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Subject: [Sipbrandy] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the SIP Best-practice Recommendations Against Network Dangers to privacY WG of the IETF.

        Title           : An Opportunistic Approach for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (OSRTP)
        Authors         : Alan Johnston
                          Bernard Aboba
                          Andrew Hutton
                          Roland Jesske
                          Thomas Stach
	Filename        : draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07.txt
	Pages           : 9
	Date            : 2018-12-03

Abstract:
   Opportunistic Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (OSRTP) is an
   implementation of the Opportunistic Security mechanism, as defined in
   RFC 7435, applied to Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP).  OSRTP
   allows encrypted media to be used in environments where support for
   encryption is not known in advance, and not required.  OSRTP does not
   require SDP extensions or features and is fully backwards compatible
   with existing implementations using encrypted and authenticated media
   and implementations that do not encrypt or authenticate media
   packets.  OSRTP is not specific to any key management technique for
   SRTP.  OSRTP is a transitional approach useful for migrating existing
   deployments of real-time communications to a fully encrypted and
   authenticated state.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Mon Dec  3 09:07:03 2018
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From: Andy Hutton <andyhutton.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2018 17:06:49 +0000
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To: sipbrandy@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sipbrandy] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07.txt
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The only change is the addition of a no-op IANA section.

Andy


On Mon, 3 Dec 2018 at 16:23, <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the SIP Best-practice Recommendations Against Network Dangers to privacY WG of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : An Opportunistic Approach for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (OSRTP)
>         Authors         : Alan Johnston
>                           Bernard Aboba
>                           Andrew Hutton
>                           Roland Jesske
>                           Thomas Stach
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07.txt
>         Pages           : 9
>         Date            : 2018-12-03
>
> Abstract:
>    Opportunistic Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (OSRTP) is an
>    implementation of the Opportunistic Security mechanism, as defined in
>    RFC 7435, applied to Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP).  OSRTP
>    allows encrypted media to be used in environments where support for
>    encryption is not known in advance, and not required.  OSRTP does not
>    require SDP extensions or features and is fully backwards compatible
>    with existing implementations using encrypted and authenticated media
>    and implementations that do not encrypt or authenticate media
>    packets.  OSRTP is not specific to any key management technique for
>    SRTP.  OSRTP is a transitional approach useful for migrating existing
>    deployments of real-time communications to a fully encrypted and
>    authenticated state.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp/
>
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp-07
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sipbrandy mailing list
> Sipbrandy@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipbrandy


From nobody Fri Dec 28 16:04:46 2018
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Subject: [Sipbrandy] AD Evaluation of draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-06
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Hi,

This is my AD Evaluation of draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-06. I have a few =
substantive comments, and some editorial and nit comments. I=E2=80=99d =
like to resolve the substantive comments prior to IETF Last Call.

Thanks!

Ben.

------------------------------

*** Substantive Comments ***

=C2=A74:
- general: The section explains the requirement that the AS and VS to be =
colocated with the caller and recipient UAs as because putting them in =
an intermediary could allow that intermediary to act as a MitM. Isn=E2=80=99=
t this more a question of trust than physical location? Users already =
need to trust the AS and VS for STIR to work at all. In particular, I =
don=E2=80=99t think it=E2=80=99s safe to imply that a local AS _can=E2=80=99=
t_ act as a MiTM unless the code is inspected (and perhaps signed) by a =
trusted entity.

For the record, I do not necessarily object to the colocation =
requirement; I=E2=80=99m just not entirely buying the explanation for =
it.

- 2nd paragraph: "While intermediaries MAY provide the verification =
service function of STIR for SIPBRANDY transactions,=E2=80=9D: That =
seems to contradict the statement in the following paragraph that the =
user agent implementations MUST implement both the AS and VS.

=C2=A74.1:
- General: This section talks about self-signed certs and TOFU. Would =
you characterize those as comprehensive security? I suspect not, since =
they offer more exposure to active attacks. But I=E2=80=99m not sure =
they qualify as =E2=80=9Copportunistic=E2=80=9D, since they don=E2=80=99t =
(necessarily) allow a fallback to cleartext. In any case, some text =
discussing this question might be helpful. (This also includes =C2=A74.2)

- third paragraph: "This profile of STIR therefore relaxes the authority =
requirements of [RFC8224]=E2=80=9D
Does that require this draft to formally update 8224?

=C2=A74.3: Does this draft need to formally update 4916? It=E2=80=99s =
not clear to me if this draft intends to update these, or is stating =
that these are some updates we should do in the future. The last =
paragraph suggests the latter, but the rest of the section seems to be =
more the former.

=C2=A74.4, last paragraph: Is there an expectation that the UA will =
alert the user if it allows the dialog to continue without media =
security?


*** Editorial Comments ***

- Abstract: Is it really still true that this draft provides solutions =
for opportunistic security? The draft mentions OS, but it seems to =
delegate the solutions to the osrtp draft.

=C2=A73.1, last paragraph:

- s/=E2=80=9CTo establishing=E2=80=9D/=E2=80=9CTo establish=E2=80=9D
- " STIR generates a signature over certain features of SIP =
requests,=E2=80=9D: Is =E2=80=9Cfeatures=E2=80=9D the right word? Maybe =
=E2=80=9Cparameters=E2=80=9D?
- "As currently defined, STIR only provides a signature over the =
"a=3Dfingerprint" attribute=E2=80=9D: That=E2=80=99s not really true. I =
think you mean to say that this is the only key exchange mechanism that =
STIR will sign as currently specced?

=C2=A73.2:
- first paragraph (and elsewhere in the doc): Please update the =
reference for the osrtp draft to "draft-ietf-sipbrandy-osrtp=E2=80=9D
- last paragraph: =E2=80=9C opportunistic confidentiality for media will =
prevent passive attacks=E2=80=9D: Should =E2=80=9Cwill=E2=80=9D be =
=E2=80=9Cmay=E2=80=9D, given that osrtp allows fallback to no =
confidentiality protection?

=C2=A74:
- Please expand UAS on first mention.
- is there something that could be cited for STIR=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Ccore =
threat model=E2=80=9D?
- 2nd to last paragraph: "Implementations MUST provide key fingerprints =
in SDP ...=E2=80=9D seems redundant to the last paragraph.

=C2=A74.1:
- first paragraph (and elsewhere): I found the use of the term =
=E2=80=9Cgreenfield=E2=80=9D to describe SIP URIs a bit confusing. I =
assume that is meant to contrast with =E2=80=9Clegacy=E2=80=9D phone =
numbers, but there is no explanation to that effect. Is it insufficient =
to just say =E2=80=9CSIP URIs=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Ctelephone numbers=E2=80=
=9D without the additional qualification?

-2nd paragraph: This will hopefully eventually be over taken by events. =
Would it make sense to add an =E2=80=9CAt the time of this writing...=E2=80=
=9D disclaimer?

=C2=A76: s/mux/multiplex, s/muxed/multiplexed

=C2=A77: =E2=80=9Cimplementations of this specification must support =
ICE=E2=80=9D: Should the =E2=80=9Cmust=E2=80=9D be =E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D?=






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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Sun, 30 Dec 2018 17:56:08 -0500
Cc: draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec.all@ietf.org, sipbrandy@ietf.org
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To: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sipbrandy] AD Evaluation of draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-06
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Ben:

Thanks for the thoughtful and careful review.

Responding only to your Substantive Comments for now...

> =C2=A74:
> - general: The section explains the requirement that the AS and VS to =
be colocated with the caller and recipient UAs as because putting them =
in an intermediary could allow that intermediary to act as a MitM. =
Isn=E2=80=99t this more a question of trust than physical location? =
Users already need to trust the AS and VS for STIR to work at all. In =
particular, I don=E2=80=99t think it=E2=80=99s safe to imply that a =
local AS _can=E2=80=99t_ act as a MiTM unless the code is inspected (and =
perhaps signed) by a trusted entity.
>=20
> For the record, I do not necessarily object to the colocation =
requirement; I=E2=80=99m just not entirely buying the explanation for =
it.

The SIPBRANDY profile is based on an end-to-end trust model.  The =
verification could take place at an intermediary, but to get the =
end-to-end assurance, the verification would need to be repeated at the =
end.

> - 2nd paragraph: "While intermediaries MAY provide the verification =
service function of STIR for SIPBRANDY transactions,=E2=80=9D: That =
seems to contradict the statement in the following paragraph that the =
user agent implementations MUST implement both the AS and VS.

Again, verification could take place at an intermediary for their own =
purposes, but the end-to-end assurance is only provided if the check is =
made at the end as well.

> =C2=A74.1:
> - General: This section talks about self-signed certs and TOFU. Would =
you characterize those as comprehensive security? I suspect not, since =
they offer more exposure to active attacks. But I=E2=80=99m not sure =
they qualify as =E2=80=9Copportunistic=E2=80=9D, since they don=E2=80=99t =
(necessarily) allow a fallback to cleartext. In any case, some text =
discussing this question might be helpful. (This also includes =C2=A74.2)

No, I would not characterize the use of self-signed certificates as =
comprehensive security.  This section is suggesting them as an =
alternative when other certificates are not available for the caller =
identity.  The PKI for telephone numbers is not yet available, but it is =
coming.  The PKI for a SIP URI without a telephone number (e.g. =
"sip:alice@example.com") is not being worked yet.  Sp, self-signed =
certificates give a way to start.  An active attacker could strip the =
signature altogether.

> - third paragraph: "This profile of STIR therefore relaxes the =
authority requirements of [RFC8224]=E2=80=9D
> Does that require this draft to formally update 8224?

I do not think so.  RFC 8224 says:

   ...  Similar practices could be used to support opportunistic
   signing of SIP requests for UA-integrated authentication services
   with self-signed certificates, though that is outside the scope of
   this specification and is left as a matter for future investigation.
   Note, however, that even when using anonymous SIP URIs, an
   authentication service must possess a certificate corresponding to
   the host portion of the addr-spec of the =46rom header field value of
   the request; accordingly, using domains like "anonymous.invalid"
   will not be usable by privacy services that simultaneously act as
   authentication services.  The assurance offered by the usage of
   anonymous URIs with a valid domain portion is "this is a known user
   in my domain that I have authenticated, but I am keeping its identity
   private."

> =C2=A74.3: Does this draft need to formally update 4916? It=E2=80=99s =
not clear to me if this draft intends to update these, or is stating =
that these are some updates we should do in the future. The last =
paragraph suggests the latter, but the rest of the section seems to be =
more the former.

Yes, it probably should update RFC 4916.

> =C2=A74.4, last paragraph: Is there an expectation that the UA will =
alert the user if it allows the dialog to continue without media =
security?

Since the IETF does not normally get into user interface, the "if policy =
permits" language would allow the user to be involved in the decision, =
or it could be set by other means.

Russ

