGH21p2RkeTdcvo6xdxj57F2sjOQ%3D=
&amp;amp;reserved=3D0">
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.nanog.org%2Fpipermail%2Fnanog%2F2021-April%2F213346.html&amp;amp;data=3D04=
%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4=
797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8ey=
JWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp=
;amp;sdata=3DTom4cL9nHEw9PVbNGH21p2RkeTdcvo6xdxj57F2sjOQ%3D&amp;amp;reserve=
d=3D0</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Frankly speaking, wouldn't it make far more sense to implement the<br>
&gt; specifications AS SPECIFIED AND PEER-REVIEWED BY MANY PEOPLE,<br>
&gt; *before* advocating new object profiles?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Especially since the CA side of BGPsec is so straight-forward and<br>
&gt; simple to implement ... ?<br>
<br>
There is no need to shout Job..<br>
<br>
I was trying to have a discussion about a possible way to help<br>
operational future deployment. This is in no way preventing the<br>
development and deployment of current standards. And should the<br>
idea be useful and accepted then of course it would be handled<br>
as a WG document, be peer-reviewed etc.<br>
<br>
I know - it's naive to think that that would be what the IETF<br>
is for. Fine. I will stop here. Discussion once again seems<br>
entirely pointless.<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Job<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; ps. Since you asked, here are required reading materials:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; BGPsec Protocol Specification<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://gcc02.saf=
elinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fd=
oc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8205&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C73965691174=
74f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C63781291=
1853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJB=
TiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3D6ruh6AJPkmReg%2BEt5Yh9A7G=
6KrQJvlpzqXZ%2B%2B%2B9xLvw%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0">
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatra=
cker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8205&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.=
gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7=
C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ=
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3D6ruh6AJP=
kmReg%2BEt5Yh9A7G6KrQJvlpzqXZ%2B%2B%2B9xLvw%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; BGPsec Considerations for Autonomous System (AS) Migration<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://gcc02.saf=
elinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fd=
oc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8206&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C73965691174=
74f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C63781291=
1853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJB=
TiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3Dc0Kh9YdXBICdNgVhka9zVtRMT=
WgyfjDnwXduHcR6c%2Bc%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0">
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cker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8206&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.=
gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7=
C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ=
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3Dc0Kh9YdX=
BICdNgVhka9zVtRMTWgyfjDnwXduHcR6c%2Bc%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; BGPsec Operational Considerations<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://gcc02.saf=
elinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fd=
oc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8207&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C73965691174=
74f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C63781291=
1853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJB=
TiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3D%2F2AQrHIqzvReQ0spKjNnMmR=
NFvmFpfSJayFvDrWDA5c%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0">
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cker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8207&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.=
gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7=
C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ=
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3D%2F2AQrH=
IqzvReQ0spKjNnMmRNFvmFpfSJayFvDrWDA5c%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://gcc02.saf=
elinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fd=
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74f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C63781291=
1853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJB=
TiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3DRH8GcLnRFf3CafW8%2FTFkaH9=
36M3nE3%2BFlnZVY0IPo7c%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0">
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cker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8208&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.=
gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7=
C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ=
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3DRH8GcLnR=
Ff3CafW8%2FTFkaH936M3nE3%2BFlnZVY0IPo7c%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; BGPsec Design Choices and Summary of Supporting Discussions<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://gcc02.saf=
elinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fd=
oc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8374&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C73965691174=
74f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C63781291=
1853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJB=
TiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3DamNinyrayWu0Skqw5TFepEpjS=
0mKQT6WAiDWuzawuVA%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0">
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cker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8374&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.=
gov%7C7396569117474f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7=
C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ=
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3DamNinyra=
yWu0Skqw5TFepEpjS0mKQT6WAiDWuzawuVA%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Router Keying for BGPsec<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://gcc02.saf=
elinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fd=
oc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8635&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Cdougm%40nist.gov%7C73965691174=
74f31495d08d9f7767196%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C63781291=
1853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJB=
TiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3DAQfk6fmJvWo1lQPeFjqU61n8n=
0MWw%2BRjM%2Fun5R9UOpA%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0">
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C1%7C0%7C637812911853664452%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ=
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;amp;sdata=3DAQfk6fmJ=
vWo1lQPeFjqU61n8n0MWw%2BRjM%2Fun5R9UOpA%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0</a><br>
<br>
Thank you Job - somehow I managed to find these documents myself.<br>
<br>
I did not ask about these. I asked about the downgrade issue.<br>
Randy was kind enough to answer.<br>
<br>
Tim<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
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Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 14:17:41 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
To: sidrops@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/AS30Q20Gi5aBVgvGMI42aQ9JeJg>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [routing-wg] misconceptions about ROV
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Hi Doug, others,

On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 11:53:25PM +0000, Montgomery, Douglas C. (Fed) wrote:
> We seem to create many security mechanisms (e.g., BGPsec, ROAs, MUD
> profiles, etc) that don’t have a safe means for individual users to
> globally test/pilot them before going into production mode.

I think the cake should be sliced up differently: the concept of "pilot
testing" shouldn't be in the protocol specs, but in the approach to
deployment.

In my experience operators are happy to request additional ASNs &
arrange separate IPv4/IPv6 space for pilot studies. Both AS and IPv6
INRs are extremely affordable, a fraction of the overall cost of
studying a new Internet technology. At least, this was my experience
with IPv6 a decade+ ago, and with RPKI ROV in recent years. I fully
expect that early adoptors of BGPsec are able to construct appropriate
pilot setups too. From that perspective I don't see the need to add new
object profiles to facilitate BGPsec, because doing so would set the
clock back.

> That increases the risk/barrier to entry to those who wish to enable
> the technologies.

At some point the conceptual "are you sure?" confirmation dialogue boxes
have to transform into something that is real. Cryptographic
attestations only have meaning when Relying Parties actually honor the
attestations: indeed, RPs have to exhibit willpower to discard invalid
objects or routes, otherwise the attestations become worthless (or
worse! read on below).

I think one of the unforeseen and accidental obstacles towards global
deployment of RPKI ROV was the following awkward dynamic:

(1) the propaganda machine was thundering on all cylinders to promote
    ROA creation
(2) many folks misconfigured their ROAs, resulting in the *crazy
    situation* that in its peak there were between 5,000 ~ 6,000
    invalids BGP routes in the DFZ [0]
(3) many folks didn't notice their ROA misconfigurations, because nobody
    was performing ROV invalid==reject. Also, there was no incentive to
    fix broken ROAs, because nobody was validating.
(4) people became afraid to enable ROV on ingress EBGP, because there
    were so many invalids "I can't just reject 5K routes!".

It is not hard to imagine how steps 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 in an alternative
universe could've resulted in complete disaster and dismissal of RPKI
ROV.

It took significant community effort to overcome the above downward
spiral: people had to be taught what CA Intent is, that 'harsh'
rejection of invalid information is exactly what makes the security
mechanism work, and that the 5K invalids did not pose a risk to business
[1] [2].

As for the misconfigured ROA creators: many learned the surprisingly
positive consequences of making bad decisions. Sometimes operators have
to touch the hot stove. :-)

How the above observations potentially apply to BGPsec isn't certain
yet, but all of us definitely have to consider what we can learn from
the ROV experience when we collectively plan and labor the next phase of
routing security.

Kind regards,

Job

[0]: https://www.denog.de/media/DENOG11/day1_1_rpki-one-year-later_yPfR6rl.pdf
[1]: https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2019-February/099522.html
[2]: https://storage.googleapis.com/site-media-prod/meetings/NANOG84/2488/20220214_Madory_Measuring_Rpki_Rov_v1.pdf


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Subject: [Sidrops] Reminder about maintaining civility- misconceptions about ROV
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Hi Working Group,

This discussion thread has become a little heated.  While the Chairs are pl=
eased to see the discussions on the thread, we would like to remind all par=
ticipants that civility is important to advance discussion in a beneficial =
manner.

It is okay to have dis-agreements as long as you preserve the code of condu=
ct on an email conversation.

Best Regards,
Chris & Keyur


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Hi Work=
ing Group,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:black">&nbsp;<=
/span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:black">This di=
scussion thread has become a little heated.&nbsp; While the Chairs are plea=
sed to see the discussions on the thread, we would like to remind all parti=
cipants that civility is important to advance
 discussion in a beneficial manner.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:black">&nbsp;<=
/span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:black">It is o=
kay to have dis-agreements as long as you preserve the code of conduct on a=
n email conversation.&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:black">&nbsp;<=
/span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Best Re=
gards,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Chris &=
amp; Keyur</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_BYAPR18MB2696BE0F3157A1A089F53657C13E9BYAPR18MB2696namp_--


From nobody Fri Feb 25 15:56:14 2022
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Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 15:55:26 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net,  sidrops@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi Job,

My pleasure!  Sorry to have taken a bit long to get back to you.

On Fri, Feb 11, 2022 at 01:16:26PM +0100, Job Snijders wrote:
> Dear Benjamin,
> 
> To me it's always is a pleasure to receive your thorough reviews. Thank
> you for sharing your insights!
> 
> On Mon, Jan 31, 2022 at 02:22:11PM -0800, Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker wrote:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > DISCUSS:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > It looks like we may have a setup where a compliant RP and compliant
> > CA/repository fail to interoperate.  This is sufficiently surprising that
> > I want to confirm that it's the intended behavior.  In particular, both
> > manifests and CRLs have thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields, and since
> > issuing an update to one requires issuing an update to the other (though
> > the CRL is always actually generated first), it is only natural for us to
> > give guidance that the times in question should match between manifest and
> > corresponding CRL.  However, we do this only as RECOMMENDED/SHOULD-level
> > guidance, and accompany it by guidance to RPs that they SHOULD NOT reject
> > a manifest of the fields do not match the CRL.  Accordingly, when a CA
> > violates the first SHOULD and issues manifeset+CRL with mismatched
> > thisUpdate/nextUpdate, and an RP violates the second SHOULD (NOT) and
> > rejects such a setup, the RP will be unable to get any RPKI data for that
> > CA.  (As a tangent, we also have one place where we give related guidance
> > that the validity period of the single-use EE cert that signs the manifest
> > match the thisUpdate/nextUpdate period, which we might want to keep in
> > mind if we make any changes in this space.)
> > 
> > It looks like RFC 6486 had a conditional MUST-level requirement that *if* a
> > manifest encompasses a CRL, then the "nextUpdate" fields MUST match (no
> > guidance on thisUpdate), which we change to a statement of fact that each
> > manifest does encompass a CRL and guidance that the "nextUpdate"s SHOULD
> > match.
> > Additionally, RFC 6486 had a MUST-level requirement for the validity
> > period of the EE cert to exactly match the thisUpdate/nextUpdate time
> > interval of the manifest, which we currently are relaxing to a SHOULD.
> > 
> > Often in this scenario we would strengthen one of the SHOULDs to be a
> > MUST so that interoperability is guaranteed, but I'm not sure that I see a
> > clear argument for which requirement is better to make the MUST.
> 
> I agree with your analysis and think your suggestion to reinforce one of
> the two SHOULDs into a MUST is a reasonable way to resolve this friction.
> From my perspective, upgrading some normative terms in this context
> won't be perceived as controversial by the WG, as the current 'watered
> down' text is the result of concerns in relationship to retaining
> interopability with CAs 'in the field'.
> 
> Some background on the ability for RP's to deploy a strict ("MUST") at
> this point in time: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/VNG77j05I2JXOwv4qkSy-DCgRNE/
> 
> One CA implementation rectified the lack of validity window alignment:
> https://github.com/NLnetLabs/krill/commit/51c58ec58b266697dd1843a5504e79bfc385932d
> There appears to be agreement enforcing alignment on the CA side 'going
> forward', while RPs remain relaxed:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/W-SrezAc5Oa1HoTW0w64EdaD1gk/
> 
> Thus, I propose the following adjustments to resolve this DISCUSS.
> 
> ----- section 4: Manifest Definition ----
> 
> OLD section 4.2.1 second paragraph:
>    Because a "one-time-use" EE certificate is employed to verify a
>    manifest, it is RECOMMENDED that the EE certificate have a validity
>    period that coincides with the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate
>    in the manifest, to prevent needless growth of the CA's CRL.
> 
> NEW Section 4.2.1:
>    Because a "one-time-use" EE certificate is employed to verify a
>    manifest, the EE certificate MUST be issued with a validity period
>    that coincides with the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate in the
>    manifest, to prevent needless growth of the CA's CRL.
> 
> ----- Section 5: Manifest Generation ----
> 
> OLD Section 5.1 last paragraph:
>        It is RECOMMENDED that the validity interval of the EE
>        certificate exactly match the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times of
>        the manifest.
>        Note: An RP MUST verify all mandated syntactic constraints, i.e.,
>        constraints imposed on a CA via a "MUST".
> 
> NEW section 5.1:
>        The validity interval of the EE certificate MUST exactly match
>        the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times specified in the manifest's
>        eContent. (An RP MUST NOT consider misalignment of the validity
>        interval misalignment in and of itself to be an error.)

This seems like a good approach to me, thanks.
In this last chunk, should we add a clause at the beginning of the
parenthetical like "In order to remain compatible with implementations of a
previous version of this specification", to motivate the "MUST NOT"?

> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > My reading of the changes in the diff from RFC 6486 indicate that there is
> > something of a fundamental shift in the processing model being made, but
> > this does not seem to be mentioned specifically in the list of changes in
> > Appendix B (or the introduction/abstract).  Specifically, it seems that
> > the old RFC 6486 model involved the manifest being a tool that's useful
> > for the RP and SHOULD be used, but that ultimately the RP policy decides
> > which signed objects from the repository to use and fundamentally places
> > trust in the signatures on those objects; the new model in this draft
> > seems to place the manifest as the primary control on what signed objects
> > to use, with phrasing like "MUST use the current manifest"/"files not
> > listed on the manifest MUST NOT be used" and the error-handling behavior
> > in §6.6 being to fall back to the previous cached state (at a SHOULD-level
> > requirement), which as I understand it would mean using the previous
> > cached manifest.  (Maybe I'm wrong about that last bit.) While the new
> > focus doesn't seem problematic per se, and it's perfectly reasonable from
> > a process perspective to make that sort of behavior change in a Proposed
> > Standard, it seems that if this was a deliberate decision it ought to be
> > emphasized a bit more.  The final bullet point in the change list of
> > removing the notion of "local policy" is perhaps related to this
> > fundamental shift, but seems to only cover part of the shift.
> 
> I appreciate the observations in the above text, but don't see an
> actionable remark. However, I can provide a bit of background:
> 
> A write-up on the /why/ of RPKI Manifests can be found here:
> https://blog.apnic.net/2020/11/10/rpki-manifests-securely-declare-contents/
> 
> Manifests are the only way to verify the completeness of a SET of signed
> objects. The notion of 'local policy' in the original RFC appears to
> have been the result of an awkward compromise (this was before my time).
> I think by now all implementers understand that just like car seatbelts,
> Manifests are not optional, and never were optional.

The background is much appreciated, thanks.

My intention here was mostly to ask for another bullet point in the list of
changes in Appendix B.  In light of the above clarifiations, it might take
the form of replacing the last bullet ("Removed the notion of 'local
policy'") or it might be a standalone point.  If replacing/modifying the
existing item, maybe:

* Clarified that use of a manifest is the only way to ensure that a
  consistent and complete view of a publication point's contents is used,
  removing the notion of "local policy" that modifies manifest processing
  and use.

There might also be room for wording tweaks in the Abstract/Introduction to
reflect this change of emphasis, but I'm inclined to say that the potential
benefit is not really worth the effort of thinking about them.

> > Section 3
> > 
> >    The CA MUST sign only one manifest with each generated private key,
> >    and MUST generate a new key pair for each new version of the
> >    manifest.  This form of use of the associated EE certificate is
> >    termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate [RFC6487]
> > 
> > Not really a comment on *this* document (6486bis), but since RFC 6487
> > generically defines the "sequential use" EE certificate that we are
> > disallowing for RPKI Manifest use, it seems reasonable to ask whether the
> > issues that cause us to forbid sequential use in this context might also
> > apply to other scenarios where "sequential use" certificates might have
> > been used.  (I did not make a survey of the RPKI specification corpus to
> > investigate whether such scenarios are likely to exist.)
> 
> I didn't perform an extensive survey either, but AFAIK the Manifest -bis
> document is one of the few places to be so explicit about the use of
> one-time-use certificates. I believe the primary motivation for this
> requirement is that Manifests / CRLs are the "#1 top churning object"
> type in the RPKI ecosystem. CRLs (and thus Manifests) generally have a
> validity window measured in hours, whereas other object types such as
> ROAs often times have a validity window of 12 to 18 months, or longer.
> 
> I expect that going forward, where needed, new object types or -bis
> documents will be mor explicit whether to "recycle keypairs" or mandate
> one-time-use.
> 
> As you highlighted, your above comment is not really a comment on *this*
> document.

Indeed, no action for this document, and thanks for the insight into the
RPKI ecosystem.

> > Section 4.2.1
> > 
> >    fileHashAlg:
> >       This field contains the OID of the hash algorithm used to hash the
> >       files that the authority has placed into the repository.  The hash
> >       algorithm used MUST conform to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size
> >       Profile specification [RFC6485].
> > 
> > RFC 6485 has been obsoleted by RFC 7935.
> 
> Correct, this has been rectified in my working copy, also noted in
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/NzCcNzcN46FD7RgV3D5ULMnEhxs/
> 
> > Section 5.1
> > 
> >    2.  Issue an EE certificate for this key pair.  The CA MUST revoke
> >        the EE certificate used for the manifest being replaced.
> > 
> > Do the mechanics of revocation still need to be undertaken even if the EE
> > certificate in question has expired?
> 
> No, in the wild one can observe how the property of expired Manifest EE
> certificates is a helpful utility to prevent needless growth of CRLs.
> Also, trimming of CRLs is permitted. Do you have suggested text to
> capture that in a concise succinct manner? Or leave as-is?

Maybe "revoke or otherwise ensure invalidity of"?

> > Section 6.x
> > 
> > The old RFC 6486 procedures allowed ("MAY") the RP to verify that each
> > file at a publication point is listed in exactly one current manifest,
> > which is no longer allowed.  I think I can see how this was a problematic
> > thing to try, but want to confirm that it is intentionally removed.
> 
> Ack.
> 
> > Similarly, RFC 6486 wanted a warning produced if there were objects
> > present in the repository that are not listed in any manifest, which does
> > not seem particularly useful and I do not mind seeing removed.
> 
> Ack.
> 
> > RFC 6486 also wanted a warning issued if a publication point contained
> > both valid and invalid manifests; removing that guidance seems correct to
> > me.
> 
> Ack.
> 
> > Section 6.3
> > 
> > The two "proceed to Section 6.4"s seem redundant (I suggest removing the
> > last one).
> > 
> > Section 6.5
> > 
> >    the publication point.  If the computed hash value of a file listed
> >    on the manifest does not match the hash value contained in the
> >    manifest, then the fetch has failed and the RP MUST proceed to
> >    Section 6.6; otherwise proceed to Section 6.6.
> > 
> > This looks an awful lot like "if X; goto Y; else; goto Y", which could
> > just be written as "goto Y".  However, since §6.6 is the "failed fetches"
> > processing, in the successful verification case perhaps we don't want to
> > do that and should instead proceed to use the content of the files listed
> > in the manifest.
> 
> Nice catch! I'll remove the last sentnce.
> 
> > Section 8
> > 
> > Perhaps it is sufficiently obvious so as to go without saying, but I trust
> > that in a prolonged period of failed fetches, the human operator is
> > expected to go figure out (via out of band channels) what's up with the
> > CA/repository in question and whether an attack is underway.
> > 
> >                              The requirement for every repository
> >    publication point to contain at least one manifest allows an RP to
> >    determine if the manifest itself has been occluded from view.  [...]
> > 
> > Do we want to say anything about how these properties change during a CA
> > key rollover or if multiple "unrelated" CAs are publishing at the same
> > publication point (the latter of which would be quite unusual, if I
> > understand correctly)?
> 
> Multiple 'repositories' can exist in a single rsync directory, akin to
> how multiple CA Repositories can be fetched via a single RRDP
> publication server. My preference would be to leave this as-is, I do not
> recall a perception of ambiguity in the wider CA operator community abou
> this aspect.

Okay, let's leave it as-is, then.

> > Section 9
> > 
> > I see that the latest update from IANA has the registry (entry) references
> > being updated from RFC 6488 to [this document], which is great and
> > obviates what I would otherwise have remarked upon.
> 
> Ack.
> 
> > Section 11.1
> > 
> > Now that we're obsoleting RFC 6486, that should probably bump it off into
> > the Informative References section.
> 
> Done!
> 
> > RFCs 6482, 6493, 8209, and 8488 appear to not actually be referenced
> > from anywhere and thus could probably be removed.
> 
> Done, this was addressed in
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/NzCcNzcN46FD7RgV3D5ULMnEhxs/
> 
> > Section 11.2
> > 
> > Do we really want to reference RFC 3370 ("CMS Algorithms") for "the CMS
> > wrapper of the object" rather than something like RFC 5652 ("CMS")?
> 
> Good suggestion, I've replaced 3370 with 5652.
> 
> Please let me know if the suggested changes to Section 4 and 5 seem
> appropriate, if so I'll make the changes and share a patchset.

They look good; please go ahead and publish at your convenience.

Thanks again,

Ben


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Dear Nathalie Trenaman,

The session(s) that you have requested have been scheduled.
Below is the scheduled session information followed by
the original request. 


    sidrops Session 1 (2:00 requested)
    Friday, 25 March 2022, Afternoon Session I 1230-1430
    Room Name: Park Suite 9 size: 165
    ---------------------------------------------


iCalendar: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/113/sessions/sidrops.ics

Request Information:


---------------------------------------------------------
Working Group Name: SIDR Operations
Area Name: Operations and Management Area
Session Requester: Nathalie Trenaman


Number of Sessions: 1
Length of Session(s): 
Number of Attendees: 70
Conflicts to Avoid: 

       


People who must be present:
  Chris Morrow
  Keyur Patel
  Warren &quot;Ace&quot; Kumari

Resources Requested:

Special Requests:
  
---------------------------------------------------------



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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Apologies for jumping in late here, I've been distracted by $dayjob
(which has not been RPKI for many years now) and only just saw this.

I fear that I must object, strongly, to Job's proposed change:

> > ----- section 4: Manifest Definition ----
> > 
> > OLD section 4.2.1 second paragraph:
> >    Because a "one-time-use" EE certificate is employed to verify a
> >    manifest, it is RECOMMENDED that the EE certificate have a validity
> >    period that coincides with the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate
> >    in the manifest, to prevent needless growth of the CA's CRL.
> > 
> > NEW Section 4.2.1:
> >    Because a "one-time-use" EE certificate is employed to verify a
> >    manifest, the EE certificate MUST be issued with a validity period
> >    that coincides with the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate in the
> >    manifest, to prevent needless growth of the CA's CRL.
> > 
> > ----- Section 5: Manifest Generation ----
> > 
> > OLD Section 5.1 last paragraph:
> >        It is RECOMMENDED that the validity interval of the EE
> >        certificate exactly match the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times of
> >        the manifest.
> >        Note: An RP MUST verify all mandated syntactic constraints, i.e.,
> >        constraints imposed on a CA via a "MUST".
> > 
> > NEW section 5.1:
> >        The validity interval of the EE certificate MUST exactly match
> >        the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times specified in the manifest's
> >        eContent. (An RP MUST NOT consider misalignment of the validity
> >        interval misalignment in and of itself to be an error.)

This business of pinning the manifiest EE certificate's validity
period to the manifest's thisUpdate/nextUpdate interval has always
been a bad idea, I've objected to it in the WG before, and we have a
long sad history of operational disasters resulting from
implementations that followed that recommendation.

The typical failure mode (demonstrated at least once each by three of
the RIRs) is to pick a thisUpdate/nextUpdate cycle on the order of a
day or so (reasonable), then go home for a long weekend, during which
something breaks and no new updates occur.

The manifest thisUpdate/nextUpdate semantics are (deliberately) very
much like the CRL semantics: failure to issue a new manifest by the
nextUpdate time does not automatically invalidate all the existing
data, it's just a hint that something might be wrong.  Think of it as
a staleness indication.  Slightly stale, log a warning but no big
deal (yet).  Gets stale enough, maybe you don't want to eat that.

Certificate expiration, on the other hand, is a hard failure.  When a
manifest's EE certificate expires without being replaced, the data
listed in the manifest is just gone.

So when an RIR does this with the manifest directly under their root
certificate, a large portion of the total database goes away.  Oops.

Manifests only have EE certificates because they're a patch on the
side of X.509.  If X.509 had allowed us to sign manifests using the CA
certificate, as with CRLs, we would have done that.  But it doesn't,
so we have the manifest EE certificates, OK, but that's no reason to
kill large portions of the database every time an operator near the
root of the tree says "oops".

All of this has been discussed before, and should be both in WG
archives and in notes from face to face meetings (probably both the
SIDR and SIDROPS WGs, not a new topic).

My own RPKI CA implementation uses the validity interval of the parent
CA certificate as the validity interval of the manifest EE
certificate, and has for about fifteen years now.  I'm not aware of
any operational problems that have arisen as a result.

Yes, there's a potential issue of a CRL getting too long, but if it
happens at all, it happens at a predictable rate, and one can always
rekey if it's really becoming big enough to be a problem.

Job's proposed change makes the bad idea a requirement rather than
just bad advice, hence my objection.


From nobody Mon Feb 28 02:27:42 2022
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From: Nathalie Trenaman <ntrenaman@ripe.net>
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Subject: [Sidrops] Agenda sidrops IETF113
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Hi all,

IETF just finalised the agenda for IETF113 and we=E2=80=99ve been =
allocated a slot on Friday 25 March, 11:30 - 13:30 UTC.
I have published the 1st draft agenda here: =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/agenda-113-sidrops/ =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/agenda-113-sidrops/>

Currently, there is still some space for agenda topics, so let us know =
(sidrops-chairs@ietf.org <mailto:sidrops-chairs@ietf.org>) if you want =
to present.

Also, I would like to ask speakers if they can let us know, if possible, =
in advance if you will present on-site or remote.=20

Thanks,
Nathalie



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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi =
all,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">IETF just =
finalised the agenda for IETF113 and we=E2=80=99ve been allocated a slot =
on Friday 25 March, 11:30 - 13:30 UTC.</div><div class=3D"">I have =
published the 1st draft agenda here:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/agenda-113-sidrops/" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/agenda-113-sidrops/</a></div><=
div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Currently, there is =
still some space for agenda topics, so let us know (<a =
href=3D"mailto:sidrops-chairs@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">sidrops-chairs@ietf.org</a>) if you want to =
present.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Also, =
I would like to ask speakers if they can let us know, if possible, in =
advance if you will present on-site or remote.&nbsp;</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div =
class=3D"">Nathalie</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Mon Feb 28 11:23:56 2022
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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I have a few comments on the document.

Section 1: I find the first paragraph very confusing. The use of "must" =
sent me down the wrong path. I think the first sentence should tell the =
reader that we are talking about the RPKI. Then, it should explain the =
choices facing the address space holder.  Then, say that the document =
will explore the pros and cons for the various choices.  Then, recommend =
the most desirable among the alternatives.

Section 1: s/space[RFC6482].If/space [RFC6482]. If/

Section 2: Please use the modern language here:

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Section 3: s/Ripencc/RIPENCC/

After reading to document, I ask the authors to consider dropping =
"Problem Statement" from the title.

Russ




From nobody Mon Feb 28 14:32:05 2022
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to the best of my understanding

    draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr
    draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis

are pretty much just going through the sausage machine of adoption and
iesg submission, and are not in need of discussion or a sales pitch.  if
folk think otherwise, then please put on agenda and i will try to put
something together.

randy, who has work to do, and it ain't sales


From nobody Mon Feb 28 23:56:49 2022
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/nLrcq8ZQA8Jn50_971GeQgODyRs>
Subject: Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-roa-considerations-01
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charse=
t=3Dutf-8"><style>body { line-height: 1.5; }blockquote { margin-top: 0px; =
margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0.5em; }body { font-size: 14px; font-fami=
ly: =E5=AE=8B=E4=BD=93; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); line-height: 1.5; }body { lin=
e-height: 1.5; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 10.5pt; }</style></head><bo=
dy>=0A<div>&nbsp;Dear Russ,</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;Thanks a lot for your k=
ind review and great comments.</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;We co-authors will f=
ollow your comments and update them to the new version.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>Thanks.<span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; background-color: transpar=
ent;">&nbsp;</span></div>=0A<div><span></span></div>=0A<hr style=3D"WIDTH:=
 210px; HEIGHT: 1px" align=3D"left" color=3D"#b5c4df" size=3D"1">=0A<div><=
span>Jiankang Yao</span></div><blockquote style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin=
-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 2em; margin-right: inherit;"><div>&nbsp;</div><=
div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm"><div style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 8px; PADDING-LEFT: 8px; FONT-SIZE: 1=
2px;FONT-FAMILY:tahoma;COLOR:#000000; BACKGROUND: #efefef; PADDING-BOTTOM:=
 8px; PADDING-TOP: 8px"><div><b>From:</b>&nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:housley@v=
igilsec.com">Russ Housley</a></div><div><b>Date:</b>&nbsp;2022-03-01&nbsp;=
01:53</div><div><b>To:</b>&nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:sidrops@ietf.org">SIDR O=
perations WG</a></div><div><b>Subject:</b>&nbsp;[Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidro=
ps-roa-considerations-01</div></div></div><div><div>I have a few comments =
on the document.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Section 1: I find the fi=
rst paragraph very confusing. The use of "must" sent me down the wrong pat=
h. I think the first sentence should tell the reader that we are talking a=
bout the RPKI. Then, it should explain the choices facing the address spac=
e holder.&nbsp; Then, say that the document will explore the pros and cons=
 for the various choices.&nbsp; Then, recommend the most desirable among t=
he alternatives.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Section 1: s/space[RFC64=
82].If/space [RFC6482]. If/</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Section 2: Pl=
ease use the modern language here:</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;=
&nbsp; The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",=
</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;&nbsp; "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT REC=
OMMENDED", "MAY", and</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;&nbsp; "OPTIONAL" in this documen=
t are to be interpreted as described in</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;&nbsp; BCP 14 [=
RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all</div>=0A<div>&n=
bsp;&nbsp; capitals, as shown here.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Secti=
on 3: s/Ripencc/RIPENCC/</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>After reading to=
 document, I ask the authors to consider dropping "Problem Statement" from=
 the title.</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>Russ</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div=
>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A<div>_________________________=
______________________</div>=0A<div>Sidrops mailing list</div>=0A<div>Sidr=
ops@ietf.org</div>=0A<div>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops</d=
iv>=0A<div>&nbsp;</div>=0A</div></blockquote>=0A</body></html>
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