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From: Aaron Yi DING <aaron.ding@tum.de>
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Hi,

For T2TRG & ICNRG colleagues, a recent survey on D2D security and privacy:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/comst2017.html 

pre-camera pdf can be found here if you are interested:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/d2d-pre-camera.pdf 

Cheers,
Aaron

On 20/11/16 20:23, "Aaron Yi DING" <aaron.ding@tum.de> wrote:

As presented in the Lisbon meeting, our work on Securebox (for IoT security) will appear at ACM CoNEXT CAN '16
http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/co-next/2016/#!/canprogram 

The pre-print and abstract can be found here for those who are interested:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/can2016.html

Cheers,
Aaron

--
TU Munich, Connected Mobility
https://www.cm.in.tum.de/index.php?id=25 




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From: "Dirk Kutscher" <ietf@dkutscher.net>
To: "Aaron Yi DING" <aaron.ding@tum.de>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 09:18:46 +0100
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Hi Aaron,

Thanks for sharing. A few comments after a cursory read:

The description of the security and privacy requirements in IIa seems a 
bit sloppy. For example:

- a) Authentication seems to be mixing up authentication and 
authorisation
- c) Non-Repudiation: what you say here may not be wrong, but the 
example with the attacker who wants an innocent party appear as an 
attacker is not the most straightforward one. Non-repudiation is 
guaranteeing that authentication can be asserted to be genuine and not 
be refuted later. So a better example may be a system that prevents an 
attacker who was authenticated before to deny authorship of messages 
later.
- e) Confidentiality: this is about ensuring that only *authorized* 
users can access the confidential information.


Best regards,
Dirk



On 5 Jan 2017, at 20:10, Aaron Yi DING wrote:

> Hi,
>
> For T2TRG & ICNRG colleagues, a recent survey on D2D security and 
> privacy:
> https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/comst2017.html
>
> pre-camera pdf can be found here if you are interested:
> https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/d2d-pre-camera.pdf
>
> Cheers,
> Aaron
>
> On 20/11/16 20:23, "Aaron Yi DING" <aaron.ding@tum.de> wrote:
>
> As presented in the Lisbon meeting, our work on Securebox (for IoT 
> security) will appear at ACM CoNEXT CAN '16
> http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/co-next/2016/#!/canprogram
>
> The pre-print and abstract can be found here for those who are 
> interested:
> https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/can2016.html
>
> Cheers,
> Aaron
>
> --
> TU Munich, Connected Mobility
> https://www.cm.in.tum.de/index.php?id=25
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> icnrg mailing list
> icnrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/icnrg

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<div class=3D"markdown">
<p dir=3D"auto">Hi Aaron,</p>

<p dir=3D"auto">Thanks for sharing. A few comments after a cursory read:<=
/p>

<p dir=3D"auto">The description of the security and privacy requirements =
in IIa seems a bit sloppy. For example:</p>

<ul>
<li>a) Authentication seems to be mixing up authentication and authorisat=
ion</li>
<li>c) Non-Repudiation: what you say here may not be wrong, but the examp=
le with the attacker who wants an innocent party appear as an attacker is=
 not the most straightforward one. Non-repudiation is guaranteeing that a=
uthentication can be asserted to be genuine and not be refuted later. So =
a better example may be a system that prevents an attacker who was authen=
ticated before to deny authorship of messages later.</li>
<li>e) Confidentiality: this is about ensuring that only <em>authorized</=
em> users can access the confidential information. </li>
</ul>

<p dir=3D"auto">Best regards,<br>
Dirk</p>

<p dir=3D"auto">On 5 Jan 2017, at 20:10, Aaron Yi DING wrote:</p>

<p dir=3D"auto"></div>
<div class=3D"plaintext"><blockquote><p dir=3D"auto">Hi,<br>
<br>
For T2TRG &amp; ICNRG colleagues, a recent survey on D2D security and pri=
vacy:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/comst2017.html=
">https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/comst2017.html</a><br>
<br>
pre-camera pdf can be found here if you are interested:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/d2d-pre-camera=
=2Epdf">https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/d2d-pre-camera.pd=
f</a><br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
Aaron<br>
<br>
On 20/11/16 20:23, &quot;Aaron Yi DING&quot; &lt;aaron.ding@tum.de&gt; wr=
ote:<br>
<br>
As presented in the Lisbon meeting, our work on Securebox (for IoT securi=
ty) will appear at ACM CoNEXT CAN &#39;16<br>
<a href=3D"http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/co-next/2016/#!/canprogram">ht=
tp://conferences2.sigcomm.org/co-next/2016/#!/canprogram</a><br>
<br>
The pre-print and abstract can be found here for those who are interested=
:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/can2016.html">=
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/can2016.html</a><br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
Aaron<br>
<br>
--<br>
TU Munich, Connected Mobility<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.cm.in.tum.de/index.php?id=3D25">https://www.cm.in.=
tum.de/index.php?id=3D25</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
icnrg mailing list<br>
icnrg@irtf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/icnrg">https://www.irtf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/icnrg</a></p>

</blockquote></div>
<div class=3D"markdown"></p>
</div>

</body>
</html>

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Hi Dirk,

Thanks a lot for your feedback! I like the example you gave for non-repudiation. 

I am now discussing with corresponding authors to update it and include your suggestions, i.e., authentication authorization mixing, non-repudiation and confidentiality.

Cheers,
Aaron


On 11/01/17 09:18, "icnrg on behalf of Dirk Kutscher" <icnrg-bounces@irtf.org on behalf of ietf@dkutscher.net> wrote:

Hi Aaron,
Thanks for sharing. A few comments after a cursory read:
The description of the security and privacy requirements in IIa seems a bit sloppy. For example:

* a) Authentication seems to be mixing up authentication and authorisation
* c) Non-Repudiation: what you say here may not be wrong, but the example with the attacker who wants an innocent party appear as an attacker is not the most straightforward one. Non-repudiation is guaranteeing that authentication can be asserted to be genuine and not be refuted later. So a better example may be a system that prevents an attacker who was authenticated before to deny authorship of messages later.
* e) Confidentiality: this is about ensuring that only authorized users can access the confidential information. 

Best regards,
Dirk
On 5 Jan 2017, at 20:10, Aaron Yi DING wrote:


Hi,

For T2TRG & ICNRG colleagues, a recent survey on D2D security and privacy:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/comst2017.html

pre-camera pdf can be found here if you are interested:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/d2d-pre-camera.pdf

Cheers,
Aaron

On 20/11/16 20:23, "Aaron Yi DING" <aaron.ding@tum.de> wrote:

As presented in the Lisbon meeting, our work on Securebox (for IoT security) will appear at ACM CoNEXT CAN '16
http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/co-next/2016/#!/canprogram

The pre-print and abstract can be found here for those who are interested:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/can2016.html

Cheers,
Aaron

--
TU Munich, Connected Mobility
https://www.cm.in.tum.de/index.php?id=25



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Subject: Re: [T2TRG] D2D security and privacy
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Hi,

Your suggestions have been included. Here is the latest one:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/d2d-pre-camera.pdf

including Sec II.a, Table II, Figure 2,  Figure 3 and Acknowledgement.

Thanks,
Aaron

On 11/01/17 10:12, "Aaron Yi DING" <aaron.ding@tum.de> wrote:

Hi Dirk,

Thanks a lot for your feedback! I like the example you gave for non-repudiation. 

I am now discussing with corresponding authors to update it and include your suggestions, i.e., authentication authorization mixing, non-repudiation and confidentiality.

Cheers,
Aaron


On 11/01/17 09:18, "icnrg on behalf of Dirk Kutscher" <icnrg-bounces@irtf.org on behalf of ietf@dkutscher.net> wrote:

Hi Aaron,
Thanks for sharing. A few comments after a cursory read:
The description of the security and privacy requirements in IIa seems a bit sloppy. For example:

* a) Authentication seems to be mixing up authentication and authorisation
* c) Non-Repudiation: what you say here may not be wrong, but the example with the attacker who wants an innocent party appear as an attacker is not the most straightforward one. Non-repudiation is guaranteeing that authentication can be asserted to be genuine and not be refuted later. So a better example may be a system that prevents an attacker who was authenticated before to deny authorship of messages later.
* e) Confidentiality: this is about ensuring that only authorized users can access the confidential information. 

Best regards,
Dirk
On 5 Jan 2017, at 20:10, Aaron Yi DING wrote:


Hi,

For T2TRG & ICNRG colleagues, a recent survey on D2D security and privacy:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/comst2017.html

pre-camera pdf can be found here if you are interested:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/d2d-pre-camera.pdf

Cheers,
Aaron

On 20/11/16 20:23, "Aaron Yi DING" <aaron.ding@tum.de> wrote:

As presented in the Lisbon meeting, our work on Securebox (for IoT security) will appear at ACM CoNEXT CAN '16
http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/co-next/2016/#!/canprogram

The pre-print and abstract can be found here for those who are interested:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/can2016.html

Cheers,
Aaron

--
TU Munich, Connected Mobility
https://www.cm.in.tum.de/index.php?id=25




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Hi,


On 1/11/17 8:40 AM, Marc.Mosko@parc.com wrote:
> Aaron,
>
> I would add that non-repudiation is mostly a legal concept not a
> cryptographic concept.  It is usually broken down to non-repudiation
> of origin, of transfer, and of delivery.  In a cooperative D2D
> environment, the biggest problem (as I see it) is if one really trusts
> another D2D device to attest to some aspect of non-repudiation as
> collusion attacks might be easy.

Yes.  And there is a fundamental problem: what happens when Bob attacks
Alice?  That is- is he is compromised.  What is the role of Faythe?

Eliot


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Subject: Re: [T2TRG] [icnrg] D2D security and privacy
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On 11 Jan 2017, at 09:18, Dirk Kutscher <ietf@dkutscher.net> wrote:
>=20
> 	=E2=80=A2 c) Non-Repudiation: what you say here may not be =
wrong, but the example with the attacker who wants an innocent party =
appear as an attacker is not the most straightforward one. =
Non-repudiation is guaranteeing that authentication can be asserted to =
be genuine and not be refuted later. So a better example may be a system =
that prevents an attacker who was authenticated before to deny =
authorship of messages later.

A much better term for what this not so great term is usually really =
meant to say is =E2=80=9Cthird-party verifiability=E2=80=9D.

Note that =E2=80=9Caccountability=E2=80=9D (which is what the joe-job =
example is about) may or may not require third-party verifiability =E2=80=94=
 in many cases it is very much sufficient that you know who did this to =
you and there is no need to prove to third parties.

It=E2=80=99s 2017 and we still don=E2=80=99t have agreed names for the =
basic security objectives and security services.  RFC 4949 =
notwithstanding...

Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe, Carsten


From nobody Wed Jan 11 11:22:33 2017
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From: Aaron Yi DING <aaron.ding@tum.de>
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Hi Marc, Eliot, Carsten,

Thanks for your feedback. I will try to incorporate them.=20

Cheers,
Aaron

On 11/01/17 18:17, "T2TRG on behalf of Carsten Bormann" <t2trg-bounces@irtf=
.org on behalf of cabo@tzi.org> wrote:>=20
> 	=E2=80=A2 c) Non-Repudiation: what you say here may not be wrong, but the exam=
ple with the attacker who wants an innocent party appear as an attacker is n=
ot the most straightforward one. Non-repudiation is guaranteeing that authen=
tication can be asserted to be genuine and not be refuted later. So a better=
 example may be a system that prevents an attacker who was authenticated bef=
ore to deny authorship of messages later.

A much better term for what this not so great term is usually really meant =
to say is =E2=80=9Cthird-party verifiability=E2=80=9D.

Note that =E2=80=9Caccountability=E2=80=9D (which is what the joe-job example is about)=
 may or may not require third-party verifiability =E2=80=94 in many cases it is ve=
ry much sufficient that you know who did this to you and there is no need to=
 prove to third parties.

It=E2=80=99s 2017 and we still don=E2=80=99t have agreed names for the basic security o=
bjectives and security services.  RFC 4949 notwithstanding...

Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe, Carsten

On 11/01/17 18:07, "Eliot Lear" <lear@cisco.com> wrote:
On 1/11/17 8:40 AM, Marc.Mosko@parc.com wrote:
> I would add that non-repudiation is mostly a legal concept not a
> cryptographic concept.  It is usually broken down to non-repudiation
> of origin, of transfer, and of delivery.  In a cooperative D2D
> environment, the biggest problem (as I see it) is if one really trusts
> another D2D device to attest to some aspect of non-repudiation as
> collusion attacks might be easy.

Yes.  And there is a fundamental problem: what happens when Bob attacks
Alice?  That is- is he is compromised.  What is the role of Faythe?

Eliot


On 11/01/17 17:40, "t2trg-bounces@irtf.org on behalf of Marc.Mosko@parc.com=
" <t2trg-bounces@irtf.org on behalf of Marc.Mosko@parc.com> wrote:

Aaron,


I would add that non-repudiation is mostly a legal concept not a cryptograp=
hic concept.  It is usually broken down to non-repudiation of origin, of tra=
nsfer, and of delivery.  In a cooperative D2D environment, the biggest probl=
em (as I see it)
 is if one really trusts another D2D device to attest to some aspect of non=
-repudiation as collusion attacks might be easy.


In terms of authentication, I would point out that strong authentication re=
quires proof of current possession of the private key =E2=80=94 i.e. they have som=
e challenge and response.  Sometimes one works around this by time-limiting =
messages.  Most ICN
 applications do not prove current possession of private key, because they =
sign something without an interactive protocol or 3rd party.  For example, I=
 could intercept a signed message that actuates something (e.g. turns on a l=
ight) and save it for later.  Then
 at a time of my choosing I send the message. If the actuator (e.g. light b=
ulb) does not use some other verification method, it might be fooled to turn=
 on when I want it to, not when the authorized person wants it to (people wo=
rk around this with sequence numbers,
 time stamps, message validity periods, etc.).


I would also change the definition of authentication.  It does not verify w=
ho you are.  It verifies possession of a private key or a secret.  You need =
some other mechanism to assign identity to a key or secret, and this is what=
 starts to get messy
 and requires revocation.  If I lose my private key, then I need to revoke =
it so it is no longer associated with my identity.  Someone could still auth=
enticate that a message was produced by possession of the key or secret, but=
 that is separate from associating
 the key with me.


Marc




On Jan 11, 2017, at 3:18 AM, Dirk Kutscher <ietf@dkutscher.net> wrote:

Hi Aaron,
Thanks for sharing. A few comments after a cursory read:
The description of the security and privacy requirements in IIa seems a bit=
 sloppy. For example:

* a) Authentication seems to be mixing up authentication and authorisation
* c) Non-Repudiation: what you say here may not be wrong, but the example w=
ith the attacker who wants an innocent party appear as an attacker is not th=
e most straightforward one. Non-repudiation is guaranteeing that authenticat=
ion can be asserted
 to be genuine and not be refuted later. So a better example may be a syste=
m that prevents an attacker who was authenticated before to deny authorship =
of messages later.
* e) Confidentiality: this is about ensuring that only authorized users can=
 access the confidential information.=20

Best regards,
Dirk
On 5 Jan 2017, at 20:10, Aaron Yi DING wrote:




Hi,

For T2TRG & ICNRG colleagues, a recent survey on D2D security and privacy:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/comst2017.html

pre-camera pdf can be found here if you are interested:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/d2d-pre-camera.pdf

Cheers,
Aaron

On 20/11/16 20:23, "Aaron Yi DING" <aaron.ding@tum.de> wrote:

As presented in the Lisbon meeting, our work on Securebox (for IoT security=
) will appear at ACM CoNEXT CAN '16
http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/co-next/2016/#!/canprogram

The pre-print and abstract can be found here for those who are interested:
https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/yding/publications/can2016.html

Cheers,
Aaron

--
TU Munich, Connected Mobility
https://www.cm.in.tum.de/index.php?id=3D25



From nobody Fri Jan 13 11:03:35 2017
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From: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>
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And now for something completely different:

Many of us have worked with experimental platforms for IoT modules that =
use some form of serial interface (often TTL or 3.3 V CMOS level) for =
debugging, packet transfer, or state querying and configuration =E2=80=94 =
even before IP packets start to flow (or as an alternative funnel for IP =
packets while other IP interfaces are being set up).
So far, most of these serial interfaces are very specific to a platform =
and often hard to integrate into a software development and =
experimentation environment.

Tobias and I have written up a slight evolution of the familiar =
SLIP-based interface (as used in, say, tunslip) that can cover all these =
bases.  This is a bit innovative in that it uses CoAP for all =
request-response exchanges (no =E2=80=9Cshell=E2=80=9D, no =E2=80=9CAT =
commands=E2=80=9D, =E2=80=A6).
Maybe you want to have a look whether such an interface would be useful =
for your R&D work.
Feedback welcome!

Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fe, Carsten

Name:		draft-bormann-t2trg-slipmux
Revision:	00
Title:		Slipmux: Using an UART interface for diagnostics, =
configuration, and packet transfer
Document date:	2017-01-13
Pages:		9
Htmlized:       =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bormann-t2trg-slipmux-00

Abstract:
  Many research and maker platforms for Internet of Things
  experimentation offer a serial interface.  This is often used for
  programming, diagnostic output, as well as a crude command interface
  ("AT interface").  Alternatively, it is often used with SLIP
  (RFC1055) to transfer IP packets only.

  The present report describes how to use a single serial interface for
  diagnostics, configuration commands and state readback, as well as
  packet transfer.

