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From: "Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL" <jherzog@ll.mit.edu>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 2010 14:47:57 -0400
Thread-Topic: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
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Subject: Re: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
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Oh, goodness. Have I really let this lie, unanswered, for almost four =
months? Yes, yes I have. My apologies. In any case, let me reply to your =
concerns:=20

On Apr 10, 2010, at 8:31 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:

> Gentlemen,
>=20
> I have been reviewing this document I would like to suggest that it is
> either overgenerous in the set of cryptographic services that are =
provided
> or missing some pre-conditions that are necessary in order to obtain =
those
> services.
>=20
> In section 1 states that one of the services that is available is
> sender-authentication, however no restrictions are placed on when this
> service is available anyplace in the document that I can find.  I =
would like
> to suggest that is this not actually either a very strong service or =
one
> that is always available.
>=20
> Please consider the following sequence of actions:
>=20
> 1.  Alice sends a static-static Authenticated message to both Bob and
> Mallory.  Alice will use a static-static DH method to transport the =
key to
> Bob, it does not really matter what technique is use to transport the =
key to
> Mallory.  The important thing is just that this is one message and =
thus one
> authentication key.
>=20
> 2.  Mallory intercepts the message and prevents Bob from receiving it.
>=20
> 3.  Mallory creates a new message using the same authentication key =
that
> Alice generated to authenticate a new message.  Mallory may or may not
> include himself as a recipient of the message.
>=20
> 4.  Mallory sends the new message to Bob.
>=20
> 5.  Bob receives the message, validates the static-static DH works and
> authenticates the message.  Bob now believes that Alice was the =
original
> sender of the message.
>=20
> There is a difference in services one gets between an online protocol =
and a
> store-and-forward protocol.  For on-line you only ever get a pair-wise
> operation and you have the immediate check that the negotiation was
> successful.  This is lacking for the store-and-forward versions.
>=20
> This difference is only relevant if you are looking for
> sender-authentication of the messages that are sent.  Thus there are =
never
> an issue for an ephemeral-static version of the protocols.  Mallory =
could
> run the same sequence as above, but since there is no reason for Bob =
to
> believe that Alice sent the message, there is not a strong attack.

This is entirely correct, and an embarrassing oversight on our part. =
Your attack works entirely as advertised, and it is incorrect for us to =
claim that our proposal provides 'sender authentication.' =20


> In order to get a sender-authentication of a message one needs to do =
the
> following:
>=20
> 1.  Mandate in any protocol using this that only a single Recipient =
Info can
> ever occur in a message.
>=20
> 2.  Mandate that the ukm be present in the message and,
>=20
> 3.  Mandate that a timeliness element be included in the ukm. =20
>=20
> In any event, the sender-authentication can never be taking to a third =
party
> for verification since either party could have constructed the =
message.  Bob
> in fact could construct a message despite the fact that Alice has =
never sent
> a message to Bob.

Those are all good suggestions, but I think that we will take another =
approach entirely: dropping the claim of sender authentication. Sender =
authentication, was never our goal, actually. Rather, our goal was to =
provide a way for the message-sender to use a certified elliptic-curve =
Diffie-Hellman key. If we get that but not sender authentication, well, =
then so be it.

Therefore, we propose the following changes:

* Change the abstract to:

  "This document describes how to use 'static-static' Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman key-agreement with the Cryptographic Message Syntax.
   In this form of key-agreement, the Diffie-Hellman values of both
   sender and receiver are long-term values contained in certificates."

* In section 1 (at the end), we change:


   We note that like ephemeral-static ECDH, static-static ECDH creates a
   secret key shared by sender and receiver.  Unlike ephemeral-static
   ECDH, however, static-static ECDH uses a static key pair for the
   sender and therefore allows for the verification of the sender's
   identity.  Each of the three CMS structures discussed in this
   document (EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData)
   use these properties of static-static ECDH to achieve different
   goals:

   o  EnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide data
      confidentiality.  It will not necessarily, however, provide either
      sender-authentication or data integrity.

   o  AuthenticatedData uses static-static ECDH to provide sender-
      authentication and data-integrity.  It will not necessarily,
      however, provide confidentiality for the data.

   o  AuthEnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide all of
      confidentiality, sender-authentication, and data-integrity.

to



   We note that like ephemeral-static ECDH, static-static ECDH creates a
   secret key shared by sender and receiver.  Unlike ephemeral-static
   ECDH, however, static-static ECDH uses a static key pair for the
   sender.  Each of the three CMS structures discussed in this
   document (EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData)
   use static-static ECDH to achieve different goals:

   o  EnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide data
      confidentiality.  It will not necessarily, however, provide data=20=

      integrity.

   o  AuthenticatedData uses static-static ECDH to provide=20
      data-integrity.  It will not necessarily,
      however, provide confidentiality for the data.

   o  AuthEnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide both of
      confidentiality and data-integrity.

* In Section 5, we change

   AuthenticatedData or AuthEnvelopedData messages, on the other hand,
   are not given any form of ECDH by [CMS-ECC].  This is appropriate: it
   defines only ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman, and this form of
   Diffie-Hellman does not (inherently) provide any form of sender-
   authentication.  This document, on the other hand, requires that the
   sender use a certified public value.  Thus, this form of key-
   agreement provides implicit key authentication and, therefore,
   authentication of the sender.

to

   AuthenticatedData or AuthEnvelopedData messages, on the other hand,
   are not given any form of ECDH by [CMS-ECC].  This is appropriate: it
   defines only ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman, and this form of
   Diffie-Hellman does not (inherently) provide any form of data-origin
   authentication.  This document, on the other hand, requires that the
   sender use a certified public value.  Thus, this form of key-
   agreement provides implicit key authentication and, under some=20
   circumstances, data-origin authentication. (See Section 7.)


* In Section 7, we describe the attack you provide above. (Do you mind =
if I use your text as a starting point?) We then explain that =
data-origin cannot be guaranteed unless it is a priori guaranteed that =
the message be sent by the sender to exactly one recipient. And if =
that's not the case, data-origin must be provided by some other =
mechanism (such as digital signatures.)




> Other comments:
>=20
> 1.  As written the ukm descriptions are incorrect.  For section 2.1 - =
the
> correct order is.  If ukm is present, it contains the =
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo
> structure.  If the user wants to add a random value, it is placed in  =
the
> entityUInfo field of this structure.

I don't quite understand. RFC 5652 defines ukm as being a =
UserKeyingMaterial, which is then defined to be an OCTET STRING. What do =
you mean, then, when you say that ukm contains a structure?

BTW, the text in our draft, as submitted, mirrors the analogous section =
from RFC 5753:=20

       ...The ukm is
      placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo
      structure.  When present, the ukm is used to ensure that a
      different key-encryption key is generated, even when the ephemeral
      private key is improperly used more than once, by using the ECC-
      CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key derivation function...



> 2.  The bullet list in section 2.2. lists the ukm twice.  (The first =
bullet
> here is vastly confusing - perhaps a error in doing updates?

Oops. Yes, this was a minor edit gone wrong. The list should read:


   o  an integer "keydatalen", which is
      the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and

   o  the value of ukm, if used.


> 3.  Note 3278bis appears to have been published in January of this =
year, so
> saying that the update is a work in progress appears to be =
significantly out
> of date.

Thanks. We can actually remove the whole comment, since it is now moot.

> 4.  Several references to section 5 appear to be out of date.

Thanks. Will fix.

> 5.  You need to supply an ASN.1 module.  I have a personal preference =
to one
> that uses the new ASN.1 but could live with an 88 module if necessary.
> Doing so might expose some deficiencies in the document. =20

Do you really think so? We don't define any new ASN.1 structures or =
values. But if you do think that we need to provide an ASN.1 module, =
then please help me understand what you envision. What would this module =
contain that's not already in other modules, such as the one in Section =
12.1 of RFC 5652?

> 6.  You need to look at the document before it is published.  Having =
the
> document tin twice is somewhat crazy. =20

I'm sorry, but what is the 'document tin'?

Thanks again for your help.

--=20
Jonathan Herzog							voice:  =
(781) 981-2356
Technical Staff							fax:    =
(781) 981-7687
Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  =
jherzog@ll.mit.edu
MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:    =
http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
244 Wood Street   =20
Lexington, MA 02420-9185


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From prvs=5831adb493=jherzog@ll.mit.edu  Tue Aug  3 12:41:59 2010
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To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Thread-Topic: [smime] New ID of potential interest
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Cc: "Khazan, Roger  - 0668 - MITLL" <rkh@ll.mit.edu>, "smime@ietf.org" <smime@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [smime] New ID of potential interest
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Again with the four-month delay in replying. We apologize again, but do =
want to follow up on your suggestions below.

On Apr 10, 2010, at 9:07 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:

> A couple of questions and comments on this document
>=20
> 1.  Is there a reason not to make the sequence require at least two =
elements
> for a union and an intersection?

No, there is no reason. And the ASN.1 module can be easily changed to =
enforce the presence of at least two elements in the sequence. But what =
are the pros and cons of doing so? Will anything be gained by requiring =
that unions and intersections have at least two elements?

> 2.  For 'union' and 'intersection' I would prefer "This sequence MUST =
be
> non-empty." To be rendered as "The sequence of SetKeyParticipentSet =
values
> MUST be non-empty."  The first time I read this I mixed up the ASN.1
> sequence with the contents of the result of the union.

Good point. Thanks.

> 3.  Given that we are discussion SETs.  Are there any reasons not to =
impose
> some restrictions on those who create SetKetParticipentSet values so =
that
> they are not every empty?  Thus an intersection SHOULD NOT result in =
an
> empty result

I fear that might turn out to be an onerous run-time requirement. These =
sets might be represented by community-identifiers, remember. If we wish =
to enforce that intersections be non-empty (for example) then we are =
requiring that someone go chase down the membership-lists of all =
communities. That may be an undesirable run-time requirement for some =
settings.

Also, that requirement may not be well-defined, if these communities =
change. A set may be non-empty when generated, but become empty later as =
come component communities change their membership.

But let me ask: what is gained by requiring that generated SETs be =
non-empty?

> 4.  Are there any locations (such as SetMember) where you one should
> explicitly state that this field may be expanded at a later date with
> additional values that may need to be recognized as being present, =
even if
> they are not evaluated.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Can you rephrase?

> 5.  When doing an intersection, does none need to understand the value =
of
> SetMember, or can the evaluation be done on the ASN.1 encoding of the
> SetMember.   Specifically would one need to understand that a =
certificate
> containing a specific public key be identified EITHER by the pub key =
info or
> by the issuer/serial?

That's a very good question. I hadn't thought about it. Do you have any =
suggestions?

Thanks.


>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: smime-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:smime-bounces@ietf.org] On =
Behalf
>> Of Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL
>> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 11:14 AM
>> To: smime@ietf.org
>> Cc: Khazan, Roger - 0668 - MITLL
>> Subject: [smime] New ID of potential interest
>>=20
>>=20
>> I would like to inform the SMIME working group of a newly-submitted
>> Internet Draft that may be of interest:
>>=20
>> A set-key attribute for symmetric-key packages  =
draft-herzog-setkey-00
>>=20
>> Abstract
>>=20
>>   A set-key is a symmetric key (or set of keys) associated with an
>>   immutable set of participants.  This document defines a set-key
>>   attribute for use in the CMS-based symmetric-key package structure
>>   defined in in RFC XXXX. {{{ RFC Editor, please replace XXXX with =
the
>>   number assigned to draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat when it is
>>   published. }}}
>>=20
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-herzog-setkey/
>>=20
>> We welcome all comments and reviews.
>>=20
>> Thank you.
>>=20
>> --
>> Jonathan Herzog
>> Technical Staff, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
>> jherzog@ll.mit.edu
>=20


--=20
Jonathan Herzog							voice:  =
(781) 981-2356
Technical Staff							fax:    =
(781) 981-7687
Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  =
jherzog@ll.mit.edu
MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:    =
http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
244 Wood Street   =20
Lexington, MA 02420-9185


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From: "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: "'Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL'" <jherzog@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [smime] New ID of potential interest
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL [mailto:jherzog@ll.mit.edu]
> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 12:42 PM
> To: Jim Schaad
> Cc: Khazan, Roger - 0668 - MITLL; smime@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [smime] New ID of potential interest
> 
> 
> Again with the four-month delay in replying. We apologize again, but do
want to follow
> up on your suggestions below.
> 
> On Apr 10, 2010, at 9:07 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
> 
> > A couple of questions and comments on this document
> >
> > 1.  Is there a reason not to make the sequence require at least two
elements
> > for a union and an intersection?
> 
> No, there is no reason. And the ASN.1 module can be easily changed to
enforce the
> presence of at least two elements in the sequence. But what are the pros
and cons of
> doing so? Will anything be gained by requiring that unions and
intersections have at
> least two elements?

I see no down side to make this requirement - it avoids the need to parse
and evaluate a node in the tree that contains a union or an intersection of
one node.  This means that the tree is smaller as is the encoded attribute.

> 
> > 2.  For 'union' and 'intersection' I would prefer "This sequence MUST be
> > non-empty." To be rendered as "The sequence of SetKeyParticipentSet
values
> > MUST be non-empty."  The first time I read this I mixed up the ASN.1
> > sequence with the contents of the result of the union.
> 
> Good point. Thanks.
> 
> > 3.  Given that we are discussion SETs.  Are there any reasons not to
impose
> > some restrictions on those who create SetKetParticipentSet values so
that
> > they are not every empty?  Thus an intersection SHOULD NOT result in an
> > empty result
> 
> I fear that might turn out to be an onerous run-time requirement. These
sets might be
> represented by community-identifiers, remember. If we wish to enforce that
> intersections be non-empty (for example) then we are requiring that
someone go chase
> down the membership-lists of all communities. That may be an undesirable
run-time
> requirement for some settings.
> 
> Also, that requirement may not be well-defined, if these communities
change. A set may
> be non-empty when generated, but become empty later as come component
communities
> change their membership.
> 
> But let me ask: what is gained by requiring that generated SETs be
non-empty?

So yes there is a good reason not to require this is the leaf nodes can be
dynamic.  If they are static then doing a pre-evaluation would make things
smaller and faster for all clients to evaluate.

> 
> > 4.  Are there any locations (such as SetMember) where you one should
> > explicitly state that this field may be expanded at a later date with
> > additional values that may need to be recognized as being present, even
if
> > they are not evaluated.
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean here. Can you rephrase?

Are you ever going to want to add additional, currently unknown, items to
the structure SetMember?  If so do you want to require that they be handled
gracefully by people written to the current specification?  Similarly are
you ever going to want to add new operations to the SetKeyParticapantSet in
the future and how should existing clients deal with such items?

> 
> > 5.  When doing an intersection, does none need to understand the value
of
> > SetMember, or can the evaluation be done on the ASN.1 encoding of the
> > SetMember.   Specifically would one need to understand that a
certificate
> > containing a specific public key be identified EITHER by the pub key
info or
> > by the issuer/serial?
> 
> That's a very good question. I hadn't thought about it. Do you have any
suggestions?

So the first question that comes up is whether you are expecting this to be
evaluated in the context of a specific certificate (or set of certificates)
or is this to be evaluated and this later applied to a set of certificates.


In the second case one cannot say that an issuer serial number and a public
key info refer to the same certificate.  Part of the question can be
addressed as a security consideration and part by expected usage.  That is a
single community might only use a single way of identifying certificates and
thus the question is moot.

You might also have some problems from Alexy if you refer to things as
names, but you don't use a name form to store them in.  You might be better
using groupId rather than groupName  (same with participantName).  Note that
you don't currently seem to expect that you can get from a participantName
to a certificate to check for matches so the best rule might be that
different name forms are treated as different identifiers even if they can
later be mapped to the same individual.

> 
> Thanks.
> 
> 
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: smime-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:smime-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> >> Of Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL
> >> Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 11:14 AM
> >> To: smime@ietf.org
> >> Cc: Khazan, Roger - 0668 - MITLL
> >> Subject: [smime] New ID of potential interest
> >>
> >>
> >> I would like to inform the SMIME working group of a newly-submitted
> >> Internet Draft that may be of interest:
> >>
> >> A set-key attribute for symmetric-key packages  draft-herzog-setkey-00
> >>
> >> Abstract
> >>
> >>   A set-key is a symmetric key (or set of keys) associated with an
> >>   immutable set of participants.  This document defines a set-key
> >>   attribute for use in the CMS-based symmetric-key package structure
> >>   defined in in RFC XXXX. {{{ RFC Editor, please replace XXXX with the
> >>   number assigned to draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat when it is
> >>   published. }}}
> >>
> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-herzog-setkey/
> >>
> >> We welcome all comments and reviews.
> >>
> >> Thank you.
> >>
> >> --
> >> Jonathan Herzog
> >> Technical Staff, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
> >> jherzog@ll.mit.edu
> >
> 
> 
> --
> Jonathan Herzog
voice:  (781) 981-
> 2356
> Technical Staff							fax:
(781) 981-
> 7687
> Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  jherzog@ll.mit.edu
> MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:
> http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
> 244 Wood Street
> Lexington, MA 02420-9185



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Cc: "'Khazan, Roger  - 0668 - MITLL'" <rkh@ll.mit.edu>, smime@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
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I can easily understand how these things slip out.  I needed to find the
document in order to figure out what I was thinking of when I wrote some of
this.

Some comments in-line


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL [mailto:jherzog@ll.mit.edu]
> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 11:48 AM
> To: Jim Schaad
> Cc: Khazan, Roger - 0668 - MITLL; smime@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
> 
> 
> Oh, goodness. Have I really let this lie, unanswered, for almost four
> months? Yes, yes I have. My apologies. In any case, let me reply to
> your concerns:
> 
> On Apr 10, 2010, at 8:31 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
> 
> > Gentlemen,
> >
> > I have been reviewing this document I would like to suggest that it
> is
> > either overgenerous in the set of cryptographic services that are
> provided
> > or missing some pre-conditions that are necessary in order to obtain
> those
> > services.
> >
> > In section 1 states that one of the services that is available is
> > sender-authentication, however no restrictions are placed on when
> this
> > service is available anyplace in the document that I can find.  I
> would like
> > to suggest that is this not actually either a very strong service or
> one
> > that is always available.
> >
> > Please consider the following sequence of actions:
> >
> > 1.  Alice sends a static-static Authenticated message to both Bob and
> > Mallory.  Alice will use a static-static DH method to transport the
> key to
> > Bob, it does not really matter what technique is use to transport the
> key to
> > Mallory.  The important thing is just that this is one message and
> thus one
> > authentication key.
> >
> > 2.  Mallory intercepts the message and prevents Bob from receiving
> it.
> >
> > 3.  Mallory creates a new message using the same authentication key
> that
> > Alice generated to authenticate a new message.  Mallory may or may
> not
> > include himself as a recipient of the message.
> >
> > 4.  Mallory sends the new message to Bob.
> >
> > 5.  Bob receives the message, validates the static-static DH works
> and
> > authenticates the message.  Bob now believes that Alice was the
> original
> > sender of the message.
> >
> > There is a difference in services one gets between an online protocol
> and a
> > store-and-forward protocol.  For on-line you only ever get a pair-
> wise
> > operation and you have the immediate check that the negotiation was
> > successful.  This is lacking for the store-and-forward versions.
> >
> > This difference is only relevant if you are looking for
> > sender-authentication of the messages that are sent.  Thus there are
> never
> > an issue for an ephemeral-static version of the protocols.  Mallory
> could
> > run the same sequence as above, but since there is no reason for Bob
> to
> > believe that Alice sent the message, there is not a strong attack.
> 
> This is entirely correct, and an embarrassing oversight on our part.
> Your attack works entirely as advertised, and it is incorrect for us to
> claim that our proposal provides 'sender authentication.'
> 
> 
> > In order to get a sender-authentication of a message one needs to do
> the
> > following:
> >
> > 1.  Mandate in any protocol using this that only a single Recipient
> Info can
> > ever occur in a message.
> >
> > 2.  Mandate that the ukm be present in the message and,
> >
> > 3.  Mandate that a timeliness element be included in the ukm.
> >
> > In any event, the sender-authentication can never be taking to a
> third party
> > for verification since either party could have constructed the
> message.  Bob
> > in fact could construct a message despite the fact that Alice has
> never sent
> > a message to Bob.
> 
> Those are all good suggestions, but I think that we will take another
> approach entirely: dropping the claim of sender authentication. Sender
> authentication, was never our goal, actually. Rather, our goal was to
> provide a way for the message-sender to use a certified elliptic-curve
> Diffie-Hellman key. If we get that but not sender authentication, well,
> then so be it.
> 
> Therefore, we propose the following changes:
> 
> * Change the abstract to:
> 
>   "This document describes how to use 'static-static' Elliptic Curve
>    Diffie-Hellman key-agreement with the Cryptographic Message Syntax.
>    In this form of key-agreement, the Diffie-Hellman values of both
>    sender and receiver are long-term values contained in certificates."
> 
> * In section 1 (at the end), we change:
> 
> 
>    We note that like ephemeral-static ECDH, static-static ECDH creates
> a
>    secret key shared by sender and receiver.  Unlike ephemeral-static
>    ECDH, however, static-static ECDH uses a static key pair for the
>    sender and therefore allows for the verification of the sender's
>    identity.  Each of the three CMS structures discussed in this
>    document (EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData)
>    use these properties of static-static ECDH to achieve different
>    goals:
> 
>    o  EnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide data
>       confidentiality.  It will not necessarily, however, provide
> either
>       sender-authentication or data integrity.
> 
>    o  AuthenticatedData uses static-static ECDH to provide sender-
>       authentication and data-integrity.  It will not necessarily,
>       however, provide confidentiality for the data.
> 
>    o  AuthEnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide all of
>       confidentiality, sender-authentication, and data-integrity.
> 
> to
> 
> 
> 
>    We note that like ephemeral-static ECDH, static-static ECDH creates
> a
>    secret key shared by sender and receiver.  Unlike ephemeral-static
>    ECDH, however, static-static ECDH uses a static key pair for the
>    sender.  Each of the three CMS structures discussed in this
>    document (EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData)
>    use static-static ECDH to achieve different goals:
> 
>    o  EnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide data
>       confidentiality.  It will not necessarily, however, provide data
>       integrity.
> 
>    o  AuthenticatedData uses static-static ECDH to provide
>       data-integrity.  It will not necessarily,
>       however, provide confidentiality for the data.

It will not provide confidentiality for the data.  I would suggest removal
or amendment of the second sentence.

> 
>    o  AuthEnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide both of
>       confidentiality and data-integrity.
> 
> * In Section 5, we change
> 
>    AuthenticatedData or AuthEnvelopedData messages, on the other hand,
>    are not given any form of ECDH by [CMS-ECC].  This is appropriate:
> it
>    defines only ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman, and this form of
>    Diffie-Hellman does not (inherently) provide any form of sender-
>    authentication.  This document, on the other hand, requires that the
>    sender use a certified public value.  Thus, this form of key-
>    agreement provides implicit key authentication and, therefore,
>    authentication of the sender.
> 
> to
> 
>    AuthenticatedData or AuthEnvelopedData messages, on the other hand,
>    are not given any form of ECDH by [CMS-ECC].  This is appropriate:
> it
>    defines only ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman, and this form of
>    Diffie-Hellman does not (inherently) provide any form of data-origin
>    authentication.  This document, on the other hand, requires that the
>    sender use a certified public value.  Thus, this form of key-
>    agreement provides implicit key authentication and, under some
>    circumstances, data-origin authentication. (See Section 7.)
> 
> 
> * In Section 7, we describe the attack you provide above. (Do you mind
> if I use your text as a starting point?) We then explain that data-
> origin cannot be guaranteed unless it is a priori guaranteed that the
> message be sent by the sender to exactly one recipient. And if that's
> not the case, data-origin must be provided by some other mechanism
> (such as digital signatures.)
> 

You can steal the text wholesale for all I care.

> 
> 
> 
> > Other comments:
> >
> > 1.  As written the ukm descriptions are incorrect.  For section 2.1 -
> the
> > correct order is.  If ukm is present, it contains the ECC-CMS-
> SharedInfo
> > structure.  If the user wants to add a random value, it is placed in
> the
> > entityUInfo field of this structure.
> 
> I don't quite understand. RFC 5652 defines ukm as being a
> UserKeyingMaterial, which is then defined to be an OCTET STRING. What
> do you mean, then, when you say that ukm contains a structure?
> 
> BTW, the text in our draft, as submitted, mirrors the analogous section
> from RFC 5753:
> 
>        ...The ukm is
>       placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo
>       structure.  When present, the ukm is used to ensure that a
>       different key-encryption key is generated, even when the
> ephemeral
>       private key is improperly used more than once, by using the ECC-
>       CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key derivation function...
> 

You are correct - that is the way it is written.  I need to find some really
old code to find out if it is written correctly or if there is a problem in
how it is done.  For now please ignore this comment.

> 
> 
> > 2.  The bullet list in section 2.2. lists the ukm twice.  (The first
> bullet
> > here is vastly confusing - perhaps a error in doing updates?
> 
> Oops. Yes, this was a minor edit gone wrong. The list should read:
> 
> 
>    o  an integer "keydatalen", which is
>       the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and
> 
>    o  the value of ukm, if used.
> 
> 
> > 3.  Note 3278bis appears to have been published in January of this
> year, so
> > saying that the update is a work in progress appears to be
> significantly out
> > of date.
> 
> Thanks. We can actually remove the whole comment, since it is now moot.
> 
> > 4.  Several references to section 5 appear to be out of date.
> 
> Thanks. Will fix.
> 
> > 5.  You need to supply an ASN.1 module.  I have a personal preference
> to one
> > that uses the new ASN.1 but could live with an 88 module if
> necessary.
> > Doing so might expose some deficiencies in the document.
> 
> Do you really think so? We don't define any new ASN.1 structures or
> values. But if you do think that we need to provide an ASN.1 module,
> then please help me understand what you envision. What would this
> module contain that's not already in other modules, such as the one in
> Section 12.1 of RFC 5652?

Sorry - I thought that I had seen some OIDs defined by this document - but
they appear to have been defined in RFC 5753 so no you do not need a module.

> 
> > 6.  You need to look at the document before it is published.  Having
> the
> > document tin twice is somewhat crazy.
> 
> I'm sorry, but what is the 'document tin'?

Sorry - if you look at the document on line, then there are two copies of
the document in the .txt file.

> 
> Thanks again for your help.
> 
> --
> Jonathan Herzog
voice:  (781)
> 981-2356
> Technical Staff							fax:
(781)
> 981-7687
> Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  jherzog@ll.mit.edu
> MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:
> http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
> 244 Wood Street
> Lexington, MA 02420-9185



From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Wed Aug 11 10:45:56 2010
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Subject: [smime] STD 70, RFC 5652 on Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
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RFC 5652 has been elevated to a Full Standard.

        STD 70        
        RFC 5652

        Title:      Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 
        Author:     R. Housley
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       September 2009
        Mailbox:    housley@vigilsec.com
        Pages:      56
        Characters: 126813
        Obsoletes:  RFC3852
        See Also:   STD0070

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-smime-rfc3852bis-00.txt

        URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652.txt

This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).  This
syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt
arbitrary message content.  [STANDARDS TRACK]

This document is a product of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Standard Protocol.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet standards track
protocol for the Internet community,and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Internet
Official Protocol Standards (STD 1) for the standardization state and
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Subject: Re: [smime] STD 70, RFC 5652 on Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
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Congrats to all involved!

spt

rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote:
> RFC 5652 has been elevated to a Full Standard.
> 
>         STD 70        
>         RFC 5652
> 
>         Title:      Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 
>         Author:     R. Housley
>         Status:     Standards Track
>         Stream:     IETF
>         Date:       September 2009
>         Mailbox:    housley@vigilsec.com
>         Pages:      56
>         Characters: 126813
>         Obsoletes:  RFC3852
>         See Also:   STD0070
> 
>         I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-smime-rfc3852bis-00.txt
> 
>         URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652.txt
> 
> This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).  This
> syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt
> arbitrary message content.  [STANDARDS TRACK]
> 
> This document is a product of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> This is now a Standard Protocol.
> 
> STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet standards track
> protocol for the Internet community,and requests discussion and suggestions
> for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Internet
> Official Protocol Standards (STD 1) for the standardization state and
> status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
> 
> This announcement is sent to the IETF-Announce and rfc-dist lists.
> To subscribe or unsubscribe, see
>   http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
>   http://mailman.rfc-editor.org/mailman/listinfo/rfc-dist
> 
> For searching the RFC series, see http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfcsearch.html.
> For downloading RFCs, see http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc.html.
> 
> Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
> author of the RFC in question, or to rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org.  Unless
> specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
> unlimited distribution.
> 
> 
> The RFC Editor Team
> Association Management Solutions, LLC
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> smime mailing list
> smime@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/smime
> 

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From: "Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL" <jherzog@ll.mit.edu>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2010 16:18:14 -0400
Thread-Topic: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
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On Aug 10, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:

> I can easily understand how these things slip out.  I needed to find =
the
> document in order to figure out what I was thinking of when I wrote =
some of
> this.
>=20
> Some comments in-line

[snip]

>>   o  AuthenticatedData uses static-static ECDH to provide
>>      data-integrity.  It will not necessarily,
>>      however, provide confidentiality for the data.
>=20
> It will not provide confidentiality for the data.  I would suggest =
removal
> or amendment of the second sentence.

Done. Now reads: "It will not provide confidentiality for the data."

>> (Do you mind
>> if I use your text as a starting point?)
>>=20
>=20
> You can steal the text wholesale for all I care.

Thank you.


>=20
> Sorry - if you look at the document on line, then there are two copies =
of
> the document in the .txt file.



Really? My goodness, you're right. That's embarrassing. Thanks for =
pointing that out.=20

Anyway, let me attach the current draft. If you have no more comments on =
it, I'll check the references again and re-submit it next week.

Thanks.

--=20
Jonathan Herzog							voice:  =
(781) 981-2356
Technical Staff							fax:    =
(781) 981-7687
Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  =
jherzog@ll.mit.edu
MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:    =
http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
244 Wood Street   =20
Lexington, MA 02420-9185


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Network Working Group                                          J. Herzog
Internet-Draft                                                 R. Khazan
Intended status: Informational                    MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Expires: February 12, 2011                               August 11, 2010


  Use of static-static Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement in
                      Cryptographic Message Syntax
                      draft-herzog-static-ecdh-02

Abstract

   This document describes how to use 'static-static' Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman key-agreement with the Cryptographic Message Syntax.
   In this form of key-agreement, the Diffie-Hellman values of both
   sender and receiver are long-term values contained in certificates.

Disclaimer

   This work is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Air Force
   Contract FA8721-05-C-0002.  Opinions, interpretations, conclusions
   and recommendations are those of the authors and are not necessarily
   endorsed by the United States Government.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 12, 2011.

Copyright Notice



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   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  EnvelopedData using static-static ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo  . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Actions of the sending agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.3.  Actions of the receiving agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  AuthenticatedData using static-static ECDH . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo  . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Actions of the sending agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.3.  Actions of the receiving agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  AuthEnvelopedData using static-static ECDH . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Actions of the sending agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.3.  Actions of the receiving agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Comparison to [CMS-ECC]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Requirements and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Security considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14














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1.  Introduction

   This document describes how to use the static-static Elliptic-Curve
   Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme [SEC1] in the Cryptographic
   Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS].  The CMS is a standard notation and
   representation for cryptographic messages.  CMS uses ASN.1 notation
   [X.680] [X.681] [X.682] [X.683] to define a number of structures that
   carry both cryptographically-protected information and key-management
   information regarding the keys used.  Of particular interest here are
   three structures:

   o  EnvelopedData, which holds encrypted (but not necessarily
      authenticated) information [CMS],

   o  AuthenticatedData, which holds authenticated (MACed) information
      [CMS], and

   o  AuthEnvelopedData, which holds information protected by
      authenticated encryption: a cryptographic scheme that combines
      encryption and authentication [CMS-AUTHENV].

   All three of these types share the same basic structure.  First, a
   fresh symmetric key is generated.  This symmetric key has a different
   name that reflects its usage in each of the three structures.
   EnvelopedData uses a content-encryption key (CEK); AuthenticatedData
   uses an authentication key; AuthEnvelopedData uses a content-
   authenticated-encryption key.  The originator uses the symmetric key
   to cryptographically protect the content.  The symmetric key is then
   used wrapped for each recipient; only the intended recipient has
   access to the private keying material necessary to unwrap the
   symmetric key.  Once unwrapped, the recipient uses the symmetric key
   to decrypt the content, check the integrity of the content, or both.
   The CMS supports several different approaches to symmetric key
   wrapping, including:

   o  key transport: the symmetric key is encrypted using the public
      encryption key of some recipient,

   o  key-encryption key: the symmetric key is encrypted using a
      previously-distributed symmetric key, and

   o  key agreement: the symmetric key is encrypted using a key-
      encryption key (KEK) created using a key-agreement scheme and a
      key-derivation function (KDF).

   One such key-agreement scheme is the Diffie-Hellman algorithm [DH]
   which uses group-theory to produce a value known only to its two
   participants.  In this case, the participants are the originator and



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   one of the recipients.  Each participant produces a private value and
   a public value, and each participant can produce the shared secret
   value from their own private value and their counterpart's public
   value.  There are some variations on the basic algorithm:

   o  The basic algorithm typically uses the group 'Z mod p', meaning
      the set of integers modulo some prime p.  One can also use an
      elliptic-curve group, which allows for shorter messages.

   o  Over elliptic-curve groups, the standard algorithm can be extended
      to incorporate the 'cofactor' of the group (see [SEC1] for more
      details).  This method, called 'cofactor Elliptic Curve Diffie-
      Hellman', can prevent certain attacks possible in the elliptic-
      curve group.

   o  The participants can generate fresh new public/private values
      (called ephemeral values) for each run of the algorithm, or they
      can re-use long-term values (called static values).  Ephemeral
      values add randomness to the resulting private value, while static
      values can be embedded in certificates.  The two participants do
      not need to use the same kind of value: either participant can use
      either type.  In 'ephemeral-static' Diffie-Hellman, for example,
      the sender uses an ephemeral public/private pair value while the
      receiver uses a static pair.  In 'static-static' Diffie-Hellman,
      on the other hand, both participants use static pairs.  (Receivers
      cannot use ephemeral values in this setting, and so we ignore
      ephemeral-ephemeral and static-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman in this
      document.)

   Several of these variations are already described in existing CMS
   standards.  [CMS-ALG] contains the conventions for using for
   ephemeral-static and static-static Diffie-Hellman over the 'basic' (Z
   mod p) group.  [CMS-ECC] contains the conventions for using
   ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman over elliptic curves (both standard
   and cofactor methods).  It does not, however, contain conventions for
   using either method of static-static Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman,
   preferring to discuss the ECMQV algorithm instead.

   In this document, we specify the conventions for using static-static
   Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for both standard and cofactor
   methods.  Our motivations are three-fold:

   1.  Intellectual-property concerns have hindered market adoptation of
       the ECMQV algorithm,

   2.  ECMQV has been removed from the National Security Agency's Suite
       B of cryptographic algorithms, and




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   3.  ECMQV requires the sender to create a fresh random value for each
       recipient.  While the incorporation of per-session randomness is
       good cryptographic practice, ECMQV fixes the size of this
       randomness: that of one elliptic-curve point.  For low-bandwidth
       networks, it may be necessary to use smaller amounts of per-
       recipient randomness.

   We note that like ephemeral-static ECDH, static-static ECDH creates a
   secret key shared by sender and receiver.  Unlike ephemeral-static
   ECDH, however, static-static ECDH uses a static key pair for the
   sender.  Each of the three CMS structures discussed in this document
   (EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData) uses
   static-static ECDH to achieve different goals:

   o  EnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide data
      confidentiality.  It will not necessarily, however, provide data
      integrity.

   o  AuthenticatedData uses static-static ECDH to provide data-
      integrity.  It will not provide data-confidentiality.

   o  AuthEnvelopedData uses static-static ECDH to provide both of
      confidentiality and data-integrity.

1.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].


2.  EnvelopedData using static-static ECDH

   If an implementation uses static-static ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData
   then the following techniques and formats MUST be used.  The fields
   of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as static-static ECDH is a key
   agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.  When
   using static-static ECDH, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY
   include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
   formation of the pairwise key.

2.1.  Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   When using static-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo [CMS] are:

   o  version MUST be 3.




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   o  originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender.  It
      MUST be either issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and
      point to one of the sending agent's certificates.

   o  ukm MAY be present or absent.  However, message originators SHOULD
      include the ukm.  As specified in [CMS], implementations MUST
      support ukm message recipient processing, so interoperability is
      not a concern if the ukm is present or absent.  The use of a fresh
      value for ukm will ensure that a different key is generated for
      each message between the same sender and receiver. ukm, if
      present, is placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC-CMS-
      SharedInfo structure [CMS-ECC] and therefore used as an input to
      the key derivation function.

   o  keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the
      key encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement
      algorithm (see Section 5).  The parameters field contains
      KeyWrapAlgorithm.  The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm
      identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used
      to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key-
      encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters (see
      Section 5).

   o  recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted CEK
      for each recipient.  The RecipientEncryptedKey
      KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
      issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
      the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
      from the recipient's certificate.  In both cases, the recipient's
      certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH public key.
      RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the content-
      encryption key encrypted with the static-static ECDH-generated
      pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the
      KeyWrapAlgorithm.

2.2.  Actions of the sending agent

   When using static-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending agent
   first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters
   (e.g. from the recipient's certificate).  It confirms that both
   certificates contain public-key values with the same curve
   parameters, and that both of these public-key values are marked as
   appropriate for ECDH (that is, marked with algorithm-identifiers id-
   ecPublicKey or id-ecDH [PKI-ECC]).  The sender then determines:

   o  whether to use standard or cofactor Diffie-Hellman, and





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   o  which hash algorithms to use for the key-derivation function.

   The sender then chooses keyEncryptionAlgorithm that reflects these
   choices.  It then determines:

   o  an integer "keydatalen", which is the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric
      key-size in bits, and

   o  the value of ukm, if used.

   The sender then determines a bit string "SharedInfo", which is the
   DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2 of [CMS-ECC]).
   The sending agent then performs the key agreement operation of the
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SEC1] and the KDF
   defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the hash algorithm identified
   in the key agreement algorithm.  As a result the sending agent
   obtains a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
   key-encryption key (KEK) to wrap the CEK for that recipient, as
   specified in [CMS].

2.3.  Actions of the receiving agent

   When using static-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
   retrieves keyEncryptionAlgorithm to determine the key-agreement
   algorithm chosen by the sender, which will identify:

   o  the domain-parameters of the curve used,

   o  whether standard or cofactor Diffie-Hellman was used, and

   o  which hash-function was used for the KDF.

   The receiver then retrieves the static EC public key identified in
   the rid field.  It confirms that both certificates contain public-key
   values associated with the curve identified by the
   keyEncryptionAlgorithm, and that both of these public-key values are
   marked as appropriate for ECDH (that is, marked with algorithm-
   identifiers id-ecPublicKey or id-ecDH [PKI-ECC]).  The receiver then
   determines a bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of
   ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2 of [CMS-ECC]) and performs the
   key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme
   specified in [SEC1]; in either case, use the KDF defined in Section
   3.6.1 of [SEC1].  As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared
   secret bit string "K", which it uses as the pairwise key-encryption
   key to unwrap the CEK.






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3.  AuthenticatedData using static-static ECDH

   This section describes how to use the static-static ECDH key
   agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData.  When using static-static
   ECDH with AuthenticatedData, the fields of AuthenticatedData are as
   in [CMS], but with the following restrictions:

   o  macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message
      authentication code (MAC) algorithm which MUST be one of the
      following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id- hmacWITHSHA256, id-
      hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512.  (See Section 5.)

   o  digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
      algorithm which MUST be one of the following: id-sha1, id-sha224,
      id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-sha512.  (See Section 5.)

   As static-static ECDH is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo
   kari choice is used in the AuthenticatedData.  When using static-
   static ECDH, the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY include
   the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of
   the pairwise key.

3.1.  Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
   same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 2.1 of this document.  The
   authentication key is wrapped in the same manner as is described
   there for the content-encryption key.

3.2.  Actions of the sending agent

   The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   static-static ECDH, as specified in Section 2.2 of this document.

3.3.  Actions of the receiving agent

   The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   static-static ECDH, as specified in Section 2.3 of this document.


4.  AuthEnvelopedData using static-static ECDH

   When using static-static ECDH with AuthEnvelopedData, the fields of
   AuthEnvelopedData are as in [CMS-AUTHENV].  As static-static ECDH is
   a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.
   When using static-static ECDH, the AuthEnvelopedData originatorInfo
   field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public key used in



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   the formation of the pairwise key.

4.1.  Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
   same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 2.1 of this document.  The
   content-authenticated-encryption key is wrapped in the same manner as
   is described there for the content-encryption key.

4.2.  Actions of the sending agent

   The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   static-static ECDH, as specified in Section 2.2 of this document.

4.3.  Actions of the receiving agent

   The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   static-static ECDH, as specified in Section 2.3 of this document.


5.  Comparison to [CMS-ECC]

   This document defines the use of static-static ECDH for
   EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData.  The
   standard [CMS-ECC] defines ephemeral-static ECDH for EnvelopedData
   only.

   With regard to EnvelopedData, this document and [CMS-ECC] greatly
   parallel each other.  Both specify how to apply Elliptic-Curve
   Diffie-Hellman, and differ only on how the sender's public value is
   to be communicated to the recipient.  In [CMS-ECC], the sender
   provides the public value explicitly by including an
   OriginatorPublicKey value in the originator field of
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.  In this document, the sender include a
   reference to a (certified) public value by including either an
   IssuerAndSerialNumber or SubjectKeyIdentifier value in the same
   field.  Put another way, [CMS-ECC] provides an interpretation of a
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure where:

   o  the keyEncryptionAlgorithm value indicates Elliptic-Curve Diffie-
      Hellman, and

   o  the originator field contains a OriginatorPublicKey value.

   This document, on the other hand, provides an interpretation of a
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure where




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   o  the keyEncryptionAlgorithm value indicates Elliptic-Curve Diffie-
      Hellman, and

   o  the originator field contains either a IssuerAndSerialNumber value
      or a SubjectKeyIdentifier value.


   AuthenticatedData or AuthEnvelopedData messages, on the other hand,
   are not given any form of ECDH by [CMS-ECC].  This is appropriate:
   that document only defines ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman, and this
   form of Diffie-Hellman does not (inherently) provide any form of
   data-authentication or data-origin authentication.  This document, on
   the other hand, requires that the sender use a certified public
   value.  Thus, this form of key-agreement provides implicit key
   authentication and, under some limited circumstances, data-origin
   authentication.  (See Section 7.)

   This document does not define any new ASN.1 structures or algorithm
   identifiers.  It provides new ways to interpret structures from [CMS]
   and [CMS-ECC], and allows previously-defined algorithms to be used
   under these new interpretations.  Specifically:

   o  The ECDH key-agreement algorithm-identifiers from [CMS-ECC] define
      only how Diffie-Hellman values are processed, not where these
      values are created.  Therefore, they can be used for static-static
      ECDH with no changes.

   o  The key-wrap, MAC, and digest algorithms referenced in [CMS-ECC]
      describe how the secret key is to be used, not created.
      Therefore, they can be used with keys from static-static ECDH
      without modification.


6.  Requirements and Recommendations

   It is RECOMMENDED that implementations of this specification support
   AuthenticatedData and EnvelopedData.  Support for AuthEnvelopedData
   is OPTIONAL.

   Implementations that support this specification MUST support standard
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman, and these implementation MAY also
   support cofactor Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.

   In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use
   the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ECC].

   Implementations that support standard static-static Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman:



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      MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement
      algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-
      aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and,

      MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
      stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and
      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the
      id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
      algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256-cbc
      content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be
      supported.

   Implementations that support cofactor static-static Elliptic-Curve
   Diffie-Hellman:

      MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
      agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
      the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and,

      MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
      cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
      sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
      aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the des-
      ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256-cbc content encryption
      algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported.


7.  Security considerations

   All security considerations in Section 9 of [CMS-ECC] apply.

   Extreme care must be used when using static-static Diffie-Hellman
   (either standard or cofactor) without the use of some per-message
   value in ukm.  If no message-specific information is used (such as a
   counter value, or a fresh random string) then the resulting secret
   key could be used in more than one message.  Under some
   circumstances, this will open the sender to the 'small subgroup'
   attack [MenezesUstaoglu] or other, yet-undiscovered attacks on re-
   used Diffie-Hellman keys.  Applications that cannot tolerate the
   inclusion of per-message information in ukm (due to bandwidth
   requirements, for example) SHOULD NOT use static-static ECDH for a
   recipient without ascertaining that the recipient knows the private
   value associated with their certified Diffie-Hellman value.  Static-
   static Diffie-Hellman, when used as described in this document, does
   not necessarily provide data-origin authentication.  Consder, for
   example, the following sequence of events:




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   o  Alice sends an AuthEnvelopedData message to both Bob and Mallory.
      Furthermore, Alice uses a static-static DH method to transport the
      content-authenticated-encryption key to Bob, and some arbitrary
      method to transport the same key to Mallory.

   o  Mallory intercepts the message and prevents Bob from receiving it.

   o  Mallory recovers the content-authenticated-encryption key from the
      message received from Alice.  Mallory then creates new plaintext
      of her choice, and encrypts it using the same authenticated-
      encryption algorithm and the same content-authenticated-encryption
      key used by Alice.

   o  Mallory then replaces the EncryptedContentInfo and
      MessageAuthenticationCode fields of Alice's message with the
      values Mallory just generated.  She may additionally remove her
      RecipientInfo value from Alice's message.

   o  Mallory sends the modified message to Bob.

   o  Bob receives the message, validates the static-static DH works and
      decrypts/authenticates the message.

   At this point, Bob has received and validated a message that appears
   to have been sent by Alice, but whose content was chosen by Mallory.
   Mallory may not even be an apparent reciever of the modified message.
   Thus, this use of static-static Diffie-Hellman does not necessarily
   provide data-origin authentication.  (We note that this example does
   not also contradict either confidentiality or data-authentication:
   Alice's message was not received by anyone not intended by Alice, and
   Mallory's message was not modified before reaching Bob.)  More
   generally, data-origin may not be authenticated unless

   o  It is a priori guaranteed that the message in question was sent to
      exactly one recipient, or

   o  Data-origin authentication is provided by some other mechanism
      (such as digital signatures).


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [CMS]      Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Request
              For Comments 5652, September 2009.

   [CMS-AUTHENV]



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              Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
              Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", Request For
              Comments 5083, November 2007.

   [CMS-ECC]  Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
              Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
              Syntax (CMS)", Request For Comments 5753, January 2010.

   [MUST]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", Request For Comments 2119,
              March 1997.

   [PKI-ECC]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", Request For Comments 5480, March 2009.

   [SEC1]     Brown, D., "Standards for Efficient Cryptography 1 (SEC
              1)", Standards for Efficient Cryptography 1, May 2009.

8.2.  Informative References

   [CMS-ALG]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
              Algorithms", Request For Comments 3370, August 2002.

   [DH]       Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
              Request For Comments 2631, June 1999.

   [MenezesUstaoglu]
              Menezes, A. and B. Ustaoglu, "On Reusing Ephemeral Keys in
              Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocols".

              International Journal of Applied Cryptography, to appear.

   [X.680]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One", Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002, 2002.

   [X.681]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Information Object Specifcation",
              Recommendation X.681, ISO/IEC 8824-2:2002, 2002.

   [X.682]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Constraint Specification", Recommendation X.682, ISO/
              IEC 8824-3:2002, 2002.

   [X.683]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications",
              Recommendation X.683, ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002, 2002.




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Authors' Addresses

   Jonathan C. Herzog
   MIT Lincoln Laboratory
   244 Wood St.
   Lexington, MA  02144
   USA

   Email: jherzog@ll.mit.edu


   Roger Khazan
   MIT Lincoln Laboratory
   244 Wood St.
   Lexington, MA  02144
   USA

   Email: rkh@ll.mit.edu

































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From: "Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL" <jherzog@ll.mit.edu>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2010 12:27:38 -0400
Thread-Topic: [smime] New ID of potential interest
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On Aug 10, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
>>=20
>> On Apr 10, 2010, at 9:07 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
>>=20
>>> A couple of questions and comments on this document
>>>=20
>>> 1.  Is there a reason not to make the sequence require at least two
> elements
>>> for a union and an intersection?
>>=20
>> No, there is no reason. And the ASN.1 module can be easily changed to
> enforce the
>> presence of at least two elements in the sequence. But what are the =
pros
> and cons of
>> doing so? Will anything be gained by requiring that unions and
> intersections have at
>> least two elements?
>=20
> I see no down side to make this requirement - it avoids the need to =
parse
> and evaluate a node in the tree that contains a union or an =
intersection of
> one node.  This means that the tree is smaller as is the encoded =
attribute.

Makes sense. I'll change it.


>>> 3.  Given that we are discussion SETs.  Are there any reasons not to
> impose
>>> some restrictions on those who create SetKetParticipentSet values so
> that
>>> they are not every empty?  Thus an intersection SHOULD NOT result in =
an
>>> empty result
>>=20
>> I fear that might turn out to be an onerous run-time requirement. =
These
> sets might be
>> represented by community-identifiers, remember. If we wish to enforce =
that
>> intersections be non-empty (for example) then we are requiring that
> someone go chase
>> down the membership-lists of all communities. That may be an =
undesirable
> run-time
>> requirement for some settings.
>>=20
>> Also, that requirement may not be well-defined, if these communities
> change. A set may
>> be non-empty when generated, but become empty later as come component
> communities
>> change their membership.
>>=20
>> But let me ask: what is gained by requiring that generated SETs be
> non-empty?
>=20
> So yes there is a good reason not to require this is the leaf nodes =
can be
> dynamic.  If they are static then doing a pre-evaluation would make =
things
> smaller and faster for all clients to evaluate.

I'll make that clear in the document.


>>=20
>>> 4.  Are there any locations (such as SetMember) where you one should
>>> explicitly state that this field may be expanded at a later date =
with
>>> additional values that may need to be recognized as being present, =
even
> if
>>> they are not evaluated.
>>=20
>> I'm not sure what you mean here. Can you rephrase?
>=20
> Are you ever going to want to add additional, currently unknown, items =
to
> the structure SetMember?  If so do you want to require that they be =
handled
> gracefully by people written to the current specification?  Similarly =
are
> you ever going to want to add new operations to the =
SetKeyParticapantSet in
> the future and how should existing clients deal with such items?

Ah, I see what you are asking. Good question. We'd like keep this as =
extensible as possible, and so what you say makes sense. But I don't =
immediately see what it means to 'handle gracefully' the case where one =
doesn't know how to interpret a set. For example, what would it mean to =
'handle gracefully' the case where the set is=20

  Intersection of (set A) and (X)

when you don't know how to interpret X? I suspect the answer depends on =
the intended use of this attribute, which can differ from setting to =
setting.

Given that we can't define what it means to 'handle gracefully' the case =
where current implementations encounter future extensions, I don't think =
we should require it in the spec. But at the same time, we don't want to =
rule out future extensions. Here's an alternate idea: what if we were to =
include a version number in this attribute? Then we could simply =
increment this version-number when we extend the attribute. Also, =
implementations would be able to tell right away whether or not they =
would understand the set-representation of the attribute. They would =
then either process the attribute to get the so-represented set, or =
gracefully handle the attribute as they would a completely unfamiliar =
attribute.=20



>>=20
>>> 5.  When doing an intersection, does none need to understand the =
value
> of
>>> SetMember, or can the evaluation be done on the ASN.1 encoding of =
the
>>> SetMember.   Specifically would one need to understand that a
> certificate
>>> containing a specific public key be identified EITHER by the pub key
> info or
>>> by the issuer/serial?
>>=20
>> That's a very good question. I hadn't thought about it. Do you have =
any
> suggestions?
>=20
> So the first question that comes up is whether you are expecting this =
to be
> evaluated in the context of a specific certificate (or set of =
certificates)
> or is this to be evaluated and this later applied to a set of =
certificates.

I'm not sure what you mean, but I don't envision that a public key would =
be included in a set-definition between creation and certification. That =
is, by the time a public key gets to the point where it will be used in =
a set definition, then one of the two following statements is true:

1) It has already been put in a certificate, and therefore can be =
referenced by issuer/serial number, or
2) It is an ephemeral/anonymous key, and will *never* be embedded in a =
certificate.

If this is a reasonable assumption, then we might simply wave the =
problem away by specifying that it is invalid to refer to a key using =
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo form when it could also be referenced using the =
IssuerAndSerialNumber form. But I'm not sure that the underlying =
assumption is valid...

I'm trying to think of how this might come up. Suppose that the same key =
were referred to in two different ways-- once using =
IssuerAndSerialNumber (the 'I' form), and once as SubjectPublicKeyInfo =
(the 'S' form). Lets further suppose that implementations believed that =
the two forms referred to two different keys. Then how could things go =
wrong?

* They could mis-count the number of elements in a set. They could count =
the key twice, for example, believing there to be one more person/key in =
the set than there really is.

* They can also over-count the number of elements in the set if they =
encounter the form "{I} SetDiff {S}". This set should be empty, but the =
implementation may believe that it is actually equivalent to the set =
{I}.=20

* Then again, they might undercount the number of elements in a set if =
they encounter the form "{I} Intersection {S}". This set actually =
contains the key in question, but might be mistaken for empty.

I think what I will propose is that when creating a SetKey attribute, =
implementations that wish to name a certified key SHOULD use the issuer =
and serial number form. However, implementations that receive and =
process a SetKey attribute SHOULD NOT regard different names as always =
indicating different keys.  And that I add a section to the document =
explaining these pitfalls.


> In the second case one cannot say that an issuer serial number and a =
public
> key info refer to the same certificate.  Part of the question can be
> addressed as a security consideration and part by expected usage.  =
That is a
> single community might only use a single way of identifying =
certificates and
> thus the question is moot.

For our intended usage, it is the case that a given community would use =
only one way to refer to a certificate.


> You might also have some problems from Alexy if you refer to things as
> names, but you don't use a name form to store them in.  You might be =
better
> using groupId rather than groupName  (same with participantName).  =
Note that
> you don't currently seem to expect that you can get from a =
participantName
> to a certificate to check for matches so the best rule might be that
> different name forms are treated as different identifiers even if they =
can
> later be mapped to the same individual.


Will do.


While you chew on this, I'll go ahead and make the changes described =
above and send the new version to you.


Thanks for your comments.
--=20
Jonathan Herzog							voice:  =
(781) 981-2356
Technical Staff							fax:    =
(781) 981-7687
Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  =
jherzog@ll.mit.edu
MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:    =
http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
244 Wood Street   =20
Lexington, MA 02420-9185


--Apple-Mail-40-528064251
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	charset=us-ascii

<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><br><div><div>On Aug 10, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Jim Schaad =
wrote:</div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><font=
 class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
color=3D"#000000"><br></font></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">On =
Apr 10, 2010, at 9:07 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">A couple of questions and comments on this =
document<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">1. &nbsp;Is there a reason not =
to make the sequence require at least =
two<br></blockquote></blockquote>elements<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">for a union and an =
intersection?<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">No, there is no =
reason. And the ASN.1 module can be easily changed =
to<br></blockquote>enforce the<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">presence of =
at least two elements in the sequence. But what are the =
pros<br></blockquote>and cons of<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">doing so? =
Will anything be gained by requiring that unions =
and<br></blockquote>intersections have at<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">least two elements?<br></blockquote><br>I see no down side =
to make this requirement - it avoids the need to parse<br>and evaluate a =
node in the tree that contains a union or an intersection of<br>one =
node. &nbsp;This means that the tree is smaller as is the encoded =
attribute.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Makes sense. I'll =
change it.</div><div><br></div><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">3. =
&nbsp;Given that we are discussion SETs. &nbsp;Are there any reasons not =
to<br></blockquote></blockquote>impose<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">some restrictions on those who =
create SetKetParticipentSet values =
so<br></blockquote></blockquote>that<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">they are not every empty? =
&nbsp;Thus an intersection SHOULD NOT result in =
an<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">empty result<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">I fear that =
might turn out to be an onerous run-time requirement. =
These<br></blockquote>sets might be<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">represented by community-identifiers, remember. If we wish =
to enforce that<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">intersections =
be non-empty (for example) then we are requiring =
that<br></blockquote>someone go chase<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">down =
the membership-lists of all communities. That may be an =
undesirable<br></blockquote>run-time<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">requirement for some settings.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Also, that =
requirement may not be well-defined, if these =
communities<br></blockquote>change. A set may<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">be non-empty when generated, but become empty later as =
come component<br></blockquote>communities<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">change their membership.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">But let me ask: =
what is gained by requiring that generated SETs =
be<br></blockquote>non-empty?<br><br>So yes there is a good reason not =
to require this is the leaf nodes can be<br>dynamic. &nbsp;If they are =
static then doing a pre-evaluation would make things<br>smaller and =
faster for all clients to =
evaluate.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I'll make that clear =
in the document.</div><div><br></div><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">4. &nbsp;Are there any locations =
(such as SetMember) where you one =
should<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">explicitly state that this field may be expanded at a =
later date with<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">additional values that may need =
to be recognized as being present, =
even<br></blockquote></blockquote>if<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">they are not =
evaluated.<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">I'm not sure =
what you mean here. Can you rephrase?<br></blockquote><br>Are you ever =
going to want to add additional, currently unknown, items to<br>the =
structure SetMember? &nbsp;If so do you want to require that they be =
handled<br>gracefully by people written to the current specification? =
&nbsp;Similarly are<br>you ever going to want to add new operations to =
the SetKeyParticapantSet in<br>the future and how should existing =
clients deal with such =
items?<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ah, I see what you are =
asking. Good question. We'd like keep this as extensible as possible, =
and so what you say makes sense. But I don't immediately see what it =
means to 'handle gracefully' the case where one doesn't know how to =
interpret a set. For example, what would it mean to 'handle gracefully' =
the case where the set =
is&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp;Intersection of (set A) =
and (X)</div><div><br></div><div>when you don't know how to interpret X? =
I suspect the answer depends on the intended use of this attribute, =
which can differ from setting to setting.</div><div><br></div><div>Given =
that we can't define what it means to 'handle gracefully' the case where =
current implementations encounter future extensions, I don't think we =
should require it in the spec.&nbsp;But at the same time, we don't want =
to rule out future extensions. Here's an alternate idea: what if we were =
to include a version number in this attribute? Then we could simply =
increment this version-number when we extend the attribute. =
Also,&nbsp;implementations would be able to tell right away whether or =
not they would understand the set-representation of the attribute. They =
would then either process the attribute to get the so-represented set, =
or gracefully handle the attribute as they would a completely unfamiliar =
attribute.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">5. &nbsp;When doing an =
intersection, does none need to understand the =
value<br></blockquote></blockquote>of<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">SetMember, or can the evaluation =
be done on the ASN.1 encoding of =
the<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">SetMember. &nbsp;&nbsp;Specifically would one need to =
understand that =
a<br></blockquote></blockquote>certificate<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">containing a specific public key =
be identified EITHER by the pub key<br></blockquote></blockquote>info =
or<br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">by the =
issuer/serial?<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">That's a very =
good question. I hadn't thought about it. Do you have =
any<br></blockquote>suggestions?<br><br>So the first question that comes =
up is whether you are expecting this to be<br>evaluated in the context =
of a specific certificate (or set of certificates)<br>or is this to be =
evaluated and this later applied to a set of =
certificates.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I'm not sure =
what you mean, but I don't envision that a public key would be included =
in a set-definition between creation and certification. That is, by the =
time a public key gets to the point where it will be used in a set =
definition, then one of the two following statements is =
true:</div><div><br></div><div>1) It has already been put in a =
certificate, and therefore can be referenced by issuer/serial number, =
or</div><div>2) It is an ephemeral/anonymous key, and will *never* be =
embedded in a certificate.</div><div><br></div><div>If this is a =
reasonable assumption, then we might simply wave the problem away by =
specifying that it is invalid to refer to a key using the =
SubjectPublicKeyInfo form when it could also be referenced using the =
IssuerAndSerialNumber form. But I'm not sure that the underlying =
assumption is valid...</div><div><br></div><div>I'm trying to think of =
how this might come up. Suppose that the same key were referred to in =
two different ways-- once using IssuerAndSerialNumber (the 'I' form), =
and once as SubjectPublicKeyInfo (the 'S' form). Lets further suppose =
that implementations believed that the two forms referred to two =
different keys. Then how could things go =
wrong?</div><div><br></div><div>* They could mis-count the number of =
elements in a set. They could count the key twice, for example, =
believing there to be one more person/key in the set than there really =
is.</div><div><br></div><div>* They can also over-count the number of =
elements in the set if they encounter the form "{I} SetDiff {S}". This =
set should be empty, but the implementation may believe that it is =
actually equivalent to the set {I}.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>* =
Then again, they might undercount the number of elements in a set if =
they encounter the form "{I} Intersection {S}". This set actually =
contains the key in question, but might be mistaken for =
empty.</div><div><br></div><div>I think what I will propose is that when =
creating a SetKey attribute, implementations that wish to name a =
certified key SHOULD use the issuer and serial number form. However, =
implementations that receive and process a SetKey attribute SHOULD NOT =
regard different names as always indicating different keys. &nbsp;And =
that I add a section to the document explaining these =
pitfalls.</div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>In the =
second case one cannot say that an issuer serial number and a =
public<br>key info refer to the same certificate. &nbsp;Part of the =
question can be<br>addressed as a security consideration and part by =
expected usage. &nbsp;That is a<br>single community might only use a =
single way of identifying certificates and<br>thus the question is =
moot.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>For our intended usage, =
it is the case that a given community would use only one way to refer to =
a certificate.</div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>You =
might also have some problems from Alexy if you refer to things =
as<br>names, but you don't use a name form to store them in. &nbsp;You =
might be better<br>using groupId rather than groupName &nbsp;(same with =
participantName). &nbsp;Note that<br>you don't currently seem to expect =
that you can get from a participantName<br>to a certificate to check for =
matches so the best rule might be that<br>different name forms are =
treated as different identifiers even if they can<br>later be mapped to =
the same =
individual.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Will =
do.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>While you chew on this, I'll =
go ahead and make the changes described above and send the new version =
to you.</div></div><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Thanks for your =
comments.<br>--&nbsp;<br>Jonathan Herzog<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">		</span>voice: &nbsp;(781) =
981-2356<br>Technical Staff<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">		</span>fax: &nbsp; &nbsp;(781) =
981-7687<br>Cyber Systems and Technology Group<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">		=
</span>email: &nbsp;<a =
href=3D"mailto:jherzog@ll.mit.edu">jherzog@ll.mit.edu</a><br>MIT Lincoln =
Laboratory &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">		=
</span>www: &nbsp; &nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/">http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/</a><br>244 =
Wood Street &nbsp; &nbsp;<br>Lexington, MA =
02420-9185<br></div><br></body></html>=

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On Aug 12, 2010, at 12:27 PM, Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL wrote:

>=20
>=20
> While you chew on this, I'll go ahead and make the changes described =
above and send the new version to you.

New version attached.

Thanks.


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Network Working Group                                          J. Herzog
Internet-Draft                                                 R. Khazan
Intended status: Informational                    MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Expires: February 13, 2011                               August 12, 2010


             A set-key attribute for symmetric-key packages
                         draft-herzog-setkey-01

Abstract

   A set-key is a symmetric key (or set of keys) associated with an
   immutable set of participants.  This document defines a set-key
   attribute for use in the CMS-based symmetric-key package structure
   defined in in RFC XXXX. {{{ RFC Editor, please replace XXXX with the
   number assigned to draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat when it is
   published. }}}

Disclaimer

   This work is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Air Force
   Contract FA8721-05-C-0002.  Opinions, interpretations, conclusions
   and recommendations are those of the authors and are not necessarily
   endorsed by the United States Government.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 13, 2011.




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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Set-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Symmetric key packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  Intended Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.4.  Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  The set-key attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11





















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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a new set-key attribute for the symmetric-key
   package structure defined in [Housley-symmkey].

1.1.  Set-keys

   A 'set-key' is a symmetric key associated with (and to be limited to)
   a specific set of participants.  Such a key can be used in many ways,
   including:

   o  To secure broadcast or multicasts of e.g., pay-per-view movies,

   o  To secure group-communication such as chat rooms, or

   o  To secure data-at-rest which belongs to a group (such as on an
      encrypted file-system or on a server).

   The only requirement of a set-key is that it be associated with a
   specific and unchanging set of participants.  That is, we make a
   distinction between sets and groups.  Sets are immutable structures:
   a set S of participants is a mathematical entity and does not change.
   A group, on the other hand, is a mutable structure that might have a
   certain name or set of names; may be under the control of a given
   administration; and may be mapped to a sequence of sets over time
   according to the needs of some particular application.  This document
   considers only sets, and therefore will not consider issues such as
   group-administration, adding or removing members, revoking keys, and
   so on.  Set-keys can be used to build group-keying protocols, but
   such issues are outside the scope of this document.

   We note that the participant-set of a set-key can be partitioned into
   two sub-sets: the active participants and the passive participants.
   In some set-key applications, such as group-chat, all participants
   may be active: both sending and receiving.  In other applications,
   such as multicast of pay-per-view movies, most participants are
   passive: only receiving.  Becuase it may be important, in some
   applications, to know which partipants are active and which are
   passive, we will allow these two sub-sets to be explicitly
   distinguished from each other.

1.2.  Symmetric key packages

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is a standard
   notation and representation for cryptographic messages.  CMS is based
   on ASN.1 [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], [X.683] and uses that notation to
   define a number of structures relevant to cryptography such as
   certificates, encrypted or signed messages, and so on.



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   A current Internet Draft [Housley-symmkey] uses CMS to define a
   structure for symmetric key packages: collections of symmetric keys
   which share common properties and are intended for the same
   participants.  The syntax for this structure follows:


   SymmetricKeyPackage ::=3D SEQUENCE {
     version           KeyPkgVersion DEFAULT v1,
     sKeyPkgAttrs  [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                                    {{ SKeyPkgAttributes }} OPTIONAL,
     sKeys             SymmetricKeys,
     ... }


   SymmetricKeys ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OneSymmetricKey

   OneSymmetricKey ::=3D SEQUENCE {
     sKeyAttrs  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                                    {{ SKeyAttributes }}  OPTIONAL,
     sKey       OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
     ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., sKeyAttrs PRESENT } |
       WITH COMPONENTS { ..., sKey PRESENT } )

   KeyPkgVersion ::=3D INTEGER  { v1(1) } ( v1, ... )

   A key-package (SymmetricKeyPackage) contains some meta-information,
   including attributes (sKeyPkgAttrs) [Housley-symmkey], and a sequence
   of key-structures.  Each individual key-structure (OneSymmetricKey)
   contains some attributes (sKeyAttrs) and some actual keying material
   (sKey).  Attributes in the sKeyPkgAttrs field apply to every key in
   the package, while attributes in a sKeyAttrs field apply only to the
   key in the containing OneSymmetricKey structure.  The same attribute
   cannot appear at both the package-level and the key-level.  That is,
   a given attribute can:

   o  appear in the sKeyPkgAttrs field but not in the sKeyAttrs field of
      any OneSymmetricKey structure,

   o  appear in the sKeyAttrs field of one or more OneSymmetricKey
      structures but not the sKeyPkgAttrs field, or

   o  not be included in the key-package at all.

   Also, it is not required that every attribute be applicable at both
   levels.  That is, [Housley-symmkey] allows a given attribute to be
   valid for only the sKeyPkgAttrs field or for only the sKeyAttrs
   field.




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   The grammar for attributes is quite complex and given in
   [Housley-symmkey].  We intend to use only a small subset of this
   grammar, however, and therefore do not reproduce it here.  We note,
   however, that it can be used to define a wide variety of attributes,
   such as attributes to represent the expiration date of a key or key-
   package, the intended cryptographic algorithm for a key, an
   identifier for a key or key-package, or the creator of a key or key-
   package.  As such attributes do not apply only to set-keys, however,
   we will not consider them futher in this document.

1.3.  Intended Usage

   The attribute defined in this document is meant to be embedded in a
   SymmetricKeyPackage structure, perhaps with other attributes as well.
   The resulting value will then hold a set-key in a common and standard
   format.  This format is appropriate both for transporting set-keys
   and for holding set-keys computed from some higher-level protocol.
   That is, one could create and distribute set-keys in this format
   through some distribution protocol, or one could use this format to
   hold set-keys computed by some protocol as Logical Key Heirarchy
   [RFC2627].

1.4.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119.


2.  The set-key attribute

   The set-key attribute is used to associate a participant-set with a
   symmetric key-package, where the participant-set MAY be divided into
   the active and passive participants.  It has the following syntax:

















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   aa-setkey-information ATTRIBUTE ::=3D {
        TYPE SetKeyInformation
        IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-setkey-information }

   id-aa-setkey-information OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
            smime(16) aa(2) XX }

   SetKeyInformation::=3D SEQUENCE {
        version    SetKeyAttrVersion DEFAULT v1,
        active     SetKeyParticipantSet,
        passive    SetKeyParticipantSet OPTIONAL }

   SetKeyAttrVersion ::=3D INTEGER  { v1(1) } ( v1, ... )

   SetKeyParticipantSet ::=3D CHOICE {
        union        [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..MAX) OF SetKeyParticipantSet,
        intersection [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..MAX) OF SetKeyParticipantSet,
        setdiff      [2] SEQUENCE {
                          orig SetKeyParticipantSet,
                          without SetKeyParticipantSet },
        community    [3] Community,
        groupID      [4] OCTET STRING,
        explicit     [5] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SetMember }

   SetMember ::=3D CHOICE {
        issuerAndSerialNumber  [0] IssuerAndSerialNumber,
        publicKey              [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
        participantID          [2] OCTET STRING }


   This attribute SHOULD NOT appear in the sKeyAttrs field of a
   OneSymmetricKey structure.  That is, it is defined to apply only to
   symmetric-key packages, not individual keys.

   The SetKeyInformation fields are used as follows:

   o  The 'version' value identifies version of the set-key
      attributestructure.  For this version of the specification, the
      default value, v1, MUST be used.  Implementations MUST gracefully
      handle unfamiliar (future) versions as if the entire attribute was
      unfamiliar.

   o  The 'active' and 'passive' fields jointly identify the
      participant-set of this set-key.  The 'active' field identifies
      the active members of this set, meaning those which may send
      messages secured by the set-key.  The 'passive' field identifies
      the passive members of this set, meaning those participants who



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      are expected to never send a message secured by this key.  (The
      internal structures of these sets are described below.)  Any
      member which could possibly send messages under some scenario
      SHOULD be in the 'active' field.  A member MAY appear in both
      fields, in which case it SHOULD be considered to be active.

   Both the 'active' and 'passive' field will be values of type
   SetKeyParticipantSet.  These values can be any of:

   o  A 'union' of other SetKeyParticipantSet values.  The sequence of
      SetKeyParticipentSet values MUST contain at least two members.
      The semanitics of this sequence is as follows: a participant is in
      the union if and only if it is any of the SetKeyParticipantSet
      values of the sequence.  If any set in the sequence is non-empty,
      then the union will be non-empty.  If all sets in the union
      sequence are empty, then the union is empty too.

   o  The 'intersection' of other SetKeyParticipantSet values.  The
      sequence of SetKeyParticipentSet values MUST contain at least two
      members.  The semantics of this sequence is as follows: a
      participant is in intersection if and only if it is all of the
      SetKeyParticipantSet values of the sequence.  If any set in the
      sequence is empty, the intersection is empty, too.  If all sets in
      the sequence are non-empty, the intersection might still be empty
      (which it would be if there is no element common to all sets in
      the sequence).

   o  The set-difference ('setdiff') of two other SetKeyParticipantSet
      values.  The semantics of this is as follows: a participant is in
      the set-difference if and only if it is in the set identified in
      the 'orig' field and not in the set identified by the 'without'
      field.  If the set identified in the 'orig' field is empty is
      empty, then the set-difference will be empty.  If the set
      identified in the 'orig' field is a subset of the set identified
      in the 'without' field, then the set-difference will be empty.  If
      neither of the two previous cases apply, the set-difference will
      be non-empty.

   o  A community, which is used byt the Trust Anchor Management
      Protocol (TAMP) [Housley-TAMP] to identify a set of 'cryptographic
      modules.'

   o  A 'groupID', which is interpreted in an application-independent
      way.  One possible use for this option is to name pre-established
      groups such as organizational departments or roles.  The details
      of establishing or using such a name-space are outside the scope
      of this document.




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   o  An 'explicit' list of SetMember values.  In this sequence, order
      is not given any meaning.  This sequence MAY NOT be empty.

   If a SetKeyParticipantSet is not defined in terms of a community or
   groupID (that is, these options do not appear in the parse-tree of
   the SetKeyParticipantSet) then the set is static and unchanging.  In
   this case, the attribute-creator SHOULD process the
   SetKeyParticipantSet to ensure that the resulting set is non-empty.
   The set of active participants SHOULD NOT be empty.  If the set of
   passive participants is empty, then it SHOULD be omitted.  If a
   SetKeyParticipantSet is defined in terms of a community or groupID,
   these may refer to participant-sets that evolve over time.  Thus, it
   may not be possible to determine if the described set will be empty
   for all points in the future.  The attribute creator MAY pre-process
   the SetKeyParticipantSet to ensure the set is non-empty, but MUST NOT
   conclude the set to be empty unless that conclusion results from the
   set-theoretic semantics described above and independently of any
   specific interpretation of community-identifiers or groupID values.
   A SetMember value, meant to identify a specific unique participant,
   can be any of:

   o  An IssuerAndSerialNumber value, defined in [RFC5911],

   o  A SubjectPublicKeyInfo, defined in [RFC5912], or

   o  A freeform ('participantID') octet-string, which is interpreted in
      an application-dependent way.  One possible use of this option is
      to use pre-established names for participants.  The details of
      establishing or using such a name-space are outside the scope of
      this document.

   This list allows a certified key to be identified in two different
   ways: using the IssuerAndSerialNumber option, or the
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo option.  This can cause ambiguity when parsing a
   SetKeyParticipantSet structure.  Suppose that a given key is
   sometimes identified using the IssuerAndSerialNumber form (value 'I')
   and sometimes identified using the SubjectPublicKeyInfor form (value
   'S').  If these two distinct values are interpreted as identifying
   distinct keys, then the following structures may be misinterpreted:

   o  The 'explicit' sequence ...I, S... may be interpreted as having
      more elements than it actually does, due to the participant in
      question being counted twice (one for the I value, one for the S
      value).

   o  Similarly, the structure "union {...I...} {...S...}" may be
      interpreted as containgin one more participant than it actually
      does.



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   o  Likewise, the set "setdiff {...I...} {...S...}" may be interpreted
      as being non-empty when it is empty.

   o  On the other hand, the set "intersection {...I...} {...S...}" may
      be interpreted as being empty when it should not.  (It will always
      contain at least one element: the participant indicated by both I
      and S.)

   For these reasons, implementations that wish to name a certified key
   SHOULD use the IssuerAndSerialNumber form rather than the
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo form.  However, implementations that receive and
   process a SetKey attribute SHOULD NOT regard different names as
   always indicating different participants.  If the set-key attribute
   is present, it MUST contain a single value.


3.  Security Considerations

   As with the entire symmetric-key package, the set-key attribute is
   not protected.  The symmetric key package content type can be
   combined with a security protocol to protect the contents of the
   attribute.


4.  References

4.1.  Normative References

   [Housley-TAMP]
              Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
              Management Protocol (TAMP)", Internet
              Draft draft-ietf-pkix-tamp-08.txt, April 2010.

   [Housley-symmkey]
              Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Symmetric Key Package Content
              Type", Internet
              Draft draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-10.txt,
              August 2010.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Request
              For Comments 5652, September 2009.

   [RFC5911]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", Request
              For Comments 5911, June 2010.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", Request For



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              Comments 5912, June 2010.

   [X.680]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One", Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002, 2002.

   [X.681]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Information Object Specification",
              Recommendation X.681, ISO/IEC 8824-2:2002, 2002.

   [X.682]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Constraint Specification", Recommendation X.682, ISO/
              IEC 8824-3:2002, 2002.

   [X.683]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications",
              Recommendation X.683, ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002, 2002.

4.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2627]  Wallner, D., Harder, E., and R. Agee, "Key Management for
              Multicast: Issues and Architectures", RFC 2627, June 1999.


Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.680] through [X.683].

SetKeyAttributev1
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
    smime(16) modules(0) XX }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=3D

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL

IMPORTS

   ATTRIBUTE
     FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
   IssuerAndSerialNumber
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)



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         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo
     FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
   Community
     FROM TAMP-Protocol-v2
       { joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
         gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) modules(0) 30 }
   ;

aa-setkey-information ATTRIBUTE ::=3D {
     TYPE SetKeyInformation
     IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-setkey-information }

id-aa-setkey-information OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
  iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
         smime(16) aa(2) XX }

SetKeyInformation::=3D SEQUENCE {
     version    SetKeyAttrVersion DEFAULT v1,
     active     SetKeyParticipantSet,
     passive    SetKeyParticipantSet OPTIONAL }

SetKeyAttrVersion ::=3D INTEGER  { v1(1) } ( v1, ... )

SetKeyParticipantSet ::=3D CHOICE {
     union        [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..MAX) OF SetKeyParticipantSet,
     intersection [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..MAX) OF SetKeyParticipantSet,
     setdiff      [2] SEQUENCE {
                       orig SetKeyParticipantSet,
                       without SetKeyParticipantSet },
     community    [3] Community,
     groupID      [4] OCTET STRING,
     explicit     [5] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SetMember }

SetMember ::=3D CHOICE {
     issuerAndSerialNumber  [0] IssuerAndSerialNumber,
     publicKey              [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
     participantID          [2] OCTET STRING }

END








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Authors' Addresses

   Jonathan C. Herzog
   MIT Lincoln Laboratory
   244 Wood St.
   Lexington, MA  02144
   USA

   Email: jherzog@ll.mit.edu


   Roger Khazan
   MIT Lincoln Laboratory
   244 Wood St.
   Lexington, MA  02144
   USA

   Email: rkh@ll.mit.edu

































Herzog & Khazan         Expires February 13, 2011              [Page 12]
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To: "'Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL'" <jherzog@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
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Looks fine.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL [mailto:jherzog@ll.mit.edu]
> Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2010 1:18 PM
> To: Jim Schaad
> Cc: Khazan, Roger - 0668 - MITLL; smime@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
> 
> 
> On Aug 10, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
> 
> > I can easily understand how these things slip out.  I needed to find
> > the document in order to figure out what I was thinking of when I
> > wrote some of this.
> >
> > Some comments in-line
> 
> [snip]
> 
> >>   o  AuthenticatedData uses static-static ECDH to provide
> >>      data-integrity.  It will not necessarily,
> >>      however, provide confidentiality for the data.
> >
> > It will not provide confidentiality for the data.  I would suggest
> > removal or amendment of the second sentence.
> 
> Done. Now reads: "It will not provide confidentiality for the data."
> 
> >> (Do you mind
> >> if I use your text as a starting point?)
> >>
> >
> > You can steal the text wholesale for all I care.
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> 
> >
> > Sorry - if you look at the document on line, then there are two
> copies
> > of the document in the .txt file.
> 
> 
> 
> Really? My goodness, you're right. That's embarrassing. Thanks for
> pointing that out.
> 
> Anyway, let me attach the current draft. If you have no more comments
> on it, I'll check the references again and re-submit it next week.
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> --
> Jonathan Herzog
voice:  (781)
> 981-2356
> Technical Staff							fax:
(781)
> 981-7687
> Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  jherzog@ll.mit.edu
> MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:
> http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
> 244 Wood Street
> Lexington, MA 02420-9185



From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu Aug 19 17:53:37 2010
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Subject: [smime] Fwd: RFC 5940 on Additional Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Revocation Information Choices
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> new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
>
>       
>        RFC 5940
>
>        Title:      Additional Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
>                    Revocation Information Choices
>        Author:     S. Turner, R. Housley
>        Status:     Standards Track
>        Stream:     IETF
>        Date:       August 2010
>        Mailbox:    turners@ieca.com,
>                    housley@vigilsec.com
>        Pages:      9
>        Characters: 15127
>        Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso:   None
>
>        I-D Tag:    draft-turner-additional-cms-ri-choices-06.txt
>
>        URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5940.txt
>
>The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) allows revocation information
>to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,
>AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The
>preferred format for revocation information is the Certificate
>Revocation List (CRL), but an extension mechanism supports other
>revocation information formats.  This document defines two additional
>revocation information formats for Online Certificate Status Protocol
>(OCSP) responses and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
>(SCVP) requests and responses.  [STANDARDS TRACK]
>
>This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

From prvs=5848f76eac=jherzog@ll.mit.edu  Fri Aug 20 07:49:44 2010
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From: "Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL" <jherzog@ll.mit.edu>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2010 10:50:11 -0400
Thread-Topic: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
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Cc: "Khazan, Roger  - 0668 - MITLL" <rkh@ll.mit.edu>, "smime@ietf.org" <smime@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
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Just wanted to let you know that the new Internet Draft for =
static-static ECDH has been posted:

  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-herzog-static-ecdh/

Any more thoughts about the set-key Internet Draft? I attach the current =
(working, not posted) version in case you didn't see it before.

Thanks.

On Aug 14, 2010, at 3:13 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:

> Looks fine.
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL [mailto:jherzog@ll.mit.edu]
>> Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2010 1:18 PM
>> To: Jim Schaad
>> Cc: Khazan, Roger - 0668 - MITLL; smime@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [smime] (Another) new ID of potential interest
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Aug 10, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
>>=20
>>> I can easily understand how these things slip out.  I needed to find
>>> the document in order to figure out what I was thinking of when I
>>> wrote some of this.
>>>=20
>>> Some comments in-line
>>=20
>> [snip]
>>=20
>>>>  o  AuthenticatedData uses static-static ECDH to provide
>>>>     data-integrity.  It will not necessarily,
>>>>     however, provide confidentiality for the data.
>>>=20
>>> It will not provide confidentiality for the data.  I would suggest
>>> removal or amendment of the second sentence.
>>=20
>> Done. Now reads: "It will not provide confidentiality for the data."
>>=20
>>>> (Do you mind
>>>> if I use your text as a starting point?)
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> You can steal the text wholesale for all I care.
>>=20
>> Thank you.
>>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Sorry - if you look at the document on line, then there are two
>> copies
>>> of the document in the .txt file.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> Really? My goodness, you're right. That's embarrassing. Thanks for
>> pointing that out.
>>=20
>> Anyway, let me attach the current draft. If you have no more comments
>> on it, I'll check the references again and re-submit it next week.
>>=20
>> Thanks.
>>=20
>> --
>> Jonathan Herzog
> voice:  (781)
>> 981-2356
>> Technical Staff							=
fax:
> (781)
>> 981-7687
>> Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  =
jherzog@ll.mit.edu
>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:
>> http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>> 244 Wood Street
>> Lexington, MA 02420-9185
>=20
>=20


--=20
Jonathan Herzog							voice:  =
(781) 981-2356
Technical Staff							fax:    =
(781) 981-7687
Cyber Systems and Technology Group		email:  =
jherzog@ll.mit.edu
MIT Lincoln Laboratory               			www:    =
http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
244 Wood Street   =20
Lexington, MA 02420-9185


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Network Working Group                                          J. Herzog
Internet-Draft                                                 R. Khazan
Intended status: Informational                    MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Expires: February 21, 2011                               August 20, 2010


             A set-key attribute for symmetric-key packages
                         draft-herzog-setkey-01

Abstract

   A set-key is a symmetric key (or set of keys) associated with an
   immutable set of participants.  This document defines a set-key
   attribute for use in the CMS-based symmetric-key package structure
   defined in in RFC XXXX. {{{ RFC Editor, please replace XXXX with the
   number assigned to draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat when it is
   published. }}}

Disclaimer

   This work is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Air Force
   Contract FA8721-05-C-0002.  Opinions, interpretations, conclusions
   and recommendations are those of the authors and are not necessarily
   endorsed by the United States Government.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 21, 2011.




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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Set-keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Symmetric key packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  Intended Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.4.  Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  The set-key attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12




















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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a new set-key attribute for the symmetric-key
   package structure defined in [Housley-symmkey].

1.1.  Set-keys

   A 'set-key' is a symmetric key associated with (and to be limited to)
   a specific set of participants.  Such a key can be used in many ways,
   including:

   o  To secure broadcast or multicasts of e.g., pay-per-view movies,

   o  To secure group-communication such as chat rooms, or

   o  To secure data-at-rest which belongs to a group (such as on an
      encrypted file-system or on a server).

   The only requirement of a set-key is that it be associated with a
   specific and unchanging set of participants.  That is, we make a
   distinction between sets and groups.  Sets are immutable structures:
   a set S of participants is a mathematical entity and does not change.
   A group, on the other hand, is a mutable structure that might have a
   certain name or set of names; may be under the control of a given
   administration; and may be mapped to a sequence of sets over time
   according to the needs of some particular application.  This document
   considers only sets, and therefore will not consider issues such as
   group-administration, adding or removing members, revoking keys, and
   so on.  Set-keys can be used to build group-keying protocols, but
   such issues are outside the scope of this document.

   We note that the participant-set of a set-key can be partitioned into
   two sub-sets: the active participants and the passive participants.
   In some set-key applications, such as group-chat, all participants
   may be active: both sending and receiving.  In other applications,
   such as multicast of pay-per-view movies, most participants are
   passive: only receiving.  Becuase it may be important, in some
   applications, to know which partipants are active and which are
   passive, we will allow these two sub-sets to be explicitly
   distinguished from each other.

1.2.  Symmetric key packages

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is a standard
   notation and representation for cryptographic messages.  CMS is based
   on ASN.1 [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], [X.683] and uses that notation to
   define a number of structures relevant to cryptography such as
   certificates, encrypted or signed messages, and so on.



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   A current Internet Draft [Housley-symmkey] uses CMS to define a
   structure for symmetric key packages: collections of symmetric keys
   which share common properties and are intended for the same
   participants.  The syntax for this structure follows:


   SymmetricKeyPackage ::=3D SEQUENCE {
     version           KeyPkgVersion DEFAULT v1,
     sKeyPkgAttrs  [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                                    {{ SKeyPkgAttributes }} OPTIONAL,
     sKeys             SymmetricKeys,
     ... }


   SymmetricKeys ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OneSymmetricKey

   OneSymmetricKey ::=3D SEQUENCE {
     sKeyAttrs  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                                    {{ SKeyAttributes }}  OPTIONAL,
     sKey       OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
     ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., sKeyAttrs PRESENT } |
       WITH COMPONENTS { ..., sKey PRESENT } )

   KeyPkgVersion ::=3D INTEGER  { v1(1) } ( v1, ... )

   A key-package (SymmetricKeyPackage) contains some meta-information,
   including attributes (sKeyPkgAttrs) [Housley-symmkey], and a sequence
   of key-structures.  Each individual key-structure (OneSymmetricKey)
   contains some attributes (sKeyAttrs) and some actual keying material
   (sKey).  Attributes in the sKeyPkgAttrs field apply to every key in
   the package, while attributes in a sKeyAttrs field apply only to the
   key in the containing OneSymmetricKey structure.  The same attribute
   cannot appear at both the package-level and the key-level.  That is,
   a given attribute can:

   o  appear in the sKeyPkgAttrs field but not in the sKeyAttrs field of
      any OneSymmetricKey structure,

   o  appear in the sKeyAttrs field of one or more OneSymmetricKey
      structures but not the sKeyPkgAttrs field, or

   o  not be included in the key-package at all.

   Also, it is not required that every attribute be applicable at both
   levels.  That is, [Housley-symmkey] allows a given attribute to be
   valid for only the sKeyPkgAttrs field or for only the sKeyAttrs
   field.




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   The grammar for attributes is quite complex and given in
   [Housley-symmkey].  We intend to use only a small subset of this
   grammar, however, and therefore do not reproduce it here.  We note,
   however, that it can be used to define a wide variety of attributes,
   such as attributes to represent the expiration date of a key or key-
   package, the intended cryptographic algorithm for a key, an
   identifier for a key or key-package, or the creator of a key or key-
   package.  As such attributes do not apply only to set-keys, however,
   we will not consider them futher in this document.

1.3.  Intended Usage

   The attribute defined in this document is meant to be embedded in a
   SymmetricKeyPackage structure, perhaps with other attributes as well.
   The resulting value will then hold a set-key in a common and standard
   format.  This format is appropriate both for transporting set-keys
   and for holding set-keys computed from some higher-level protocol.
   That is, one could create and distribute set-keys in this format
   through some distribution protocol, or one could use this format to
   hold set-keys computed by some protocol as Logical Key Heirarchy
   [RFC2627].

1.4.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119.


2.  The set-key attribute

   The set-key attribute is used to associate a participant-set with a
   symmetric key-package, where the participant-set MAY be divided into
   the active and passive participants.  It has the following syntax:

















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   aa-setkey-information ATTRIBUTE ::=3D {
        TYPE SetKeyInformation
        IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-setkey-information }

   id-aa-setkey-information OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
            smime(16) aa(2) XX }

   SetKeyInformation::=3D SEQUENCE {
        version    SetKeyAttrVersion DEFAULT v1,
        active     SetKeyParticipantSet,
        passive    SetKeyParticipantSet OPTIONAL }

   SetKeyAttrVersion ::=3D INTEGER  { v1(1) } ( v1, ... )

   SetKeyParticipantSet ::=3D CHOICE {
        union        [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..MAX) OF SetKeyParticipantSet,
        intersection [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..MAX) OF SetKeyParticipantSet,
        setdiff      [2] SEQUENCE {
                          orig SetKeyParticipantSet,
                          without SetKeyParticipantSet },
        community    [3] Community,
        groupID      [4] OCTET STRING,
        explicit     [5] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SetMember }

   SetMember ::=3D CHOICE {
        issuerAndSerialNumber  [0] IssuerAndSerialNumber,
        publicKey              [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
        participantID          [2] OCTET STRING }


   This attribute SHOULD NOT appear in the sKeyAttrs field of a
   OneSymmetricKey structure.  That is, it is defined to apply only to
   symmetric-key packages, not individual keys.

   The SetKeyInformation fields are used as follows:

   o  The 'version' value identifies version of the set-key
      attributestructure.  For this version of the specification, the
      default value, v1, MUST be used.  Implementations MUST gracefully
      handle unfamiliar (future) versions as if the entire attribute was
      unfamiliar.

   o  The 'active' and 'passive' fields jointly identify the
      participant-set of this set-key.  The 'active' field identifies
      the active members of this set, meaning those which may send
      messages secured by the set-key.  The 'passive' field identifies
      the passive members of this set, meaning those participants who



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      are expected to never send a message secured by this key.  (The
      internal structures of these sets are described below.)  Any
      member which could possibly send messages under some scenario
      SHOULD be in the 'active' field.  A member MAY appear in both
      fields, in which case it SHOULD be considered to be active.

   Both the 'active' and 'passive' field will be values of type
   SetKeyParticipantSet.  These values can be any of:

   o  A 'union' of other SetKeyParticipantSet values.  The sequence of
      SetKeyParticipentSet values MUST contain at least two members.
      The semanitics of this sequence is as follows: a participant is in
      the union if and only if it is any of the SetKeyParticipantSet
      values of the sequence.  If any set in the sequence is non-empty,
      then the union will be non-empty.  If all sets in the union
      sequence are empty, then the union is empty too.

   o  The 'intersection' of other SetKeyParticipantSet values.  The
      sequence of SetKeyParticipentSet values MUST contain at least two
      members.  The semantics of this sequence is as follows: a
      participant is in intersection if and only if it is all of the
      SetKeyParticipantSet values of the sequence.  If any set in the
      sequence is empty, the intersection is empty, too.  If all sets in
      the sequence are non-empty, the intersection might still be empty
      (which it would be if there is no element common to all sets in
      the sequence).

   o  The set-difference ('setdiff') of two other SetKeyParticipantSet
      values.  The semantics of this is as follows: a participant is in
      the set-difference if and only if it is in the set identified in
      the 'orig' field and not in the set identified by the 'without'
      field.  If the set identified in the 'orig' field is empty is
      empty, then the set-difference will be empty.  If the set
      identified in the 'orig' field is a subset of the set identified
      in the 'without' field, then the set-difference will be empty.  If
      neither of the two previous cases apply, the set-difference will
      be non-empty.

   o  A community, which is used byt the Trust Anchor Management
      Protocol (TAMP) [Housley-TAMP] to identify a set of 'cryptographic
      modules.'

   o  A 'groupID', which is interpreted in an application-independent
      way.  One possible use for this option is to name pre-established
      groups such as organizational departments or roles.  The details
      of establishing or using such a name-space are outside the scope
      of this document.




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   o  An 'explicit' list of SetMember values.  In this sequence, order
      is not given any meaning.  This sequence MAY NOT be empty.

   If a SetKeyParticipantSet is not defined in terms of a community or
   groupID (that is, these options do not appear in the parse-tree of
   the SetKeyParticipantSet) then the set is static and unchanging.  In
   this case, the attribute-creator SHOULD process the
   SetKeyParticipantSet to ensure that the resulting set is non-empty.
   The set of active participants SHOULD NOT be empty.  If the set of
   passive participants is empty, then it SHOULD be omitted.  If a
   SetKeyParticipantSet is defined in terms of a community or groupID,
   these may refer to participant-sets that evolve over time.  Thus, it
   may not be possible to determine if the described set will be empty
   for all points in the future.  The attribute creator MAY pre-process
   the SetKeyParticipantSet to ensure the set is non-empty, but MUST NOT
   conclude the set to be empty unless that conclusion results from the
   set-theoretic semantics described above and independently of any
   specific interpretation of community-identifiers or groupID values.
   A SetMember value, meant to identify a specific unique participant,
   can be any of:

   o  An IssuerAndSerialNumber value, defined in [RFC5911],

   o  A SubjectPublicKeyInfo, defined in [RFC5912], or

   o  A freeform ('participantID') octet-string, which is interpreted in
      an application-dependent way.  One possible use of this option is
      to use pre-established names for participants.  The details of
      establishing or using such a name-space are outside the scope of
      this document.

   This list allows a certified key to be identified in two different
   ways: using the IssuerAndSerialNumber option, or the
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo option.  This can cause ambiguity when parsing a
   SetKeyParticipantSet structure.  Suppose that a given key is
   sometimes identified using the IssuerAndSerialNumber form (value 'I')
   and sometimes identified using the SubjectPublicKeyInfor form (value
   'S').  If these two distinct values are interpreted as identifying
   distinct keys, then the following structures may be misinterpreted:

   o  The 'explicit' sequence ...I, S... may be interpreted as having
      more elements than it actually does, due to the participant in
      question being counted twice (one for the I value, one for the S
      value).

   o  Similarly, the structure "union {...I...} {...S...}" may be
      interpreted as containgin one more participant than it actually
      does.



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   o  Likewise, the set "setdiff {...I...} {...S...}" may be interpreted
      as being non-empty when it is empty.

   o  On the other hand, the set "intersection {...I...} {...S...}" may
      be interpreted as being empty when it should not.  (It will always
      contain at least one element: the participant indicated by both I
      and S.)

   For these reasons, implementations that wish to name a certified key
   SHOULD use the IssuerAndSerialNumber form rather than the
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo form.  However, implementations that receive and
   process a SetKey attribute SHOULD NOT regard different names as
   always indicating different participants.  If the set-key attribute
   is present, it MUST contain a single value.


3.  Security Considerations

   As with the entire symmetric-key package, the set-key attribute is
   not protected.  The symmetric key package content type can be
   combined with a security protocol to protect the contents of the
   attribute.


4.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Jim Schaad for his helpful comments
   and suggestions.


5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [Housley-TAMP]
              Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
              Management Protocol (TAMP)", Internet
              Draft draft-ietf-pkix-tamp-08.txt, April 2010.

   [Housley-symmkey]
              Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Symmetric Key Package Content
              Type", Internet
              Draft draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-10.txt,
              August 2010.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Request
              For Comments 5652, September 2009.




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   [RFC5911]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", Request
              For Comments 5911, June 2010.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", Request For
              Comments 5912, June 2010.

   [X.680]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One", Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002, 2002.

   [X.681]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Information Object Specification",
              Recommendation X.681, ISO/IEC 8824-2:2002, 2002.

   [X.682]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Constraint Specification", Recommendation X.682, ISO/
              IEC 8824-3:2002, 2002.

   [X.683]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One: Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications",
              Recommendation X.683, ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002, 2002.

5.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2627]  Wallner, D., Harder, E., and R. Agee, "Key Management for
              Multicast: Issues and Architectures", RFC 2627, June 1999.


Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.680] through [X.683].

SetKeyAttributev1
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
    smime(16) modules(0) XX }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=3D

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL

IMPORTS

   ATTRIBUTE



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     FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
   IssuerAndSerialNumber
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo
     FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
   Community
     FROM TAMP-Protocol-v2
       { joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
         gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) modules(0) 30 }
   ;

aa-setkey-information ATTRIBUTE ::=3D {
     TYPE SetKeyInformation
     IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-setkey-information }

id-aa-setkey-information OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
  iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
         smime(16) aa(2) XX }

SetKeyInformation::=3D SEQUENCE {
     version    SetKeyAttrVersion DEFAULT v1,
     active     SetKeyParticipantSet,
     passive    SetKeyParticipantSet OPTIONAL }

SetKeyAttrVersion ::=3D INTEGER  { v1(1) } ( v1, ... )

SetKeyParticipantSet ::=3D CHOICE {
     union        [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..MAX) OF SetKeyParticipantSet,
     intersection [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..MAX) OF SetKeyParticipantSet,
     setdiff      [2] SEQUENCE {
                       orig SetKeyParticipantSet,
                       without SetKeyParticipantSet },
     community    [3] Community,
     groupID      [4] OCTET STRING,
     explicit     [5] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SetMember }

SetMember ::=3D CHOICE {
     issuerAndSerialNumber  [0] IssuerAndSerialNumber,
     publicKey              [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
     participantID          [2] OCTET STRING }




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END


Authors' Addresses

   Jonathan C. Herzog
   MIT Lincoln Laboratory
   244 Wood St.
   Lexington, MA  02144
   USA

   Email: jherzog@ll.mit.edu


   Roger Khazan
   MIT Lincoln Laboratory
   244 Wood St.
   Lexington, MA  02144
   USA

   Email: rkh@ll.mit.edu






























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