
From brian.rosen@neustar.biz  Thu Aug  2 15:48:44 2012
Return-Path: <brian.rosen@neustar.biz>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A17E321E8047 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 15:48:44 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.353
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.353 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.246,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vLhPi9EpnZyo for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 15:48:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from neustar.com (mx2.neustar.com [156.154.25.104]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD10121E8043 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 15:48:43 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=neustar.biz; s=neustarbiz; t=1343947623; x=1659306336; q=dns/txt; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Language: Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=2w9C86xvF6UJVrVxYGeox D+xR4MWIdVAPeWOljnbqjE=; b=iFSXYZ5MqntYsWQ7ALa9YqoFGoy97C4MQccxP Vg14s10tAonKUc3XOPTkfwpbqpcK+1/OXFGhSK2Jm6tHwODog==
Received: from ([10.31.13.229]) by chihiron1.nc.neustar.com with ESMTP with TLS id J041123128.7963328;  Thu, 02 Aug 2012 18:47:01 -0400
Received: from STNTEXCH01.cis.neustar.com ([fe80::28fd:d8c6:49f0:619b]) by STNTEXCHHT02.cis.neustar.com ([::1]) with mapi; Thu, 2 Aug 2012 18:48:29 -0400
From: "Rosen, Brian" <Brian.Rosen@neustar.biz>
To: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2012 18:48:26 -0400
Thread-Topic: Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security section
Thread-Index: Ac1xAO8pI5JIA7wFQ52sCCJ+/1qsIA==
Message-ID: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
x-ems-proccessed: R64IxjzeHPwwd+efoj3ZcA==
x-ems-stamp: G8gVglpta+BC8halBG1c/w==
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2012 22:48:44 -0000

In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the context of t=
he protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's security sect=
ion, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:

1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the CS, and m=
ay need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing more poss=
ibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on the storage=
 system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized retrieval inter=
face).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.  Cryptosuites, =
and protocol mechanisms must be considered. =20
2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the client mus=
t be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It is les=
s important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations must hav=
e the ability to perform mutual authentication
3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the =
media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works =
when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying=
 mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has implications on manda=
tory to implement keying mechanisms
4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS, and is re-encrypted on the R=
S, a new key must be used
5. The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  =
The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of recording, b=
ut because the retriever is another party to the recording session, item 2 =
is reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The crypto must be no less=
 strong than that on the RS, and may need to be better.

Brian=

From pravindran@sonusnet.com  Thu Aug  2 16:51:21 2012
Return-Path: <pravindran@sonusnet.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82D2311E815E for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 16:51:21 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.399
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.399 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.200,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 04b-666wD0Hd for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 16:51:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from na3sys010aog113.obsmtp.com (na3sys010aog113.obsmtp.com [74.125.245.94]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6666E11E815A for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 16:51:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from USMA-EX-HUB2.sonusnet.com ([69.147.176.212]) (using TLSv1) by na3sys010aob113.postini.com ([74.125.244.12]) with SMTP ID DSNKUBsSd1MpS2fC4xMRx5GcXfp37vl7Jkau@postini.com; Thu, 02 Aug 2012 16:51:20 PDT
Received: from INBA-HUB02.sonusnet.com (10.70.51.87) by USMA-EX-HUB2.sonusnet.com (66.203.90.17) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.309.2; Thu, 2 Aug 2012 19:51:18 -0400
Received: from INBA-MAIL02.sonusnet.com ([fe80::f8d4:7090:f632:bbbc]) by inba-hub02.sonusnet.com ([fe80::80b9:dc60:caf7:7dfc%11]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Fri, 3 Aug 2012 05:21:15 +0530
From: "Ravindran, Parthasarathi" <pravindran@sonusnet.com>
To: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] comments on draft-ietf-siprec-metadata-07
Thread-Index: Ac1vjQDN8zXHYxh0TdyfDVEBhvV+if//34KA//zng+A=
Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2012 23:51:15 +0000
Message-ID: <387F9047F55E8C42850AD6B3A7A03C6C2BD148A5@inba-mail02.sonusnet.com>
References: <059AF07365DC474393A19A3AF187DF740806753E@NAHALD.us.int.genesyslab.com> <5018C5D5.4090207@alum.mit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <5018C5D5.4090207@alum.mit.edu>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [121.242.142.186]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] comments on draft-ietf-siprec-metadata-07
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2012 23:51:21 -0000

Hi all,

As discussed today meeting, Paul mentioned below metadata model change is a=
n alternative which clarifies the stream XML element usage within the speci=
fic single CS instead of spread across. I'm interested in hearing anybody h=
as objection to this change.

Thanks
Partha

>-----Original Message-----
>From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
>Of Paul Kyzivat
>Sent: Wednesday, August 01, 2012 11:30 AM
>To: siprec@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [siprec] comments on draft-ietf-siprec-metadata-07
>
>Hi Henry,
>
>Yes, I agree that there is an inconsistency.
>We have also been discussing problems with this association that we plan
>to talk about on Thursday. My proposal is to change it to:
>
>CS ------------------- Media Stream
>    0..1          0..*
>
>	Thanks,
>	Paul
>
>On 7/31/12 7:26 PM, Henry Lum wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> I notice that in the metadata model in section 4 CS has a 1..* to 0..*
>relation with a media stream and this is inconsistent with further text.
>>
>> In section 6.3, CS is stating that it has a 0..* to 0..* relation with
>a media stream. On top of page 12 it explains that a media stream can be
>associated with zero of more CS and points out that a multicast MOH
>stream can be without a CS. In section 6.7 a media stream can connect to
>1..* CS.
>>
>> Which one is the intended usage? Note that XML<stream>  requires the
>session_id attribute so it seems like section 6.3 is odd one out.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Henry
>> _______________________________________________
>> siprec mailing list
>> siprec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>
>
>_______________________________________________
>siprec mailing list
>siprec@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From jmpolk@cisco.com  Thu Aug  2 18:38:42 2012
Return-Path: <jmpolk@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C30311E80A4 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 18:38:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.511
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.511 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.088, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id MocqdVtTQKEY for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 18:38:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mtv-iport-4.cisco.com (mtv-iport-4.cisco.com [173.36.130.15]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 380AB11E8072 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 18:38:41 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=jmpolk@cisco.com; l=12968; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1343957921; x=1345167521; h=message-id:date:to:from:subject:in-reply-to:references: mime-version; bh=MyhSW+hQN3Cx3n326iU1WBIfZFRNFNTrDt6kNcF2eQ0=; b=EIhPfYNh/YWvTJWXynhjXQj9cnDSdGfZHZ2+UhkvX+i1jfyt8ie0C6fn Q71pemF5x8O03ZfmbRkEAxzZV3i7E1dfL3AsRx5vxjl76A+EZNlG8P8Qj 2uUU/5rrBmorhkFS4/lzHZ0w77mjCVtiUecra5zLq9/PSLVRpWacxem2B I=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Av8EAKcqG1CrRDoH/2dsb2JhbABFuSSBB4IgAQEBBAEBAQ8BFBECLgYXBAcEEQQBAQEeCQcZCAYfCQgGCgkbB4dcAwsMnQWWcw2JSgSKY2cahmoDiE2LJ4xdgx2BZoJ9gUE
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,704,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="53856618"
Received: from mtv-core-2.cisco.com ([171.68.58.7]) by mtv-iport-4.cisco.com with ESMTP; 03 Aug 2012 01:38:40 +0000
Received: from jmpolk-WS.cisco.com ([10.21.166.204]) (authenticated bits=0) by mtv-core-2.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q731cdMR026288 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for <siprec@ietf.org>; Fri, 3 Aug 2012 01:38:40 GMT
Message-Id: <201208030138.q731cdMR026288@mtv-core-2.cisco.com>
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2012 20:38:39 -0500
To: <siprec@ietf.org>
From: James Polk <jmpolk@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <50176CC9.80701@alum.mit.edu>
References: <CC3D4A7F.2EAEF%rmohanr@cisco.com> <50176CC9.80701@alum.mit.edu>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-Authenticated-User: jmpolk
Subject: Re: [siprec] "==" padding in Metadata URN UUID [wasFW: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices]
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2012 01:38:42 -0000

all the examples in the INSIPID drafts are in hex. There's been 
discussions for weeks to use hex, and that's the proposal on the 
table there, so I would suggest not making any decisions in SIPREC 
based on INSIPID using base64 - because that's not a sure thing at 
all at this point.

James

At 12:27 AM 7/31/2012, Paul Kyzivat wrote:
>I don't have strong feelings either way. Just understand that 
>omitting the "==" locks us in to 64 bit values. That doesn't seem to 
>be a big constraint, since the spec we're referencing for the value 
>calls for 64 bits.
>
>         Thanks,
>         Paul
>
>On 7/30/12 8:12 PM, Ram Mohan R (rmohanr) wrote:
>>I am Ok too.
>>
>>Ram
>>
>>>On 30/07/12 10:44 PM, "Leon Portman"<leon.portman@gmail.com>  wrote:
>>
>>>I am OK
>>>
>>>Leon
>>>On Jul 30, 2012, at 8:13 PM, "Ravindran, Parthasarathi"
>>><pravindran@sonusnet.com>  wrote:
>>>
>>>>Hi all,
>>>>
>>>>Metadata uses based 64 encoding of URN UUID. There is a discussion in
>>>>INSIPID WG to optimize "==" padding occurs due to base 64 URN UUID. I
>>>>attached Paul's snip of the below mail thread.
>>>>
>>>><snip>
>>>>If we go with base64, I agree that we don't need to preserve the
>>>>trailing "==".
>>>></snip>
>>>>
>>>>I'm fine with the optimization as it reduces 2 bytes in each URN UUID
>>>>of metadata XML element. I'm interested in hearing WG opinion about this
>>>>optimization.
>>>>
>>>>Thanks
>>>>Partha
>>>>
>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>From: insipid-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:insipid-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>Behalf Of Paul Kyzivat
>>>>Sent: Thursday, July 26, 2012 8:30 PM
>>>>To: Paul E. Jones
>>>>Cc: 'James Polk'; insipid@ietf.org
>>>>Subject: Re: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices
>>>>
>>>>On 7/24/12 10:51 PM, Paul E. Jones wrote:
>>>>>Paul,
>>>>>
>>>>>Following up on this thread, as I did not see an outcome.  I think
>>>>>this message might be the last in the series on this topic.
>>>>>
>>>>>I think your proposal is along the lines of what we originally
>>>>>proposed. As I understand, there is a desire to always include both A
>>>>>and B's halves.
>>>>>That's fine, so long as devices understand they might change from one
>>>>>message to the next.
>>>>>
>>>>>So given these two abbreviated UUIDs:
>>>>>
>>>>>UUID 1: 0xaeffa652
>>>>>UUID 2: 0xbe11afc8
>>>>>
>>>>>We would have:
>>>>>
>>>>>Session-ID: 0xaeffa652be11afc8
>>>>>
>>>>>If we agree to encode it in hex and agree on the size (a 16 octet
>>>>>UUID), that means this will always be a 64-byte hex string and there
>>>>>is no need to put a :.  We could also base64 encode the 64 octet
>>>>>binary value, which would encode in 44 octets (shaving off 20 octets).
>>>>>
>>>>>Do we want to go for reduced size or more readable hex string?
>>>>
>>>>I don't have a strong feeling about hex vs. base64.
>>>>But I think it would be good to have a separator (I'm not attached to
>>>>":" - that is just an example.) I realize it isn't logically necessary
>>>>as long as the halves are fixed length. But its not very friendly, and I
>>>>think it is worth "wasting" *1* byte on.
>>>>
>>>>If we go with base64, I agree that we don't need to preserve the
>>>>trailing "==".
>>>>
>>>>>As for putting the entire Session-ID into messages, there are many
>>>>>situations where the Session-ID will be wrong.  Let me give you just
>>>>>one example.
>>>>>
>>>>>Syntax:
>>>>>    A == B means A is in a call with B
>>>>>
>>>>>A == B&&   A == C  (A in call with B; A has a separate call with C.)
>>>>>
>>>>>         &&   B == D  (B has a separate call with D)
>>>>>
>>>>>A&   B are talking.  A puts B on hold.
>>>>>A starts talking to C.
>>>>>Meanwhile B puts A on hold and talks to D.
>>>>>
>>>>>A performs some action to join B and C, while at the same time B
>>>>>performs some action to join D and C
>>>>>
>>>>>Assuming a PBX does this magic, we might have some INVITE messages
>>>>>going down the wire like this:
>>>>>
>>>>>          +  INVITE ---->   C (so C can talk to B)  (Session-ID: B || C)
>>>>>PBX1 ---|
>>>>>          +  INVITE ---->   B (so B can talk to C)  (Session-ID: B || C)
>>>>>
>>>>>And we have
>>>>>
>>>>>          +  INVITE ---->   A (so A can talk to D)  (Session-ID: A || D)
>>>>>PBX2 ---|
>>>>>          +  INVITE ---->   D (so D can talk to A)  (Session-ID: A || D)
>>>>
>>>>I can't fully follow the above. My problem is that I don't know where
>>>>PBX1 and PBX2 fit into the topology of A,B,C,D. So I'm not going to
>>>>speculate much.
>>>>
>>>>>Now, these messages are passing on the wire at the same time.  So that
>>>>>message from PBX1 heading toward B is actually now heading toward D.
>>>>
>>>>???
>>>>
>>>>>So, what D receives is Session-ID "B || C".  D thought the Session-ID
>>>>>was A
>>>>>|| D.  It will be confused.  Perhaps PBX2 can massage the Session-ID,
>>>>>|| but
>>>>>it's not supposed to do that.  We really don't want intermediaries to
>>>>>touch it.
>>>>
>>>>Can you please map out the full topology, and a lot more of the call
>>>>flow you have in mind. (Including REFERs, or some other indication of
>>>>how the PBXs are being instructed what to do.) (There are a million ways
>>>>this could be done.)
>>>>
>>>>>To avoid these kinds of race conditions, adding complexity to try to
>>>>>straighten it out, etc., I very much prefer to have only the
>>>>>Session-ID-UUID header that contains only the UUID of the sender of
>>>>>the message.  If we did that, the endpoints in the above scenario
>>>>>would not be confused and the correct Session-ID could be noted in
>>>>>logs.
>>>>
>>>>I'm not ready to leap to this conclusion until I understand the cases
>>>>better.
>>>>
>>>>         Thanks,
>>>>         Paul K
>>>>
>>>>>Paul
>>>>>
>>>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>>>From: insipid-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:insipid-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>>>Behalf Of Paul Kyzivat
>>>>>>Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2012 7:38 PM
>>>>>>To: James Polk
>>>>>>Cc: insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>Subject: Re: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices
>>>>>>
>>>>>>On 7/11/12 6:23 PM, James Polk wrote:
>>>>>>...
>>>>>>>>>Option#1 - attach a prefix (e.g., From: and To:) to each half
>>>>>>...
>>>>>>>>>We have a proposal going forward: insert the From:/To: tags from
>>>>>>>>>Option #1.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>Does anyone have a technical reason why this wouldn't work?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>Do you mean to assign From and To once, and then keep it fixed for
>>>>>>>>the duration of the dialog? ISTM that From and To are not well
>>>>>>>>defined in all cases.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>For instance, consider a BTBUA that sets up a session by inviting
>>>>>>>>both endpoints. Which is From and which is To? IIUC, the reason for
>>>>>>>>labeling this way is so that someone observing a session id in a
>>>>>>>>message can tell which half corresponds to which end. Using From
>>>>>>>>and To won't satisfy that unless those tags are reassigned for each
>>>>>>request.
>>>>>>>>(This is a special case of a conference focus, which you already
>>>>>>>>call out as an exception.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>The desire is to have the same half in the same position throughout
>>>>>>>the transaction or dialog (whichever it is). I believe in the case
>>>>>>>of a B2BUA initiating or originating the transaction or dialog on
>>>>>>>behalf of other endpoint UAs, the B2BUA would pick which Session-ID
>>>>>>>is the  From and which is the To. IOW - we don't make it a
>>>>>>>requirement on an implementation that Alice is always inserting her
>>>>>>>half in first, and Bob in as the second half. If the B2BUA is
>>>>>>>sending an INVITE to both Alice and Bob, then that's 2 separate
>>>>>>>Session-IDs because it's two different dialogs, even if a 3rd party
>>>>>>>isn't part (i.e., listening) of the media flow. This would be a hub
>>>>>>>and 2 spokes in which the hub doesn't listen or interact with the
>>>>>>>media of the 2 UAs.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>We could also have text that says for this scenario, that an INVITE
>>>>>>>normally inserts the From half of the Session-ID, but that in this
>>>>>>>scenario it can insert the To: half and the invitee inserts the To
>>>>>>>half.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>Identifying which end is which is easy for any single transaction,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>agreed
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>but hard if you want to use the same identifiers in every message.
>>>>>>>>The endpoints can easily figure this out, because they should know
>>>>>>>>their half, and the half that isn't theirs is the other end's. But
>>>>>>>>its not simple for middleboxes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>remember that each half is a UUID or GUID, which will always be a
>>>>>>>unique value through space and time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>The solution that is used for dialog ids is to use To and From, but
>>>>>>>>they must be reassigned depending on the direction of the message.
>>>>>>>>We could do the same for session id, but only if they are remapped
>>>>>>>>based on the direction of the request.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>I guess I'm no getting why the halves need to switch places yet
>>>>>>>depending on whether it's in a request or response. Or are you
>>>>>>>saying that for one complete transaction they are in a certain
>>>>>>>order, but in a related transaction(s) they are possibly in the
>>>>>>>reverse order - depending on who sent the message?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>When a message is sent in the reverse direction from the dialog
>>>>>>establishing message, the From URI and To URI are reversed, as well
>>>>>>as the  From and To tags. If the session id still has its halves
>>>>>>tagged consistent with the from and to of the dialog establishing
>>>>>>request, then you will get confused about which half goes with which
>>>>>>end.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>There is no problem for servers that keep state and remember the
>>>>>>values for each end. For them we don't need to tag the halves at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>There is also no problem for those who don't *care* which end is
>>>>>>which.
>>>>>>And there may be a lot of those.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>This tagging is only there for those who don't keep state yet need to
>>>>>>know. Maybe there aren't any of those, in which case we can stop
>>>>>>worrying about it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I guess an example that might matter is something analyzing logs, and
>>>>>>doesn't have a complete set of logs available to it - in particular
>>>>>>it doesn't have a log of the initial signaling that set up the
>>>>>>session, so it can't figure out which half-id belongs to which end.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Then it sees a change - it sees a message where half of the id
>>>>>>matches prior things, but the other half doesn't - is new. From this
>>>>>>it can perhaps infer that there was a transfer. And in that case it
>>>>>>will want to know which end remains and which was replaced. But it
>>>>>>can't figure that out from which half of the id changed without
>>>>>>knowing the mapping from half to end.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>But I will be the first to say that this case is somewhat implausible.
>>>>>>In practice there will be lots of stuff in the messages being
>>>>>>analyzed that should support figuring this out. Perhaps this just
>>>>>>isn't a good example, and there is another that is better. But I
>>>>>>don't know a better one. Anybody else? (I think Paul J was the one
>>>>>>who raised this concern, so maybe he has an example.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>If we can't find a plausible reason why we need to do this mapping,
>>>>>>then I propose that we just not bother. In that case I think
>>>>>>representation
>>>>>>#3 is attractive. It provides for the easiest comparison between id
>>>>>>values
>>>>>>- a single string comparison is sufficient. And its among the most
>>>>>>compact representations. I'd recommend:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>         session-id: SmallestHalf:BiggestHalf
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Or just
>>>>>>
>>>>>>         session-id: FirstHalf
>>>>>>
>>>>>>before the half for the far end has been assigned.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>         Thanks,
>>>>>>         Paul
>>>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>>>insipid mailing list
>>>>>>insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/insipid
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>insipid mailing list
>>>>insipid@ietf.org
>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/insipid
>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>siprec mailing list
>>>>siprec@ietf.org
>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>
>>>_______________________________________________
>>>siprec mailing list
>>>siprec@ietf.org
>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>siprec mailing list
>>siprec@ietf.org
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>
>_______________________________________________
>siprec mailing list
>siprec@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec


From pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu  Thu Aug  2 19:09:11 2012
Return-Path: <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1F12821F8BD7 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 19:09:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.373
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.373 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.064,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_NET=0.611,  RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oVy+muzaExwx for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 19:09:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from qmta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net (qmta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net [IPv6:2001:558:fe14:43:76:96:62:24]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3165721F8650 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 19:09:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from omta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.62.19]) by qmta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id i1wW1j0030QuhwU5129BnV; Fri, 03 Aug 2012 02:09:11 +0000
Received: from dhcp-40e5.meeting.ietf.org ([IPv6:2001:df8:0:64:19d6:c06f:f140:d490]) by omta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id i28w1j0093NDGqc3N28wb9; Fri, 03 Aug 2012 02:08:57 +0000
Message-ID: <501B32C1.7040905@alum.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2012 19:09:05 -0700
From: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:12.0) Gecko/20120428 Thunderbird/12.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: siprec@ietf.org
References: <CC3D4A7F.2EAEF%rmohanr@cisco.com> <50176CC9.80701@alum.mit.edu> <201208030138.q731cdMR026288@mtv-core-2.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <201208030138.q731cdMR026288@mtv-core-2.cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: Re: [siprec] "==" padding in Metadata URN UUID [wasFW: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices]
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2012 02:09:11 -0000

On 8/2/12 6:38 PM, James Polk wrote:
> all the examples in the INSIPID drafts are in hex. There's been
> discussions for weeks to use hex, and that's the proposal on the table
> there, so I would suggest not making any decisions in SIPREC based on
> INSIPID using base64 - because that's not a sure thing at all at this
> point.

We had a discussion of this in the siprec meeting today.
There was violent objection from Joe Hildebrand and Hadriel not to do 
this because it would make it harder to use standard libraries to do the 
encode/decode.

I'm not an XML guy, so I guess I'll defer to them on that part, though 
it seems trivial to me to append "==" before calling the decoder and 
strip the "==" after calling the encoder. But if the conversions are 
automatic based on the declared typing in the schema then I guess I can 
see why it might be harder than that.

At the end of the day I don't really care. So I'll defer to someone who 
does.

	Thanks,
	Paul

> James
>
> At 12:27 AM 7/31/2012, Paul Kyzivat wrote:
>> I don't have strong feelings either way. Just understand that omitting
>> the "==" locks us in to 64 bit values. That doesn't seem to be a big
>> constraint, since the spec we're referencing for the value calls for
>> 64 bits.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Paul
>>
>> On 7/30/12 8:12 PM, Ram Mohan R (rmohanr) wrote:
>>> I am Ok too.
>>>
>>> Ram
>>>
>>>> On 30/07/12 10:44 PM, "Leon Portman"<leon.portman@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I am OK
>>>>
>>>> Leon
>>>> On Jul 30, 2012, at 8:13 PM, "Ravindran, Parthasarathi"
>>>> <pravindran@sonusnet.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>
>>>>> Metadata uses based 64 encoding of URN UUID. There is a discussion in
>>>>> INSIPID WG to optimize "==" padding occurs due to base 64 URN UUID. I
>>>>> attached Paul's snip of the below mail thread.
>>>>>
>>>>> <snip>
>>>>> If we go with base64, I agree that we don't need to preserve the
>>>>> trailing "==".
>>>>> </snip>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm fine with the optimization as it reduces 2 bytes in each URN UUID
>>>>> of metadata XML element. I'm interested in hearing WG opinion about
>>>>> this
>>>>> optimization.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks
>>>>> Partha
>>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: insipid-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:insipid-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>> Behalf Of Paul Kyzivat
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 26, 2012 8:30 PM
>>>>> To: Paul E. Jones
>>>>> Cc: 'James Polk'; insipid@ietf.org
>>>>> Subject: Re: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices
>>>>>
>>>>> On 7/24/12 10:51 PM, Paul E. Jones wrote:
>>>>>> Paul,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Following up on this thread, as I did not see an outcome. I think
>>>>>> this message might be the last in the series on this topic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think your proposal is along the lines of what we originally
>>>>>> proposed. As I understand, there is a desire to always include both A
>>>>>> and B's halves.
>>>>>> That's fine, so long as devices understand they might change from one
>>>>>> message to the next.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So given these two abbreviated UUIDs:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> UUID 1: 0xaeffa652
>>>>>> UUID 2: 0xbe11afc8
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We would have:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Session-ID: 0xaeffa652be11afc8
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we agree to encode it in hex and agree on the size (a 16 octet
>>>>>> UUID), that means this will always be a 64-byte hex string and there
>>>>>> is no need to put a :. We could also base64 encode the 64 octet
>>>>>> binary value, which would encode in 44 octets (shaving off 20
>>>>>> octets).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do we want to go for reduced size or more readable hex string?
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't have a strong feeling about hex vs. base64.
>>>>> But I think it would be good to have a separator (I'm not attached to
>>>>> ":" - that is just an example.) I realize it isn't logically necessary
>>>>> as long as the halves are fixed length. But its not very friendly,
>>>>> and I
>>>>> think it is worth "wasting" *1* byte on.
>>>>>
>>>>> If we go with base64, I agree that we don't need to preserve the
>>>>> trailing "==".
>>>>>
>>>>>> As for putting the entire Session-ID into messages, there are many
>>>>>> situations where the Session-ID will be wrong. Let me give you just
>>>>>> one example.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Syntax:
>>>>>> A == B means A is in a call with B
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A == B&& A == C (A in call with B; A has a separate call with C.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> && B == D (B has a separate call with D)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A& B are talking. A puts B on hold.
>>>>>> A starts talking to C.
>>>>>> Meanwhile B puts A on hold and talks to D.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A performs some action to join B and C, while at the same time B
>>>>>> performs some action to join D and C
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Assuming a PBX does this magic, we might have some INVITE messages
>>>>>> going down the wire like this:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> + INVITE ----> C (so C can talk to B) (Session-ID: B || C)
>>>>>> PBX1 ---|
>>>>>> + INVITE ----> B (so B can talk to C) (Session-ID: B || C)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And we have
>>>>>>
>>>>>> + INVITE ----> A (so A can talk to D) (Session-ID: A || D)
>>>>>> PBX2 ---|
>>>>>> + INVITE ----> D (so D can talk to A) (Session-ID: A || D)
>>>>>
>>>>> I can't fully follow the above. My problem is that I don't know where
>>>>> PBX1 and PBX2 fit into the topology of A,B,C,D. So I'm not going to
>>>>> speculate much.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Now, these messages are passing on the wire at the same time. So that
>>>>>> message from PBX1 heading toward B is actually now heading toward D.
>>>>>
>>>>> ???
>>>>>
>>>>>> So, what D receives is Session-ID "B || C". D thought the Session-ID
>>>>>> was A
>>>>>> || D. It will be confused. Perhaps PBX2 can massage the Session-ID,
>>>>>> || but
>>>>>> it's not supposed to do that. We really don't want intermediaries to
>>>>>> touch it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you please map out the full topology, and a lot more of the call
>>>>> flow you have in mind. (Including REFERs, or some other indication of
>>>>> how the PBXs are being instructed what to do.) (There are a million
>>>>> ways
>>>>> this could be done.)
>>>>>
>>>>>> To avoid these kinds of race conditions, adding complexity to try to
>>>>>> straighten it out, etc., I very much prefer to have only the
>>>>>> Session-ID-UUID header that contains only the UUID of the sender of
>>>>>> the message. If we did that, the endpoints in the above scenario
>>>>>> would not be confused and the correct Session-ID could be noted in
>>>>>> logs.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not ready to leap to this conclusion until I understand the cases
>>>>> better.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Paul K
>>>>>
>>>>>> Paul
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: insipid-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:insipid-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>>>> Behalf Of Paul Kyzivat
>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2012 7:38 PM
>>>>>>> To: James Polk
>>>>>>> Cc: insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 7/11/12 6:23 PM, James Polk wrote:
>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> Option#1 - attach a prefix (e.g., From: and To:) to each half
>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> We have a proposal going forward: insert the From:/To: tags from
>>>>>>>>>> Option #1.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Does anyone have a technical reason why this wouldn't work?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Do you mean to assign From and To once, and then keep it fixed for
>>>>>>>>> the duration of the dialog? ISTM that From and To are not well
>>>>>>>>> defined in all cases.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For instance, consider a BTBUA that sets up a session by inviting
>>>>>>>>> both endpoints. Which is From and which is To? IIUC, the reason
>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> labeling this way is so that someone observing a session id in a
>>>>>>>>> message can tell which half corresponds to which end. Using From
>>>>>>>>> and To won't satisfy that unless those tags are reassigned for
>>>>>>>>> each
>>>>>>> request.
>>>>>>>>> (This is a special case of a conference focus, which you already
>>>>>>>>> call out as an exception.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The desire is to have the same half in the same position throughout
>>>>>>>> the transaction or dialog (whichever it is). I believe in the case
>>>>>>>> of a B2BUA initiating or originating the transaction or dialog on
>>>>>>>> behalf of other endpoint UAs, the B2BUA would pick which Session-ID
>>>>>>>> is the From and which is the To. IOW - we don't make it a
>>>>>>>> requirement on an implementation that Alice is always inserting her
>>>>>>>> half in first, and Bob in as the second half. If the B2BUA is
>>>>>>>> sending an INVITE to both Alice and Bob, then that's 2 separate
>>>>>>>> Session-IDs because it's two different dialogs, even if a 3rd party
>>>>>>>> isn't part (i.e., listening) of the media flow. This would be a hub
>>>>>>>> and 2 spokes in which the hub doesn't listen or interact with the
>>>>>>>> media of the 2 UAs.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We could also have text that says for this scenario, that an INVITE
>>>>>>>> normally inserts the From half of the Session-ID, but that in this
>>>>>>>> scenario it can insert the To: half and the invitee inserts the To
>>>>>>>> half.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Identifying which end is which is easy for any single transaction,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> agreed
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> but hard if you want to use the same identifiers in every message.
>>>>>>>>> The endpoints can easily figure this out, because they should know
>>>>>>>>> their half, and the half that isn't theirs is the other end's. But
>>>>>>>>> its not simple for middleboxes.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> remember that each half is a UUID or GUID, which will always be a
>>>>>>>> unique value through space and time.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The solution that is used for dialog ids is to use To and From,
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> they must be reassigned depending on the direction of the message.
>>>>>>>>> We could do the same for session id, but only if they are remapped
>>>>>>>>> based on the direction of the request.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I guess I'm no getting why the halves need to switch places yet
>>>>>>>> depending on whether it's in a request or response. Or are you
>>>>>>>> saying that for one complete transaction they are in a certain
>>>>>>>> order, but in a related transaction(s) they are possibly in the
>>>>>>>> reverse order - depending on who sent the message?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When a message is sent in the reverse direction from the dialog
>>>>>>> establishing message, the From URI and To URI are reversed, as well
>>>>>>> as the From and To tags. If the session id still has its halves
>>>>>>> tagged consistent with the from and to of the dialog establishing
>>>>>>> request, then you will get confused about which half goes with which
>>>>>>> end.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is no problem for servers that keep state and remember the
>>>>>>> values for each end. For them we don't need to tag the halves at
>>>>>>> all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is also no problem for those who don't *care* which end is
>>>>>>> which.
>>>>>>> And there may be a lot of those.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This tagging is only there for those who don't keep state yet
>>>>>>> need to
>>>>>>> know. Maybe there aren't any of those, in which case we can stop
>>>>>>> worrying about it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I guess an example that might matter is something analyzing logs,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> doesn't have a complete set of logs available to it - in particular
>>>>>>> it doesn't have a log of the initial signaling that set up the
>>>>>>> session, so it can't figure out which half-id belongs to which end.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then it sees a change - it sees a message where half of the id
>>>>>>> matches prior things, but the other half doesn't - is new. From this
>>>>>>> it can perhaps infer that there was a transfer. And in that case it
>>>>>>> will want to know which end remains and which was replaced. But it
>>>>>>> can't figure that out from which half of the id changed without
>>>>>>> knowing the mapping from half to end.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But I will be the first to say that this case is somewhat
>>>>>>> implausible.
>>>>>>> In practice there will be lots of stuff in the messages being
>>>>>>> analyzed that should support figuring this out. Perhaps this just
>>>>>>> isn't a good example, and there is another that is better. But I
>>>>>>> don't know a better one. Anybody else? (I think Paul J was the one
>>>>>>> who raised this concern, so maybe he has an example.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If we can't find a plausible reason why we need to do this mapping,
>>>>>>> then I propose that we just not bother. In that case I think
>>>>>>> representation
>>>>>>> #3 is attractive. It provides for the easiest comparison between id
>>>>>>> values
>>>>>>> - a single string comparison is sufficient. And its among the most
>>>>>>> compact representations. I'd recommend:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> session-id: SmallestHalf:BiggestHalf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Or just
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> session-id: FirstHalf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> before the half for the far end has been assigned.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>> Paul
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> insipid mailing list
>>>>>>> insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/insipid
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> insipid mailing list
>>>>> insipid@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/insipid
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> siprec mailing list
>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> siprec mailing list
>> siprec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>


From jmpolk@cisco.com  Thu Aug  2 23:51:27 2012
Return-Path: <jmpolk@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB4FE11E80D5 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 23:51:27 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.515
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.515 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.084, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id zdNB8AlspEWR for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 23:51:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mtv-iport-3.cisco.com (mtv-iport-3.cisco.com [173.36.130.14]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4BCD111E809A for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  2 Aug 2012 23:51:26 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=jmpolk@cisco.com; l=14930; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1343976686; x=1345186286; h=message-id:date:to:from:subject:in-reply-to:references: mime-version; bh=WBw+wsDnpSKnHJVl48n3dYpd0WdwmY3TTsnMgvSnjvY=; b=CFwhjRvHPWGU6vRX0xZf043LmaseHp+ze2uSz1uZ/++jf4YJerK29r43 NXh3fSltyqCQhZzKQGTi0i6flbH5ruWruC8GxQP4oihjrAYomu9OZSLnZ L/14uuGdSCSKg8wVR0WT2mlmmLqXlzYPcCO4WFKPRcTTvkqrR/w7H7VKR M=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Av8EAI50G1CrRDoH/2dsb2JhbABFDrkYgQeCIAEBAQQBAQEPARQRAi4GFwQHBA4DBAEBAR4JBxkIBh8JCAYBCQkbB4dcAwsMnQmWXA2JSgSKYGcahmoDiE2LKIxdgx2BZoImV4FB
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,705,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="51382422"
Received: from mtv-core-2.cisco.com ([171.68.58.7]) by mtv-iport-3.cisco.com with ESMTP; 03 Aug 2012 06:51:25 +0000
Received: from jmpolk-WS.cisco.com ([10.21.166.106]) (authenticated bits=0) by mtv-core-2.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q736pOWo027248 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 3 Aug 2012 06:51:24 GMT
Message-Id: <201208030651.q736pOWo027248@mtv-core-2.cisco.com>
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2012 01:51:24 -0500
To: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>, <siprec@ietf.org>
From: James Polk <jmpolk@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <501B32C1.7040905@alum.mit.edu>
References: <CC3D4A7F.2EAEF%rmohanr@cisco.com> <50176CC9.80701@alum.mit.edu> <201208030138.q731cdMR026288@mtv-core-2.cisco.com> <501B32C1.7040905@alum.mit.edu>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-Authenticated-User: jmpolk
Subject: Re: [siprec] "==" padding in Metadata URN UUID [wasFW: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices]
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2012 06:51:28 -0000

At 09:09 PM 8/2/2012, Paul Kyzivat wrote:
>On 8/2/12 6:38 PM, James Polk wrote:
>>all the examples in the INSIPID drafts are in hex. There's been
>>discussions for weeks to use hex, and that's the proposal on the table
>>there, so I would suggest not making any decisions in SIPREC based on
>>INSIPID using base64 - because that's not a sure thing at all at this
>>point.
>
>We had a discussion of this in the siprec meeting today. There was 
>violent objection from Joe Hildebrand and Hadriel not to do this

Paul - which do you mean when you say "this"?

IOW, were Joe and Hadriel violently against base64 or hex?

Hadriel was in INSIPID when I mentioned the UUID is a RFC 4122 
defined 32 byte hex value, and he didn't leap out of his chair to 
jump my (you know what), but I don't want to assume which way he 
agrees with or disagrees with.

James

>because it would make it harder to use standard libraries to do the 
>encode/decode.
>
>I'm not an XML guy, so I guess I'll defer to them on that part, 
>though it seems trivial to me to append "==" before calling the 
>decoder and strip the "==" after calling the encoder. But if the 
>conversions are automatic based on the declared typing in the schema 
>then I guess I can see why it might be harder than that.
>
>At the end of the day I don't really care. So I'll defer to someone who does.
>
>         Thanks,
>         Paul
>
>>James
>>
>>At 12:27 AM 7/31/2012, Paul Kyzivat wrote:
>>>I don't have strong feelings either way. Just understand that omitting
>>>the "==" locks us in to 64 bit values. That doesn't seem to be a big
>>>constraint, since the spec we're referencing for the value calls for
>>>64 bits.
>>>
>>>Thanks,
>>>Paul
>>>
>>>On 7/30/12 8:12 PM, Ram Mohan R (rmohanr) wrote:
>>>>I am Ok too.
>>>>
>>>>Ram
>>>>
>>>>>On 30/07/12 10:44 PM, "Leon Portman"<leon.portman@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>I am OK
>>>>>
>>>>>Leon
>>>>>On Jul 30, 2012, at 8:13 PM, "Ravindran, Parthasarathi"
>>>>><pravindran@sonusnet.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>Hi all,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Metadata uses based 64 encoding of URN UUID. There is a discussion in
>>>>>>INSIPID WG to optimize "==" padding occurs due to base 64 URN UUID. I
>>>>>>attached Paul's snip of the below mail thread.
>>>>>>
>>>>>><snip>
>>>>>>If we go with base64, I agree that we don't need to preserve the
>>>>>>trailing "==".
>>>>>></snip>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I'm fine with the optimization as it reduces 2 bytes in each URN UUID
>>>>>>of metadata XML element. I'm interested in hearing WG opinion about
>>>>>>this
>>>>>>optimization.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Thanks
>>>>>>Partha
>>>>>>
>>>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>>>From: insipid-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:insipid-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>>>Behalf Of Paul Kyzivat
>>>>>>Sent: Thursday, July 26, 2012 8:30 PM
>>>>>>To: Paul E. Jones
>>>>>>Cc: 'James Polk'; insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>Subject: Re: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices
>>>>>>
>>>>>>On 7/24/12 10:51 PM, Paul E. Jones wrote:
>>>>>>>Paul,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Following up on this thread, as I did not see an outcome. I think
>>>>>>>this message might be the last in the series on this topic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>I think your proposal is along the lines of what we originally
>>>>>>>proposed. As I understand, there is a desire to always include both A
>>>>>>>and B's halves.
>>>>>>>That's fine, so long as devices understand they might change from one
>>>>>>>message to the next.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>So given these two abbreviated UUIDs:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>UUID 1: 0xaeffa652
>>>>>>>UUID 2: 0xbe11afc8
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>We would have:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Session-ID: 0xaeffa652be11afc8
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>If we agree to encode it in hex and agree on the size (a 16 octet
>>>>>>>UUID), that means this will always be a 64-byte hex string and there
>>>>>>>is no need to put a :. We could also base64 encode the 64 octet
>>>>>>>binary value, which would encode in 44 octets (shaving off 20
>>>>>>>octets).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Do we want to go for reduced size or more readable hex string?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I don't have a strong feeling about hex vs. base64.
>>>>>>But I think it would be good to have a separator (I'm not attached to
>>>>>>":" - that is just an example.) I realize it isn't logically necessary
>>>>>>as long as the halves are fixed length. But its not very friendly,
>>>>>>and I
>>>>>>think it is worth "wasting" *1* byte on.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>If we go with base64, I agree that we don't need to preserve the
>>>>>>trailing "==".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>As for putting the entire Session-ID into messages, there are many
>>>>>>>situations where the Session-ID will be wrong. Let me give you just
>>>>>>>one example.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Syntax:
>>>>>>>A == B means A is in a call with B
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>A == B&& A == C (A in call with B; A has a separate call with C.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>&& B == D (B has a separate call with D)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>A& B are talking. A puts B on hold.
>>>>>>>A starts talking to C.
>>>>>>>Meanwhile B puts A on hold and talks to D.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>A performs some action to join B and C, while at the same time B
>>>>>>>performs some action to join D and C
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Assuming a PBX does this magic, we might have some INVITE messages
>>>>>>>going down the wire like this:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>+ INVITE ----> C (so C can talk to B) (Session-ID: B || C)
>>>>>>>PBX1 ---|
>>>>>>>+ INVITE ----> B (so B can talk to C) (Session-ID: B || C)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>And we have
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>+ INVITE ----> A (so A can talk to D) (Session-ID: A || D)
>>>>>>>PBX2 ---|
>>>>>>>+ INVITE ----> D (so D can talk to A) (Session-ID: A || D)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I can't fully follow the above. My problem is that I don't know where
>>>>>>PBX1 and PBX2 fit into the topology of A,B,C,D. So I'm not going to
>>>>>>speculate much.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Now, these messages are passing on the wire at the same time. So that
>>>>>>>message from PBX1 heading toward B is actually now heading toward D.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>???
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>So, what D receives is Session-ID "B || C". D thought the Session-ID
>>>>>>>was A
>>>>>>>|| D. It will be confused. Perhaps PBX2 can massage the Session-ID,
>>>>>>>|| but
>>>>>>>it's not supposed to do that. We really don't want intermediaries to
>>>>>>>touch it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Can you please map out the full topology, and a lot more of the call
>>>>>>flow you have in mind. (Including REFERs, or some other indication of
>>>>>>how the PBXs are being instructed what to do.) (There are a million
>>>>>>ways
>>>>>>this could be done.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>To avoid these kinds of race conditions, adding complexity to try to
>>>>>>>straighten it out, etc., I very much prefer to have only the
>>>>>>>Session-ID-UUID header that contains only the UUID of the sender of
>>>>>>>the message. If we did that, the endpoints in the above scenario
>>>>>>>would not be confused and the correct Session-ID could be noted in
>>>>>>>logs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I'm not ready to leap to this conclusion until I understand the cases
>>>>>>better.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Thanks,
>>>>>>Paul K
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Paul
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>From: insipid-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:insipid-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>>>>>Behalf Of Paul Kyzivat
>>>>>>>>Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2012 7:38 PM
>>>>>>>>To: James Polk
>>>>>>>>Cc: insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>Subject: Re: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>On 7/11/12 6:23 PM, James Polk wrote:
>>>>>>>>...
>>>>>>>>>>>Option#1 - attach a prefix (e.g., From: and To:) to each half
>>>>>>>>...
>>>>>>>>>>>We have a proposal going forward: insert the From:/To: tags from
>>>>>>>>>>>Option #1.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>Does anyone have a technical reason why this wouldn't work?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>Do you mean to assign From and To once, and then keep it fixed for
>>>>>>>>>>the duration of the dialog? ISTM that From and To are not well
>>>>>>>>>>defined in all cases.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>For instance, consider a BTBUA that sets up a session by inviting
>>>>>>>>>>both endpoints. Which is From and which is To? IIUC, the reason
>>>>>>>>>>for
>>>>>>>>>>labeling this way is so that someone observing a session id in a
>>>>>>>>>>message can tell which half corresponds to which end. Using From
>>>>>>>>>>and To won't satisfy that unless those tags are reassigned for
>>>>>>>>>>each
>>>>>>>>request.
>>>>>>>>>>(This is a special case of a conference focus, which you already
>>>>>>>>>>call out as an exception.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>The desire is to have the same half in the same position throughout
>>>>>>>>>the transaction or dialog (whichever it is). I believe in the case
>>>>>>>>>of a B2BUA initiating or originating the transaction or dialog on
>>>>>>>>>behalf of other endpoint UAs, the B2BUA would pick which Session-ID
>>>>>>>>>is the From and which is the To. IOW - we don't make it a
>>>>>>>>>requirement on an implementation that Alice is always inserting her
>>>>>>>>>half in first, and Bob in as the second half. If the B2BUA is
>>>>>>>>>sending an INVITE to both Alice and Bob, then that's 2 separate
>>>>>>>>>Session-IDs because it's two different dialogs, even if a 3rd party
>>>>>>>>>isn't part (i.e., listening) of the media flow. This would be a hub
>>>>>>>>>and 2 spokes in which the hub doesn't listen or interact with the
>>>>>>>>>media of the 2 UAs.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>We could also have text that says for this scenario, that an INVITE
>>>>>>>>>normally inserts the From half of the Session-ID, but that in this
>>>>>>>>>scenario it can insert the To: half and the invitee inserts the To
>>>>>>>>>half.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>Identifying which end is which is easy for any single transaction,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>agreed
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>but hard if you want to use the same identifiers in every message.
>>>>>>>>>>The endpoints can easily figure this out, because they should know
>>>>>>>>>>their half, and the half that isn't theirs is the other end's. But
>>>>>>>>>>its not simple for middleboxes.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>remember that each half is a UUID or GUID, which will always be a
>>>>>>>>>unique value through space and time.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>The solution that is used for dialog ids is to use To and From,
>>>>>>>>>>but
>>>>>>>>>>they must be reassigned depending on the direction of the message.
>>>>>>>>>>We could do the same for session id, but only if they are remapped
>>>>>>>>>>based on the direction of the request.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>I guess I'm no getting why the halves need to switch places yet
>>>>>>>>>depending on whether it's in a request or response. Or are you
>>>>>>>>>saying that for one complete transaction they are in a certain
>>>>>>>>>order, but in a related transaction(s) they are possibly in the
>>>>>>>>>reverse order - depending on who sent the message?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>When a message is sent in the reverse direction from the dialog
>>>>>>>>establishing message, the From URI and To URI are reversed, as well
>>>>>>>>as the From and To tags. If the session id still has its halves
>>>>>>>>tagged consistent with the from and to of the dialog establishing
>>>>>>>>request, then you will get confused about which half goes with which
>>>>>>>>end.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>There is no problem for servers that keep state and remember the
>>>>>>>>values for each end. For them we don't need to tag the halves at
>>>>>>>>all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>There is also no problem for those who don't *care* which end is
>>>>>>>>which.
>>>>>>>>And there may be a lot of those.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>This tagging is only there for those who don't keep state yet
>>>>>>>>need to
>>>>>>>>know. Maybe there aren't any of those, in which case we can stop
>>>>>>>>worrying about it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>I guess an example that might matter is something analyzing logs,
>>>>>>>>and
>>>>>>>>doesn't have a complete set of logs available to it - in particular
>>>>>>>>it doesn't have a log of the initial signaling that set up the
>>>>>>>>session, so it can't figure out which half-id belongs to which end.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>Then it sees a change - it sees a message where half of the id
>>>>>>>>matches prior things, but the other half doesn't - is new. From this
>>>>>>>>it can perhaps infer that there was a transfer. And in that case it
>>>>>>>>will want to know which end remains and which was replaced. But it
>>>>>>>>can't figure that out from which half of the id changed without
>>>>>>>>knowing the mapping from half to end.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>But I will be the first to say that this case is somewhat
>>>>>>>>implausible.
>>>>>>>>In practice there will be lots of stuff in the messages being
>>>>>>>>analyzed that should support figuring this out. Perhaps this just
>>>>>>>>isn't a good example, and there is another that is better. But I
>>>>>>>>don't know a better one. Anybody else? (I think Paul J was the one
>>>>>>>>who raised this concern, so maybe he has an example.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>If we can't find a plausible reason why we need to do this mapping,
>>>>>>>>then I propose that we just not bother. In that case I think
>>>>>>>>representation
>>>>>>>>#3 is attractive. It provides for the easiest comparison between id
>>>>>>>>values
>>>>>>>>- a single string comparison is sufficient. And its among the most
>>>>>>>>compact representations. I'd recommend:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>session-id: SmallestHalf:BiggestHalf
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>Or just
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>session-id: FirstHalf
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>before the half for the far end has been assigned.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>Thanks,
>>>>>>>>Paul
>>>>>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>insipid mailing list
>>>>>>>>insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/insipid
>>>>>>
>>>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>>>insipid mailing list
>>>>>>insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/insipid
>>>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>>>siprec mailing list
>>>>>>siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>
>>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>>siprec mailing list
>>>>>siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>siprec mailing list
>>>>siprec@ietf.org
>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>
>>>_______________________________________________
>>>siprec mailing list
>>>siprec@ietf.org
>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>siprec mailing list
>>siprec@ietf.org
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>
>_______________________________________________
>siprec mailing list
>siprec@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec


From pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu  Fri Aug  3 00:01:44 2012
Return-Path: <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D7A8021E8040 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  3 Aug 2012 00:01:44 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.273
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.273 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.164,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_NET=0.611,  RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id A2N5Xqa8rg39 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  3 Aug 2012 00:01:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from qmta01.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net (qmta01.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net [IPv6:2001:558:fe14:43:76:96:62:16]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C39821E8039 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Fri,  3 Aug 2012 00:01:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from omta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.62.19]) by qmta01.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id i71m1j0020QuhwU5171msC; Fri, 03 Aug 2012 07:01:46 +0000
Received: from dhcp-40e5.meeting.ietf.org ([IPv6:2001:df8:0:64:19d6:c06f:f140:d490]) by omta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id i71U1j00A3NDGqc3N71VHR; Fri, 03 Aug 2012 07:01:31 +0000
Message-ID: <501B7752.4090900@alum.mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2012 00:01:38 -0700
From: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:12.0) Gecko/20120428 Thunderbird/12.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: James Polk <jmpolk@cisco.com>
References: <CC3D4A7F.2EAEF%rmohanr@cisco.com> <50176CC9.80701@alum.mit.edu> <201208030138.q731cdMR026288@mtv-core-2.cisco.com> <501B32C1.7040905@alum.mit.edu> <201208030651.q736pOWo027248@mtv-core-2.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <201208030651.q736pOWo027248@mtv-core-2.cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: siprec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [siprec] "==" padding in Metadata URN UUID [wasFW: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices]
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2012 07:01:45 -0000

On 8/2/12 11:51 PM, James Polk wrote:
> At 09:09 PM 8/2/2012, Paul Kyzivat wrote:
>> On 8/2/12 6:38 PM, James Polk wrote:
>>> all the examples in the INSIPID drafts are in hex. There's been
>>> discussions for weeks to use hex, and that's the proposal on the table
>>> there, so I would suggest not making any decisions in SIPREC based on
>>> INSIPID using base64 - because that's not a sure thing at all at this
>>> point.
>>
>> We had a discussion of this in the siprec meeting today. There was
>> violent objection from Joe Hildebrand and Hadriel not to do this
>
> Paul - which do you mean when you say "this"?

They were opposed to using base64 with the "==" stripped.
They were fine with using base64 with the "==" present.

	Thanks,
	Paul

> IOW, were Joe and Hadriel violently against base64 or hex?
>
> Hadriel was in INSIPID when I mentioned the UUID is a RFC 4122 defined
> 32 byte hex value, and he didn't leap out of his chair to jump my (you
> know what), but I don't want to assume which way he agrees with or
> disagrees with.
>
> James
>
>> because it would make it harder to use standard libraries to do the
>> encode/decode.
>>
>> I'm not an XML guy, so I guess I'll defer to them on that part, though
>> it seems trivial to me to append "==" before calling the decoder and
>> strip the "==" after calling the encoder. But if the conversions are
>> automatic based on the declared typing in the schema then I guess I
>> can see why it might be harder than that.
>>
>> At the end of the day I don't really care. So I'll defer to someone
>> who does.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Paul
>>
>>> James
>>>
>>> At 12:27 AM 7/31/2012, Paul Kyzivat wrote:
>>>> I don't have strong feelings either way. Just understand that omitting
>>>> the "==" locks us in to 64 bit values. That doesn't seem to be a big
>>>> constraint, since the spec we're referencing for the value calls for
>>>> 64 bits.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Paul
>>>>
>>>> On 7/30/12 8:12 PM, Ram Mohan R (rmohanr) wrote:
>>>>> I am Ok too.
>>>>>
>>>>> Ram
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 30/07/12 10:44 PM, "Leon Portman"<leon.portman@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> I am OK
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Leon
>>>>>> On Jul 30, 2012, at 8:13 PM, "Ravindran, Parthasarathi"
>>>>>> <pravindran@sonusnet.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Metadata uses based 64 encoding of URN UUID. There is a
>>>>>>> discussion in
>>>>>>> INSIPID WG to optimize "==" padding occurs due to base 64 URN
>>>>>>> UUID. I
>>>>>>> attached Paul's snip of the below mail thread.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>>> If we go with base64, I agree that we don't need to preserve the
>>>>>>> trailing "==".
>>>>>>> </snip>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm fine with the optimization as it reduces 2 bytes in each URN
>>>>>>> UUID
>>>>>>> of metadata XML element. I'm interested in hearing WG opinion about
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>> optimization.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>>> Partha
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: insipid-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:insipid-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>>>> Behalf Of Paul Kyzivat
>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, July 26, 2012 8:30 PM
>>>>>>> To: Paul E. Jones
>>>>>>> Cc: 'James Polk'; insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 7/24/12 10:51 PM, Paul E. Jones wrote:
>>>>>>>> Paul,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Following up on this thread, as I did not see an outcome. I think
>>>>>>>> this message might be the last in the series on this topic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think your proposal is along the lines of what we originally
>>>>>>>> proposed. As I understand, there is a desire to always include
>>>>>>>> both A
>>>>>>>> and B's halves.
>>>>>>>> That's fine, so long as devices understand they might change
>>>>>>>> from one
>>>>>>>> message to the next.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So given these two abbreviated UUIDs:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> UUID 1: 0xaeffa652
>>>>>>>> UUID 2: 0xbe11afc8
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We would have:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Session-ID: 0xaeffa652be11afc8
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If we agree to encode it in hex and agree on the size (a 16 octet
>>>>>>>> UUID), that means this will always be a 64-byte hex string and
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>> is no need to put a :. We could also base64 encode the 64 octet
>>>>>>>> binary value, which would encode in 44 octets (shaving off 20
>>>>>>>> octets).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do we want to go for reduced size or more readable hex string?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't have a strong feeling about hex vs. base64.
>>>>>>> But I think it would be good to have a separator (I'm not
>>>>>>> attached to
>>>>>>> ":" - that is just an example.) I realize it isn't logically
>>>>>>> necessary
>>>>>>> as long as the halves are fixed length. But its not very friendly,
>>>>>>> and I
>>>>>>> think it is worth "wasting" *1* byte on.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If we go with base64, I agree that we don't need to preserve the
>>>>>>> trailing "==".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As for putting the entire Session-ID into messages, there are many
>>>>>>>> situations where the Session-ID will be wrong. Let me give you just
>>>>>>>> one example.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Syntax:
>>>>>>>> A == B means A is in a call with B
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A == B&& A == C (A in call with B; A has a separate call with C.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> && B == D (B has a separate call with D)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A& B are talking. A puts B on hold.
>>>>>>>> A starts talking to C.
>>>>>>>> Meanwhile B puts A on hold and talks to D.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A performs some action to join B and C, while at the same time B
>>>>>>>> performs some action to join D and C
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Assuming a PBX does this magic, we might have some INVITE messages
>>>>>>>> going down the wire like this:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> + INVITE ----> C (so C can talk to B) (Session-ID: B || C)
>>>>>>>> PBX1 ---|
>>>>>>>> + INVITE ----> B (so B can talk to C) (Session-ID: B || C)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And we have
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> + INVITE ----> A (so A can talk to D) (Session-ID: A || D)
>>>>>>>> PBX2 ---|
>>>>>>>> + INVITE ----> D (so D can talk to A) (Session-ID: A || D)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I can't fully follow the above. My problem is that I don't know
>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>> PBX1 and PBX2 fit into the topology of A,B,C,D. So I'm not going to
>>>>>>> speculate much.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Now, these messages are passing on the wire at the same time. So
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> message from PBX1 heading toward B is actually now heading
>>>>>>>> toward D.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ???
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, what D receives is Session-ID "B || C". D thought the
>>>>>>>> Session-ID
>>>>>>>> was A
>>>>>>>> || D. It will be confused. Perhaps PBX2 can massage the Session-ID,
>>>>>>>> || but
>>>>>>>> it's not supposed to do that. We really don't want
>>>>>>>> intermediaries to
>>>>>>>> touch it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Can you please map out the full topology, and a lot more of the call
>>>>>>> flow you have in mind. (Including REFERs, or some other
>>>>>>> indication of
>>>>>>> how the PBXs are being instructed what to do.) (There are a million
>>>>>>> ways
>>>>>>> this could be done.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> To avoid these kinds of race conditions, adding complexity to
>>>>>>>> try to
>>>>>>>> straighten it out, etc., I very much prefer to have only the
>>>>>>>> Session-ID-UUID header that contains only the UUID of the sender of
>>>>>>>> the message. If we did that, the endpoints in the above scenario
>>>>>>>> would not be confused and the correct Session-ID could be noted in
>>>>>>>> logs.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm not ready to leap to this conclusion until I understand the
>>>>>>> cases
>>>>>>> better.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>> Paul K
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Paul
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>> From: insipid-bounces@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> [mailto:insipid-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Paul Kyzivat
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2012 7:38 PM
>>>>>>>>> To: James Polk
>>>>>>>>> Cc: insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Insipid] Session-ID construction choices
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 7/11/12 6:23 PM, James Polk wrote:
>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> Option#1 - attach a prefix (e.g., From: and To:) to each half
>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> We have a proposal going forward: insert the From:/To: tags
>>>>>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>>>>>> Option #1.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Does anyone have a technical reason why this wouldn't work?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Do you mean to assign From and To once, and then keep it
>>>>>>>>>>> fixed for
>>>>>>>>>>> the duration of the dialog? ISTM that From and To are not well
>>>>>>>>>>> defined in all cases.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> For instance, consider a BTBUA that sets up a session by
>>>>>>>>>>> inviting
>>>>>>>>>>> both endpoints. Which is From and which is To? IIUC, the reason
>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>> labeling this way is so that someone observing a session id in a
>>>>>>>>>>> message can tell which half corresponds to which end. Using From
>>>>>>>>>>> and To won't satisfy that unless those tags are reassigned for
>>>>>>>>>>> each
>>>>>>>>> request.
>>>>>>>>>>> (This is a special case of a conference focus, which you already
>>>>>>>>>>> call out as an exception.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The desire is to have the same half in the same position
>>>>>>>>>> throughout
>>>>>>>>>> the transaction or dialog (whichever it is). I believe in the
>>>>>>>>>> case
>>>>>>>>>> of a B2BUA initiating or originating the transaction or dialog on
>>>>>>>>>> behalf of other endpoint UAs, the B2BUA would pick which
>>>>>>>>>> Session-ID
>>>>>>>>>> is the From and which is the To. IOW - we don't make it a
>>>>>>>>>> requirement on an implementation that Alice is always
>>>>>>>>>> inserting her
>>>>>>>>>> half in first, and Bob in as the second half. If the B2BUA is
>>>>>>>>>> sending an INVITE to both Alice and Bob, then that's 2 separate
>>>>>>>>>> Session-IDs because it's two different dialogs, even if a 3rd
>>>>>>>>>> party
>>>>>>>>>> isn't part (i.e., listening) of the media flow. This would be
>>>>>>>>>> a hub
>>>>>>>>>> and 2 spokes in which the hub doesn't listen or interact with the
>>>>>>>>>> media of the 2 UAs.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We could also have text that says for this scenario, that an
>>>>>>>>>> INVITE
>>>>>>>>>> normally inserts the From half of the Session-ID, but that in
>>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>> scenario it can insert the To: half and the invitee inserts
>>>>>>>>>> the To
>>>>>>>>>> half.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Identifying which end is which is easy for any single
>>>>>>>>>>> transaction,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> agreed
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> but hard if you want to use the same identifiers in every
>>>>>>>>>>> message.
>>>>>>>>>>> The endpoints can easily figure this out, because they should
>>>>>>>>>>> know
>>>>>>>>>>> their half, and the half that isn't theirs is the other
>>>>>>>>>>> end's. But
>>>>>>>>>>> its not simple for middleboxes.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> remember that each half is a UUID or GUID, which will always be a
>>>>>>>>>> unique value through space and time.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The solution that is used for dialog ids is to use To and From,
>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>> they must be reassigned depending on the direction of the
>>>>>>>>>>> message.
>>>>>>>>>>> We could do the same for session id, but only if they are
>>>>>>>>>>> remapped
>>>>>>>>>>> based on the direction of the request.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I guess I'm no getting why the halves need to switch places yet
>>>>>>>>>> depending on whether it's in a request or response. Or are you
>>>>>>>>>> saying that for one complete transaction they are in a certain
>>>>>>>>>> order, but in a related transaction(s) they are possibly in the
>>>>>>>>>> reverse order - depending on who sent the message?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When a message is sent in the reverse direction from the dialog
>>>>>>>>> establishing message, the From URI and To URI are reversed, as
>>>>>>>>> well
>>>>>>>>> as the From and To tags. If the session id still has its halves
>>>>>>>>> tagged consistent with the from and to of the dialog establishing
>>>>>>>>> request, then you will get confused about which half goes with
>>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>> end.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is no problem for servers that keep state and remember the
>>>>>>>>> values for each end. For them we don't need to tag the halves at
>>>>>>>>> all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is also no problem for those who don't *care* which end is
>>>>>>>>> which.
>>>>>>>>> And there may be a lot of those.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This tagging is only there for those who don't keep state yet
>>>>>>>>> need to
>>>>>>>>> know. Maybe there aren't any of those, in which case we can stop
>>>>>>>>> worrying about it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I guess an example that might matter is something analyzing logs,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> doesn't have a complete set of logs available to it - in
>>>>>>>>> particular
>>>>>>>>> it doesn't have a log of the initial signaling that set up the
>>>>>>>>> session, so it can't figure out which half-id belongs to which
>>>>>>>>> end.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then it sees a change - it sees a message where half of the id
>>>>>>>>> matches prior things, but the other half doesn't - is new. From
>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>> it can perhaps infer that there was a transfer. And in that
>>>>>>>>> case it
>>>>>>>>> will want to know which end remains and which was replaced. But it
>>>>>>>>> can't figure that out from which half of the id changed without
>>>>>>>>> knowing the mapping from half to end.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But I will be the first to say that this case is somewhat
>>>>>>>>> implausible.
>>>>>>>>> In practice there will be lots of stuff in the messages being
>>>>>>>>> analyzed that should support figuring this out. Perhaps this just
>>>>>>>>> isn't a good example, and there is another that is better. But I
>>>>>>>>> don't know a better one. Anybody else? (I think Paul J was the one
>>>>>>>>> who raised this concern, so maybe he has an example.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If we can't find a plausible reason why we need to do this
>>>>>>>>> mapping,
>>>>>>>>> then I propose that we just not bother. In that case I think
>>>>>>>>> representation
>>>>>>>>> #3 is attractive. It provides for the easiest comparison
>>>>>>>>> between id
>>>>>>>>> values
>>>>>>>>> - a single string comparison is sufficient. And its among the most
>>>>>>>>> compact representations. I'd recommend:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> session-id: SmallestHalf:BiggestHalf
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Or just
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> session-id: FirstHalf
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> before the half for the far end has been assigned.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>> Paul
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> insipid mailing list
>>>>>>>>> insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/insipid
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> insipid mailing list
>>>>>>> insipid@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/insipid
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> siprec mailing list
>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> siprec mailing list
>> siprec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>
>


From pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu  Fri Aug  3 20:40:09 2012
Return-Path: <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79D5311E8091 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  3 Aug 2012 20:40:09 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.284
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.284 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.153,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_NET=0.611,  RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kbRd0jCBn5o5 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  3 Aug 2012 20:40:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from qmta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net (qmta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net [IPv6:2001:558:fe14:43:76:96:62:24]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 90AC411E8072 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Fri,  3 Aug 2012 20:40:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from omta01.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.62.11]) by qmta02.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id iTcf1j0040EZKEL51Tg9dw; Sat, 04 Aug 2012 03:40:09 +0000
Received: from dhcp-40e5.meeting.ietf.org ([IPv6:2001:df8:0:64:8d66:c310:2c90:f92]) by omta01.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id iTgH1j00c5JjU8M3MTgJYY; Sat, 04 Aug 2012 03:40:18 +0000
Message-ID: <501C9994.8020207@alum.mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2012 20:40:04 -0700
From: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:12.0) Gecko/20120428 Thunderbird/12.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Ravindran, Parthasarathi" <pravindran@sonusnet.com>
References: <059AF07365DC474393A19A3AF187DF740806753E@NAHALD.us.int.genesyslab.com> <5018C5D5.4090207@alum.mit.edu> <387F9047F55E8C42850AD6B3A7A03C6C2BD148A5@inba-mail02.sonusnet.com>
In-Reply-To: <387F9047F55E8C42850AD6B3A7A03C6C2BD148A5@inba-mail02.sonusnet.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] comments on draft-ietf-siprec-metadata-07
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 04 Aug 2012 03:40:09 -0000

On 8/2/12 4:51 PM, Ravindran, Parthasarathi wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> As discussed today meeting, Paul mentioned below metadata model change is an alternative which clarifies the stream XML element usage within the specific single CS instead of spread across. I'm interested in hearing anybody has objection to this change.

In followup to the presentation at the meeting, which probably wasn't 
very clear...

(This will be longer than I'd like, but I don't know how to say it more 
concisely.)

In metadata-07 we have the following model:

                                    Participant
                                | 0..*       1..*|
                        receives|                |sends
                                | 0..*       0..*|
                             +-------------------------+
                             |          Media Stream   |
                             |                         |
    Communication 1..*  0..* +-------------------------+
      Session    ------------|                         |
                             |  Media Stream Reference |
                             |  Content-type           |
                             |                         |
                             +-------------------------+

Note that a Media Stream can associate with one or more Communication 
Sessions.

One issue with this is that we had wanted to allow a media stream with 
zero sessions. That's an easy change.

Normally there would be no need for a media stream to associate with 
more than one CS. We made the change to allow multiple to accommodate 
the Turret use case, where there is a desire to record a mix of streams 
from multiple CSs.

What we ended up with for the XML of the Media Stream element in 
metadata-07 is called <stream>, has two attributes, identifying the 
stream itself as well as a Communication Session.

If you never think about streams that associate with more than one one 
CS, this seems reasonable. You can then think of it as a stream element 
with one attribute identifying its key, and another non-key attribute 
identifying the CS its associated with.

But if you attempt to do an example where a media stream associates with 
multiple CSs (see section 4.6 of draft-ram-siprec-callflows-01) it gets 
weird. Because we need to identify two CSs, and can only do one per 
<stream>, we need two instances of <stream>. But because they are 
supposed to be the same stream, they must have the same stream id. We 
can see that in 4.6:

           <stream id="UAAMm5GRQKSCMVvLyl4rFw=="
               session="hVpd7YQgRW2nD22h7q60JQ==">
               <label>96</label>
           </stream>
           <stream id="UAAMm5GRQKSCMVvLyl4rFw=="
               session="zzlafnvvjlCHllaHF6mn8kkSS==">
               <label>96</label>
           </stream>


In the above, both have the same id=, and are distinguished by differing 
session= values. If <stream> had only one key attribute, then the 2nd of 
these would *replace* the first. For that not to happen, both the 'id' 
and 'session' attributes must be key attributes.

The XML representing senders and receivers only identifies the 'id' of 
the stream, such as:

           <participantstreamassoc
               participant="zSfPoSvdSDCmU3A3TRDxAw==">
             <send>UAAMm5GRQKSCMVvLyl4rFw==</send>
             <recv>UAAMm5GRQKSCMVvLyl4rFw==</recv>
           </participantstreamassoc>

This isn't consistent with the model. In the XML, regular elements have 
a single key attribute that identifies the element itself. Assoc 
elements have two key attributes that identify the keys of the two 
elements they associate. So our XML is more consistent with:

                             +-------------------------+
                             |        Media Stream     |
                             |                         |
    Communication 1..*  0..* +-------------------------+
      Session    ------------|                         |
                     |       |  Media Stream Reference |
                     |       |  Content-type           |
                     |       |                         |
                     |       +-------------------------+
                     |
                     |       +-------------------------+
                     |       |   MediaStream_CS_Assoc  |
                     +-------|                         |
                             +-------------------------+

But not quite, because we don't have two XML types. Rather we have one 
XML element called <stream> that has the two keys of the association 
class, but also carries the attributes of the Media Stream. But the 
<send> and <recv> reference the single 'id' of Media Stream that isn't 
explicitly coded at all.

This disturbs me. Its inconsistent with the way the rest of the model is 
represented.

So the way I propose to fix this is to change the model a bit:

                                    Participant
                                | 0..*       1..*|
                        receives|                |sends
                                | 0..*       0..*|
                             +-------------------------+
                             |          Media Stream   |
                             |                         |
    Communication 0..1  0..* +-------------------------+
      Session    ------------|                         |
                             |  Media Stream Reference |
                             |  Content-type           |
                             |                         |
                             +-------------------------+

In this model, a Media Stream can associate with at most one CS. No 
association class is needed. The association can be represented in XML 
as an optional attribute of <stream>.

This appears not to support the turret case. I propose to address that 
simply by having multiple distinct instances of <stream> reference a 
common m-line by using the same <label> value. The schema looks very 
much the same, but the 'session' attribute of <stream> is becomes a 
non-key attribute, and is optional.

So in the turret example, the two streams will have different values of 
the 'id' attribute.

I think the change to the schema in metadata-07 will be simple:

OLD:

    <xs:complexType name="stream">
...
        <xs:attribute name="stream_id" type="xs:base64Binary"
             use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="session_id" type="xs:base64Binary"
             use="required"/>
    </xs:complexType>

NEW:

    <xs:complexType name="stream">
...
       <xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:base64Binary"
             use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="session_id" type="xs:base64Binary"/>
    </xs:complexType>

(There has been some flopping around of the name of the first attribute 
between 'id' and 'stream_id'. I don't care, but I think Partha got some 
guidelines that suggest it should be 'id' if it is a single key.)

I *hope* this makes things clearer rather than more confusing.

	Thanks,
	Paul




From Leon.Portman@nice.com  Tue Aug  7 01:51:36 2012
Return-Path: <Leon.Portman@nice.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40D7421F8617 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 01:51:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Y6SlTC+mDSW0 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 01:51:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mailil.nice.com (mailil.nice.com [192.114.148.4]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA45621F8615 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 01:51:34 -0700 (PDT)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,726,1336338000";  d="scan'208";a="3720389"
Received: from TLVMBX01.nice.com ([192.168.253.242]) by tlvcas02.nice.com ([172.18.253.6]) with mapi; Tue, 7 Aug 2012 11:51:32 +0300
From: Leon Portman <Leon.Portman@nice.com>
To: "Rosen, Brian" <Brian.Rosen@neustar.biz>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2012 11:51:31 +0300
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security section
Thread-Index: Ac1xAO8pI5JIA7wFQ52sCCJ+/1qsIADeNKgg
Message-ID: <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz>
In-Reply-To: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security	section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2012 08:51:36 -0000

Brian, Thank you=20

I will update the architecture draft.

Leon

-----Original Message-----
From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Rosen, Brian
Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
To: siprec@ietf.org
Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security sec=
tion

In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the context of t=
he protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's security sect=
ion, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:

1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the CS, and m=
ay need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing more poss=
ibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on the storage=
 system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized retrieval inter=
face).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.  Cryptosuites, =
and protocol mechanisms must be considered. =20
2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the client mus=
t be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It is les=
s important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations must hav=
e the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some environments, it =
is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This means the same =
key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media is encrypted,=
 not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism is the same on th=
e CS as the RS.  That has implications on mandatory to implement keying mec=
hanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS, and is re-encrypted =
on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document doesn't discuss a retriev=
al mechanism for recorded media.  The security implications on retrieval ar=
e similar to those of recording, but because the retriever is another party=
 to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the client must be authenti=
cated.  The crypto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need=
 to be better.

Brian
_______________________________________________
siprec mailing list
siprec@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From brian.rosen@neustar.biz  Tue Aug  7 06:08:53 2012
Return-Path: <brian.rosen@neustar.biz>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8CCA121F86A1 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 06:08:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.376
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.376 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.223,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EwcQ3-gNUHh0 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 06:08:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from neustar.com (mx1.neustar.com [156.154.17.104]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 374ED21F8690 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 06:08:52 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=neustar.biz; s=neustarbiz; t=1344345200; x=1659695105; q=dns/txt; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Language: Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=XyBKdoFcij7zLGPRPmrd9 lJcTE8zPAIT5aVjY3aDZyg=; b=bV4KayWErpoBS4lWAYvRO/cD4BO2v5CHS4Bhl qMApW8mFgWgPEuw8bSfeUpnpcI2pcOCGZdQ9LL8E+KS3CpTAw==
Received: from ([10.31.13.228]) by stihiron1.va.neustar.com with ESMTP with TLS id J041124052.12787961;  Tue, 07 Aug 2012 09:13:19 -0400
Received: from STNTEXCH01.cis.neustar.com ([fe80::28fd:d8c6:49f0:619b]) by STNTEXCHHT01.cis.neustar.com ([::1]) with mapi; Tue, 7 Aug 2012 09:08:49 -0400
From: "Rosen, Brian" <Brian.Rosen@neustar.biz>
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2012 09:08:48 -0400
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security section
Thread-Index: Ac10nchEAESZ6p0dTUOFrFPfNDgcfA==
Message-ID: <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com>
In-Reply-To: <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
x-ems-proccessed: R64IxjzeHPwwd+efoj3ZcA==
x-ems-stamp: 2uXlBkv3mZ6JM/gWYlYCZA==
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Leon Portman <leon.portman@nice.com>
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security	section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2012 13:08:54 -0000

In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that the retriev=
al is out of scope.  Maybe reword=20
> The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  T=
he security implications on retrieval are similar to those of recording, bu=
t because the retriever is another party to the recording session, item 2 i=
s reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be better=
.
to
The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is out of scope=
.  Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the security imp=
lications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party to the call tha=
t was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the reverse =
of item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less strong tha=
n used on the RS, and may need to be better.


On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:

> Brian, Thank you=20
>=20
> I will update the architecture draft.
>=20
> Leon
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Rosen, Brian
> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
> To: siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security s=
ection
>=20
> In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the context of=
 the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's security se=
ction, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
>=20
> 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the CS, and=
 may need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing more po=
ssibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on the stora=
ge system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized retrieval int=
erface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.  Cryptosuites=
, and protocol mechanisms must be considered. =20
> 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the client m=
ust be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It is l=
ess important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations must h=
ave the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some environments, i=
t is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This means the sam=
e key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media is encrypte=
d, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism is the same on =
the CS as the RS.  That has implications on mandatory to implement keying m=
echanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS, and is re-encrypte=
d on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document doesn't discuss a retri=
eval mechanism for recorded media.  The security implications on retrieval =
are similar to those of recording, but because the retriever is another par=
ty to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the client must be authen=
ticated.  The cry
> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be better=
.
>=20
> Brian
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec


From andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com  Tue Aug  7 06:10:42 2012
Return-Path: <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3FB4721F865C for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 06:10:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.56
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.56 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.039,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lV3En-+Oq+Za for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 06:10:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com [62.134.46.9]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0568021F862B for <siprec@ietf.org>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 06:10:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net (unknown [172.29.42.235]) by senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (Server) with ESMTP id 386A41EB8486 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 15:10:36 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net ([169.254.1.131]) by MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net ([172.29.42.235]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Tue, 7 Aug 2012 15:10:35 +0200
From: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
To: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
Thread-Index: Ac10ngaWJceBMVsMR3azLl+NbP1UIA==
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2012 13:10:35 +0000
Message-ID: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0762EA@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [172.29.42.225]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2012 13:10:42 -0000

Hi All,

Have you seen the discussion in the INSIPID WG regarding the scope of this =
WG and the use cases for generating and end to end session identifier if no=
t have a look at http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/insipid/current/msg00=
255.html.

I am interested in the opinions of the SIPREC WG members on the following q=
uestions.

1. Does SIPREC still need such an end to end session identifier and if so h=
ow would we use it in the current metadata model as the communication sessi=
on identifier or something else?
2. If SIPREC does need such an identifier is it important that the 3PCC cas=
e is covered so for example when an SRC is the 3rd party controller that su=
ch an end to end session identifier is generated?
3. If INSIPID cannot create such an identifier for the communication sessio=
n do we need to create a communication session identifier for use in SIPREC=
?

Regards
Andy (SIPREC Co-Chair).


From ietf@meetecho.com  Tue Aug  7 15:57:24 2012
Return-Path: <ietf@meetecho.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A92421F858A for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 15:57:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.697
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.697 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.544,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_IT=0.635, HOST_EQ_IT=1.245, RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET=1.96]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Qx542WvTXE0Y for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 15:57:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtplq04.aruba.it (smtplqs-out18.aruba.it [62.149.158.58]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id D84B321F8566 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 15:57:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 18001 invoked by uid 89); 7 Aug 2012 22:57:21 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO smtp8.aruba.it) (62.149.158.228) by smtplq04.aruba.it with SMTP; 7 Aug 2012 22:57:21 -0000
Received: (qmail 13143 invoked by uid 89); 7 Aug 2012 22:57:21 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO ?192.168.1.154?) (alex@meetecho.com@87.11.150.210) by smtp8.ad.aruba.it with ESMTPA; 7 Aug 2012 22:57:21 -0000
Message-ID: <50219D42.2090309@meetecho.com>
Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 00:57:06 +0200
From: Meetecho IETF support <ietf@meetecho.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:14.0) Gecko/20120713 Thunderbird/14.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: siprec@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-15; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Spam-Rating: smtplq04.aruba.it 1.6.2 0/1000/N
Subject: [siprec] Meetecho session recording available
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2012 22:57:24 -0000

Dear all,

the full recording (synchronized video, audio, slides and jabber room)
of SIPREC session at IETF-84 is available.

You can watch it by accessing the following URL:
http://ietf84.conf.meetecho.com/index.php/Recorded_Sessions#IETF84_SIPREC

For the chair(s): please feel free to put the link to the recording in 
the minutes, if you think this might be useful.

In case of problems with the playout, just drop an e-mail to 
team@meetecho.com.

Cheers,
the Meetecho team

-- 
Meetecho s.r.l.
Web Conferencing and Collaboration Tools
www.meetecho.com

From eckelcu@cisco.com  Tue Aug  7 20:57:57 2012
Return-Path: <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BBDD111E8122 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:57 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iOG3SGTXrpZM for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rcdn-iport-2.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-2.cisco.com [173.37.86.73]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE4BA11E811D for <siprec@ietf.org>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:56 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=eckelcu@cisco.com; l=4540; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1344398276; x=1345607876; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:references: in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=laFMiWC9keXundB56JKZb8OqmB9+B2NxSNcih3tEkJ8=; b=RF+9YMcYpeGScYgF8tNRm5kezBSgYP/qMrCZwQbAsmtIMYjoHqKpH/af XTS+Urzx+EeGPwfflpBgSAMR1I8RjTqjJaSf45paaxWVHyfAfZKm1J1M3 ZQtEiZ92RbFidqoRAQ7nJ3c+gzVcIxNmwTVGMk6Gyv0/HZSzXxCbeBccl g=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgAFAHbiIVCtJV2c/2dsb2JhbABFuWqBB4IgAQEBAwEBAQEPASc0CwUHBAIBCBEBAwEBAQoUCQcnCxQDBggCBAENBQgah2UGC5peoEsEiw8ghWBgA6NugWaCX4FX
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,730,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="109418451"
Received: from rcdn-core-5.cisco.com ([173.37.93.156]) by rcdn-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Aug 2012 03:57:56 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x15.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x15.cisco.com [173.37.183.89]) by rcdn-core-5.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q783vu5B028400 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:57:56 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com ([169.254.3.66]) by xhc-rcd-x15.cisco.com ([173.37.183.89]) with mapi id 14.02.0298.004; Tue, 7 Aug 2012 22:57:55 -0500
From: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>
To: "Rosen, Brian" <Brian.Rosen@neustar.biz>, Leon Portman <leon.portman@nice.com>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc	security section
Thread-Index: AQHNdHnd+3o0vD2zmkGHiqYGzfKwcZdOpm4AgABz+sA=
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:57:55 +0000
Message-ID: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz>
In-Reply-To: <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.21.80.120]
x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-10.2.0.1135-7.000.1014-19092.001
x-tm-as-result: No--57.539300-8.000000-31
x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: No
x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc	security	section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 03:57:57 -0000

Hi Brian,

I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see inline for =
additional comments.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Rosen, Brian
> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
> To: Leon Portman
> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc securi=
ty
> section
>=20
> In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that the retri=
eval
> is out of scope.  Maybe reword
> > The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.
> The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of recording,=
 but
> because the retriever is another party to the recording session, item 2 i=
s
> reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
> > pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be bett=
er.
> to
> The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is out of sco=
pe.
> Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the security
> implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party to the cal=
l that
> was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the reverse =
of
> item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less strong than
> used on the RS, and may need to be better.
>=20
>=20
> On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
>=20
> > Brian, Thank you
> >
> > I will update the architecture draft.
> >
> > Leon
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
> > Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
> > To: siprec@ietf.org
> > Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security
> section
> >
> > In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the context =
of
> the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's security
> section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
> >
> > 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the CS, a=
nd
> may need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing more
> possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on the
> storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized retrie=
val
> interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
> Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
> > 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the client=
 must
> be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It is les=
s
> important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations must
> have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some environments=
,
> it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This means the
> same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media is
> encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism is th=
e
> same on the CS as the RS.

I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the RS, it co=
uld be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the key could be th=
e same despite the keying mechanism being different, with the SRC providing=
 the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the SRC and SR=
S. This recommendation would be added to the protocol draft.

Cheers,
Charles

> That has implications on mandatory to implement
> keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS, and is
> re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document doesn't
> discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security implicati=
ons
> on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the retriever=
 is
> another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the client m=
ust
> be authenticated.  The c
>  ry
> > pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be bett=
er.
> >
> > Brian
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From eckelcu@cisco.com  Tue Aug  7 20:57:58 2012
Return-Path: <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2F7011E8123 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:58 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id S6E12rcd92f0 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rcdn-iport-5.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-5.cisco.com [173.37.86.76]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D370911E811D for <siprec@ietf.org>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:57 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=eckelcu@cisco.com; l=8677; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1344398278; x=1345607878; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:references: in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=yn5slLzMyRYDDS/9NM+hmjpH/4zbZJ6HBJJfr0m9ASs=; b=mln01wviCsrbkPNsTqIdACl7aYx3XYyDpctWdadMJ4JDN46mIstGN6g3 JYo6mCZM1hlwCeceqqUQf6J8iY9kaBf+hb9F06JCub3bGXP1iW6MTtZHP mpQqLK8WH/TAGuKiDg2RYexwPyCmL5Q6lWCbg0YCpwcmUtwVDTmTkD9Rm M=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgAFADfjIVCtJXG9/2dsb2JhbAA7Cg65XIEHgiABAQEEAQEBDwEnLQcLDAQCAQgOAwQBAQEKFAkHJwsUCQgBAQQOBQgTB4drC5paoEsEiw8QCoVmYAOjboFmgiY5gV8
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,730,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="109436360"
Received: from rcdn-core2-2.cisco.com ([173.37.113.189]) by rcdn-iport-5.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Aug 2012 03:57:57 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x14.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x14.cisco.com [173.37.183.88]) by rcdn-core2-2.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q783vvda015809 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:57:57 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com ([169.254.3.66]) by xhc-rcd-x14.cisco.com ([173.37.183.88]) with mapi id 14.02.0298.004; Tue, 7 Aug 2012 22:57:56 -0500
From: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>
To: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>, "Ravindran, Parthasarathi" <pravindran@sonusnet.com>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] comments on draft-ietf-siprec-metadata-07
Thread-Index: Ac1vjQDN8zXHYxh0TdyfDVEBhvV+iQAR8QOAAFe194AAOkhiAAC5/Kxw
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:57:56 +0000
Message-ID: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADAE@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
References: <059AF07365DC474393A19A3AF187DF740806753E@NAHALD.us.int.genesyslab.com> <5018C5D5.4090207@alum.mit.edu> <387F9047F55E8C42850AD6B3A7A03C6C2BD148A5@inba-mail02.sonusnet.com> <501C9994.8020207@alum.mit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <501C9994.8020207@alum.mit.edu>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.21.80.120]
x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-10.2.0.1135-7.000.1014-19092.001
x-tm-as-result: No--68.530400-8.000000-31
x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: No
x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] comments on draft-ietf-siprec-metadata-07
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 03:57:59 -0000

Hi Paul,

Thank you for the detailed description of the problem and the proposed solu=
tion. I must admit, I was completely confused by the discussion of this top=
ic during the working group session. Having had a chance now to read throug=
h your e-mail, I am pretty sure I get it, and I like your proposed solution=
 as well. It provides the flexibility required for the turret case to be su=
pported as described, yet it does not complicate the more typical case, nor=
 does it add the undesirable burden of dealing with compound keys.

Thanks,
Charles

> -----Original Message-----
> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Paul Kyzivat
> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 8:40 PM
> To: Ravindran, Parthasarathi
> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [siprec] comments on draft-ietf-siprec-metadata-07
>=20
> On 8/2/12 4:51 PM, Ravindran, Parthasarathi wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > As discussed today meeting, Paul mentioned below metadata model
> change is an alternative which clarifies the stream XML element usage
> within the specific single CS instead of spread across. I'm interested in
> hearing anybody has objection to this change.
>=20
>=20
> In followup to the presentation at the meeting, which probably wasn't
> very clear...
>=20
> (This will be longer than I'd like, but I don't know how to say it more
> concisely.)
>=20
> In metadata-07 we have the following model:
>=20
>                                     Participant
>                                 | 0..*       1..*|
>                         receives|                |sends
>                                 | 0..*       0..*|
>                              +-------------------------+
>                              |          Media Stream   |
>                              |                         |
>     Communication 1..*  0..* +-------------------------+
>       Session    ------------|                         |
>                              |  Media Stream Reference |
>                              |  Content-type           |
>                              |                         |
>                              +-------------------------+
>=20
> Note that a Media Stream can associate with one or more Communication
> Sessions.
>=20
> One issue with this is that we had wanted to allow a media stream with
> zero sessions. That's an easy change.
>=20
> Normally there would be no need for a media stream to associate with
> more than one CS. We made the change to allow multiple to accommodate
> the Turret use case, where there is a desire to record a mix of streams
> from multiple CSs.
>=20
> What we ended up with for the XML of the Media Stream element in
> metadata-07 is called <stream>, has two attributes, identifying the
> stream itself as well as a Communication Session.
>=20
> If you never think about streams that associate with more than one one
> CS, this seems reasonable. You can then think of it as a stream element
> with one attribute identifying its key, and another non-key attribute
> identifying the CS its associated with.
>=20
> But if you attempt to do an example where a media stream associates with
> multiple CSs (see section 4.6 of draft-ram-siprec-callflows-01) it gets
> weird. Because we need to identify two CSs, and can only do one per
> <stream>, we need two instances of <stream>. But because they are
> supposed to be the same stream, they must have the same stream id. We
> can see that in 4.6:
>=20
>            <stream id=3D"UAAMm5GRQKSCMVvLyl4rFw=3D=3D"
>                session=3D"hVpd7YQgRW2nD22h7q60JQ=3D=3D">
>                <label>96</label>
>            </stream>
>            <stream id=3D"UAAMm5GRQKSCMVvLyl4rFw=3D=3D"
>                session=3D"zzlafnvvjlCHllaHF6mn8kkSS=3D=3D">
>                <label>96</label>
>            </stream>
>=20
>=20
> In the above, both have the same id=3D, and are distinguished by differin=
g
> session=3D values. If <stream> had only one key attribute, then the 2nd o=
f
> these would *replace* the first. For that not to happen, both the 'id'
> and 'session' attributes must be key attributes.
>=20
> The XML representing senders and receivers only identifies the 'id' of
> the stream, such as:
>=20
>            <participantstreamassoc
>                participant=3D"zSfPoSvdSDCmU3A3TRDxAw=3D=3D">
>              <send>UAAMm5GRQKSCMVvLyl4rFw=3D=3D</send>
>              <recv>UAAMm5GRQKSCMVvLyl4rFw=3D=3D</recv>
>            </participantstreamassoc>
>=20
> This isn't consistent with the model. In the XML, regular elements have
> a single key attribute that identifies the element itself. Assoc
> elements have two key attributes that identify the keys of the two
> elements they associate. So our XML is more consistent with:
>=20
>                              +-------------------------+
>                              |        Media Stream     |
>                              |                         |
>     Communication 1..*  0..* +-------------------------+
>       Session    ------------|                         |
>                      |       |  Media Stream Reference |
>                      |       |  Content-type           |
>                      |       |                         |
>                      |       +-------------------------+
>                      |
>                      |       +-------------------------+
>                      |       |   MediaStream_CS_Assoc  |
>                      +-------|                         |
>                              +-------------------------+
>=20
> But not quite, because we don't have two XML types. Rather we have one
> XML element called <stream> that has the two keys of the association
> class, but also carries the attributes of the Media Stream. But the
> <send> and <recv> reference the single 'id' of Media Stream that isn't
> explicitly coded at all.
>=20
> This disturbs me. Its inconsistent with the way the rest of the model is
> represented.
>=20
> So the way I propose to fix this is to change the model a bit:
>=20
>                                     Participant
>                                 | 0..*       1..*|
>                         receives|                |sends
>                                 | 0..*       0..*|
>                              +-------------------------+
>                              |          Media Stream   |
>                              |                         |
>     Communication 0..1  0..* +-------------------------+
>       Session    ------------|                         |
>                              |  Media Stream Reference |
>                              |  Content-type           |
>                              |                         |
>                              +-------------------------+
>=20
> In this model, a Media Stream can associate with at most one CS. No
> association class is needed. The association can be represented in XML
> as an optional attribute of <stream>.
>=20
> This appears not to support the turret case. I propose to address that
> simply by having multiple distinct instances of <stream> reference a
> common m-line by using the same <label> value. The schema looks very
> much the same, but the 'session' attribute of <stream> is becomes a
> non-key attribute, and is optional.
>=20
> So in the turret example, the two streams will have different values of
> the 'id' attribute.
>=20
> I think the change to the schema in metadata-07 will be simple:
>=20
> OLD:
>=20
>     <xs:complexType name=3D"stream">
> ...
>         <xs:attribute name=3D"stream_id" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
>              use=3D"required"/>
>         <xs:attribute name=3D"session_id" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
>              use=3D"required"/>
>     </xs:complexType>
>=20
> NEW:
>=20
>     <xs:complexType name=3D"stream">
> ...
>        <xs:attribute name=3D"id" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
>              use=3D"required"/>
>         <xs:attribute name=3D"session_id" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"/>
>     </xs:complexType>
>=20
> (There has been some flopping around of the name of the first attribute
> between 'id' and 'stream_id'. I don't care, but I think Partha got some
> guidelines that suggest it should be 'id' if it is a single key.)
>=20
> I *hope* this makes things clearer rather than more confusing.
>=20
> 	Thanks,
> 	Paul
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From eckelcu@cisco.com  Tue Aug  7 20:57:59 2012
Return-Path: <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15B9F11E8123 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:59 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id s4YD0otdJ3zL for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com [173.37.86.75]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5BB7011E8122 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Tue,  7 Aug 2012 20:57:58 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=eckelcu@cisco.com; l=2162; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1344398278; x=1345607878; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:references:in-reply-to: content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=hSmpqi1b6U8BBYt5/AwOeaELGs+ddwgFcCV+PgFqzHs=; b=FsKFIXBMxe5vecnpptmScJHx3hH01ByBXz4DYPqhONwmWIAxdJtyJS3J UnIA9GOLAOLmV+qfUotTp4EkZdfU/A9MMYm7BNiRL2ZgTtusew0ppwkx/ rK2ugPJGuU1KE6/sKZO/UqH6LQDZRcW9v1MG7R91WVsQrF7SOUTK4pw2a Q=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Av8EALriIVCtJV2Z/2dsb2JhbABFuWqBB4IgAQEBBAEBAQ8BJzQXBAIBCBEEAQELFAkHJwsUCQgBAQQBEggBGYdrC5peoE+LDxqFZmADoFSDGoFmgl+BXw
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,730,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="109464483"
Received: from rcdn-core-2.cisco.com ([173.37.93.153]) by rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Aug 2012 03:57:58 +0000
Received: from xhc-aln-x14.cisco.com (xhc-aln-x14.cisco.com [173.36.12.88]) by rcdn-core-2.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q783vviv028236 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:57:57 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com ([169.254.3.66]) by xhc-aln-x14.cisco.com ([173.36.12.88]) with mapi id 14.02.0283.003; Tue, 7 Aug 2012 22:57:57 -0500
From: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>
To: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
Thread-Index: Ac10ngaWJceBMVsMR3azLl+NbP1UIAAZ4VDg
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:57:57 +0000
Message-ID: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADB5@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
References: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0762EA@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
In-Reply-To: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0762EA@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.21.80.120]
x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-10.2.0.1135-7.000.1014-19092.001
x-tm-as-result: No--31.890400-8.000000-31
x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: No
x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 03:57:59 -0000

I see two places in which the INSIPID work could apply to SIPREC.
1) if the SRC relies on inclusion of the INSIPID Session-ID as the actual i=
dentifier in the SIPREC metadata it send to the SRS to enable the SRS to co=
rrelate multiple RSs for the same CS, or for CSs for the same INSIPID sessi=
on ID.
2) if the SRC uses the INSIPID Session-ID to help it determine when multipl=
e CSs are in fact related to each other (i.e. corresponding to the same INS=
IPID Session-ID).

(1) could result in INSIPID being required for SIPREC.
(2) could result in INSIPID being valuable for SIPREC.

I do not think we have, or should, mandate (1) as it adds an unnecessary de=
pendency for INSIPID within SIPREC.

Cheers,
Charles=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Hutton, Andrew
> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:11 AM
> To: siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC=
 etc.
>=20
> Hi All,
>=20
> Have you seen the discussion in the INSIPID WG regarding the scope of thi=
s
> WG and the use cases for generating and end to end session identifier if =
not
> have a look at http://www.ietf.org/mail-
> archive/web/insipid/current/msg00255.html.
>=20
> I am interested in the opinions of the SIPREC WG members on the following
> questions.
>=20
> 1. Does SIPREC still need such an end to end session identifier and if so=
 how
> would we use it in the current metadata model as the communication
> session identifier or something else?
> 2. If SIPREC does need such an identifier is it important that the 3PCC c=
ase is
> covered so for example when an SRC is the 3rd party controller that such =
an
> end to end session identifier is generated?
> 3. If INSIPID cannot create such an identifier for the communication sess=
ion
> do we need to create a communication session identifier for use in SIPREC=
?
>=20
> Regards
> Andy (SIPREC Co-Chair).
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com  Wed Aug  8 05:16:52 2012
Return-Path: <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2AE021F859F for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 05:16:52 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.562
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.562 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.037,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vFbCNnXoz6lA for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 05:16:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com [62.134.46.9]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CFA421F8564 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 05:16:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net (unknown [172.29.42.235]) by senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (Server) with ESMTP id 2393C1EB8414; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 14:16:49 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net ([169.254.1.39]) by MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net ([172.29.42.235]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Wed, 8 Aug 2012 14:16:48 +0200
From: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
To: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
Thread-Index: AQHNdV+vIutawr71Lk6gwnJXf09HfA==
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 12:16:48 +0000
Message-ID: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF086240@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
References: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0762EA@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADB5@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADB5@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [172.29.42.225]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 12:16:52 -0000

Hi Charles,

I agree we should not have any dependency on INSIPID so relying on the INSI=
PID Session-ID as the actions communication session identifier does not loo=
k like a good idea.

However I though the main use of the INSIPID Session-ID in SIPREC was for t=
he SRS to be able to determine that it is receiving media relating to the s=
ame CS from different SRC's.  Again this would result in the INSIPID being =
valuable for SIPREC but no dependency but if this was the case we may want =
to specify where it appears in the metadata.

Regards
Andy=20



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Charles Eckel (eckelcu) [mailto:eckelcu@cisco.com]
> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
> To: Hutton, Andrew; siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session
> identifies, 3PCC etc.
>=20
> I see two places in which the INSIPID work could apply to SIPREC.
> 1) if the SRC relies on inclusion of the INSIPID Session-ID as the
> actual identifier in the SIPREC metadata it send to the SRS to enable
> the SRS to correlate multiple RSs for the same CS, or for CSs for the
> same INSIPID session ID.
> 2) if the SRC uses the INSIPID Session-ID to help it determine when
> multiple CSs are in fact related to each other (i.e. corresponding to
> the same INSIPID Session-ID).
>=20
> (1) could result in INSIPID being required for SIPREC.
> (2) could result in INSIPID being valuable for SIPREC.
>=20
> I do not think we have, or should, mandate (1) as it adds an
> unnecessary dependency for INSIPID within SIPREC.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Charles
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf
> > Of Hutton, Andrew
> > Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:11 AM
> > To: siprec@ietf.org
> > Subject: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies,
> 3PCC etc.
> >
> > Hi All,
> >
> > Have you seen the discussion in the INSIPID WG regarding the scope of
> this
> > WG and the use cases for generating and end to end session identifier
> if not
> > have a look at http://www.ietf.org/mail-
> > archive/web/insipid/current/msg00255.html.
> >
> > I am interested in the opinions of the SIPREC WG members on the
> following
> > questions.
> >
> > 1. Does SIPREC still need such an end to end session identifier and
> if so how
> > would we use it in the current metadata model as the communication
> > session identifier or something else?
> > 2. If SIPREC does need such an identifier is it important that the
> 3PCC case is
> > covered so for example when an SRC is the 3rd party controller that
> such an
> > end to end session identifier is generated?
> > 3. If INSIPID cannot create such an identifier for the communication
> session
> > do we need to create a communication session identifier for use in
> SIPREC?
> >
> > Regards
> > Andy (SIPREC Co-Chair).
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com  Wed Aug  8 05:49:42 2012
Return-Path: <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D132421F859F for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 05:49:41 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.563
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.563 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.036,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id D-GmQCcR8Tnc for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 05:49:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com [62.134.46.10]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0F3521F857D for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 05:49:40 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net (unknown [172.29.42.235]) by senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (Server) with ESMTP id 6679323F04E3; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 14:49:39 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net ([169.254.1.39]) by MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net ([172.29.42.235]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Wed, 8 Aug 2012 14:49:39 +0200
From: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
To: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>, "Rosen, Brian" <Brian.Rosen@neustar.biz>, Leon Portman <leon.portman@nice.com>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
Thread-Index: AQHNdHnd+3o0vD2zmkGHiqYGzfKwcZdOpm4AgABz+sCAAL9bUA==
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 12:49:38 +0000
Message-ID: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [172.29.42.225]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security	section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 12:49:42 -0000

Hi,

I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which makes it c=
lear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of SIPREC.

I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on the RS and =
really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the conclusion from our =
session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the security section o=
f the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific recommendati=
ons regarding the keying mechanism however we would for example need to mak=
e some statements such as stating that TLS must be used for SIP if SDES is =
deployed.

Regards
Andy (As an individual).




> -----Original Message-----
> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
> To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> security section
>=20
> Hi Brian,
>=20
> I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see inline
> for additional comments.
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf
> > Of Rosen, Brian
> > Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
> > To: Leon Portman
> > Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> security
> > section
> >
> > In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that the
> retrieval
> > is out of scope.  Maybe reword
> > > The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded
> media.
> > The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
> recording, but
> > because the retriever is another party to the recording session, item
> 2 is
> > reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
> > > pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
> better.
> > to
> > The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is out of
> scope.
> > Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the security
> > implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party to the
> call that
> > was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the
> reverse of
> > item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less strong
> than
> > used on the RS, and may need to be better.
> >
> >
> > On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
> >
> > > Brian, Thank you
> > >
> > > I will update the architecture draft.
> > >
> > > Leon
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
> > > Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
> > > To: siprec@ietf.org
> > > Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> security
> > section
> > >
> > > In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
> context of
> > the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
> security
> > section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
> > >
> > > 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the
> CS, and
> > may need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing
> more
> > possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on
> the
> > storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized
> retrieval
> > interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
> > Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
> > > 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the
> client must
> > be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It is
> less
> > important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations must
> > have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
> environments,
> > it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This means
> the
> > same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media is
> > encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism
> is the
> > same on the CS as the RS.
>=20
> I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the RS,
> it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the key
> could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different, with
> the SRC providing the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
> For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the SRC
> and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol draft.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Charles
>=20
> > That has implications on mandatory to implement
> > keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS, and
> is
> > re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
> doesn't
> > discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
> implications
> > on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
> retriever is
> > another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the
> client must
> > be authenticated.  The c
> >  ry
> > > pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
> better.
> > >
> > > Brian
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > siprec mailing list
> > > siprec@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > siprec mailing list
> > > siprec@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu  Wed Aug  8 07:06:01 2012
Return-Path: <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9FD9021F854A for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 07:06:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.288
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.288 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.311,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IT7Ue9s5HCk7 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 07:06:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from qmta09.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net (qmta09.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net [76.96.62.96]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B088721F8592 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 07:05:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from omta08.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.62.12]) by qmta09.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id kBgv1j0020Fqzac59E62jD; Wed, 08 Aug 2012 14:06:02 +0000
Received: from Paul-Kyzivats-MacBook-Pro.local ([50.138.229.164]) by omta08.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id kE5w1j00M3ZTu2S3UE5w1y; Wed, 08 Aug 2012 14:05:56 +0000
Message-ID: <50227245.4000200@alum.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 07:05:57 -0700
From: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:12.0) Gecko/20120428 Thunderbird/12.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: siprec@ietf.org
References: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0762EA@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADB5@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF086240@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
In-Reply-To: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF086240@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: Re: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 14:06:01 -0000

On 8/8/12 5:16 AM, Hutton, Andrew wrote:
> Hi Charles,
>
> I agree we should not have any dependency on INSIPID so relying on the INSIPID Session-ID as the actions communication session identifier does not look like a good idea.
>
> However I though the main use of the INSIPID Session-ID in SIPREC was for the SRS to be able to determine that it is receiving media relating to the same CS from different SRC's.  Again this would result in the INSIPID being valuable for SIPREC but no dependency but if this was the case we may want to specify where it appears in the metadata.

Ideally we would provide an optional attribute in the metadata for this.
But the timing might prevent us from doing that. I expect that we will 
be publishing our metadata draft before insipid has finalized what it is 
going to do. So we may have to leave that as an extension.

(AFAIK it should even be possible to publish an extension to our 
metadata as part of the draft that comes out of INSIPID.)

	Thanks,
	Paul

> Regards
> Andy
>
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Charles Eckel (eckelcu) [mailto:eckelcu@cisco.com]
>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
>> To: Hutton, Andrew; siprec@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session
>> identifies, 3PCC etc.
>>
>> I see two places in which the INSIPID work could apply to SIPREC.
>> 1) if the SRC relies on inclusion of the INSIPID Session-ID as the
>> actual identifier in the SIPREC metadata it send to the SRS to enable
>> the SRS to correlate multiple RSs for the same CS, or for CSs for the
>> same INSIPID session ID.
>> 2) if the SRC uses the INSIPID Session-ID to help it determine when
>> multiple CSs are in fact related to each other (i.e. corresponding to
>> the same INSIPID Session-ID).
>>
>> (1) could result in INSIPID being required for SIPREC.
>> (2) could result in INSIPID being valuable for SIPREC.
>>
>> I do not think we have, or should, mandate (1) as it adds an
>> unnecessary dependency for INSIPID within SIPREC.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Charles
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>> Behalf
>>> Of Hutton, Andrew
>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:11 AM
>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies,
>> 3PCC etc.
>>>
>>> Hi All,
>>>
>>> Have you seen the discussion in the INSIPID WG regarding the scope of
>> this
>>> WG and the use cases for generating and end to end session identifier
>> if not
>>> have a look at http://www.ietf.org/mail-
>>> archive/web/insipid/current/msg00255.html.
>>>
>>> I am interested in the opinions of the SIPREC WG members on the
>> following
>>> questions.
>>>
>>> 1. Does SIPREC still need such an end to end session identifier and
>> if so how
>>> would we use it in the current metadata model as the communication
>>> session identifier or something else?
>>> 2. If SIPREC does need such an identifier is it important that the
>> 3PCC case is
>>> covered so for example when an SRC is the 3rd party controller that
>> such an
>>> end to end session identifier is generated?
>>> 3. If INSIPID cannot create such an identifier for the communication
>> session
>>> do we need to create a communication session identifier for use in
>> SIPREC?
>>>
>>> Regards
>>> Andy (SIPREC Co-Chair).
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> siprec mailing list
>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>


From andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com  Wed Aug  8 08:30:00 2012
Return-Path: <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A81F711E80F2 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 08:30:00 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.564
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.564 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.035,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id t61LxgDWuWz7 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 08:29:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com [62.134.46.10]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A4DE11E80ED for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 08:29:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net (unknown [172.29.42.235]) by senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (Server) with ESMTP id 70D7723F0518; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 17:29:58 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net ([169.254.1.39]) by MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net ([172.29.42.235]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Wed, 8 Aug 2012 17:29:58 +0200
From: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
To: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>, "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>, "Rosen, Brian" <Brian.Rosen@neustar.biz>, Leon Portman <leon.portman@nice.com>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the	Architecture	doc	security section
Thread-Index: AQHNdXqqcOYQYL4q1Eimnc93kv/Yxw==
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 15:29:57 +0000
Message-ID: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF086604@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
In-Reply-To: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [172.29.42.225]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the	Architecture	doc	security	section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 15:30:00 -0000

A comment on my own comment below.

Regards
Andy

> -----Original Message-----
> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of Hutton, Andrew
> Sent: 08 August 2012 13:50
> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman;
> siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> security section
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which makes
> it clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of
> SIPREC.
>=20
> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on the RS
> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the conclusion
> from our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the
> security section of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making
> specific recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we
> would for example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS
> must be used for SIP if SDES is deployed.

[AndyH] - Having just been through the notes and the meetecho video then I =
have to say we did not conclude that we should avoid specific recommendatio=
ns the only conclusion was that we need to do so work on crafting the secur=
ity considerations in both the protocol and architecture spec and that more=
 discussion is needed on the list.


>=20
> Regards
> Andy (As an individual).
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
> > Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
> > To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
> > Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> > security section
> >
> > Hi Brian,
> >
> > I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see
> inline
> > for additional comments.
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > Behalf
> > > Of Rosen, Brian
> > > Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
> > > To: Leon Portman
> > > Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> > security
> > > section
> > >
> > > In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that the
> > retrieval
> > > is out of scope.  Maybe reword
> > > > The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded
> > media.
> > > The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
> > recording, but
> > > because the retriever is another party to the recording session,
> item
> > 2 is
> > > reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
> > > > pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to
> be
> > better.
> > > to
> > > The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is out
> of
> > scope.
> > > Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the
> security
> > > implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party to
> the
> > call that
> > > was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the
> > reverse of
> > > item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less
> strong
> > than
> > > used on the RS, and may need to be better.
> > >
> > >
> > > On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
> > >
> > > > Brian, Thank you
> > > >
> > > > I will update the architecture draft.
> > > >
> > > > Leon
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > > Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
> > > > Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
> > > > To: siprec@ietf.org
> > > > Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> > security
> > > section
> > > >
> > > > In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
> > context of
> > > the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
> > security
> > > section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
> > > >
> > > > 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the
> > CS, and
> > > may need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing
> > more
> > > possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on
> > the
> > > storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized
> > retrieval
> > > interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
> > > Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
> > > > 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the
> > client must
> > > be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It
> is
> > less
> > > important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations
> must
> > > have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
> > environments,
> > > it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This
> means
> > the
> > > same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media
> is
> > > encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism
> > is the
> > > same on the CS as the RS.
> >
> > I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the RS,
> > it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the key
> > could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different, with
> > the SRC providing the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
> > For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the SRC
> > and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol draft.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Charles
> >
> > > That has implications on mandatory to implement
> > > keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS,
> and
> > is
> > > re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
> > doesn't
> > > discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
> > implications
> > > on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
> > retriever is
> > > another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the
> > client must
> > > be authenticated.  The c
> > >  ry
> > > > pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to
> be
> > better.
> > > >
> > > > Brian
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > siprec mailing list
> > > > siprec@ietf.org
> > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > siprec mailing list
> > > > siprec@ietf.org
> > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > siprec mailing list
> > > siprec@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From eckelcu@cisco.com  Wed Aug  8 08:57:48 2012
Return-Path: <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA5C211E8106 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 08:57:48 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id s7ThgalEGbSl for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 08:57:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rcdn-iport-6.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-6.cisco.com [173.37.86.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A241921F86B6 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 08:57:47 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=eckelcu@cisco.com; l=7978; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1344441467; x=1345651067; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:references:in-reply-to: content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=qRX0QhLQDOVA7dxNPhGU2uvJj3dFs1MCQZTQHtkh7Tg=; b=jdOh8IILODvGjrEJH/LOExu2/pjJugWxD5sIGqbafAQjomEKkOslHH+c Zi1+VnnjTNqaOip59npVvzL0TjFabXIg03hMGehxUXSq4z21vaQD8rlqU d3nFfQAG+IbAeBI7zxUCDrb+zu66y7+Lwb5V/AQL/2cStf4n5soVBQ4sR E=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Av8EABuMIlCtJV2d/2dsb2JhbABFuVyBB4IgAQEBBAEBAQ8BJy4GFwQCAQgRAQMBAQEKFAkHJwsUAwYIAgQBEggah2sLmnGgOgSLEiCFYGADo3KBZoJfgVc
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,733,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="109617171"
Received: from rcdn-core-6.cisco.com ([173.37.93.157]) by rcdn-iport-6.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Aug 2012 15:57:47 +0000
Received: from xhc-aln-x01.cisco.com (xhc-aln-x01.cisco.com [173.36.12.75]) by rcdn-core-6.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q78FvlhF010328 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Wed, 8 Aug 2012 15:57:47 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com ([169.254.3.66]) by xhc-aln-x01.cisco.com ([173.36.12.75]) with mapi id 14.02.0298.004; Wed, 8 Aug 2012 10:57:46 -0500
From: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>
To: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>, "Rosen, Brian" <Brian.Rosen@neustar.biz>, Leon Portman <leon.portman@nice.com>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
Thread-Index: AQHNdWRGftdaEyHu60mdGI3Ieh2IbZdQDS/g
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 15:57:45 +0000
Message-ID: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
In-Reply-To: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.21.80.120]
x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-10.2.0.1135-7.000.1014-19092.004
x-tm-as-result: No--68.815900-8.000000-31
x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: No
x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security	section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 15:57:49 -0000

Hi Andy,

Let me try to clarify. The part of the suggested text that I see as problem=
atic is the following:

" 3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt th=
e media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only work=
s when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keyi=
ng mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has implications on man=
datory to implement keying mechanisms."

The point I was trying to make was that using the same key in the CS as in =
the RS does NOT imply that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS as th=
e RS. An example of such as case is a SRC using SDES in the CS and EKT in t=
he RS.=20
With that in mind, I think it would be useful to add a description of this =
to the security section of the protocol draft along, possibly with a recomm=
endation for EKT support by at least the SRC and potentially for recording =
aware UAs and the SRS as well. In this case,  support for media encryption =
using SRTP with SDES may be required for recording-aware UAs, the SRC and t=
he SRS, and DTLS/SRTP with EKT may be recommended. Any such requirements/re=
commendation would be in the protocol draft, not the architecture. Interwor=
king with RTCWEB is one case in which support for EKT in the SRC would be u=
seful. Interworking with a SIPREC aware conference server that supports EKT=
 is another.

Cheers,
Charles

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hutton, Andrew [mailto:andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 5:50 AM
> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman; siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc securi=
ty
> section
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which makes it
> clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of SIPREC.
>=20
> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on the RS
> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the conclusion fro=
m
> our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the security sec=
tion
> of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific
> recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we would for
> example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS must be
> used for SIP if SDES is deployed.
>=20
> Regards
> Andy (As an individual).
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
> > Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
> > To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
> > Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> > security section
> >
> > Hi Brian,
> >
> > I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see inline
> > for additional comments.
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > Behalf
> > > Of Rosen, Brian
> > > Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
> > > To: Leon Portman
> > > Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> > security
> > > section
> > >
> > > In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that the
> > retrieval
> > > is out of scope.  Maybe reword
> > > > The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded
> > media.
> > > The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
> > recording, but
> > > because the retriever is another party to the recording session, item
> > 2 is
> > > reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
> > > > pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
> > better.
> > > to
> > > The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is out of
> > scope.
> > > Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the security
> > > implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party to the
> > call that
> > > was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the
> > reverse of
> > > item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less strong
> > than
> > > used on the RS, and may need to be better.
> > >
> > >
> > > On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
> > >
> > > > Brian, Thank you
> > > >
> > > > I will update the architecture draft.
> > > >
> > > > Leon
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > > Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
> > > > Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
> > > > To: siprec@ietf.org
> > > > Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> > security
> > > section
> > > >
> > > > In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
> > context of
> > > the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
> > security
> > > section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
> > > >
> > > > 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the
> > CS, and
> > > may need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing
> > more
> > > possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on
> > the
> > > storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized
> > retrieval
> > > interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
> > > Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
> > > > 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the
> > client must
> > > be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It is
> > less
> > > important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations must
> > > have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
> > environments,
> > > it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This means
> > the
> > > same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media is
> > > encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism
> > is the
> > > same on the CS as the RS.
> >
> > I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the RS,
> > it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the key
> > could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different, with
> > the SRC providing the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
> > For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the SRC
> > and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol draft.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Charles
> >
> > > That has implications on mandatory to implement
> > > keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS,
> and
> > is
> > > re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
> > doesn't
> > > discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
> > implications
> > > on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
> > retriever is
> > > another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the
> > client must
> > > be authenticated.  The c
> > >  ry
> > > > pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
> > better.
> > > >
> > > > Brian
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > siprec mailing list
> > > > siprec@ietf.org
> > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > siprec mailing list
> > > > siprec@ietf.org
> > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > siprec mailing list
> > > siprec@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu  Wed Aug  8 09:26:44 2012
Return-Path: <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2CAC621F8747 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 09:26:44 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.296
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.296 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.303,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id o2qI6DID1XfY for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 09:26:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from qmta15.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net (qmta15.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net [76.96.59.228]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E2B2921F8744 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 09:26:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from omta19.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.62.98]) by qmta15.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id kBku1j00127AodY5FGSwYY; Wed, 08 Aug 2012 16:26:56 +0000
Received: from Paul-Kyzivats-MacBook-Pro.local ([50.138.229.164]) by omta19.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id kGSx1j00B3ZTu2S3fGSx6N; Wed, 08 Aug 2012 16:26:57 +0000
Message-ID: <50229341.5010800@alum.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 09:26:41 -0700
From: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:12.0) Gecko/20120428 Thunderbird/12.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: siprec@ietf.org
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 16:26:44 -0000

I don't think we need to *recommend* that the SRC/SRC implement EKT.
It should be sufficient to point out what becomes possible if it is 
implemented.

	Thanks,
	Paul

On 8/8/12 8:57 AM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> Let me try to clarify. The part of the suggested text that I see as problematic is the following:
>
> " 3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has implications on mandatory to implement keying mechanisms."
>
> The point I was trying to make was that using the same key in the CS as in the RS does NOT imply that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS. An example of such as case is a SRC using SDES in the CS and EKT in the RS.
> With that in mind, I think it would be useful to add a description of this to the security section of the protocol draft along, possibly with a recommendation for EKT support by at least the SRC and potentially for recording aware UAs and the SRS as well. In this case,  support for media encryption using SRTP with SDES may be required for recording-aware UAs, the SRC and the SRS, and DTLS/SRTP with EKT may be recommended. Any such requirements/recommendation would be in the protocol draft, not the architecture. Interworking with RTCWEB is one case in which support for EKT in the SRC would be useful. Interworking with a SIPREC aware conference server that supports EKT is another.
>
> Cheers,
> Charles
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Hutton, Andrew [mailto:andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 5:50 AM
>> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman; siprec@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc security
>> section
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which makes it
>> clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of SIPREC.
>>
>> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on the RS
>> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the conclusion from
>> our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the security section
>> of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific
>> recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we would for
>> example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS must be
>> used for SIP if SDES is deployed.
>>
>> Regards
>> Andy (As an individual).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>> Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
>>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
>>> To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>> security section
>>>
>>> Hi Brian,
>>>
>>> I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see inline
>>> for additional comments.
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>> Behalf
>>>> Of Rosen, Brian
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
>>>> To: Leon Portman
>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>> security
>>>> section
>>>>
>>>> In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that the
>>> retrieval
>>>> is out of scope.  Maybe reword
>>>>> The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded
>>> media.
>>>> The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
>>> recording, but
>>>> because the retriever is another party to the recording session, item
>>> 2 is
>>>> reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
>>> better.
>>>> to
>>>> The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is out of
>>> scope.
>>>> Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the security
>>>> implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party to the
>>> call that
>>>> was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the
>>> reverse of
>>>> item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less strong
>>> than
>>>> used on the RS, and may need to be better.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Brian, Thank you
>>>>>
>>>>> I will update the architecture draft.
>>>>>
>>>>> Leon
>>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>> Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
>>>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>> security
>>>> section
>>>>>
>>>>> In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
>>> context of
>>>> the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
>>> security
>>>> section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the
>>> CS, and
>>>> may need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing
>>> more
>>>> possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on
>>> the
>>>> storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized
>>> retrieval
>>>> interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
>>>> Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
>>>>> 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the
>>> client must
>>>> be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It is
>>> less
>>>> important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations must
>>>> have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
>>> environments,
>>>> it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This means
>>> the
>>>> same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media is
>>>> encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism
>>> is the
>>>> same on the CS as the RS.
>>>
>>> I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the RS,
>>> it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the key
>>> could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different, with
>>> the SRC providing the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
>>> For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the SRC
>>> and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol draft.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Charles
>>>
>>>> That has implications on mandatory to implement
>>>> keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS,
>> and
>>> is
>>>> re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
>>> doesn't
>>>> discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
>>> implications
>>>> on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
>>> retriever is
>>>> another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the
>>> client must
>>>> be authenticated.  The c
>>>>   ry
>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
>>> better.
>>>>>
>>>>> Brian
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> siprec mailing list
>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>


From andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com  Wed Aug  8 12:14:30 2012
Return-Path: <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE34621F86C1 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 12:14:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.565
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.565 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.034,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id m9-yHdzs5giV for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 12:14:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com [62.134.46.9]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4393221F86B7 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 12:14:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from MCHP01HTC.global-ad.net (unknown [172.29.42.234]) by senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (Server) with ESMTP id B44101EB84CD; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 21:14:27 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net ([169.254.1.39]) by MCHP01HTC.global-ad.net ([172.29.42.234]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Wed, 8 Aug 2012 21:14:27 +0200
From: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
To: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
Thread-Index: AQHNdYKbWqncLQdUMEufPH/TeqG/0ZdQSQjm
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 19:14:26 +0000
Message-ID: <2514F092-EE40-48D9-91DF-6E851534545A@siemens-enterprise.com>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>, <50229341.5010800@alum.mit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <50229341.5010800@alum.mit.edu>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-GB
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 19:14:30 -0000

I agree with Paul and see no reason why we should "recommend" that any comp=
onent in the SIPREC architecture support EKT. If we have to mention EKT, an=
d I am not convinced we do, then it should be sufficient to describe the im=
plications.

Regards
Andy (As an Individual)




On 8 Aug 2012, at 17:26, "Paul Kyzivat" <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu> wrote:

> I don't think we need to *recommend* that the SRC/SRC implement EKT.
> It should be sufficient to point out what becomes possible if it is imple=
mented.
>=20
>    Thanks,
>    Paul
>=20
> On 8/8/12 8:57 AM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) wrote:
>> Hi Andy,
>>=20
>> Let me try to clarify. The part of the suggested text that I see as prob=
lematic is the following:
>>=20
>> " 3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt=
 the media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only w=
orks when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the k=
eying mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has implications on =
mandatory to implement keying mechanisms."
>>=20
>> The point I was trying to make was that using the same key in the CS as =
in the RS does NOT imply that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS as=
 the RS. An example of such as case is a SRC using SDES in the CS and EKT i=
n the RS.
>> With that in mind, I think it would be useful to add a description of th=
is to the security section of the protocol draft along, possibly with a rec=
ommendation for EKT support by at least the SRC and potentially for recordi=
ng aware UAs and the SRS as well. In this case,  support for media encrypti=
on using SRTP with SDES may be required for recording-aware UAs, the SRC an=
d the SRS, and DTLS/SRTP with EKT may be recommended. Any such requirements=
/recommendation would be in the protocol draft, not the architecture. Inter=
working with RTCWEB is one case in which support for EKT in the SRC would b=
e useful. Interworking with a SIPREC aware conference server that supports =
EKT is another.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> Charles
>>=20
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Hutton, Andrew [mailto:andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com]
>>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 5:50 AM
>>> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman; siprec@ietf.or=
g
>>> Subject: RE: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc secu=
rity
>>> section
>>>=20
>>> Hi,
>>>=20
>>> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which makes =
it
>>> clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of SIPREC.
>>>=20
>>> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on the RS
>>> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the conclusion f=
rom
>>> our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the security s=
ection
>>> of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific
>>> recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we would for
>>> example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS must be
>>> used for SIP if SDES is deployed.
>>>=20
>>> Regards
>>> Andy (As an individual).
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>> Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
>>>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
>>>> To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>>> security section
>>>>=20
>>>> Hi Brian,
>>>>=20
>>>> I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see inline
>>>> for additional comments.
>>>>=20
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>> Behalf
>>>>> Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
>>>>> To: Leon Portman
>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>>> security
>>>>> section
>>>>>=20
>>>>> In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that the
>>>> retrieval
>>>>> is out of scope.  Maybe reword
>>>>>> The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded
>>>> media.
>>>>> The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
>>>> recording, but
>>>>> because the retriever is another party to the recording session, item
>>>> 2 is
>>>>> reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
>>>> better.
>>>>> to
>>>>> The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is out of
>>>> scope.
>>>>> Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the security
>>>>> implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party to the
>>>> call that
>>>>> was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the
>>>> reverse of
>>>>> item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less strong
>>>> than
>>>>> used on the RS, and may need to be better.
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Brian, Thank you
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I will update the architecture draft.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Leon
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>> Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>>> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
>>>>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>>> security
>>>>> section
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
>>>> context of
>>>>> the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
>>>> security
>>>>> section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the
>>>> CS, and
>>>>> may need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing
>>>> more
>>>>> possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on
>>>> the
>>>>> storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized
>>>> retrieval
>>>>> interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
>>>>> Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
>>>>>> 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the
>>>> client must
>>>>> be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It is
>>>> less
>>>>> important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations must
>>>>> have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
>>>> environments,
>>>>> it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This means
>>>> the
>>>>> same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media is
>>>>> encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism
>>>> is the
>>>>> same on the CS as the RS.
>>>>=20
>>>> I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the RS,
>>>> it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the key
>>>> could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different, with
>>>> the SRC providing the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
>>>> For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the SRC
>>>> and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol draft.
>>>>=20
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Charles
>>>>=20
>>>>> That has implications on mandatory to implement
>>>>> keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS,
>>> and
>>>> is
>>>>> re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
>>>> doesn't
>>>>> discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
>>>> implications
>>>>> on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
>>>> retriever is
>>>>> another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the
>>>> client must
>>>>> be authenticated.  The c
>>>>>  ry
>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
>>>> better.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Brian
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>=20
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>> _______________________________________________
>> siprec mailing list
>> siprec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From eckelcu@cisco.com  Wed Aug  8 13:48:08 2012
Return-Path: <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C75D321F8566 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:48:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id I1v5DS6Vfq-F for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:48:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rcdn-iport-1.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-1.cisco.com [173.37.86.72]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48CCB21F8565 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:48:07 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=eckelcu@cisco.com; l=10335; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1344458887; x=1345668487; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:references: in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=uKcq3dTsj2osgSlNC04arRbcuQOH7g3RQor56EXteBI=; b=ZpWfUShp4q/y3gOCUtDwFOhIaZEBcqRVkimvb8w/E3ot6usdRiZ12fQM 8Lko3EorlhUCLrfF3PrLBx0Ut53lEyI+CMKiF0jxW/q5xUOw8NJ2zVh9L tqORiD14zkkTE2J/h2b97FRxFiGyEJH/PjgzFo6ohvgvEcyGesxENluz2 I=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgAFAOvPIlCtJXHA/2dsb2JhbABFDrlVgQeCIAEBAQQBAQEPAScuBgsMBAIBCBEBAwEBAQoUCQcnCxQDBggCBAENBQgah2sLmwugQYsSIIVgYAOWXY0VgWaCJjmBVw
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,734,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="109501992"
Received: from rcdn-core2-5.cisco.com ([173.37.113.192]) by rcdn-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Aug 2012 20:48:06 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x06.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x06.cisco.com [173.37.183.80]) by rcdn-core2-5.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q78Km6M3003301 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Wed, 8 Aug 2012 20:48:06 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com ([169.254.3.66]) by xhc-rcd-x06.cisco.com ([173.37.183.80]) with mapi id 14.02.0298.004; Wed, 8 Aug 2012 15:48:06 -0500
From: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>
To: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>, Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
Thread-Index: AQHNdYKbtGwXIgABXEuew5L7fmel9ZdQnNkA///EtNA=
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 20:48:05 +0000
Message-ID: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B162@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>, <50229341.5010800@alum.mit.edu> <2514F092-EE40-48D9-91DF-6E851534545A@siemens-enterprise.com>
In-Reply-To: <2514F092-EE40-48D9-91DF-6E851534545A@siemens-enterprise.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.21.114.222]
x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-10.2.0.1135-7.000.1014-19096.001
x-tm-as-result: No--79.478100-8.000000-31
x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: No
x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 20:48:08 -0000

I believe this works for me as well. Let me summarize to make sure we are a=
ll in agreement.
1) remove "It implies that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS as th=
e RS." from proposed addition to architecture document.
2) mention in security section of protocol draft that EKT may optionally be=
 used to interwork with SDES without requiring media decrypt/encrypt by SRC=
.

Cheers,
Charles

> -----Original Message-----
> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Hutton, Andrew
> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 12:14 PM
> To: Paul Kyzivat
> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc securi=
ty
> section
>=20
> I agree with Paul and see no reason why we should "recommend" that any
> component in the SIPREC architecture support EKT. If we have to mention
> EKT, and I am not convinced we do, then it should be sufficient to descri=
be
> the implications.
>=20
> Regards
> Andy (As an Individual)
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On 8 Aug 2012, at 17:26, "Paul Kyzivat" <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> > I don't think we need to *recommend* that the SRC/SRC implement EKT.
> > It should be sufficient to point out what becomes possible if it is
> implemented.
> >
> >    Thanks,
> >    Paul
> >
> > On 8/8/12 8:57 AM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) wrote:
> >> Hi Andy,
> >>
> >> Let me try to clarify. The part of the suggested text that I see as
> problematic is the following:
> >>
> >> " 3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encry=
pt
> the media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only
> works when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that th=
e
> keying mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has implications =
on
> mandatory to implement keying mechanisms."
> >>
> >> The point I was trying to make was that using the same key in the CS a=
s in
> the RS does NOT imply that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS as
> the RS. An example of such as case is a SRC using SDES in the CS and EKT =
in
> the RS.
> >> With that in mind, I think it would be useful to add a description of =
this to
> the security section of the protocol draft along, possibly with a
> recommendation for EKT support by at least the SRC and potentially for
> recording aware UAs and the SRS as well. In this case,  support for media
> encryption using SRTP with SDES may be required for recording-aware UAs,
> the SRC and the SRS, and DTLS/SRTP with EKT may be recommended. Any
> such requirements/recommendation would be in the protocol draft, not the
> architecture. Interworking with RTCWEB is one case in which support for E=
KT
> in the SRC would be useful. Interworking with a SIPREC aware conference
> server that supports EKT is another.
> >>
> >> Cheers,
> >> Charles
> >>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: Hutton, Andrew [mailto:andrew.hutton@siemens-
> enterprise.com]
> >>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 5:50 AM
> >>> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman; siprec@ietf.=
org
> >>> Subject: RE: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc se=
curity
> >>> section
> >>>
> >>> Hi,
> >>>
> >>> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which make=
s it
> >>> clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of SIPREC.
> >>>
> >>> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on the
> RS
> >>> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the conclusion
> from
> >>> our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the security
> section
> >>> of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific
> >>> recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we would
> for
> >>> example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS must
> be
> >>> used for SIP if SDES is deployed.
> >>>
> >>> Regards
> >>> Andy (As an individual).
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >>>> Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
> >>>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
> >>>> To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
> >>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> >>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> >>>> security section
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi Brian,
> >>>>
> >>>> I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see inli=
ne
> >>>> for additional comments.
> >>>>
> >>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >>>> Behalf
> >>>>> Of Rosen, Brian
> >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
> >>>>> To: Leon Portman
> >>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> >>>> security
> >>>>> section
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that the
> >>>> retrieval
> >>>>> is out of scope.  Maybe reword
> >>>>>> The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded
> >>>> media.
> >>>>> The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
> >>>> recording, but
> >>>>> because the retriever is another party to the recording session, it=
em
> >>>> 2 is
> >>>>> reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
> >>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
> >>>> better.
> >>>>> to
> >>>>> The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is out =
of
> >>>> scope.
> >>>>> Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the
> security
> >>>>> implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party to t=
he
> >>>> call that
> >>>>> was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the
> >>>> reverse of
> >>>>> item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less stron=
g
> >>>> than
> >>>>> used on the RS, and may need to be better.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Brian, Thank you
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I will update the architecture draft.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Leon
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >>>>> Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
> >>>>>> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
> >>>>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>> Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> >>>> security
> >>>>> section
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
> >>>> context of
> >>>>> the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
> >>>> security
> >>>>> section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of the
> >>>> CS, and
> >>>>> may need to be better because the media is retransmitted (allowing
> >>>> more
> >>>>> possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack on
> >>>> the
> >>>>> storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's authorized
> >>>> retrieval
> >>>>> interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
> >>>>> Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
> >>>>>> 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because the
> >>>> client must
> >>>>> be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  It =
is
> >>>> less
> >>>>> important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations
> must
> >>>>> have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
> >>>> environments,
> >>>>> it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This mean=
s
> >>>> the
> >>>>> same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the media =
is
> >>>>> encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying mechanism
> >>>> is the
> >>>>> same on the CS as the RS.
> >>>>
> >>>> I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the RS=
,
> >>>> it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the key
> >>>> could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different, with
> >>>> the SRC providing the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
> >>>> For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the SRC
> >>>> and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol draft.
> >>>>
> >>>> Cheers,
> >>>> Charles
> >>>>
> >>>>> That has implications on mandatory to implement
> >>>>> keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS,
> >>> and
> >>>> is
> >>>>> re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
> >>>> doesn't
> >>>>> discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
> >>>> implications
> >>>>> on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
> >>>> retriever is
> >>>>> another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the
> >>>> client must
> >>>>> be authenticated.  The c
> >>>>>  ry
> >>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to be
> >>>> better.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Brian
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> siprec mailing list
> >> siprec@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From eckelcu@cisco.com  Wed Aug  8 13:48:36 2012
Return-Path: <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6394421F8565 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:48:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6uHtb8V9Pm80 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:48:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rcdn-iport-5.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-5.cisco.com [173.37.86.76]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5ACCA21F8566 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:48:35 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=eckelcu@cisco.com; l=4412; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1344458915; x=1345668515; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:references:in-reply-to: content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=EP6E6WgeUB0LTbcM1/YEzq5qGIf7I3oNwInhScMyxgg=; b=kdBGtrVmaZeRg4V2LNvbklITx/YHIyvuyv0vLJarDDBl09X7viY2sc7Y UB3ljXjdP8UqmkQbsH0hLMQIT7AvKkdGyT4aH3crE5pfgkJfaHWvvmCE6 7ERbqSHU5YSUHt31wcE08F/yebExy6yhaAc1+reMpNa9c4VAnhIyeL1Ee U=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Av8EAHXPIlCtJXG+/2dsb2JhbABFDrlVgQeCIAEBAQQBAQEPASc0FwQCAQgOAwQBAQEKFAkHJwsUCQgCBAESCAEZh2sLmwugQYsSGoVmYAOgVoMcgWaCJjmBXw
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,734,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="109712334"
Received: from rcdn-core2-3.cisco.com ([173.37.113.190]) by rcdn-iport-5.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Aug 2012 20:48:32 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x11.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x11.cisco.com [173.37.183.85]) by rcdn-core2-3.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q78KmWGg027414 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Wed, 8 Aug 2012 20:48:32 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com ([169.254.3.66]) by xhc-rcd-x11.cisco.com ([173.37.183.85]) with mapi id 14.02.0298.004; Wed, 8 Aug 2012 15:48:32 -0500
From: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>
To: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
Thread-Index: AQHNdW71d6vVmL8YPki88n4UAPLKV5dQY2Yw
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 20:48:31 +0000
Message-ID: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B173@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
References: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0762EA@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADB5@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF086240@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <50227245.4000200@alum.mit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <50227245.4000200@alum.mit.edu>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.21.114.222]
x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-10.2.0.1135-7.000.1014-19096.001
x-tm-as-result: No--48.348100-8.000000-31
x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: No
x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 20:48:36 -0000

Works for me.

Thanks,
Charles

> -----Original Message-----
> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Paul Kyzivat
> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 7:06 AM
> To: siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, =
3PCC
> etc.
>=20
> On 8/8/12 5:16 AM, Hutton, Andrew wrote:
> > Hi Charles,
> >
> > I agree we should not have any dependency on INSIPID so relying on the
> INSIPID Session-ID as the actions communication session identifier does n=
ot
> look like a good idea.
> >
> > However I though the main use of the INSIPID Session-ID in SIPREC was f=
or
> the SRS to be able to determine that it is receiving media relating to th=
e
> same CS from different SRC's.  Again this would result in the INSIPID bei=
ng
> valuable for SIPREC but no dependency but if this was the case we may wan=
t
> to specify where it appears in the metadata.
>=20
> Ideally we would provide an optional attribute in the metadata for this.
> But the timing might prevent us from doing that. I expect that we will
> be publishing our metadata draft before insipid has finalized what it is
> going to do. So we may have to leave that as an extension.
>=20
> (AFAIK it should even be possible to publish an extension to our
> metadata as part of the draft that comes out of INSIPID.)
>=20
> 	Thanks,
> 	Paul
>=20
> > Regards
> > Andy
> >
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Charles Eckel (eckelcu) [mailto:eckelcu@cisco.com]
> >> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
> >> To: Hutton, Andrew; siprec@ietf.org
> >> Subject: RE: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session
> >> identifies, 3PCC etc.
> >>
> >> I see two places in which the INSIPID work could apply to SIPREC.
> >> 1) if the SRC relies on inclusion of the INSIPID Session-ID as the
> >> actual identifier in the SIPREC metadata it send to the SRS to enable
> >> the SRS to correlate multiple RSs for the same CS, or for CSs for the
> >> same INSIPID session ID.
> >> 2) if the SRC uses the INSIPID Session-ID to help it determine when
> >> multiple CSs are in fact related to each other (i.e. corresponding to
> >> the same INSIPID Session-ID).
> >>
> >> (1) could result in INSIPID being required for SIPREC.
> >> (2) could result in INSIPID being valuable for SIPREC.
> >>
> >> I do not think we have, or should, mandate (1) as it adds an
> >> unnecessary dependency for INSIPID within SIPREC.
> >>
> >> Cheers,
> >> Charles
> >>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >> Behalf
> >>> Of Hutton, Andrew
> >>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:11 AM
> >>> To: siprec@ietf.org
> >>> Subject: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies,
> >> 3PCC etc.
> >>>
> >>> Hi All,
> >>>
> >>> Have you seen the discussion in the INSIPID WG regarding the scope of
> >> this
> >>> WG and the use cases for generating and end to end session identifier
> >> if not
> >>> have a look at http://www.ietf.org/mail-
> >>> archive/web/insipid/current/msg00255.html.
> >>>
> >>> I am interested in the opinions of the SIPREC WG members on the
> >> following
> >>> questions.
> >>>
> >>> 1. Does SIPREC still need such an end to end session identifier and
> >> if so how
> >>> would we use it in the current metadata model as the communication
> >>> session identifier or something else?
> >>> 2. If SIPREC does need such an identifier is it important that the
> >> 3PCC case is
> >>> covered so for example when an SRC is the 3rd party controller that
> >> such an
> >>> end to end session identifier is generated?
> >>> 3. If INSIPID cannot create such an identifier for the communication
> >> session
> >>> do we need to create a communication session identifier for use in
> >> SIPREC?
> >>>
> >>> Regards
> >>> Andy (SIPREC Co-Chair).
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> siprec mailing list
> >>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec

From leon.portman@gmail.com  Wed Aug  8 13:51:21 2012
Return-Path: <leon.portman@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA86521F860B for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:51:21 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id J5k9di3em1tY for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:51:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-wi0-f172.google.com (mail-wi0-f172.google.com [209.85.212.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1033E21F8605 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:51:19 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by wibhm11 with SMTP id hm11so3348414wib.13 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed, 08 Aug 2012 13:51:19 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=content-type:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to:x-mailer; bh=cc3446Az1BEE0mH+edjvBqzrOeZd45g2uIKnrxSHsZM=; b=uEm7Nub5+gioTMwZPUknVSuNJKo6e/LHUE8qd8VuntkSlZBiOSFeEPrV4TX7a9nkho tYJysCVB79jN1hd8IHOxgIsg8sJPAUtG55gMCmrlSLg09wUr8URGwjCT85gnMqXNuFL6 51mFFhaSg9z923WoFtgfRWM/mNlJaPXjVaZAfLSWuX5BLKZRg763Q0Gs6fSBVCTAefM7 6Pz1FjWFbR1pe418Gux7qaU0wZPJAFRWY4KDZWlek1BBm2h+CeoF6y5FV0Z7bn645TF+ af+TzfXXiomebeKvMgt57XKxNGCa5/mNBCnqdwobyCgm4N6qMF4u6miYqpjn3bHlAOSD rMWg==
Received: by 10.217.1.197 with SMTP id n47mr9877378wes.27.1344459078991; Wed, 08 Aug 2012 13:51:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [192.168.2.105] (46-116-183-62.bb.netvision.net.il. [46.116.183.62]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id cl8sm7139637wib.10.2012.08.08.13.51.16 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Wed, 08 Aug 2012 13:51:17 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.0 \(1485\))
From: Leon Portman <leon.portman@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B162@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 23:51:20 +0300
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <20E902F0-3013-4575-A99C-34C758BC8E77@gmail.com>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>, <50229341.5010800@alum.mit.edu> <2514F092-EE40-48D9-91DF-6E851534545A@siemens-enterprise.com> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B162@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu) <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1485)
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 20:51:21 -0000

I am ok

Leon

On Aug 8, 2012, at 11:48 PM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) <eckelcu@cisco.com> =
wrote:

> I believe this works for me as well. Let me summarize to make sure we =
are all in agreement.
> 1) remove "It implies that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS =
as the RS." from proposed addition to architecture document.
> 2) mention in security section of protocol draft that EKT may =
optionally be used to interwork with SDES without requiring media =
decrypt/encrypt by SRC.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Charles
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On =
Behalf
>> Of Hutton, Andrew
>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 12:14 PM
>> To: Paul Kyzivat
>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc =
security
>> section
>>=20
>> I agree with Paul and see no reason why we should "recommend" that =
any
>> component in the SIPREC architecture support EKT. If we have to =
mention
>> EKT, and I am not convinced we do, then it should be sufficient to =
describe
>> the implications.
>>=20
>> Regards
>> Andy (As an Individual)
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 8 Aug 2012, at 17:26, "Paul Kyzivat" <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> I don't think we need to *recommend* that the SRC/SRC implement EKT.
>>> It should be sufficient to point out what becomes possible if it is
>> implemented.
>>>=20
>>>   Thanks,
>>>   Paul
>>>=20
>>> On 8/8/12 8:57 AM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) wrote:
>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>=20
>>>> Let me try to clarify. The part of the suggested text that I see as
>> problematic is the following:
>>>>=20
>>>> " 3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and =
re-encrypt
>> the media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This =
only
>> works when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies =
that the
>> keying mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has =
implications on
>> mandatory to implement keying mechanisms."
>>>>=20
>>>> The point I was trying to make was that using the same key in the =
CS as in
>> the RS does NOT imply that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS =
as
>> the RS. An example of such as case is a SRC using SDES in the CS and =
EKT in
>> the RS.
>>>> With that in mind, I think it would be useful to add a description =
of this to
>> the security section of the protocol draft along, possibly with a
>> recommendation for EKT support by at least the SRC and potentially =
for
>> recording aware UAs and the SRS as well. In this case,  support for =
media
>> encryption using SRTP with SDES may be required for recording-aware =
UAs,
>> the SRC and the SRS, and DTLS/SRTP with EKT may be recommended. Any
>> such requirements/recommendation would be in the protocol draft, not =
the
>> architecture. Interworking with RTCWEB is one case in which support =
for EKT
>> in the SRC would be useful. Interworking with a SIPREC aware =
conference
>> server that supports EKT is another.
>>>>=20
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Charles
>>>>=20
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: Hutton, Andrew [mailto:andrew.hutton@siemens-
>> enterprise.com]
>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 5:50 AM
>>>>> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman; =
siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> Subject: RE: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc =
security
>>>>> section
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which =
makes it
>>>>> clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of =
SIPREC.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on =
the
>> RS
>>>>> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the =
conclusion
>> from
>>>>> our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the =
security
>> section
>>>>> of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific
>>>>> recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we would
>> for
>>>>> example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS must
>> be
>>>>> used for SIP if SDES is deployed.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Regards
>>>>> Andy (As an individual).
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>>> Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
>>>>>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
>>>>>> To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
>>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture =
doc
>>>>>> security section
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Hi Brian,
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see =
inline
>>>>>> for additional comments.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] =
On
>>>>>> Behalf
>>>>>>> Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
>>>>>>> To: Leon Portman
>>>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture =
doc
>>>>>> security
>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that =
the
>>>>>> retrieval
>>>>>>> is out of scope.  Maybe reword
>>>>>>>> The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded
>>>>>> media.
>>>>>>> The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
>>>>>> recording, but
>>>>>>> because the retriever is another party to the recording session, =
item
>>>>>> 2 is
>>>>>>> reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
>>>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to =
be
>>>>>> better.
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is =
out of
>>>>>> scope.
>>>>>>> Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the
>> security
>>>>>>> implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party =
to the
>>>>>> call that
>>>>>>> was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the
>>>>>> reverse of
>>>>>>> item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less =
strong
>>>>>> than
>>>>>>> used on the RS, and may need to be better.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Brian, Thank you
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> I will update the architecture draft.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Leon
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] =
On
>>>>>>> Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
>>>>>>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>>>>> security
>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
>>>>>> context of
>>>>>>> the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
>>>>>> security
>>>>>>> section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of =
the
>>>>>> CS, and
>>>>>>> may need to be better because the media is retransmitted =
(allowing
>>>>>> more
>>>>>>> possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack =
on
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's =
authorized
>>>>>> retrieval
>>>>>>> interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
>>>>>>> Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
>>>>>>>> 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because =
the
>>>>>> client must
>>>>>>> be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  =
It is
>>>>>> less
>>>>>>> important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations
>> must
>>>>>>> have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
>>>>>> environments,
>>>>>>> it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This =
means
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the =
media is
>>>>>>> encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying =
mechanism
>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>> same on the CS as the RS.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the =
RS,
>>>>>> it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the =
key
>>>>>> could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different, =
with
>>>>>> the SRC providing the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
>>>>>> For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the =
SRC
>>>>>> and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol =
draft.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>> Charles
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> That has implications on mandatory to implement
>>>>>>> keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS,
>>>>> and
>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>> discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
>>>>>> implications
>>>>>>> on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
>>>>>> retriever is
>>>>>>> another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the
>>>>>> client must
>>>>>>> be authenticated.  The c
>>>>>>> ry
>>>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to =
be
>>>>>> better.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Brian
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> siprec mailing list
>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>> _______________________________________________
>> siprec mailing list
>> siprec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec


From br@brianrosen.net  Wed Aug  8 13:56:24 2012
Return-Path: <br@brianrosen.net>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15CE521F86F7 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:56:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -103.456
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-103.456 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.143, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ggGzzo8bma8A for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:56:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from barmail6.idig.net (barmail6.idig.net [64.34.111.239]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA85521F86F6 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 13:56:22 -0700 (PDT)
X-ASG-Debug-ID: 1344459381-0538de0e35451ac0001-sFFYAS
Received: from wwh1.winweblinux.com (wwh1.winweblinux.com [76.74.186.184]) by barmail6.idig.net with ESMTP id Kl7Zdo9Nw2m6cI6A; Wed, 08 Aug 2012 13:56:21 -0700 (PDT)
X-Barracuda-Envelope-From: br@brianrosen.net
X-Barracuda-Apparent-Source-IP: 76.74.186.184
Received: from neustargw.va.neustar.com ([209.173.53.233]:55804 helo=[192.168.133.78]) by wwh1.winweblinux.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES128-SHA:128) (Exim 4.77) (envelope-from <br@brianrosen.net>) id 1SzDIj-002PI4-OP; Wed, 08 Aug 2012 13:56:22 -0700
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.0 \(1485\))
From: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
X-ASG-Orig-Subj: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
In-Reply-To: <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B162@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2012 16:56:19 -0400
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <5C9D6239-0487-4D01-A34D-95949DB23295@brianrosen.net>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>, <50229341.5010800@alum.mit.edu> <2514F092-EE40-48D9-91DF-6E851534545A@siemens-enterprise.com> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B162@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>
To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu) <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1485)
X-Barracuda-Connect: wwh1.winweblinux.com[76.74.186.184]
X-Barracuda-Start-Time: 1344459381
X-Barracuda-URL: http://64.34.111.239:8000/cgi-mod/mark.cgi
X-Virus-Scanned: by bsmtpd at idig.net
X-Barracuda-Spam-Score: 0.00
X-Barracuda-Spam-Status: No, SCORE=0.00 using global scores of TAG_LEVEL=1000.0 QUARANTINE_LEVEL=1000.0 KILL_LEVEL=3.5 tests=
X-Barracuda-Spam-Report: Code version 3.2, rules version 3.2.2.105075 Rule breakdown below pts rule name              description ---- ---------------------- --------------------------------------------------
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 20:56:24 -0000

WFM

On Aug 8, 2012, at 4:48 PM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) <eckelcu@cisco.com> =
wrote:

> I believe this works for me as well. Let me summarize to make sure we =
are all in agreement.
> 1) remove "It implies that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS =
as the RS." from proposed addition to architecture document.
> 2) mention in security section of protocol draft that EKT may =
optionally be used to interwork with SDES without requiring media =
decrypt/encrypt by SRC.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Charles
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On =
Behalf
>> Of Hutton, Andrew
>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 12:14 PM
>> To: Paul Kyzivat
>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc =
security
>> section
>>=20
>> I agree with Paul and see no reason why we should "recommend" that =
any
>> component in the SIPREC architecture support EKT. If we have to =
mention
>> EKT, and I am not convinced we do, then it should be sufficient to =
describe
>> the implications.
>>=20
>> Regards
>> Andy (As an Individual)
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 8 Aug 2012, at 17:26, "Paul Kyzivat" <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> I don't think we need to *recommend* that the SRC/SRC implement EKT.
>>> It should be sufficient to point out what becomes possible if it is
>> implemented.
>>>=20
>>>   Thanks,
>>>   Paul
>>>=20
>>> On 8/8/12 8:57 AM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) wrote:
>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>=20
>>>> Let me try to clarify. The part of the suggested text that I see as
>> problematic is the following:
>>>>=20
>>>> " 3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and =
re-encrypt
>> the media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This =
only
>> works when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies =
that the
>> keying mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has =
implications on
>> mandatory to implement keying mechanisms."
>>>>=20
>>>> The point I was trying to make was that using the same key in the =
CS as in
>> the RS does NOT imply that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS =
as
>> the RS. An example of such as case is a SRC using SDES in the CS and =
EKT in
>> the RS.
>>>> With that in mind, I think it would be useful to add a description =
of this to
>> the security section of the protocol draft along, possibly with a
>> recommendation for EKT support by at least the SRC and potentially =
for
>> recording aware UAs and the SRS as well. In this case,  support for =
media
>> encryption using SRTP with SDES may be required for recording-aware =
UAs,
>> the SRC and the SRS, and DTLS/SRTP with EKT may be recommended. Any
>> such requirements/recommendation would be in the protocol draft, not =
the
>> architecture. Interworking with RTCWEB is one case in which support =
for EKT
>> in the SRC would be useful. Interworking with a SIPREC aware =
conference
>> server that supports EKT is another.
>>>>=20
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Charles
>>>>=20
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: Hutton, Andrew [mailto:andrew.hutton@siemens-
>> enterprise.com]
>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 5:50 AM
>>>>> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman; =
siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> Subject: RE: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc =
security
>>>>> section
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which =
makes it
>>>>> clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of =
SIPREC.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on =
the
>> RS
>>>>> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the =
conclusion
>> from
>>>>> our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the =
security
>> section
>>>>> of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific
>>>>> recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we would
>> for
>>>>> example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS must
>> be
>>>>> used for SIP if SDES is deployed.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Regards
>>>>> Andy (As an individual).
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>>>> Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
>>>>>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
>>>>>> To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
>>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture =
doc
>>>>>> security section
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Hi Brian,
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see =
inline
>>>>>> for additional comments.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] =
On
>>>>>> Behalf
>>>>>>> Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
>>>>>>> To: Leon Portman
>>>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture =
doc
>>>>>> security
>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that =
the
>>>>>> retrieval
>>>>>>> is out of scope.  Maybe reword
>>>>>>>> The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded
>>>>>> media.
>>>>>>> The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
>>>>>> recording, but
>>>>>>> because the retriever is another party to the recording session, =
item
>>>>>> 2 is
>>>>>>> reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
>>>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to =
be
>>>>>> better.
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is =
out of
>>>>>> scope.
>>>>>>> Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the
>> security
>>>>>>> implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party =
to the
>>>>>> call that
>>>>>>> was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully (the
>>>>>> reverse of
>>>>>>> item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less =
strong
>>>>>> than
>>>>>>> used on the RS, and may need to be better.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Brian, Thank you
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> I will update the architecture draft.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Leon
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] =
On
>>>>>>> Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
>>>>>>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>>>>> security
>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
>>>>>> context of
>>>>>>> the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
>>>>>> security
>>>>>>> section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of =
the
>>>>>> CS, and
>>>>>>> may need to be better because the media is retransmitted =
(allowing
>>>>>> more
>>>>>>> possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious attack =
on
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's =
authorized
>>>>>> retrieval
>>>>>>> interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media paths.
>>>>>>> Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
>>>>>>>> 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because =
the
>>>>>> client must
>>>>>>> be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.  =
It is
>>>>>> less
>>>>>>> important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but implementations
>> must
>>>>>>> have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
>>>>>> environments,
>>>>>>> it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This =
means
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the =
media is
>>>>>>> encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying =
mechanism
>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>> same on the CS as the RS.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in the =
RS,
>>>>>> it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the =
key
>>>>>> could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different, =
with
>>>>>> the SRC providing the interworking between the keying mechanisms.
>>>>>> For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the =
SRC
>>>>>> and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol =
draft.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>> Charles
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> That has implications on mandatory to implement
>>>>>>> keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the CS,
>>>>> and
>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>> discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
>>>>>> implications
>>>>>>> on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
>>>>>> retriever is
>>>>>>> another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed - the
>>>>>> client must
>>>>>>> be authenticated.  The c
>>>>>>> ry
>>>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need to =
be
>>>>>> better.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Brian
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> siprec mailing list
>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>> _______________________________________________
>> siprec mailing list
>> siprec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> _______________________________________________
> siprec mailing list
> siprec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec


From rmohanr@cisco.com  Wed Aug  8 23:37:15 2012
Return-Path: <rmohanr@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 305BE11E809C for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 23:37:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id pKNMc2-p39L7 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 23:37:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rcdn-iport-3.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-3.cisco.com [173.37.86.74]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6D9D11E80F9 for <siprec@ietf.org>; Wed,  8 Aug 2012 23:37:13 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=rmohanr@cisco.com; l=4126; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1344494234; x=1345703834; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:content-id: content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=qZRMq7DRXfP4+JSlqQ13vGLenINwGh/ZrM1RyvBSeOE=; b=NZgjk7PP4KWdDNfXZGjax2CplWjuEz+lwQLnAfYGeEl5J8VkP+A8hzV7 NuCoTeG1Sehsf+WMNg8Y0dUq2HzN7Yl4B9xhmgRymsmtKrG1JYfDMgPCr mGx5oz8L07Bn3zaNUsR3S7ZLcfV8EhmW5p9caO5ZRDeEe8lO8wHp4fFrj Q=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Av8EAMlZI1CtJV2a/2dsb2JhbABFDrlPgQeCIAEBAQMBAQEBDwEnNBAHBgEIDgMEAQEBHgkuCxQJCAIEARIJGYdlBguba6A6ixMahkoDlUmLDYMcgWaCJjmBXw
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.77,738,1336348800"; d="scan'208";a="109872354"
Received: from rcdn-core-3.cisco.com ([173.37.93.154]) by rcdn-iport-3.cisco.com with ESMTP; 09 Aug 2012 06:37:13 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x01.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x01.cisco.com [173.37.183.75]) by rcdn-core-3.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q796bD9d025319 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Thu, 9 Aug 2012 06:37:13 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x05.cisco.com ([169.254.11.223]) by xhc-rcd-x01.cisco.com ([173.37.183.75]) with mapi id 14.02.0298.004; Thu, 9 Aug 2012 01:37:13 -0500
From: "Ram Mohan R (rmohanr)" <rmohanr@cisco.com>
To: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>, "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
Thread-Index: AQHNdflor7v0apknuEyVmVpjKac9yA==
Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2012 06:37:12 +0000
Message-ID: <CC49581C.30020%rmohanr@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <50227245.4000200@alum.mit.edu>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [173.39.68.45]
x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-10.2.0.1135-7.000.1014-19096.004
x-tm-as-result: No--37.665900-8.000000-31
x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: No
x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <03BC156385F63A4C9CF191205E7E8184@cisco.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies, 3PCC etc.
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2012 06:37:15 -0000

> On 08/08/12 7:35 PM, "Paul Kyzivat" <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu> wrote:

>On 8/8/12 5:16 AM, Hutton, Andrew wrote:
>> Hi Charles,
>>
>> I agree we should not have any dependency on INSIPID so relying on the
>>INSIPID Session-ID as the actions communication session identifier does
>>not look like a good idea.
>>
>> However I though the main use of the INSIPID Session-ID in SIPREC was
>>for the SRS to be able to determine that it is receiving media relating
>>to the same CS from different SRC's.  Again this would result in the
>>INSIPID being valuable for SIPREC but no dependency but if this was the
>>case we may want to specify where it appears in the metadata.
>
>Ideally we would provide an optional attribute in the metadata for this.
>But the timing might prevent us from doing that. I expect that we will
>be publishing our metadata draft before insipid has finalized what it is
>going to do. So we may have to leave that as an extension.

I also agree with this. We can leave it as extension data for now

Regards,
Ram
 =20
>
>(AFAIK it should even be possible to publish an extension to our
>metadata as part of the draft that comes out of INSIPID.)
>
>	Thanks,
>	Paul
>
>> Regards
>> Andy
>>
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Charles Eckel (eckelcu) [mailto:eckelcu@cisco.com]
>>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
>>> To: Hutton, Andrew; siprec@ietf.org
>>> Subject: RE: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session
>>> identifies, 3PCC etc.
>>>
>>> I see two places in which the INSIPID work could apply to SIPREC.
>>> 1) if the SRC relies on inclusion of the INSIPID Session-ID as the
>>> actual identifier in the SIPREC metadata it send to the SRS to enable
>>> the SRS to correlate multiple RSs for the same CS, or for CSs for the
>>> same INSIPID session ID.
>>> 2) if the SRC uses the INSIPID Session-ID to help it determine when
>>> multiple CSs are in fact related to each other (i.e. corresponding to
>>> the same INSIPID Session-ID).
>>>
>>> (1) could result in INSIPID being required for SIPREC.
>>> (2) could result in INSIPID being valuable for SIPREC.
>>>
>>> I do not think we have, or should, mandate (1) as it adds an
>>> unnecessary dependency for INSIPID within SIPREC.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Charles
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>> Behalf
>>>> Of Hutton, Andrew
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:11 AM
>>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: [siprec] INSIPID Discussion on scope of session identifies,
>>> 3PCC etc.
>>>>
>>>> Hi All,
>>>>
>>>> Have you seen the discussion in the INSIPID WG regarding the scope of
>>> this
>>>> WG and the use cases for generating and end to end session identifier
>>> if not
>>>> have a look at http://www.ietf.org/mail-
>>>> archive/web/insipid/current/msg00255.html.
>>>>
>>>> I am interested in the opinions of the SIPREC WG members on the
>>> following
>>>> questions.
>>>>
>>>> 1. Does SIPREC still need such an end to end session identifier and
>>> if so how
>>>> would we use it in the current metadata model as the communication
>>>> session identifier or something else?
>>>> 2. If SIPREC does need such an identifier is it important that the
>>> 3PCC case is
>>>> covered so for example when an SRC is the 3rd party controller that
>>> such an
>>>> end to end session identifier is generated?
>>>> 3. If INSIPID cannot create such an identifier for the communication
>>> session
>>>> do we need to create a communication session identifier for use in
>>> SIPREC?
>>>>
>>>> Regards
>>>> Andy (SIPREC Co-Chair).
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>> _______________________________________________
>> siprec mailing list
>> siprec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>
>
>_______________________________________________
>siprec mailing list
>siprec@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>



From andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com  Thu Aug  9 02:03:53 2012
Return-Path: <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8661921F8711 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 02:03:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.566
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.566 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.033,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Y73WwpRZsKKr for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 02:03:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com [62.134.46.10]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE17E21F870B for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 02:03:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net (unknown [172.29.42.235]) by senmx12-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (Server) with ESMTP id 108D923F0539; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 11:03:50 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net ([169.254.1.39]) by MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net ([172.29.42.235]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Thu, 9 Aug 2012 11:03:49 +0200
From: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
To: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>, Charles Eckel <eckelcu@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
Thread-Index: AQHNdYKbWqncLQdUMEufPH/TeqG/0ZdQSQjm///4o4CAAAJNgIAA7GKA
Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2012 09:03:48 +0000
Message-ID: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF089216@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>, <50229341.5010800@alum.mit.edu> <2514F092-EE40-48D9-91DF-6E851534545A@siemens-enterprise.com> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B162@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <5C9D6239-0487-4D01-A34D-95949DB23295@brianrosen.net>
In-Reply-To: <5C9D6239-0487-4D01-A34D-95949DB23295@brianrosen.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [172.29.42.225]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2012 09:03:53 -0000

Would this mean a dependency on the draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-00?

If so I would like to try to avoid that.

Regards
Andy



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brian Rosen [mailto:br@brianrosen.net]
> Sent: 08 August 2012 21:56
> To: Charles Eckel
> Cc: Hutton, Andrew; Paul Kyzivat; siprec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> security section
>=20
> WFM
>=20
> On Aug 8, 2012, at 4:48 PM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) <eckelcu@cisco.com>
> wrote:
>=20
> > I believe this works for me as well. Let me summarize to make sure we
> are all in agreement.
> > 1) remove "It implies that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS
> as the RS." from proposed addition to architecture document.
> > 2) mention in security section of protocol draft that EKT may
> optionally be used to interwork with SDES without requiring media
> decrypt/encrypt by SRC.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Charles
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf
> >> Of Hutton, Andrew
> >> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 12:14 PM
> >> To: Paul Kyzivat
> >> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> security
> >> section
> >>
> >> I agree with Paul and see no reason why we should "recommend" that
> any
> >> component in the SIPREC architecture support EKT. If we have to
> mention
> >> EKT, and I am not convinced we do, then it should be sufficient to
> describe
> >> the implications.
> >>
> >> Regards
> >> Andy (As an Individual)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 8 Aug 2012, at 17:26, "Paul Kyzivat" <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>> I don't think we need to *recommend* that the SRC/SRC implement
> EKT.
> >>> It should be sufficient to point out what becomes possible if it is
> >> implemented.
> >>>
> >>>   Thanks,
> >>>   Paul
> >>>
> >>> On 8/8/12 8:57 AM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) wrote:
> >>>> Hi Andy,
> >>>>
> >>>> Let me try to clarify. The part of the suggested text that I see
> as
> >> problematic is the following:
> >>>>
> >>>> " 3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and re-
> encrypt
> >> the media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This
> only
> >> works when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies
> that the
> >> keying mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has
> implications on
> >> mandatory to implement keying mechanisms."
> >>>>
> >>>> The point I was trying to make was that using the same key in the
> CS as in
> >> the RS does NOT imply that the keying mechanism is the same on the
> CS as
> >> the RS. An example of such as case is a SRC using SDES in the CS and
> EKT in
> >> the RS.
> >>>> With that in mind, I think it would be useful to add a description
> of this to
> >> the security section of the protocol draft along, possibly with a
> >> recommendation for EKT support by at least the SRC and potentially
> for
> >> recording aware UAs and the SRS as well. In this case,  support for
> media
> >> encryption using SRTP with SDES may be required for recording-aware
> UAs,
> >> the SRC and the SRS, and DTLS/SRTP with EKT may be recommended. Any
> >> such requirements/recommendation would be in the protocol draft, not
> the
> >> architecture. Interworking with RTCWEB is one case in which support
> for EKT
> >> in the SRC would be useful. Interworking with a SIPREC aware
> conference
> >> server that supports EKT is another.
> >>>>
> >>>> Cheers,
> >>>> Charles
> >>>>
> >>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>> From: Hutton, Andrew [mailto:andrew.hutton@siemens-
> >> enterprise.com]
> >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 5:50 AM
> >>>>> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman;
> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>> Subject: RE: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture
> doc security
> >>>>> section
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Hi,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which
> makes it
> >>>>> clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of
> SIPREC.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on
> the
> >> RS
> >>>>> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the
> conclusion
> >> from
> >>>>> our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the
> security
> >> section
> >>>>> of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific
> >>>>> recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we would
> >> for
> >>>>> example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS
> must
> >> be
> >>>>> used for SIP if SDES is deployed.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Regards
> >>>>> Andy (As an individual).
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org]
> On
> >>>>>> Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
> >>>>>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
> >>>>>> To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
> >>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture
> doc
> >>>>>> security section
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Hi Brian,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see
> inline
> >>>>>> for additional comments.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org]
> On
> >>>>>> Behalf
> >>>>>>> Of Rosen, Brian
> >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
> >>>>>>> To: Leon Portman
> >>>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture
> doc
> >>>>>> security
> >>>>>>> section
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that
> the
> >>>>>> retrieval
> >>>>>>> is out of scope.  Maybe reword
> >>>>>>>> The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for
> recorded
> >>>>>> media.
> >>>>>>> The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
> >>>>>> recording, but
> >>>>>>> because the retriever is another party to the recording
> session, item
> >>>>>> 2 is
> >>>>>>> reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
> >>>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need
> to be
> >>>>>> better.
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>> The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is
> out of
> >>>>>> scope.
> >>>>>>> Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the
> >> security
> >>>>>>> implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party
> to the
> >>>>>> call that
> >>>>>>> was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully
> (the
> >>>>>> reverse of
> >>>>>>> item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less
> strong
> >>>>>> than
> >>>>>>> used on the RS, and may need to be better.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Brian, Thank you
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I will update the architecture draft.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Leon
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org]
> On
> >>>>>>> Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
> >>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
> >>>>>>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>>>> Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
> >>>>>> security
> >>>>>>> section
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
> >>>>>> context of
> >>>>>>> the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
> >>>>>> security
> >>>>>>> section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of
> the
> >>>>>> CS, and
> >>>>>>> may need to be better because the media is retransmitted
> (allowing
> >>>>>> more
> >>>>>>> possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious
> attack on
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's
> authorized
> >>>>>> retrieval
> >>>>>>> interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media
> paths.
> >>>>>>> Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
> >>>>>>>> 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because
> the
> >>>>>> client must
> >>>>>>> be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.
> It is
> >>>>>> less
> >>>>>>> important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but
> implementations
> >> must
> >>>>>>> have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
> >>>>>> environments,
> >>>>>>> it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This
> means
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the
> media is
> >>>>>>> encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying
> mechanism
> >>>>>> is the
> >>>>>>> same on the CS as the RS.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in
> the RS,
> >>>>>> it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the
> key
> >>>>>> could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different,
> with
> >>>>>> the SRC providing the interworking between the keying
> mechanisms.
> >>>>>> For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the
> SRC
> >>>>>> and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol
> draft.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Cheers,
> >>>>>> Charles
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> That has implications on mandatory to implement
> >>>>>>> keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the
> CS,
> >>>>> and
> >>>>>> is
> >>>>>>> re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
> >>>>>> doesn't
> >>>>>>> discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
> >>>>>> implications
> >>>>>>> on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
> >>>>>> retriever is
> >>>>>>> another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed -
> the
> >>>>>> client must
> >>>>>>> be authenticated.  The c
> >>>>>>> ry
> >>>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need
> to be
> >>>>>> better.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Brian
> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> siprec mailing list
> >>>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> siprec mailing list
> >>> siprec@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> siprec mailing list
> >> siprec@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
> > _______________________________________________
> > siprec mailing list
> > siprec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec


From andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com  Thu Aug  9 03:10:51 2012
Return-Path: <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5930021F85C4 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 03:10:51 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.566
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.566 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.033,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id o0jtQf0z9gPu for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 03:10:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com [62.134.46.9]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC84E21F859F for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 03:10:50 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net (unknown [172.29.42.235]) by senmx11-mx.siemens-enterprise.com (Server) with ESMTP id 967171EB850E for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 12:10:49 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net ([169.254.1.39]) by MCHP02HTC.global-ad.net ([172.29.42.235]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Thu, 9 Aug 2012 12:10:49 +0200
From: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
To: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Draft IETF 84 SIPREC Minutes.
Thread-Index: Ac12Fz9QadFsCNf8SVKx7Lx3LAf7Zw==
Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2012 10:10:49 +0000
Message-ID: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0892FF@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [172.29.42.225]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: [siprec] Draft IETF 84 SIPREC Minutes.
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2012 10:10:51 -0000

Hi All,

Draft minutes of our IETF84 SIPREC Session can be found at http://www.ietf.=
org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-siprec.

Please let me have any comments/corrections within the next couple of weeks=
.

Regards
Andy



From pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu  Thu Aug  9 07:04:39 2012
Return-Path: <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
X-Original-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: siprec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE19B21F86B0 for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 07:04:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.299
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.300,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id os1AVxnb+Uvm for <siprec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 07:04:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from qmta07.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net (qmta07.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net [76.96.62.64]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABDA721F86AD for <siprec@ietf.org>; Thu,  9 Aug 2012 07:04:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from omta10.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.62.28]) by qmta07.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id kcwo1j0030cZkys57e4dvX; Thu, 09 Aug 2012 14:04:37 +0000
Received: from Paul-Kyzivats-MacBook-Pro.local ([50.138.229.164]) by omta10.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id ke4c1j00Q3ZTu2S3We4c9p; Thu, 09 Aug 2012 14:04:37 +0000
Message-ID: <5023C371.6090700@alum.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2012 07:04:33 -0700
From: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:12.0) Gecko/20120428 Thunderbird/12.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
References: <68EA92D0-6B1E-492C-B95C-2462C195FE0F@neustar.biz> <07465C1D981ABC41A344374066AE1A2C3AD7AF4B28@TLVMBX01.nice.com> <EBE8BE75-B093-48AD-8CE5-08B76C52B46E@neustar.biz> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807ADA9@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF0862D9@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B038@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com>, <50229341.5010800@alum.mit.edu> <2514F092-EE40-48D9-91DF-6E851534545A@siemens-enterprise.com> <92B7E61ADAC1BB4F941F943788C0882807B162@xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com> <5C9D6239-0487-4D01-A34D-95949DB23295@brianrosen.net> <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF089216@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
In-Reply-To: <9F33F40F6F2CD847824537F3C4E37DDF089216@MCHP04MSX.global-ad.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: "siprec@ietf.org" <siprec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture	doc	security section
X-BeenThere: siprec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: SIP Recording Working Group Discussion List <siprec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/siprec>
List-Post: <mailto:siprec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec>, <mailto:siprec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2012 14:04:40 -0000

On 8/9/12 2:03 AM, Hutton, Andrew wrote:
> Would this mean a dependency on the draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-00?
>
> If so I would like to try to avoid that.

IMO what we write should be done in such a way that we don't get 
normative dependency. IIUC we should be safe as long as we only have an 
informative reference. So as long as we only describe the implications 
of EKT, without requiring anything, we should be ok.

	Thanks,
	Paul

> Regards
> Andy
>
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Brian Rosen [mailto:br@brianrosen.net]
>> Sent: 08 August 2012 21:56
>> To: Charles Eckel
>> Cc: Hutton, Andrew; Paul Kyzivat; siprec@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>> security section
>>
>> WFM
>>
>> On Aug 8, 2012, at 4:48 PM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu)<eckelcu@cisco.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I believe this works for me as well. Let me summarize to make sure we
>> are all in agreement.
>>> 1) remove "It implies that the keying mechanism is the same on the CS
>> as the RS." from proposed addition to architecture document.
>>> 2) mention in security section of protocol draft that EKT may
>> optionally be used to interwork with SDES without requiring media
>> decrypt/encrypt by SRC.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Charles
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org] On
>> Behalf
>>>> Of Hutton, Andrew
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 12:14 PM
>>>> To: Paul Kyzivat
>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>> security
>>>> section
>>>>
>>>> I agree with Paul and see no reason why we should "recommend" that
>> any
>>>> component in the SIPREC architecture support EKT. If we have to
>> mention
>>>> EKT, and I am not convinced we do, then it should be sufficient to
>> describe
>>>> the implications.
>>>>
>>>> Regards
>>>> Andy (As an Individual)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 8 Aug 2012, at 17:26, "Paul Kyzivat"<pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I don't think we need to *recommend* that the SRC/SRC implement
>> EKT.
>>>>> It should be sufficient to point out what becomes possible if it is
>>>> implemented.
>>>>>
>>>>>    Thanks,
>>>>>    Paul
>>>>>
>>>>> On 8/8/12 8:57 AM, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let me try to clarify. The part of the suggested text that I see
>> as
>>>> problematic is the following:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> " 3. In some environments, it is desirable to not decrypt and re-
>> encrypt
>>>> the media.  This means the same key is used on the CS and RS.  This
>> only
>>>> works when the media is encrypted, not the transport.  It implies
>> that the
>>>> keying mechanism is the same on the CS as the RS.  That has
>> implications on
>>>> mandatory to implement keying mechanisms."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The point I was trying to make was that using the same key in the
>> CS as in
>>>> the RS does NOT imply that the keying mechanism is the same on the
>> CS as
>>>> the RS. An example of such as case is a SRC using SDES in the CS and
>> EKT in
>>>> the RS.
>>>>>> With that in mind, I think it would be useful to add a description
>> of this to
>>>> the security section of the protocol draft along, possibly with a
>>>> recommendation for EKT support by at least the SRC and potentially
>> for
>>>> recording aware UAs and the SRS as well. In this case,  support for
>> media
>>>> encryption using SRTP with SDES may be required for recording-aware
>> UAs,
>>>> the SRC and the SRS, and DTLS/SRTP with EKT may be recommended. Any
>>>> such requirements/recommendation would be in the protocol draft, not
>> the
>>>> architecture. Interworking with RTCWEB is one case in which support
>> for EKT
>>>> in the SRC would be useful. Interworking with a SIPREC aware
>> conference
>>>> server that supports EKT is another.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>> Charles
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: Hutton, Andrew [mailto:andrew.hutton@siemens-
>>>> enterprise.com]
>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2012 5:50 AM
>>>>>>> To: Charles Eckel (eckelcu); Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman;
>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>> Subject: RE: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture
>> doc security
>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I am also in favor of the latest suggested text from Brian which
>> makes it
>>>>>>> clear that the retrieval of recordings is not within scope of
>> SIPREC.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't understand the argument that we should recommend EKT on
>> the
>>>> RS
>>>>>>> and really hope we can avoid such a statement. I think the
>> conclusion
>>>> from
>>>>>>> our session at IETF84 was that we should carefully craft the
>> security
>>>> section
>>>>>>> of the architecture and protocol specs to avoid making specific
>>>>>>> recommendations regarding the keying mechanism however we would
>>>> for
>>>>>>> example need to make some statements such as stating that TLS
>> must
>>>> be
>>>>>>> used for SIP if SDES is deployed.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards
>>>>>>> Andy (As an individual).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org]
>> On
>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
>>>>>>>> Sent: 08 August 2012 04:58
>>>>>>>> To: Rosen, Brian; Leon Portman
>>>>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture
>> doc
>>>>>>>> security section
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Brian,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I am in favor of that working of the suggested text. Please see
>> inline
>>>>>>>> for additional comments.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org]
>> On
>>>>>>>> Behalf
>>>>>>>>> Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 6:09 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: Leon Portman
>>>>>>>>> Cc: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture
>> doc
>>>>>>>> security
>>>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In discussions, some folks felt we should be more explicit that
>> the
>>>>>>>> retrieval
>>>>>>>>> is out of scope.  Maybe reword
>>>>>>>>>> The document doesn't discuss a retrieval mechanism for
>> recorded
>>>>>>>> media.
>>>>>>>>> The security implications on retrieval are similar to those of
>>>>>>>> recording, but
>>>>>>>>> because the retriever is another party to the recording
>> session, item
>>>>>>>> 2 is
>>>>>>>>> reversed - the client must be authenticated.  The cry
>>>>>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need
>> to be
>>>>>>>> better.
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> The retrieval mechanism for media recorded by this protocol is
>> out of
>>>>>>>> scope.
>>>>>>>>> Implementations of retrieval mechanisms should consider the
>>>> security
>>>>>>>>> implications carefully as the retriever is not usually a party
>> to the
>>>>>>>> call that
>>>>>>>>> was recorded.  Retrievers should be authenticated carefully
>> (the
>>>>>>>> reverse of
>>>>>>>>> item 2 above).  The crypto on the retrieval should be no less
>> strong
>>>>>>>> than
>>>>>>>>> used on the RS, and may need to be better.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Aug 7, 2012, at 4:51 AM, Leon Portman wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Brian, Thank you
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I will update the architecture draft.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Leon
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>>> From: siprec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:siprec-bounces@ietf.org]
>> On
>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, August 03, 2012 1:48 AM
>>>>>>>>>> To: siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [siprec] Suggestions for text in the Architecture doc
>>>>>>>> security
>>>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In today's siprec meeting we discussed security, mostly in the
>>>>>>>> context of
>>>>>>>>> the protocol document.  Looking at the ARCHITECTURE document's
>>>>>>>> security
>>>>>>>>> section, I find it way too weak.  I suggest we add:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 1. Protection of the RS should be no worse than protection of
>> the
>>>>>>>> CS, and
>>>>>>>>> may need to be better because the media is retransmitted
>> (allowing
>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>>> possibility for interception), stored (allowing malicious
>> attack on
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> storage system) and retrievable (through the recorder's
>> authorized
>>>>>>>> retrieval
>>>>>>>>> interface).  This applies to both the signaling and media
>> paths.
>>>>>>>>> Cryptosuites, and protocol mechanisms must be considered.
>>>>>>>>>> 2. It is essential that the SRC authenticate the SRS because
>> the
>>>>>>>> client must
>>>>>>>>> be certain that it is recording on the right recording system.
>> It is
>>>>>>>> less
>>>>>>>>> important that the SRS authenticate the SRC, but
>> implementations
>>>> must
>>>>>>>>> have the ability to perform mutual authentication 3. In some
>>>>>>>> environments,
>>>>>>>>> it is desirable to not decrypt and re-encrypt the media.  This
>> means
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> same key is used on the CS and RS.  This only works when the
>> media is
>>>>>>>>> encrypted, not the transport.  It implies that the keying
>> mechanism
>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>> same on the CS as the RS.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I do not believe this is true. For example, if EKT is used in
>> the RS,
>>>>>>>> it could be interworked with SDES in the CS. In such a case, the
>> key
>>>>>>>> could be the same despite the keying mechanism being different,
>> with
>>>>>>>> the SRC providing the interworking between the keying
>> mechanisms.
>>>>>>>> For this reason, we may want to recommend support for EKT by the
>> SRC
>>>>>>>> and SRS. This recommendation would be added to the protocol
>> draft.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>> Charles
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That has implications on mandatory to implement
>>>>>>>>> keying mechanisms 4. When the media must be decrypted on the
>> CS,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> re-encrypted on the RS, a new key must be used 5. The document
>>>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>>>> discuss a retrieval mechanism for recorded media.  The security
>>>>>>>> implications
>>>>>>>>> on retrieval are similar to those of recording, but because the
>>>>>>>> retriever is
>>>>>>>>> another party to the recording session, item 2 is reversed -
>> the
>>>>>>>> client must
>>>>>>>>> be authenticated.  The c
>>>>>>>>> ry
>>>>>>>>>> pto must be no less strong than that on the RS, and may need
>> to be
>>>>>>>> better.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Brian
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> siprec mailing list
>>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> siprec mailing list
>>> siprec@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/siprec
>
>

