
From nobody Wed Sep 24 11:18:52 2014
Return-Path: <contact@taoeffect.com>
X-Original-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F8EB1A031C for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:18:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.366
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.366 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_SOFTFAIL=0.665] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XxjWcKcSjU4L for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:18:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a14.g.dreamhost.com (homie.mail.dreamhost.com [208.97.132.208]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82D231A031B for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:18:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a14.g.dreamhost.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by homiemail-a14.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D1D5392077 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:18:38 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=taoeffect.com; h=from :content-type:subject:message-id:date:mime-version:to; s= taoeffect.com; bh=wHwyuohdn00rhdAS7wWzbVV9Jqg=; b=BuyVpp7u8vTrzg yUBoi44Mf41vfXXAsVY02R68Sha1XU9yzieCJVxQO71E0i+wrX1+uuHCUinBpZhY LonrvhpC0tq1/eYXozylw3AaOA1fk2KRaeMB8OadgL5RdDd7PnEtVP1a3v+YCyBD q/7/l5Se+FvBWPHhSc5WsH7iXx58A=
Received: from [192.168.42.78] (50-0-138-93.dsl.dynamic.sonic.net [50.0.138.93]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: contact@taoeffect.com) by homiemail-a14.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 023AD392070 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:18:37 -0700 (PDT)
From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
X-Pgp-Agent: GPGMail 2.1 (f76fd85)
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_6728AEEB-42C9-4ACB-911C-658C8962B53F"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512
X-Mao-Original-Outgoing-Id: 433275517.032561-7a7e7a124c206b4bb1b9f72b3685c7c3
Message-Id: <4906532C-F002-49E4-9F9F-D8D7D1AD96DB@taoeffect.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:18:37 -0700
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.3 \(1878.6\))
To: therightkey@ietf.org
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1878.6)
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/therightkey/53LLS6E8ET_v0NNMtcqVBfiglaY
Subject: [therightkey] The Trouble with Certificate Transparency
X-BeenThere: therightkey@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: <therightkey.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/>
List-Post: <mailto:therightkey@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 18:18:40 -0000

--Apple-Mail=_6728AEEB-42C9-4ACB-911C-658C8962B53F
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="Apple-Mail=_62CB62B7-3E07-4CE4-A2B7-BA7443A409FE"


--Apple-Mail=_62CB62B7-3E07-4CE4-A2B7-BA7443A409FE
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset=us-ascii

Dear [therightkey] list,

This post explains how undetected MITM attacks still remain possible =
even if Google's Certificate Transparency (CT) becomes widely deployed, =
and it dissects many of Google's false and misleading claims about it.

Many thanks go to Zaki (@zmanian), Simon (@simondlr) and others to =
reviewing it prior to publication:

=
http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-transparenc=
y/

Kind regards,
Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_62CB62B7-3E07-4CE4-A2B7-BA7443A409FE
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Dear [therightkey] =
list,</div><div><br></div>This post explains how undetected MITM attacks =
still remain possible even if Google's Certificate&nbsp;Transparency =
(CT) becomes widely deployed, and it dissects many of Google's false and =
misleading&nbsp;claims about it.<br><br>Many thanks go to Zaki =
(@zmanian), Simon (@simondlr) and others to reviewing it prior to =
publication:<br><br><a =
href=3D"http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-tra=
nsparency/">http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate=
-transparency/</a><br><br>Kind regards,<br>Greg<br><br><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_62CB62B7-3E07-4CE4-A2B7-BA7443A409FE--

--Apple-Mail=_6728AEEB-42C9-4ACB-911C-658C8962B53F
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename=signature.asc
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature;
	name=signature.asc
Content-Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org

iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJUIwr9AAoJEOxnICvpCVJHHTUQALU2+S4u2N87VI1jToZrCcwv
rd2ZnDNAJkIN5p1OqB1hkcz+K0/mIadbv+lqVbuxNmbeTNfr2DNGC8QxeFZa9+9j
vwT6MZE5y4qPiuudlVnS075D0N2NTEQiymN6IQ5Du+kHdeVeJGpja9RUIR2YAKvR
jVQYn92YKC1ZPlq4+CF6erxVJwynCdRTatr4DRDxd3GptSTTO3tTzyXzIZCTEYjS
PFedqMb+GyKvWH1M7MyMAQtWYNxpL868quAq3azqJcdcC+bEBY/cOuCwMPTspVxZ
KBMQ1MYC85Iyc26iR3cMHNSzieJeZG0ahVzMcyII8O1XvsU8XIZi+me4WoSR4XNb
aOCCFqCp6bYBLzy8kMlYJEaeI37iNjPiM3DsL412dwqADmaUr4baImImmsMC624x
0SnSZ0BxKErX1AnPfncaDH6UK6cQLATHX830LCZAHORQ4ddBYEVtGsFmDfbtH43N
eHC9+NOB24uvE2J8wEBPGp1Od9JgXz4hOENJyeegkS2eH/JS2CgJxhYNhecn/NjB
xHZ7lCUbBmsqvHUnm+YMnHMr8MXdJmyWcmpPzcudE3Kzxhu4ToJNh30hLZ9T/KWq
GHddABZlfzVQIcu1MAxAl+nBZ6UDnyo/IAZnZg/HrW9yNsZ7hwLS7ry5OxSa0h1s
4CQ5LxiVGVd7NJNbNzsO
=NvUf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--Apple-Mail=_6728AEEB-42C9-4ACB-911C-658C8962B53F--


From nobody Thu Sep 25 06:40:16 2014
Return-Path: <beldmit@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79A671A0081 for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 25 Sep 2014 06:40:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.701
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.701 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xgqCmAYhsfwj for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 25 Sep 2014 06:40:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ig0-x22d.google.com (mail-ig0-x22d.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4001:c05::22d]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D7EC91A6FC8 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Thu, 25 Sep 2014 06:40:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ig0-f173.google.com with SMTP id l13so8465488iga.0 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Thu, 25 Sep 2014 06:40:13 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113;  h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=2f5zzD0ZEeDWrZjMP3fUOm0IUoV8x9q7gjhpHc/bDCE=; b=RSDQXb7dOhMsL9mf4ctnodbLzFahJahX0a5ev9aihlXlGc0hfDB3Dg9DGLY9E9/xIm UBvm9472teZI+mu7Dqq5vKZ+iP/kTzWz83dy3wVzfRjriNaXTVPhoHO1FloD91BZ3NiO GBKLv8tdgdnrywEenE0kBRWyL5o0nQAMoRW9QehwFs1WWv7uhxxcN5OZKi+n1K+CYKcs TDhYQeoJn5Nsp56whIMLkKbnkbQ39zmIXawKDMGKaaTJDCnFlBtXM1lI57wTIuFk02UV mcUmLcOwO0GUeQ5MwAWU5RKTr8mfaAUxjP3Uzj3zrfcsho1VtdfawsHBG1H1Eyv1qLwL obsg==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.50.234.193 with SMTP id ug1mr22302985igc.20.1411652413257; Thu, 25 Sep 2014 06:40:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.107.138.2 with HTTP; Thu, 25 Sep 2014 06:40:13 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <4906532C-F002-49E4-9F9F-D8D7D1AD96DB@taoeffect.com>
References: <4906532C-F002-49E4-9F9F-D8D7D1AD96DB@taoeffect.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 17:40:13 +0400
Message-ID: <CADqLbz++OtVCLm3X6PQTq8FFq89CfMFFg2dq8WgK6oWSfJZQbg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113489e0a37ff20503e3f011
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/therightkey/9Bj99i3TlaP-HV_zE695bKjv79c
Cc: therightkey@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [therightkey] The Trouble with Certificate Transparency
X-BeenThere: therightkey@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: <therightkey.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/>
List-Post: <mailto:therightkey@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 13:40:15 -0000

--001a113489e0a37ff20503e3f011
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Hello,

I'm sorry, I do not understand the idea of providing different trees and
proofs to different parties.

If I understand correctly, it should be prevented by Auditors and the
gossip protocol (yes, I understand it is not specified in fact). Auditors
and gossip protocol are designed for solving precisely this case.
The other possibility is that the Merkle tree is not neither append-only
nor verifiable.

We should have an perfect MITM that can intercept all the communications by
the victim and her/his software to turn this scenario into real life.

And, BTW, if we ask for more than one SCT in the cert as Ben does, the
attack becomes much more difficult even for the perfect MITM.

Thank you!


On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 10:18 PM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:

> Dear [therightkey] list,
>
> This post explains how undetected MITM attacks still remain possible even
> if Google's Certificate Transparency (CT) becomes widely deployed, and it
> dissects many of Google's false and misleading claims about it.
>
> Many thanks go to Zaki (@zmanian), Simon (@simondlr) and others to
> reviewing it prior to publication:
>
>
> http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-transparency/
>
> Kind regards,
> Greg
>
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with
> the NSA.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> therightkey mailing list
> therightkey@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
>
>


-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

--001a113489e0a37ff20503e3f011
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px=
">Hello,</span><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><=
br></div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">I&#39;m=
 sorry, I do not understand the idea of providing different trees and proof=
s to different parties.=C2=A0</div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:13px"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;fon=
t-size:13px">If I understand correctly, it should be prevented by Auditors =
and the gossip protocol (yes, I understand it is not specified in fact). Au=
ditors and gossip protocol are designed for solving precisely=C2=A0this cas=
e.</div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">The othe=
r possibility is that the Merkle tree is not neither append-only nor verifi=
able.=C2=A0</div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"=
><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">We sh=
ould have an perfect MITM that can intercept all the communications by the =
victim and her/his software to turn this scenario into real life.=C2=A0</di=
v><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br></div><div=
 style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">And, BTW, if we ask =
for more than one SCT in the cert as Ben does, the attack becomes much more=
 difficult even for the perfect MITM.=C2=A0</div><div style=3D"font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,=
sans-serif;font-size:13px">Thank you!</div><div><br></div></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 10:=
18 PM, Tao Effect <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:contact@taoeffect=
.com" target=3D"_blank">contact@taoeffect.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div>Dear [t=
herightkey] list,</div><div><br></div>This post explains how undetected MIT=
M attacks still remain possible even if Google&#39;s Certificate=C2=A0Trans=
parency (CT) becomes widely deployed, and it dissects many of Google&#39;s =
false and misleading=C2=A0claims about it.<br><br>Many thanks go to Zaki (@=
zmanian), Simon (@simondlr) and others to reviewing it prior to publication=
:<br><br><a href=3D"http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-cert=
ificate-transparency/" target=3D"_blank">http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/=
the-trouble-with-certificate-transparency/</a><br><br>Kind regards,<br>Greg=
<br><br><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-siz=
e:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spac=
ing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transfo=
rm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline!important;float:=
none">--</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-siz=
e:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spac=
ing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transfo=
rm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0=
);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:norma=
l;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;display:inline!important;float:none">Please do not email me anything that =
you are not comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);=
font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;=
font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:star=
t;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;d=
isplay:inline!important;float:none">=C2=A0with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>
therightkey mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:therightkey@ietf.org">therightkey@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>SY, Dmit=
ry Belyavsky
</div>

--001a113489e0a37ff20503e3f011--


From nobody Fri Sep 26 19:05:33 2014
Return-Path: <bascule@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5A3301A010F for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:32 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.1
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.1 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_40=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id X2P2REYIxE6w for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ob0-x232.google.com (mail-ob0-x232.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c01::232]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B3CD21A00FB for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ob0-f178.google.com with SMTP id va2so10982763obc.9 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:30 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113;  h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to:content-type; bh=GNO8mDxCHd3iQ2LBK0be85WI+y2qHa2gFzFhToyiJxQ=; b=FZvCWfghdcvfX6/sCOQwcE0+g7sLCOGVfarZwnW+QiTfR0xdjR00I8juY2XfGSchbH 68OyB+mV0ba1iyPGvksjHwTeKxGrx9FQeCuh8ihD/f7DNF6rNpgPbCqZ1BPYFdKb3FVe M6jYGfaFA0NJNCJyLSi0BXUgni5GhpToGzLRY5/MquXEmFYZfDhZ8XeFWlIrM0oKBnIw mGRLYdnQmJ+oARjKFHCR1PohpApawS6uGdgmHol1S29sgaecthFpmnvZJzga7uV0e3DU 9Ys3ZNAU1D1D/eUnAHdjnwMVrXm3kSZwENR0edGpKvKLYo9MN5AqYoImFhSbQgl2V8Ao bacw==
X-Received: by 10.60.35.6 with SMTP id d6mr14906oej.77.1411783530150; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:30 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.60.59.8 with HTTP; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:10 -0700 (PDT)
From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:10 -0700
Message-ID: <CAHOTMVLTD27CCgUZOipr1+ERjpuYz2vX=ymP5rh6GXUucgm7Rw@mail.gmail.com>
To: messaging <messaging@moderncrypto.org>, therightkey@ietf.org,  Crypto <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, cpunks <cypherpunks@cpunks.org>,  liberationtech <liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e01228b1ad083d3050402771b
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/therightkey/mm9AkLyTrc5TF2UxdLplKUPre9s
Subject: [therightkey] Informing the user they have the wrong key
X-BeenThere: therightkey@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: <therightkey.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/>
List-Post: <mailto:therightkey@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2014 02:05:32 -0000

--089e01228b1ad083d3050402771b
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

If we build fancy systems to detect things like misadvertised keys or MitM
attacks, how can we reasonably inform an end user what is amiss in an
actionable way that won't confuse them with too many false positives to
avoid taking action when something bad actually happens?

I recently went to SOUPS and saw a number of presentations on the general
difficulty of communicating security-actionable information to users. From
what I saw I'd say the problem is twofold:

1) How does the system provide a high confidence level that when it tries
to communicate a security-actionable event, it's fairly certain it's not a
false positive? False positives condition users to ignore security warnings

2) How do you express what's happening to the user in such a way that they
will actually take action on it and not just click-through dismiss it?

Given the wide-ranging number of scenarios, the answer will of course be
contextual, and I'd be curious to hear any replies about how systems try to
solve the "right key" user experience problem in general.

That said, the messaging use-case (in conjunction with a "key directory"
system) is particularly interesting to me.

If an end-to-end encrypted messaging system which relies on a
centrally-managed key directory (e.g. iMessage) were to by coersion or
compromise publish a poison key to their directory to facilitate a MitM
attack, but the system creators wanted to make such action obvious to their
users, how can the systems reasonably detect and reflect this in such a way
that such users aren't conditioned to ignore such alerts for routine events
(e.g. the SSH "SOMETHING NASTY" message) and actually feel compelled to
take action on that knowledge?

And then what? How can we help someone who is a victim of an attack like
this actually compile all of the necessary information for someone to
figure out what actually happened? How can encryption tools compile
incident reports that experts can scrutinize to determine what happened?

-- 
Tony Arcieri

--089e01228b1ad083d3050402771b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>If we build fancy systems to detect things =
like misadvertised keys or MitM attacks, how can we reasonably inform an en=
d user what is amiss in an actionable way that won&#39;t confuse them with =
too many false positives to avoid taking action when something bad actually=
 happens?</div><div><br></div><div>I recently went to SOUPS and saw a numbe=
r of presentations on the general difficulty of communicating security-acti=
onable information to users. From what I saw I&#39;d say the problem is two=
fold:</div><div><br></div><div>1) How does the system provide a high confid=
ence level that when it tries to communicate a security-actionable event, i=
t&#39;s fairly certain it&#39;s not a false positive? False positives condi=
tion users to ignore security warnings</div><div><br></div><div>2) How do y=
ou express what&#39;s happening to the user in such a way that they will ac=
tually take action on it and not just click-through dismiss it?</div><div><=
br></div><div>Given the wide-ranging number of scenarios, the answer will o=
f course be contextual, and I&#39;d be curious to hear any replies about ho=
w systems try to solve the &quot;right key&quot; user experience problem in=
 general.</div><div><br></div><div>That said, the messaging use-case (in co=
njunction with a &quot;key directory&quot; system) is particularly interest=
ing to me.</div><div><br></div><div>If an end-to-end encrypted messaging sy=
stem which relies on a centrally-managed key directory (e.g. iMessage) were=
 to by coersion or compromise publish a poison key to their directory to fa=
cilitate a MitM attack, but the system creators wanted to make such action =
obvious to their users, how can the systems reasonably detect and reflect t=
his in such a way that such users aren&#39;t conditioned to ignore such ale=
rts for routine events (e.g. the SSH &quot;SOMETHING NASTY&quot; message) a=
nd actually feel compelled to take action on that knowledge?</div><div><br>=
</div><div>And then what? How can we help someone who is a victim of an att=
ack like this actually compile all of the necessary information for someone=
 to figure out what actually happened? How can encryption tools compile inc=
ident reports that experts can scrutinize to determine what happened?</div>=
<div><br></div><div>-- <br>Tony Arcieri<br>
</div></div></div></div>

--089e01228b1ad083d3050402771b--


From nobody Fri Sep 26 19:05:48 2014
Return-Path: <contact@taoeffect.com>
X-Original-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B333A1A700D for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:46 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.334
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.334 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_SOFTFAIL=0.665] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XGTdanQ-UJ5R for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a14.g.dreamhost.com (homie.mail.dreamhost.com [208.97.132.208]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 608B11A6F98 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a14.g.dreamhost.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by homiemail-a14.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37F10392075; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:45 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=taoeffect.com; h= content-type:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :message-id:references:to; s=taoeffect.com; bh=qmMPnxKn5f0X4/XIu VXBscbNoM0=; b=B075lUe3sKKkZl6vBSgHr4Zj8li/ft1LI19wACTvNhdta6mC2 VHy5vJaCpR8ctDjBgak1xHDpfXROhzFHDg6nxDNLdNkiX1RFz+UgO3/pCbWCBCQC rcAaMCXrHU1jVUQ7T738DHkrfIVNK7Wdjka3zXWr3PbMbFSTOdJH0JR5PE=
Received: from [192.168.42.78] (50-0-138-93.dsl.dynamic.sonic.net [50.0.138.93]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: contact@taoeffect.com) by homiemail-a14.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D863C392070; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:44 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_47113FB9-84AE-41B0-9E6B-688804B01250"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.3 \(1878.6\))
X-Pgp-Agent: GPGMail 2.1 (f76fd85)
From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
In-Reply-To: <CADqLbz++OtVCLm3X6PQTq8FFq89CfMFFg2dq8WgK6oWSfJZQbg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:05:43 -0700
X-Mao-Original-Outgoing-Id: 433476343.499172-6bf805d4f472c77bdaf08eaced5b5d49
Message-Id: <2EF07525-0508-4E4E-950F-05709FAA5466@taoeffect.com>
References: <4906532C-F002-49E4-9F9F-D8D7D1AD96DB@taoeffect.com> <CADqLbz++OtVCLm3X6PQTq8FFq89CfMFFg2dq8WgK6oWSfJZQbg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1878.6)
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/therightkey/znBllCTG3a5v6KySRec7zSsOEOs
Cc: therightkey@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [therightkey] The Trouble with Certificate Transparency
X-BeenThere: therightkey@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: <therightkey.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/>
List-Post: <mailto:therightkey@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2014 02:05:46 -0000

--Apple-Mail=_47113FB9-84AE-41B0-9E6B-688804B01250
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="Apple-Mail=_C565951F-9AE6-41B2-9353-411805C3673E"


--Apple-Mail=_C565951F-9AE6-41B2-9353-411805C3673E
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset=us-ascii

Dear Dmitry,

Thank you for the reply.

On Sep 25, 2014, at 6:40 AM, Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> wrote:

> If I understand correctly, it should be prevented by Auditors and the =
gossip protocol (yes, I understand it is not specified in fact). =
Auditors and gossip protocol are designed for solving precisely this =
case.

Well, please reply with the details of gossip.

This blog post was simply a more formal way of restating an email I'd =
brought up on [trans] back in May.

I pointed out back then that gossip was essential if this attack is to =
have any hope of being detected, and I am still waiting for those =
details.

> And, BTW, if we ask for more than one SCT in the cert as Ben does, the =
attack becomes much more difficult even for the perfect MITM.


Define "much more"? If we're dealing with "the perfect MITM", they might =
own one of the CAs, and then only need to send an NSL to another (or =
hack another). Not too difficult for "the perfect MITM".

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_C565951F-9AE6-41B2-9353-411805C3673E
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Dear =
Dmitry,<div><br></div><div>Thank you for the =
reply.</div><div><br></div><div>On Sep 25, 2014, at 6:40 AM, Dmitry =
Belyavsky &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:beldmit@gmail.com">beldmit@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: =
13px;">If I understand correctly, it should be prevented by Auditors and =
the gossip protocol (yes, I understand it is not specified in fact). =
Auditors and gossip protocol are designed for solving =
precisely&nbsp;this case.</div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Well, please reply with =
the details of gossip.</div><div><br></div><div>This blog post was =
simply a more formal way of restating an email I'd brought up on [trans] =
back in May.</div><div><br></div><div>I pointed out back then that =
gossip was essential if this attack is to have any hope of being =
detected, and I am still waiting for those =
details.</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: =
13px;">And, BTW, if we ask for more than one SCT in the cert as Ben =
does, the attack becomes much more difficult even for the perfect =
MITM.&nbsp;</div></div></blockquote></div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div =
style=3D"font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: =
13px;"><br></div></div></div><div>Define "much more"? If we're dealing =
with "the perfect MITM", they might own one of the CAs, and then only =
need to send an NSL to another (or hack another). Not too difficult for =
"the perfect MITM".</div><div><br></div><div>Kind =
regards,</div><div>Greg Slepak</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<div><div><br></div></div></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_C565951F-9AE6-41B2-9353-411805C3673E--

--Apple-Mail=_47113FB9-84AE-41B0-9E6B-688804B01250
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename=signature.asc
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature;
	name=signature.asc
Content-Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
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=wT29
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--Apple-Mail=_47113FB9-84AE-41B0-9E6B-688804B01250--


From nobody Mon Sep 29 13:19:22 2014
Return-Path: <paul@cypherpunks.ca>
X-Original-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EBAB1A8790 for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:15:09 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.5
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.5 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Db8LuuIkqE0b for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:15:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from bofh.nohats.ca (bofh.nohats.ca [76.10.157.69]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A52A81A8785 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 19:15:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from bofh.nohats.ca (bofh.nohats.ca [127.0.0.1]) by bofh.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id E684C80098; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 22:15:04 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from localhost (paul@localhost) by bofh.nohats.ca (8.14.7/8.14.7/Submit) with ESMTP id s8R2F35b001959; Fri, 26 Sep 2014 22:15:04 -0400
X-Authentication-Warning: bofh.nohats.ca: paul owned process doing -bs
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 22:15:03 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@cypherpunks.ca>
X-X-Sender: paul@bofh.nohats.ca
To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
In-Reply-To: <2EF07525-0508-4E4E-950F-05709FAA5466@taoeffect.com>
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.10.1409262213170.27616@bofh.nohats.ca>
References: <4906532C-F002-49E4-9F9F-D8D7D1AD96DB@taoeffect.com> <CADqLbz++OtVCLm3X6PQTq8FFq89CfMFFg2dq8WgK6oWSfJZQbg@mail.gmail.com> <2EF07525-0508-4E4E-950F-05709FAA5466@taoeffect.com>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.10 (LFD 1266 2009-07-14)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/therightkey/DcbjxqGcslswLZd-wyFFLpgxD4E
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 13:19:20 -0700
Cc: therightkey@ietf.org, Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [therightkey] The Trouble with Certificate Transparency
X-BeenThere: therightkey@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: <therightkey.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/>
List-Post: <mailto:therightkey@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2014 02:15:09 -0000

On Fri, 26 Sep 2014, Tao Effect wrote:

> I pointed out back then that gossip was essential if this attack is to have any hope of being
> detected, and I am still waiting for those details.

The trans working group decided to split the gossip protocol from the
main draft and work on it seperately. Seeing that you have some ideas
on how it should be implemented, perhaps you're willing to participate
in its protocol design?

Paul (trans wg co-chair)


From mwfarb@cmu.edu  Mon Sep 29 08:43:42 2014
Return-Path: <mwfarb@cmu.edu>
X-Original-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9916A1A87EE for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 29 Sep 2014 08:43:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.086
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.086 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.786] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id G2spb7etaJPm for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 29 Sep 2014 08:43:39 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.andrew.cmu.edu (SMTP.ANDREW.CMU.EDU [128.2.105.202]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 787B71A87E0 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Mon, 29 Sep 2014 08:43:39 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mac1mwfwifi.wv.cc.cmu.edu (MAC1MWFWIFI.WV.CC.CMU.EDU [128.237.214.251]) (user=mwfarb mech=PLAIN (0 bits)) by smtp.andrew.cmu.edu (8.14.8/8.14.8) with ESMTP id s8TFhVn9002449 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NOT); Mon, 29 Sep 2014 11:43:32 -0400
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_741DC15B-9174-4741-902B-205D07DFCE2C"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.3 \(1878.6\))
From: Michael Farb <mwfarb@cmu.edu>
In-Reply-To: <CAHOTMVLTD27CCgUZOipr1+ERjpuYz2vX=ymP5rh6GXUucgm7Rw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 11:43:31 -0400
Message-Id: <BDB0579C-7B9D-4847-A2A0-94FBFE862AE5@cmu.edu>
References: <CAHOTMVLTD27CCgUZOipr1+ERjpuYz2vX=ymP5rh6GXUucgm7Rw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1878.6)
X-PMX-Version: 6.0.3.2322014, Antispam-Engine: 2.7.2.2107409, Antispam-Data: 2014.9.29.153620
X-SMTP-Spam-Clean: 8% ( MULTIPLE_RCPTS 0.1, MIME_LOWER_CASE 0.05, SUPERLONG_LINE 0.05, BODYTEXTH_SIZE_10000_LESS 0, BODY_SIZE_10000_PLUS 0, DATE_TZ_NA 0, FROM_EDU_TLD 0, __ANY_URI 0, __BOUNCE_CHALLENGE_SUBJ 0, __BOUNCE_NDR_SUBJ_EXEMPT 0, __C230066_P5 0, __CP_MEDIA_BODY 0, __CT 0, __CTYPE_HAS_BOUNDARY 0, __CTYPE_MULTIPART 0, __CTYPE_MULTIPART_ALT 0, __FORWARDED_MSG 0, __FRAUD_BODY_WEBMAIL 0, __FRAUD_TRUST 0, __FRAUD_WEBMAIL 0,  __HAS_FROM 0, __HAS_HTML 0, __HAS_MSGID 0, __HAS_X_MAILER 0, __IN_REP_TO 0, __MIME_HTML 0, __MIME_VERSION 0, __MSGID_APPLEMAIL 0, __MULTIPLE_RCPTS_CC_X2 0, __SANE_MSGID 0, __SUBJ_ALPHA_END 0, __SUBJ_ALPHA_NEGATE 0, __TAG_EXISTS_HTML 0, __TO_MALFORMED_2 0, __URI_NS )
X-SMTP-Spam-Score: 8%
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.74 on 128.2.105.202
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/therightkey/ewGpON_m9Js40IP6-WTsGn8SFsU
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 13:19:20 -0700
Cc: messaging <messaging@moderncrypto.org>, cpunks <cypherpunks@cpunks.org>, therightkey@ietf.org, Crypto <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, liberationtech <liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu>
Subject: Re: [therightkey] [messaging] Informing the user they have the wrong key
X-BeenThere: therightkey@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: <therightkey.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/>
List-Post: <mailto:therightkey@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 17:44:13 -0000

--Apple-Mail=_741DC15B-9174-4741-902B-205D07DFCE2C
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset=us-ascii

I'm not sure what the best way to do this in the asynchronous case, =
where I may have keys but have not validated their correctness and I =
want a process where I can verify against public data on a server at =
anytime.=20

However, for synchronous cases, where 2 or more users are leveraging an =
existing physical meeting, video chat, or phone call, we establish key =
correctness (and initial exchange if needed) resolving some of these =
issues. SafeSlinger reports MITM interference in the exchange to the UI =
and aborts its protocol for all users, and prevents habituation of =
click-through by forcing users communicate out of band to choose =
matching words among some decoys.

But this case is active verification, I think you're referring to =
passive verification. I'd be interested to hear what others have to say. =
We use language like "unexpected data found in the exchange" in the =
active case. Perhaps the passive case should include a system of time =
sensitive escalation. Notifications come to the user about the suspect =
key that its authenticity is suspicious and can be used but will be =
reported compromised by the directory in X amount of time. Perhaps there =
should be rectification process with the directory publisher to =
troubleshoot keys before the X time?

Cheers,
Mike

Michael W. Farb
Research Programmer, Carnegie Mellon University CyLab
M 412-965-4725 - www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger

On Sep 26, 2014, at 10:05 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:

> If we build fancy systems to detect things like misadvertised keys or =
MitM attacks, how can we reasonably inform an end user what is amiss in =
an actionable way that won't confuse them with too many false positives =
to avoid taking action when something bad actually happens?
>=20
> I recently went to SOUPS and saw a number of presentations on the =
general difficulty of communicating security-actionable information to =
users. =46rom what I saw I'd say the problem is twofold:
>=20
> 1) How does the system provide a high confidence level that when it =
tries to communicate a security-actionable event, it's fairly certain =
it's not a false positive? False positives condition users to ignore =
security warnings
>=20
> 2) How do you express what's happening to the user in such a way that =
they will actually take action on it and not just click-through dismiss =
it?
>=20
> Given the wide-ranging number of scenarios, the answer will of course =
be contextual, and I'd be curious to hear any replies about how systems =
try to solve the "right key" user experience problem in general.
>=20
> That said, the messaging use-case (in conjunction with a "key =
directory" system) is particularly interesting to me.
>=20
> If an end-to-end encrypted messaging system which relies on a =
centrally-managed key directory (e.g. iMessage) were to by coersion or =
compromise publish a poison key to their directory to facilitate a MitM =
attack, but the system creators wanted to make such action obvious to =
their users, how can the systems reasonably detect and reflect this in =
such a way that such users aren't conditioned to ignore such alerts for =
routine events (e.g. the SSH "SOMETHING NASTY" message) and actually =
feel compelled to take action on that knowledge?
>=20
> And then what? How can we help someone who is a victim of an attack =
like this actually compile all of the necessary information for someone =
to figure out what actually happened? How can encryption tools compile =
incident reports that experts can scrutinize to determine what happened?
>=20
> --=20
> Tony Arcieri
> _______________________________________________
> Messaging mailing list
> Messaging@moderncrypto.org
> https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging


--Apple-Mail=_741DC15B-9174-4741-902B-205D07DFCE2C
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>I'm not sure what the best way to do this in =
the asynchronous case, where I may have keys but have not validated =
their correctness and I want a process where I can verify against public =
data on a server at anytime.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>However, for =
synchronous cases, where 2 or more users are leveraging an existing =
physical meeting, video chat, or phone call, we establish key =
correctness (and initial exchange if needed) resolving some of these =
issues. SafeSlinger reports MITM interference in the exchange to the UI =
and aborts its protocol for all users, and prevents habituation of =
click-through by forcing users communicate out of band to choose =
matching words among some decoys.</div><div><br></div><div>But this case =
is active verification, I think you're referring to passive =
verification. I'd be interested to hear what others have to say. We use =
language like "unexpected data found in the exchange" in the active =
case. Perhaps the passive case should include a system of time sensitive =
escalation. Notifications come to the user about the suspect key that =
its authenticity is suspicious and can be used but will be reported =
compromised by the directory in X amount of time. Perhaps there should =
be rectification process with the directory publisher to troubleshoot =
keys before the X time?</div><div><br></div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true">
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: normal; orphans: =
auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;"><div =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: =
normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;"><div =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;"></div><div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Mike</div><div><br></div><div>Mich=
ael W. Farb</div><div>Research Programmer, Carnegie Mellon University =
CyLab</div><div>M 412-965-4725 - <a =
href=3D"http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinger">www.cylab.cmu.edu/safeslinge=
r</a></div></div></div></div></div>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Sep 26, 2014, at 10:05 PM, Tony Arcieri &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bascule@gmail.com">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>If we build fancy systems to detect =
things like misadvertised keys or MitM attacks, how can we reasonably =
inform an end user what is amiss in an actionable way that won't confuse =
them with too many false positives to avoid taking action when something =
bad actually happens?</div><div><br></div><div>I recently went to SOUPS =
and saw a number of presentations on the general difficulty of =
communicating security-actionable information to users. =46rom what I =
saw I'd say the problem is twofold:</div><div><br></div><div>1) How does =
the system provide a high confidence level that when it tries to =
communicate a security-actionable event, it's fairly certain it's not a =
false positive? False positives condition users to ignore security =
warnings</div><div><br></div><div>2) How do you express what's happening =
to the user in such a way that they will actually take action on it and =
not just click-through dismiss it?</div><div><br></div><div>Given the =
wide-ranging number of scenarios, the answer will of course be =
contextual, and I'd be curious to hear any replies about how systems try =
to solve the "right key" user experience problem in =
general.</div><div><br></div><div>That said, the messaging use-case (in =
conjunction with a "key directory" system) is particularly interesting =
to me.</div><div><br></div><div>If an end-to-end encrypted messaging =
system which relies on a centrally-managed key directory (e.g. iMessage) =
were to by coersion or compromise publish a poison key to their =
directory to facilitate a MitM attack, but the system creators wanted to =
make such action obvious to their users, how can the systems reasonably =
detect and reflect this in such a way that such users aren't conditioned =
to ignore such alerts for routine events (e.g. the SSH "SOMETHING NASTY" =
message) and actually feel compelled to take action on that =
knowledge?</div><div><br></div><div>And then what? How can we help =
someone who is a victim of an attack like this actually compile all of =
the necessary information for someone to figure out what actually =
happened? How can encryption tools compile incident reports that experts =
can scrutinize to determine what happened?</div><div><br></div><div>-- =
<br>Tony Arcieri<br>
</div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>Messaging mailing =
list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Messaging@moderncrypto.org">Messaging@moderncrypto.org</a><=
br>https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging<br></blockquote></d=
iv><br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_741DC15B-9174-4741-902B-205D07DFCE2C--


From nobody Tue Sep 30 11:24:01 2014
Return-Path: <nico@cryptonector.com>
X-Original-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC4BD1A3B9D for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 11:23:58 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.266
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.266 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, IP_NOT_FRIENDLY=0.334, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jiyRrpsYQ1B3 for <therightkey@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 11:23:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a31.g.dreamhost.com (sub4.mail.dreamhost.com [69.163.253.135]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B0A61A1F04 for <therightkey@ietf.org>; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 11:23:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a31.g.dreamhost.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by homiemail-a31.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB743202022; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 11:23:57 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=cryptonector.com; h=date :from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:in-reply-to; s=cryptonector.com; bh=YKguywXltY06/w tt4F61ikO3bQM=; b=ZUkM5L1BQR2gHxX+0y0AL0CUjuirsRp5kC6lZ8c/iY237s u5UvJpkv6NFbR4EO7DNMRXn8ERFo/zTeDQ4wCrxDbprqxj1CODtdFJap+A7/teFN kapnrl79LXIpgnlZleFeFOisLFdk5x9HNopCiPgIB6k3jVzTzu0QtVI39FDfU=
Received: from localhost (108-207-244-174.lightspeed.austtx.sbcglobal.net [108.207.244.174]) (Authenticated sender: nico@cryptonector.com) by homiemail-a31.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 30C86202018; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 11:23:56 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2014 13:23:56 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
Message-ID: <20140930182354.GA2630@localhost>
References: <4906532C-F002-49E4-9F9F-D8D7D1AD96DB@taoeffect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <4906532C-F002-49E4-9F9F-D8D7D1AD96DB@taoeffect.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/therightkey/gkn7Aa6EodH3aiEvC9vKxPlrvoI
Cc: therightkey@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [therightkey] The Trouble with Certificate Transparency
X-BeenThere: therightkey@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: <therightkey.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/>
List-Post: <mailto:therightkey@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey>, <mailto:therightkey-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2014 18:23:59 -0000

First, no protocol can really protect you from MITM attacks when you
can't have pre-shared key material a priori.

Second, CT helps primarily by increasing the risk of MITMing CAs (and
logs) getting caught.

Anything that increases that risk will tend to make the CAs (and logs)
less willing to act as or cooperate with MITMs.

Sure, targeted attacks might succeed, but they might fail (e.g., they
might be detected after the fact), with all the consequences that that
entails (at least reputational damage).

Now consider a world where we opportunistically encrypt (and
authenticate, where possible).  In such a world targeted attacks get
much harder: because the attacker might have to MITM non-targets'
connections in order to find the target's connections.  The risk to the
attacker then grows quite a bit (hard to quantify), and the attacker
then has to do much more work to reduce their risk.

All of the above is not nothing.  It's a lot.  It might be enough to
greatly improve security on the Internet all around.  IMO it will be.

Nico
-- 

