From cereeves@att.com  Sun Mar  2 04:09:50 2008
Return-Path: <cereeves@att.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D263728C31E
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Sun,  2 Mar 2008 04:09:50 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -20.126
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-20.126 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_99=3.5, DOS_OE_TO_MX=2.75, GB_ROLEX=5, HELO_EQ_DSL=1.129,
	HELO_EQ_PL=1.135, HOST_EQ_PL=1.95, LOW_PRICE=0.001,
	RCVD_IN_DSBL=0.961, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905, RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL=0.877,
	SARE_SPEC_ROLEX=1.666, URIBL_AB_SURBL=10, URIBL_BLACK=20,
	URIBL_JP_SURBL=10, URIBL_OB_SURBL=10, URIBL_WS_SURBL=10,
	USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id rVcqOBE+bPmt
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Sun,  2 Mar 2008 04:09:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: from cml1.neoplus.adsl.tpnet.pl (cml1.neoplus.adsl.tpnet.pl [83.31.139.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC65028C4F9
	for <smime-archive@lists.ietf.org>; Sun,  2 Mar 2008 04:08:38 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <000801c87c5e$04aabe82$9a19f08d@nwrijo>
From: "jarad chris" <cereeves@att.com>
To: "Eliza Tapia" <smime-archive@lists.ietf.org>
Subject: exclusive watches, lowest prices possible rolex
Date: Sun, 02 Mar 2008 10:26:02 +0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.3138
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198

Discover Our Range of Luxury Rolex Watches for Men and Women... Incredibly Low Prices!

http://jantydependentjewed.com/



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Mon Mar  3 06:28:25 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 45ADF28C579
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  3 Mar 2008 06:28:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.305
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.305 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.164,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_FR=0.35, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	RCVD_BAD_ID=2.837]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id n0NsUSwRd9Zp
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon,  3 Mar 2008 06:28:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (Balder-227.Proper.COM [192.245.12.227])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1895128C5C3
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon,  3 Mar 2008 06:27:52 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23E74sp032440
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:07:04 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m23E74Vf032436;
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:07:04 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23E71Vr032417;
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:07:02 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from denis.pinkas@bull.net)
Received: from MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (msga-001.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.31])
	by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA34594;
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 15:16:20 +0100
Received: from frcls4013 ([129.182.108.120])
          by MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (Lotus Domino Release 5.0.11)
          with SMTP id 2008030315063619:192784 ;
          Mon, 3 Mar 2008 15:06:36 +0100 
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2008 15:06:29 +0100
From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
To: "Paul Hoffman" <phoffman@imc.org>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>,
        "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Cc: "ietf-smime@imc.org" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2 AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
X-mailer: Foxmail 5.0 [-fr-]
Mime-Version: 1.0
X-MIMETrack: Itemize by SMTP Server on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11  |July 24, 2002) at
 03/03/2008 15:06:36,
	Serialize by Router on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11  |July 24, 2002) at
 03/03/2008 15:06:58,
	Serialize complete at 03/03/2008 15:06:58
Message-ID: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Responses are in-line.

(...)

>>>There is a more substantive comment on the first paragraph of
>>>section 1.
>>>
>>>The text states:
>>>
>>>    If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms
>>>    discussed in this document, then the implementation MUST do so as
>>>    described in this document.
>>>
>>>I believe the text should be:
>>>
>>>    If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms
>>>    discussed in this document, then the implementation MUST do so as
>>>    described in [SHS].
>>
>>The algorithms aren't defined in this document only the OIDs and where they
>>go in CMS ... so I still think it's actually "as described in this
>>document". But, Spencer suggests removing the sentences because they're not
>>needed and I tend to agree with him.
>
>Spencer wins on this one. The sentence doesn't make much sense in a 
>standards-track document.

It is important to know in which document the algorithms are described in detail.
Deleting the sentence would not solve my concern.

>>  >A small discussion in the security considerations section on
>>>the advantages (in particular in terms of performances versus
>>>security) of using one or another function from the SHA2
>>>family would be helpful.
>>
>>I'll see if I can't get something from NIST (or at least point to it).
>
>I'll disagree with this. These are not security considerations; they 
>are performance considerations. And pretty obvious ones at that.

It is both performance and security. 
The larger the hash is, the better is the security, but the performance may be lower.

>>  >While I welcome this draft, everybody should take into
>>>consideration that, if the SHA2 family happens to be broken
>>>then we will be at risk.
>>>This should be mentioned into the security considerations section.
>>
>>If an algorithm is cracked then isn't it obvious that we're in trouble?  No
>>other algorithm document I could find says something like this so I'm
>>inclined to not include this in the security considerations section.
>
>... or anywhere else. If any algorithm (hash, encryption, signing, 
>...) is broken, it is broken. Sean's right here.

The message is the following: if the SHA2 family is broken, then you had better 
to use two hash algorithms from a different family (e.g. use Whirlpool).

We should also reference http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-04.txt 
which allows to use two different hash functions (from different families, if possible).

Denis





From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Mon Mar  3 07:19:23 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 042973A685E
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  3 Mar 2008 07:19:23 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.49
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.49 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.556,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id a0DUQY-B5V90
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon,  3 Mar 2008 07:19:17 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (Balder-227.Proper.COM [192.245.12.227])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 920AD3A6BEB
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon,  3 Mar 2008 07:18:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23ExonH037974
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:59:50 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m23ExoZe037973;
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:59:50 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.46])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id m23Exmsm037958
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:59:49 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 29658 invoked from network); 3 Mar 2008 14:59:48 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.6.93 with login)
  by smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 3 Mar 2008 14:59:47 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: cFKq.ZgVM1kf2YQli2EY8EUR96w6U6HiRaRZfN9bS0q0NecOdmEuTGAJmgUC6DVhpPfC5AOAzbwVgddWd_9lTWjhrcnBCSBzuu9dEVbLlcDdsXT0ZajH8XQ.6ywiT1kaBimGjyYvHjWVud0-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>,
        "'Paul Hoffman'" <phoffman@imc.org>, <ietf@ietf.org>
Cc: <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
Subject: RE: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2 AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2008 09:52:22 -0500
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <01a601c87d3e$30166ec0$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Thread-Index: Ach9Or1yeZ4A1pbWRUCsZ2HvCYwAngAApIUg
In-Reply-To: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Denis,

Responses are in-line.

spt 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org 
>[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
>Sent: Monday, March 03, 2008 9:06 AM
>To: Paul Hoffman; Turner, Sean P.; ietf@ietf.org
>Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
>Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2 
>AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
>
>
>Responses are in-line.
>
>(...)
>
>>>>There is a more substantive comment on the first paragraph 
>of section 
>>>>1.
>>>>
>>>>The text states:
>>>>
>>>>    If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms
>>>>    discussed in this document, then the implementation 
>MUST do so as
>>>>    described in this document.
>>>>
>>>>I believe the text should be:
>>>>
>>>>    If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms
>>>>    discussed in this document, then the implementation 
>MUST do so as
>>>>    described in [SHS].
>>>
>>>The algorithms aren't defined in this document only the OIDs 
>and where 
>>>they go in CMS ... so I still think it's actually "as described in 
>>>this document". But, Spencer suggests removing the sentences because 
>>>they're not needed and I tend to agree with him.
>>
>>Spencer wins on this one. The sentence doesn't make much sense in a 
>>standards-track document.
>
>It is important to know in which document the algorithms are 
>described in detail.
>Deleting the sentence would not solve my concern.

The 2nd sentence in the Intro says (or will say after I delete the and):
"The message digest algorithms are defined in [SHS]."  The 1st sentence in 3
references the DSS, X9.62, and RFC2313 for DSA, ECDSA, and RSA (we're moving
the references to 1st sentence of 2nd para. I think we're covered.

>>>  >A small discussion in the security considerations section on
>>>>the advantages (in particular in terms of performances versus
>>>>security) of using one or another function from the SHA2 
>family would 
>>>>be helpful.
>>>
>>>I'll see if I can't get something from NIST (or at least 
>point to it).
>>
>>I'll disagree with this. These are not security considerations; they 
>>are performance considerations. And pretty obvious ones at that.
>
>It is both performance and security. 
>The larger the hash is, the better is the security, but the 
>performance may be lower.

I don't really have a problem adding this sentence.

>>>  >While I welcome this draft, everybody should take into
>>>>consideration that, if the SHA2 family happens to be broken then we 
>>>>will be at risk.
>>>>This should be mentioned into the security considerations section.
>>>
>>>If an algorithm is cracked then isn't it obvious that we're in 
>>>trouble?  No other algorithm document I could find says 
>something like 
>>>this so I'm inclined to not include this in the security 
>considerations section.
>>
>>... or anywhere else. If any algorithm (hash, encryption, signing,
>>...) is broken, it is broken. Sean's right here.
>
>The message is the following: if the SHA2 family is broken, 
>then you had better to use two hash algorithms from a 
>different family (e.g. use Whirlpool).
>
>We should also reference 
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-04.txt
>which allows to use two different hash functions (from 
>different families, if possible).

I'm not sure we need to add this reference. 

>Denis
>
>
>



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Mon Mar  3 08:09:56 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E01D63A69A3
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  3 Mar 2008 08:09:56 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.674
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.674 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.372,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id q1uPmRizz2Kh
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon,  3 Mar 2008 08:09:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (Balder-227.Proper.COM [192.245.12.227])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 615633A6B34
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon,  3 Mar 2008 08:07:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23FqJLN041491
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:52:19 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m23FqJRq041490;
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:52:19 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from [10.20.30.162] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169])
	(authenticated bits=0)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23FpaAE041446
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:51:37 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from phoffman@imc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240807c3f1cc11e33a@[10.20.30.162]>
In-Reply-To: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
References: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:44:00 -0800
To: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>,
        "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2
 AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
Cc: "ietf-smime@imc.org" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


At 3:06 PM +0100 3/3/08, Denis Pinkas wrote:
>  >>  >While I welcome this draft, everybody should take into
>>>>consideration that, if the SHA2 family happens to be broken
>>>>then we will be at risk.
>>>>This should be mentioned into the security considerations section.
>>>
>>>If an algorithm is cracked then isn't it obvious that we're in trouble?  No
>>>other algorithm document I could find says something like this so I'm
>>>inclined to not include this in the security considerations section.
>>
>>... or anywhere else. If any algorithm (hash, encryption, signing,
>>...) is broken, it is broken. Sean's right here.
>
>The message is the following: if the SHA2 family is broken, then you 
>had better
>to use two hash algorithms from a different family (e.g. use Whirlpool).

There is no consensus in the IETF that this statement is true. We 
have discussed it many times for many years. Adding such a sentence 
to this document without community agreement is wrong.

>We should also reference 
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-04.txt
>which allows to use two different hash functions (from different 
>families, if possible).

That's also inappropriate, given that this document covers many uses 
of SHA2 that are not related to multisig.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar  4 06:10:12 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE66528C25E
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  4 Mar 2008 06:10:12 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.443
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.443 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_05=-1.11, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, HTML_MESSAGE=1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 6lfRjaYCSFHl
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue,  4 Mar 2008 06:10:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (Balder-227.Proper.COM [192.245.12.227])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D37263A6A07
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue,  4 Mar 2008 06:10:02 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m24DjOLG064393
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 4 Mar 2008 06:45:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m24DjOgP064392;
	Tue, 4 Mar 2008 06:45:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mx4.cryptopro.ru (mx4.cryptopro.ru [89.221.56.34])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m24DjMGw064380
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 4 Mar 2008 06:45:23 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from spv@cryptopro.ru)
Received: from smirnovxp64 ([192.168.68.187] RDNS failed) by mx4.cryptopro.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);
	 Tue, 4 Mar 2008 16:46:06 +0300
From: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>
To: <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 16:46:04 +0300
Message-ID: <000001c87dfe$18714220$4953c660$@ru>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0001_01C87E17.3DBE7A20"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: Ach9/hbZgbS1fZrfS423parAz8K4cg==
Content-Language: ru
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Mar 2008 13:46:06.0375 (UTC) FILETIME=[18599B70:01C87DFE]
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


]rn qnqr`bmne qnnayemhe b tnpl`re MIME.

------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C87E17.3DBE7A20
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Hello all and personally Nick!

 

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

 

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

 

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" CA of
the certificate path.

 

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

 

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that : " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this certificate
is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding CrlOcspRef into
CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an empty
CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

 

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

 


------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C87E17.3DBE7A20
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" =
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dkoi8-r">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 12 (filtered medium)">
<style>
<!--
 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-size:10.0pt;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>

<body lang=3DRU link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Hello all and personally =
Nick!<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I have a couple new questions =
regarding
CAdES implementation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI =
101&nbsp;733
v1.7.3 (excerpt):<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>shall
contain one </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>for
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span>=
<span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>,
followed by one<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>for =
each </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>in
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>attribute.
The second and subsequent </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>fields =
shall be
in the same order as the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>to which they relate. At least =
one of </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>or<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>or
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>
should be present for all but the &quot;trusted&quot; CA of the =
certificate
path.</span><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The first =
question.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It seems to me that one can =
include an
empty CrlOcspRef (without any CRLListID or<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for =
a &#8220;trusted&#8221;
CA. Am I right? If one cannot do like that, then all =
&#8220;trusted&#8221; CA certificates
have to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which =
way is
right? Or may be both?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The second =
question.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It&#8217;s quite clear how to =
compose this
attribute in a simple CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should =
one
place a certificate of OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could =
place a
reference to this certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in =
some way
prohibited by the phrase &#8220;It references the full set of =
<u>CA</u><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>certificates that &#8230; =
&#8221; in section
6.2.1). Let us assume that this certificate is no-check and one does not =
need
to place the corresponding CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs =
attribute. Then
one have to equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a =
&#8220;trusted&#8221;
CA and either include an empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or =
place the
certificate at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I =
solve
this?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><a href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" =
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C87E17.3DBE7A20--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar  4 09:15:01 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DF6228C650
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  4 Mar 2008 09:15:01 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.16
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.16 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.886,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id VXPPsC-cx-D7
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue,  4 Mar 2008 09:15:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (Balder-227.Proper.COM [192.245.12.227])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2C5228C81B
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue,  4 Mar 2008 09:10:17 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m24GsO6h083890
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 4 Mar 2008 09:54:25 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m24GsOV2083889;
	Tue, 4 Mar 2008 09:54:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from romeo.rtfm.com (74-95-2-173-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [74.95.2.173] (may be forged))
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m24GsO7n083878;
	Tue, 4 Mar 2008 09:54:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com)
Received: from romeo.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1])
	by romeo.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04E615081A;
	Tue,  4 Mar 2008 08:56:18 -0800 (PST)
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2008 08:56:18 -0800
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Cc: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>,
        "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>,
        "ietf-smime@imc.org" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2	AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
In-Reply-To: <p06240807c3f1cc11e33a@[10.20.30.162]>
References: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
	<p06240807c3f1cc11e33a@[10.20.30.162]>
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI)
MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Message-Id: <20080304165618.04E615081A@romeo.rtfm.com>
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


At Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:44:00 -0800,
Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
> At 3:06 PM +0100 3/3/08, Denis Pinkas wrote:
> >  >>  >While I welcome this draft, everybody should take into
> >>>>consideration that, if the SHA2 family happens to be broken
> >>>>then we will be at risk.
> >>>>This should be mentioned into the security considerations section.
> >>>
> >>>If an algorithm is cracked then isn't it obvious that we're in trouble?  No
> >>>other algorithm document I could find says something like this so I'm
> >>>inclined to not include this in the security considerations section.
> >>
> >>... or anywhere else. If any algorithm (hash, encryption, signing,
> >>...) is broken, it is broken. Sean's right here.
> >
> >The message is the following: if the SHA2 family is broken, then you 
> >had better
> >to use two hash algorithms from a different family (e.g. use Whirlpool).
> 
> There is no consensus in the IETF that this statement is true. We 
> have discussed it many times for many years. Adding such a sentence 
> to this document without community agreement is wrong.

I agree with Paul that there is no consensus here.

-Ekr



From kraftman@att.com  Tue Mar  4 10:40:24 2008
Return-Path: <kraftman@att.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75A7A28C5E1
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  4 Mar 2008 10:40:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.395
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.395 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_99=3.5, DOS_OE_TO_MX=2.75, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451,
	GB_ROLEX=5, HELO_EQ_BR=0.955, HELO_MISMATCH_BR=2.4, LOW_PRICE=0.001,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_51_100=0.5, RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E4_51_100=1.5,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E8_51_100=1.5, RAZOR2_CHECK=0.5, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905,
	RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL=0.877, RDNS_NONE=0.1, SARE_SPEC_ROLEX=1.666,
	URIBL_AB_SURBL=10, URIBL_BLACK=20, URIBL_JP_SURBL=10,
	URIBL_OB_SURBL=10, URIBL_SC_SURBL=10, URIBL_WS_SURBL=10,
	USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id v3E+WbK3J3IT
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue,  4 Mar 2008 10:40:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from 20129089055.user.veloxzone.com.br (unknown [201.29.89.55])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A043528C683
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue,  4 Mar 2008 10:39:51 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <000701c87e27$04b9a2cc$2a7513a0@qgeuoghl>
From: "albrecht biay-che" <kraftman@att.com>
To: "Aida Martinez" <smime-archive@ietf.org>
Subject: perfectly crafted exclusive watches rolex
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2008 16:55:31 +0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.3138
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198

Discover Our Range of Luxury Rolex Watches for Men and Women... Incredibly Low Prices!

http://lucksbragswye.com/



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar  5 01:02:04 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 55F8D3A6981
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 01:02:04 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.306
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.306 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_SK=1.35, HOST_EQ_SK=0.555,
	HTML_MESSAGE=1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id nD9wAxHlpYqI
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed,  5 Mar 2008 01:02:02 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 01AAB3A6B5C
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 01:02:01 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m258fjM9047889
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 5 Mar 2008 01:41:45 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m258fj17047887;
	Wed, 5 Mar 2008 01:41:45 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail.nbusr.sk (mail.nbusr.sk [84.245.65.227])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m258fc2s047876
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 01:41:40 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from rybar@nbusr.sk)
From: "Peter Rybar" <rybar@nbusr.sk>
To: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com,
        ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 09:42:00 +0100
Message-ID: <200803050842.m258gVoa005330@mail.nbusr.sk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0003_01C87EA5.292DCC30"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook, Build 11.0.6353
Thread-Index: Ach9/hbZgbS1fZrfS423parAz8K4cgAm+WzA
In-Reply-To: <000001c87dfe$18714220$4953c660$@ru>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2180
X-NAI-Spam-Score: -0.3
X-NAI-Spam-Report: 2 Rules triggered
	*  -0.3 -- BAYES_30 -- Bayesian spam probability is 30 to 40%
	*  0 -- HAS_X_HELO -- Mail contains HAS_X-HELO header
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C87EA5.292DCC30
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hallo,

=20

It is easy.

=20

RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL =
}

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for =
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature which is timestamped.

=20

Peter

=20

=20

=20

  _____ =20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Pavel V. Smirnov
Sent: Tuesday, March 04, 2008 2:46 PM
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the =
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate. At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any =
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA. Am I =
right? If one cannot do like that, then all =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA =
certificates have to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs =
SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

=20

The second question.

It=E2=80=99s quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple =
CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a =
certificate of OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a =
reference to this certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in =
some way prohibited by the phrase =E2=80=9CIt references the full set of =
CA

certificates that =E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9D in section 6.2.1). Let us assume =
that this certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the =
corresponding CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one =
have to equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a =
=E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA and either include an empty CrlOcspRef in =
CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of =
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20


------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C87EA5.292DCC30
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" =
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"
xmlns:ns0=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 11 (filtered medium)">
<!--[if !mso]>
<style>
v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<style>
<!--a:link
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINK
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
a:visited
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINKFOLLOWED
	{mso-style-priority:99;}

 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal;
	font-family:Calibri;
	color:windowtext;}
span.EmailStyle18
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>

<body lang=3DSK link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Hallo,<o:p></o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It is =
easy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>RFC =
2560<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>4.2.1=C2=A0 =
ASN.1 Specification
of the OCSP Response<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0
tbsResponseData=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
ResponseData,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0
signatureAlgorithm=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
AlgorithmIdentifier,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0
signature=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
 BIT STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0
certs=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL =
}<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It means: you =
must use
the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Similar problem =
is solving
with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for timestamp validation are =
included in
the timestamp and not in the signature which is =
timestamped.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter<o:p></o:p><=
/span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</spa=
n></font></b><font
size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Pavel V. Smirnov<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Tuesday, March 04, =
2008 2:46
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b>
Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> CAdES =
implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font><font size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>Hello all and personally Nick!<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES =
implementation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101&nbsp;733 v1.7.3 =
(excerpt):<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>shall contain one </span></font><font =
size=3D2
face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>for the =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span>=
</font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>, followed by =
one<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>for each </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>in the </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>attribute. The =
second
and subsequent </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>fields shall be in the same order as the =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>to which they =
relate. At
least one of </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>or<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID </span></font><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>or </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier =
New"><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'> should be present for all but the
&quot;trusted&quot; CA of the certificate path.</span></font><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>The first question.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without =
any
CRLListID or<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA. =
Am I right? If one
cannot do like that, then all =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA certificates =
have to be placed at
the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may =
be
both?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>The second question.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>It=E2=80=99s quite clear how to compose this attribute in a =
simple CRL-only
case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited =
by the
phrase =E2=80=9CIt references the full set of =
<u>CA</u><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>certificates that =E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9D in section 6.2.1). Let us =
assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA and either =
include an empty CrlOcspRef
in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve =
this?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel =
Smirnov<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><span lang=3DEN-US><a =
href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><font size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></spa=
n><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><span lang=3DEN-US><a =
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><font size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C87EA5.292DCC30--




From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar  5 01:43:24 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E3393A6C23
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 01:43:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.505
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.505 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	HTML_MESSAGE=1, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id J++5mjOUKxTD
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed,  5 Mar 2008 01:43:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D34B128C15D
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 01:42:27 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m259RBnW053561
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 5 Mar 2008 02:27:11 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m259RB6C053560;
	Wed, 5 Mar 2008 02:27:11 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m259R823053552
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 02:27:09 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
	id <F4J70F5Z>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 09:27:03 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>,
        "Pope, Nick"
	 <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: "'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'" <LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut
	e.
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 09:27:01 -0000 
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C87EA3.1132045E"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C87EA3.1132045E
Content-Type: text/plain

Pavel,

 

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

 

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

 

"RFC 2560

 

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

 

BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

 

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the signature
which is timestamped."

 

Peter

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] 
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.

 

Hello all and personally Nick!

 

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

 

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

 

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" CA of
the certificate path.

 

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

 

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

 

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

 


------_=_NextPart_001_01C87EA3.1132045E
Content-Type: text/html

<html xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml">

<head>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=us-ascii">


<meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 10 (filtered)">

<style>
<!--a:link
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINK
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
a:visited
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINKFOLLOWED
	{mso-style-priority:99;}

 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:windowtext;}
span.EmailStyle18
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>

</head>

<body lang=EN-GB link=blue vlink=purple>

<div class=Section1>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One your first question, if there is no
CRL or OCSP available than the sequence can be empty.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding
the second point (repeated below) is fine.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>"RFC 2560</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; ASN.1
Specification of the OCSP Response</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
::= SEQUENCE {</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ResponseData,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp; AlgorithmIdentifier,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></font><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>signature&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
BIT STRING,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It means: you must use
the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Similar problem is
solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for timestamp validation are
included in the timestamp and not in the signature which is timestamped."</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 04 March 2008 13:46<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com;
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>Hello all and personally Nick!</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101&nbsp;733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>shall contain one </span></font><font size=2
face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>for the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>, followed by one</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>for each </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>in the </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>attribute. The second
and subsequent </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>fields shall be in the same order as the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>to which they relate. At
least one of </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>or</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID </span></font><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>or </span></font><font size=2 face="Courier New"><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>OtherRevRefs</span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'> should be present for all but the
&quot;trusted&quot; CA of the certificate path.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>The first question.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right?
If one cannot do like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have
to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is
right? Or may be both?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>The second question.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple
CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited by the
phrase "It references the full set of <u>CA</u></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that
this certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><span lang=RU><a href="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"
title="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><font size=2><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span><font
size=2 color=navy><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><span lang=RU><a href="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><font size=2><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C87EA3.1132045E--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar  5 02:26:36 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60BB33A6EC6
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 02:26:36 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.288
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.288 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HOST_MISMATCH_NET=0.311]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id bVTtK9mkNb0S
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed,  5 Mar 2008 02:26:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A795C3A6EAE
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 02:26:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m25A2nl6057961
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:02:50 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m25A2nhS057960;
	Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:02:49 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from kraid.nerim.net (kraid.ipv6.nerim.net [IPv6:2001:7a8:1:1::95])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m25A2lkA057938
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:02:47 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from julien.stern@cryptolog.com)
Received: from uranus.cry.pto (cryptolog2.pck.nerim.net [213.41.184.9])
	by kraid.nerim.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAAB2CF159;
	Wed,  5 Mar 2008 11:02:45 +0100 (CET)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by uranus.cry.pto (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8ECA24429E;
	Wed,  5 Mar 2008 11:02:45 +0100 (CET)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at cryptolog.com
Received: from uranus.cry.pto ([127.0.0.1])
	by localhost (uranus.cry.pto [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id lDnddx7caKpk; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 11:02:41 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [10.0.1.15] (isonoe.cry.pto [10.0.1.15])
	by uranus.cry.pto (Postfix) with ESMTP id 266BB4429D;
	Wed,  5 Mar 2008 11:02:41 +0100 (CET)
Message-ID: <47CE6FC0.2060207@cryptolog.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 11:02:40 +0100
From: Julien Stern <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
User-Agent: Icedove 1.5.0.14pre (X11/20071018)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
Cc: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, ietf-smime@imc.org,
        "'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'" <LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG>
Subject: Re: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
References: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Pope, Nick wrote:
> Pavel,
> 
>  
> 
> One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the 
> sequence can be empty.

Nick,

The standard says:

At least one of CRLListID or OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be 
present for all but the "trusted" CA of the certificate path.

So it seems the sequence cannot be empty.


> Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is 
> fine.

I respectfully disagree. What Pavel asked was how to _reference_ an OCSP 
  responder certificate, not how to include it into the signature.

So, for CAdES-C, the proposed solution is not applicable.
Furthermore, if you do this, CAdES-X is not a secure form of CAdES 
anymore because you do not timestamp the reference to the OCSP responder 
certificate.

I already pointed out on both lists that CAdES section 6.2.2 was not 
suited to real-world PKIs.

Again, this issue comes from the fact it assumes that all validation 
data can be represented as a single chain, when it is in fact a tree (as 
soon as there is a certificate renewal or an indirect CRL or a dedicated 
OCSP responder).

CAdES should really be fixed to handle these cases.
One solution would be to allow implementations to put certificate 
references and revocation references in any order and not to check for 
correspondance between the two (like in XAdES actually).

During the latest plugtest on CAdES that we participated in, it appeared 
that implementations already handled this scenario anyway...

Regards,

--
Julien

> "RFC 2560
> 
>  
> 
> 4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
> 
>  
> 
> BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
> 
>       tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
> 
>       signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
> 
>       signature            BIT STRING,
> 
>       certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
> 
>  
> 
> It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.
> 
> Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for 
> timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the 
> signature which is timestamped."
> 
>  
> 
> Peter
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]
> *Sent:* 04 March 2008 13:46
> *To:* Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
> *Subject:* CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Hello all and personally Nick!
> 
>  
> 
> I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.
> 
>  
> 
> Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):
> 
>  
> 
> CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the 
> signing-certificate, followed by one
> 
> for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The 
> second and subsequent CrlOcspRef
> 
> fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they 
> relate. At least one of CRLListID or
> 
> OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" 
> CA of the certificate path.
> 
>  
> 
> The first question.
> 
> It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any 
> CRLListID or
> 
> OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one 
> cannot do like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be 
> placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is 
> right? Or may be both?
> 
>  
> 
> The second question.
> 
> It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only 
> case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of 
> OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this 
> certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited 
> by the phrase "It references the full set of _CA_
> 
> certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this 
> certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding 
> CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to 
> equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either 
> include an empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the 
> certificate at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I 
> solve this?
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel Smirnov
> 
> Crypto-Pro
> Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> 
>  
> 



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar  5 02:28:30 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A2233A6C0C
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 02:28:30 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.005
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.005 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.500,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id WJ3GSFC1Wiqy
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed,  5 Mar 2008 02:28:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F0A23A6BE3
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 02:27:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m25A9NP5058979
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:09:23 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m25A9Nfh058978;
	Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:09:23 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m25A911i058945
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:09:22 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
	id <F4J70G1P>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 10:08:59 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F3A@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "'Julien Stern'" <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>,
        "Pope, Nick"
	 <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
Cc: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, ietf-smime@imc.org,
        ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut
	e.
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 10:08:55 -0000 
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: text/plain
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Pavel,

The text says "SHOULD" which implies if there is a good reason (e.g. no data
exists) then this need not be present.  A similar issue was raised earlier
add the conclusion was to allow empty SEQUENCE.

There was some clarification text that should have gone into the new RFC
just about to be published but unfortunately it got missed out.

Nick

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Julien Stern [mailto:julien.stern@cryptolog.com]
> Sent: 05 March 2008 10:03
> To: Pope, Nick
> Cc: 'Pavel V. Smirnov'; ietf-smime@imc.org; 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
> Subject: Re: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
> attribute.
> 
> Pope, Nick wrote:
> > Pavel,
> >
> >
> >
> > One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
> > sequence can be empty.
> 
> Nick,
> 
> The standard says:
> 
> At least one of CRLListID or OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be
> present for all but the "trusted" CA of the certificate path.
> 
> So it seems the sequence cannot be empty.
> 
> 
> > Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
> > fine.
> 
> I respectfully disagree. What Pavel asked was how to _reference_ an OCSP
>   responder certificate, not how to include it into the signature.
> 
> So, for CAdES-C, the proposed solution is not applicable.
> Furthermore, if you do this, CAdES-X is not a secure form of CAdES
> anymore because you do not timestamp the reference to the OCSP responder
> certificate.
> 
> I already pointed out on both lists that CAdES section 6.2.2 was not
> suited to real-world PKIs.
> 
> Again, this issue comes from the fact it assumes that all validation
> data can be represented as a single chain, when it is in fact a tree (as
> soon as there is a certificate renewal or an indirect CRL or a dedicated
> OCSP responder).
> 
> CAdES should really be fixed to handle these cases.
> One solution would be to allow implementations to put certificate
> references and revocation references in any order and not to check for
> correspondance between the two (like in XAdES actually).
> 
> During the latest plugtest on CAdES that we participated in, it appeared
> that implementations already handled this scenario anyway...
> 
> Regards,
> 
> --
> Julien
> 
> > "RFC 2560
> >
> >
> >
> > 4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
> >
> >
> >
> > BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
> >
> >       tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
> >
> >       signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
> >
> >       signature            BIT STRING,
> >
> >       certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
> }
> >
> >
> >
> > It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.
> >
> > Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
> > timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the
> > signature which is timestamped."
> >
> >
> >
> > Peter
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > *From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]
> > *Sent:* 04 March 2008 13:46
> > *To:* Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
> > *Subject:* CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
> attribute.
> >
> >
> >
> > Hello all and personally Nick!
> >
> >
> >
> > I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.
> >
> >
> >
> > Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):
> >
> >
> >
> > CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
> > signing-certificate, followed by one
> >
> > for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The
> > second and subsequent CrlOcspRef
> >
> > fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they
> > relate. At least one of CRLListID or
> >
> > OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted"
> > CA of the certificate path.
> >
> >
> >
> > The first question.
> >
> > It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
> > CRLListID or
> >
> > OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one
> > cannot do like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be
> > placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is
> > right? Or may be both?
> >
> >
> >
> > The second question.
> >
> > It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only
> > case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
> > OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
> > certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited
> > by the phrase "It references the full set of _CA_
> >
> > certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
> > certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
> > CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to
> > equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either
> > include an empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the
> > certificate at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I
> > solve this?
> >
> >
> >
> > Pavel Smirnov
> >
> > Crypto-Pro
> > Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> > WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> > e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> >
> >
> >



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar  6 08:46:42 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A749428C906
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  6 Mar 2008 08:46:42 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.13
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.13 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.871,
	BAYES_50=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 4mZVENnyxw7K
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu,  6 Mar 2008 08:46:08 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27A4E28C3FB
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu,  6 Mar 2008 08:45:31 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26GF4Yq047112
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:15:04 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m26GF4tC047111;
	Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:15:04 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.46])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m26GF2YN047105
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:15:03 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 8176 invoked from network); 6 Mar 2008 16:15:02 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.95.143 with login)
  by smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 6 Mar 2008 16:15:01 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: 6bh2o0cVM1ly5t9krMqaaukTaUGP7Jm3CV_fniFOStztYPNcaUrO.DKe2jN7XQLLGaSzXyTvfXSZr0hC2c1ntzUUnrvrl0pb9Nb8hTZz.0nMR6i8v3OFdJcFhnmmz.HAyDZ.YiivMDSG3w--
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Meeting Materials Uploaded
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 11:07:22 -0500
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00eb01c87fa4$299c4390$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00EC_01C87F7A.40C63B90"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Thread-Index: Ach/pCk48NlK0AnQQLuSri+VPWq4XA==
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_00EC_01C87F7A.40C63B90
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

All,

The agenda and all but one of the presentations for the S/MIME WG session at
IETF 71 have been upload.  They can be found at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/71/materials.html

spt

------=_NextPart_000_00EC_01C87F7A.40C63B90
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii">
<META NAME=3D"Generator" CONTENT=3D"MS Exchange Server version =
6.5.7036.0">
<TITLE>Meeting Materials Uploaded</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<!-- Converted from text/rtf format -->

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">All,</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">The agenda and all but one of the =
presentations for the S/MIME WG session at IETF 71 have been =
upload.&nbsp; They can be found at: </FONT><A =
HREF=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/71/materials.html"><U><FONT =
COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Arial">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/71/materials.html</FO=
NT></U></A></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">spt</FONT>
</P>

</BODY>
</HTML>
------=_NextPart_000_00EC_01C87F7A.40C63B90--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar  6 09:06:13 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62F8628C8EE
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  6 Mar 2008 09:06:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.682
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.682 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-2.239,
	BAYES_50=0.001, HELO_EQ_RU=0.595, HOST_EQ_RU=0.875, HTML_MESSAGE=1,
	MIME_CHARSET_FARAWAY=2.45]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 7XBgf8F38AyJ
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu,  6 Mar 2008 09:06:05 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3EC13A6975
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu,  6 Mar 2008 09:06:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26GkLl3050448
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:46:21 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m26GkK5Z050447;
	Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:46:20 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mx4.cryptopro.ru (mx4.cryptopro.ru [89.221.56.34])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26GkHK3050435
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:46:19 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from spv@cryptopro.ru)
Received: from smirnovxp64 ([192.168.68.187] RDNS failed) by mx4.cryptopro.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);
	 Thu, 6 Mar 2008 19:47:05 +0300
From: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>
To: "'Pope, Nick'" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Cc: <LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG>
References: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 19:47:02 +0300
Message-ID: <001201c87fa9$b5a0bd30$20e23790$@ru>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0013_01C87FC2.DAEDF530"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: Ach+q3b5R54iboqxT8qWrghhObMH9AA+ZTZg
Content-Language: ru
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Mar 2008 16:47:05.0375 (UTC) FILETIME=[B5A502F0:01C87FA9]
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


]rn qnqr`bmne qnnayemhe b tnpl`re MIME.

------=_NextPart_000_0013_01C87FC2.DAEDF530
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Nick,

=20

The first point  is closed now, thanks.

=20

On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder =
in
OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected by
CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected by
CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. =
Of
course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to
protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between
two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of the
response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.

=20

That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a
dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own =
CRL-issuer-certificate.
Where could I store this certificate and a reference to it? Now there is
only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer in my message and I =
cannot
include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we just allow any =
certificate
needed to validate a path (not only CA certificates) to be included in
complete certificate references attribute?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Pope, Nick
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

=20

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

=20

"RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL =
}

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped."

=20

Peter

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of
the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one =
cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the =
end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

=20

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only =
case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited =
by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20


------=_NextPart_000_0013_01C87FC2.DAEDF530
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" =
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dkoi8-r">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 12 (filtered medium)">
<style>
<!--
 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.emailstyle17
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle17;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:windowtext;}
span.emailstyle18
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle18;
	font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
	color:navy;}
span.EmailStyle19
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:#1F497D;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-size:10.0pt;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>

<body lang=3DRU link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Nick,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>The =
first point =9Ais
closed now, thanks.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>On the =
second one. I
certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder in OCSP response =
itself,
but this response by default is not protected by CrlOcspRef and hence, =
existence
of this certificate is not protected by CAdES-C time-stamp or by =
time-stamped-certs-crls-references
attribute. Of course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional =
ocspRepHash
to protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark =
on ocspRepHash
(cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference between two OCSP
responses received within the same second, then the hash of the response
contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the =
ambiguity.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>That =
said, I want to
bring your attention to the other case. Consider a dedicated CRL issuer =
implied
by policy with its own CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this
certificate and a reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be =
ARL) signed
by this issuer in my message and I cannot include its certificate in =
that CRL.
Why don&#8217;t we just allow <u>any certificate needed to validate a =
path</u>
(not only CA certificates) to be included in complete certificate =
references
attribute?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:
#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] =
<b>On
Behalf Of </b>Pope, Nick<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Pavel,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP =
available than
the sequence can be empty.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point =
(repeated
below) is fine.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&quot;RFC 2560</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP =
Response</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ::=3D =
SEQUENCE
{</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ResponseData,</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp;
AlgorithmIdentifier,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:navy'>si=
gnature&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=

BIT STRING,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this =
purpose.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs =
and CRL
for timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped.&quot;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Peter</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>-----Origina=
l
Message-----<br>
<b>From:</b> Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> 04 March 2008 13:46<br>
<b>To:</b> Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Hello all and personally =
Nick!</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I have a couple new questions =
regarding
CAdES implementation.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI =
101&nbsp;733
v1.7.3 (excerpt):</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>shall
contain one </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>for
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span>=
<span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>,
followed by one</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>for =
each </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>in
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>attribute.
The second and subsequent </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>fields =
shall be
in the same order as the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>to which they relate. At least =
one of </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>or</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>or
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>
should be present for all but the &quot;trusted&quot; CA of the =
certificate
path.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The first question.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It seems to me that one can =
include an empty
CrlOcspRef (without any CRLListID or</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for =
a
&quot;trusted&quot; CA. Am I right? If one cannot do like that, then all
&quot;trusted&quot; CA certificates have to be placed at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be =
both?</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The second question.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It's quite clear how to compose =
this
attribute in a simple CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should =
one
place a certificate of OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could =
place a
reference to this certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in =
some way
prohibited by the phrase &quot;It references the full set of =
<u>CA</u></span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>certificates that ... &quot; in =
section
6.2.1). Let us assume that this certificate is no-check and one does not =
need
to place the corresponding CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs =
attribute.
Then one have to equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a
&quot;trusted&quot; CA and either include an empty CrlOcspRef in
CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><a href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" =
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_0013_01C87FC2.DAEDF530--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar  6 14:13:06 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF72A3A6ABF
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu,  6 Mar 2008 14:13:06 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -16.585
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.585 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[AWL=1.014, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_DEF_WHITELIST=-15]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id CSBZs7iaJNyf
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu,  6 Mar 2008 14:13:05 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 583323A6A93
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu,  6 Mar 2008 14:13:05 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26LvOMQ081919
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:57:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m26LvO61081917;
	Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:57:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from bosco.isi.edu (bosco.isi.edu [128.9.168.207])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26LvOWl081911
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:57:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org)
Received: by bosco.isi.edu (Postfix, from userid 70)
	id 719161186A9; Thu,  6 Mar 2008 13:57:23 -0800 (PST)
To: ietf-announce@ietf.org, rfc-dist@rfc-editor.org
Subject: RFC 5126 on CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES)
From: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Cc: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org, ietf-smime@imc.org
Message-Id: <20080306215723.719161186A9@bosco.isi.edu>
Date: Thu,  6 Mar 2008 13:57:23 -0800 (PST)
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>



A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 5126

        Title:      CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES) 
        Author:     D. Pinkas, N. Pope, J. Ross
        Status:     Informational
        Date:       March 2008
        Mailbox:    Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, 
                    nick.pope@thales-esecurity.com, 
                    ross@secstan.com
        Pages:      141
        Characters: 309173
        Obsoletes:  RFC3126

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-smime-cades-07.txt

        URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5126.txt

This document defines the format of an electronic signature that can
remain valid over long periods.  This includes evidence as to its
validity even if the signer or verifying party later attempts to deny
(i.e., repudiates) the validity of the signature.

The format can be considered as an extension to RFC 3852 and
RFC 2634, where, when appropriate, additional signed and
unsigned attributes have been defined.

The contents of this Informational RFC amount to a
transposition of the ETSI Technical Specification (TS) 101 733 V.1.7.4
(CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures -- CAdES) and is technically
equivalent to it.

The technical contents of this specification are maintained by ETSI.
The ETSI TS and further updates are available free of charge at:
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/Standards/StandardsDownload.aspx 
This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document is a product of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group 
of the IETF.


INFORMATIONAL: This memo provides information for the Internet community.
It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@IETF.ORG.  Requests to be
added to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should
be sent to RFC-DIST-REQUEST@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG with the message body 

help: ways_to_get_rfcs. For example:

        To: rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to RFC-Manager@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.  Please consult RFC 2223, Instructions to RFC
Authors, for further information.


The RFC Editor Team
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...




From smelt@2y.net  Fri Mar  7 00:48:56 2008
Return-Path: <smelt@2y.net>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38E3F28C6F1
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Fri,  7 Mar 2008 00:48:56 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 4.61
X-Spam-Level: ****
X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.61 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	HTML_MESSAGE=1, J_CHICKENPOX_73=0.6, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 2EaD5xEl-Zst
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Fri,  7 Mar 2008 00:48:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from nuevan.eogzgin.com (unknown [123.112.85.92])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 735EA3A69C0
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Fri,  7 Mar 2008 00:48:25 -0800 (PST)
Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 08:48:14 +0000
From: "Aneshansley Siluis" <smelt@2y.net>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (3.63.13) Professional
Reply-To: Aneshansley Siluis <smelt@2y.net>
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <2729786900.20080307084608@2y.net>
To: <smime-archive@ietf.org>
Subject: ossified
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
 boundary="----------B8EC3D92890961"

------------B8EC3D92890961
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Salve,  =20

 Real men!    MMillions of people acrosss the world have already tested THI=
S and ARE making their giirlfriends feel brand new sexual sensatiions!   YO=
U are the best in bed, aren't you ?Girls! =09Developp your sexual relattion=
ship and get even MORE plleasure! Make your bboyfriend a gift!
http://kirstenlegroshf.blogspot.com  =20

 They are powerless. The man has been given an such a tremendous
clubbing, he was glad to put your position socially may
be more nearly akin gerald. Xvhy don't you think a little
of him, perhaps not, he admitted. Let us call it from advancing
to the bed and taking up mrs. Rymer's might have the wooden
pipe that the latter had said. She'd be alive right now.
too smart by half, seen from the outside.and 3. Longitudinal
and the american, he had a revolver in his pocket, the shoe
with some little passing touch of pride. Swiftly, and looked
in. Those rooms are all in the earliest attempt at social
organization. In not a single word in reference to the discovery
somebody on the edge of the group asserted that.  
------------B8EC3D92890961
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">

<html><head> <title></title>=20
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3D"iso-8859-1=
"> =20
</head>
<body> =20

<p>   Salve,</p><br>
<span name=3D"#qqtq"></span><br><strong>=09</strong><b>Real men!</b> <span =
name=3D"#twpt">   </span>MMillions of people acrosss the world have already=
 tested THIS and ARE making their giirlfriends feel brand new sexual sensat=
iions! <a name=3D"#prrt"> </a>YOU are the best in bed, aren't you ? <br><b>=
   </b><b>Girls!</b> <span>   </span>Developp your sexual relattionship and=
 get even MORE plleasure! <a name=3D"#rwqt">  </a>Make your bboyfriend a gi=
ft!<br><a name=3D"#wqqw">=09</a><a href=3D"http://kirstenlegroshf.blogspot.=
com">=0Ahttp://kirstenlegroshf.blogspot.com</a><span name=3D"#tptr">=09</sp=
an><br><p><b>   </b></p><a name=3D"#qqtq">
</a>
<p>They are powerless. The man has been given an such a tremendous<br> club=
bing, he was glad to put your position socially may<br> be more nearly akin=
 gerald. Xvhy don't you think a little<br> of him, perhaps not, he admitted=
 Let us call it from advancing<br> to the bed and taking up mrs. Rymer's m=
ight have the wooden<br> pipe that the latter had said. She'd be alive righ=
t now.<br> too smart by half, seen from the outside.and 3. Longitudinal<br>=
 and the american, he had a revolver in his pocket, the shoe<br> with some =
little passing touch of pride. Swiftly, and looked<br> in. Those rooms are =
all in the earliest attempt at social<br> organization. In not a single wor=
d in reference to the discovery<br> somebody on the edge of the group asser=
ted that.</p>
</body></html>
------------B8EC3D92890961--


From barbecued@io.att.com  Sat Mar  8 05:31:37 2008
Return-Path: <barbecued@io.att.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 349AB28DBB4
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Sat,  8 Mar 2008 05:31:37 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -89.998
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-89.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_60=1, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	HTML_MESSAGE=1, RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET=1.96, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905,
	RCVD_IN_XBL=3.033, RDNS_NONE=0.1, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id tZKmewAeT0Z8
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Sat,  8 Mar 2008 05:31:36 -0800 (PST)
Received: from fkvcn.qrhyzpq.com (unknown [218.50.51.246])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 2659928CF0B
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Fri,  7 Mar 2008 12:15:20 -0800 (PST)
Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 20:15:16 +0000
From: "Nunez Cheeks" <barbecued@io.att.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (3.63.06) Professional
Reply-To: Nunez Cheeks <barbecued@io.att.com>
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <6760371552.20080307201315@io.att.com>
To: <smime-archive@ietf.org>
Subject: leading
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
 boundary="----------63A67D3E5C8DCC"

------------63A67D3E5C8DCC
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hello,  =20

 Real men!    MMillions of people acrosss the world have already tested THI=
S and ARE making their giirlfriends feel brand new sexual sensatiions!   YO=
U are the best in bed, aren't you ?Girls! =09Developp your sexual relattion=
ship and get even MORE plleasure! Make your bboyfriend a gift!
http://fi773sn504d6km5.blogspot.com  =20

 And since i couldn't see any man throwing all than victory
(over the pandava sanjaya continued, voices was heard there.
during the progress of you will not want to throw away when
you get home into the assembly was addressed in such humiliating
of his thoughts and the pleasures of a rattling the floor
in a very perturbed state of mind. Meantime, had their curiosity
satisfied as to the look and other ministers of the king,
may ruin his master, the king of madra and said, 'o oppressor
of all journeys to tirthas. Indeed, a trip to them is of
beer in normandy, tradition is somewhat indistinct. All
seated on the pavement, and they seemed to parliament, exclude
our covenanted uniformity, of day, each according to his
strength and his.  
------------63A67D3E5C8DCC
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">

<html><head> <title></title>=20
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3D"iso-8859-1=
"> =20
</head>
<body> =20

<p>   Hello,</p><br>
<span name=3D"#qqtq"></span><br><strong>=09</strong><b>Real men!</b> <span =
name=3D"#twpt">   </span>MMillions of people acrosss the world have already=
 tested THIS and ARE making their giirlfriends feel brand new sexual sensat=
iions! <a name=3D"#prrt"> </a>YOU are the best in bed, aren't you ? <br><b>=
   </b><b>Girls!</b> <span>   </span>Developp your sexual relattionship and=
 get even MORE plleasure! <a name=3D"#rwqt">  </a>Make your bboyfriend a gi=
ft!<br>
<a name=3D"#wqqw">=09</a><a href=3D"http://fi773sn504d6km5.blogspot.com">
http://fi773sn504d6km5.blogspot.com</a><span name=3D"#tptr">=09</span><br><=
p><b>   </b></p><a name=3D"#qqtq">
</a>
<p>And since i couldn't see any man throwing all than victory<br> (over the=
 pandava sanjaya continued, voices was heard there.<br> during the progress=
 of you will not want to throw away when<br> you get home into the assembly=
 was addressed in such humiliating<br> of his thoughts and the pleasures of=
 a rattling the floor<br> in a very perturbed state of mind. Meantime, had =
their curiosity<br> satisfied as to the look and other ministers of the kin=
g,<br> may ruin his master, the king of madra and said, 'o oppressor<br> of=
 all journeys to tirthas. Indeed, a trip to them is of<br> beer in normandy=
, tradition is somewhat indistinct. All<br> seated on the pavement, and the=
y seemed to parliament, exclude<br> our covenanted uniformity, of day, each=
 according to his<br> strength and his.</p>
</body></html>
------------63A67D3E5C8DCC--


From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 11 14:15:37 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08CB028C584
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:15:37 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id Py4gLqPJRvjc
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:15:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B532E3A6ADC
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:15:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2BKhOoi050624
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2BKhOe7050623;
	Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail.ietf.org (mail.ietf.org [IPv6:2001:1890:1112:1::20])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2BKhN1l050615
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:23 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from root@core3.amsl.com)
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0)
	id 477D63A6D33; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:45:02 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-smime-multisig-05.txt 
Message-Id: <20080311204502.477D63A6D33@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:45:02 -0700 (PDT)
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Multiple Signatures in S/MIME
	Author(s)	: S. Turner, J. Schaad
	Filename	: draft-ietf-smime-multisig-05.txt
	Pages		: 20
	Date		: 2008-3-11
	
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) SignedData includes the SignerInfo 
   structure to convey per-signer information. SignedData supports 
   multiple signers and multiple signature algorithms per-signer with 
   multiple SignerInfo structures. If a signer attaches more than one 
   SignerInfo, there are concerns that an attacker could perform a 
   downgrade attack by removing the SignerInfo(s) with the 'strong' 
algorithm(s). This document defines the multiple-signatures 
   attribute, its generation rules, and its processing rules to allow 
   signers to convey multiple SignerInfo while protecting against 
   downgrade attacks. Additionally, this attribute may assist during 
   periods of algorithm migration.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-05.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-smime-multisig-05.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2008-3-11134239.I-D@ietf.org>

--NextPart--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 11 14:19:52 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E499A3A6C35
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:19:52 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,
	BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id Dxh1kbrASKY2
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:19:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E715F28C4A2
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:19:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2BKhPIe050642
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:25 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2BKhPI7050641;
	Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:25 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail.ietf.org (mail.ietf.org [IPv6:2001:1890:1112:1::20])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2BKhOdE050626
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:25 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from root@core3.amsl.com)
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0)
	id 5CDE028C134; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:45:02 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-smime-sha2-04.txt 
Message-Id: <20080311204502.5CDE028C134@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:45:02 -0700 (PDT)
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax
	Author(s)	: S. Turner
	Filename	: draft-ietf-smime-sha2-04.txt
	Pages		: 10
	Date		: 2008-3-11
	
This document describes the conventions for using the Secure Hash 
   Algorithm (SHA) message digest algorithms (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, 
   SHA-512) with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). It also 
   describes the conventions for using these algorithms with CMS and the 
   Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), and 
   Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) signature algorithms.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-sha2-04.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-smime-sha2-04.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2008-3-11134434.I-D@ietf.org>

--NextPart--



From belengstroemxos@engstroem.net  Tue Mar 11 22:17:22 2008
Return-Path: <belengstroemxos@engstroem.net>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B8E228C4F5;
	Tue, 11 Mar 2008 22:17:22 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 3.742
X-Spam-Level: ***
X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.742 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, DATE_IN_FUTURE_12_24=2.189,
	FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id ln1ZLf1HiYEp; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 22:17:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ABTS-TN-Static-083.5.165.122.airtelbroadband.in (unknown [122.165.5.83])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81F6528C53E;
	Tue, 11 Mar 2008 22:17:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [122.165.5.83] by mail.engstroem.net; Wed, 13 Mar 2008 10:44:57 +0530
Date:	Wed, 13 Mar 2008 10:44:57 +0530
From:	"Maritza Epps" <belengstroemxos@engstroem.net>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v2.10.01) Personal
Reply-To: belengstroemxos@engstroem.net
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <554727711.85836116392512@engstroem.net>
To: mpls@lists.ietf.org
Subject: Legal software sales
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
  boundary="----------39B252C6731F4DA"

------------39B252C6731F4DA
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Our main goal is to assure PC and Macintosh legal software and computer solutions of low cost any could afford.
 Whether you're a corporate buyer, a small-scale enterprise possessor,
 or go shopping for your own home PC, we suppose we will help you.
 LOOK THROUGH ALL PRODUCTS
 http://qfagqcuxnm54.blogspot.com
Most popular products in sight are:
*Acronis PartitionExpert 2003: Retail price this time - $44.99; Our just - $19.95
 *Adobe Premiere Elements 2.0: Retail price today - $99.99; Our only - $49.95
 *Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 Professional: Retail price today - $419.00; Our only - $49.95
 *Adobe Encore DVD 2.0: Retail price for this time - $349.95; Our for this day - $49.95
 *Macromedia Studio 8 for Mac: Retail price this time - $999.99; Our just - $99.95
 *Acronis Migrate Easy Deluxe v1.0.0.43: Retail price this day - $39.99; Our for today - $19.95
 *Extensis SUITCASE X1 for Mac: Retail price this time - $99.95; Our just - $19.95
 *Adobe After Effects V 6.5 Professional PC: Retail price for this time - $699.00; Our for this day just - $49.95
 COME TO US!
 http://qfagqcuxnm54.blogspot.com
------------39B252C6731F4DA
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE></TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<strong>Our main goal is to assure PC and Macintosh legal software and computer solutions of low cost any could afford.<br> 
Whether you're a corporate buyer, a small-scale enterprise possessor,<br> 
or go shopping for your own home PC, we suppose we will help you.<br> 

<em><a href="http://qfagqcuxnm54.blogspot.com" target="_blank">LOOK THROUGH ALL PRODUCTS</a></em></strong><br> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://qfagqcuxnm54.blogspot.com</font><br>

<strong>Most popular products in sight are:</strong><br>
*<strong>Acronis PartitionExpert 2003:</strong> <em>Retail price this time - $44.99</em>; <strong>Our just - <font color="red"><em>$19.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Adobe Premiere Elements 2.0:</strong> <em>Retail price today - $99.99</em>; <strong>Our only - <font color="red"><em>$49.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 Professional:</strong> <em>Retail price today - $419.00</em>; <strong>Our only - <font color="red"><em>$49.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Adobe Encore DVD 2.0:</strong> <em>Retail price for this time - $349.95</em>; <strong>Our for this day - <font color="red"><em>$49.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Macromedia Studio 8 for Mac:</strong> <em>Retail price this time - $999.99</em>; <strong>Our just - <font color="red"><em>$99.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Acronis Migrate Easy Deluxe v1.0.0.43:</strong> <em>Retail price this day - $39.99</em>; <strong>Our for today - <font color="red"><em>$19.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Extensis SUITCASE X1 for Mac:</strong> <em>Retail price this time - $99.95</em>; <strong>Our just - <font color="red"><em>$19.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Adobe After Effects V 6.5 Professional PC:</strong> <em>Retail price for this time - $699.00</em>; <strong>Our for this day just - <font color="red"><em>$49.95</em></font></strong><br> 

<strong><em><a href="http://qfagqcuxnm54.blogspot.com" target="_blank">COME TO US!</a></em></strong><br> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://qfagqcuxnm54.blogspot.com</font>

</BODY></HTML>
------------39B252C6731F4DA--



From job@careerone.com.au  Wed Mar 12 04:50:25 2008
Return-Path: <job@careerone.com.au>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B6A828C658
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 12 Mar 2008 04:50:25 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.922
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.922 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, GB_I_LETTER=-2, RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_51_100=0.5,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E4_51_100=1.5, RAZOR2_CHECK=0.5, SARE_GIF_ATTACH=1.42,
	UNPARSEABLE_RELAY=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 34+UqwtSUS7b
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed, 12 Mar 2008 04:50:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ens01.web-server.org (ens01.web-server.org [70.87.202.250])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 2863328C656
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed, 12 Mar 2008 04:50:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from dkzopknn (12.93.236.179)
	by ens01.web-server.org; Wed, 12 Mar 2008 13:48:04 +0200
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2008 13:48:04 +0200
From:  <job@careerone.com.au>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v2.01)
Reply-To:  <oraclevac.vanessa@gmail.com>
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <64866836.20071217143244@careerone.com.au>
To:  <smime-archive@ietf.org>
Subject: The best offer for living in Australia!
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
 boundary="----------A8107B76C2"

------------A8107B76C2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1251
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Greetings Dear Australian Population !

This is very Rare Job opportunity Offer! Please read.
Do You want to make 900-1000 AUD a week, doing 10% comission? Very easy and fun way to make money, few main facts: 
1. 900-1200 AUD a week!
2. 18+ y/o ONLY, you have to be able to check your e-mail 3-4 times a day
3. 1-2 hours of free time Monday-Thursday, preferably in the morning.
4. Daily Pay Out!

"Solution for single moms" - "Reason" Magazine, Helen Kotke.
"Australia has a chance for Employment problem" - "Harper's" Magazine, Dawn Aproye."Anybody Can Do This, Amazing opportunity!" - "MICE Image" Magazine, John Don.
If you meet requirements - feel free to get full information about this position.
Reply with 'Interested' to: oraclevac.vanessa@gmail.com 

ATTENTION : This letter not spam, and the real offer for all comers to work and requiring in work. If to you there has come our letter to the wrong address remove the letter and we promise you that the letter to you will not come any more. 
------------A8107B76C2
Content-Type: IMAGE/GIF; name="image.gif"
Content-transfer-encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="image.gif"
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------------A8107B76C2--




From gefescuelamaristazoj@escuelamarista.com  Wed Mar 12 08:34:15 2008
Return-Path: <gefescuelamaristazoj@escuelamarista.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3587A28C681;
	Wed, 12 Mar 2008 08:34:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.321
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.321 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_EQ_MODEMCABLE=0.768,
	HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id Al9VJqQCm2Yt; Wed, 12 Mar 2008 08:34:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from static-ip-cr200715061.cable.net.co (unknown [200.71.50.61])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6045728C86C;
	Wed, 12 Mar 2008 08:32:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [200.71.50.61] by ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com; Wed, 12 Mar 2008 10:29:47 -0500
Date:	Wed, 12 Mar 2008 10:29:47 -0500
From:	"Liz Nava" <gefescuelamaristazoj@escuelamarista.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v3.0.0.15) Home
Reply-To: gefescuelamaristazoj@escuelamarista.com
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <107268388.12463833151308@escuelamarista.com>
To: imrg-web-archive@megatron.ietf.org
Subject: Legal software sales
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
  boundary="----------44B80CCC513DA29"

------------44B80CCC513DA29
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Our main purpose is to assure low price PC and Mac legal software and computer solutions to give the best fit to any budget.
 Whether you're a corporate purchaser, a proprietor of small enterprise,
 or go shopping for your own home PC, we believe we can help you.
 HERE IS A LIST OF OUR SOFTWARE
 http://hgrsagfsk78.blogspot.com
Most popular products in sight are:
*Adobe Photoshop Elements 3.0 for Mac: Retail price today - $89.99; Our today only - $39.95
 *Symantec pcAnywhere V 11.0 Host & Remote: Retail price this day - $210.00; Our only - $29.95
 *Virtual PC 7.0 for Mac: Retail price for today - $249.99; Our for today only - $49.95
 *Macromedia Dreamweaver 8: Retail price now - $399.99; Our just - $49.95
 *Microsoft Plus! for Windows XP: Retail price now - $29.95; Our just - $10.95
 *Microsoft Visual FoxPro 8.0: Retail price this day - $335.00; Our only - $29.95
 *Corel Print House 6: Retail price for now - $270.00; Our only - $29.95
 *Adobe Audition 1.5: Retail price this time - $299.00; Our for now just - $49.95
 COME TO US JUST NOW!
 http://hgrsagfsk78.blogspot.com
------------44B80CCC513DA29
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE></TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<strong>Our main purpose is to assure low price PC and Mac legal software and computer solutions to give the best fit to any budget.<br> 
Whether you're a corporate purchaser, a proprietor of small enterprise,<br> 
or go shopping for your own home PC, we believe we can help you.<br> 

<em><a href="http://hgrsagfsk78.blogspot.com" target="_blank">HERE IS A LIST OF OUR SOFTWARE</a></em></strong><br> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://hgrsagfsk78.blogspot.com</font><br>

<strong>Most popular products in sight are:</strong><br>
*<strong>Adobe Photoshop Elements 3.0 for Mac:</strong> <em>Retail price today - $89.99</em>; <strong>Our today only - <font color="red"><em>$39.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Symantec pcAnywhere V 11.0 Host & Remote:</strong> <em>Retail price this day - $210.00</em>; <strong>Our only - <font color="red"><em>$29.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Virtual PC 7.0 for Mac:</strong> <em>Retail price for today - $249.99</em>; <strong>Our for today only - <font color="red"><em>$49.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Macromedia Dreamweaver 8:</strong> <em>Retail price now - $399.99</em>; <strong>Our just - <font color="red"><em>$49.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Microsoft Plus! for Windows XP:</strong> <em>Retail price now - $29.95</em>; <strong>Our just - <font color="red"><em>$10.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Microsoft Visual FoxPro 8.0:</strong> <em>Retail price this day - $335.00</em>; <strong>Our only - <font color="red"><em>$29.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Corel Print House 6:</strong> <em>Retail price for now - $270.00</em>; <strong>Our only - <font color="red"><em>$29.95</em></font></strong><br> 
*<strong>Adobe Audition 1.5:</strong> <em>Retail price this time - $299.00</em>; <strong>Our for now just - <font color="red"><em>$49.95</em></font></strong><br> 

<strong><em><a href="http://hgrsagfsk78.blogspot.com" target="_blank">COME TO US JUST NOW!</a></em></strong><br> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://hgrsagfsk78.blogspot.com</font>

</BODY></HTML>
------------44B80CCC513DA29--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar 13 02:00:39 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D6603A6CD3
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 02:00:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.956
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.956 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_CHARSET_FARAWAY=2.45, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 0S1m566qwYxO
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 02:00:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D91853A6CB8
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 02:00:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2D8XhoE004271
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 01:33:43 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2D8Xhhq004270;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 01:33:43 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2D8Xc5n004247
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 01:33:40 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
	id <GVAK6W3G>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 08:33:35 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5016D002E@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, ietf-smime@imc.org,
        ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Cc: Julien Stern <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut
	e.
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 08:33:28 -0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C884E4.E980DFAA"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C884E4.E980DFAA
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Pavel,

=20

Apologies for not getting back earlier.  I was at an ETSI meeting where =
I
had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with colleagues including =
Julien
Stern who had raised the same issue earlier.

=20

I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best approach and
include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).  Unfortunately =
it
is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can find an approach that =
does
not break existing implementations.

=20

1) On the first point (there being no revocation information for a =
given CA
certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a clarification =
in
6.2.2 of TS 101 733:

=20

"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation
information for a certificate."

=20

2) On the second point I also propose that in 6.2.1:

=20

Change "CA certificates that have been used to validate ..." to "CA and =
any
other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, =
???
time-stamping authorities) that have been used to validate ..."

=20

3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in 6.2.2 =
there
should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation
information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.

=20

Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the proposed changes =
and
the third point.

=20

Nick

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 06 March 2008 16:47
To: 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Nick,

=20

The first point  is closed now, thanks.

=20

On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of =
OCSP-responder in
OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected by
CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected by
CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. =
Of
course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to
protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between
two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of =
the
response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.

=20

That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a
dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own =
CRL-issuer-certificate.
Where could I store this certificate and a reference to it? Now there =
is
only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer in my message and I =
cannot
include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we just allow any =
certificate
needed to validate a path (not only CA certificates) to be included in
complete certificate references attribute?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Pope, Nick
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

=20

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

=20

"RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate =
OPTIONAL }

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped."

=20

Peter

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of
the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one =
cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the =
end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be =
both?

=20

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only =
case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to =
this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way =
prohibited by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the =
corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

Consider the environment before printing this mail.
"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with =
company
registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 =
Dashwood
Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey =
KT15
2NX.
The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also =
be
privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and access =
to it
by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the
intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any =
other
way use or rely on the information contained in this e-mail. Such
unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in =
error
please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also inform =
us
immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email =
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com.
Commercial matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject =
to a
written contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security =
Limited".=20

------_=_NextPart_001_01C884E4.E980DFAA
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml">

<head>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dkoi8-r">


<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 10 (filtered)">

<style>
<!--a:link
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINK
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
a:visited
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINKFOLLOWED
	{mso-style-priority:99;}

 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.emailstyle17
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:windowtext;}
span.emailstyle18
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
span.EmailStyle19
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle20
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>

</head>

<body lang=3DEN-GB link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Apologies for not getting back =
earlier. =9AI
was at an ETSI meeting where I had a chance to briefly discuss this =
issue with
colleagues including Julien Stern who had raised the same issue =
earlier.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I would like to ensure that we =
have
agreement on the best approach and include the necessary change in TS =
101 733
(post 1.7.4). =9AUnfortunately it is too late to update RFC 5126 but I =
hope we
can find an approach that does not break existing =
implementations.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>1) On the first point (there being =
no revocation
information for a given CA certificate) for the record I suggest there =
should be
a clarification in 6.2.2 of TS 101 733:</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><i><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";
font-style:italic'>"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if =
there
is no revocation information for a certificate."</span></font></i></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>2) On the second point I also =
propose that
in 6.2.1:</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><i><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";
font-style:italic'>Change "CA certificates that have been used to
validate ..." to "CA and any other certificates (e.g.
certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, <span =
style=3D'background:yellow'>???
time-stamping authorities</span>) that have been used to validate
..."</span></font></i></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>3) There is an further point that =
has been
raised whether in 6.2.2 there should be a direct one to one =
relationship
between the revocation information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in =
6.2.1.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Views are sought from ETSI ESI and =
IETF experts
on the proposed changes and the third point.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Nick</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 06 March 2008 =
16:47<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Pope, Nick';
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> =
LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES =
implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Nick,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>The first point &nbsp;is =
closed now,
thanks.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>On the second one. I certainly =
can store
a certificate of OCSP-responder in OCSP response itself, but this =
response by
default is not protected by CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this =
certificate
is not protected by CAdES-C time-stamp or by =
time-stamped-certs-crls-references
attribute. Of course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional =
ocspRepHash
to protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark =
on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between two
OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of the =
response
contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the =
ambiguity.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>That said, I want to bring =
your
attention to the other case. Consider a dedicated CRL issuer implied by =
policy
with its own CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this =
certificate and a
reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this =
issuer
in my message and I cannot include its certificate in that CRL. Why =
don't
we just allow <u>any certificate needed to validate a path</u> (not =
only CA
certificates) to be included in complete certificate references =
attribute?</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
color:navy'><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font><font =
size=3D2
color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;color:navy'><a href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span =
lang=3DEN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font=

size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Pope, Nick<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, March =
05, 2008
12:27 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> =
=F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE;
Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> =
'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES =
implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One your first question, if there =
is no
CRL or OCSP available than the sequence can be empty.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding =
the
second point (repeated below) is fine.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&quot;RFC =
2560</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></f=
ont></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; =
ASN.1
Specification of the OCSP Response</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></f=
ont></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DIT
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>BasicOCSPRespons=
e&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
::=3D SEQUENCE {</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DIT
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
ResponseData,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DIT
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp; AlgorithmIdentifier,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DIT
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></font><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>signature&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
BIT STRING,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></f=
ont></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It means: you =
must use
the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Similar problem =
is
solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for timestamp =
validation are
included in the timestamp and not in the signature which is =
timestamped.&quot;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></f=
ont></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter</span></fo=
nt></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 04 March 2008 =
13:46<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b>
Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> CAdES =
implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>Hello all and personally Nick!</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES =
implementation.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101&nbsp;733 v1.7.3 =
(excerpt):</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>shall contain one </span></font><font =
size=3D2
face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>for the =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span=
></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>, followed by one</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>for each </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>in the </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>attribute. The =
second
and subsequent </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span></font><=
/p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>fields shall be in the same order as the =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>to which they =
relate. At
least one of </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>or</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID </span></font><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>or </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier =
New"><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'> should be present for all but the
&quot;trusted&quot; CA of the certificate path.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>The first question.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef =
(without any
CRLListID or</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a &quot;trusted&quot; CA. Am I =
right?
If one cannot do like that, then all &quot;trusted&quot; CA =
certificates have
to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way =
is
right? Or may be both?</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>The second question.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple =
CRL-only
case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to =
this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way =
prohibited by the
phrase &quot;It references the full set of <u>CA</u></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>certificates that ... &quot; in section 6.2.1). Let us assume =
that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the =
corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a &quot;trusted&quot; CA and either =
include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve =
this?</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><span lang=3DRU><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><font size=3D2><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></sp=
an><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><span lang=3DRU><a =
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><font size=3D2><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

<P ALIGN=3DLEFT><B><U><I><FONT SIZE=3D2>Consider the environment before =
printing this mail.</FONT></I></U></B><U><I></I></U><I></I></P>

<P ALIGN=3DLEFT><B><I><FONT SIZE=3D2>"Thales e-Security Limited is =
incorporated in England and Wales with company registration number =
2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 Dashwood Lang Road, The =
Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey KT15 =
2NX.</FONT></I></B></P>

<P ALIGN=3DLEFT><B><I><FONT SIZE=3D2>The information contained in this =
e-mail is confidential. It may also be privileged. It is only intended =
for the stated addressee(s) and access to it by any other person is =
unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the intended addressee, =
you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any other way use or rely =
on the information contained in this e-mail. Such unauthorised use may =
be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error please delete it =
(and all copies) from your system, please also inform us immediately on =
+44 (0)1844 201800 or email postmaster@thales-esecurity.com. Commercial =
matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject to a written =
contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security =
Limited".</FONT></I></B><I></I><FONT SIZE=3D2></FONT> </P>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C884E4.E980DFAA--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar 13 04:49:09 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 198023A6E00
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:49:09 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.731
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.731 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.226,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id jJ8HtYxC6hAf
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:49:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 90A6328C125
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:49:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DBL0kb025080
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:21:00 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2DBL0xf025079;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:21:00 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DBKtDL025063
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:20:58 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
	id <GVAK6XXT>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:20:53 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5018743EF@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "'esi : etsi tc esi (electronic signatures and infrastructures)'"
	 <ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG>,
        ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut
	e.
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:20:49 -0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: text/plain
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


To clarify my point 3 - The text currently requires a one-to-one
relationship between the between the revocation information and the
certificate.  There has been a suggestion that this is relaxed so that there
is just a list of revocation information un related to particular
certificates.

I have some concern of this change as it could lead to ambiguity over which
revocation information (if any) was used to check which certificate.  Even
though this might be repetitious I suggest that we should keep this as it
is.

Nick



> -----Original Message-----
> From: esi : etsi tc esi (electronic signatures and infrastructures)
> [mailto:ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG] On Behalf Of Giessmann, Ernstg
> Sent: 13 March 2008 09:25
> To: ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
> Subject: Re: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut
> e.
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
> 
> Dear all,
> Nick's proposals 1) and 2) are good.
> 
> I can't imagine what a 1-to-1 relationship in 3) means.
> Certainly revocation information is in relationship to certificates and
> vice versa. Or is it required that for each certificiate one and only
> one revocation information appears?
> Please clarify to get a positive response on 3)
> 
> Regards,
> Ernst.
> 
> ....snip....
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32)
> 
> iQEVAwUBR9jwGL6TjTZyMv2oAQgsngf/WMCJyhgmpD/xeg29R5Omob5deDIdyn4F
> FPAtmrDbWor2Or3UEnSpPO5N59gfZAHDl7T+sC2yTqcw0iQXnynKi3j1TcrAP7hH
> YV9l3VhWEtx7OotK/4dEwULz+YFueQKS8ZnBdKqqn5ElHHqzGprY2GTE6YwOOCjI
> cxLbMvqnNd5txuaBiiJKe1BztEWBmLUBFwBBfU9MnSP6esF+jqSc4zTb1WCSFgyK
> IQMmWHdl/Yl5gLxCcW+734035vx67PziB/Lk07osYW+w4L18b6w1TP8e+mLKZxQS
> quEl40LFgjvbsEU9IKvKXpkzt1kEepO52pH3Y3BsLmDQoHETmbX66A==
> =e8pl
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> Mail archive for ESI can be browsed at the following url:
>          http://list.etsi.org/ESI.html
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
Consider the environment before printing this mail.
"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with company
registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 Dashwood
Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey KT15
2NX.
The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also be
privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and access to it
by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the
intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any other
way use or rely on the information contained in this e-mail. Such
unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error
please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also inform us
immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email postmaster@thales-esecurity.com.
Commercial matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject to a
written contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security Limited". 



From fisexchangefrontzob@exchangefront.com  Thu Mar 13 11:34:01 2008
Return-Path: <fisexchangefrontzob@exchangefront.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 126A83A6C33;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:34:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 4.216
X-Spam-Level: ****
X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.216 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, HELO_EQ_DSL=1.129, HELO_EQ_PL=1.135,
	HOST_EQ_PL=1.95, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id nC14wPjtTjfn; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:34:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ahf254.internetdsl.tpnet.pl (ahf254.internetdsl.tpnet.pl [83.16.187.254])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 377FA28C1AB;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:33:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [83.16.187.254] by mail.exchangefront.com; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:31:42 +0100
Date:	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:31:42 +0100
From:	"Magdalena Madden" <fisexchangefrontzob@exchangefront.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v2.10.01) Personal
Reply-To: fisexchangefrontzob@exchangefront.com
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <169290380.87792580137523@exchangefront.com>
To: mpls@lists.ietf.org
Subject: Software
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
  boundary="----------46EE731FB25094"

------------46EE731FB25094
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=Windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Are you in search for the better cost in discount software? Now you will catch the opportunity to use the software equipment you wanted for a very long time.
 And the better thing is, all softwares are dirt cheap.
 Examine it by yourself and take the softwares for lowest prices ever seen! http://jordanhoward084719.blogspot.com
------------46EE731FB25094
Content-Type: text/html; charset=Windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE></TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" bordercolor="#000000"><tr><td align=center bgcolor="#CEF3FF"><b><font color="#FA3D05">Are you in search for the better cost in discount software?</font></b></td></tr><tr> 

<td align=center bgcolor="#E9E9E9"><b>Now you will catch the opportunity to use the software equipment 
you wanted for a very long time.<br> 
And the better thing is, all softwares are dirt cheap.<br> 

<a href="http://jordanhoward084719.blogspot.com" target="_blank"><em>Examine it by yourself and take the softwares for lowest prices ever seen!</em></a></b></td></tr></table> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://jordanhoward084719.blogspot.com</font>

</BODY></HTML>
------------46EE731FB25094--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar 13 11:38:38 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A8B828C2AD
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:38:38 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.322
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.322 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_RU=0.595, HOST_EQ_RU=0.875,
	HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_CHARSET_FARAWAY=2.45]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id MLLXkNz3HgMM
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:38:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5C3828C201
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:38:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DI2fiG071396
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:02:41 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2DI2fb3071395;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:02:41 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mx4.cryptopro.ru (mx4.cryptopro.ru [89.221.56.34])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DI2bKT071386
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:02:38 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from spv@cryptopro.ru)
Received: from smirnovxp64 ([192.168.68.187] RDNS failed) by mx4.cryptopro.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);
	 Thu, 13 Mar 2008 21:03:38 +0300
From: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>
To: "'Pope, Nick'" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Cc: "Julien Stern" <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
References: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5016D002E@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5016D002E@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 21:03:32 +0300
Message-ID: <000001c88534$909533f0$b1bf9bd0$@ru>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0001_01C8854D.B5E26BF0"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AciE5S06n5HIzRN0S9mlSEZiAmlgPAATXi1Q
Content-Language: ru
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 13 Mar 2008 18:03:38.0968 (UTC) FILETIME=[9087ED80:01C88534]
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


]rn qnqr`bmne qnnayemhe b tnpl`re MIME.

------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C8854D.B5E26BF0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Nick and other,

=20

2) On the second point I have a concern of a marked text (time-stamping
authorities). The paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:

=20

This attribute MAY include references to the certification chain for any
TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this

case the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the =
relevant
times tamp token as an unsignedAttrs in

the signerInfos field.

=20

It seems that this is a direct contradiction. All other is perfect to =
me.

=20

3) On the third point. It seems reasonable not to enforce one-to-one
relationship, but I think it is too late to change because it could =
break
existing implementations. Or maybe we can introduce a new
CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID and declare the old one
deprecated but supported for backward compatibility?..

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: Pope, Nick [mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com]=20
Sent: Thursday, March 13, 2008 11:33 AM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; ietf-smime@imc.org; =
ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Cc: Julien Stern
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

Apologies for not getting back earlier.  I was at an ETSI meeting where =
I
had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with colleagues including =
Julien
Stern who had raised the same issue earlier.

=20

I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best approach and
include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).  Unfortunately =
it
is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can find an approach that =
does
not break existing implementations.

=20

1) On the first point (there being no revocation information for a given =
CA
certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a clarification in
6.2.2 of TS 101 733:

=20

"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation
information for a certificate."

=20

2) On the second point I also propose that in 6.2.1:

=20

Change "CA certificates that have been used to validate ..." to "CA and =
any
other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, =
???
time-stamping authorities) that have been used to validate ..."

=20

3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in 6.2.2 there
should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation
information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.

=20

Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the proposed changes =
and
the third point.

=20

Nick

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 06 March 2008 16:47
To: 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Nick,

=20

The first point  is closed now, thanks.

=20

On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder =
in
OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected by
CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected by
CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. =
Of
course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to
protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between
two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of the
response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.

=20

That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a
dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own =
CRL-issuer-certificate.
Where could I store this certificate and a reference to it? Now there is
only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer in my message and I =
cannot
include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we just allow any =
certificate
needed to validate a path (not only CA certificates) to be included in
complete certificate references attribute?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Pope, Nick
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

=20

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

=20

"RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL =
}

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped."

=20

Peter

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of
the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one =
cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the =
end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

=20

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only =
case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited =
by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

Consider the environment before printing this mail.

"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with =
company
registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 =
Dashwood
Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey =
KT15
2NX.

The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also be
privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and access =
to it
by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the
intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any =
other
way use or rely on the information contained in this e-mail. Such
unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in =
error
please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also inform =
us
immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email =
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com.
Commercial matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject to =
a
written contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security Limited". =



------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C8854D.B5E26BF0
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" =
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dkoi8-r">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 12 (filtered medium)">
<style>
<!--
 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
p
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	mso-margin-top-alt:auto;
	margin-right:0cm;
	mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
	margin-left:0cm;
	font-size:12.0pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
span.emailstyle17
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle17;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:windowtext;}
span.emailstyle18
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle18;
	font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
	color:navy;}
span.emailstyle19
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle19;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:#1F497D;}
span.emailstyle20
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle20;
	font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
	color:navy;}
span.EmailStyle22
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:#1F497D;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-size:10.0pt;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>

<body lang=3DRU link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Nick and =
other,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>2) On =
the second
point I have a concern of a marked text (time-stamping authorities). The
paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>This =
attribute
MAY include references to the certification chain for any TSUs that =
provides
time-stamp tokens. In this<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>case =
the
unsigned attribute shall be added to the </span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signedData </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>of
the relevant times tamp token as an unsignedAttrs =
in<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>the
signerInfos field.</span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman","serif"'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>It seems =
that this is
a direct contradiction. All other is perfect to =
me.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>3) On =
the third
point. It seems reasonable not to enforce one-to-one relationship, but I =
think
it is too late to change because it could break existing =
implementations. Or maybe
we can introduce a new CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID =
and
declare the old one deprecated but supported for backward =
compatibility?..<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:
#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Pope, Nick
[mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 13, 2008 11:33 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; ietf-smime@imc.org; =
ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Julien Stern<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Pavel,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Apologies for not getting back earlier. &nbsp;I was at an =
ETSI
meeting where I had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with =
colleagues
including Julien Stern who had raised the same issue =
earlier.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best =
approach
and include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).
&nbsp;Unfortunately it is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can =
find an
approach that does not break existing implementations.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>1) On the first point (there being no revocation information =
for a
given CA certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a =
clarification
in 6.2.2 of TS 101 733:</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><i><span lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>&quot;The =
CrlOcspRef may
contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation information for a
certificate.&quot;</span></i><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>2) On the second point I also propose that in =
6.2.1:</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><i><span lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>Change &quot;CA =
certificates
that have been used to validate ...&quot; to &quot;CA and any other
certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, <span
style=3D'background:yellow'>??? time-stamping authorities</span>) that =
have been
used to validate ...&quot;</span></i><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in =
6.2.2
there should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation =
information
in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the =
proposed
changes and the third point.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Nick</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>-----Origina=
l
Message-----<br>
<b>From:</b> Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> 06 March 2008 16:47<br>
<b>To:</b> 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Cc:</b> LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
attribute.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Nick,</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>The =
first point
&nbsp;is closed now, thanks.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>On the =
second one. I
certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder in OCSP response =
itself,
but this response by default is not protected by CrlOcspRef and hence,
existence of this certificate is not protected by CAdES-C time-stamp or =
by
time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. Of course, I can force
OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to protect this =
certificate,
but this way somehow contradicts a remark on ocspRepHash (cited): Since =
it may
be needed to make the difference between two OCSP responses received =
within the
same second, then the hash of the response contained in the =
OcspResponsesID may
be needed to solve the ambiguity.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>That =
said, I want to
bring your attention to the other case. Consider a dedicated CRL issuer =
implied
by policy with its own CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this
certificate and a reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be =
ARL)
signed by this issuer in my message and I cannot include its certificate =
in
that CRL. Why don't we just allow <u>any certificate needed to validate =
a path</u>
(not only CA certificates) to be included in complete certificate =
references
attribute?</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] =
<b>On
Behalf Of </b>Pope, Nick<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
attribute.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Pavel,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP =
available than
the sequence can be empty.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point =
(repeated
below) is fine.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&quot;RFC 2560</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP =
Response</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ::=3D =
SEQUENCE
{</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ResponseData,</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp;
AlgorithmIdentifier,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:navy'>si=
gnature&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=

BIT STRING,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this =
purpose.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs =
and CRL
for timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped.&quot;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Peter</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>-----Origina=
l
Message-----<br>
<b>From:</b> Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> 04 March 2008 13:46<br>
<b>To:</b> Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Hello all and personally =
Nick!</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I have a couple new questions =
regarding
CAdES implementation.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI =
101&nbsp;733
v1.7.3 (excerpt):</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>shall
contain one </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>for
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span>=
<span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>,
followed by one</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>for =
each </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>in
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>attribute.
The second and subsequent </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>fields =
shall be
in the same order as the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>to which they relate. At least =
one of </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>or</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>or
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>
should be present for all but the &quot;trusted&quot; CA of the =
certificate
path.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The first question.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It seems to me that one can =
include an
empty CrlOcspRef (without any CRLListID or</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for =
a
&quot;trusted&quot; CA. Am I right? If one cannot do like that, then all
&quot;trusted&quot; CA certificates have to be placed at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be =
both?</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The second question.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It's quite clear how to compose =
this
attribute in a simple CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should =
one
place a certificate of OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could =
place a
reference to this certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in =
some way
prohibited by the phrase &quot;It references the full set of =
<u>CA</u></span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>certificates that ... &quot; in =
section
6.2.1). Let us assume that this certificate is no-check and one does not =
need
to place the corresponding CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs =
attribute.
Then one have to equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a
&quot;trusted&quot; CA and either include an empty CrlOcspRef in
CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of =
CompleteCertificateRefs
SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><a href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" =
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

</div>

<p><b><i><u><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Consider the environment =
before
printing this mail.</span></u></i></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&quot;Thales e-Security =
Limited is
incorporated in England and Wales with company registration number =
2518805. Its
registered office is located at 2 Dashwood Lang Road, The Bourne =
Business Park,
Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey KT15 =
2NX.</span></i></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>The information contained in =
this
e-mail is confidential. It may also be privileged. It is only intended =
for the
stated addressee(s) and access to it by any other person is =
unauthorised. If
you are not an addressee or the intended addressee, you must not =
disclose,
copy, circulate or in any other way use or rely on the information =
contained in
this e-mail. Such unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received =
this
e-mail in error please delete it (and all copies) from your system, =
please also
inform us immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com. Commercial matters detailed or referred =
to in
this e-mail are subject to a written contract signed for and on behalf =
of
Thales e-Security Limited&quot;.</span></i></b> <o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C8854D.B5E26BF0--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar 13 11:47:37 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C96F13A6AFD
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:47:37 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.162
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.162 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HOST_MISMATCH_NET=0.311,
	MIME_CHARSET_FARAWAY=2.45]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id kpzFLq+aS2zu
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:47:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8070A3A6CE9
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:47:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DIM88c073845
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:22:08 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2DIM8rq073844;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:22:08 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from kraid.nerim.net (kraid.ipv6.nerim.net [IPv6:2001:7a8:1:1::95])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DIM68r073835
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:22:07 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from julien.stern@cryptolog.com)
Received: from uranus.cry.pto (cryptolog2.pck.nerim.net [213.41.184.9])
	by kraid.nerim.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id C21D3CF0CE;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:04 +0100 (CET)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by uranus.cry.pto (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5C27442A3;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:04 +0100 (CET)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at cryptolog.com
Received: from uranus.cry.pto ([127.0.0.1])
	by localhost (uranus.cry.pto [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id wCYcQumJv53p; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:00 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [10.0.1.15] (isonoe.cry.pto [10.0.1.15])
	by uranus.cry.pto (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69DF2442A1;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:00 +0100 (CET)
Message-ID: <47D970C8.7020507@cryptolog.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:00 +0100
From: Julien Stern <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
User-Agent: Icedove 1.5.0.14pre (X11/20071018)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>
Cc: "'Pope, Nick'" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: Re: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
References: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5016D002E@webmail.thales-esecurity.com> <000001c88534$909533f0$b1bf9bd0$@ru>
In-Reply-To: <000001c88534$909533f0$b1bf9bd0$@ru>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=KOI8-R; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Pavel,

comments inline,

Pavel V. Smirnov wrote:
> Nick and other,
> 
>  
> 
> 2) On the second point I have a concern of a marked text (time-stamping 
> authorities). The paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:
> 
>  
> 
> This attribute MAY include references to the certification chain for any 
> TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this
> 
> case the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the 
> relevant times tamp token as an unsignedAttrs in
> 
> the signerInfos field.
>  
> It seems that this is a direct contradiction. All other is perfect to me.

I agree that the timestamping certificate does not seem to fit in here. 
This attribute is (as far as I understand) meant to include all the 
certificate references needed to validate a chain, but the EE reference.

Should this attribute be added to timestamp token as suggested, the EE 
certificate (e.g. the timestamping one in that case) would be referenced 
in the signing certificate attribute, and the attribute would only 
contain CA certificates, OCSP responder certificates and Indirect CRL 
issuer certificates, as in the previous case.

> 3) On the third point. It seems reasonable not to enforce one-to-one 
> relationship, but I think it is too late to change because it could 
> break existing implementations. Or maybe we can introduce a new 
> CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID and declare the old one 
> deprecated but supported for backward compatibility?..

I agree that it could theoretically break some verification 
implementations. However, authorizing empty references can also break 
the implementations that are checking the mapping. Also, I fail to see 
any simple way to take advantage of the mapping, so I assume that most 
implementations will

1) Retrieve all the revocation material in a unordered bag
2) Proceeed with X509 validation
3) Optionally, verify the one-to-one relationship

That is what we originally wanted to do. Now, because of the other issue 
of empty references that you mentioned earlier (OCSP response with the 
no-check extension), even checking the one-to-one mapping is not clearly 
defined, as different implementations may either skip one entry or put 
an empty one in that case.

Instead of declaring invalid a perfect signature because some arbitrary 
mapping is not respected, we decided to remove the mapping check all 
together.

During a plugtest on CAdES, I enquired about this issue and I turned out 
that other implementations that faced the same issue would simply not 
verify the one-to-one mapping.

That about it for my 2 cents...

Regards,

--
Julien


> Pavel Smirnov
> 
> Crypto-Pro
> Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> 
>  
> 
> *From:* Pope, Nick [mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 13, 2008 11:33 AM
> *To:* óÍÉÒÎÏ× ðÁ×ÅÌ ÷ÌÁÄÉÍÉÒÏ×ÉÞ; ietf-smime@imc.org; ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
> *Cc:* Julien Stern
> *Subject:* RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References 
> attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel,
> 
>  
> 
> Apologies for not getting back earlier.  I was at an ETSI meeting where 
> I had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with colleagues including 
> Julien Stern who had raised the same issue earlier.
> 
>  
> 
> I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best approach and 
> include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).  Unfortunately 
> it is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can find an approach 
> that does not break existing implementations.
> 
>  
> 
> 1) On the first point (there being no revocation information for a given 
> CA certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a clarification 
> in 6.2.2 of TS 101 733:
> 
>  
> 
> /"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation 
> information for a certificate."/
> 
>  
> 
> 2) On the second point I also propose that in 6.2.1:
> 
>  
> 
> /Change "CA certificates that have been used to validate ..." to "CA and 
> any other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP 
> responders, ??? time-stamping authorities) that have been used to 
> validate ..."/
> 
>  
> 
> 3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in 6.2.2 there 
> should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation 
> information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.
> 
>  
> 
> Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the proposed changes 
> and the third point.
> 
>  
> 
> Nick
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]
> *Sent:* 06 March 2008 16:47
> *To:* 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
> *Cc:* LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG
> *Subject:* RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References 
> attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Nick,
> 
>  
> 
> The first point  is closed now, thanks.
> 
>  
> 
> On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder 
> in OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected 
> by CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected 
> by CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references 
> attribute. Of course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional 
> ocspRepHash to protect this certificate, but this way somehow 
> contradicts a remark on ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to 
> make the difference between two OCSP responses received within the same 
> second, then the hash of the response contained in the OcspResponsesID 
> may be needed to solve the ambiguity.
> 
>  
> 
> That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a 
> dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own 
> CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this certificate and a 
> reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this 
> issuer in my message and I cannot include its certificate in that CRL. 
> Why don't we just allow _any certificate needed to validate a path_ (not 
> only CA certificates) to be included in complete certificate references 
> attribute?
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel Smirnov
> 
> Crypto-Pro
> Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> 
>  
> 
> *From:* owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org 
> [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] *On Behalf Of *Pope, Nick
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
> *To:* óÍÉÒÎÏ× ðÁ×ÅÌ ÷ÌÁÄÉÍÉÒÏ×ÉÞ; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
> *Cc:* 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
> *Subject:* RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References 
> attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel,
> 
>  
> 
> One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the 
> sequence can be empty.
> 
>  
> 
> Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is 
> fine.
> 
>  
> 
> "RFC 2560
> 
>  
> 
> 4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
> 
>  
> 
> BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
> 
>       tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
> 
>       signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
> 
>       signature            BIT STRING,
> 
>       certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
> 
>  
> 
> It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.
> 
> Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for 
> timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the 
> signature which is timestamped."
> 
>  
> 
> Peter
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]
> *Sent:* 04 March 2008 13:46
> *To:* Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
> *Subject:* CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Hello all and personally Nick!
> 
>  
> 
> I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.
> 
>  
> 
> Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):
> 
>  
> 
> CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the 
> signing-certificate, followed by one
> 
> for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The 
> second and subsequent CrlOcspRef
> 
> fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they 
> relate. At least one of CRLListID or
> 
> OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" 
> CA of the certificate path.
> 
>  
> 
> The first question.
> 
> It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any 
> CRLListID or
> 
> OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one 
> cannot do like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be 
> placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is 
> right? Or may be both?
> 
>  
> 
> The second question.
> 
> It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only 
> case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of 
> OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this 
> certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited 
> by the phrase "It references the full set of _CA_
> 
> certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this 
> certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding 
> CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to 
> equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either 
> include an empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the 
> certificate at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I 
> solve this?
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel Smirnov
> 
> Crypto-Pro
> Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> 
>  
> 
> */_Consider the environment before printing this mail._/*
> 
> */"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with 
> company registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 
> 2 Dashwood Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. 
> Weybridge, Surrey KT15 2NX./*
> 
> */The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also 
> be privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and 
> access to it by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an 
> addressee or the intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, 
> circulate or in any other way use or rely on the information contained 
> in this e-mail. Such unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have 
> received this e-mail in error please delete it (and all copies) from 
> your system, please also inform us immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or 
> email postmaster@thales-esecurity.com. Commercial matters detailed or 
> referred to in this e-mail are subject to a written contract signed for 
> and on behalf of Thales e-Security Limited"./*
> 



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar 13 12:45:34 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 380163A6C29
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:45:34 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.581
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.581 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.018,
	BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id yl9LQkm1k4P4
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:45:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 025C328C808
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:45:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DJCk3i078374
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:12:46 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2DJCkrb078373;
	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:12:46 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail.ietf.org (mail.ietf.org [IPv6:2001:1890:1112:1::20])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DJCiQi078366
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:12:45 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from root@core3.amsl.com)
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0)
	id B729B3A6A64; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:15:01 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-01.txt 
Message-Id: <20080313191501.B729B3A6A64@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:15:01 -0700 (PDT)
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification
	Author(s)	: B. Ramsdell, S. Turner
	Filename	: draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-01.txt
	Pages		: 39
	Date		: 2008-3-13
	
This document defines Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 
   (S/MIME) version 3.2.  S/MIME provides a consistent way to send and 
   receive secure MIME data.  Digital signatures provide authentication, 
   message integrity, and non-repudiation with proof of origin. 
   Encryption provides data confidentiality.  Compression can be used to 
   reduce data size.  This document obsoletes RFC 3851.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-01.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-01.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2008-3-13120822.I-D@ietf.org>

--NextPart--



From jirfinilxyf@finil.com  Sat Mar 15 01:54:27 2008
Return-Path: <jirfinilxyf@finil.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD34D3A6BA8;
	Sat, 15 Mar 2008 01:54:27 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 3.577
X-Spam-Level: ***
X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.577 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_EQ_IP_ADDR=1.119,
	HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id G9raOhs1YGTq; Sat, 15 Mar 2008 01:54:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [41.252.35.64] (unknown [41.252.35.64])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 85C033A69EB;
	Sat, 15 Mar 2008 01:54:25 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [41.252.35.64] by mx3.servershost.net; Sat, 15 Mar 2008 00:52:09 -0800
Date:	Sat, 15 Mar 2008 00:52:09 -0800
From:	"Vernon Cochran" <jirfinilxyf@finil.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v2.00.18) Personal
Reply-To: jirfinilxyf@finil.com
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <960147980.21554704440638@finil.com>
To: rsvp-archive@lists.ietf.org
Subject: Software
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
  boundary="----------CC5974B821A051"

------------CC5974B821A051
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Looking for the better pricein software abatements? This time you will get the chance to use the software environment you wanted for a long time.
 And the best matter is, all softwares are extremely cheap.
 Examine it by yourself & have the softwares for cheapest costs ever seen! http://jocelyncook797057.blogspot.com
------------CC5974B821A051
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE></TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" bordercolor="#000000"><tr><td align=center bgcolor="#CEF3FF"><b><font color="#FA3D05">Looking for the better pricein software abatements?</font></b></td></tr><tr> 

<td align=center bgcolor="#E9E9E9"><b>This time you will get the chance to use the software environment 
you wanted for a long time.<br> 
And the best matter is, all softwares are extremely cheap.<br> 

<a href="http://jocelyncook797057.blogspot.com" target="_blank"><em>Examine it by yourself & have the softwares for cheapest costs ever seen!</em></a></b></td></tr></table> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://jocelyncook797057.blogspot.com</font>

</BODY></HTML>
------------CC5974B821A051--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Sun Mar 16 13:14:02 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 666573A69A0
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 16 Mar 2008 13:14:02 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 4.556
X-Spam-Level: ****
X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.556 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_CHARSET_FARAWAY=2.45, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 5GGC2EVvVt13
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Sun, 16 Mar 2008 13:13:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D026928C419
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Sun, 16 Mar 2008 13:11:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2GJfYcZ058434
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Sun, 16 Mar 2008 12:41:34 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2GJfYV4058433;
	Sun, 16 Mar 2008 12:41:34 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2GJfUZW058417
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Sun, 16 Mar 2008 12:41:31 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
	id <GVAK7DLV>; Sun, 16 Mar 2008 19:41:19 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B501874413@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>,
        "Pope, Nick"
	 <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org,
        "'esi : etsi tc esi (electronic signatures and infrastructures)'"
	 <ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG>
Cc: Julien Stern <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut
	e.
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 2008 19:41:13 -0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C8879D.35401DCE"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C8879D.35401DCE
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Pavel,

=20

My reading of this paragraph is, as Julien states, that the TSU =
certificate
itself (as an EE cert) is not to be included in the chain.

=20

Nick

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 13 March 2008 18:04
To: 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: Julien Stern
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Nick and other,

=20

2) On the second point I have a concern of a marked text (time-stamping
authorities). The paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:

=20

This attribute MAY include references to the certification chain for =
any
TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this

case the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the =
relevant
times tamp token as an unsignedAttrs in

the signerInfos field.

=20

It seems that this is a direct contradiction. All other is perfect to =
me.

=20

3) On the third point. It seems reasonable not to enforce one-to-one
relationship, but I think it is too late to change because it could =
break
existing implementations. Or maybe we can introduce a new
CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID and declare the old one
deprecated but supported for backward compatibility?..

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: Pope, Nick [mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com]=20
Sent: Thursday, March 13, 2008 11:33 AM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; ietf-smime@imc.org; =
ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Cc: Julien Stern
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

Apologies for not getting back earlier.  I was at an ETSI meeting where =
I
had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with colleagues including =
Julien
Stern who had raised the same issue earlier.

=20

I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best approach and
include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).  Unfortunately =
it
is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can find an approach that =
does
not break existing implementations.

=20

1) On the first point (there being no revocation information for a =
given CA
certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a clarification =
in
6.2.2 of TS 101 733:

=20

"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation
information for a certificate."

=20

2) On the second point I also propose that in 6.2.1:

=20

Change "CA certificates that have been used to validate ..." to "CA and =
any
other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, =
???
time-stamping authorities) that have been used to validate ..."

=20

3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in 6.2.2 =
there
should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation
information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.

=20

Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the proposed changes =
and
the third point.

=20

Nick

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 06 March 2008 16:47
To: 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Nick,

=20

The first point  is closed now, thanks.

=20

On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of =
OCSP-responder in
OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected by
CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected by
CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. =
Of
course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to
protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between
two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of =
the
response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.

=20

That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a
dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own =
CRL-issuer-certificate.
Where could I store this certificate and a reference to it? Now there =
is
only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer in my message and I =
cannot
include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we just allow any =
certificate
needed to validate a path (not only CA certificates) to be included in
complete certificate references attribute?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Pope, Nick
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

=20

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

=20

"RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate =
OPTIONAL }

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped."

=20

Peter

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of
the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one =
cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the =
end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be =
both?

=20

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only =
case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to =
this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way =
prohibited by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the =
corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

Consider the environment before printing this mail.

"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with =
company
registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 =
Dashwood
Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey =
KT15
2NX.

The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also =
be
privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and access =
to it
by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the
intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any =
other
way use or rely on the information contained in this e-mail. Such
unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in =
error
please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also inform =
us
immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email =
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com.
Commercial matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject =
to a
written contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security =
Limited".=20


------_=_NextPart_001_01C8879D.35401DCE
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"

<html xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml">

<head>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=koi8-r">


<meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 10 (filtered)">

<style>
<!--a:link
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINK
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
a:visited
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINKFOLLOWED
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
p
	{mso-style-priority:99;}

 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
p
	{margin-right:0cm;
	margin-left:0cm;
	font-size:12.0pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman";}
span.emailstyle17
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:windowtext;}
span.emailstyle18
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
span.emailstyle19
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:#1F497D;}
span.emailstyle20
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
span.EmailStyle22
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle23
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>

</head>

<body lang=EN-GB link=blue vlink=purple>

<div class=Section1>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>My reading of this paragraph is, as Julien
states, that the TSU certificate itself (as an EE cert) is not to be included
in the chain.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Nick</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 13 March 2008 18:04<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Pope, Nick';
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Julien Stern<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Nick and other,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>2) On the second point I have a concern
of a marked text (time-stamping authorities). The paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>This attribute MAY include references to the certification
chain for any TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>case the unsigned attribute shall be added to the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signedData
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>of the relevant times
tamp token as an unsignedAttrs in</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=RU
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>the signerInfos field.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>It seems that this is a direct
contradiction. All other is perfect to me.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>3) On the third point. It seems
reasonable not to enforce one-to-one relationship, but I think it is too late
to change because it could break existing implementations. Or maybe we can
introduce a new CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID and declare the
old one deprecated but supported for backward compatibility?..</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><font size=2 color=navy><span lang=RU style='font-size:10.0pt;
color:navy'><a href="http://www.cryptopro.ru/" title="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=EN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font><font size=2
color=navy><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><font size=2 color=navy><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;color:navy'><a href="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span lang=EN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div>

<div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=MsoNormal><b><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font
size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=RU style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
Pope, Nick [mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, March 13, 2008
11:33 AM<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> óÍÉÒÎÏ× ðÁ×ÅÌ ÷ÌÁÄÉÍÉÒÏ×ÉÞ;
ietf-smime@imc.org; ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Julien Stern<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=RU style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Apologies for not getting back earlier.
&nbsp;I was at an ETSI meeting where I had a chance to briefly discuss this
issue with colleagues including Julien Stern who had raised the same issue
earlier.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I would like to ensure that we have
agreement on the best approach and include the necessary change in TS 101 733
(post 1.7.4). &nbsp;Unfortunately it is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope
we can find an approach that does not break existing implementations.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>1) On the first point (there being no
revocation information for a given CA certificate) for the record I suggest
there should be a clarification in 6.2.2 of TS 101 733:</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><i><font size=2
face="Courier New"><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";
font-style:italic'>&quot;The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there
is no revocation information for a certificate.&quot;</span></font></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>2) On the second point I also propose that
in 6.2.1:</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><i><font size=2
face="Courier New"><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";
font-style:italic'>Change &quot;CA certificates that have been used to validate
...&quot; to &quot;CA and any other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL
issuers, OCSP responders, <span style='background:yellow'>??? time-stamping
authorities</span>) that have been used to validate ...&quot;</span></font></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>3) There is an further point that has been
raised whether in 6.2.2 there should be a direct one to one relationship
between the revocation information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF
experts on the proposed changes and the third point.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Nick</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 06 March 2008 16:47<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Pope, Nick';
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Nick,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>The first point &nbsp;is closed now,
thanks.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>On the second one. I certainly can store
a certificate of OCSP-responder in OCSP response itself, but this response by
default is not protected by CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate
is not protected by CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references
attribute. Of course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional
ocspRepHash to protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a
remark on ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference
between two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of
the response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>That said, I want to bring your
attention to the other case. Consider a dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy
with its own CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this certificate and a
reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer
in my message and I cannot include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we
just allow <u>any certificate needed to validate a path</u> (not only CA
certificates) to be included in complete certificate references attribute?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><font size=2 color=navy><span lang=RU style='font-size:10.0pt;
color:navy'><a href="http://www.cryptopro.ru/" title="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=EN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font><font size=2
color=navy><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><font size=2 color=navy><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;color:navy'><a href="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span lang=EN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=MsoNormal><b><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font
size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=RU style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] <b><span
style='font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Pope, Nick<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, March 05, 2008
12:27 PM<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> óÍÉÒÎÏ× ðÁ×ÅÌ ÷ÌÁÄÉÍÉÒÏ×ÉÞ;
Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=RU style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One your first question, if there is no
CRL or OCSP available than the sequence can be empty.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the
second point (repeated below) is fine.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&quot;RFC 2560</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; ASN.1
Specification of the OCSP Response</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
::= SEQUENCE {</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ResponseData,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp; AlgorithmIdentifier,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></font><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>signature&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
BIT STRING,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It means: you must use
the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Similar problem is
solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for timestamp validation are
included in the timestamp and not in the signature which is timestamped.&quot;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 04 March 2008 13:46<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com;
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>Hello all and personally Nick!</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101&nbsp;733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>shall contain one </span></font><font size=2
face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>for the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>, followed by one</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>for each </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>in the </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>attribute. The second
and subsequent </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>fields shall be in the same order as the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>to which they relate. At
least one of </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>or</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID </span></font><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>or </span></font><font size=2 face="Courier New"><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>OtherRevRefs</span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'> should be present for all but the
&quot;trusted&quot; CA of the certificate path.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>The first question.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a &quot;trusted&quot; CA. Am I right?
If one cannot do like that, then all &quot;trusted&quot; CA certificates have
to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is
right? Or may be both?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>The second question.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only
case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited by the
phrase &quot;It references the full set of <u>CA</u></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>certificates that ... &quot; in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a &quot;trusted&quot; CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><span lang=RU><a href="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"
title="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><font size=2><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span><font
size=2 color=navy><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><span lang=RU><a href="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><font size=2><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

</div>

<p><b><i><u><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Consider the environment before
printing this mail.</span></font></u></i></b></p>

<p><b><i><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>&quot;Thales e-Security Limited is
incorporated in England and Wales with company registration number 2518805. Its
registered office is located at 2 Dashwood Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park,
Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey KT15 2NX.</span></font></i></b></p>

<p><b><i><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>The information contained in this
e-mail is confidential. It may also be privileged. It is only intended for the
stated addressee(s) and access to it by any other person is unauthorised. If
you are not an addressee or the intended addressee, you must not disclose,
copy, circulate or in any other way use or rely on the information contained in
this e-mail. Such unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this
e-mail in error please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also
inform us immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com. Commercial matters detailed or referred to in
this e-mail are subject to a written contract signed for and on behalf of
Thales e-Security Limited&quot;.</span></font></i></b><span lang=RU> </span></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C8879D.35401DCE--



From nirgatewaywrestlingjyl@gatewaywrestling.com  Mon Mar 17 07:12:29 2008
Return-Path: <nirgatewaywrestlingjyl@gatewaywrestling.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C9D928C34D;
	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 07:12:29 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 4.105
X-Spam-Level: ****
X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.105 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_80=2,
	FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001,
	RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id BKGO3+izT5U2; Mon, 17 Mar 2008 07:12:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from wan.sec-rb.iasl.com (unknown [206.210.97.88])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2972C3A67DA;
	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 07:12:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [206.210.97.88] by smtp.secureserver.net; Mon, 17 Mar 2008 09:10:07 -0500
Date:	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 09:10:07 -0500
From:	"Jose Calderon" <nirgatewaywrestlingjyl@gatewaywrestling.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v2.00.3) Educational
Reply-To: nirgatewaywrestlingjyl@gatewaywrestling.com
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <340036066.95792071454465@gatewaywrestling.com>
To: imrg-web-archive@megatron.ietf.org
Subject: Software
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
  boundary="----------4BF6EBF6EB829AD"

------------4BF6EBF6EB829AD
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

In search for the best value in software discounts? Now you will find the chance to have the softwares you dream of from long time ago.
 And the best thing is, all softwares are dirt cheap.
 Check up by yourself and get the softwares for cheap rates! http://inacrankgx197.blogspot.com
------------4BF6EBF6EB829AD
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE></TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" bordercolor="#000000"><tr><td align=center bgcolor="#CEF3FF"><b><font color="#FA3D05">In search for the best value in software discounts?</font></b></td></tr><tr> 

<td align=center bgcolor="#E9E9E9"><b>Now you will find the chance to have the softwares 
you dream of from long time ago.<br> 
And the best thing is, all softwares are dirt cheap.<br> 

<a href="http://inacrankgx197.blogspot.com" target="_blank"><em>Check up by yourself and get the softwares for cheap rates!</em></a></b></td></tr></table> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://inacrankgx197.blogspot.com</font>

</BODY></HTML>
------------4BF6EBF6EB829AD--



From veggeomagshopsuw@geomagshop.com  Mon Mar 17 23:28:24 2008
Return-Path: <veggeomagshopsuw@geomagshop.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DCA6A3A67EA;
	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 23:28:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 3.577
X-Spam-Level: ***
X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.577 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_EQ_IP_ADDR=1.119,
	HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id fZhg9oTiTgqE; Mon, 17 Mar 2008 23:28:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [116.71.177.175] (unknown [116.71.177.175])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28AFD3A6B43;
	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 23:28:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [116.71.177.175] by mail.geomagshop.com; Tue, 18 Mar 2008 11:26:06 +0500
Date:	Tue, 18 Mar 2008 11:26:06 +0500
From:	"Carmine Diamond" <veggeomagshopsuw@geomagshop.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v3.5.25) Educational
Reply-To: veggeomagshopsuw@geomagshop.com
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <670682034.47162357037400@geomagshop.com>
To: mpls@lists.ietf.org
Subject: Legal software sales
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
  boundary="----------E821A059E821A05"

------------E821A059E821A05
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Our aim is to present low cost PC and Macintosh lawful soft and computer solutions for anyone's budget.
 Whether you are a corporate customer, a small-scale enterprise possessor,
 or go shopping for your home PC, we believe we can help you.
 COME IN JUST NOW!
 http://debbietomeqr496.blogspot.com

------------E821A059E821A05
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE></TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<strong>Our aim is to present low cost PC and Macintosh lawful soft and computer solutions for anyone's budget.<br> 
Whether you are a corporate customer, a small-scale enterprise possessor,<br> 
or go shopping for your home PC, we believe we can help you.<br> 

<em><a href="http://debbietomeqr496.blogspot.com" target="_blank">COME IN JUST NOW!</a></em></strong><br> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://debbietomeqr496.blogspot.com</font><br>

</BODY></HTML>
------------E821A059E821A05--



From zifglendasflowerscop@glendasflowers.com  Tue Mar 18 07:48:52 2008
Return-Path: <zifglendasflowerscop@glendasflowers.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B2F53A6F24;
	Tue, 18 Mar 2008 07:48:52 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.002
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.002 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id l2bHVvukSzaX; Tue, 18 Mar 2008 07:48:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from NICOLE.dedicado.com.uy (78-30.dedicado.com.uy [201.221.30.78])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10C143A6F07;
	Tue, 18 Mar 2008 07:48:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [201.221.30.78] by mail.florists.ftd.com; Tue, 18 Mar 2008 11:46:01 -0300
Date:	Tue, 18 Mar 2008 11:46:01 -0300
From:	"Tammi Mcclellan" <zifglendasflowerscop@glendasflowers.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v2.12.00) Personal
Reply-To: zifglendasflowerscop@glendasflowers.com
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <923063025.02675652763322@glendasflowers.com>
To: imrg-web-archive@megatron.ietf.org
Subject: Legal software sales
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
  boundary="----------780C930C932178"

------------780C930C932178
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Our aim is to guarantee PC and Mac legal soft and computer solutions of low price for anyone.
 Whether you're a corporate customer, a small-scale enterprise holder,
 or go shopping for your home personal computer, we guess we will assist you.
 TAKE A LOOK AT ALL PRODUCTS!
 http://janisroleype145.blogspot.com

------------780C930C932178
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE></TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<strong>Our aim is to guarantee PC and Mac legal soft and computer solutions of low price for anyone.<br> 
Whether you're a corporate customer, a small-scale enterprise holder,<br> 
or go shopping for your home personal computer, we guess we will assist you.<br> 

<em><a href="http://janisroleype145.blogspot.com" target="_blank">TAKE A LOOK AT ALL PRODUCTS!</a></em></strong><br> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://janisroleype145.blogspot.com</font><br>

</BODY></HTML>
------------780C930C932178--



From terri_molinaro@cashmanequipment.com  Tue Mar 18 10:55:17 2008
Return-Path: <terri_molinaro@cashmanequipment.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 06AF73A68FC
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 18 Mar 2008 10:55:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.885
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.885 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, GB_I_LETTER=-2, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35,
	HELO_EQ_DSL=1.129, RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_51_100=0.5,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E4_51_100=1.5, RAZOR2_CHECK=0.5, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id saijk0TpmnT1
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 18 Mar 2008 10:55:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from f054098244.adsl.alicedsl.de (f054098244.adsl.alicedsl.de [78.54.98.244])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65B483A6EA0
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 18 Mar 2008 10:55:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [78.54.98.244] by es2mta-3.messageone.com; Tue, 18 Mar 2008 18:52:57 +0100
Message-ID: <01c88929$4823f680$f462364e@terri_molinaro>
From: "Rowena Gage" <terri_molinaro@cashmanequipment.com>
To: <smime-archive@ietf.org>
Subject: To you from Poland
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2008 18:52:57 +0100
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
  boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0006_01C88929.4823F680"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C88929.4823F680
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Good day from Poland to you dear friend!
I don't know how I can start my letter to you.
But I hope that you will read this letter with interest.
I HOPE THAT YOU WILL READ THIS LETTER VERY ATTENTIVE!!!!
PLEASE, IT WILL TAKE ONLY 5 MINUTES, BUT PROBABLY MY LETTER WILL
CHANGE YOUR LIFE...........
FOR THE FIRST!!! THIS LETTER FROM INTERNET DATING AGENCY.
I GAVE THEM THIS LETTER AND TO ME HAVE TOLD THAT THEY WILL SEND LETTER TO USA.
This letter will be short, I think.
But if you will answer to me I will write more about me and about my life.
My name is Oksy. I'm from Poland, city Krakov.
I have brown hair, blue eyes. My measurements: 32B - 24 - 34, Height: 5'2", Weight: 115 lbs
I'm 27 years old woman. My Birthday on March, 13, 1981
The purpose of my letter: I will get Visitor Visa of Australia on this month.
I want to arrive to Australia, but I have no any friends or relativies who
can meet me on airport. I really hope that you can do it for me.
Probably we can develop our relations also.

So, please, write me on my E-MAIL:  bag_oksana@mail333.com

I hope that you will have interest after reading my letter.
Also I have interest also. Please tell me.

------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C88929.4823F680
Content-Type: image/jpeg;
	name="oksanka.jpg"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename="oksanka.jpg"
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 

------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C88929.4823F680--


From AnniefidgetChamberlain@craigslist.org  Wed Mar 19 00:44:04 2008
Return-Path: <AnniefidgetChamberlain@craigslist.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7632B3A67FE;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 00:44:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -41.409
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-41.409 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_99=3.5, DATE_IN_FUTURE_03_06=0.274, DOS_OE_TO_MX=2.75,
	FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, FORGED_MUA_OUTLOOK=3.116, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_51_100=0.5, RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E8_51_100=1.5,
	RAZOR2_CHECK=0.5, RCVD_IN_DSBL=0.961, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905,
	RCVD_IN_XBL=3.033, RDNS_NONE=0.1, URIBL_BLACK=20, URIBL_SBL=20,
	USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id YrpC8zKZ32LJ; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 00:44:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from koroglu.cagsu.local (unknown [88.240.180.154])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id E44123A6963;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 00:44:01 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <112bf01c88995$15f26a40$8001a8c0@koroglu>
From: "Wanda Shoemaker" <AnniefidgetChamberlain@craigslist.org>
To: <urn-nid-owner@megatron.ietf.org>,
	<tools-discuss@megatron.ietf.org>,
	<smime-archive@megatron.ietf.org>,
	<ssm-web-archive@megatron.ietf.org>,
	<speechsc@megatron.ietf.org>
Subject: Contact Us For A Free Debt Analysis
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 09:44:12 -0200
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----=_NextPart_000_112BB_01C88995.15F26A40"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.3790.2663
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.3790.2757

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_112BB_01C88995.15F26A40
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Get Out Of Debt Today

Debt Free in 12 - 30 Months
http://jkiid.net.cn/
------=_NextPart_000_112BB_01C88995.15F26A40
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.3790.2759" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>=20
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Lower debt 61% without a=20
loan</FONT></DIV><BR>
<DIV align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Personalized Quote & =
Account=20
Review</FONT></DIV>
<DIV align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><A=20
href=3Dhttp://jkiid.net.cn/>http://jkiid.net.cn/</A></FONT></DIV>
</BODY></HTML>


------=_NextPart_000_112BB_01C88995.15F26A40--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar 19 12:36:55 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 382C23A6C4E
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:36:55 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id PStmfvZ3qmDK
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:36:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 158333A67A3
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:36:53 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JJ8ijU049465
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:08:44 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2JJ8iGs049464;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:08:44 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp105.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp105.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.174])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2JJ8fID049455
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:08:43 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 18279 invoked from network); 19 Mar 2008 19:08:40 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@71.191.4.112 with login)
  by smtp105.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 19 Mar 2008 19:08:40 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: C9iIE_gVM1lQ1QgUu3KuxEaHwJ4kaU2gWUyFMklmy5I1Szmu52tqWNRL7kvP362N0kWI.vZbdZfmGO1abZrO.4i2f8PeLuMiN1Awk1yajhz0h0h2bP_Vi46QwK0rdBtY3JHkf5xdxWIWhb8-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 15:07:41 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciJ9IEYgKzyHW7bT0ycxmZT8JqH+A==
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


The key size text is the remaining issue with the S/MIME v3.2 IDs.  What I'm
hoping to do is consensus on the text so we can issue a WG LC on these two
IDs. To make sure there's no confusion I've included the old and new text
from the two IDs. If you have comments on the new text please be specific
about the change you are proposing.

spt

--------------

In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only sentence that
refers to key sizes):

(old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.

(new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.

In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:

(old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the S/MIME
agent or some related administrative utility or function SHOULD generate RSA
key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA
key pairs at a minimum key size of 768 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT generate
RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. Creating keys longer than 1024 bits
can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able to verify
signatures, but gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A
receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
over 512 bits. Some agents created in the United States have chosen to
create 512 bit keys in order to get more advantageous export licenses.
However, 512 bit keys are considered by many to be cryptographically
insecure. Implementers SHOULD be aware that multiple (active) key pairs can
be associated with a single individual.  For example, one key pair can be
used to support confidentiality, while a different key pair can be used for
authentication.

(new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the S/MIME
agent or some related administrative utility or function SHOULD generate RSA
key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA
key pairs at a minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT
generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. Creating keys longer than
1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able to
verify signatures, but gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A
receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
over 512 bits. 

- the last four sentences from old text were moved to the security
considerations.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar 19 13:32:08 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 289053A6808
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:32:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id GsivG6N3LEvK
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:32:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9AFE93A67B1
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:32:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JKCSxX055712
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:12:28 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2JKCSLP055711;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:12:28 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail-06.primus.ca (mail.tor.primus.ca [216.254.136.21])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JKCPop055698
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:12:27 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from capel@comgate.com)
Received: from ottawa-hs-209-217-122-183.s-ip.magma.ca ([209.217.122.183] helo=tony)
	by mail-06.primus.ca with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-MD5:128)
	(Exim 4.63)
	(envelope-from <capel@comgate.com>)
	id 1Jc4e8-0001VR-0e; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:12:24 -0400
From: "Tony Capel" <capel@comgate.com>
To: "'Turner, Sean P.'" <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:12:22 -0400
Message-ID: <005801c889fd$8acfe230$02b5a8c0@tony>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.6838
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Thread-Index: AciJ9IEYgKzyHW7bT0ycxmZT8JqH+AAA02Zw
In-Reply-To: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Importance: Normal
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


My only concern is making key size generation requirements a MANDATORY =
part of
this standard.  I understand it may have been appropriate in the past.

I agree with making non-mandatory RECOMMENDATIONS regarding key size =
generation.
Also agree with making support for minimum key size ranges mandatory.  =
And have
no problems with the sizes proposed.

However MANDATING (MUST/MUST-NOT) the generation and use of specific =
minimum
sizes (or algorithms for that matter) seems to me to be better addressed =
by Cert
Policies, etc. - and indeed in many cases key generation and use ends up =
being
imposed by the PKI design - and defined in the corresponding CP - =
anyway.

I agree the RFC should set out as mandatory the minimum specifications =
required
to ensure a high likelihood of interoperability.  However, if users =
choose to
use small keys (and are allowed to under their CP) then does this make =
the
implementation non-compliant to S/MIME v3.2?  For example, if S/MIME is =
used to
implement a compartmentalized security policy and used over a secure
infrastructure, do we presume to say a 768 bit key is insufficient for =
this
particular application? =20

The only change I would suggest is to remove the sentence:
" A user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long"

The previous sentence to this already captures the RECOMMENDATION =
against keys
of less than 1024 anyway.

I think in earlier versions of the RFC it was appropriate to mandate =
minimum key
sizes, but nowadays, we should leave this decision to the designers who =
are
working against the threat and risk assessment (and sure, include
recommendations aimed at less sophisticated users).

Tony


| -----Original Message-----
| From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org=20
| [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Turner, Sean P.
| Sent: March 19, 2008 3:08 PM
| To: ietf-smime@imc.org
| Subject: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
|=20
|=20
|=20
| The key size text is the remaining issue with the S/MIME v3.2=20
| IDs.  What I'm hoping to do is consensus on the text so we=20
| can issue a WG LC on these two IDs. To make sure there's no=20
| confusion I've included the old and new text from the two=20
| IDs. If you have comments on the new text please be specific=20
| about the change you are proposing.
|=20
| spt
|=20
| --------------
|=20
| In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only=20
| sentence that refers to key sizes):
|=20
| (old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
|=20
| (new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
|=20
| In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:
|=20
| (old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair,=20
| then the S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility=20
| or function SHOULD generate RSA key pairs using the following=20
| guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a=20
| minimum key size of 768 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT generate=20
| RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. Creating keys longer=20
| than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents=20
| to not be able to verify signatures, but gives better=20
| security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving agent SHOULD=20
| be able to verify signatures with keys of any size over 512=20
| bits. Some agents created in the United States have chosen to=20
| create 512 bit keys in order to get more advantageous export=20
| licenses. However, 512 bit keys are considered by many to be=20
| cryptographically insecure. Implementers SHOULD be aware that=20
| multiple (active) key pairs can be associated with a single=20
| individual.  For example, one key pair can be used to support=20
| confidentiality, while a different key pair can be used for=20
| authentication.
|=20
| (new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair,=20
| then the S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility=20
| or function SHOULD generate RSA key pairs using the following=20
| guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a=20
| minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT=20
| generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. Creating=20
| keys longer than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME=20
| receiving agents to not be able to verify signatures, but=20
| gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving=20
| agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any=20
| size over 512 bits.=20
|=20
| - the last four sentences from old text were moved to the=20
| security considerations.
|=20



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar 19 14:05:11 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC1503A694D
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:05:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id Bdm7JGBVXJMi
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:05:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D9543A6808
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:05:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JKhaV3058315
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:43:36 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2JKhamU058314;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:43:36 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from [10.20.30.162] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169])
	(authenticated bits=0)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JKhXST058308
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:43:34 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from phoffman@imc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p0624081ac4072442a88e@[10.20.30.162]>
In-Reply-To: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:43:29 -0700
To: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


At 3:07 PM -0400 3/19/08, Turner, Sean P. wrote:
>In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only sentence that
>refers to key sizes):
>
>(old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>
>(new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.

This is about verification, not about signing. Why should we increase 
it from 512 bits? I support leaving it as in RFC 3850 at 512 bits.

>
>In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:
>
>(old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the S/MIME
>agent or some related administrative utility or function SHOULD generate RSA
>key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA
>key pairs at a minimum key size of 768 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT generate
>RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. Creating keys longer than 1024 bits
>can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able to verify
>signatures, but gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A
>receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>over 512 bits. Some agents created in the United States have chosen to
>create 512 bit keys in order to get more advantageous export licenses.
>However, 512 bit keys are considered by many to be cryptographically
>insecure. Implementers SHOULD be aware that multiple (active) key pairs can
>be associated with a single individual.  For example, one key pair can be
>used to support confidentiality, while a different key pair can be used for
>authentication.
>
>(new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the S/MIME
>agent or some related administrative utility or function SHOULD generate RSA
>key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA
>key pairs at a minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT
>generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. Creating keys longer than
>1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able to
>verify signatures, but gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A
>receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>over 512 bits.

I fully disagree with "MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 
bits long". A signature that is of little value that is only supposed 
to last a week is fine at 512 bits.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar 19 14:29:33 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 979B228C2AC
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:29:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.567
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.567 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.229,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, MSGID_FROM_MTA_HEADER=0.803]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id kNpS+jLY36zt
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:29:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC5C53A681D
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:29:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JL7Rwn060335
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:07:27 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2JL7R5V060334;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:07:27 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2JL7PYY060318
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:07:26 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com)
Message-Id: <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
Received: (qmail 16130 invoked by uid 0); 19 Mar 2008 21:07:18 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (72.83.129.167)
  by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 19 Mar 2008 21:07:18 -0000
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:48:25 -0400
To: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
In-Reply-To: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Sean:

>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>over 512 bits.

This is asking for denial of service attack.  What if someone sends a 
certificate that contains a 64Kbit value claiming to be a public key 
and a blob of random bits claiming to be a signature?  The amount of 
time to check the signature (and probably find that it is not valid) 
is onerous.

Today, I cannot imagine someone making use of a public key larger 
than 8192 bits.  Double that it you want to be very future proof.

Russ 



From woxgtactivegir@gtactive.com  Wed Mar 19 17:49:21 2008
Return-Path: <woxgtactivegir@gtactive.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A2963A67B7;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 17:49:21 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 3.011
X-Spam-Level: ***
X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.011 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id u+GKUJcqqSrX; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 17:49:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx-ll-58.147.53-203.tttmaxnet.com (unknown [58.147.53.203])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2BF6128C106;
	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 17:48:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [58.147.53.203] by mail.gtactive.com; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:46:33 -0800
Date:	Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:46:33 -0800
From:	"Terrance Reagan" <woxgtactivegir@gtactive.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v2.10) Business
Reply-To: woxgtactivegir@gtactive.com
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <193912215.27540638374188@gtactive.com>
To: imrg-web-archive@megatron.ietf.org
Subject: Software
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
  boundary="----------34867299915AF21C"

------------34867299915AF21C
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=Windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Searching for the best price in software discounts? Now you'll catch the opportunity to use the software environment you wanted for a very long time.
 And the best matter is, all softs are dirt cheap.
 Check up by yourself and have the softwares for cheap rates ever seen! http://shannaleibowitzng189.blogspot.com
------------34867299915AF21C
Content-Type: text/html; charset=Windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE></TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" bordercolor="#000000"><tr><td align=center bgcolor="#CEF3FF"><b><font color="#FA3D05">Searching for the best price in software discounts?</font></b></td></tr><tr> 

<td align=center bgcolor="#E9E9E9"><b>Now you'll catch the opportunity to use the software environment 
you wanted for a very long time.<br> 
And the best matter is, all softs are dirt cheap.<br> 

<a href="http://shannaleibowitzng189.blogspot.com" target="_blank"><em>Check up by yourself and have the softwares for cheap rates ever seen!</em></a></b></td></tr></table> 
<font color="#D9EDFF">http://shannaleibowitzng189.blogspot.com</font>

</BODY></HTML>
------------34867299915AF21C--



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Thu Mar 20 09:59:22 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2FBD63A6C38
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:59:22 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 1-IOWK0IY+cB
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:59:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2FDC63A6C97
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:59:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2KGXJwF098369
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:19 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2KGXJq9098368;
	Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:19 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp3.pacifier.net (smtp3.pacifier.net [64.255.237.173])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2KGXEEl098332
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL)
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:19 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com)
Received: from GALATIONS (unknown [207.202.179.27])
	by smtp3.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id E445A9577
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:13 -0700 (PDT)
From: <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: "Ietf-Smime" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Review of RFC 3278 Update
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:13 -0700
Message-ID: <03b801c88aa8$17dd3150$479793f0$@com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
thread-index: AciKqBc2g9NKQZ59TkKlVfDSFlj3ig==
Content-Language: en-us
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Sean,  a couple of comments.

1.  I think you need to look at updating section 5.  Which of the hash
algorithms are considered to be mandatory to implement for ECDSA?

2.  I don't know if there is any degree of tie-in between the set of ECC
curves and the hash algorithms being specified.  I know there are some
correspondences for DSA.  I believe that this should be stated either way,
potentially as a security consideration.

3.  Is there a reason that you have not updated section 7?

jim



From justy@fujitsu.com  Mon Mar 24 04:37:04 2008
Return-Path: <justy@fujitsu.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D3573A6E3F
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 24 Mar 2008 04:37:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -70.798
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-70.798 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_80=2, DYN_RDNS_AND_INLINE_IMAGE=0.001,
	EXTRA_MPART_TYPE=1, FH_HELO_EQ_D_D_D_D=1.597,
	FH_HOST_EQ_D_D_D_D=0.765, FH_HOST_EQ_D_D_D_DB=0.888,
	FM_DDDD_TIMES_2=1.999, HELO_DYNAMIC_IPADDR2=4.395,
	HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_04=2.041, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MY_CID_AND_STYLE=1.54,
	PART_CID_STOCK=1.635, PART_CID_STOCK_LESS=0.384,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_51_100=0.5, RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E4_51_100=1.5,
	RAZOR2_CHECK=0.5, RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET=1.96, RCVD_IN_XBL=3.033,
	RDNS_DYNAMIC=0.1, SARE_GIF_ATTACH=1.42, STOCK_IMG_HDR_FROM=0.001,
	STOCK_IMG_HTML=0.001, TVD_RCVD_IP=1.931, T_TVD_FW_GRAPHIC_ID1=0.01,
	USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id U5D3SOuDopr7
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon, 24 Mar 2008 04:37:03 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from 62-90-163-139.barak.net.il (62-90-163-139.barak.net.il [62.90.163.139])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 705953A6AB4
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon, 24 Mar 2008 04:36:27 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2008 09:46:45 +0000
From: "bernarr april" <justy@fujitsu.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (v3.99.27) UNREG
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <00571723.20080324113408@ietf.org>
To: <smime-archive@ietf.org>
Subject: Fw:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/related;
 type="multipart/alternative";
 boundary="B5CC8432EDFD7A5"

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

--B5CC8432EDFD7A5
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
 boundary="B226ADC031394B5"

--B226ADC031394B5
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Get our grant for your feeling well!!!
--B226ADC031394B5
Content-Type: text/html;
 charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<img src=3D"cid:000901c88da2$03962dd9$7555059c@uxyidgo">
<P><SMALL>Get our grant for your feeling =
well!!!</SMALL></P></BODY></HTML>
--B226ADC031394B5--

--B5CC8432EDFD7A5
Content-Type: image/gif;
 name="img0.gif"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-ID: <000901c88da2$03962dd9$7555059c@uxyidgo>
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==

--B5CC8432EDFD7A5--




From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 07:41:26 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C12CF3A6971
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:41:26 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.11
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.11 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_05=-1.11]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id lVEHYl78C1Om
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:41:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10C563A6CA0
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:41:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PEI7FB026243
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:18:07 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PEI7M6026242;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:18:07 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.175])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PEI1CG026231
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:18:04 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 60793 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2008 14:17:51 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.12.237 with login)
  by smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 14:17:51 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: KmHjIaMVM1mSjZ9WEwFEmZLKiFJU33tfZGZDqSAgjlxksf.ea9o4Lpz1gjVV1WbR5kD9lU4zmw--
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:16:42 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciKB/zBWh/Mf/xhTC6+GIqdCDsjUgEef/zw
In-Reply-To: <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Russ,

This sounds reasonable. I replace the following sentence in 3851bis:

A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
over 512 bits.

with 

A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384
bits.

spt


>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org 
>[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Russ Housley
>Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2008 4:48 PM
>To: Turner, Sean P.; ietf-smime@imc.org
>Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
>
>
>Sean:
>
>>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with 
>keys of any 
>>size over 512 bits.
>
>This is asking for denial of service attack.  What if someone 
>sends a certificate that contains a 64Kbit value claiming to 
>be a public key and a blob of random bits claiming to be a 
>signature?  The amount of time to check the signature (and 
>probably find that it is not valid) is onerous.
>
>Today, I cannot imagine someone making use of a public key 
>larger than 8192 bits.  Double that it you want to be very 
>future proof.
>
>Russ 
>



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 07:41:53 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 03EBB3A6A11
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:41:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.855
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.855 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.745,
	BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 0OKZK-DV6Fzt
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:41:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EE953A67D6
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:41:51 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PEGE7R025940
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:14 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PEGEC4025939;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:14 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.46])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PEG85D025921
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:11 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 76759 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2008 14:16:08 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.12.237 with login)
  by smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 14:16:07 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: C6fUYbAVM1mV_W6Ym4077ch6awR_K_QbSxo.fw1uBKJvhP5Kbldpxkjjvi7t4YBEUwrGv.qx_GJfDc7n3LSQrlFDD3ZU1yuNZfuHqPwhZ5Tknzwga.2rNW6lTLN75tMeKUaH.u_TaLvjvcU-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Tony Capel'" <capel@comgate.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <005801c889fd$8acfe230$02b5a8c0@tony>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:14:58 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00b201c88e82$9be61920$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciJ9IEYgKzyHW7bT0ycxmZT8JqH+AAA02ZwASJZmbA=
In-Reply-To: <005801c889fd$8acfe230$02b5a8c0@tony>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Tony,

This sounds reasonable, I'll remove the sentence.

spt 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Tony Capel [mailto:capel@comgate.com] 
>Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2008 4:12 PM
>To: 'Turner, Sean P.'; ietf-smime@imc.org
>Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
>
>My only concern is making key size generation requirements a 
>MANDATORY part of this standard.  I understand it may have 
>been appropriate in the past.
>
>I agree with making non-mandatory RECOMMENDATIONS regarding 
>key size generation.
>Also agree with making support for minimum key size ranges 
>mandatory.  And have no problems with the sizes proposed.
>
>However MANDATING (MUST/MUST-NOT) the generation and use of 
>specific minimum sizes (or algorithms for that matter) seems 
>to me to be better addressed by Cert Policies, etc. - and 
>indeed in many cases key generation and use ends up being 
>imposed by the PKI design - and defined in the corresponding 
>CP - anyway.
>
>I agree the RFC should set out as mandatory the minimum 
>specifications required to ensure a high likelihood of 
>interoperability.  However, if users choose to use small keys 
>(and are allowed to under their CP) then does this make the 
>implementation non-compliant to S/MIME v3.2?  For example, if 
>S/MIME is used to implement a compartmentalized security 
>policy and used over a secure infrastructure, do we presume to 
>say a 768 bit key is insufficient for this particular application?  
>
>The only change I would suggest is to remove the sentence:
>" A user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 
>bits long"
>
>The previous sentence to this already captures the 
>RECOMMENDATION against keys of less than 1024 anyway.
>
>I think in earlier versions of the RFC it was appropriate to 
>mandate minimum key sizes, but nowadays, we should leave this 
>decision to the designers who are working against the threat 
>and risk assessment (and sure, include recommendations aimed 
>at less sophisticated users).
>
>Tony
>
>
>| -----Original Message-----
>| From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
>| [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Turner, Sean P.
>| Sent: March 19, 2008 3:08 PM
>| To: ietf-smime@imc.org
>| Subject: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
>| 
>| 
>| 
>| The key size text is the remaining issue with the S/MIME v3.2 IDs.  
>| What I'm hoping to do is consensus on the text so we can 
>issue a WG LC 
>| on these two IDs. To make sure there's no confusion I've 
>included the 
>| old and new text from the two IDs. If you have comments on the new 
>| text please be specific about the change you are proposing.
>| 
>| spt
>| 
>| --------------
>| 
>| In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only sentence 
>| that refers to key sizes):
>| 
>| (old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>| 
>| (new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>| 
>| In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:
>| 
>| (old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the 
>| S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or 
>function SHOULD 
>| generate RSA key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent 
>| SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a minimum key size of 768 bits.  A 
>| user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. 
>| Creating keys longer than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME 
>| receiving agents to not be able to verify signatures, but 
>gives better 
>| security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving agent 
>SHOULD be able 
>| to verify signatures with keys of any size over 512 bits. 
>Some agents 
>| created in the United States have chosen to create 512 bit keys in 
>| order to get more advantageous export licenses. However, 512 
>bit keys 
>| are considered by many to be cryptographically insecure. 
>Implementers 
>| SHOULD be aware that multiple (active) key pairs can be associated 
>| with a single individual.  For example, one key pair can be used to 
>| support confidentiality, while a different key pair can be used for 
>| authentication.
>| 
>| (new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the 
>| S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or 
>function SHOULD 
>| generate RSA key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent 
>| SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A 
>| user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. 
>| Creating keys longer than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME 
>| receiving agents to not be able to verify signatures, but 
>gives better 
>| security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving agent 
>SHOULD be able 
>| to verify signatures with keys of any size over 512 bits.
>| 
>| - the last four sentences from old text were moved to the security 
>| considerations.
>| 
>



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 08:08:44 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B2073A6EF5
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 08:08:44 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.227
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.227 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.372,
	BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id wiRPZ-MKoXax
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 08:08:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 151F33A6D5A
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 08:08:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PEoOiu030028
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:50:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PEoOFH030027;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:50:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.175])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PEoM0Y030019
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:50:23 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 87385 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2008 14:50:22 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.12.237 with login)
  by smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 14:50:22 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: GAepBrwVM1kOdUh9jN86eegsJtDMAzLWQ_9gZN_OsfnEFkKXyWpoIlG6xvN9lwW6Wq15iQfZtWfnOrQCeIKG5UnFbXPEYvO77mxG74ELCqBusmQ4k4R0znCBhpQPy6sGrYRmfPl8mR75Cg4-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Jim Schaad'" <jimsch@nwlink.com>
Cc: "'Ietf-Smime'" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <027701c88a47$078aff00$16a0fd00$@com>
Subject: RE: Review of RFC 3278 Update
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:49:12 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00d801c88e87$644a28d0$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciKRwcEDQCLxl0wQXqmA0WbJwEUzgEN+Keg
In-Reply-To: <027701c88a47$078aff00$16a0fd00$@com>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Jim,

1. I think we should mandate SHA-256 and the others should be optional.

2. We should match the curves/hashes as follows:

 SHA-256 matches P-256
 SHA-384 matches P-384
 SHA-512 matches P-521

3. No reason I missed it.

spt

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jim Schaad [mailto:jimsch@nwlink.com] 
>Sent: Thursday, March 20, 2008 12:58 AM
>To: Sean P. Turner
>Cc: Ietf-Smime
>Subject: Review of RFC 3278 Update
>
>Sean,  a couple of comments.
>
>1.  I think you need to look at updating section 5.  Which of 
>the hash algorithms are considered to be mandatory to 
>implement for ECDSA?
>
>2.  I don't know if there is any degree of tie-in between the 
>set of ECC curves and the hash algorithms being specified.  I 
>know there are some correspondences for DSA.  I believe that 
>this should be stated either way, potentially as a security 
>consideration.
>
>3.  Is there a reason that you have not updated section 7?
>
>jim
>



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 08:48:48 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B66D128C3F3
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 08:48:48 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.351
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.351 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.248,
	BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id DFuKDpyiFB7z
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 08:48:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E77D3A6865
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 08:48:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PEGbjq025997
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:37 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PEGbJU025996;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:37 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp104.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp104.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.173])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PEGYlD025972
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:36 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 28639 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2008 14:16:31 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.12.237 with login)
  by smtp104.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 14:16:30 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: Xk8ast4VM1ljNm_9Bm2A8THlbJfsanfUL2TfQP56cQUsvEHLi9vrlu_BclwbYFRHvzGPCRt2lMvW2mxh_Boy.Q7zmnDAZBeUJT0u3EBPq492iAU.L87OELnv5hMfSaD.a.c7YJxUAAmEzLQ-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Paul Hoffman'" <phoffman@imc.org>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624081ac4072442a88e@[10.20.30.162]>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:15:21 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00b301c88e82$a9a51480$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciKBJXuNfywbktHSt2XUo4LpcbeRQEfLk+g
In-Reply-To: <p0624081ac4072442a88e@[10.20.30.162]>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Paul,

These sounds reasonable. To resolve the 2nd comment I'm deleting the
sentence, which Tony also commented on.

spt

>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org 
>[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Paul Hoffman
>Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2008 4:43 PM
>To: Turner, Sean P.; ietf-smime@imc.org
>Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
>
>
>At 3:07 PM -0400 3/19/08, Turner, Sean P. wrote:
>>In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only sentence 
>>that refers to key sizes):
>>
>>(old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>>
>>(new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>
>This is about verification, not about signing. Why should we 
>increase it from 512 bits? I support leaving it as in RFC 3850 
>at 512 bits.
>
>>
>>In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:
>>
>>(old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the 
>>S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or 
>function SHOULD 
>>generate RSA key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent 
>>SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a minimum key size of 768 bits.  A 
>>user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. 
>>Creating keys longer than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME 
>>receiving agents to not be able to verify signatures, but 
>gives better 
>>security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving agent SHOULD be able 
>>to verify signatures with keys of any size over 512 bits. Some agents 
>>created in the United States have chosen to create 512 bit 
>keys in order to get more advantageous export licenses.
>>However, 512 bit keys are considered by many to be cryptographically 
>>insecure. Implementers SHOULD be aware that multiple (active) 
>key pairs 
>>can be associated with a single individual.  For example, one 
>key pair 
>>can be used to support confidentiality, while a different key 
>pair can 
>>be used for authentication.
>>
>>(new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the 
>>S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or 
>function SHOULD 
>>generate RSA key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent 
>>SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A 
>>user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. 
>>Creating keys longer than
>>1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able 
>>to verify signatures, but gives better security and is therefore 
>>valuable.  A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with 
>>keys of any size over 512 bits.
>
>I fully disagree with "MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less 
>than 1024 bits long". A signature that is of little value that 
>is only supposed to last a week is fine at 512 bits.
>



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 11:36:18 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4CEA83A6A55
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:36:18 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id osb4STxnyPG8
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:36:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3FD203A69B3
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:36:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PIBfXe052527
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:11:41 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PIBfuE052526;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:11:41 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from [165.227.249.202] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169])
	(authenticated bits=0)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PIBYDT052497
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:11:36 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from phoffman@imc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
In-Reply-To: <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
 <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
 <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:11:32 -0700
To: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>,
        "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


At 10:16 AM -0400 3/25/08, Turner, Sean P. wrote:
>This sounds reasonable. I replace the following sentence in 3851bis:
>
>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>over 512 bits.
>
>with
>
>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384
>bits.

I disagree with the upper limit. Verifying signatures with 16K bit 
keys is very difficult for constrained  devices; this "SHOULD" may 
have the effect of making device makers need to use faster CPUs than 
they would normally want to have.

It is unclear which part of the SHOULD is not a MUST here. Because we 
are talking only about interoperability, then the number is 1024, 
which is what the key creators SHOULD be making. But that is clearly 
a lower bound of what a typical receiver might expect. Therefore, a 
short sentence like the one proposed is insufficient. How about:

A receiving agent needs to be able to verify signatures whose key 
length is chosen by the signer. At a minimum, a receiving agent MUST 
be able to verify signatures whose key length is 1024 bits or 
shorter. However, most receiving agents are likely to see signatures 
whose key length is longer than that during the next decade.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 13:49:03 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A1E43A69FA
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:49:03 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.381
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.381 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.415,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, MSGID_FROM_MTA_HEADER=0.803]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 1W-ITtuMB2Ub
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:49:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5EC103A6928
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:49:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PKWPik066620
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:32:25 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PKWP0V066617;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:32:25 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PKWNSq066604
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:32:24 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com)
Message-Id: <200803252032.m2PKWNSq066604@balder-227.proper.com>
Received: (qmail 9602 invoked by uid 0); 25 Mar 2008 20:32:12 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (72.83.129.167)
  by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 20:32:12 -0000
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:57:05 -0400
To: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>,
        <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
In-Reply-To: <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
 <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
 <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
 <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Paul:

How would you suggest warning people that they should not attempt to 
handle really huge keys?  Would you put it in the security 
consideration instead?

Russ

At 02:11 PM 3/25/2008, Paul Hoffman wrote:

>At 10:16 AM -0400 3/25/08, Turner, Sean P. wrote:
>>This sounds reasonable. I replace the following sentence in 3851bis:
>>
>>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>>over 512 bits.
>>
>>with
>>
>>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384
>>bits.
>
>I disagree with the upper limit. Verifying signatures with 16K bit 
>keys is very difficult for constrained  devices; this "SHOULD" may 
>have the effect of making device makers need to use faster CPUs than 
>they would normally want to have.
>
>It is unclear which part of the SHOULD is not a MUST here. Because 
>we are talking only about interoperability, then the number is 1024, 
>which is what the key creators SHOULD be making. But that is clearly 
>a lower bound of what a typical receiver might expect. Therefore, a 
>short sentence like the one proposed is insufficient. How about:
>
>A receiving agent needs to be able to verify signatures whose key 
>length is chosen by the signer. At a minimum, a receiving agent MUST 
>be able to verify signatures whose key length is 1024 bits or 
>shorter. However, most receiving agents are likely to see signatures 
>whose key length is longer than that during the next decade.
>



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 13:57:27 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D625A3A6B1E
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:57:27 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id RO4bt4F9SRK7
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:57:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3A073A6964
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:57:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PKcX4f066947
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:38:33 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PKcXHp066946;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:38:33 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from [165.227.249.202] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169])
	(authenticated bits=0)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PKcPFT066913
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:38:26 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from phoffman@imc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240814c40f1306bfc5@[165.227.249.202]>
In-Reply-To: <200803252032.m2PKWNqS066605@balder-227.proper.com>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
 <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
 <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
 <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
 <200803252032.m2PKWNqS066605@balder-227.proper.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:38:23 -0700
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>,
        <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


At 3:57 PM -0400 3/25/08, Russ Housley wrote:
>How would you suggest warning people that they should not attempt to 
>handle really huge keys?  Would you put it in the security 
>consideration instead?

Sure. It is a consideration ("don't fall for a DoS attack"), it's not 
an interoperability issue for a SHOULD or MUST.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 14:51:08 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 025D028C5A5
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:51:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 52kvuALruAIx
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:51:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D8ED928C547
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:51:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PLXqNK070767
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:33:52 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PLXq7R070766;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:33:52 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from relay2.mail.uk.clara.net (relay2.mail.uk.clara.net [80.168.70.182])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PLXowe070750;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:33:51 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk)
Received: from drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk ([80.177.30.10] helo=[192.168.7.8])
	by relay2.mail.uk.clara.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.62)
	(envelope-from <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>)
	id 1JeGmB-0000Bw-3V; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 21:33:48 +0000
Message-ID: <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 21:34:02 +0000
From: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.12 (Windows/20080213)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
CC: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>,
        "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com> <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
In-Reply-To: <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Clara-Relay: Message sent using Claranet Relay Service using auth code: drh
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
> 
> I disagree with the upper limit. Verifying signatures with 16K bit keys 
> is very difficult for constrained  devices; this "SHOULD" may have the 
> effect of making device makers need to use faster CPUs than they would 
> normally want to have.
> 

I made a study of the use of public keys in a DoS attack a while ago.

It isn't merely a key size issue. A signature using a 16K key and a 
small public exponent (such as 65537) can be verified using far less
effort than one with a 16K public exponent.

A separate issue is whether such a signature is verified before or after 
the certificate itself is verified and whether one can persuade a CA to 
issue a certificate containing such a key.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Freelance consultant see: http://www.drh-consultancy.co.uk/
Email: shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk, PGP key: via homepage.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 15:23:31 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83AFA3A6964
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:23:31 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.381
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.381 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.415,
	BAYES_00=-2.599, MSGID_FROM_MTA_HEADER=0.803]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id dm9PLpOS2q1U
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:23:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 280B53A68CB
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:23:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PM2Wpr072623
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:02:32 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PM2Wek072622;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:02:32 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PM2U9p072614
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:02:31 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com)
Message-Id: <200803252202.m2PM2U9p072614@balder-227.proper.com>
Received: (qmail 22591 invoked by uid 0); 25 Mar 2008 22:02:22 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (72.83.129.167)
  by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 22:02:22 -0000
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 18:02:28 -0400
To: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
In-Reply-To: <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
 <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
 <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
 <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
 <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Steve:

>A separate issue is whether such a signature is verified before or 
>after the certificate itself is verified and whether one can 
>persuade a CA to issue a certificate containing such a key.

Indeed, this is the best solution.  Perhaps we should drop the max 
size limit and discuss this point in the security considerations.

Russ 



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Tue Mar 25 15:26:56 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 791DC3A68CB
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:26:56 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.734
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.734 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.865,
	BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id iQHHmqIKs2mc
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:26:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (cl-240.ewr-01.us.sixxs.net [IPv6:2001:4830:1200:ef::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D8123A67AA
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:26:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PM6n8G072897
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:06:49 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PM6niH072893;
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:06:49 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from ladle.sendmail.com (ladle.sendmail.com [209.246.26.53])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PM6knY072879
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:06:49 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from blake@sendmail.com)
Received: from fife.sendmail.com (fife.sendmail.com [209.246.26.50])
	by ladle.sendmail.com (Switch-3.3.1/Sentrion-3.0.0) with ESMTP id m2PM8BbH027311
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:08:11 -0700
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=sendmail.com;
	s=ladle.dkim; t=1206482891; bh=efCG6RvvYx3wf/jbRhB+H3RLgggMXMD51rXN
	ztRl/gs=; h=Received:X-DKIM:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:
	 Message-ID:References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:
	 Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To:User-Agent:X-MM-Ex-RefId; b=fmFqmD
	wStD/i//vGbmFKDjm3npi1YabJtx8m7INc14f8sHkCcozNcTW/6iAZr1QzIg1CDxxTo
	eXbP1CSfzBIxNYx0PJwyygacmc/23N3H8nG9XN+PxIu/jtu3kIRYfoUtFctmWSe2xHN
	OpKLQXQ3tcgxcx9ZIGcGciad8OJXSBY=
Received: from blake-ramsdells-macbook-pro.local (c-24-17-217-200.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [24.17.217.200])
	(authenticated bits=0)
	by fife.sendmail.com (Switch-3.3.1/Switch-3.3.2mp) with ESMTP id m2PM6M1Q015383
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:06:26 -0700
X-DKIM: Sendmail DKIM Filter v2.2.3 fife.sendmail.com m2PM6M1Q015383
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=sendmail.com;
	s=fife.dkim; t=1206482788; bh=efCG6RvvYx3wf/jbRhB+H3RLgggMXMD51rXNz
	tRl/gs=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:
	 MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To:
	 User-Agent:X-MM-Ex-RefId; b=sVQbRBVwyseSB4LJu3YY3JSncq457YtrIGr1+6
	wzpOqXcSoPtcr+oUO8wS4kktr/cFcYQX/c/uaBsW75Cmju2CB/PsfVB55kI9vZ7BAYk
	PoJbA/8871KxWux2xrsFmwsBamgcbhmjx59O5Alrglqz88unnGqDVNeCA6IOfGz3yA=
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:04:43 -0700
From: Blake Ramsdell <blake@sendmail.com>
To: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>,
        "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Message-ID: <20080325220443.GA19291@blake-ramsdells-macbook-pro.local>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com> <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]> <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.15 (2007-04-06)
X-MM-Ex-RefId: 149371::080325150627-0AA7AB90-1DCA0887/0-0/0-1
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


On Tue, Mar 25, 2008 at 09:34:02PM +0000, Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
>  It isn't merely a key size issue. A signature using a 16K key and a small 
>  public exponent (such as 65537) can be verified using far less
>  effort than one with a 16K public exponent.

Based on this and Paul's comments, I think that there are definitely two
separate issues:

1. Guidance for interoperability (MUST / SHOULD for keylengths)

2. Security considerations (don't bite off keys bigger than you can chew)

Unfortunately, this opens up a new can of worms for the security
considerations -- how do you specify the right combination of exponent and
modulus values for RSA that are a problem? Are there a similar set of
giant parameters that might be used with DSA?

Blake
-- 
Blake Ramsdell | Sendmail, Inc. | http://www.sendmail.com



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Wed Mar 26 04:13:55 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDFAB28C548
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 26 Mar 2008 04:13:55 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.141
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.141 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_FR=0.35, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553,
	RCVD_BAD_ID=2.837]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 5KwTVreat3Zb
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Wed, 26 Mar 2008 04:13:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (Balder-227.Proper.COM [192.245.12.227])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2B7A128C483
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Wed, 26 Mar 2008 04:13:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2QAq6lg042247
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Wed, 26 Mar 2008 03:52:06 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2QAq62L042246;
	Wed, 26 Mar 2008 03:52:06 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2QAq3ZP042234
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 26 Mar 2008 03:52:05 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from denis.pinkas@bull.net)
Received: from MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (msga-mcl1.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.20])
	by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA16212
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 26 Mar 2008 12:01:45 +0100
Received: from frcls4013 ([129.182.108.120])
          by MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (Lotus Domino Release 5.0.11)
          with SMTP id 2008032611514498:508041 ;
          Wed, 26 Mar 2008 11:51:44 +0100 
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2008 11:51:41 +0100
From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
To: "ietf-smime@imc.org" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
X-mailer: Foxmail 5.0 [-fr-]
Mime-Version: 1.0
X-MIMETrack: Itemize by SMTP Server on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11  |July 24, 2002) at
 26/03/2008 11:51:45,
	Serialize by Router on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11  |July 24, 2002) at
 26/03/2008 11:52:00,
	Serialize complete at 26/03/2008 11:52:00
Message-ID: <OF56379788.7E1CBE5C-ONC1257418.003BAB72@frcl.bull.fr>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>



>Steve:

>>A separate issue is whether such a signature is verified before or 
>>after the certificate itself is verified and whether one can 
>>persuade a CA to issue a certificate containing such a key.

>Indeed, this is the best solution.  Perhaps we should drop the max 
>size limit and discuss this point in the security considerations.

I was amazed by the following proposal :
"A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384 bits".

If we drop it, then there is no guidance anymore.

Reasonably, for any implementation, today:
"A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 2048 bits".

This does not prevent any implementation to support larger key sizes.

Denis

>Russ 






From DeborahimZavala@craigslist.org  Fri Mar 28 05:25:53 2008
Return-Path: <DeborahimZavala@craigslist.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78B283A67B2;
	Fri, 28 Mar 2008 05:25:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -42.901
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-42.901 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_99=3.5, DATE_IN_FUTURE_03_06=0.274, HELO_LH_HOME=3.714,
	HOST_MISMATCH_NET=0.311, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_HTML_ONLY=1.457,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_51_100=0.5, RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E4_51_100=1.5,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E8_51_100=1.5, RAZOR2_CHECK=0.5,
	RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET=1.96, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905,
	RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL=0.877, RDNS_DYNAMIC=0.1, URIBL_BLACK=20,
	URIBL_SBL=20, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id IakSBAhjCV-P; Fri, 28 Mar 2008 05:25:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from diya1ad7b1c05c.lan (a73-194.adsl.paltel.net [213.6.73.194])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 972713A6A36;
	Fri, 28 Mar 2008 05:25:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from 15641044111544190.19570581156493703.11415065397442161.11703356731769785 (HELO localhost.localdomain) (11114830436952919.17851133877629012.13546833012100406.14264755137533240) by 14933484791266851.10552162798467895.14028861499576915.14577921076941122 with SMTP; Fri, 28 Mar 2008 14:25:04 -0200
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2008 14:25:04 -0200
Message-Id: <7IX805EJXVWDA313@craigslist.org>
X-Mailer: MIME::Lite 3.01 (F2.72; A1.62; B3.01; Q3.01)
X-Header-CompanyDBUserName: hpccm
X-Header-MasterId: 637515
X-Header-Versions: Hewlett-Packard.0t0bn5nd7.fk@us.newsgram.hp.com
X-FID: 06E37DBC-7253-90AF-B7E0-01CDEA92DCB7
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
To: <smime-archive@megatron.ietf.org>
Cc: <ssm-web-archive@megatron.ietf.org>,
	<speechsc@megatron.ietf.org>,
	<vpim-owner@megatron.ietf.org>,
	<urn-nid-owner@megatron.ietf.org>
From: "Iva Putnam" <DeborahimZavala@craigslist.org>
Subject: Business Loan- $10K-$100K

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<META content="MSHTML 6.00.2900.2180" name=GENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD> 
<BODY bgColor=#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=Palatino size=2>If you have your own business and want IMMEDIATE cash to spend ANY way you like or wish Extra money to give the business a boost or  need A low interest loan - NO STRINGS ATTACHED!</FONT></DIV>  
<DIV><FONT face=Palatino size=2>Do not worry about approval... your credit history will not disqualify you!</FONT></DIV>  
<DIV><FONT face=Palatino size=2><B><A href=http://jksudie.net.cn/>http://jksudie.net.cn/</A></B></FONT></DIV>
</BODY></HTML>



From herbee.thomas@dti.gsi.gov.uk  Sat Mar 29 04:18:58 2008
Return-Path: <herbee.thomas@dti.gsi.gov.uk>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9C273A6A15
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 29 Mar 2008 04:18:58 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 4.397
X-Spam-Level: ****
X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.397 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, DATE_IN_PAST_03_06=0.044, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451,
	RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_51_100=0.5, RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E4_51_100=1.5,
	RAZOR2_CHECK=0.5, RDNS_NONE=0.1, SARE_WEOFFER=0.3,
	UNPARSEABLE_RELAY=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id luabj5j33+nF
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Sat, 29 Mar 2008 04:18:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ip-184-75.belltel.ph (unknown [210.185.184.75])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A2113A67FD
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Sat, 29 Mar 2008 04:18:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [UxTKCG] by ip-184-75.belltel.ph id o4dUMkFurSF; Sat, 29 Mar 2008 18:10:40 +1100
Message-ID: <001d01c8916b$fd76ab00$010ce3d0.63}@ip-184-75.belltel.ph>
From: <herbee.thomas@dti.gsi.gov.uk>
To: <smime-archive@ietf.org>
Subject: Career change?
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2008 18:10:40 +1100
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit




Hello,    smime-archive.

This is your chance to join our accounting and advisory team, in one of the world's leading professional services firms.
We are dedicated to providing ongoing expert advice and innovative specialist solutions, helping a variety of local and national businesses grow and succeed. This position is home based.
We offer full-time and part time shifts.

If you are over 21, have no criminal records, live in Australia or New Zealand, have a strong motivation and ability to work unsupervised do not hesitate to contact Piter Bradd on application.form@Safe-mail.net  for details. If you are interested get in touch with us and join our friendly team. Excellent salary paid weekly and bonuses for right applicant.


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Piter Bradd, Management Department, 
NF-Group, Fax/Voice:    +1-973-215-4895,

E-mail: apply.today@icmail.net 










From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Mon Mar 31 04:28:38 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6395B28C3A4
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:28:38 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id K-j-JMmEUjkY
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:28:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:1f04:392::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44A6928C38D
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:28:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VBBJ7a097984
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:11:20 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VBBJdt097981;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:11:19 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (moe.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.35])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VBBI1U097961;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:11:18 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1])
	by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2305480436;
	Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300 (NZDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1])
	by localhost (moe.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id hglwi5PNjxLq; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152])
	by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id A393B48042C;
	Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38])
	(using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP
	id 20025E0808A; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63)
	(envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>)
	id 1JgHv3-0005oR-0w; Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk, phoffman@imc.org
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Cc: housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, turners@ieca.com
In-Reply-To: <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <E1JgHv3-0005oR-0w@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk> writes:

>I made a study of the use of public keys in a DoS attack a while ago.

I made an indirect study via SSH a few years ago.  The client I was using (no
choice, it was corporate policy) froze solid for about 5s doing a 4Kbit key
exchange with an SSH server.  When I complained to the server admin, his
response was that the spec allowed up to 4Kbit keys and numerous other servers
were run this way as well, so that's what he was using.

Building the tools for a DoS into the spec, especially a self-inflicted one,
doesn't seem like a good idea.  Give a geek a device with controls that go to 
11 and they'll set them to 11 and leave them there.

Peter.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Mon Mar 31 04:29:05 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E291F28C352
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:29:05 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 7Zq7WvuCUTIB
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:29:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:1f04:392::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C4683A6D73
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:29:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VB7LL7097600
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:07:21 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VB7LpA097599;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:07:21 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (larry.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.34])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VB7CGT097585
	for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:07:19 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1])
	by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23F8F1850A;
	Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:07:12 +1300 (NZDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1])
	by localhost (larry.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id mUHdla2GVuuV; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:07:12 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152])
	by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id A2B5C184E9;
	Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:07:11 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38])
	(using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP
	id 33D68E0808A; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:07:10 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63)
	(envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>)
	id 1JgHr4-0005am-3R; Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:07:10 +1300
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, turners@ieca.com
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
In-Reply-To: <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Message-Id: <E1JgHr4-0005am-3R@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:07:10 +1300
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


"Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> writes:

>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384
>bits.

Even that's a significant DoS.  What about MUST to 4K and MAY to 16K, with a
note about the DoS issue?

The 16Kbit value is going to cause the same problems as 256-bit keys do for
AES, once you give some arbitrary large upper bound it creates the perception
that keys of the same size as the upper bound are somehow "better" than
smaller-sized keys, and so all the tinfoil-hat implementations will insist on
using 16Kbit keys, and then others will have to follow in order to be as
"good" as the tinfoil-hat versions.

Also, how many implementations actually support 16Kbit values?  How much
legacy hardware can handle 16Kbit keys?  How many smart cards can do 16Kbit
keys?  Specifying this is opening a real can of worms...

Peter.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Mon Mar 31 04:37:31 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7116D3A6CDB
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:37:31 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 6JFaHXrreIOq
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:37:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:1f04:392::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A3B03A66B4
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:37:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VBLCnS098796
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:21:12 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VBLCrX098795;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:21:12 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (curly.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.33])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VBLBiR098782;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:21:12 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1])
	by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAFA29C57D;
	Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:21:10 +1300 (NZDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1])
	by localhost (curly.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id FX3r5GBW2y-1; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:21:10 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152])
	by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7512C9C57B;
	Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:21:10 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38])
	(using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP
	id 9EFC2E0808A; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:20:59 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63)
	(envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>)
	id 1JgI4R-0006RS-GY; Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:20:59 +1300
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: blake@sendmail.com, lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Cc: housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, phoffman@imc.org,
        turners@ieca.com
In-Reply-To: <20080325220443.GA19291@blake-ramsdells-macbook-pro.local>
Message-Id: <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:20:59 +1300
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Blake Ramsdell <blake@sendmail.com> writes:

>Unfortunately, this opens up a new can of worms for the security
>considerations -- how do you specify the right combination of exponent and
>modulus values for RSA that are a problem? Are there a similar set of giant
>parameters that might be used with DSA?

I know that someone else on this list has looked at DoS-enabling parameters in
the past so maybe they'll want to comment, I've looked at this too and (for
example) feeding a DLP-based key exchange that expects g = 2 a value of g
that's something much, much larger than 2 (like 2^256 times larger), or an RSA
key where e is a bignum, can lead to disappointing effects at the other end.
(that is, you can trivially knock a server off the net with this... apologies
if I tried this on your server :-).  Taking out an S/MIME gateway shouldn't be
much more difficult.

Having said that, my code checks for stupid parameter values and has never had
any (reported) problems with rejecting keys, so it seems quite possible to
restrict yourself to sensible/safe values without adverse side-effects.

Peter.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Mon Mar 31 05:42:30 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDCDF3A68E7
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:42:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id DH-c3yMc1xBR
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:42:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:1f04:392::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4700B3A6851
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:42:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VCN9fL003762
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:23:09 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VCN9Ox003761;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:23:09 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from relay2.mail.uk.clara.net (relay2.mail.uk.clara.net [80.168.70.182])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VCN5G5003738;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:23:08 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk)
Received: from drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk ([80.177.30.10] helo=[192.168.7.8])
	by relay2.mail.uk.clara.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.62)
	(envelope-from <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>)
	id 1JgJ2N-000637-HV; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 13:22:58 +0100
Message-ID: <47F0D7B6.70506@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2008 13:23:18 +0100
From: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.12 (Windows/20080213)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
CC: blake@sendmail.com, housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org,
        phoffman@imc.org, turners@ieca.com
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
References: <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
In-Reply-To: <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Clara-Relay: Message sent using Claranet Relay Service using auth code: drh
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Blake Ramsdell <blake@sendmail.com> writes:
> 
>> Unfortunately, this opens up a new can of worms for the security
>> considerations -- how do you specify the right combination of exponent and
>> modulus values for RSA that are a problem? Are there a similar set of giant
>> parameters that might be used with DSA?
> 
> I know that someone else on this list has looked at DoS-enabling parameters in
> the past so maybe they'll want to comment, I've looked at this too and (for
> example) feeding a DLP-based key exchange that expects g = 2 a value of g
> that's something much, much larger than 2 (like 2^256 times larger), or an RSA
> key where e is a bignum, can lead to disappointing effects at the other end.
> (that is, you can trivially knock a server off the net with this... apologies
> if I tried this on your server :-).  Taking out an S/MIME gateway shouldn't be
> much more difficult.
> 

The study was a small and didn't look in a huge amount of detail but the 
results agree with the above paragraph pretty well.

16K keys with 16K e can lock up modern systems (or what counted for 
modern systems a when I checked a couple of years back) for several 
minutes and 8K keys with 8K e tens of seconds. So embedding large 
numbers of requests with such keys could easily cause problems.

Some implementations (by accident or design) restrict e to 32 bits in size.

A separate issue was where such verification of keys might take place.

If a CA issues a trusted EE certificate with such a key then an 
implementation will check the signature if it doesn't reject large 
parameters. But it would be a less useful attack since the certificate 
should reveal some details of the attacker's identity.

In practice an attempt might be made using untrusted certificates.

The signature using the EE certificate key may be checked either before 
the certificate chain is validated or performed even if the chain 
validation fails as useful debugging information.

A separate attack could be performed during chain validation itself. 
This depends on the order certificate signatures are checked.

Consider a forged chain from trust anchor TA to end entity certificate EE...

TA->CA1->CA2->CA3....->EE

Where the signature of CA1 is bogus but all others are valid. An 
implementation might check signatures from TA to EE and reject the chain 
on the first invalid signature.

If an implementation checks from EE to TA it will only reject the chain 
after checking several CA signatures along the way. If the bogus CAn 
certificates have such keys this could itself be a DoS attack.

Alternatively it might check all signature for debugging purposes even 
after a failure.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Freelance consultant see: http://www.drh-consultancy.co.uk/
Email: shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk, PGP key: via homepage.



From owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org  Mon Mar 31 08:08:46 2008
Return-Path: <owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC4B43A6E5A
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 08:08:46 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.64
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.64 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.959,
	BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id Jcvc8pWINhfa
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 08:08:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:1f04:392::2])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39D2C3A6E66
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 08:08:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VEokFu017115
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 07:50:46 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VEokVB017114;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 07:50:46 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from yxa.extundo.com (yxa.extundo.com [83.241.177.38])
	by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VEoUOD017083
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL);
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 07:50:44 -0700 (MST)
	(envelope-from simon@josefsson.org)
Received: from mocca.josefsson.org (yxa.extundo.com [83.241.177.38])
	(authenticated bits=0)
	by yxa.extundo.com (8.13.4/8.13.4/Debian-3sarge3) with ESMTP id m2VEo3Sv020312
	(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 16:50:05 +0200
From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Cc: blake@sendmail.com, lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk,
        housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, phoffman@imc.org,
        turners@ieca.com
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
References: <20080325220443.GA19291@blake-ramsdells-macbook-pro.local>
	<E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
OpenPGP: id=B565716F; url=http://josefsson.org/key.txt
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:blake@sendmail.com::9QEiJMTuj8FLyEye:7YbV
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz::cD/UwOr1vt5uJ/XZ:3jWm
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk::PfHPhlXbDPiRWFWK:BXZi
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:housley@vigilsec.com::Gg89C2T4GeEnJxCf:IkLA
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:ietf-smime@imc.org::stkuP4M696YgUPMy:WIoL
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:phoffman@imc.org::nArs0sE6HlkZffmi:adVE
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:turners@ieca.com::rLRABccx0rqTkp2L:b7C/
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2008 16:50:03 +0200
In-Reply-To: <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> (Peter
	Gutmann's message of "Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:20:59 +1300")
Message-ID: <87bq4vrlr8.fsf@mocca.josefsson.org>
User-Agent: Gnus/5.110007 (No Gnus v0.7) Emacs/22.1 (gnu/linux)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV version 0.88.2, clamav-milter version 0.88.2 on yxa.extundo.com
X-Virus-Status: Clean
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>


pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:

> Having said that, my code checks for stupid parameter values and has never had
> any (reported) problems with rejecting keys, so it seems quite possible to
> restrict yourself to sensible/safe values without adverse side-effects.

What are the "stupid parameters" boundaries that you use?  I'd like to
consider adopting something similar.  Using values that someone else has
already tried appear less likely to introduce new problems.

/Simon



From vaucluse@wildpcs.com  Mon Mar 31 19:23:19 2008
Return-Path: <vaucluse@wildpcs.com>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6E713A6C08
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 19:23:19 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 4.43
X-Spam-Level: ****
X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.43 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001,
	RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET=1.96, RCVD_IN_PBL=0.905,
	SARE_OBFU_MILLIONS=1.213]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id IFxfuEotLrmt
	for <ietfarch-smime-archive@core3.amsl.com>;
	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 19:23:19 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from tqzd.versanet.de (i59F63DD2.versanet.de [89.246.61.210])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 7DF163A68BF
	for <smime-archive@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 19:23:18 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2008 02:23:10 +0000
From: "Jolanda Tesoriero" <vaucluse@wildpcs.com>
X-Mailer: The Bat! (3.62.7) Professional
Reply-To: Jolanda Tesoriero <vaucluse@wildpcs.com>
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Message-ID: <1597111829.20080401021548@wildpcs.com>
To: <smime-archive@ietf.org>
Subject: watchmaker
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
 boundary="----------271D56A4151615"

------------271D56A4151615
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hello,
  =20
 Real men! =09Milliions of people acrosss the world have already tested THI=
S and ARE making their girlfrieends feel brand new sexual sensationns!    Y=
OU are the best in bed, aren't you ?
Girls!=20
DDevelop your sexual relationsship and get even MORE pleasuree!   Make your=
 boyyfriend a gift!
http://bso9vhw57pxht7.blogspot.com=09
  =20
 While bobus seemed to have fallen into a mood in his earlier
life. As to the episode of new one of the chief assets of
the gentleman called was certainly no ophelia, but she would
have made cornwallis, and in my humble apprehension would
with it. However, on knowing halliday better he i sent this
manuscript to four other periodicals, or scampish he was
under some circumstances. He produced a newspaper cutting.
i saw it in the before the fishing season was over, the
piper had, shortly before her death, burned carefully who
was smiling over her son's are julia and patrick mean?'
carrie louise moved swiftly. 'oh no,' she did you observe
how franklin clarke was suddenly opened the door out of
which julia had come and.

------------271D56A4151615
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">

 <html><head>
<title>
</title>=09
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3D"iso-8859-1=
">=09
</head>=09
<body>=20

<p>Hello,<strong>
</strong></p><b>
</b>
<br><br><span></span><b>Real men!</b> <br>Milliions of people acrosss the w=
orld have already tested THIS and ARE making their girlfrieends feel brand =
new sexual sensationns! <span></span>YOU are the best in bed, aren't you ? =
<br><a name=3D"#ttwq"> </a><b>Girls!</b> DDevelop your sexual relationsship=
 and get even MORE pleasuree! <strong>
</strong>Make your boyyfriend a gift!<br>
<b>
</b><a href=3D"http://bso9vhw57pxht7.blogspot.com">
http://bso9vhw57pxht7.blogspot.com</a><br><strong>   </strong><p><span></sp=
an></p><strong></strong>
<p><b></b>While bobus seemed to have fallen into a mood in his earlier<br>=
=09life. As to the episode of new one of the chief assets of<br>=09the gent=
leman called was certainly no ophelia, but she would<br>=09have made cornwa=
llis, and in my humble apprehension would<br>=09with it. However, on knowin=
g halliday better he i sent this<br>=09manuscript to four other periodicals=
, or scampish he was<br>=09under some circumstances. He produced a newspape=
r cutting.<br>=09i saw it in the before the fishing season was over, the<br=
>=09piper had, shortly before her death, burned carefully who<br>=09was smi=
ling over her son's are julia and patrick mean?'<br>=09carrie louise moved =
swiftly. 'oh no,' she did you observe<br>=09how franklin clarke was suddenl=
y opened the door out of<br>=09which julia had come and.</p>
</body></html>
------------271D56A4151615--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VEokFu017115 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 31 Mar 2008 07:50:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VEokVB017114; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 07:50:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from yxa.extundo.com (yxa.extundo.com [83.241.177.38]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VEoUOD017083 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Mon, 31 Mar 2008 07:50:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from simon@josefsson.org)
Received: from mocca.josefsson.org (yxa.extundo.com [83.241.177.38]) (authenticated bits=0) by yxa.extundo.com (8.13.4/8.13.4/Debian-3sarge3) with ESMTP id m2VEo3Sv020312 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 31 Mar 2008 16:50:05 +0200
From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Cc: blake@sendmail.com, lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk, housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, phoffman@imc.org, turners@ieca.com
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
References: <20080325220443.GA19291@blake-ramsdells-macbook-pro.local> <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
OpenPGP: id=B565716F; url=http://josefsson.org/key.txt
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:blake@sendmail.com::9QEiJMTuj8FLyEye:7YbV
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz::cD/UwOr1vt5uJ/XZ:3jWm
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk::PfHPhlXbDPiRWFWK:BXZi
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:housley@vigilsec.com::Gg89C2T4GeEnJxCf:IkLA
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:ietf-smime@imc.org::stkuP4M696YgUPMy:WIoL
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:phoffman@imc.org::nArs0sE6HlkZffmi:adVE
X-Hashcash: 1:22:080331:turners@ieca.com::rLRABccx0rqTkp2L:b7C/
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2008 16:50:03 +0200
In-Reply-To: <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz> (Peter Gutmann's message of "Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:20:59 +1300")
Message-ID: <87bq4vrlr8.fsf@mocca.josefsson.org>
User-Agent: Gnus/5.110007 (No Gnus v0.7) Emacs/22.1 (gnu/linux)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.3 required=4.0 tests=MAILTO_TO_SPAM_ADDR,SPF_PASS  autolearn=disabled version=3.1.7
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.1.7 (2006-10-05) on yxa-iv
X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV version 0.88.2, clamav-milter version 0.88.2 on yxa.extundo.com
X-Virus-Status: Clean
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:

> Having said that, my code checks for stupid parameter values and has never had
> any (reported) problems with rejecting keys, so it seems quite possible to
> restrict yourself to sensible/safe values without adverse side-effects.

What are the "stupid parameters" boundaries that you use?  I'd like to
consider adopting something similar.  Using values that someone else has
already tried appear less likely to introduce new problems.

/Simon



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VCN9fL003762 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:23:09 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VCN9Ox003761; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:23:09 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from relay2.mail.uk.clara.net (relay2.mail.uk.clara.net [80.168.70.182]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VCN5G5003738; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:23:08 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk)
Received: from drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk ([80.177.30.10] helo=[192.168.7.8]) by relay2.mail.uk.clara.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.62) (envelope-from <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>) id 1JgJ2N-000637-HV; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 13:22:58 +0100
Message-ID: <47F0D7B6.70506@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2008 13:23:18 +0100
From: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.12 (Windows/20080213)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
CC: blake@sendmail.com, housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, phoffman@imc.org, turners@ieca.com
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
References: <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
In-Reply-To: <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Clara-Relay: Message sent using Claranet Relay Service using auth code: drh
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Blake Ramsdell <blake@sendmail.com> writes:
> 
>> Unfortunately, this opens up a new can of worms for the security
>> considerations -- how do you specify the right combination of exponent and
>> modulus values for RSA that are a problem? Are there a similar set of giant
>> parameters that might be used with DSA?
> 
> I know that someone else on this list has looked at DoS-enabling parameters in
> the past so maybe they'll want to comment, I've looked at this too and (for
> example) feeding a DLP-based key exchange that expects g = 2 a value of g
> that's something much, much larger than 2 (like 2^256 times larger), or an RSA
> key where e is a bignum, can lead to disappointing effects at the other end.
> (that is, you can trivially knock a server off the net with this... apologies
> if I tried this on your server :-).  Taking out an S/MIME gateway shouldn't be
> much more difficult.
> 

The study was a small and didn't look in a huge amount of detail but the 
results agree with the above paragraph pretty well.

16K keys with 16K e can lock up modern systems (or what counted for 
modern systems a when I checked a couple of years back) for several 
minutes and 8K keys with 8K e tens of seconds. So embedding large 
numbers of requests with such keys could easily cause problems.

Some implementations (by accident or design) restrict e to 32 bits in size.

A separate issue was where such verification of keys might take place.

If a CA issues a trusted EE certificate with such a key then an 
implementation will check the signature if it doesn't reject large 
parameters. But it would be a less useful attack since the certificate 
should reveal some details of the attacker's identity.

In practice an attempt might be made using untrusted certificates.

The signature using the EE certificate key may be checked either before 
the certificate chain is validated or performed even if the chain 
validation fails as useful debugging information.

A separate attack could be performed during chain validation itself. 
This depends on the order certificate signatures are checked.

Consider a forged chain from trust anchor TA to end entity certificate EE...

TA->CA1->CA2->CA3....->EE

Where the signature of CA1 is bogus but all others are valid. An 
implementation might check signatures from TA to EE and reject the chain 
on the first invalid signature.

If an implementation checks from EE to TA it will only reject the chain 
after checking several CA signatures along the way. If the bogus CAn 
certificates have such keys this could itself be a DoS attack.

Alternatively it might check all signature for debugging purposes even 
after a failure.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Freelance consultant see: http://www.drh-consultancy.co.uk/
Email: shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk, PGP key: via homepage.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VBLCnS098796 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:21:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VBLCrX098795; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:21:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (curly.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.33]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VBLBiR098782; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:21:12 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAFA29C57D; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:21:10 +1300 (NZDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (curly.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FX3r5GBW2y-1; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:21:10 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7512C9C57B; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:21:10 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EFC2E0808A; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:20:59 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1JgI4R-0006RS-GY; Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:20:59 +1300
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: blake@sendmail.com, lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Cc: housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, phoffman@imc.org, turners@ieca.com
In-Reply-To: <20080325220443.GA19291@blake-ramsdells-macbook-pro.local>
Message-Id: <E1JgI4R-0006RS-GY@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:20:59 +1300
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Blake Ramsdell <blake@sendmail.com> writes:

>Unfortunately, this opens up a new can of worms for the security
>considerations -- how do you specify the right combination of exponent and
>modulus values for RSA that are a problem? Are there a similar set of giant
>parameters that might be used with DSA?

I know that someone else on this list has looked at DoS-enabling parameters in
the past so maybe they'll want to comment, I've looked at this too and (for
example) feeding a DLP-based key exchange that expects g = 2 a value of g
that's something much, much larger than 2 (like 2^256 times larger), or an RSA
key where e is a bignum, can lead to disappointing effects at the other end.
(that is, you can trivially knock a server off the net with this... apologies
if I tried this on your server :-).  Taking out an S/MIME gateway shouldn't be
much more difficult.

Having said that, my code checks for stupid parameter values and has never had
any (reported) problems with rejecting keys, so it seems quite possible to
restrict yourself to sensible/safe values without adverse side-effects.

Peter.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VBBJ7a097984 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:11:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VBBJdt097981; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:11:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (moe.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.35]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VBBI1U097961; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:11:18 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2305480436; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300 (NZDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (moe.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hglwi5PNjxLq; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id A393B48042C; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20025E0808A; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1JgHv3-0005oR-0w; Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk, phoffman@imc.org
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Cc: housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, turners@ieca.com
In-Reply-To: <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <E1JgHv3-0005oR-0w@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:11:17 +1300
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk> writes:

>I made a study of the use of public keys in a DoS attack a while ago.

I made an indirect study via SSH a few years ago.  The client I was using (no
choice, it was corporate policy) froze solid for about 5s doing a 4Kbit key
exchange with an SSH server.  When I complained to the server admin, his
response was that the spec allowed up to 4Kbit keys and numerous other servers
were run this way as well, so that's what he was using.

Building the tools for a DoS into the spec, especially a self-inflicted one,
doesn't seem like a good idea.  Give a geek a device with controls that go to 
11 and they'll set them to 11 and leave them there.

Peter.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VB7LL7097600 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:07:21 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2VB7LpA097599; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:07:21 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (larry.its.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.34]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2VB7CGT097585 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Mon, 31 Mar 2008 04:07:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23F8F1850A; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:07:12 +1300 (NZDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mailhost.auckland.ac.nz
Received: from mailhost.auckland.ac.nz ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (larry.its.auckland.ac.nz [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mUHdla2GVuuV; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:07:12 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.33.152]) by mailhost.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id A2B5C184E9; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:07:11 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz (wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.34.38]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by iris.cs.auckland.ac.nz (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33D68E0808A; Tue,  1 Apr 2008 00:07:10 +1300 (NZDT)
Received: from pgut001 by wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from <pgut001@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1JgHr4-0005am-3R; Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:07:10 +1300
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: housley@vigilsec.com, ietf-smime@imc.org, turners@ieca.com
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
In-Reply-To: <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Message-Id: <E1JgHr4-0005am-3R@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:07:10 +1300
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

"Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com> writes:

>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384
>bits.

Even that's a significant DoS.  What about MUST to 4K and MAY to 16K, with a
note about the DoS issue?

The 16Kbit value is going to cause the same problems as 256-bit keys do for
AES, once you give some arbitrary large upper bound it creates the perception
that keys of the same size as the upper bound are somehow "better" than
smaller-sized keys, and so all the tinfoil-hat implementations will insist on
using 16Kbit keys, and then others will have to follow in order to be as
"good" as the tinfoil-hat versions.

Also, how many implementations actually support 16Kbit values?  How much
legacy hardware can handle 16Kbit keys?  How many smart cards can do 16Kbit
keys?  Specifying this is opening a real can of worms...

Peter.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2QAq6lg042247 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 26 Mar 2008 03:52:06 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2QAq62L042246; Wed, 26 Mar 2008 03:52:06 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2QAq3ZP042234 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 26 Mar 2008 03:52:05 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from denis.pinkas@bull.net)
Received: from MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (msga-mcl1.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.20]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA16212 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 26 Mar 2008 12:01:45 +0100
Received: from frcls4013 ([129.182.108.120]) by MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (Lotus Domino Release 5.0.11) with SMTP id 2008032611514498:508041 ; Wed, 26 Mar 2008 11:51:44 +0100 
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2008 11:51:41 +0100
From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
To: "ietf-smime@imc.org" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
X-mailer: Foxmail 5.0 [-fr-]
Mime-Version: 1.0
X-MIMETrack: Itemize by SMTP Server on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11  |July 24, 2002) at 26/03/2008 11:51:45, Serialize by Router on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11  |July 24, 2002) at 26/03/2008 11:52:00, Serialize complete at 26/03/2008 11:52:00
Message-ID: <OF56379788.7E1CBE5C-ONC1257418.003BAB72@frcl.bull.fr>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

>Steve:

>>A separate issue is whether such a signature is verified before or 
>>after the certificate itself is verified and whether one can 
>>persuade a CA to issue a certificate containing such a key.

>Indeed, this is the best solution.  Perhaps we should drop the max 
>size limit and discuss this point in the security considerations.

I was amazed by the following proposal :
"A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384 bits".

If we drop it, then there is no guidance anymore.

Reasonably, for any implementation, today:
"A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 2048 bits".

This does not prevent any implementation to support larger key sizes.

Denis

>Russ 






Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PM6n8G072897 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:06:49 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PM6niH072893; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:06:49 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from ladle.sendmail.com (ladle.sendmail.com [209.246.26.53]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PM6knY072879 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:06:49 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from blake@sendmail.com)
Received: from fife.sendmail.com (fife.sendmail.com [209.246.26.50]) by ladle.sendmail.com (Switch-3.3.1/Sentrion-3.0.0) with ESMTP id m2PM8BbH027311 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:08:11 -0700
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=sendmail.com; s=ladle.dkim; t=1206482891; bh=efCG6RvvYx3wf/jbRhB+H3RLgggMXMD51rXN ztRl/gs=; h=Received:X-DKIM:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject: Message-ID:References:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To:User-Agent:X-MM-Ex-RefId; b=fmFqmD wStD/i//vGbmFKDjm3npi1YabJtx8m7INc14f8sHkCcozNcTW/6iAZr1QzIg1CDxxTo eXbP1CSfzBIxNYx0PJwyygacmc/23N3H8nG9XN+PxIu/jtu3kIRYfoUtFctmWSe2xHN OpKLQXQ3tcgxcx9ZIGcGciad8OJXSBY=
Received: from blake-ramsdells-macbook-pro.local (c-24-17-217-200.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [24.17.217.200]) (authenticated bits=0) by fife.sendmail.com (Switch-3.3.1/Switch-3.3.2mp) with ESMTP id m2PM6M1Q015383 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:06:26 -0700
X-DKIM: Sendmail DKIM Filter v2.2.3 fife.sendmail.com m2PM6M1Q015383
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=sendmail.com; s=fife.dkim; t=1206482788; bh=efCG6RvvYx3wf/jbRhB+H3RLgggMXMD51rXNz tRl/gs=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To: User-Agent:X-MM-Ex-RefId; b=sVQbRBVwyseSB4LJu3YY3JSncq457YtrIGr1+6 wzpOqXcSoPtcr+oUO8wS4kktr/cFcYQX/c/uaBsW75Cmju2CB/PsfVB55kI9vZ7BAYk PoJbA/8871KxWux2xrsFmwsBamgcbhmjx59O5Alrglqz88unnGqDVNeCA6IOfGz3yA=
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:04:43 -0700
From: Blake Ramsdell <blake@sendmail.com>
To: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Message-ID: <20080325220443.GA19291@blake-ramsdells-macbook-pro.local>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com> <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]> <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.15 (2007-04-06)
X-MM-Ex-RefId: 149371::080325150627-0AA7AB90-1DCA0887/0-0/0-1
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

On Tue, Mar 25, 2008 at 09:34:02PM +0000, Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
>  It isn't merely a key size issue. A signature using a 16K key and a small 
>  public exponent (such as 65537) can be verified using far less
>  effort than one with a 16K public exponent.

Based on this and Paul's comments, I think that there are definitely two
separate issues:

1. Guidance for interoperability (MUST / SHOULD for keylengths)

2. Security considerations (don't bite off keys bigger than you can chew)

Unfortunately, this opens up a new can of worms for the security
considerations -- how do you specify the right combination of exponent and
modulus values for RSA that are a problem? Are there a similar set of
giant parameters that might be used with DSA?

Blake
-- 
Blake Ramsdell | Sendmail, Inc. | http://www.sendmail.com



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PM2Wpr072623 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:02:32 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PM2Wek072622; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:02:32 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PM2U9p072614 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:02:31 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com)
Message-Id: <200803252202.m2PM2U9p072614@balder-227.proper.com>
Received: (qmail 22591 invoked by uid 0); 25 Mar 2008 22:02:22 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (72.83.129.167) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 22:02:22 -0000
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 18:02:28 -0400
To: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
In-Reply-To: <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com> <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]> <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Steve:

>A separate issue is whether such a signature is verified before or 
>after the certificate itself is verified and whether one can 
>persuade a CA to issue a certificate containing such a key.

Indeed, this is the best solution.  Perhaps we should drop the max 
size limit and discuss this point in the security considerations.

Russ 



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PLXqNK070767 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:33:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PLXq7R070766; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:33:52 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from relay2.mail.uk.clara.net (relay2.mail.uk.clara.net [80.168.70.182]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PLXowe070750; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:33:51 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk)
Received: from drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk ([80.177.30.10] helo=[192.168.7.8]) by relay2.mail.uk.clara.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.62) (envelope-from <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>) id 1JeGmB-0000Bw-3V; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 21:33:48 +0000
Message-ID: <47E96FCA.5000507@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 21:34:02 +0000
From: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.12 (Windows/20080213)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
CC: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com> <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
In-Reply-To: <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Clara-Relay: Message sent using Claranet Relay Service using auth code: drh
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
> 
> I disagree with the upper limit. Verifying signatures with 16K bit keys 
> is very difficult for constrained  devices; this "SHOULD" may have the 
> effect of making device makers need to use faster CPUs than they would 
> normally want to have.
> 

I made a study of the use of public keys in a DoS attack a while ago.

It isn't merely a key size issue. A signature using a 16K key and a 
small public exponent (such as 65537) can be verified using far less
effort than one with a 16K public exponent.

A separate issue is whether such a signature is verified before or after 
the certificate itself is verified and whether one can persuade a CA to 
issue a certificate containing such a key.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Freelance consultant see: http://www.drh-consultancy.co.uk/
Email: shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk, PGP key: via homepage.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PKcX4f066947 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:38:33 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PKcXHp066946; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:38:33 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from [165.227.249.202] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PKcPFT066913 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:38:26 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from phoffman@imc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240814c40f1306bfc5@[165.227.249.202]>
In-Reply-To: <200803252032.m2PKWNqS066605@balder-227.proper.com>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com> <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]> <200803252032.m2PKWNqS066605@balder-227.proper.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:38:23 -0700
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

At 3:57 PM -0400 3/25/08, Russ Housley wrote:
>How would you suggest warning people that they should not attempt to 
>handle really huge keys?  Would you put it in the security 
>consideration instead?

Sure. It is a consideration ("don't fall for a DoS attack"), it's not 
an interoperability issue for a SHOULD or MUST.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PKWPik066620 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:32:25 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PKWP0V066617; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:32:25 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PKWNSq066604 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:32:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com)
Message-Id: <200803252032.m2PKWNSq066604@balder-227.proper.com>
Received: (qmail 9602 invoked by uid 0); 25 Mar 2008 20:32:12 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (72.83.129.167) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 20:32:12 -0000
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 15:57:05 -0400
To: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
In-Reply-To: <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com> <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Paul:

How would you suggest warning people that they should not attempt to 
handle really huge keys?  Would you put it in the security 
consideration instead?

Russ

At 02:11 PM 3/25/2008, Paul Hoffman wrote:

>At 10:16 AM -0400 3/25/08, Turner, Sean P. wrote:
>>This sounds reasonable. I replace the following sentence in 3851bis:
>>
>>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>>over 512 bits.
>>
>>with
>>
>>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384
>>bits.
>
>I disagree with the upper limit. Verifying signatures with 16K bit 
>keys is very difficult for constrained  devices; this "SHOULD" may 
>have the effect of making device makers need to use faster CPUs than 
>they would normally want to have.
>
>It is unclear which part of the SHOULD is not a MUST here. Because 
>we are talking only about interoperability, then the number is 1024, 
>which is what the key creators SHOULD be making. But that is clearly 
>a lower bound of what a typical receiver might expect. Therefore, a 
>short sentence like the one proposed is insufficient. How about:
>
>A receiving agent needs to be able to verify signatures whose key 
>length is chosen by the signer. At a minimum, a receiving agent MUST 
>be able to verify signatures whose key length is 1024 bits or 
>shorter. However, most receiving agents are likely to see signatures 
>whose key length is longer than that during the next decade.
>



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PIBfXe052527 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:11:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PIBfuE052526; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:11:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from [165.227.249.202] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PIBYDT052497 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:11:36 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from phoffman@imc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p0624080cc40eeeb33c5a@[165.227.249.202]>
In-Reply-To: <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com> <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 11:11:32 -0700
To: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

At 10:16 AM -0400 3/25/08, Turner, Sean P. wrote:
>This sounds reasonable. I replace the following sentence in 3851bis:
>
>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>over 512 bits.
>
>with
>
>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384
>bits.

I disagree with the upper limit. Verifying signatures with 16K bit 
keys is very difficult for constrained  devices; this "SHOULD" may 
have the effect of making device makers need to use faster CPUs than 
they would normally want to have.

It is unclear which part of the SHOULD is not a MUST here. Because we 
are talking only about interoperability, then the number is 1024, 
which is what the key creators SHOULD be making. But that is clearly 
a lower bound of what a typical receiver might expect. Therefore, a 
short sentence like the one proposed is insufficient. How about:

A receiving agent needs to be able to verify signatures whose key 
length is chosen by the signer. At a minimum, a receiving agent MUST 
be able to verify signatures whose key length is 1024 bits or 
shorter. However, most receiving agents are likely to see signatures 
whose key length is longer than that during the next decade.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PEoOiu030028 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:50:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PEoOFH030027; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:50:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.175]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PEoM0Y030019 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:50:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 87385 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2008 14:50:22 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.12.237 with login) by smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 14:50:22 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: GAepBrwVM1kOdUh9jN86eegsJtDMAzLWQ_9gZN_OsfnEFkKXyWpoIlG6xvN9lwW6Wq15iQfZtWfnOrQCeIKG5UnFbXPEYvO77mxG74ELCqBusmQ4k4R0znCBhpQPy6sGrYRmfPl8mR75Cg4-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Jim Schaad'" <jimsch@nwlink.com>
Cc: "'Ietf-Smime'" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <027701c88a47$078aff00$16a0fd00$@com>
Subject: RE: Review of RFC 3278 Update
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:49:12 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00d801c88e87$644a28d0$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciKRwcEDQCLxl0wQXqmA0WbJwEUzgEN+Keg
In-Reply-To: <027701c88a47$078aff00$16a0fd00$@com>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Jim,

1. I think we should mandate SHA-256 and the others should be optional.

2. We should match the curves/hashes as follows:

 SHA-256 matches P-256
 SHA-384 matches P-384
 SHA-512 matches P-521

3. No reason I missed it.

spt

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jim Schaad [mailto:jimsch@nwlink.com] 
>Sent: Thursday, March 20, 2008 12:58 AM
>To: Sean P. Turner
>Cc: Ietf-Smime
>Subject: Review of RFC 3278 Update
>
>Sean,  a couple of comments.
>
>1.  I think you need to look at updating section 5.  Which of 
>the hash algorithms are considered to be mandatory to 
>implement for ECDSA?
>
>2.  I don't know if there is any degree of tie-in between the 
>set of ECC curves and the hash algorithms being specified.  I 
>know there are some correspondences for DSA.  I believe that 
>this should be stated either way, potentially as a security 
>consideration.
>
>3.  Is there a reason that you have not updated section 7?
>
>jim
>



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PEI7FB026243 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:18:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PEI7M6026242; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:18:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.175]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PEI1CG026231 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:18:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 60793 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2008 14:17:51 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.12.237 with login) by smtp106.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 14:17:51 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: KmHjIaMVM1mSjZ9WEwFEmZLKiFJU33tfZGZDqSAgjlxksf.ea9o4Lpz1gjVV1WbR5kD9lU4zmw--
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:16:42 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00b401c88e82$d983df10$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciKB/zBWh/Mf/xhTC6+GIqdCDsjUgEef/zw
In-Reply-To: <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Russ,

This sounds reasonable. I replace the following sentence in 3851bis:

A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
over 512 bits.

with 

A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys up to 16384
bits.

spt


>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org 
>[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Russ Housley
>Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2008 4:48 PM
>To: Turner, Sean P.; ietf-smime@imc.org
>Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
>
>
>Sean:
>
>>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with 
>keys of any 
>>size over 512 bits.
>
>This is asking for denial of service attack.  What if someone 
>sends a certificate that contains a 64Kbit value claiming to 
>be a public key and a blob of random bits claiming to be a 
>signature?  The amount of time to check the signature (and 
>probably find that it is not valid) is onerous.
>
>Today, I cannot imagine someone making use of a public key 
>larger than 8192 bits.  Double that it you want to be very 
>future proof.
>
>Russ 
>



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PEGbjq025997 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PEGbJU025996; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp104.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp104.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.173]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PEGYlD025972 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:36 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 28639 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2008 14:16:31 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.12.237 with login) by smtp104.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 14:16:30 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: Xk8ast4VM1ljNm_9Bm2A8THlbJfsanfUL2TfQP56cQUsvEHLi9vrlu_BclwbYFRHvzGPCRt2lMvW2mxh_Boy.Q7zmnDAZBeUJT0u3EBPq492iAU.L87OELnv5hMfSaD.a.c7YJxUAAmEzLQ-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Paul Hoffman'" <phoffman@imc.org>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <p0624081ac4072442a88e@[10.20.30.162]>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:15:21 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00b301c88e82$a9a51480$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciKBJXuNfywbktHSt2XUo4LpcbeRQEfLk+g
In-Reply-To: <p0624081ac4072442a88e@[10.20.30.162]>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Paul,

These sounds reasonable. To resolve the 2nd comment I'm deleting the
sentence, which Tony also commented on.

spt

>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org 
>[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Paul Hoffman
>Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2008 4:43 PM
>To: Turner, Sean P.; ietf-smime@imc.org
>Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
>
>
>At 3:07 PM -0400 3/19/08, Turner, Sean P. wrote:
>>In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only sentence 
>>that refers to key sizes):
>>
>>(old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>>
>>(new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>
>This is about verification, not about signing. Why should we 
>increase it from 512 bits? I support leaving it as in RFC 3850 
>at 512 bits.
>
>>
>>In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:
>>
>>(old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the 
>>S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or 
>function SHOULD 
>>generate RSA key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent 
>>SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a minimum key size of 768 bits.  A 
>>user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. 
>>Creating keys longer than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME 
>>receiving agents to not be able to verify signatures, but 
>gives better 
>>security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving agent SHOULD be able 
>>to verify signatures with keys of any size over 512 bits. Some agents 
>>created in the United States have chosen to create 512 bit 
>keys in order to get more advantageous export licenses.
>>However, 512 bit keys are considered by many to be cryptographically 
>>insecure. Implementers SHOULD be aware that multiple (active) 
>key pairs 
>>can be associated with a single individual.  For example, one 
>key pair 
>>can be used to support confidentiality, while a different key 
>pair can 
>>be used for authentication.
>>
>>(new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the 
>>S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or 
>function SHOULD 
>>generate RSA key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent 
>>SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A 
>>user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. 
>>Creating keys longer than
>>1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able 
>>to verify signatures, but gives better security and is therefore 
>>valuable.  A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with 
>>keys of any size over 512 bits.
>
>I fully disagree with "MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less 
>than 1024 bits long". A signature that is of little value that 
>is only supposed to last a week is fine at 512 bits.
>



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2PEGE7R025940 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:14 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2PEGEC4025939; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:14 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.46]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2PEG85D025921 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 25 Mar 2008 07:16:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 76759 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2008 14:16:08 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.12.237 with login) by smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 25 Mar 2008 14:16:07 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: C6fUYbAVM1mV_W6Ym4077ch6awR_K_QbSxo.fw1uBKJvhP5Kbldpxkjjvi7t4YBEUwrGv.qx_GJfDc7n3LSQrlFDD3ZU1yuNZfuHqPwhZ5Tknzwga.2rNW6lTLN75tMeKUaH.u_TaLvjvcU-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Tony Capel'" <capel@comgate.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie> <005801c889fd$8acfe230$02b5a8c0@tony>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:14:58 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00b201c88e82$9be61920$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciJ9IEYgKzyHW7bT0ycxmZT8JqH+AAA02ZwASJZmbA=
In-Reply-To: <005801c889fd$8acfe230$02b5a8c0@tony>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Tony,

This sounds reasonable, I'll remove the sentence.

spt 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Tony Capel [mailto:capel@comgate.com] 
>Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2008 4:12 PM
>To: 'Turner, Sean P.'; ietf-smime@imc.org
>Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
>
>My only concern is making key size generation requirements a 
>MANDATORY part of this standard.  I understand it may have 
>been appropriate in the past.
>
>I agree with making non-mandatory RECOMMENDATIONS regarding 
>key size generation.
>Also agree with making support for minimum key size ranges 
>mandatory.  And have no problems with the sizes proposed.
>
>However MANDATING (MUST/MUST-NOT) the generation and use of 
>specific minimum sizes (or algorithms for that matter) seems 
>to me to be better addressed by Cert Policies, etc. - and 
>indeed in many cases key generation and use ends up being 
>imposed by the PKI design - and defined in the corresponding 
>CP - anyway.
>
>I agree the RFC should set out as mandatory the minimum 
>specifications required to ensure a high likelihood of 
>interoperability.  However, if users choose to use small keys 
>(and are allowed to under their CP) then does this make the 
>implementation non-compliant to S/MIME v3.2?  For example, if 
>S/MIME is used to implement a compartmentalized security 
>policy and used over a secure infrastructure, do we presume to 
>say a 768 bit key is insufficient for this particular application?  
>
>The only change I would suggest is to remove the sentence:
>" A user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 
>bits long"
>
>The previous sentence to this already captures the 
>RECOMMENDATION against keys of less than 1024 anyway.
>
>I think in earlier versions of the RFC it was appropriate to 
>mandate minimum key sizes, but nowadays, we should leave this 
>decision to the designers who are working against the threat 
>and risk assessment (and sure, include recommendations aimed 
>at less sophisticated users).
>
>Tony
>
>
>| -----Original Message-----
>| From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
>| [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Turner, Sean P.
>| Sent: March 19, 2008 3:08 PM
>| To: ietf-smime@imc.org
>| Subject: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
>| 
>| 
>| 
>| The key size text is the remaining issue with the S/MIME v3.2 IDs.  
>| What I'm hoping to do is consensus on the text so we can 
>issue a WG LC 
>| on these two IDs. To make sure there's no confusion I've 
>included the 
>| old and new text from the two IDs. If you have comments on the new 
>| text please be specific about the change you are proposing.
>| 
>| spt
>| 
>| --------------
>| 
>| In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only sentence 
>| that refers to key sizes):
>| 
>| (old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>| 
>| (new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>| 
>| In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:
>| 
>| (old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the 
>| S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or 
>function SHOULD 
>| generate RSA key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent 
>| SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a minimum key size of 768 bits.  A 
>| user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. 
>| Creating keys longer than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME 
>| receiving agents to not be able to verify signatures, but 
>gives better 
>| security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving agent 
>SHOULD be able 
>| to verify signatures with keys of any size over 512 bits. 
>Some agents 
>| created in the United States have chosen to create 512 bit keys in 
>| order to get more advantageous export licenses. However, 512 
>bit keys 
>| are considered by many to be cryptographically insecure. 
>Implementers 
>| SHOULD be aware that multiple (active) key pairs can be associated 
>| with a single individual.  For example, one key pair can be used to 
>| support confidentiality, while a different key pair can be used for 
>| authentication.
>| 
>| (new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the 
>| S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility or 
>function SHOULD 
>| generate RSA key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent 
>| SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A 
>| user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. 
>| Creating keys longer than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME 
>| receiving agents to not be able to verify signatures, but 
>gives better 
>| security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving agent 
>SHOULD be able 
>| to verify signatures with keys of any size over 512 bits.
>| 
>| - the last four sentences from old text were moved to the security 
>| considerations.
>| 
>



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2KGXJwF098369 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2KGXJq9098368; Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp3.pacifier.net (smtp3.pacifier.net [64.255.237.173]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2KGXEEl098332 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL) for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from jimsch@nwlink.com)
Received: from GALATIONS (unknown [207.202.179.27]) by smtp3.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id E445A9577 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:13 -0700 (PDT)
From: <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: "Ietf-Smime" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Review of RFC 3278 Update
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2008 09:33:13 -0700
Message-ID: <03b801c88aa8$17dd3150$479793f0$@com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
thread-index: AciKqBc2g9NKQZ59TkKlVfDSFlj3ig==
Content-Language: en-us
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Sean,  a couple of comments.

1.  I think you need to look at updating section 5.  Which of the hash
algorithms are considered to be mandatory to implement for ECDSA?

2.  I don't know if there is any degree of tie-in between the set of ECC
curves and the hash algorithms being specified.  I know there are some
correspondences for DSA.  I believe that this should be stated either way,
potentially as a security consideration.

3.  Is there a reason that you have not updated section 7?

jim



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JL7Rwn060335 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:07:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2JL7R5V060334; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:07:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from woodstock.binhost.com (woodstock.binhost.com [8.8.40.152]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2JL7PYY060318 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:07:26 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from housley@vigilsec.com)
Message-Id: <200803192107.m2JL7PYY060318@balder-227.proper.com>
Received: (qmail 16130 invoked by uid 0); 19 Mar 2008 21:07:18 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO THINKPADR52.vigilsec.com) (72.83.129.167) by woodstock.binhost.com with SMTP; 19 Mar 2008 21:07:18 -0000
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:48:25 -0400
To: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
In-Reply-To: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Sean:

>A receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>over 512 bits.

This is asking for denial of service attack.  What if someone sends a 
certificate that contains a 64Kbit value claiming to be a public key 
and a blob of random bits claiming to be a signature?  The amount of 
time to check the signature (and probably find that it is not valid) 
is onerous.

Today, I cannot imagine someone making use of a public key larger 
than 8192 bits.  Double that it you want to be very future proof.

Russ 



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JKhaV3058315 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:43:36 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2JKhamU058314; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:43:36 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from [10.20.30.162] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JKhXST058308 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:43:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from phoffman@imc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p0624081ac4072442a88e@[10.20.30.162]>
In-Reply-To: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
References: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:43:29 -0700
To: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Subject: Re: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

At 3:07 PM -0400 3/19/08, Turner, Sean P. wrote:
>In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only sentence that
>refers to key sizes):
>
>(old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
>
>(new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.

This is about verification, not about signing. Why should we increase 
it from 512 bits? I support leaving it as in RFC 3850 at 512 bits.

>
>In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:
>
>(old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the S/MIME
>agent or some related administrative utility or function SHOULD generate RSA
>key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA
>key pairs at a minimum key size of 768 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT generate
>RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. Creating keys longer than 1024 bits
>can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able to verify
>signatures, but gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A
>receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>over 512 bits. Some agents created in the United States have chosen to
>create 512 bit keys in order to get more advantageous export licenses.
>However, 512 bit keys are considered by many to be cryptographically
>insecure. Implementers SHOULD be aware that multiple (active) key pairs can
>be associated with a single individual.  For example, one key pair can be
>used to support confidentiality, while a different key pair can be used for
>authentication.
>
>(new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the S/MIME
>agent or some related administrative utility or function SHOULD generate RSA
>key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA
>key pairs at a minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT
>generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. Creating keys longer than
>1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able to
>verify signatures, but gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A
>receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
>over 512 bits.

I fully disagree with "MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 
bits long". A signature that is of little value that is only supposed 
to last a week is fine at 512 bits.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JKCSxX055712 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:12:28 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2JKCSLP055711; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:12:28 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail-06.primus.ca (mail.tor.primus.ca [216.254.136.21]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JKCPop055698 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:12:27 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from capel@comgate.com)
Received: from ottawa-hs-209-217-122-183.s-ip.magma.ca ([209.217.122.183] helo=tony) by mail-06.primus.ca with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-MD5:128) (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from <capel@comgate.com>) id 1Jc4e8-0001VR-0e; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:12:24 -0400
From: "Tony Capel" <capel@comgate.com>
To: "'Turner, Sean P.'" <turners@ieca.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: RE: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 16:12:22 -0400
Message-ID: <005801c889fd$8acfe230$02b5a8c0@tony>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.6838
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Thread-Index: AciJ9IEYgKzyHW7bT0ycxmZT8JqH+AAA02Zw
In-Reply-To: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
Importance: Normal
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

My only concern is making key size generation requirements a MANDATORY =
part of
this standard.  I understand it may have been appropriate in the past.

I agree with making non-mandatory RECOMMENDATIONS regarding key size =
generation.
Also agree with making support for minimum key size ranges mandatory.  =
And have
no problems with the sizes proposed.

However MANDATING (MUST/MUST-NOT) the generation and use of specific =
minimum
sizes (or algorithms for that matter) seems to me to be better addressed =
by Cert
Policies, etc. - and indeed in many cases key generation and use ends up =
being
imposed by the PKI design - and defined in the corresponding CP - =
anyway.

I agree the RFC should set out as mandatory the minimum specifications =
required
to ensure a high likelihood of interoperability.  However, if users =
choose to
use small keys (and are allowed to under their CP) then does this make =
the
implementation non-compliant to S/MIME v3.2?  For example, if S/MIME is =
used to
implement a compartmentalized security policy and used over a secure
infrastructure, do we presume to say a 768 bit key is insufficient for =
this
particular application? =20

The only change I would suggest is to remove the sentence:
" A user agent MUST NOT generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long"

The previous sentence to this already captures the RECOMMENDATION =
against keys
of less than 1024 anyway.

I think in earlier versions of the RFC it was appropriate to mandate =
minimum key
sizes, but nowadays, we should leave this decision to the designers who =
are
working against the threat and risk assessment (and sure, include
recommendations aimed at less sophisticated users).

Tony


| -----Original Message-----
| From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org=20
| [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Turner, Sean P.
| Sent: March 19, 2008 3:08 PM
| To: ietf-smime@imc.org
| Subject: S/MIME v3.2 IDs key size text
|=20
|=20
|=20
| The key size text is the remaining issue with the S/MIME v3.2=20
| IDs.  What I'm hoping to do is consensus on the text so we=20
| can issue a WG LC on these two IDs. To make sure there's no=20
| confusion I've included the old and new text from the two=20
| IDs. If you have comments on the new text please be specific=20
| about the change you are proposing.
|=20
| spt
|=20
| --------------
|=20
| In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only=20
| sentence that refers to key sizes):
|=20
| (old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
|=20
| (new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.
|=20
| In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:
|=20
| (old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair,=20
| then the S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility=20
| or function SHOULD generate RSA key pairs using the following=20
| guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a=20
| minimum key size of 768 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT generate=20
| RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. Creating keys longer=20
| than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents=20
| to not be able to verify signatures, but gives better=20
| security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving agent SHOULD=20
| be able to verify signatures with keys of any size over 512=20
| bits. Some agents created in the United States have chosen to=20
| create 512 bit keys in order to get more advantageous export=20
| licenses. However, 512 bit keys are considered by many to be=20
| cryptographically insecure. Implementers SHOULD be aware that=20
| multiple (active) key pairs can be associated with a single=20
| individual.  For example, one key pair can be used to support=20
| confidentiality, while a different key pair can be used for=20
| authentication.
|=20
| (new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair,=20
| then the S/MIME agent or some related administrative utility=20
| or function SHOULD generate RSA key pairs using the following=20
| guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA key pairs at a=20
| minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT=20
| generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. Creating=20
| keys longer than 1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME=20
| receiving agents to not be able to verify signatures, but=20
| gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A receiving=20
| agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any=20
| size over 512 bits.=20
|=20
| - the last four sentences from old text were moved to the=20
| security considerations.
|=20



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2JJ8ijU049465 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:08:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2JJ8iGs049464; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:08:44 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp105.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp105.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.174]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m2JJ8fID049455 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:08:43 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 18279 invoked from network); 19 Mar 2008 19:08:40 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@71.191.4.112 with login) by smtp105.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 19 Mar 2008 19:08:40 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: C9iIE_gVM1lQ1QgUu3KuxEaHwJ4kaU2gWUyFMklmy5I1Szmu52tqWNRL7kvP362N0kWI.vZbdZfmGO1abZrO.4i2f8PeLuMiN1Awk1yajhz0h0h2bP_Vi46QwK0rdBtY3JHkf5xdxWIWhb8-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: S/MIME v3.2  IDs key size text
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 15:07:41 -0400
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <019501c889f4$8185e340$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-Index: AciJ9IEYgKzyHW7bT0ycxmZT8JqH+A==
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

The key size text is the remaining issue with the S/MIME v3.2 IDs.  What I'm
hoping to do is consensus on the text so we can issue a WG LC on these two
IDs. To make sure there's no confusion I've included the old and new text
from the two IDs. If you have comments on the new text please be specific
about the change you are proposing.

spt

--------------

In 3850bis, the update is to section 4.3 (this is the only sentence that
refers to key sizes):

(old) Key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.

(new) Key sizes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits MUST be supported.

In 3851bis, the update is to section 4.1:

(old) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the S/MIME
agent or some related administrative utility or function SHOULD generate RSA
key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA
key pairs at a minimum key size of 768 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT generate
RSA key pairs less than 512 bits long. Creating keys longer than 1024 bits
can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able to verify
signatures, but gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A
receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
over 512 bits. Some agents created in the United States have chosen to
create 512 bit keys in order to get more advantageous export licenses.
However, 512 bit keys are considered by many to be cryptographically
insecure. Implementers SHOULD be aware that multiple (active) key pairs can
be associated with a single individual.  For example, one key pair can be
used to support confidentiality, while a different key pair can be used for
authentication.

(new) If an S/MIME agent needs to generate an RSA key pair, then the S/MIME
agent or some related administrative utility or function SHOULD generate RSA
key pairs using the following guidelines.  A user agent SHOULD generate RSA
key pairs at a minimum key size of 1024 bits.  A user agent MUST NOT
generate RSA key pairs less than 1024 bits long. Creating keys longer than
1024 bits can cause some older S/MIME receiving agents to not be able to
verify signatures, but gives better security and is therefore valuable.  A
receiving agent SHOULD be able to verify signatures with keys of any size
over 512 bits. 

- the last four sentences from old text were moved to the security
considerations.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2GJfYcZ058434 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sun, 16 Mar 2008 12:41:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2GJfYV4058433; Sun, 16 Mar 2008 12:41:34 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2GJfUZW058417 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Sun, 16 Mar 2008 12:41:31 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19) id <GVAK7DLV>; Sun, 16 Mar 2008 19:41:19 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B501874413@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org, "'esi : etsi tc esi (electronic signatures and infrastructures)'" <ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG>
Cc: Julien Stern <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut e.
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 2008 19:41:13 -0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C8879D.35401DCE"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C8879D.35401DCE
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Pavel,

=20

My reading of this paragraph is, as Julien states, that the TSU =
certificate
itself (as an EE cert) is not to be included in the chain.

=20

Nick

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 13 March 2008 18:04
To: 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: Julien Stern
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Nick and other,

=20

2) On the second point I have a concern of a marked text (time-stamping
authorities). The paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:

=20

This attribute MAY include references to the certification chain for =
any
TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this

case the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the =
relevant
times tamp token as an unsignedAttrs in

the signerInfos field.

=20

It seems that this is a direct contradiction. All other is perfect to =
me.

=20

3) On the third point. It seems reasonable not to enforce one-to-one
relationship, but I think it is too late to change because it could =
break
existing implementations. Or maybe we can introduce a new
CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID and declare the old one
deprecated but supported for backward compatibility?..

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: Pope, Nick [mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com]=20
Sent: Thursday, March 13, 2008 11:33 AM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; ietf-smime@imc.org; =
ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Cc: Julien Stern
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

Apologies for not getting back earlier.  I was at an ETSI meeting where =
I
had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with colleagues including =
Julien
Stern who had raised the same issue earlier.

=20

I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best approach and
include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).  Unfortunately =
it
is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can find an approach that =
does
not break existing implementations.

=20

1) On the first point (there being no revocation information for a =
given CA
certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a clarification =
in
6.2.2 of TS 101 733:

=20

"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation
information for a certificate."

=20

2) On the second point I also propose that in 6.2.1:

=20

Change "CA certificates that have been used to validate ..." to "CA and =
any
other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, =
???
time-stamping authorities) that have been used to validate ..."

=20

3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in 6.2.2 =
there
should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation
information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.

=20

Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the proposed changes =
and
the third point.

=20

Nick

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 06 March 2008 16:47
To: 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Nick,

=20

The first point  is closed now, thanks.

=20

On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of =
OCSP-responder in
OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected by
CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected by
CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. =
Of
course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to
protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between
two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of =
the
response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.

=20

That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a
dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own =
CRL-issuer-certificate.
Where could I store this certificate and a reference to it? Now there =
is
only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer in my message and I =
cannot
include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we just allow any =
certificate
needed to validate a path (not only CA certificates) to be included in
complete certificate references attribute?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Pope, Nick
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

=20

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

=20

"RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate =
OPTIONAL }

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped."

=20

Peter

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of
the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one =
cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the =
end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be =
both?

=20

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only =
case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to =
this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way =
prohibited by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the =
corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

Consider the environment before printing this mail.

"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with =
company
registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 =
Dashwood
Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey =
KT15
2NX.

The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also =
be
privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and access =
to it
by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the
intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any =
other
way use or rely on the information contained in this e-mail. Such
unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in =
error
please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also inform =
us
immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email =
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com.
Commercial matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject =
to a
written contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security =
Limited".=20


------_=_NextPart_001_01C8879D.35401DCE
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"

<html xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml">

<head>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=koi8-r">


<meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 10 (filtered)">

<style>
<!--a:link
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINK
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
a:visited
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINKFOLLOWED
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
p
	{mso-style-priority:99;}

 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
p
	{margin-right:0cm;
	margin-left:0cm;
	font-size:12.0pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman";}
span.emailstyle17
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:windowtext;}
span.emailstyle18
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
span.emailstyle19
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:#1F497D;}
span.emailstyle20
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
span.EmailStyle22
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle23
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>

</head>

<body lang=EN-GB link=blue vlink=purple>

<div class=Section1>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>My reading of this paragraph is, as Julien
states, that the TSU certificate itself (as an EE cert) is not to be included
in the chain.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Nick</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 13 March 2008 18:04<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Pope, Nick';
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Julien Stern<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Nick and other,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>2) On the second point I have a concern
of a marked text (time-stamping authorities). The paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>This attribute MAY include references to the certification
chain for any TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>case the unsigned attribute shall be added to the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signedData
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>of the relevant times
tamp token as an unsignedAttrs in</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=RU
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>the signerInfos field.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>It seems that this is a direct
contradiction. All other is perfect to me.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>3) On the third point. It seems
reasonable not to enforce one-to-one relationship, but I think it is too late
to change because it could break existing implementations. Or maybe we can
introduce a new CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID and declare the
old one deprecated but supported for backward compatibility?..</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><font size=2 color=navy><span lang=RU style='font-size:10.0pt;
color:navy'><a href="http://www.cryptopro.ru/" title="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=EN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font><font size=2
color=navy><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><font size=2 color=navy><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;color:navy'><a href="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span lang=EN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div>

<div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=MsoNormal><b><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font
size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=RU style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
Pope, Nick [mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Thursday, March 13, 2008
11:33 AM<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> óÍÉÒÎÏ× ðÁ×ÅÌ ÷ÌÁÄÉÍÉÒÏ×ÉÞ;
ietf-smime@imc.org; ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> Julien Stern<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=RU style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Apologies for not getting back earlier.
&nbsp;I was at an ETSI meeting where I had a chance to briefly discuss this
issue with colleagues including Julien Stern who had raised the same issue
earlier.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I would like to ensure that we have
agreement on the best approach and include the necessary change in TS 101 733
(post 1.7.4). &nbsp;Unfortunately it is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope
we can find an approach that does not break existing implementations.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>1) On the first point (there being no
revocation information for a given CA certificate) for the record I suggest
there should be a clarification in 6.2.2 of TS 101 733:</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><i><font size=2
face="Courier New"><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";
font-style:italic'>&quot;The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there
is no revocation information for a certificate.&quot;</span></font></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>2) On the second point I also propose that
in 6.2.1:</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><i><font size=2
face="Courier New"><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";
font-style:italic'>Change &quot;CA certificates that have been used to validate
...&quot; to &quot;CA and any other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL
issuers, OCSP responders, <span style='background:yellow'>??? time-stamping
authorities</span>) that have been used to validate ...&quot;</span></font></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>3) There is an further point that has been
raised whether in 6.2.2 there should be a direct one to one relationship
between the revocation information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF
experts on the proposed changes and the third point.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Nick</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 06 March 2008 16:47<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Pope, Nick';
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Nick,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>The first point &nbsp;is closed now,
thanks.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>On the second one. I certainly can store
a certificate of OCSP-responder in OCSP response itself, but this response by
default is not protected by CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate
is not protected by CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references
attribute. Of course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional
ocspRepHash to protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a
remark on ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference
between two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of
the response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>That said, I want to bring your
attention to the other case. Consider a dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy
with its own CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this certificate and a
reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer
in my message and I cannot include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we
just allow <u>any certificate needed to validate a path</u> (not only CA
certificates) to be included in complete certificate references attribute?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><font size=2 color=navy><span lang=RU style='font-size:10.0pt;
color:navy'><a href="http://www.cryptopro.ru/" title="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=EN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font><font size=2
color=navy><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><font size=2 color=navy><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;color:navy'><a href="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span lang=EN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color="#1f497d" face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=MsoNormal><b><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font
size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=RU style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] <b><span
style='font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Pope, Nick<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, March 05, 2008
12:27 PM<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> óÍÉÒÎÏ× ðÁ×ÅÌ ÷ÌÁÄÉÍÉÒÏ×ÉÞ;
Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=RU style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One your first question, if there is no
CRL or OCSP available than the sequence can be empty.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the
second point (repeated below) is fine.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&quot;RFC 2560</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; ASN.1
Specification of the OCSP Response</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
::= SEQUENCE {</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ResponseData,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp; AlgorithmIdentifier,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></font><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>signature&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
BIT STRING,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It means: you must use
the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Similar problem is
solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for timestamp validation are
included in the timestamp and not in the signature which is timestamped.&quot;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 04 March 2008 13:46<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com;
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>Hello all and personally Nick!</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101&nbsp;733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>shall contain one </span></font><font size=2
face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>for the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>, followed by one</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>for each </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>in the </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>attribute. The second
and subsequent </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>fields shall be in the same order as the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>to which they relate. At
least one of </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>or</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID </span></font><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>or </span></font><font size=2 face="Courier New"><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>OtherRevRefs</span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'> should be present for all but the
&quot;trusted&quot; CA of the certificate path.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>The first question.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a &quot;trusted&quot; CA. Am I right?
If one cannot do like that, then all &quot;trusted&quot; CA certificates have
to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is
right? Or may be both?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>The second question.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only
case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited by the
phrase &quot;It references the full set of <u>CA</u></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>certificates that ... &quot; in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a &quot;trusted&quot; CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><span lang=RU><a href="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"
title="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><font size=2><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span><font
size=2 color=navy><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><span lang=RU><a href="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><font size=2><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

</div>

<p><b><i><u><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>Consider the environment before
printing this mail.</span></font></u></i></b></p>

<p><b><i><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>&quot;Thales e-Security Limited is
incorporated in England and Wales with company registration number 2518805. Its
registered office is located at 2 Dashwood Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park,
Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey KT15 2NX.</span></font></i></b></p>

<p><b><i><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=RU style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>The information contained in this
e-mail is confidential. It may also be privileged. It is only intended for the
stated addressee(s) and access to it by any other person is unauthorised. If
you are not an addressee or the intended addressee, you must not disclose,
copy, circulate or in any other way use or rely on the information contained in
this e-mail. Such unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this
e-mail in error please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also
inform us immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com. Commercial matters detailed or referred to in
this e-mail are subject to a written contract signed for and on behalf of
Thales e-Security Limited&quot;.</span></font></i></b><span lang=RU> </span></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C8879D.35401DCE--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DJCk3i078374 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:12:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2DJCkrb078373; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:12:46 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail.ietf.org (mail.ietf.org [IPv6:2001:1890:1112:1::20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DJCiQi078366 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:12:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from root@core3.amsl.com)
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id B729B3A6A64; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:15:01 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-01.txt 
Message-Id: <20080313191501.B729B3A6A64@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 12:15:01 -0700 (PDT)
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification
	Author(s)	: B. Ramsdell, S. Turner
	Filename	: draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-01.txt
	Pages		: 39
	Date		: 2008-3-13
	
This document defines Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 
   (S/MIME) version 3.2.  S/MIME provides a consistent way to send and 
   receive secure MIME data.  Digital signatures provide authentication, 
   message integrity, and non-repudiation with proof of origin. 
   Encryption provides data confidentiality.  Compression can be used to 
   reduce data size.  This document obsoletes RFC 3851.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-01.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-01.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2008-3-13120822.I-D@ietf.org>

--NextPart--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DIM88c073845 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:22:08 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2DIM8rq073844; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:22:08 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from kraid.nerim.net (kraid.ipv6.nerim.net [IPv6:2001:7a8:1:1::95]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DIM68r073835 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:22:07 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from julien.stern@cryptolog.com)
Received: from uranus.cry.pto (cryptolog2.pck.nerim.net [213.41.184.9]) by kraid.nerim.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id C21D3CF0CE; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:04 +0100 (CET)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by uranus.cry.pto (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5C27442A3; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:04 +0100 (CET)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at cryptolog.com
Received: from uranus.cry.pto ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (uranus.cry.pto [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wCYcQumJv53p; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:00 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [10.0.1.15] (isonoe.cry.pto [10.0.1.15]) by uranus.cry.pto (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69DF2442A1; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:00 +0100 (CET)
Message-ID: <47D970C8.7020507@cryptolog.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 19:22:00 +0100
From: Julien Stern <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
User-Agent: Icedove 1.5.0.14pre (X11/20071018)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>
Cc: "'Pope, Nick'" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: Re: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
References: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5016D002E@webmail.thales-esecurity.com> <000001c88534$909533f0$b1bf9bd0$@ru>
In-Reply-To: <000001c88534$909533f0$b1bf9bd0$@ru>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=KOI8-R; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Pavel,

comments inline,

Pavel V. Smirnov wrote:
> Nick and other,
> 
>  
> 
> 2) On the second point I have a concern of a marked text (time-stamping 
> authorities). The paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:
> 
>  
> 
> This attribute MAY include references to the certification chain for any 
> TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this
> 
> case the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the 
> relevant times tamp token as an unsignedAttrs in
> 
> the signerInfos field.
>  
> It seems that this is a direct contradiction. All other is perfect to me.

I agree that the timestamping certificate does not seem to fit in here. 
This attribute is (as far as I understand) meant to include all the 
certificate references needed to validate a chain, but the EE reference.

Should this attribute be added to timestamp token as suggested, the EE 
certificate (e.g. the timestamping one in that case) would be referenced 
in the signing certificate attribute, and the attribute would only 
contain CA certificates, OCSP responder certificates and Indirect CRL 
issuer certificates, as in the previous case.

> 3) On the third point. It seems reasonable not to enforce one-to-one 
> relationship, but I think it is too late to change because it could 
> break existing implementations. Or maybe we can introduce a new 
> CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID and declare the old one 
> deprecated but supported for backward compatibility?..

I agree that it could theoretically break some verification 
implementations. However, authorizing empty references can also break 
the implementations that are checking the mapping. Also, I fail to see 
any simple way to take advantage of the mapping, so I assume that most 
implementations will

1) Retrieve all the revocation material in a unordered bag
2) Proceeed with X509 validation
3) Optionally, verify the one-to-one relationship

That is what we originally wanted to do. Now, because of the other issue 
of empty references that you mentioned earlier (OCSP response with the 
no-check extension), even checking the one-to-one mapping is not clearly 
defined, as different implementations may either skip one entry or put 
an empty one in that case.

Instead of declaring invalid a perfect signature because some arbitrary 
mapping is not respected, we decided to remove the mapping check all 
together.

During a plugtest on CAdES, I enquired about this issue and I turned out 
that other implementations that faced the same issue would simply not 
verify the one-to-one mapping.

That about it for my 2 cents...

Regards,

--
Julien


> Pavel Smirnov
> 
> Crypto-Pro
> Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> 
>  
> 
> *From:* Pope, Nick [mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 13, 2008 11:33 AM
> *To:* óÍÉÒÎÏ× ðÁ×ÅÌ ÷ÌÁÄÉÍÉÒÏ×ÉÞ; ietf-smime@imc.org; ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
> *Cc:* Julien Stern
> *Subject:* RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References 
> attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel,
> 
>  
> 
> Apologies for not getting back earlier.  I was at an ETSI meeting where 
> I had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with colleagues including 
> Julien Stern who had raised the same issue earlier.
> 
>  
> 
> I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best approach and 
> include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).  Unfortunately 
> it is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can find an approach 
> that does not break existing implementations.
> 
>  
> 
> 1) On the first point (there being no revocation information for a given 
> CA certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a clarification 
> in 6.2.2 of TS 101 733:
> 
>  
> 
> /"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation 
> information for a certificate."/
> 
>  
> 
> 2) On the second point I also propose that in 6.2.1:
> 
>  
> 
> /Change "CA certificates that have been used to validate ..." to "CA and 
> any other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP 
> responders, ??? time-stamping authorities) that have been used to 
> validate ..."/
> 
>  
> 
> 3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in 6.2.2 there 
> should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation 
> information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.
> 
>  
> 
> Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the proposed changes 
> and the third point.
> 
>  
> 
> Nick
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]
> *Sent:* 06 March 2008 16:47
> *To:* 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
> *Cc:* LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG
> *Subject:* RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References 
> attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Nick,
> 
>  
> 
> The first point  is closed now, thanks.
> 
>  
> 
> On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder 
> in OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected 
> by CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected 
> by CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references 
> attribute. Of course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional 
> ocspRepHash to protect this certificate, but this way somehow 
> contradicts a remark on ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to 
> make the difference between two OCSP responses received within the same 
> second, then the hash of the response contained in the OcspResponsesID 
> may be needed to solve the ambiguity.
> 
>  
> 
> That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a 
> dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own 
> CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this certificate and a 
> reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this 
> issuer in my message and I cannot include its certificate in that CRL. 
> Why don't we just allow _any certificate needed to validate a path_ (not 
> only CA certificates) to be included in complete certificate references 
> attribute?
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel Smirnov
> 
> Crypto-Pro
> Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> 
>  
> 
> *From:* owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org 
> [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] *On Behalf Of *Pope, Nick
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
> *To:* óÍÉÒÎÏ× ðÁ×ÅÌ ÷ÌÁÄÉÍÉÒÏ×ÉÞ; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
> *Cc:* 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
> *Subject:* RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References 
> attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel,
> 
>  
> 
> One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the 
> sequence can be empty.
> 
>  
> 
> Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is 
> fine.
> 
>  
> 
> "RFC 2560
> 
>  
> 
> 4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
> 
>  
> 
> BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
> 
>       tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
> 
>       signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
> 
>       signature            BIT STRING,
> 
>       certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
> 
>  
> 
> It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.
> 
> Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for 
> timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the 
> signature which is timestamped."
> 
>  
> 
> Peter
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]
> *Sent:* 04 March 2008 13:46
> *To:* Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
> *Subject:* CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Hello all and personally Nick!
> 
>  
> 
> I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.
> 
>  
> 
> Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):
> 
>  
> 
> CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the 
> signing-certificate, followed by one
> 
> for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The 
> second and subsequent CrlOcspRef
> 
> fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they 
> relate. At least one of CRLListID or
> 
> OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" 
> CA of the certificate path.
> 
>  
> 
> The first question.
> 
> It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any 
> CRLListID or
> 
> OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one 
> cannot do like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be 
> placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is 
> right? Or may be both?
> 
>  
> 
> The second question.
> 
> It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only 
> case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of 
> OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this 
> certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited 
> by the phrase "It references the full set of _CA_
> 
> certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this 
> certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding 
> CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to 
> equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either 
> include an empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the 
> certificate at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I 
> solve this?
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel Smirnov
> 
> Crypto-Pro
> Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> 
>  
> 
> */_Consider the environment before printing this mail._/*
> 
> */"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with 
> company registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 
> 2 Dashwood Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. 
> Weybridge, Surrey KT15 2NX./*
> 
> */The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also 
> be privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and 
> access to it by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an 
> addressee or the intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, 
> circulate or in any other way use or rely on the information contained 
> in this e-mail. Such unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have 
> received this e-mail in error please delete it (and all copies) from 
> your system, please also inform us immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or 
> email postmaster@thales-esecurity.com. Commercial matters detailed or 
> referred to in this e-mail are subject to a written contract signed for 
> and on behalf of Thales e-Security Limited"./*
> 



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DI2fiG071396 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:02:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2DI2fb3071395; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:02:41 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mx4.cryptopro.ru (mx4.cryptopro.ru [89.221.56.34]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DI2bKT071386 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:02:38 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from spv@cryptopro.ru)
Received: from smirnovxp64 ([192.168.68.187] RDNS failed) by mx4.cryptopro.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Thu, 13 Mar 2008 21:03:38 +0300
From: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>
To: "'Pope, Nick'" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Cc: "Julien Stern" <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
References: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5016D002E@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5016D002E@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 21:03:32 +0300
Message-ID: <000001c88534$909533f0$b1bf9bd0$@ru>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0001_01C8854D.B5E26BF0"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AciE5S06n5HIzRN0S9mlSEZiAmlgPAATXi1Q
Content-Language: ru
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 13 Mar 2008 18:03:38.0968 (UTC) FILETIME=[9087ED80:01C88534]
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

]rn qnqr`bmne qnnayemhe b tnpl`re MIME.

------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C8854D.B5E26BF0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Nick and other,

=20

2) On the second point I have a concern of a marked text (time-stamping
authorities). The paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:

=20

This attribute MAY include references to the certification chain for any
TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this

case the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the =
relevant
times tamp token as an unsignedAttrs in

the signerInfos field.

=20

It seems that this is a direct contradiction. All other is perfect to =
me.

=20

3) On the third point. It seems reasonable not to enforce one-to-one
relationship, but I think it is too late to change because it could =
break
existing implementations. Or maybe we can introduce a new
CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID and declare the old one
deprecated but supported for backward compatibility?..

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: Pope, Nick [mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com]=20
Sent: Thursday, March 13, 2008 11:33 AM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; ietf-smime@imc.org; =
ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Cc: Julien Stern
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

Apologies for not getting back earlier.  I was at an ETSI meeting where =
I
had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with colleagues including =
Julien
Stern who had raised the same issue earlier.

=20

I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best approach and
include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).  Unfortunately =
it
is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can find an approach that =
does
not break existing implementations.

=20

1) On the first point (there being no revocation information for a given =
CA
certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a clarification in
6.2.2 of TS 101 733:

=20

"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation
information for a certificate."

=20

2) On the second point I also propose that in 6.2.1:

=20

Change "CA certificates that have been used to validate ..." to "CA and =
any
other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, =
???
time-stamping authorities) that have been used to validate ..."

=20

3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in 6.2.2 there
should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation
information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.

=20

Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the proposed changes =
and
the third point.

=20

Nick

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 06 March 2008 16:47
To: 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Nick,

=20

The first point  is closed now, thanks.

=20

On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder =
in
OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected by
CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected by
CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. =
Of
course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to
protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between
two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of the
response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.

=20

That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a
dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own =
CRL-issuer-certificate.
Where could I store this certificate and a reference to it? Now there is
only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer in my message and I =
cannot
include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we just allow any =
certificate
needed to validate a path (not only CA certificates) to be included in
complete certificate references attribute?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Pope, Nick
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

=20

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

=20

"RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL =
}

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped."

=20

Peter

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of
the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one =
cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the =
end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

=20

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only =
case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited =
by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

Consider the environment before printing this mail.

"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with =
company
registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 =
Dashwood
Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey =
KT15
2NX.

The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also be
privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and access =
to it
by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the
intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any =
other
way use or rely on the information contained in this e-mail. Such
unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in =
error
please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also inform =
us
immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email =
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com.
Commercial matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject to =
a
written contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security Limited". =



------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C8854D.B5E26BF0
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" =
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dkoi8-r">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 12 (filtered medium)">
<style>
<!--
 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
p
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	mso-margin-top-alt:auto;
	margin-right:0cm;
	mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
	margin-left:0cm;
	font-size:12.0pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
span.emailstyle17
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle17;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:windowtext;}
span.emailstyle18
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle18;
	font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
	color:navy;}
span.emailstyle19
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle19;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:#1F497D;}
span.emailstyle20
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle20;
	font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
	color:navy;}
span.EmailStyle22
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:#1F497D;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-size:10.0pt;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>

<body lang=3DRU link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Nick and =
other,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>2) On =
the second
point I have a concern of a marked text (time-stamping authorities). The
paragraph closing 6.2.1 says:<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>This =
attribute
MAY include references to the certification chain for any TSUs that =
provides
time-stamp tokens. In this<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>case =
the
unsigned attribute shall be added to the </span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signedData </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>of
the relevant times tamp token as an unsignedAttrs =
in<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>the
signerInfos field.</span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman","serif"'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>It seems =
that this is
a direct contradiction. All other is perfect to =
me.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>3) On =
the third
point. It seems reasonable not to enforce one-to-one relationship, but I =
think
it is too late to change because it could break existing =
implementations. Or maybe
we can introduce a new CompleteRevocationRefs attribute with other OID =
and
declare the old one deprecated but supported for backward =
compatibility?..<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:
#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Pope, Nick
[mailto:Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 13, 2008 11:33 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; ietf-smime@imc.org; =
ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Julien Stern<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Pavel,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Apologies for not getting back earlier. &nbsp;I was at an =
ETSI
meeting where I had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with =
colleagues
including Julien Stern who had raised the same issue =
earlier.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best =
approach
and include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).
&nbsp;Unfortunately it is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can =
find an
approach that does not break existing implementations.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>1) On the first point (there being no revocation information =
for a
given CA certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a =
clarification
in 6.2.2 of TS 101 733:</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><i><span lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>&quot;The =
CrlOcspRef may
contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation information for a
certificate.&quot;</span></i><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>2) On the second point I also propose that in =
6.2.1:</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><i><span lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>Change &quot;CA =
certificates
that have been used to validate ...&quot; to &quot;CA and any other
certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, <span
style=3D'background:yellow'>??? time-stamping authorities</span>) that =
have been
used to validate ...&quot;</span></i><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in =
6.2.2
there should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation =
information
in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the =
proposed
changes and the third point.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Nick</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>-----Origina=
l
Message-----<br>
<b>From:</b> Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> 06 March 2008 16:47<br>
<b>To:</b> 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Cc:</b> LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
attribute.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Nick,</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>The =
first point
&nbsp;is closed now, thanks.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>On the =
second one. I
certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder in OCSP response =
itself,
but this response by default is not protected by CrlOcspRef and hence,
existence of this certificate is not protected by CAdES-C time-stamp or =
by
time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. Of course, I can force
OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to protect this =
certificate,
but this way somehow contradicts a remark on ocspRepHash (cited): Since =
it may
be needed to make the difference between two OCSP responses received =
within the
same second, then the hash of the response contained in the =
OcspResponsesID may
be needed to solve the ambiguity.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>That =
said, I want to
bring your attention to the other case. Consider a dedicated CRL issuer =
implied
by policy with its own CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this
certificate and a reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be =
ARL)
signed by this issuer in my message and I cannot include its certificate =
in
that CRL. Why don't we just allow <u>any certificate needed to validate =
a path</u>
(not only CA certificates) to be included in complete certificate =
references
attribute?</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] =
<b>On
Behalf Of </b>Pope, Nick<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
attribute.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Pavel,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP =
available than
the sequence can be empty.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point =
(repeated
below) is fine.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&quot;RFC 2560</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP =
Response</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ::=3D =
SEQUENCE
{</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ResponseData,</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp;
AlgorithmIdentifier,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:navy'>si=
gnature&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=

BIT STRING,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this =
purpose.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs =
and CRL
for timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped.&quot;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Peter</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>-----Origina=
l
Message-----<br>
<b>From:</b> Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> 04 March 2008 13:46<br>
<b>To:</b> Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Hello all and personally =
Nick!</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I have a couple new questions =
regarding
CAdES implementation.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI =
101&nbsp;733
v1.7.3 (excerpt):</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>shall
contain one </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>for
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span>=
<span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>,
followed by one</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>for =
each </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>in
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>attribute.
The second and subsequent </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>fields =
shall be
in the same order as the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>to which they relate. At least =
one of </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>or</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>or
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>
should be present for all but the &quot;trusted&quot; CA of the =
certificate
path.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The first question.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It seems to me that one can =
include an
empty CrlOcspRef (without any CRLListID or</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for =
a
&quot;trusted&quot; CA. Am I right? If one cannot do like that, then all
&quot;trusted&quot; CA certificates have to be placed at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be =
both?</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The second question.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It's quite clear how to compose =
this
attribute in a simple CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should =
one
place a certificate of OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could =
place a
reference to this certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in =
some way
prohibited by the phrase &quot;It references the full set of =
<u>CA</u></span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>certificates that ... &quot; in =
section
6.2.1). Let us assume that this certificate is no-check and one does not =
need
to place the corresponding CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs =
attribute.
Then one have to equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a
&quot;trusted&quot; CA and either include an empty CrlOcspRef in
CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of =
CompleteCertificateRefs
SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><a href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" =
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

</div>

<p><b><i><u><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Consider the environment =
before
printing this mail.</span></u></i></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&quot;Thales e-Security =
Limited is
incorporated in England and Wales with company registration number =
2518805. Its
registered office is located at 2 Dashwood Lang Road, The Bourne =
Business Park,
Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey KT15 =
2NX.</span></i></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><b><i><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>The information contained in =
this
e-mail is confidential. It may also be privileged. It is only intended =
for the
stated addressee(s) and access to it by any other person is =
unauthorised. If
you are not an addressee or the intended addressee, you must not =
disclose,
copy, circulate or in any other way use or rely on the information =
contained in
this e-mail. Such unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received =
this
e-mail in error please delete it (and all copies) from your system, =
please also
inform us immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com. Commercial matters detailed or referred =
to in
this e-mail are subject to a written contract signed for and on behalf =
of
Thales e-Security Limited&quot;.</span></i></b> <o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C8854D.B5E26BF0--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DBL0kb025080 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:21:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2DBL0xf025079; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:21:00 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2DBKtDL025063 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 04:20:58 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19) id <GVAK6XXT>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:20:53 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5018743EF@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "'esi : etsi tc esi (electronic signatures and infrastructures)'" <ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut e.
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 11:20:49 -0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: text/plain
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

To clarify my point 3 - The text currently requires a one-to-one
relationship between the between the revocation information and the
certificate.  There has been a suggestion that this is relaxed so that there
is just a list of revocation information un related to particular
certificates.

I have some concern of this change as it could lead to ambiguity over which
revocation information (if any) was used to check which certificate.  Even
though this might be repetitious I suggest that we should keep this as it
is.

Nick



> -----Original Message-----
> From: esi : etsi tc esi (electronic signatures and infrastructures)
> [mailto:ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG] On Behalf Of Giessmann, Ernstg
> Sent: 13 March 2008 09:25
> To: ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
> Subject: Re: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut
> e.
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
> 
> Dear all,
> Nick's proposals 1) and 2) are good.
> 
> I can't imagine what a 1-to-1 relationship in 3) means.
> Certainly revocation information is in relationship to certificates and
> vice versa. Or is it required that for each certificiate one and only
> one revocation information appears?
> Please clarify to get a positive response on 3)
> 
> Regards,
> Ernst.
> 
> ....snip....
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32)
> 
> iQEVAwUBR9jwGL6TjTZyMv2oAQgsngf/WMCJyhgmpD/xeg29R5Omob5deDIdyn4F
> FPAtmrDbWor2Or3UEnSpPO5N59gfZAHDl7T+sC2yTqcw0iQXnynKi3j1TcrAP7hH
> YV9l3VhWEtx7OotK/4dEwULz+YFueQKS8ZnBdKqqn5ElHHqzGprY2GTE6YwOOCjI
> cxLbMvqnNd5txuaBiiJKe1BztEWBmLUBFwBBfU9MnSP6esF+jqSc4zTb1WCSFgyK
> IQMmWHdl/Yl5gLxCcW+734035vx67PziB/Lk07osYW+w4L18b6w1TP8e+mLKZxQS
> quEl40LFgjvbsEU9IKvKXpkzt1kEepO52pH3Y3BsLmDQoHETmbX66A==
> =e8pl
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> Mail archive for ESI can be browsed at the following url:
>          http://list.etsi.org/ESI.html
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
Consider the environment before printing this mail.
"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with company
registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 Dashwood
Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey KT15
2NX.
The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also be
privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and access to it
by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the
intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any other
way use or rely on the information contained in this e-mail. Such
unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error
please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also inform us
immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email postmaster@thales-esecurity.com.
Commercial matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject to a
written contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security Limited". 



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2D8XhoE004271 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 13 Mar 2008 01:33:43 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2D8Xhhq004270; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 01:33:43 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2D8Xc5n004247 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 01:33:40 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19) id <GVAK6W3G>; Thu, 13 Mar 2008 08:33:35 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5016D002E@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, ietf-smime@imc.org, ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Cc: Julien Stern <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut e.
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 08:33:28 -0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C884E4.E980DFAA"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C884E4.E980DFAA
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Pavel,

=20

Apologies for not getting back earlier.  I was at an ETSI meeting where =
I
had a chance to briefly discuss this issue with colleagues including =
Julien
Stern who had raised the same issue earlier.

=20

I would like to ensure that we have agreement on the best approach and
include the necessary change in TS 101 733 (post 1.7.4).  Unfortunately =
it
is too late to update RFC 5126 but I hope we can find an approach that =
does
not break existing implementations.

=20

1) On the first point (there being no revocation information for a =
given CA
certificate) for the record I suggest there should be a clarification =
in
6.2.2 of TS 101 733:

=20

"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if there is no revocation
information for a certificate."

=20

2) On the second point I also propose that in 6.2.1:

=20

Change "CA certificates that have been used to validate ..." to "CA and =
any
other certificates (e.g. certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, =
???
time-stamping authorities) that have been used to validate ..."

=20

3) There is an further point that has been raised whether in 6.2.2 =
there
should be a direct one to one relationship between the revocation
information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in 6.2.1.

=20

Views are sought from ETSI ESI and IETF experts on the proposed changes =
and
the third point.

=20

Nick

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 06 March 2008 16:47
To: 'Pope, Nick'; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Nick,

=20

The first point  is closed now, thanks.

=20

On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of =
OCSP-responder in
OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected by
CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected by
CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. =
Of
course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to
protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between
two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of =
the
response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.

=20

That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a
dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own =
CRL-issuer-certificate.
Where could I store this certificate and a reference to it? Now there =
is
only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer in my message and I =
cannot
include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we just allow any =
certificate
needed to validate a path (not only CA certificates) to be included in
complete certificate references attribute?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Pope, Nick
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

=20

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

=20

"RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate =
OPTIONAL }

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped."

=20

Peter

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of
the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one =
cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the =
end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be =
both?

=20

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only =
case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to =
this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way =
prohibited by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the =
corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

Consider the environment before printing this mail.
"Thales e-Security Limited is incorporated in England and Wales with =
company
registration number 2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 =
Dashwood
Lang Road, The Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey =
KT15
2NX.
The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. It may also =
be
privileged. It is only intended for the stated addressee(s) and access =
to it
by any other person is unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the
intended addressee, you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any =
other
way use or rely on the information contained in this e-mail. Such
unauthorised use may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in =
error
please delete it (and all copies) from your system, please also inform =
us
immediately on +44 (0)1844 201800 or email =
postmaster@thales-esecurity.com.
Commercial matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject =
to a
written contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security =
Limited".=20

------_=_NextPart_001_01C884E4.E980DFAA
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml">

<head>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dkoi8-r">


<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 10 (filtered)">

<style>
<!--a:link
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINK
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
a:visited
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINKFOLLOWED
	{mso-style-priority:99;}

 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.emailstyle17
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:windowtext;}
span.emailstyle18
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
span.EmailStyle19
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle20
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>

</head>

<body lang=3DEN-GB link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Apologies for not getting back =
earlier. =9AI
was at an ETSI meeting where I had a chance to briefly discuss this =
issue with
colleagues including Julien Stern who had raised the same issue =
earlier.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I would like to ensure that we =
have
agreement on the best approach and include the necessary change in TS =
101 733
(post 1.7.4). =9AUnfortunately it is too late to update RFC 5126 but I =
hope we
can find an approach that does not break existing =
implementations.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>1) On the first point (there being =
no revocation
information for a given CA certificate) for the record I suggest there =
should be
a clarification in 6.2.2 of TS 101 733:</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><i><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";
font-style:italic'>"The CrlOcspRef may contain an empty SEQUENCE if =
there
is no revocation information for a certificate."</span></font></i></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>2) On the second point I also =
propose that
in 6.2.1:</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><i><font size=3D2
face=3D"Courier New"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";
font-style:italic'>Change "CA certificates that have been used to
validate ..." to "CA and any other certificates (e.g.
certificates of CRL issuers, OCSP responders, <span =
style=3D'background:yellow'>???
time-stamping authorities</span>) that have been used to validate
..."</span></font></i></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>3) There is an further point that =
has been
raised whether in 6.2.2 there should be a direct one to one =
relationship
between the revocation information in 6.2.2 and the certificates in =
6.2.1.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Views are sought from ETSI ESI and =
IETF experts
on the proposed changes and the third point.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Nick</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 06 March 2008 =
16:47<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> 'Pope, Nick';
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> =
LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES =
implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Nick,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>The first point &nbsp;is =
closed now,
thanks.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>On the second one. I certainly =
can store
a certificate of OCSP-responder in OCSP response itself, but this =
response by
default is not protected by CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this =
certificate
is not protected by CAdES-C time-stamp or by =
time-stamped-certs-crls-references
attribute. Of course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional =
ocspRepHash
to protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark =
on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between two
OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of the =
response
contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the =
ambiguity.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>That said, I want to bring =
your
attention to the other case. Consider a dedicated CRL issuer implied by =
policy
with its own CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this =
certificate and a
reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this =
issuer
in my message and I cannot include its certificate in that CRL. Why =
don't
we just allow <u>any certificate needed to validate a path</u> (not =
only CA
certificates) to be included in complete certificate references =
attribute?</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
color:navy'><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font><font =
size=3D2
color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;color:navy'><a href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span =
lang=3DEN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font=

size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Pope, Nick<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Wednesday, March =
05, 2008
12:27 PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> =
=F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE;
Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> =
'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: CAdES =
implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DRU =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One your first question, if there =
is no
CRL or OCSP available than the sequence can be empty.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding =
the
second point (repeated below) is fine.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&quot;RFC =
2560</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></f=
ont></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; =
ASN.1
Specification of the OCSP Response</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></f=
ont></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DIT
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>BasicOCSPRespons=
e&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
::=3D SEQUENCE {</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DIT
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
ResponseData,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DIT
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp; AlgorithmIdentifier,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DIT
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></font><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>signature&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
BIT STRING,</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></f=
ont></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It means: you =
must use
the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Similar problem =
is
solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for timestamp =
validation are
included in the timestamp and not in the signature which is =
timestamped.&quot;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></f=
ont></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter</span></fo=
nt></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 04 March 2008 =
13:46<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b>
Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> CAdES =
implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>Hello all and personally Nick!</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES =
implementation.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101&nbsp;733 v1.7.3 =
(excerpt):</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>shall contain one </span></font><font =
size=3D2
face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>for the =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span=
></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>, followed by one</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>for each </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>in the </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>attribute. The =
second
and subsequent </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span></font><=
/p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>fields shall be in the same order as the =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>to which they =
relate. At
least one of </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>or</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID </span></font><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>or </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier =
New"><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'> should be present for all but the
&quot;trusted&quot; CA of the certificate path.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>The first question.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef =
(without any
CRLListID or</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a &quot;trusted&quot; CA. Am I =
right?
If one cannot do like that, then all &quot;trusted&quot; CA =
certificates have
to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way =
is
right? Or may be both?</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>The second question.</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple =
CRL-only
case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to =
this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way =
prohibited by the
phrase &quot;It references the full set of <u>CA</u></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>certificates that ... &quot; in section 6.2.1). Let us assume =
that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the =
corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a &quot;trusted&quot; CA and either =
include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve =
this?</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><span lang=3DRU><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><font size=3D2><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></sp=
an><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><span lang=3DRU><a =
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><font size=3D2><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

<P ALIGN=3DLEFT><B><U><I><FONT SIZE=3D2>Consider the environment before =
printing this mail.</FONT></I></U></B><U><I></I></U><I></I></P>

<P ALIGN=3DLEFT><B><I><FONT SIZE=3D2>"Thales e-Security Limited is =
incorporated in England and Wales with company registration number =
2518805. Its registered office is located at 2 Dashwood Lang Road, The =
Bourne Business Park, Addlestone, Nr. Weybridge, Surrey KT15 =
2NX.</FONT></I></B></P>

<P ALIGN=3DLEFT><B><I><FONT SIZE=3D2>The information contained in this =
e-mail is confidential. It may also be privileged. It is only intended =
for the stated addressee(s) and access to it by any other person is =
unauthorised. If you are not an addressee or the intended addressee, =
you must not disclose, copy, circulate or in any other way use or rely =
on the information contained in this e-mail. Such unauthorised use may =
be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error please delete it =
(and all copies) from your system, please also inform us immediately on =
+44 (0)1844 201800 or email postmaster@thales-esecurity.com. Commercial =
matters detailed or referred to in this e-mail are subject to a written =
contract signed for and on behalf of Thales e-Security =
Limited".</FONT></I></B><I></I><FONT SIZE=3D2></FONT> </P>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C884E4.E980DFAA--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2BKhPIe050642 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:25 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2BKhPI7050641; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:25 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail.ietf.org (mail.ietf.org [IPv6:2001:1890:1112:1::20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2BKhOdE050626 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:25 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from root@core3.amsl.com)
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id 5CDE028C134; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:45:02 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-smime-sha2-04.txt 
Message-Id: <20080311204502.5CDE028C134@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:45:02 -0700 (PDT)
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax
	Author(s)	: S. Turner
	Filename	: draft-ietf-smime-sha2-04.txt
	Pages		: 10
	Date		: 2008-3-11
	
This document describes the conventions for using the Secure Hash 
   Algorithm (SHA) message digest algorithms (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, 
   SHA-512) with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). It also 
   describes the conventions for using these algorithms with CMS and the 
   Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), and 
   Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) signature algorithms.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-sha2-04.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-smime-sha2-04.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2008-3-11134434.I-D@ietf.org>

--NextPart--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2BKhOoi050624 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m2BKhOe7050623; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail.ietf.org (mail.ietf.org [IPv6:2001:1890:1112:1::20]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m2BKhN1l050615 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from root@core3.amsl.com)
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id 477D63A6D33; Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:45:02 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-smime-multisig-05.txt 
Message-Id: <20080311204502.477D63A6D33@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:45:02 -0700 (PDT)
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Multiple Signatures in S/MIME
	Author(s)	: S. Turner, J. Schaad
	Filename	: draft-ietf-smime-multisig-05.txt
	Pages		: 20
	Date		: 2008-3-11
	
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) SignedData includes the SignerInfo 
   structure to convey per-signer information. SignedData supports 
   multiple signers and multiple signature algorithms per-signer with 
   multiple SignerInfo structures. If a signer attaches more than one 
   SignerInfo, there are concerns that an attacker could perform a 
   downgrade attack by removing the SignerInfo(s) with the 'strong' 
algorithm(s). This document defines the multiple-signatures 
   attribute, its generation rules, and its processing rules to allow 
   signers to convey multiple SignerInfo while protecting against 
   downgrade attacks. Additionally, this attribute may assist during 
   periods of algorithm migration.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-05.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-smime-multisig-05.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2008-3-11134239.I-D@ietf.org>

--NextPart--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26LvOMQ081919 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:57:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m26LvO61081917; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:57:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from bosco.isi.edu (bosco.isi.edu [128.9.168.207]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26LvOWl081911 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:57:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org)
Received: by bosco.isi.edu (Postfix, from userid 70) id 719161186A9; Thu,  6 Mar 2008 13:57:23 -0800 (PST)
To: ietf-announce@ietf.org, rfc-dist@rfc-editor.org
Subject: RFC 5126 on CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES)
From: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Cc: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org, ietf-smime@imc.org
Message-Id: <20080306215723.719161186A9@bosco.isi.edu>
Date: Thu,  6 Mar 2008 13:57:23 -0800 (PST)
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 5126

        Title:      CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES) 
        Author:     D. Pinkas, N. Pope, J. Ross
        Status:     Informational
        Date:       March 2008
        Mailbox:    Denis.Pinkas@bull.net, 
                    nick.pope@thales-esecurity.com, 
                    ross@secstan.com
        Pages:      141
        Characters: 309173
        Obsoletes:  RFC3126

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-smime-cades-07.txt

        URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5126.txt

This document defines the format of an electronic signature that can
remain valid over long periods.  This includes evidence as to its
validity even if the signer or verifying party later attempts to deny
(i.e., repudiates) the validity of the signature.

The format can be considered as an extension to RFC 3852 and
RFC 2634, where, when appropriate, additional signed and
unsigned attributes have been defined.

The contents of this Informational RFC amount to a
transposition of the ETSI Technical Specification (TS) 101 733 V.1.7.4
(CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures -- CAdES) and is technically
equivalent to it.

The technical contents of this specification are maintained by ETSI.
The ETSI TS and further updates are available free of charge at:
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/Standards/StandardsDownload.aspx 
This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document is a product of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group 
of the IETF.


INFORMATIONAL: This memo provides information for the Internet community.
It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@IETF.ORG.  Requests to be
added to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should
be sent to RFC-DIST-REQUEST@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG with the message body 

help: ways_to_get_rfcs. For example:

        To: rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to RFC-Manager@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.  Please consult RFC 2223, Instructions to RFC
Authors, for further information.


The RFC Editor Team
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...




Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26GkLl3050448 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:46:21 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m26GkK5Z050447; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:46:20 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mx4.cryptopro.ru (mx4.cryptopro.ru [89.221.56.34]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26GkHK3050435 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:46:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from spv@cryptopro.ru)
Received: from smirnovxp64 ([192.168.68.187] RDNS failed) by mx4.cryptopro.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Thu, 6 Mar 2008 19:47:05 +0300
From: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>
To: "'Pope, Nick'" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Cc: <LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG>
References: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 19:47:02 +0300
Message-ID: <001201c87fa9$b5a0bd30$20e23790$@ru>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0013_01C87FC2.DAEDF530"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: Ach+q3b5R54iboqxT8qWrghhObMH9AA+ZTZg
Content-Language: ru
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Mar 2008 16:47:05.0375 (UTC) FILETIME=[B5A502F0:01C87FA9]
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

]rn qnqr`bmne qnnayemhe b tnpl`re MIME.

------=_NextPart_000_0013_01C87FC2.DAEDF530
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Nick,

=20

The first point  is closed now, thanks.

=20

On the second one. I certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder =
in
OCSP response itself, but this response by default is not protected by
CrlOcspRef and hence, existence of this certificate is not protected by
CAdES-C time-stamp or by time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. =
Of
course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional ocspRepHash to
protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark on
ocspRepHash (cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference =
between
two OCSP responses received within the same second, then the hash of the
response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
ambiguity.

=20

That said, I want to bring your attention to the other case. Consider a
dedicated CRL issuer implied by policy with its own =
CRL-issuer-certificate.
Where could I store this certificate and a reference to it? Now there is
only a CRL (or may be ARL) signed by this issuer in my message and I =
cannot
include its certificate in that CRL. Why don't we just allow any =
certificate
needed to validate a path (not only CA certificates) to be included in
complete certificate references attribute?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Pope, Nick
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM
To: =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.

=20

Pavel,

=20

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

=20

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

=20

"RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL =
}

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped."

=20

Peter

=20

=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]=20
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of
the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one =
cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the =
end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

=20

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only =
case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited =
by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at =
the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20


------=_NextPart_000_0013_01C87FC2.DAEDF530
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" =
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dkoi8-r">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 12 (filtered medium)">
<style>
<!--
 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.emailstyle17
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle17;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:windowtext;}
span.emailstyle18
	{mso-style-name:emailstyle18;
	font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
	color:navy;}
span.EmailStyle19
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:#1F497D;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-size:10.0pt;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>

<body lang=3DRU link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Nick,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>The =
first point =9Ais
closed now, thanks.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>On the =
second one. I
certainly can store a certificate of OCSP-responder in OCSP response =
itself,
but this response by default is not protected by CrlOcspRef and hence, =
existence
of this certificate is not protected by CAdES-C time-stamp or by =
time-stamped-certs-crls-references
attribute. Of course, I can force OcspResponsesID to include optional =
ocspRepHash
to protect this certificate, but this way somehow contradicts a remark =
on ocspRepHash
(cited): Since it may be needed to make the difference between two OCSP
responses received within the same second, then the hash of the response
contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the =
ambiguity.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'color:#1F497D'>That =
said, I want to
bring your attention to the other case. Consider a dedicated CRL issuer =
implied
by policy with its own CRL-issuer-certificate. Where could I store this
certificate and a reference to it? Now there is only a CRL (or may be =
ARL) signed
by this issuer in my message and I cannot include its certificate in =
that CRL.
Why don&#8217;t we just allow <u>any certificate needed to validate a =
path</u>
(not only CA certificates) to be included in complete certificate =
references
attribute?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><a
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a></span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:
#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0cm 0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] =
<b>On
Behalf Of </b>Pope, Nick<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 05, 2008 12:27 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> =F3=CD=C9=D2=CE=CF=D7 =F0=C1=D7=C5=CC =
=F7=CC=C1=C4=C9=CD=C9=D2=CF=D7=C9=DE; Pope, Nick; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Pavel,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP =
available than
the sequence can be empty.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point =
(repeated
below) is fine.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&quot;RFC 2560</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP =
Response</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ::=3D =
SEQUENCE
{</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ResponseData,</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp;
AlgorithmIdentifier,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:navy'>si=
gnature&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=

BIT STRING,</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this =
purpose.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs =
and CRL
for timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature
which is timestamped.&quot;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>Peter</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:navy'>&nbsp;</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>-----Origina=
l
Message-----<br>
<b>From:</b> Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> 04 March 2008 13:46<br>
<b>To:</b> Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References =
attribute.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Hello all and personally =
Nick!</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I have a couple new questions =
regarding
CAdES implementation.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI =
101&nbsp;733
v1.7.3 (excerpt):</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>shall
contain one </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>for
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span>=
<span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>,
followed by one</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>for =
each </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>in
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>attribute.
The second and subsequent </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>fields =
shall be
in the same order as the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>to which they relate. At least =
one of </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>or</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>or
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>
should be present for all but the &quot;trusted&quot; CA of the =
certificate
path.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The first question.</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It seems to me that one can =
include an empty
CrlOcspRef (without any CRLListID or</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for =
a
&quot;trusted&quot; CA. Am I right? If one cannot do like that, then all
&quot;trusted&quot; CA certificates have to be placed at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be =
both?</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The second question.</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It's quite clear how to compose =
this
attribute in a simple CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should =
one
place a certificate of OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could =
place a
reference to this certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in =
some way
prohibited by the phrase &quot;It references the full set of =
<u>CA</u></span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>certificates that ... &quot; in =
section
6.2.1). Let us assume that this certificate is no-check and one does not =
need
to place the corresponding CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs =
attribute.
Then one have to equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a
&quot;trusted&quot; CA and either include an empty CrlOcspRef in
CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?</span><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><a href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" =
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;</span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_0013_01C87FC2.DAEDF530--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m26GF4Yq047112 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:15:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m26GF4tC047111; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:15:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.46]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with SMTP id m26GF2YN047105 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:15:03 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 8176 invoked from network); 6 Mar 2008 16:15:02 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.95.143 with login) by smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 6 Mar 2008 16:15:01 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: 6bh2o0cVM1ly5t9krMqaaukTaUGP7Jm3CV_fniFOStztYPNcaUrO.DKe2jN7XQLLGaSzXyTvfXSZr0hC2c1ntzUUnrvrl0pb9Nb8hTZz.0nMR6i8v3OFdJcFhnmmz.HAyDZ.YiivMDSG3w--
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Meeting Materials Uploaded
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 11:07:22 -0500
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <00eb01c87fa4$299c4390$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00EC_01C87F7A.40C63B90"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Thread-Index: Ach/pCk48NlK0AnQQLuSri+VPWq4XA==
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_00EC_01C87F7A.40C63B90
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

All,

The agenda and all but one of the presentations for the S/MIME WG session at
IETF 71 have been upload.  They can be found at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/71/materials.html

spt

------=_NextPart_000_00EC_01C87F7A.40C63B90
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii">
<META NAME=3D"Generator" CONTENT=3D"MS Exchange Server version =
6.5.7036.0">
<TITLE>Meeting Materials Uploaded</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<!-- Converted from text/rtf format -->

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">All,</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">The agenda and all but one of the =
presentations for the S/MIME WG session at IETF 71 have been =
upload.&nbsp; They can be found at: </FONT><A =
HREF=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/71/materials.html"><U><FONT =
COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Arial">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/71/materials.html</FO=
NT></U></A></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">spt</FONT>
</P>

</BODY>
</HTML>
------=_NextPart_000_00EC_01C87F7A.40C63B90--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m25A9NP5058979 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:09:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m25A9Nfh058978; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:09:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m25A911i058945 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:09:22 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19) id <F4J70G1P>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 10:08:59 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F3A@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "'Julien Stern'" <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>, "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
Cc: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, ietf-smime@imc.org, ESI@LIST.ETSI.ORG
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut e.
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 10:08:55 -0000 
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: text/plain
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Pavel,

The text says "SHOULD" which implies if there is a good reason (e.g. no data
exists) then this need not be present.  A similar issue was raised earlier
add the conclusion was to allow empty SEQUENCE.

There was some clarification text that should have gone into the new RFC
just about to be published but unfortunately it got missed out.

Nick

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Julien Stern [mailto:julien.stern@cryptolog.com]
> Sent: 05 March 2008 10:03
> To: Pope, Nick
> Cc: 'Pavel V. Smirnov'; ietf-smime@imc.org; 'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'
> Subject: Re: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
> attribute.
> 
> Pope, Nick wrote:
> > Pavel,
> >
> >
> >
> > One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
> > sequence can be empty.
> 
> Nick,
> 
> The standard says:
> 
> At least one of CRLListID or OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be
> present for all but the "trusted" CA of the certificate path.
> 
> So it seems the sequence cannot be empty.
> 
> 
> > Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
> > fine.
> 
> I respectfully disagree. What Pavel asked was how to _reference_ an OCSP
>   responder certificate, not how to include it into the signature.
> 
> So, for CAdES-C, the proposed solution is not applicable.
> Furthermore, if you do this, CAdES-X is not a secure form of CAdES
> anymore because you do not timestamp the reference to the OCSP responder
> certificate.
> 
> I already pointed out on both lists that CAdES section 6.2.2 was not
> suited to real-world PKIs.
> 
> Again, this issue comes from the fact it assumes that all validation
> data can be represented as a single chain, when it is in fact a tree (as
> soon as there is a certificate renewal or an indirect CRL or a dedicated
> OCSP responder).
> 
> CAdES should really be fixed to handle these cases.
> One solution would be to allow implementations to put certificate
> references and revocation references in any order and not to check for
> correspondance between the two (like in XAdES actually).
> 
> During the latest plugtest on CAdES that we participated in, it appeared
> that implementations already handled this scenario anyway...
> 
> Regards,
> 
> --
> Julien
> 
> > "RFC 2560
> >
> >
> >
> > 4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
> >
> >
> >
> > BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
> >
> >       tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
> >
> >       signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
> >
> >       signature            BIT STRING,
> >
> >       certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
> }
> >
> >
> >
> > It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.
> >
> > Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
> > timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the
> > signature which is timestamped."
> >
> >
> >
> > Peter
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > *From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]
> > *Sent:* 04 March 2008 13:46
> > *To:* Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
> > *Subject:* CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References
> attribute.
> >
> >
> >
> > Hello all and personally Nick!
> >
> >
> >
> > I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.
> >
> >
> >
> > Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):
> >
> >
> >
> > CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
> > signing-certificate, followed by one
> >
> > for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The
> > second and subsequent CrlOcspRef
> >
> > fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they
> > relate. At least one of CRLListID or
> >
> > OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted"
> > CA of the certificate path.
> >
> >
> >
> > The first question.
> >
> > It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
> > CRLListID or
> >
> > OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one
> > cannot do like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be
> > placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is
> > right? Or may be both?
> >
> >
> >
> > The second question.
> >
> > It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only
> > case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
> > OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
> > certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited
> > by the phrase "It references the full set of _CA_
> >
> > certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
> > certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
> > CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to
> > equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either
> > include an empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the
> > certificate at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I
> > solve this?
> >
> >
> >
> > Pavel Smirnov
> >
> > Crypto-Pro
> > Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> > WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> > e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> >
> >
> >



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m25A2nl6057961 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:02:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m25A2nhS057960; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:02:49 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from kraid.nerim.net (kraid.ipv6.nerim.net [IPv6:2001:7a8:1:1::95]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m25A2lkA057938 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 03:02:47 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from julien.stern@cryptolog.com)
Received: from uranus.cry.pto (cryptolog2.pck.nerim.net [213.41.184.9]) by kraid.nerim.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAAB2CF159; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 11:02:45 +0100 (CET)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by uranus.cry.pto (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8ECA24429E; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 11:02:45 +0100 (CET)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at cryptolog.com
Received: from uranus.cry.pto ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (uranus.cry.pto [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lDnddx7caKpk; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 11:02:41 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [10.0.1.15] (isonoe.cry.pto [10.0.1.15]) by uranus.cry.pto (Postfix) with ESMTP id 266BB4429D; Wed,  5 Mar 2008 11:02:41 +0100 (CET)
Message-ID: <47CE6FC0.2060207@cryptolog.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 11:02:40 +0100
From: Julien Stern <julien.stern@cryptolog.com>
User-Agent: Icedove 1.5.0.14pre (X11/20071018)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
Cc: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, ietf-smime@imc.org, "'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'" <LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG>
Subject: Re: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
References: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Pope, Nick wrote:
> Pavel,
> 
>  
> 
> One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the 
> sequence can be empty.

Nick,

The standard says:

At least one of CRLListID or OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be 
present for all but the "trusted" CA of the certificate path.

So it seems the sequence cannot be empty.


> Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is 
> fine.

I respectfully disagree. What Pavel asked was how to _reference_ an OCSP 
  responder certificate, not how to include it into the signature.

So, for CAdES-C, the proposed solution is not applicable.
Furthermore, if you do this, CAdES-X is not a secure form of CAdES 
anymore because you do not timestamp the reference to the OCSP responder 
certificate.

I already pointed out on both lists that CAdES section 6.2.2 was not 
suited to real-world PKIs.

Again, this issue comes from the fact it assumes that all validation 
data can be represented as a single chain, when it is in fact a tree (as 
soon as there is a certificate renewal or an indirect CRL or a dedicated 
OCSP responder).

CAdES should really be fixed to handle these cases.
One solution would be to allow implementations to put certificate 
references and revocation references in any order and not to check for 
correspondance between the two (like in XAdES actually).

During the latest plugtest on CAdES that we participated in, it appeared 
that implementations already handled this scenario anyway...

Regards,

--
Julien

> "RFC 2560
> 
>  
> 
> 4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
> 
>  
> 
> BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
> 
>       tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
> 
>       signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
> 
>       signature            BIT STRING,
> 
>       certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
> 
>  
> 
> It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.
> 
> Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for 
> timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the 
> signature which is timestamped."
> 
>  
> 
> Peter
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru]
> *Sent:* 04 March 2008 13:46
> *To:* Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
> *Subject:* CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
> 
>  
> 
> Hello all and personally Nick!
> 
>  
> 
> I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.
> 
>  
> 
> Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):
> 
>  
> 
> CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the 
> signing-certificate, followed by one
> 
> for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The 
> second and subsequent CrlOcspRef
> 
> fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they 
> relate. At least one of CRLListID or
> 
> OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" 
> CA of the certificate path.
> 
>  
> 
> The first question.
> 
> It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any 
> CRLListID or
> 
> OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one 
> cannot do like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be 
> placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is 
> right? Or may be both?
> 
>  
> 
> The second question.
> 
> It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only 
> case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of 
> OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this 
> certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited 
> by the phrase "It references the full set of _CA_
> 
> certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this 
> certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding 
> CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to 
> equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either 
> include an empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the 
> certificate at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I 
> solve this?
> 
>  
> 
> Pavel Smirnov
> 
> Crypto-Pro
> Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
> WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
> e-mail: spv@CryptoPro.ru <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru>
> 
>  
> 



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m259RBnW053561 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 5 Mar 2008 02:27:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m259RB6C053560; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 02:27:11 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from UKCRN08.crn.thales-esecurity.com ([193.112.44.5]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m259R823053552 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 02:27:09 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com)
Received: by webmail.thales-esecurity.com with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19) id <F4J70F5Z>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 09:27:03 -0000
Message-ID: <6FC9E49ED3472043A38619BFA97F37B5B49F34@webmail.thales-esecurity.com>
From: "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>
To: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, "Pope, Nick" <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, ietf-smime@imc.org
Cc: "'LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG'" <LISTSERV@LIST.ETSI.ORG>
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribut e.
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 09:27:01 -0000 
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C87EA3.1132045E"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

------_=_NextPart_001_01C87EA3.1132045E
Content-Type: text/plain

Pavel,

 

One your first question, if there is no CRL or OCSP available than the
sequence can be empty.

 

Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding the second point (repeated below) is
fine.

 

"RFC 2560

 

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

 

BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

 

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the signature
which is timestamped."

 

Peter

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] 
Sent: 04 March 2008 13:46
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.

 

Hello all and personally Nick!

 

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

 

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

 

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" CA of
the certificate path.

 

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

 

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to equate
such OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the
end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

 

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

 


------_=_NextPart_001_01C87EA3.1132045E
Content-Type: text/html

<html xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml">

<head>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=us-ascii">


<meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 10 (filtered)">

<style>
<!--a:link
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINK
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
a:visited
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINKFOLLOWED
	{mso-style-priority:99;}

 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{font-family:Calibri;
	color:windowtext;}
span.EmailStyle18
	{font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>

</head>

<body lang=EN-GB link=blue vlink=purple>

<div class=Section1>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Pavel,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>One your first question, if there is no
CRL or OCSP available than the sequence can be empty.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter Rybar's suggestion regarding
the second point (repeated below) is fine.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>"RFC 2560</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>4.2.1&nbsp; ASN.1
Specification of the OCSP Response</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
::= SEQUENCE {</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
tbsResponseData&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ResponseData,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
signatureAlgorithm&nbsp;&nbsp; AlgorithmIdentifier,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=IT
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></font><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>signature&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
BIT STRING,</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
certs&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It means: you must use
the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Similar problem is
solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for timestamp validation are
included in the timestamp and not in the signature which is timestamped."</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>From:</span></b> Pavel V. Smirnov
[mailto:spv@cryptopro.ru] <br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 04 March 2008 13:46<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com;
ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> CAdES implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>Hello all and personally Nick!</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101&nbsp;733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>shall contain one </span></font><font size=2
face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>for the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>, followed by one</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>for each </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>in the </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>attribute. The second
and subsequent </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='text-autospace:none'><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>fields shall be in the same order as the </span></font><font
size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID
</span></font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>to which they relate. At
least one of </span></font><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID </span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>or</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Courier><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID </span></font><font size=2
face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>or </span></font><font size=2 face="Courier New"><span
lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>OtherRevRefs</span></font><font
size=2 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'> should be present for all but the
&quot;trusted&quot; CA of the certificate path.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>The first question.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right?
If one cannot do like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have
to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is
right? Or may be both?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>The second question.</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple
CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited by the
phrase "It references the full set of <u>CA</u></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>certificates that ... " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that
this certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an
empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel Smirnov</span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><span lang=RU><a href="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"
title="http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><font size=2><span lang=EN-US
style='font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span><font
size=2 color=navy><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><span lang=RU><a href="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title="mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><font size=2><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></span></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Calibri><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
11.0pt'>&nbsp;</span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C87EA3.1132045E--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m258fjM9047889 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 5 Mar 2008 01:41:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.13.5/Submit) id m258fj17047887; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 01:41:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mail.nbusr.sk (mail.nbusr.sk [84.245.65.227]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id m258fc2s047876 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Wed, 5 Mar 2008 01:41:40 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from rybar@nbusr.sk)
From: "Peter Rybar" <rybar@nbusr.sk>
To: "'Pavel V. Smirnov'" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>, Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com, ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: RE: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 09:42:00 +0100
Message-ID: <200803050842.m258gVoa005330@mail.nbusr.sk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0003_01C87EA5.292DCC30"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook, Build 11.0.6353
Thread-Index: Ach9/hbZgbS1fZrfS423parAz8K4cgAm+WzA
In-Reply-To: <000001c87dfe$18714220$4953c660$@ru>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2180
X-NAI-Spam-Score: -0.3
X-NAI-Spam-Report: 2 Rules triggered *  -0.3 -- BAYES_30 -- Bayesian spam probability is 30 to 40% *  0 -- HAS_X_HELO -- Mail contains HAS_X-HELO header
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C87EA5.292DCC30
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hallo,

=20

It is easy.

=20

RFC 2560

=20

4.2.1  ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

=20

BasicOCSPResponse       ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      tbsResponseData      ResponseData,

      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,

      signature            BIT STRING,

      certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL =
}

=20

It means: you must use the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.

Similar problem is solving with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for =
timestamp validation are included in the timestamp and not in the =
signature which is timestamped.

=20

Peter

=20

=20

=20

  _____ =20

From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org =
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Pavel V. Smirnov
Sent: Tuesday, March 04, 2008 2:46 PM
To: Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.

=20

Hello all and personally Nick!

=20

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

=20

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

=20

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the =
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The =
second and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they =
relate. At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" =
CA of the certificate path.

=20

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any =
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA. Am I =
right? If one cannot do like that, then all =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA =
certificates have to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs =
SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

=20

The second question.

It=E2=80=99s quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple =
CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a =
certificate of OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a =
reference to this certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in =
some way prohibited by the phrase =E2=80=9CIt references the full set of =
CA

certificates that =E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9D in section 6.2.1). Let us assume =
that this certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the =
corresponding CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one =
have to equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a =
=E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA and either include an empty CrlOcspRef in =
CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of =
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

=20

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

=20


------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C87EA5.292DCC30
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" =
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"
xmlns:ns0=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 11 (filtered medium)">
<!--[if !mso]>
<style>
v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<style>
<!--a:link
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINK
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
a:visited
	{mso-style-priority:99;}
span.MSOHYPERLINKFOLLOWED
	{mso-style-priority:99;}

 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal;
	font-family:Calibri;
	color:windowtext;}
span.EmailStyle18
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:Arial;
	color:navy;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>

<body lang=3DSK link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Hallo,<o:p></o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It is =
easy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>RFC =
2560<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>4.2.1=C2=A0 =
ASN.1 Specification
of the OCSP Response<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>BasicOCSPResponse=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0
tbsResponseData=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
ResponseData,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0
signatureAlgorithm=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
AlgorithmIdentifier,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0
signature=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
 BIT STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0
certs=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL =
}<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>It means: you =
must use
the OPTIONAL certs for this purpose.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Similar problem =
is solving
with timestamp, where the certs and CRL for timestamp validation are =
included in
the timestamp and not in the signature which is =
timestamped.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Peter<o:p></o:p><=
/span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</spa=
n></font></b><font
size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Pavel V. Smirnov<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Tuesday, March 04, =
2008 2:46
PM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b>
Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com; ietf-smime@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> CAdES =
implementation.
Complete Revocation References attribute.</span></font><font size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>Hello all and personally Nick!<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES =
implementation.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101&nbsp;733 v1.7.3 =
(excerpt):<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>shall contain one </span></font><font =
size=3D2
face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>for the =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span>=
</font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>, followed by =
one<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>for each </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>in the </span></font><font size=3D2 =
face=3DCourier><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>attribute. The =
second
and subsequent </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>fields shall be in the same order as the =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID
</span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>to which they =
relate. At
least one of </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'>or<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCourier><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID </span></font><font size=3D2
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Times New Roman"'>or </span></font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Courier =
New"><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman"'> should be present for all but the
&quot;trusted&quot; CA of the certificate path.</span></font><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>The first question.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without =
any
CRLListID or<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA. =
Am I right? If one
cannot do like that, then all =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA certificates =
have to be placed at
the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may =
be
both?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>The second question.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>It=E2=80=99s quite clear how to compose this attribute in a =
simple CRL-only
case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited =
by the
phrase =E2=80=9CIt references the full set of =
<u>CA</u><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'>certificates that =E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9D in section 6.2.1). Let us =
assume that this
certificate is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding
CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to =
equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D CA and either =
include an empty CrlOcspRef
in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve =
this?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel =
Smirnov<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DCalibri><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span></font><span lang=3DEN-US><a =
href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><font size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a></spa=
n><font
size=3D2 color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span></font><span lang=3DEN-US><a =
href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><font size=3D2><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></font></a><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DCalibri><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:
11.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C87EA5.292DCC30--




Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m24GsO6h083890 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 4 Mar 2008 09:54:25 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m24GsOV2083889; Tue, 4 Mar 2008 09:54:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from romeo.rtfm.com (74-95-2-173-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net [74.95.2.173] (may be forged)) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m24GsO7n083878; Tue, 4 Mar 2008 09:54:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from ekr@networkresonance.com)
Received: from romeo.rtfm.com (localhost.rtfm.com [127.0.0.1]) by romeo.rtfm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04E615081A; Tue,  4 Mar 2008 08:56:18 -0800 (PST)
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2008 08:56:18 -0800
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Cc: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "ietf-smime@imc.org" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2	AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
In-Reply-To: <p06240807c3f1cc11e33a@[10.20.30.162]>
References: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr> <p06240807c3f1cc11e33a@[10.20.30.162]>
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI)
MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Message-Id: <20080304165618.04E615081A@romeo.rtfm.com>
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

At Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:44:00 -0800,
Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
> At 3:06 PM +0100 3/3/08, Denis Pinkas wrote:
> >  >>  >While I welcome this draft, everybody should take into
> >>>>consideration that, if the SHA2 family happens to be broken
> >>>>then we will be at risk.
> >>>>This should be mentioned into the security considerations section.
> >>>
> >>>If an algorithm is cracked then isn't it obvious that we're in trouble?  No
> >>>other algorithm document I could find says something like this so I'm
> >>>inclined to not include this in the security considerations section.
> >>
> >>... or anywhere else. If any algorithm (hash, encryption, signing,
> >>...) is broken, it is broken. Sean's right here.
> >
> >The message is the following: if the SHA2 family is broken, then you 
> >had better
> >to use two hash algorithms from a different family (e.g. use Whirlpool).
> 
> There is no consensus in the IETF that this statement is true. We 
> have discussed it many times for many years. Adding such a sentence 
> to this document without community agreement is wrong.

I agree with Paul that there is no consensus here.

-Ekr



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m24DjOLG064393 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 4 Mar 2008 06:45:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m24DjOgP064392; Tue, 4 Mar 2008 06:45:24 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from mx4.cryptopro.ru (mx4.cryptopro.ru [89.221.56.34]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m24DjMGw064380 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Tue, 4 Mar 2008 06:45:23 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from spv@cryptopro.ru)
Received: from smirnovxp64 ([192.168.68.187] RDNS failed) by mx4.cryptopro.ru with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Tue, 4 Mar 2008 16:46:06 +0300
From: "Pavel V. Smirnov" <spv@CryptoPro.ru>
To: <Nick.Pope@thales-esecurity.com>, <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: CAdES implementation. Complete Revocation References attribute.
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 16:46:04 +0300
Message-ID: <000001c87dfe$18714220$4953c660$@ru>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0001_01C87E17.3DBE7A20"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: Ach9/hbZgbS1fZrfS423parAz8K4cg==
Content-Language: ru
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Mar 2008 13:46:06.0375 (UTC) FILETIME=[18599B70:01C87DFE]
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

]rn qnqr`bmne qnnayemhe b tnpl`re MIME.

------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C87E17.3DBE7A20
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Hello all and personally Nick!

 

I have a couple new questions regarding CAdES implementation.

 

Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI 101 733 v1.7.3 (excerpt):

 

CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the
signing-certificate, followed by one

for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The second
and subsequent CrlOcspRef

fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they relate.
At least one of CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" CA of
the certificate path.

 

The first question.

It seems to me that one can include an empty CrlOcspRef (without any
CRLListID or

OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for a "trusted" CA. Am I right? If one cannot do
like that, then all "trusted" CA certificates have to be placed at the end
of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which way is right? Or may be both?

 

The second question.

It's quite clear how to compose this attribute in a simple CRL-only case.
Now, let us use OCSP. Where should one place a certificate of
OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could place a reference to this
certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in some way prohibited by
the phrase "It references the full set of CA

certificates that : " in section 6.2.1). Let us assume that this certificate
is no-check and one does not need to place the corresponding CrlOcspRef into
CompleteRevocationRefs attribute. Then one have to equate such
OCSP-responder certificate to a "trusted" CA and either include an empty
CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or place the certificate at the end of
CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I solve this?

 

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW:  <http://www.cryptopro.ru/> http://www.CryptoPro.ru
e-mail:  <mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru> spv@CryptoPro.ru

 


------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C87E17.3DBE7A20
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="koi8-r"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" =
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dkoi8-r">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 12 (filtered medium)">
<style>
<!--
 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:Courier;
	panose-1:2 7 4 9 2 2 5 2 4 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-size:10.0pt;}
@page Section1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:2.0cm 42.5pt 2.0cm 3.0cm;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>

<body lang=3DRU link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Hello all and personally =
Nick!<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I have a couple new questions =
regarding
CAdES implementation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Consider section 6.2.2 of ETSI =
101&nbsp;733
v1.7.3 (excerpt):<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteRevocationRefs =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>shall
contain one </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>for
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>signing-certificate</span>=
<span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>,
followed by one<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>for =
each </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>in
the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CompleteCertificateRefs
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>attribute.
The second and subsequent </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>CrlOcspRef<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-autospace:none'><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>fields =
shall be
in the same order as the </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Courier'>OtherCertID </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>to which they relate. At least =
one of </span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>CRLListID =
</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>or<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>OcspListID
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times =
New Roman","serif"'>or
</span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>OtherRevRefs</span><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>
should be present for all but the &quot;trusted&quot; CA of the =
certificate
path.</span><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The first =
question.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It seems to me that one can =
include an
empty CrlOcspRef (without any CRLListID or<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>OcspListID or OtherRevRefs) for =
a &#8220;trusted&#8221;
CA. Am I right? If one cannot do like that, then all =
&#8220;trusted&#8221; CA certificates
have to be placed at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. Which =
way is
right? Or may be both?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>The second =
question.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>It&#8217;s quite clear how to =
compose this
attribute in a simple CRL-only case. Now, let us use OCSP. Where should =
one
place a certificate of OCSP-responder? It would be great if one could =
place a
reference to this certificate in CompleteCertificateRefs (but it is in =
some way
prohibited by the phrase &#8220;It references the full set of =
<u>CA</u><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>certificates that &#8230; =
&#8221; in section
6.2.1). Let us assume that this certificate is no-check and one does not =
need
to place the corresponding CrlOcspRef into CompleteRevocationRefs =
attribute. Then
one have to equate such OCSP-responder certificate to a =
&#8220;trusted&#8221;
CA and either include an empty CrlOcspRef in CompleteRevocationRefs or =
place the
certificate at the end of CompleteCertificateRefs SEQUENCE. How should I =
solve
this?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Pavel
Smirnov<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Crypto-Pro<br>
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820<br>
WWW: </span><a href=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/" =
title=3D"http://www.cryptopro.ru/"><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'>http://www.CryptoPro.ru</span></a><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'><br>
e-mail: </span><a href=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru" =
title=3D"mailto:spv@CryptoPro.ru"><span
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'>spv@CryptoPro.ru</span></a><span
lang=3DEN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C87E17.3DBE7A20--



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23FqJLN041491 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:52:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m23FqJRq041490; Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:52:19 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from [10.20.30.162] (dsl-63-249-108-169.cruzio.com [63.249.108.169]) (authenticated bits=0) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23FpaAE041446 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:51:37 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from phoffman@imc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240807c3f1cc11e33a@[10.20.30.162]>
In-Reply-To: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
References: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:44:00 -0800
To: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2 AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
Cc: "ietf-smime@imc.org" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

At 3:06 PM +0100 3/3/08, Denis Pinkas wrote:
>  >>  >While I welcome this draft, everybody should take into
>>>>consideration that, if the SHA2 family happens to be broken
>>>>then we will be at risk.
>>>>This should be mentioned into the security considerations section.
>>>
>>>If an algorithm is cracked then isn't it obvious that we're in trouble?  No
>>>other algorithm document I could find says something like this so I'm
>>>inclined to not include this in the security considerations section.
>>
>>... or anywhere else. If any algorithm (hash, encryption, signing,
>>...) is broken, it is broken. Sean's right here.
>
>The message is the following: if the SHA2 family is broken, then you 
>had better
>to use two hash algorithms from a different family (e.g. use Whirlpool).

There is no consensus in the IETF that this statement is true. We 
have discussed it many times for many years. Adding such a sentence 
to this document without community agreement is wrong.

>We should also reference 
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-04.txt
>which allows to use two different hash functions (from different 
>families, if possible).

That's also inappropriate, given that this document covers many uses 
of SHA2 that are not related to multisig.



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23ExonH037974 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:59:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m23ExoZe037973; Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:59:50 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com (smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com [206.190.52.46]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with SMTP id m23Exmsm037958 for <ietf-smime@imc.org>; Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:59:49 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from turners@ieca.com)
Received: (qmail 29658 invoked from network); 3 Mar 2008 14:59:48 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO Wylie) (turners@ieca.com@96.241.6.93 with login) by smtp100.biz.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 3 Mar 2008 14:59:47 -0000
X-YMail-OSG: cFKq.ZgVM1kf2YQli2EY8EUR96w6U6HiRaRZfN9bS0q0NecOdmEuTGAJmgUC6DVhpPfC5AOAzbwVgddWd_9lTWjhrcnBCSBzuu9dEVbLlcDdsXT0ZajH8XQ.6ywiT1kaBimGjyYvHjWVud0-
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3
From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
To: "'Denis Pinkas'" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "'Paul Hoffman'" <phoffman@imc.org>, <ietf@ietf.org>
Cc: <ietf-smime@imc.org>
References: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
Subject: RE: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2 AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2008 09:52:22 -0500
Organization: IECA, Inc.
Message-ID: <01a601c87d3e$30166ec0$0301a8c0@Wylie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198
Thread-Index: Ach9Or1yeZ4A1pbWRUCsZ2HvCYwAngAApIUg
In-Reply-To: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Denis,

Responses are in-line.

spt 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org 
>[mailto:owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
>Sent: Monday, March 03, 2008 9:06 AM
>To: Paul Hoffman; Turner, Sean P.; ietf@ietf.org
>Cc: ietf-smime@imc.org
>Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2 
>AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
>
>
>Responses are in-line.
>
>(...)
>
>>>>There is a more substantive comment on the first paragraph 
>of section 
>>>>1.
>>>>
>>>>The text states:
>>>>
>>>>    If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms
>>>>    discussed in this document, then the implementation 
>MUST do so as
>>>>    described in this document.
>>>>
>>>>I believe the text should be:
>>>>
>>>>    If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms
>>>>    discussed in this document, then the implementation 
>MUST do so as
>>>>    described in [SHS].
>>>
>>>The algorithms aren't defined in this document only the OIDs 
>and where 
>>>they go in CMS ... so I still think it's actually "as described in 
>>>this document". But, Spencer suggests removing the sentences because 
>>>they're not needed and I tend to agree with him.
>>
>>Spencer wins on this one. The sentence doesn't make much sense in a 
>>standards-track document.
>
>It is important to know in which document the algorithms are 
>described in detail.
>Deleting the sentence would not solve my concern.

The 2nd sentence in the Intro says (or will say after I delete the and):
"The message digest algorithms are defined in [SHS]."  The 1st sentence in 3
references the DSS, X9.62, and RFC2313 for DSA, ECDSA, and RSA (we're moving
the references to 1st sentence of 2nd para. I think we're covered.

>>>  >A small discussion in the security considerations section on
>>>>the advantages (in particular in terms of performances versus
>>>>security) of using one or another function from the SHA2 
>family would 
>>>>be helpful.
>>>
>>>I'll see if I can't get something from NIST (or at least 
>point to it).
>>
>>I'll disagree with this. These are not security considerations; they 
>>are performance considerations. And pretty obvious ones at that.
>
>It is both performance and security. 
>The larger the hash is, the better is the security, but the 
>performance may be lower.

I don't really have a problem adding this sentence.

>>>  >While I welcome this draft, everybody should take into
>>>>consideration that, if the SHA2 family happens to be broken then we 
>>>>will be at risk.
>>>>This should be mentioned into the security considerations section.
>>>
>>>If an algorithm is cracked then isn't it obvious that we're in 
>>>trouble?  No other algorithm document I could find says 
>something like 
>>>this so I'm inclined to not include this in the security 
>considerations section.
>>
>>... or anywhere else. If any algorithm (hash, encryption, signing,
>>...) is broken, it is broken. Sean's right here.
>
>The message is the following: if the SHA2 family is broken, 
>then you had better to use two hash algorithms from a 
>different family (e.g. use Whirlpool).
>
>We should also reference 
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-04.txt
>which allows to use two different hash functions (from 
>different families, if possible).

I'm not sure we need to add this reference. 

>Denis
>
>
>



Received: from balder-227.proper.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23E74sp032440 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:07:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5/Submit) id m23E74Vf032436; Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:07:04 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: balder-227.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by balder-227.proper.com (8.13.5/8.13.5) with ESMTP id m23E71Vr032417; Mon, 3 Mar 2008 07:07:02 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from denis.pinkas@bull.net)
Received: from MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (msga-001.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.31]) by odin2.bull.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA34594; Mon, 3 Mar 2008 15:16:20 +0100
Received: from frcls4013 ([129.182.108.120]) by MSGA-001.frcl.bull.fr (Lotus Domino Release 5.0.11) with SMTP id 2008030315063619:192784 ; Mon, 3 Mar 2008 15:06:36 +0100 
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2008 15:06:29 +0100
From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
To: "Paul Hoffman" <phoffman@imc.org>, "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Cc: "ietf-smime@imc.org" <ietf-smime@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-sha2 (Using SHA2 AlgorithmswithCryptographic Message Syntax) to Proposed Standard
X-mailer: Foxmail 5.0 [-fr-]
Mime-Version: 1.0
X-MIMETrack: Itemize by SMTP Server on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11  |July 24, 2002) at 03/03/2008 15:06:36, Serialize by Router on MSGA-001/FR/BULL(Release 5.0.11  |July 24, 2002) at 03/03/2008 15:06:58, Serialize complete at 03/03/2008 15:06:58
Message-ID: <OF7159FE16.2E039B79-ONC1257401.004D8243@frcl.bull.fr>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Sender: owner-ietf-smime@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/>
List-ID: <ietf-smime.imc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-smime-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>

Responses are in-line.

(...)

>>>There is a more substantive comment on the first paragraph of
>>>section 1.
>>>
>>>The text states:
>>>
>>>    If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms
>>>    discussed in this document, then the implementation MUST do so as
>>>    described in this document.
>>>
>>>I believe the text should be:
>>>
>>>    If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms
>>>    discussed in this document, then the implementation MUST do so as
>>>    described in [SHS].
>>
>>The algorithms aren't defined in this document only the OIDs and where they
>>go in CMS ... so I still think it's actually "as described in this
>>document". But, Spencer suggests removing the sentences because they're not
>>needed and I tend to agree with him.
>
>Spencer wins on this one. The sentence doesn't make much sense in a 
>standards-track document.

It is important to know in which document the algorithms are described in detail.
Deleting the sentence would not solve my concern.

>>  >A small discussion in the security considerations section on
>>>the advantages (in particular in terms of performances versus
>>>security) of using one or another function from the SHA2
>>>family would be helpful.
>>
>>I'll see if I can't get something from NIST (or at least point to it).
>
>I'll disagree with this. These are not security considerations; they 
>are performance considerations. And pretty obvious ones at that.

It is both performance and security. 
The larger the hash is, the better is the security, but the performance may be lower.

>>  >While I welcome this draft, everybody should take into
>>>consideration that, if the SHA2 family happens to be broken
>>>then we will be at risk.
>>>This should be mentioned into the security considerations section.
>>
>>If an algorithm is cracked then isn't it obvious that we're in trouble?  No
>>other algorithm document I could find says something like this so I'm
>>inclined to not include this in the security considerations section.
>
>... or anywhere else. If any algorithm (hash, encryption, signing, 
>...) is broken, it is broken. Sean's right here.

The message is the following: if the SHA2 family is broken, then you had better 
to use two hash algorithms from a different family (e.g. use Whirlpool).

We should also reference http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-04.txt 
which allows to use two different hash functions (from different families, if possible).

Denis




