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Cc: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org, tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TICTOC] Renamed: Interleave Questions
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David ,

The primary purpose of the scenarios illustrated in the book was to=20
quantify the output delay and the antisymmetric Ethernet card delays,=20
especially with Solaris. The GPS servers used for primary=20
synchronization operate only in client/server mode and so far as I know, =

not in any interleave mode.

There has been recent interest in stateful servers, such as might be=20
supported using the MRU list now used for rate management. If this works =

out, it might be possible to support an interleaved client/server mode.=20
This might be a topic for further research.

Dave

Marlow, David T CIV NSWCDD, W64 wrote:

>Dave,
>   A while back in an email thread you pointed out that our ID (draft-ma=
rlow-tictoc-computer-clock-accuracy-00.txt) only addressed interleaved br=
oadcast and did not include interleaved symmetric mode and that a lot of =
the detail information is in your book.  We bought the book and have lear=
ned a lot particularly in section 16.6 where you have measurement data fo=
r interleave mode operation.  Your Backroom LAN example is similar to the=
 experiments we ran.  We had some questions:
>
>1) In your Backroom LAN example the GPS clock server ran in client/serve=
r mode with clients Macabre and Mort.  Would you expect better accuracy i=
f client/server mode is used (as you did) versus if interleave broadcast =
mode were used between this server and these two clients? =20
>
>2)Similar in your Campus LAN example you used client/server mode in some=
 of the operations versus using interleave broadcast, where is client/ser=
ver mode better than interleave broadcast to use?
>
>3) In your Backroom LAN example, Macabre and Mort ran interleaved symmet=
ric mode between each other.  Would not the dominant synchronization fact=
or come from the GPS clock server, given its lower stratum number?  Is th=
e interleaved symmetric mode exchanges providing a secondary effect to ke=
ep these two together?
>
>  Dave=20
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: tictoc-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tictoc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf=
 Of Karen O'Donoghue
>Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 23:10
>To: NTP Working Group; tictoc@ietf.org
>Subject: [TICTOC] Fwd: Re: [ntpwg] Fwd: reminder for remote participatio=
n in today's tictoc meeting
>
>Folks,
>
>This came to me personally, and I neglected to send it on to the ntp and=
 tictoc wg lists. My apologies for the delay. The question before us is w=
hether or not the interleave capability should be properly documented and=
 where the resources will come from to complete the effort.=20
>
>Karen
>
>-------- Original Message --------=20
>Subject: 	Re: [ntpwg] Fwd: [TICTOC] reminder for remote participation in=
 today's tictoc meeting	=20
>Date: 	Tue, 12 Apr 2011 18:18:43 +0000	=20
>From: 	David L. Mills <mills@udel.edu> <mailto:mills@udel.edu> 	=20
>To: 	kodonog@pobox.com	=20
>
>
>Karen,
>
>The following is in response to the ID you distributed. I offer it as a =
candidate for distribution to th eWG members.
>
>Dave
>
>This internet draft describes experiments using the interleaved broadcas=
t mode recently incorporated in the NTP reference implementation. The exp=
eriments do not include the interleaved symmetric mode, which provides si=
milar functionality in peer-to-peer configurations. For reference, these =
modes, their relevance to PTP and related information are discussed in de=
tail in Chapters 15 through 17 of the book "Network Time Synchronization =
- the Network Time Protocol on Earth and in Space, Second Edition, CRC Pr=
ess 2011, as cited on my web page www.eedis.udel.edu/~mills <http://www.e=
edis.udel.edu/%7Emills> . However, most of the information relevant to th=
e followings discussion can be found in the white papers at www.eecis.ude=
l.edu/~mills/ntp.html <http://www.eecis.udel.edu/%7Emills/ntp.html> . Of =
particular interest are the documents "Analysis and Simulation of the NTP=
 On-Wire Protocol" and "Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol." Both of t=
hese documents represent an update since th!
>!
>e book was published late last year.
>
>Readers may wonder why these documents have not been published as an upd=
ate to the protocol specification RFC-5905, which would have been the exp=
ectation several years ago in the adolescent Internet. However, the effor=
t necessary to publish an ID with figures, tables and equations is nowada=
ys simply unacceptable. My experience with RFC-5905 and RFC-5906 over the=
 last five years of publishing effort is not sustainable. Thus, unless so=
me collaboration, perhaps the TICTOC working group, chose to publish them=
 as IDs, I will not commit that adventure myself.
>
>First some nomenclature that may help in the following discussion. Times=
tamps captured for the clock discipline are classed as hardstamps, drives=
tamps and softstamps. Softstamps are captured during the course of user-s=
pace processing; they may be corrupted by operating system and device lat=
encies, as well as transmission delays. Drivestamps are captured during t=
he packet interrupt routines, so are much less affected by operating syst=
em scheduling and competition with other programs. Hardstamps are capture=
d by dedicated hardware means, typically in the PHY layer of the network =
interface card (NIC). While the details vary, the typical intercept point=
 is the media independent interface (MII), which monitors the frame level=
 interface on a character by character basis. The capture means is usuall=
t a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) that parses the packeet, inserts=
 timestamp data and recomputes the UDP checksum.
>
>The interleaved capability was originally not intended for NTP, but for =
the Proximity-1 protocol specified by the Consultive Committee on Space D=
ata systems (CCSDS). The Proximity-1 protocol is designed for communicati=
on between spacecraft in the vicinity of Mars and for future missions in =
the vicinity of the Moon. Space data links are often operated at very low=
 data rates compared to typical Ethernet links. Typical rates range from =
1 kb/s to 256 kb/s with very different data rates in each direction. Due =
to various queuing and transmission operations, the output delay can reac=
h 30 s, so it is imparities that timestamps be captured close to the PHY =
layer. In the Proximity-1 desing, hardstamps are captured upon the passag=
e of the ASM code combination at the beginning of each transmitted frame.=
=2E
>
>Queuing and transmission delays are not the only contributors to space d=
ata link delay. Reed-Solomon and convolutional encoding delays can be a l=
arge contribution to the link delay; however, these delays are a constant=
 contribution to the lightwave transmission delay. These contributions - =
up to many seconds - can dwarf the lightwave transmission delays.
>
>In the NTP interleaved design, drivestamps are captured in the device in=
terrupt routine - on input immediately after the frame has been received =
and before copying to an input buffer; on output shortly after the frame =
has been transmitted and before the buffer is released for the following =
input or output frame. This can become rather awkward in the case of NICs=
 of the PCNET architecture, as data are copied directly from user space t=
o device buffers directed by DMA descriptors. Drivestamps have been used =
on input for many years, but for output this is possible only using the i=
nterleaved modes. The result avoids the latencies due to the message dige=
st computation, Autokey protocol data units, output queuing and frame tra=
nsmissions, typically some 10-40 microseconds.
>
>It should be obvious from the documents that a primary motivation for th=
e NTP interleaved design was protection from network errors and intruder =
attack. The detailed analysis and simulation are designed to demonstrate =
resistance to common corruptions such as dropped or duplicate packets and=
 possible bogus attacks. The NTP design includes a four-level security mo=
del, the lower two levels might be considered for a PTP application. This=
 is one of the most important difference between the PTP and NTP protocol=
 designs; however, the NTP design might be considered overkill in a shelt=
ered, isolated Ethernet network.
>
>Careful observers may notice an interesting anomaly with the interleaved=
 broadcast mode. The preliminary volley intended to measure the roundtrip=
 time uses basic mode, not interleaved mode. The reason for this requires=
 some explanation. In times of old, the dominant concern was the 6-bone, =
an international consortium of multicast application developers. In that =
context with historic multicast configurations, including DVMRP and PIM, =
the multicast spanning tree was far different than the unicast spanning t=
ree. Therefore, the preliminary volley was important to estimate the offs=
et of the multicast server to the multicast client and thus the apparent =
one-way delay. In principle, with adroit protocolmanship, it would be pos=
sible to change the protocol to measure the interleaved roundtrip delay, =
which would be more appropriate for modern high-speed Ethernet networks.
>
>Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
>
>
>
>
>	-------- Original Message --------=20
>Subject: 	[TICTOC] reminder for remote participation in today's tictoc m=
eeting	=20
>Date: 	Thu, 31 Mar 2011 09:56:35 +0200	=20
>From: 	Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> <mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org>=
 	=20
>Reply-To: 	odonoghue@isoc.org	=20
>Organization: 	ISOC	=20
>To: 	tictoc@ietf.org, NTP Working Group <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org> <mailto:nt=
pwg@lists.ntp.org> 	=20
>
>
>	Folks,
>=09
>	This is a reminder that the tictoc working group will meet today from=20
>	17:40 - 19:40 CEST (15:40 - 17:40 UTC). The tools agenda for the IETF=20
>	meeting (http://tools.ietf.org/agenda/80/) has links for the drafts,=20
>	presentations, jabber chat room, and audio streaming to facilitate=20
>	remote participation.
>=09
>	Regards,
>	Karen
>=09
>	_______________________________________________
>	TICTOC mailing list
>	TICTOC@ietf.org
>	https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tictoc
>	 =20
>=09
>________________________________
>
>
>	_______________________________________________
>	ntpwg mailing list
>	ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
>	http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg
>
>
> =20
>



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From talmi@marvell.com  Sun Jul  8 23:14:02 2012
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From: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>
To: balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2012 09:14:20 +0300
Thread-Topic: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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Hi Balaji,

A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these i=
ssues in the draft:
1.	Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand that PTP t=
raffic itself does not use label hopping, right?
2.	Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP, thus caus=
ing DoS to the data plane?
3.	Is the "additional label" similar to an Integrity Check Value (ICV) comp=
uted over part of the packet header?=20
4.	Is there something in your approach that would prevent an attacker from =
a replay attack?
5.	Looking at "Algorithm 3" I was not sure: does the receiver check two con=
sequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am referring to a case =
where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, and the packet is rec=
eived at the beginning of the next time slot. That would mean the receiver =
has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, right?
6.	The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secure link, wh=
ich basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer PEs. A nai=
ve question would be: how is your approach better than just using a standar=
d ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?

Tal.


From gregimirsky@gmail.com  Mon Jul  9 10:45:12 2012
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From: Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com>
To: Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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--20cf3054a0af68abeb04c4692e80
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Dear Balaji,
you've said " There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs
that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected
by this scheme."
AFAIK, notion of PTP LSP is not limited to PE's but to all P's that get PTP
updates. Would that compromise your method?

Regards,
Greg

On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Balaji venkat Venkataswami <
balajivenkat299@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Tal,
>
> Comments inline
>
> On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Balaji,
>>
>> A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these
>> issues in the draft:
>> 1.      Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand
>> that PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?
>>
>
> The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.
>
>
>> 2.      Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP,
>> thus causing DoS to the data plane?
>>
>
> It would be difficult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PTP
> LSP for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by
> this scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs
> that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected
> by this scheme.
>
> 3.      Is the "additional label" similar to an Integrity Check Value
>> (ICV) computed over part of the packet header?
>>
>
> It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits are chosen to
> become the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon the bitmask
> exchanged during the control plane.
>
>
>> 4.      Is there something in your approach that would prevent an
>> attacker from a replay attack?
>>
>
> For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly
> otherwise the traffic gets rejected.
>
> 5.      Looking at "Algorithm 3" I was not sure: does the receiver check
>> two consequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am referring to
>> a case where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, and the packet
>> is received at the beginning of the next time slot. That would mean the
>> receiver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, right?
>>
>
> Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) in the algorithm.
> Maybe a little more fine tuning is required on this.
>
>
>> 6.      The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secure
>> link, which basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer
>> PEs. A naive question would be: how is your approach better than just using
>> a standard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?
>>
>
> While the ICV may protect against modification of the inner payload one
> cannot prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is deduced.
> Our scheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice to time
> slice so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself
> becomes difficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV
> alone we protect against modification but not with replay attacks. The
> proposed scheme protects against VPN traffic identification (so replay
> attacks cannot be made) and modification as well through the ICV which is
> the innermost label.
>
> thanks and regards,
> balaji , shankar and bhargav
>
>>
>> Tal.
>>
>>
>

--20cf3054a0af68abeb04c4692e80
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Dear Balaji,<br>you&#39;ve said &quot; There is no information except on th=
e ingress and egress PEs that=20
identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected=20
by this scheme.&quot;<br>AFAIK, notion of PTP LSP is not limited to PE&#39;=
s but to all P&#39;s that get PTP updates. Would that compromise your metho=
d?<br><br>Regards,<br>Greg<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Jul 9,=
 2012 at 8:47 AM, Balaji venkat Venkataswami <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:balajivenkat299@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">balajivenkat299@gma=
il.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Dear Tal,<div><br></div><div>Comments inline=
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"im">On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at=
 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:talmi@marvel=
l.com" target=3D"_blank">talmi@marvell.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Balaji,<br>
<br>
A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these i=
ssues in the draft:<br>
1. =A0 =A0 =A0Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand=
 that PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?<br></blockquote=
><div><br></div></div><div>The PTP traffic itself does not use label hoppin=
g.</div>
<div class=3D"im">
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
2. =A0 =A0 =A0Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP=
, thus causing DoS to the data plane?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div>=
<div>It would be difficult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PT=
P LSP for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by=
 this scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs =
that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected=
 by this scheme.=A0</div>
<div class=3D"im">
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
3. =A0 =A0 =A0Is the &quot;additional label&quot; similar to an Integrity C=
heck Value (ICV) computed over part of the packet header?<br></blockquote><=
div><br></div></div><div>It serves as a digest from which certain specific =
bits are chosen to become the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depend=
s upon the bitmask exchanged during the control plane.</div>
<div class=3D"im">
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
4. =A0 =A0 =A0Is there something in your approach that would prevent an att=
acker from a replay attack?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>For a=
 reply attack to succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly other=
wise the traffic gets rejected.</div>
<div class=3D"im">
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
5. =A0 =A0 =A0Looking at &quot;Algorithm 3&quot; I was not sure: does the r=
eceiver check two consequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am=
 referring to a case where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, =
and the packet is received at the beginning of the next time slot. That wou=
ld mean the receiver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, =
right?<br>

</blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit =
(usually seconds) in the algorithm. Maybe a little more fine tuning is requ=
ired on this.</div><div class=3D"im"><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex">


6. =A0 =A0 =A0The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secu=
re link, which basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer=
 PEs. A naive question would be: how is your approach better than just usin=
g a standard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?<br>

</blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>While the ICV may protect against mo=
dification of the inner payload one cannot prevent spoofing attacks if the =
algorithm for the ICV is deduced. Our scheme provides facility to change th=
e labels from time slice to time slice so that guessing what packet belongs=
 to which VPN traffic itself becomes difficult. This is the first line of d=
efense. If we provide ICV alone we protect against modification but not wit=
h replay attacks. The proposed scheme protects against VPN traffic identifi=
cation (so replay attacks cannot be made) and modification as well through =
the ICV which is the innermost label.</div>

<div><br></div><div>thanks and regards,</div><div>balaji , shankar and bhar=
gav</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Tal.<br>
<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br>

--20cf3054a0af68abeb04c4692e80--

From talmi@marvell.com  Mon Jul  9 12:06:21 2012
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From: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>
To: Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2012 22:06:29 +0300
Thread-Topic: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8743E91ILMB01marve_
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Hi Balaji,

Thanks for the prompt and detailed response.
Please see inline.

Regards,
Tal.

From: Balaji venkat Venkataswami [mailto:balajivenkat299@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 6:47 PM
To: Tal Mizrahi
Cc: l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; tictoc@ietf.org; robert@raszuk.net
Subject: Re: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...

Dear Tal,

Comments inline
On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com<mailto:talm=
i@marvell.com>> wrote:
Hi Balaji,

A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these i=
ssues in the draft:
1.      Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand that =
PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?

The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.

2.      Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP, thus=
 causing DoS to the data plane?

It would be difficult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PTP LSP=
 for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by this=
 scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs that =
identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected by t=
his scheme.

3.      Is the "additional label" similar to an Integrity Check Value (ICV)=
 computed over part of the packet header?

It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits are chosen to become=
 the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon the bitmask exchan=
ged during the control plane.
[TM] Right. Unless I am missing something, that sounds like a variant of an=
 ICV: it basically produces a label which is a function(packet payload, pre=
-shared secret). That is essentially what an ICV does, unless I am missing =
something?

4.      Is there something in your approach that would prevent an attacker =
from a replay attack?

For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly =
otherwise the traffic gets rejected.
[TM] Right, so assuming the attacker is "fast enough", the attacker can rep=
lay during the time slice (which is ~seconds)?

5.      Looking at "Algorithm 3" I was not sure: does the receiver check tw=
o consequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am referring to a =
case where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, and the packet i=
s received at the beginning of the next time slot. That would mean the rece=
iver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, right?

Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) in the algorithm. May=
be a little more fine tuning is required on this.

6.      The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secure lin=
k, which basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer PEs. =
A naive question would be: how is your approach better than just using a st=
andard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?

While the ICV may protect against modification of the inner payload one can=
not prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is deduced. Our s=
cheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice to time slice =
so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself becomes di=
fficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV alone we prot=
ect against modification but not with replay attacks. The proposed scheme p=
rotects against VPN traffic identification (so replay attacks cannot be mad=
e) and modification as well through the ICV which is the innermost label.
[TM] Since an ICV uses a pre-shared key, even if the algorithm is well-know=
n to the attacker, the attacker cannot forge/spoof it, assuming that the at=
tacker is not exposed to the key. ICV mechanisms typically support anti rep=
lay, e.g., the IPsec AH.

thanks and regards,
balaji , shankar and bhargav

Tal.


--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8743E91ILMB01marve_
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<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
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<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Hi Balaji=
,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Thanks for the prompt and detailed response=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Please see inline.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sa=
ns-serif";color:#1F497D'>Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F=
497D'>Tal.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0p=
t;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Balaji venkat Venkataswami [mailto:ba=
lajivenkat299@gmail.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 09, 2012 6:47 PM<br>=
<b>To:</b> Tal Mizrahi<br><b>Cc:</b> l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; tic=
toc@ietf.org; robert@raszuk.net<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn=
-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Dear Tal,<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal styl=
e=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>Comments inline<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal>On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
talmi@marvell.com" target=3D"_blank">talmi@marvell.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p><=
/o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi Balaji,<br><br>A few clarification questio=
ns - I think it would be good to clarify these issues in the draft:<br>1. &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I under=
stand that PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?<o:p></o:p>=
</p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal>The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.<o:p></o:p></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=
=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;m=
argin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal>2. &nbsp; &nbsp; &n=
bsp;Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP, thus cau=
sing DoS to the data plane?<o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>It would be diff=
icult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PTP LSP for a specific =
VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by this scheme. There i=
s no information except on the ingress and egress PEs that identifies which=
 is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected by this scheme.&nbsp=
;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div>=
<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal>3.=
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is the &quot;additional label&quot; similar to an Inte=
grity Check Value (ICV) computed over part of the packet header?<o:p></o:p>=
</p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal>It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits=
 are chosen to become the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends up=
on the bitmask exchanged during the control plane.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><b><i><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","s=
ans-serif";color:#1F497D'>[TM] Right. Unless I am missing something, that s=
ounds like a variant of an ICV: it basically produces a label which is a fu=
nction(packet payload, pre-shared secret). That is essentially what an ICV =
does, unless I am missing something?</span></i></b><span style=3D'font-size=
:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote=
 style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6=
.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal>4. &nbsp; &nb=
sp; &nbsp;Is there something in your approach that would prevent an attacke=
r from a replay attack?<o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>For a reply attack t=
o succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly otherwise the traffi=
c gets rejected.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><i><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>[TM] Right=
, so assuming the attacker is &#8220;fast enough&#8221;, the attacker can r=
eplay during the time slice (which is ~seconds)?</span></i></b><span style=
=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></di=
v><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:=
0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
5. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Looking at &quot;Algorithm 3&quot; I was not sure: d=
oes the receiver check two consequent time slots? I could not see such a ch=
eck. I am referring to a case where the sender transmits at the end of a ti=
me slot, and the packet is received at the beginning of the next time slot.=
 That would mean the receiver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent tim=
e slots, right?<o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Yes. It is available as +or-=
 1 unit (usually seconds) in the algorithm. Maybe a little more fine tuning=
 is required on this.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<=
o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCC=
CCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>6. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The security parameters K, TS, A, =
I are exchanged over a secure link, which basically assumes there is a pre-=
shared key between the peer PEs. A naive question would be: how is your app=
roach better than just using a standard ICV, based on the existing pre-shar=
ed key?<o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o=
:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>While the ICV may protect against mo=
dification of the inner payload one cannot prevent spoofing attacks if the =
algorithm for the ICV is deduced. Our scheme provides facility to change th=
e labels from time slice to time slice so that guessing what packet belongs=
 to which VPN traffic itself becomes difficult. This is the first line of d=
efense. If we provide ICV alone we protect against modification but not wit=
h replay attacks. The proposed scheme protects against VPN traffic identifi=
cation (so replay attacks cannot be made) and modification as well through =
the ICV which is the innermost label.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><b=
><i><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";colo=
r:#1F497D'>[TM] Since an ICV uses a pre-shared key, even if the algorithm i=
s well-known to the attacker, the attacker cannot forge/spoof it, assuming =
that the attacker is not exposed to the key. ICV mechanisms typically suppo=
rt anti replay, e.g., the IPsec AH.</span></i></b><span style=3D'font-size:=
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal>thanks and regards,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal>balaji , shankar and bhargav<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'=
border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margi=
n-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:=
12.0pt'><span style=3D'color:#888888'><br><span class=3Dhoenzb>Tal.</span><=
/span><o:p></o:p></p></blockquote></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o=
:p></p></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8743E91ILMB01marve_--

From gregory.mirsky@ericsson.com  Mon Jul  9 16:09:28 2012
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From: Gregory Mirsky <gregory.mirsky@ericsson.com>
To: Bhargav Bhikkaji <bhargav@force10networks.com>, Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com>, Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2012 19:09:45 -0400
Thread-Topic: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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Dear Bhargav,
thank you for your expedient reply to my question.
Yes, technically, PTP LSP can run through LSRs that are not 1588-aware. But=
 that is very unlikely IMHO.
Then I need to note that the http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-1=
588overmpls-02 had expired last April.

    Regards,
        Greg

________________________________
From: l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of B=
hargav Bhikkaji
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 3:45 PM
To: Greg Mirsky; Balaji venkat Venkataswami
Cc: l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; tictoc@ietf.org; robert@raszuk.net
Subject: RE: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...

Dear Greg,

As per the PTP over MPLS draft, all intervening LSRs need not be 1588-aware=
.

If we use the EF-PHB with green as drop probability all P routers need not =
know about the PTP LSP. This has been stated in the PTP over MPLS draft.

Even if we were to use the 1588 aware LSRs the actual binding between a PTP=
 LSP and the VPN which is protected by it is known only to the ingress and =
egress PE and not anywhere else. The PTP LSP would have to be tied into the=
 labels only at the ingress and egress PE and this binding / tying up is kn=
own only to them. Hence even if the PTP LSP timing is elicited the time sli=
ces when the labels have to be used is known only to the ingress  and egres=
s PEs.

Thanks

From: l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of G=
reg Mirsky
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 10:46 AM
To: Balaji venkat Venkataswami
Cc: l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; robert@raszuk.net; tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...

Dear Balaji,
you've said " There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs =
that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected=
 by this scheme."
AFAIK, notion of PTP LSP is not limited to PE's but to all P's that get PTP=
 updates. Would that compromise your method?

Regards,
Greg
On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299=
@gmail.com<mailto:balajivenkat299@gmail.com>> wrote:
Dear Tal,

Comments inline
On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com<mailto:talm=
i@marvell.com>> wrote:
Hi Balaji,

A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these i=
ssues in the draft:
1.      Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand that =
PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?

The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.

2.      Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP, thus=
 causing DoS to the data plane?

It would be difficult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PTP LSP=
 for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by this=
 scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs that =
identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected by t=
his scheme.

3.      Is the "additional label" similar to an Integrity Check Value (ICV)=
 computed over part of the packet header?

It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits are chosen to become=
 the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon the bitmask exchan=
ged during the control plane.

4.      Is there something in your approach that would prevent an attacker =
from a replay attack?

For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly =
otherwise the traffic gets rejected.

5.      Looking at "Algorithm 3" I was not sure: does the receiver check tw=
o consequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am referring to a =
case where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, and the packet i=
s received at the beginning of the next time slot. That would mean the rece=
iver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, right?

Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) in the algorithm. May=
be a little more fine tuning is required on this.

6.      The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secure lin=
k, which basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer PEs. =
A naive question would be: how is your approach better than just using a st=
andard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?

While the ICV may protect against modification of the inner payload one can=
not prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is deduced. Our s=
cheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice to time slice =
so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself becomes di=
fficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV alone we prot=
ect against modification but not with replay attacks. The proposed scheme p=
rotects against VPN traffic identification (so replay attacks cannot be mad=
e) and modification as well through the ICV which is the innermost label.

thanks and regards,
balaji , shankar and bhargav

Tal.



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	COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: "Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-style-type: perso=
nal-reply
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	mso-style-type: export-only
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DIV.Section1 {
	page: Section1
}
</STYLE>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
  <o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
 </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></HEAD>
<BODY lang=3DEN-US vLink=3Dpurple link=3Dblue>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SP=
AN=20
class=3D637010623-09072012>Dear Bhargav,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SP=
AN=20
class=3D637010623-09072012>thank you for your expedient reply to my=20
question.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SP=
AN=20
class=3D637010623-09072012>Yes, technically, PTP LSP can run through LSRs t=
hat are=20
not 1588-aware. But that is very unlikely IMHO.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SP=
AN=20
class=3D637010623-09072012>Then I need to note that the <A=20
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls-02">http:=
//tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls-02</A>&nbsp;had=20
expired last April.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SP=
AN=20
class=3D637010623-09072012></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SP=
AN=20
class=3D637010623-09072012>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Regards,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SP=
AN=20
class=3D637010623-09072012>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
Greg</SPAN></FONT></DIV><BR>
<DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader lang=3Den-us dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft>
<HR tabIndex=3D-1>
<FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><B>From:</B> l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org=20
[mailto:l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org] <B>On Behalf Of </B>Bhargav=20
Bhikkaji<BR><B>Sent:</B> Monday, July 09, 2012 3:45 PM<BR><B>To:</B> Greg=20
Mirsky; Balaji venkat Venkataswami<BR><B>Cc:</B> l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Ra=
man M=20
J; tictoc@ietf.org; robert@raszuk.net<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE:=20
draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=3DSection1>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; BACKGROUND: white; COLOR: #222222; FONT-FAMILY: '=
Calibri','sans-serif'">Dear=20
Greg,</SPAN><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p><=
/SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"BACKGROUND: white"><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #222222; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"BACKGROUND: white"><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #222222; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'">As=20
per the PTP over MPLS draft, all intervening LSRs need not be=20
1588-aware.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"BACKGROUND: white"><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #222222; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"BACKGROUND: white"><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #222222; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'">If=20
we use the EF-PHB with green as drop probability all P routers need not kno=
w=20
about the PTP LSP. This has been stated in the PTP over MPLS=20
draft.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"BACKGROUND: white"><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #222222; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"BACKGROUND: white"><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #222222; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'">Even=20
if we were to use the 1588 aware LSRs the actual binding between a PTP LSP =
and=20
the VPN which is protected by it is known only to the ingress and egress PE=
 and=20
not anywhere else. The PTP LSP would have to be tied into the labels only a=
t the=20
ingress and egress PE and this binding / tying up is known only to them. He=
nce=20
even if the PTP LSP timing is elicited the time slices when the labels have=
 to=20
be used is known only to the ingress &nbsp;and egress PEs</SPAN><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 9pt; COLOR: #222222; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"=
>.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'">Thanks<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-seri=
f'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<DIV=20
style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df=
 1pt solid; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; BORDER-LEFT: medium non=
e; PADDING-TOP: 3pt; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
<P class=3DMsoNormal><B><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Tahoma','sans-serif'">From:</SPAN><=
/B><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Tahoma','sans-serif'">=20
l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org] <B>On Behalf Of </B>=
Greg=20
Mirsky<BR><B>Sent:</B> Monday, July 09, 2012 10:46 AM<BR><B>To:</B> Balaji=
=20
venkat Venkataswami<BR><B>Cc:</B> l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J;=20
robert@raszuk.net; tictoc@ietf.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re:=20
draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt=20
...<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt">Dear Balaji,<BR>you've s=
aid "=20
There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs that identifie=
s=20
which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected by this=20
scheme."<BR>AFAIK, notion of PTP LSP is not limited to PE's but to all P's =
that=20
get PTP updates. Would that compromise your=20
method?<BR><BR>Regards,<BR>Greg<o:p></o:p></P>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Balaji venkat Venkatas=
wami=20
&lt;<A href=3D"mailto:balajivenkat299@gmail.com"=20
target=3D_blank>balajivenkat299@gmail.com</A>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>Dear Tal,<o:p></o:p></P>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt">Comments inline<o:p></o:=
p></P>
<DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi &lt;<A=20
href=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" target=3D_blank>talmi@marvell.com</A>&gt;=
=20
wrote:<o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>Hi Balaji,<BR><BR>A few clarification questions - I th=
ink it=20
would be good to clarify these issues in the draft:<BR>1. &nbsp; &nbsp;=20
&nbsp;Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand that PT=
P=20
traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?<o:p></o:p></P>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>The PTP traffic itself does not use label=20
hopping.<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: medium =
none; PADDING-LEFT: 6pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; MARGIN-LEFT: 4.8pt; BORDER-LE=
FT: #cccccc 1pt solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0in; PADDING-TOP: 0in; BORDER-BOTTOM: =
medium none">
  <P class=3DMsoNormal>2. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is there something preventing=
 the=20
  attacker from attacking PTP, thus causing DoS to the data=20
plane?<o:p></o:p></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>It would be difficult for the attacker to identify whi=
ch LSP=20
is the PTP LSP for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is=20
protected by this scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and=
=20
egress PEs that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffi=
c=20
protected by this scheme.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: medium =
none; PADDING-LEFT: 6pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; MARGIN-LEFT: 4.8pt; BORDER-LE=
FT: #cccccc 1pt solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0in; PADDING-TOP: 0in; BORDER-BOTTOM: =
medium none">
  <P class=3DMsoNormal>3. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is the "additional label" sim=
ilar to=20
  an Integrity Check Value (ICV) computed over part of the packet=20
  header?<o:p></o:p></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits=
 are=20
chosen to become the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon th=
e=20
bitmask exchanged during the control plane.<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: medium =
none; PADDING-LEFT: 6pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; MARGIN-LEFT: 4.8pt; BORDER-LE=
FT: #cccccc 1pt solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0in; PADDING-TOP: 0in; BORDER-BOTTOM: =
medium none">
  <P class=3DMsoNormal>4. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is there something in your ap=
proach=20
  that would prevent an attacker from a replay attack?<o:p></o:p></P></BLOC=
KQUOTE>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time =
the=20
labels correctly otherwise the traffic gets rejected.<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: medium =
none; PADDING-LEFT: 6pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; MARGIN-LEFT: 4.8pt; BORDER-LE=
FT: #cccccc 1pt solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0in; PADDING-TOP: 0in; BORDER-BOTTOM: =
medium none">
  <P class=3DMsoNormal>5. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Looking at "Algorithm 3" I wa=
s not=20
  sure: does the receiver check two consequent time slots? I could not see =
such=20
  a check. I am referring to a case where the sender transmits at the end o=
f a=20
  time slot, and the packet is received at the beginning of the next time s=
lot.=20
  That would mean the receiver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent ti=
me=20
  slots, right?<o:p></o:p></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) =
in the=20
algorithm. Maybe a little more fine tuning is required on=20
this.<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: medium =
none; PADDING-LEFT: 6pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; MARGIN-LEFT: 4.8pt; BORDER-LE=
FT: #cccccc 1pt solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0in; PADDING-TOP: 0in; BORDER-BOTTOM: =
medium none">
  <P class=3DMsoNormal>6. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The security parameters K, TS=
, A, I=20
  are exchanged over a secure link, which basically assumes there is a=20
  pre-shared key between the peer PEs. A naive question would be: how is yo=
ur=20
  approach better than just using a standard ICV, based on the existing=20
  pre-shared key?<o:p></o:p></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>While the ICV may protect against modification of the =
inner=20
payload one cannot prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is=
=20
deduced. Our scheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice =
to=20
time slice so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself=
=20
becomes difficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV alo=
ne we=20
protect against modification but not with replay attacks. The proposed sche=
me=20
protects against VPN traffic identification (so replay attacks cannot be ma=
de)=20
and modification as well through the ICV which is the innermost=20
label.<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>thanks and regards,<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>balaji , shankar and bhargav<o:p></o:p></P></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: medium =
none; PADDING-LEFT: 6pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; MARGIN-LEFT: 4.8pt; BORDER-LE=
FT: #cccccc 1pt solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0in; PADDING-TOP: 0in; BORDER-BOTTOM: =
medium none">
  <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><SPAN=20
  style=3D"COLOR: #888888"><BR>Tal.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV=
>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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From: Bhargav Bhikkaji <bhargav@force10networks.com>
To: Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com>, Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2012 15:45:04 -0700
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Dear Greg,

As per the PTP over MPLS draft, all intervening LSRs need not be 1588-aware=
.

If we use the EF-PHB with green as drop probability all P routers need not =
know about the PTP LSP. This has been stated in the PTP over MPLS draft.

Even if we were to use the 1588 aware LSRs the actual binding between a PTP=
 LSP and the VPN which is protected by it is known only to the ingress and =
egress PE and not anywhere else. The PTP LSP would have to be tied into the=
 labels only at the ingress and egress PE and this binding / tying up is kn=
own only to them. Hence even if the PTP LSP timing is elicited the time sli=
ces when the labels have to be used is known only to the ingress  and egres=
s PEs.

Thanks

From: l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of G=
reg Mirsky
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 10:46 AM
To: Balaji venkat Venkataswami
Cc: l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; robert@raszuk.net; tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...

Dear Balaji,
you've said " There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs =
that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected=
 by this scheme."
AFAIK, notion of PTP LSP is not limited to PE's but to all P's that get PTP=
 updates. Would that compromise your method?

Regards,
Greg
On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299=
@gmail.com<mailto:balajivenkat299@gmail.com>> wrote:
Dear Tal,

Comments inline
On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com<mailto:talm=
i@marvell.com>> wrote:
Hi Balaji,

A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these i=
ssues in the draft:
1.      Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand that =
PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?

The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.

2.      Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP, thus=
 causing DoS to the data plane?

It would be difficult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PTP LSP=
 for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by this=
 scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs that =
identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected by t=
his scheme.

3.      Is the "additional label" similar to an Integrity Check Value (ICV)=
 computed over part of the packet header?

It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits are chosen to become=
 the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon the bitmask exchan=
ged during the control plane.

4.      Is there something in your approach that would prevent an attacker =
from a replay attack?

For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly =
otherwise the traffic gets rejected.

5.      Looking at "Algorithm 3" I was not sure: does the receiver check tw=
o consequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am referring to a =
case where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, and the packet i=
s received at the beginning of the next time slot. That would mean the rece=
iver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, right?

Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) in the algorithm. May=
be a little more fine tuning is required on this.

6.      The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secure lin=
k, which basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer PEs. =
A naive question would be: how is your approach better than just using a st=
andard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?

While the ICV may protect against modification of the inner payload one can=
not prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is deduced. Our s=
cheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice to time slice =
so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself becomes di=
fficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV alone we prot=
ect against modification but not with replay attacks. The proposed scheme p=
rotects against VPN traffic identification (so replay attacks cannot be mad=
e) and modification as well through the ICV which is the innermost label.

thanks and regards,
balaji , shankar and bhargav

Tal.



--_000_EB72E43FE49DA8449253018A9FA7422706AAC3C613EX07SJCMBX1fo_
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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#222222;background:white'>Dear Greg,</span><span style=3D'font-size:1=
1.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'background:white'><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#222222'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'background:white'><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#222222'>As per the PTP over MPLS
draft, all intervening LSRs need not be 1588-aware.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'background:white'><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#222222'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'background:white'><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#222222'>If we use the EF-PHB with
green as drop probability all P routers need not know about the PTP LSP. Th=
is
has been stated in the PTP over MPLS draft.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'background:white'><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#222222'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'background:white'><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#222222'>Even if we were to use th=
e
1588 aware LSRs the actual binding between a PTP LSP and the VPN which is p=
rotected
by it is known only to the ingress and egress PE and not anywhere else. The=
 PTP
LSP would have to be tied into the labels only at the ingress and egress PE=
 and
this binding / tying up is known only to them. Hence even if the PTP LSP ti=
ming
is elicited the time slices when the labels have to be used is known only t=
o
the ingress &nbsp;and egress PEs</span><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-=
family:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#222222'>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Thanks<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma=
","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> l2vpn-bounces=
@ietf.org
[mailto:l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Greg Mirsky<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 09, 2012 10:46 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Balaji venkat Venkataswami<br>
<b>Cc:</b> l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; robert@raszuk.net;
tictoc@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>Dear Balaji,<br>
you've said &quot; There is no information except on the ingress and egress=
 PEs
that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected=
 by
this scheme.&quot;<br>
AFAIK, notion of PTP LSP is not limited to PE's but to all P's that get PTP
updates. Would that compromise your method?<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Greg<o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Balaji venkat Venkatas=
wami
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:balajivenkat299@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">balajive=
nkat299@gmail.com</a>&gt;
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Dear Tal,<o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>Comments inline<o:p></o=
:p></p>

<div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi &lt;<a
href=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" target=3D"_blank">talmi@marvell.com</a>&g=
t;
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi Balaji,<br>
<br>
A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these
issues in the draft:<br>
1. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I
understand that PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?<o:p><=
/o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.<o:p=
></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>2. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is there something preventing t=
he
attacker from attacking PTP, thus causing DoS to the data plane?<o:p></o:p>=
</p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>It would be difficult for the attacker to identify whi=
ch LSP
is the PTP LSP for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is
protected by this scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and
egress PEs that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffi=
c
protected by this scheme.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>3. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is the &quot;additional label&q=
uot;
similar to an Integrity Check Value (ICV) computed over part of the packet
header?<o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits=
 are
chosen to become the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon th=
e
bitmask exchanged during the control plane.<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>4. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is there something in your appr=
oach
that would prevent an attacker from a replay attack?<o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time =
the
labels correctly otherwise the traffic gets rejected.<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>5. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Looking at &quot;Algorithm 3&qu=
ot; I
was not sure: does the receiver check two consequent time slots? I could no=
t
see such a check. I am referring to a case where the sender transmits at th=
e
end of a time slot, and the packet is received at the beginning of the next
time slot. That would mean the receiver has to be able to tolerate two
concurrent time slots, right?<o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) =
in the
algorithm. Maybe a little more fine tuning is required on this.<o:p></o:p><=
/p>

</div>

<div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>6. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The security parameters K, TS, =
A, I
are exchanged over a secure link, which basically assumes there is a pre-sh=
ared
key between the peer PEs. A naive question would be: how is your approach
better than just using a standard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key=
?<o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>While the ICV may protect against modification of the =
inner
payload one cannot prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is
deduced. Our scheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice =
to
time slice so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself
becomes difficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV alo=
ne
we protect against modification but not with replay attacks. The proposed
scheme protects against VPN traffic identification (so replay attacks canno=
t be
made) and modification as well through the ICV which is the innermost label=
.<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>thanks and regards,<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>balaji , shankar and bhargav<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span style=3D'color:#8=
88888'><br>
Tal.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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From bhargav@force10networks.com  Mon Jul  9 19:58:51 2012
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From: Bhargav Bhikkaji <bhargav@force10networks.com>
To: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>, Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2012 19:59:12 -0700
Thread-Topic: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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Hi Tal,

Thanks for your comments. Pls see inline [BB] for response

-Bhargav

From: l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of T=
al Mizrahi
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 12:06 PM
To: Balaji venkat Venkataswami
Cc: l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; tictoc@ietf.org; robert@raszuk.net
Subject: RE: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...

Hi Balaji,

Thanks for the prompt and detailed response.
Please see inline.

Regards,
Tal.

From: Balaji venkat Venkataswami [mailto:balajivenkat299@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 6:47 PM
To: Tal Mizrahi
Cc: l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; tictoc@ietf.org; robert@raszuk.net
Subject: Re: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...

Dear Tal,

Comments inline
On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com<mailto:talm=
i@marvell.com>> wrote:
Hi Balaji,

A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these i=
ssues in the draft:
1.      Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand that =
PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?

The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.

2.      Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP, thus=
 causing DoS to the data plane?

It would be difficult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PTP LSP=
 for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by this=
 scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs that =
identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected by t=
his scheme.

3.      Is the "additional label" similar to an Integrity Check Value (ICV)=
 computed over part of the packet header?

It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits are chosen to become=
 the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon the bitmask exchan=
ged during the control plane.
[TM] Right. Unless I am missing something, that sounds like a variant of an=
 ICV: it basically produces a label which is a function(packet payload, pre=
-shared secret). That is essentially what an ICV does, unless I am missing =
something?

[BB]: Agreed, the scheme we proposed is a of ICV scheme.

4.      Is there something in your approach that would prevent an attacker =
from a replay attack?

For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly =
otherwise the traffic gets rejected.
[TM] Right, so assuming the attacker is "fast enough", the attacker can rep=
lay during the time slice (which is ~seconds)?

5.      Looking at "Algorithm 3" I was not sure: does the receiver check tw=
o consequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am referring to a =
case where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, and the packet i=
s received at the beginning of the next time slot. That would mean the rece=
iver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, right?

Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) in the algorithm. May=
be a little more fine tuning is required on this.

6.      The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secure lin=
k, which basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer PEs. =
A naive question would be: how is your approach better than just using a st=
andard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?

While the ICV may protect against modification of the inner payload one can=
not prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is deduced. Our s=
cheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice to time slice =
so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself becomes di=
fficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV alone we prot=
ect against modification but not with replay attacks. The proposed scheme p=
rotects against VPN traffic identification (so replay attacks cannot be mad=
e) and modification as well through the ICV which is the innermost label.
[TM] Since an ICV uses a pre-shared key, even if the algorithm is well-know=
n to the attacker, the attacker cannot forge/spoof it, assuming that the at=
tacker is not exposed to the key. ICV mechanisms typically support anti rep=
lay, e.g., the IPsec AH.

[BB]: We had submitted a draft where certain bits of IPSec digital signatur=
e is used as "additional label". This would help to identify forged/spoofed=
 packet.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhargav-l3vpn-inter-provider-optcsec-01

thanks and regards,
balaji , shankar and bhargav

Tal.


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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Hi Tal,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Thanks for your comments. Pls see inline [BB] for response<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>-Bhargav<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma=
","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> l2vpn-bounces=
@ietf.org
[mailto:l2vpn-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Tal Mizrahi<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 09, 2012 12:06 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Balaji venkat Venkataswami<br>
<b>Cc:</b> l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; tictoc@ietf.org;
robert@raszuk.net<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Hi Balaji,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Thanks for the prompt and detailed response.<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Please see inline.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Tal.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma=
","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Balaji venkat
Venkataswami [mailto:balajivenkat299@gmail.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 09, 2012 6:47 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Tal Mizrahi<br>
<b>Cc:</b> l2vpn@ietf.org; Shankar Raman M J; tictoc@ietf.org;
robert@raszuk.net<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Dear Tal,<o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>Comments inline<o:p></o=
:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi &lt;<a
href=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" target=3D"_blank">talmi@marvell.com</a>&g=
t; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi Balaji,<br>
<br>
A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these
issues in the draft:<br>
1. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I
understand that PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?<o:p><=
/o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.<o:p=
></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>2. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is there something preventing t=
he
attacker from attacking PTP, thus causing DoS to the data plane?<o:p></o:p>=
</p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>It would be difficult for the attacker to identify whi=
ch LSP
is the PTP LSP for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is
protected by this scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and
egress PEs that identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffi=
c
protected by this scheme.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>3. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is the &quot;additional label&q=
uot;
similar to an Integrity Check Value (ICV) computed over part of the packet
header?<o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits=
 are
chosen to become the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon th=
e
bitmask exchanged during the control plane.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><i><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[TM] Right. Unless I am missing something, that sounds like =
a
variant of an ICV: it basically produces a label which is a function(packet
payload, pre-shared secret). That is essentially what an ICV does, unless I=
 am
missing something?<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif"'>[BB]:
Agreed, the scheme we proposed is a of ICV scheme.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>4. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Is there something in your appr=
oach
that would prevent an attacker from a replay attack?<o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time =
the
labels correctly otherwise the traffic gets rejected.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><i><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[TM] Right, so assuming the attacker is &#8220;fast enough&#=
8221;, the
attacker can replay during the time slice (which is ~seconds)?</span></i></=
b><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'=
><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>5. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Looking at &quot;Algorithm 3&qu=
ot; I
was not sure: does the receiver check two consequent time slots? I could no=
t
see such a check. I am referring to a case where the sender transmits at th=
e
end of a time slot, and the packet is received at the beginning of the next
time slot. That would mean the receiver has to be able to tolerate two
concurrent time slots, right?<o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) =
in the
algorithm. Maybe a little more fine tuning is required on this.<o:p></o:p><=
/p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>6. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;The security parameters K, TS, =
A, I
are exchanged over a secure link, which basically assumes there is a pre-sh=
ared
key between the peer PEs. A naive question would be: how is your approach
better than just using a standard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key=
?<o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>While the ICV may protect against modification of the =
inner
payload one cannot prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is
deduced. Our scheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice =
to
time slice so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself
becomes difficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV alo=
ne
we protect against modification but not with replay attacks. The proposed
scheme protects against VPN traffic identification (so replay attacks canno=
t be
made) and modification as well through the ICV which is the innermost label=
.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><i><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[TM] Since an ICV uses a pre-shared key, even if the algorit=
hm
is well-known to the attacker, the attacker cannot forge/spoof it, assuming
that the attacker is not exposed to the key. ICV mechanisms typically suppo=
rt
anti replay, e.g., the IPsec AH.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif"'>[BB]:
We had submitted a draft where certain bits of IPSec digital signature is u=
sed
as &quot;additional label&quot;. This would help to identify forged/spoofed
packet. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></b></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif"'>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhargav-l3vpn-inter-provi=
der-optcsec-01</span></b><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'=
><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>thanks and regards,<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>balaji , shankar and bhargav<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;
margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span style=3D'color:#8=
88888'><br>
<span class=3Dhoenzb>Tal.</span></span><o:p></o:p></p>

</blockquote>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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From: Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Dear Tal,

Comments inline

On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com> wrote:

> Hi Balaji,
>
> A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these
> issues in the draft:
> 1.      Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand that
> PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?
>

The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.


> 2.      Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP,
> thus causing DoS to the data plane?
>

It would be difficult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PTP LSP
for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by this
scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs that
identifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected by
this scheme.

3.      Is the "additional label" similar to an Integrity Check Value (ICV)
> computed over part of the packet header?
>

It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits are chosen to become
the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon the bitmask
exchanged during the control plane.


> 4.      Is there something in your approach that would prevent an attacker
> from a replay attack?
>

For a reply attack to succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly
otherwise the traffic gets rejected.

5.      Looking at "Algorithm 3" I was not sure: does the receiver check
> two consequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am referring to
> a case where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, and the packet
> is received at the beginning of the next time slot. That would mean the
> receiver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, right?
>

Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usually seconds) in the algorithm.
Maybe a little more fine tuning is required on this.


> 6.      The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secure
> link, which basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer
> PEs. A naive question would be: how is your approach better than just using
> a standard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?
>

While the ICV may protect against modification of the inner payload one
cannot prevent spoofing attacks if the algorithm for the ICV is deduced.
Our scheme provides facility to change the labels from time slice to time
slice so that guessing what packet belongs to which VPN traffic itself
becomes difficult. This is the first line of defense. If we provide ICV
alone we protect against modification but not with replay attacks. The
proposed scheme protects against VPN traffic identification (so replay
attacks cannot be made) and modification as well through the ICV which is
the innermost label.

thanks and regards,
balaji , shankar and bhargav

>
> Tal.
>
>

--047d7b10c8a7a85e1a04c467867d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Dear Tal,<div><br></div><div>Comments inline<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Tal Mizrahi <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:talmi@marvell.com" target=3D"_blank">talmi@marvell.com</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Balaji,<br>
<br>
A few clarification questions - I think it would be good to clarify these i=
ssues in the draft:<br>
1. =A0 =A0 =A0Since the label hopping mechanism relies on PTP, I understand=
 that PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping, right?<br></blockquote=
><div><br></div><div>The PTP traffic itself does not use label hopping.</di=
v>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
2. =A0 =A0 =A0Is there something preventing the attacker from attacking PTP=
, thus causing DoS to the data plane?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I=
t would be difficult for the attacker to identify which LSP is the PTP LSP =
for a specific VPN traffic (flow / set of flows) that is protected by this =
scheme. There is no information except on the ingress and egress PEs that i=
dentifies which is the PTP LSP for a particular VPN traffic protected by th=
is scheme.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
3. =A0 =A0 =A0Is the &quot;additional label&quot; similar to an Integrity C=
heck Value (ICV) computed over part of the packet header?<br></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>It serves as a digest from which certain specific bits a=
re chosen to become the innermost label. Which bits are chosen depends upon=
 the bitmask exchanged during the control plane.</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
4. =A0 =A0 =A0Is there something in your approach that would prevent an att=
acker from a replay attack?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>For a reply=
 attack to succeed, the replay should time the labels correctly otherwise t=
he traffic gets rejected.</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
5. =A0 =A0 =A0Looking at &quot;Algorithm 3&quot; I was not sure: does the r=
eceiver check two consequent time slots? I could not see such a check. I am=
 referring to a case where the sender transmits at the end of a time slot, =
and the packet is received at the beginning of the next time slot. That wou=
ld mean the receiver has to be able to tolerate two concurrent time slots, =
right?<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes. It is available as +or- 1 unit (usual=
ly seconds) in the algorithm. Maybe a little more fine tuning is required o=
n this.</div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">

6. =A0 =A0 =A0The security parameters K, TS, A, I are exchanged over a secu=
re link, which basically assumes there is a pre-shared key between the peer=
 PEs. A naive question would be: how is your approach better than just usin=
g a standard ICV, based on the existing pre-shared key?<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>While the ICV may protect against modifica=
tion of the inner payload one cannot prevent spoofing attacks if the algori=
thm for the ICV is deduced. Our scheme provides facility to change the labe=
ls from time slice to time slice so that guessing what packet belongs to wh=
ich VPN traffic itself becomes difficult. This is the first line of defense=
. If we provide ICV alone we protect against modification but not with repl=
ay attacks. The proposed scheme protects against VPN traffic identification=
 (so replay attacks cannot be made) and modification as well through the IC=
V which is the innermost label.</div>
<div><br></div><div>thanks and regards,</div><div>balaji , shankar and bhar=
gav</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Tal.<br>
<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--047d7b10c8a7a85e1a04c467867d--

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References: <4FF968A8.7060806@raszuk.net> <CC1F6CF4.CA9C%balajivenkat299@gmail.com> <74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8743C0A@IL-MB01.marvell.com> <CAHF4apO2a=Xkv1ZJQqYrg21zanWCBaSbRkUA5WdjkrXU7-RifQ@mail.gmail.com> <CA+RyBmXZLq5S_y2TqisNpEZ0EEMMaQ11XuR0=houqS-C=paxmA@mail.gmail.com> <EB72E43FE49DA8449253018A9FA7422706AAC3C613@EX07-SJC-MBX1.force10networks.com>
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Cc: "l2vpn@ietf.org" <l2vpn@ietf.org>, "robert@raszuk.net" <robert@raszuk.net>, Shankar Raman M J <mjsraman@gmail.com>, Balaji venkat Venkataswami <balajivenkat299@gmail.com>, "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TICTOC] draft-mjsraman-l2vpn-vpls-tictoc-label-hop-00.txt ...
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> If we use the EF-PHB with green as drop probability all P routers need 
> not know about the PTP LSP. This has been stated in the PTP over MPLS 
> draft.
>
Given that forwarders are work conserving, a packet that has already 
started will go to completion, so a high priority  packet arriving after 
the transmit decision has been taken by the forwarder waits. The now 
devalued timing packet goes ahead of all other packets, some of which 
are less devalued by the delay. I am worried that giving timing packet 
priority degrades the network without achieving anything for the timing 
system.

Do we have any measured evidence that sending timing packets with a high 
priority is actually beneficial? If so can someone please point me at it.

Thanks

Stewart



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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
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  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:EB72E43FE49DA8449253018A9FA7422706AAC3C613@EX07-SJC-MBX1.force10networks.com"
      type="cite">
      <div class="Section1">
        <p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span
            style="font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#222222">If
            we use the EF-PHB with
            green as drop probability all P routers need not know about
            the PTP LSP. This
            has been stated in the PTP over MPLS draft.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    Given that forwarders are work conserving, a packet that has already
    started will go to completion, so a high priority&nbsp; packet arriving
    after the transmit decision has been taken by the forwarder waits.
    The now devalued timing packet goes ahead of all other packets, some
    of which are less devalued by the delay. I am worried that giving
    timing packet priority degrades the network without achieving
    anything for the timing system.<br>
    <br>
    Do we have any measured evidence that sending timing packets with a
    high priority is actually beneficial? If so can someone please point
    me at it.<br>
    <br>
    Thanks<br>
    <br>
    Stewart<br>
    <br>
    <br>
  </body>
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From stefano.ruffini@ericsson.com  Tue Jul 10 04:21:31 2012
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To: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>, "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
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Dear Authors

I had a look at the security draft (draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements=
-02.txt) and here are some comments/questions/proposals.

In general I think the document is very good and presents very useful infor=
mation.

General considerations

1) In the introduction it is clarified that this draft addresses time synch=
ronization protocols (PTP and NTP) Security requirements and in Section 4 t=
he requirements refer to "security mechanisms" for a timing protocol.

NTP and PTP are the timing protocols, whereas integrity, authentication, an=
d confidentiality are security mechanisms that can either be introduced to =
those protocols or solved by using other protocols, such as IPsec.

The draft mentions both, but it is sometime unclear on which some of the di=
scussion applies.

It would be clearer if a distinction between introducing new security mecha=
nisms to NTP/PTP vs. using other security protocols is made wherever applic=
able (e.g. adding some introductory text in section 4).

2) A related aspect is that it could be reminded that current packet timing=
 deployments may not involve any security protocol.

Indeed in some cases it may not be strictly necessary (e.g. due to other se=
curity practices in place, and/or the architecture of the network).

In general there needs to be a risk based decision when applying these secu=
rity controls. It should also be considered that applying multiple security=
 controls may introduce disturbances in the timing service.

In addition, the draft provides a good overview and introduction to the sub=
ject of packet timing and security, however since it is not targeting a spe=
cifc set of applications and does not set a clear definition of what a reas=
onable level of security is for timing, the draft may address more than it =
really needs to.

Benefit vs. drawback for a specific application need to be taken into accou=
nt (for example, what is the impact on network timing performance for a spe=
cific application).

A note addressing these considerations could be added in the Introduction o=
f the draft .

=1B$B!!=1B(B

Detailed comments/questions:

3) Abstract:

- Instead of "This document defines a set of requirements for security solu=
tions for time synchronization protocols...", I think it is more correct to=
 say: "This document defines a set of security requirements for security so=
lutions for time synchronization protocols..."

=1B$B!!=1B(B

4) Abstract

Refer to "PTP and NTP", rather than "IEEE1588 and NTP "

5) In section 3.1.2 the distinction betwen MITM and Packet Injector is not =
fully clear : "intercept a packet" or "record a packet" look equivalent.

In particular the existing description for packet injector is not fully cle=
ar.

A packet injector doesn't necessarily need to "record a packet" in order to=
 inject traffic in to the network. It is sufficient to know what protocol t=
o use and the necessary parameters needed to launch an attack (e.g. address=
 of the slave and master). It may be possible to argue that in order to get=
 this information, the attack must first intercept a packet with this data.

6) 3.2.2: Could clarify that the spoofing implies generating your own packe=
ts and not relying on recorded or intercepted packets. At least that may cl=
arify the difference with the other attacks.

7) 3.2.3: I think it's important to note that in a replay attack, the messa=
ge is not altered or manipulated.

8) From the description it is not fully clear the difference between Packet=
 Delay Manipulation (3.2.6) and "Replay Attack" (3.2.3). They look equivale=
nt.

Probably the only difference is that in case of Replay attack the recorded =
packet can be injected multiple times ? Some clarifcation could be added.

9) 3.3: In the case of a prolonged "interception and removal" attack, I wou=
ld add DoS as an impact.

This is evident in mobile networks as it will eventually mean, or may preve=
nt the, that the mobile services from being available.

On further thought, I guess one could argue that for certain mobile scenari=
os, all the mentioned attacks could result in the mobile service becoming u=
navailable. I expect that is the end goal when attacking the sync service i=
n a mobile network.

10) 3.3, I think "Master Time source spoofing" attacks may be difficult - i=
n many cases, impossible from outside the network. This is case dependent.

I would propose to remove the " External" from the table

11) 4.2.1.2: a note could be added for the "End to Ent Integrity Protection=
" method, clarifying that it can add complexity because it requires multipl=
e fields to be protected separately and using different keys, presumably.

12) 4.3: even in case of external attacks, Authentication alone is not suff=
icient to prevent DoS attacks, or attackes against availability. It can mit=
igate some risks.

I think when it comes to availability, other mechanisms - possibily in conj=
unction with cryptographic mechanisms - are probably more reliable to addre=
ss the issue.

13) 4.5.1: this section implies a fairly heavy solution; Even if the handli=
ng of the association protocol is not implemented by the clock (but is hand=
led transparently to the sync application as in case of IPsec/MACsec), it i=
ntroduces an additional overhead and complexity when managing large network=
s.

A security association is essentially a set of shared security attributes b=
etween two network elements. How these security attributes are configured/n=
egotiated can be either accomplished with a protocol such as IKEv2 or by ot=
her means, e.g. manual configuration or via NMS/OSS .

By only mentioning "association protocol" the draft is pushing towards a sp=
ecific implementation. .

In conclusion , 4.5.1 should be optional. Other ways to distribute the secu=
rity attributes should be considered

14) 4.7: Comment on the last sentence on MITM.

Because both NTP and PTP have predictable behavior it could be possible to =
launch a successful attack targeting sync packets despite the fact that the=
y are encrypted.

15) 4.8, requirement.

I guess the reason for the MAY is that it may be impossible to distinguish =
between a delay attack from delay introduced by disturbances in the network=
?

16) 4.9: I don't think both "Secure Mode" and "Hybrid Mode" should be explo=
red. Either the security is on or off. Nothing inbetween because that creat=
es the opportunity for a proverbial backdoor.

17) 6.2. Comment on

"Note that if an encryption mechanism is used, it presents a challenge

to the timestamping mechanism, since time protocol packets are

encrypted when traversing the physical interface, and are thus

impossible to identify."

This is dependent on what is encrypted. This has actually not been discusse=
d in the draft. The above statement assumes that the entire IP packet is en=
crypted. But if it is only the "sensitive" information, e.g. the NTP/PTP pa=
yload, then it would be possible to identify sync packets even if they are =
encrypted. On the other hand, if IPsec is used, then the statement is corre=
ct.

18) Section 6.4. As discussed at last TICTOC meeting, it is not mandatory t=
o deliver timing packets in the same IPSEC tunnel used for the traffic, eve=
n in case of Femtocell

The text should be revised, for instance adding "may" in the folloiwng sent=
ence:

A typical example is the 3GPP Femtocell network [3GPP], where IPsec

is used for securing traffic between a Femtocell and the Femto

Gateway. In some cases, all traffic between these two nodes may be secured =
by IPsec,

including the time synchronization protocol traffic. This use-case is

thoroughly discussed in [IPsecSync].

19) Section 6.5 refers to a requirement of being time synchronized: what is=
 the requirent in this case ? 0.5 sec accuracy?

Best Regards

Stefano

________________________________
From: tictoc-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tictoc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Tal Mizrahi
Sent: domenica 17 giugno 2012 9.21
To: tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: [TICTOC] Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02

Hi,

The following changes have been made in this draft compared to the previous=
 draft:

1.       Following feedback from IETF 83, a threat analysis section was add=
ed.

2.       Made various corrections to address comments received on the maili=
ng list.

3.       Wrote section 6, which was previously just a placeholder.

http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt

Comments will be appreciated.

Thanks,
Tal.

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<BODY lang=3DEN-US vLink=3Dpurple link=3Dblue>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT color=3D#0000ff><FONT color=3D#0000ff>
<P><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>Dear Authors</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>I had a look at the security draft=20
(</FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2><FONT=20
face=3DArial>draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt<FONT color=3D#0=
000ff>)=20
and&nbsp;<SPAN class=3D859241911-10072012>here are some=20
comments/questions/proposals</SPAN>. </FONT></FONT></FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>In general I think </FONT><S=
PAN=20
lang=3DSV><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>the document is very =
good and=20
presents very useful information.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial><U>General consi<SPAN=20
class=3D859241911-10072012>d</SPAN>erations</U></FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>1) In the introduction it is=
 clarified=20
that this draft addresses time synchronization protocols (PTP and NTP) Secu=
rity=20
requirements and in Section 4 the requirements refer to "security mechanism=
s"=20
for a timing protocol. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>NTP and PTP are the timing p=
rotocols,=20
whereas integrity, authentication, and confidentiality are security mechani=
sms=20
that can either be introduced to those protocols or solved by using other=20
protocols, such as IPsec. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>The draft mentions both, but=
 it is=20
sometime unclear on which some of the discussion applies.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>It would be clearer if a dis=
tinction=20
between introducing new security mechanisms to NTP/PTP vs. using other secu=
rity=20
protocols is made wherever applicable (e.g. adding some introductory text i=
n=20
section 4).</FONT></P><B></B>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>2) A related aspect is that =
it could be=20
reminded that current packet timing deployments may not involve any securit=
y=20
protocol. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>Indeed in some cases it may =
not be=20
strictly necessary (e.g. due to other security practices in place, and/or t=
he=20
architecture of the network). </FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>In general there needs to be=
 a risk=20
based decision when applying these security controls. It should also be=20
considered that applying multiple security controls may introduce disturban=
ces=20
in the timing service.</FONT></P></SPAN><SPAN lang=3DIT>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>In addition, the draft provi=
des a good=20
overview and introduction to the subject of packet timing and security, how=
ever=20
since it is not targeting a specifc set of applications and does not set a =
clear=20
definition of what a reasonable level of security is for timing, the draft =
may=20
address more than it really needs to. </FONT></P><B></B>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>Benefit vs. drawback for a s=
pecific=20
application need to be taken into account (for example, what is the impact =
on=20
network timing performance for a specific application).</FONT></P></SPAN><S=
PAN=20
lang=3DSV>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>A note addressing these cons=
iderations=20
could be added in the Introduction of the draft .</FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial>=1B$B!!=1B(B</FONT></P>
<P><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial><U>Detailed comments<SPAN=20
class=3D859241911-10072012>/questions</SPAN>:</U></FONT></P><FONT=20
size=3D2></FONT></SPAN><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff=
 size=3D2><SPAN=20
lang=3DIT>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>3) Abstract: </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>- Instead of "This document defines a set of requirem=
ents=20
for security solutions for time synchronization protocols...", I think it i=
s=20
more correct to say: "This document defines a set of </FONT></FONT></FONT><=
FONT=20
face=3DArial><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2><FONT color=3D#ff0000=20
size=3D2>security</FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=
=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2> requirements for<STRIKE> security solutions for </STRIKE>time=20
synchronization protocols..."</P></FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#ff0000=
=20
size=3D2><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=3DArial>
<P>=1B$B!!=1B(B</P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=
=3D#0000ff size=3D2>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>4) Abstract </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>Refer to "PTP and NTP", rather than "IEEE1588 and NTP=
=20
"</FONT></P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2><FONT color=3D#ff0=
000=20
size=3D2></FONT></FONT></SPAN><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D=
#0000ff=20
size=3D2><SPAN lang=3DSV>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>5) In section 3.1.2 the distinction betwen MITM and P=
acket=20
Injector is not fully clear : "intercept a packet" or "record a packet" loo=
k=20
equivalent.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>In particular the existing description for packet inj=
ector=20
is not fully clear.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>A packet injector doesn't necessarily need to "record=
 a=20
packet" in order to inject traffic in to the network. It is sufficient to k=
now=20
what protocol to use and the necessary parameters needed to launch an attac=
k=20
(e.g. address of the slave and master). It may be possible to argue that in=
=20
order to get this information, the attack must first intercept a packet wit=
h=20
this data. </FONT></P></SPAN><SPAN lang=3DIT>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>6) 3.2.2: Could clarify that the spoofing implies gen=
erating=20
your own packets and not relying on recorded or intercepted packets. At lea=
st=20
that may clarify the difference with the other=20
attacks.</FONT></P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2><FONT color=
=3D#ff0000=20
size=3D2 face=3DArial>
<P></P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff s=
ize=3D2=20
face=3DArial>
<P>7) 3.2.3: I think it's important to note that in a replay attack, the me=
ssage=20
is not altered or manipulated.</FONT></FONT></SPAN><FONT color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN lang=3DSV></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>8) From the description it is not fully clear the dif=
ference=20
between Packet Delay Manipulation (3.2.6) and "Replay Attack" (3.2.3). They=
 look=20
equivalent.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>Probably the only difference is that in case of Repla=
y=20
attack the recorded packet can be injected multiple times ? Some clarifcati=
on=20
could be added.</FONT></SPAN><SPAN lang=3DIT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>9) 3.3: In the case of a prolonged "interception and=
=20
removal" attack, I would add DoS as an impact. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>This is evident in mobile networks as it will eventua=
lly=20
mean, or may prevent the, that the mobile services from being available.=20
</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>On further thought, I guess one could argue that for =
certain=20
mobile scenarios, all the mentioned attacks could result in the mobile serv=
ice=20
becoming unavailable. I expect that is the end goal when attacking the sync=
=20
service in a mobile network.</FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#ff0000=20
size=3D2><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=3DArial></P></FONT></FONT><FON=
T=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>10) 3.3, I think "Master Time source spoofing" attack=
s may=20
be difficult - in many cases, impossible from outside the network. This is =
case=20
dependent.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>I would propose to remove the " External" from the=20
table</FONT></P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#008000 size=3D2><FONT color=3D=
#008000=20
size=3D2 face=3DArial>
<P></P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff s=
ize=3D2=20
face=3DArial>
<P>11) 4.2.1.2: a note could be added for the "End to Ent Integrity Protect=
ion"=20
method, clarifying that it can add complexity because it requires multiple=
=20
fields to be protected separately and using different keys,=20
presumably.</FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000=
ff=20
size=3D2></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>12) 4.3: even in case of external attacks, Authentica=
tion=20
alone is not sufficient to prevent DoS attacks, or attackes against=20
availability. It can mitigate some risks.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>I think when it comes to availability, other mechanis=
ms -=20
possibily in conjunction with cryptographic mechanisms - are probably more=
=20
reliable to address the issue.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>13) 4.5.1: this section implies a fairly heavy soluti=
on;=20
Even if the handling of the association protocol is not implemented by the =
clock=20
(but is handled transparently to the sync application as in case of=20
IPsec/MACsec), it introduces an additional overhead and complexity when man=
aging=20
large networks.</FONT></P></SPAN><SPAN lang=3DSV>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>A security association is essentially a set of shared=
=20
security attributes between two network elements. How these security attrib=
utes=20
are configured/negotiated can be either accomplished with a protocol such a=
s=20
IKEv2 or by other means, e.g. manual configuration or via NMS/OSS . </FONT>=
</P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>By only mentioning "association protocol" the draft i=
s=20
pushing towards a specific implementation. .</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>In conclusion , 4.5.1 should be optional. Other ways =
to=20
distribute the security attributes should be considered </FONT></P></SPAN><=
SPAN=20
lang=3DIT>
<P><FONT face=3DArial></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>14) 4.7: Comment on the last sentence on MITM. </FONT=
></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>Because both NTP and PTP have predictable behavior it=
 could=20
be possible to launch a successful attack targeting sync packets despite th=
e=20
fact that they are encrypted.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>15) 4.8, requirement. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>I guess the reason for the MAY is that it may be impo=
ssible=20
to distinguish between a delay attack from delay introduced by disturbances=
 in=20
the network?</FONT></P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2><FONT=20
color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=3DArial>
<P></P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff s=
ize=3D2=20
face=3DArial>
<P>16) 4.9: I don't think both "Secure Mode" and "Hybrid Mode" should be=20
explored. Either the security is on or off. Nothing inbetween because that=
=20
creates the opportunity for a proverbial backdoor.</P></FONT></FONT><FONT=20
color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=3DArial>
<P></P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff s=
ize=3D2>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>17) 6.2. Comment on </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>"</FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2><FONT size=3D2><=
FONT=20
face=3DArial>Note that if an encryption mechanism is used, it presents a=20
challenge</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>to the timestamping mechanism, since time protocol pa=
ckets=20
are</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>encrypted when traversing the physical interface, and=
 are=20
thus</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>impossible to identify.</FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT face=3DArial>=
"</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>This is dependent on what is encrypted. This has actu=
ally=20
not been discussed in the draft. The above statement assumes that the entir=
e IP=20
packet is encrypted. But if it is only the "sensitive" information, e.g. th=
e=20
NTP/PTP payload, then it would be possible to identify sync packets even if=
 they=20
are encrypted. On the other hand, if IPsec is used, then the statement is=20
correct.</FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#=
0000ff=20
size=3D2></P></SPAN><SPAN lang=3DSV>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>18) Section 6.4. As discussed at last TICTOC meeting,=
 it is=20
not mandatory to deliver timing packets in the same IPSEC tunnel used for t=
he=20
traffic, even in case of Femtocell</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>The text should be revised, for instance adding "may"=
 in the=20
folloiwng sentence:</FONT></P></FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2></FONT></SPAN><F=
ONT=20
size=3D2 face=3DCourier><FONT size=3D2 face=3DCourier><SPAN lang=3DIT>
<P>A typical example is the 3GPP Femtocell network [3GPP], where IPsec</P>
<P>is used for securing traffic between a Femtocell and the Femto</P>
<P>Gateway. </FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=3DCourier><FO=
NT=20
color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=3DCourier><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=
=3DCourier>In=20
some cases</FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3DCourier><FONT size=3D2=
=20
face=3DCourier>, all traffic between these two nodes </FONT></FONT><FONT=20
color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=3DCourier><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=
=3DCourier><FONT=20
color=3D#ff0000 size=3D2 face=3DCourier>may be </FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT s=
ize=3D2=20
face=3DCourier><FONT size=3D2 face=3DCourier>secured by IPsec,</P>
<P>including the time synchronization protocol traffic. This use-case is</P=
>
<P>thoroughly discussed in [IPsecSync].</P></FONT></FONT><FONT color=3D#000=
0ff=20
size=3D2 face=3DArial><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2 face=3DArial><FONT col=
or=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2 face=3DArial>
<P>19) Section 6.5 refers to a requirement of being time synchronized: what=
 is=20
the requirent in this case ? 0.5 sec accuracy?</P></FONT></FONT></FONT><FON=
T=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>Best Regards</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial>Stefano</FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2>=20
</P></FONT></SPAN></DIV><BR>
<DIV dir=3Dltr lang=3Den-us class=3DOutlookMessageHeader align=3Dleft>
<HR tabIndex=3D-1>
<FONT size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><B>From:</B> tictoc-bounces@ietf.org=20
[mailto:tictoc-bounces@ietf.org] <B>On Behalf Of </B>Tal Mizrahi<BR><B>Sent=
:</B>=20
domenica 17 giugno 2012 9.21<BR><B>To:</B> tictoc@ietf.org<BR><B>Subject:</=
B>=20
[TICTOC] Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02<BR></FONT><BR><=
/DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=3DWordSection1>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>Hi,<o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>The following changes have been made in this draft com=
pared=20
to the previous draft:<o:p></o:p></P>
<P style=3D"TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1"=20
class=3DMsoListParagraph><![if !supportLists]><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">1.<SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
=20
</SPAN></SPAN><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr></SPAN>Following feedback from IETF=
 83, a=20
threat analysis section was added.<o:p></o:p></P>
<P style=3D"TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1"=20
class=3DMsoListParagraph><![if !supportLists]><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">2.<SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
=20
</SPAN></SPAN><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr></SPAN>Made various corrections to =
address=20
comments received on the mailing list.<o:p></o:p></P>
<P style=3D"TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1"=20
class=3DMsoListParagraph><![if !supportLists]><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">3.<SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
=20
</SPAN></SPAN><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr></SPAN>Wrote section 6, which was=20
previously just a placeholder.<o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><A=20
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.t=
xt">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt</=
A><o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>Comments will be appreciated.<o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Tal.</SPAN><o:=
p></o:p></P></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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From: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>
To: Stefano Ruffini <stefano.ruffini@ericsson.com>, "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2012 16:17:22 +0300
Thread-Topic: Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02
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Hi Stefano,

Thanks for the very thorough review.
We will be sure to address your comments in the next draft.

> 16) 4.9: I don't think both "Secure Mode" and "Hybrid Mode" should be exp=
lored. Either the security is on or off. Nothing inbetween because that cre=
ates the opportunity for a proverbial backdoor.
Strictly as a security enthusiast I agree, but our feeling was that a hybri=
d mode is called for.
IEEE 1588 Annex K (informative) discusses the need for a mixture of secure =
and nonsecure nodes. NTP allows a network with a mixture of secure and nons=
ecure clients.
I am not sure whether we can avoid a hybrid mode.

Thanks,
Tal.

From: Stefano Ruffini [mailto:stefano.ruffini@ericsson.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 2:22 PM
To: Tal Mizrahi; tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: RE: Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02


Dear Authors

I had a look at the security draft (draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements=
-02.txt) and here are some comments/questions/proposals.

In general I think the document is very good and presents very useful infor=
mation.

General considerations

1) In the introduction it is clarified that this draft addresses time synch=
ronization protocols (PTP and NTP) Security requirements and in Section 4 t=
he requirements refer to "security mechanisms" for a timing protocol.

NTP and PTP are the timing protocols, whereas integrity, authentication, an=
d confidentiality are security mechanisms that can either be introduced to =
those protocols or solved by using other protocols, such as IPsec.

The draft mentions both, but it is sometime unclear on which some of the di=
scussion applies.

It would be clearer if a distinction between introducing new security mecha=
nisms to NTP/PTP vs. using other security protocols is made wherever applic=
able (e.g. adding some introductory text in section 4).

2) A related aspect is that it could be reminded that current packet timing=
 deployments may not involve any security protocol.

Indeed in some cases it may not be strictly necessary (e.g. due to other se=
curity practices in place, and/or the architecture of the network).

In general there needs to be a risk based decision when applying these secu=
rity controls. It should also be considered that applying multiple security=
 controls may introduce disturbances in the timing service.

In addition, the draft provides a good overview and introduction to the sub=
ject of packet timing and security, however since it is not targeting a spe=
cifc set of applications and does not set a clear definition of what a reas=
onable level of security is for timing, the draft may address more than it =
really needs to.

Benefit vs. drawback for a specific application need to be taken into accou=
nt (for example, what is the impact on network timing performance for a spe=
cific application).

A note addressing these considerations could be added in the Introduction o=
f the draft .

=1B$B!!=1B(B

Detailed comments/questions:

3) Abstract:

- Instead of "This document defines a set of requirements for security solu=
tions for time synchronization protocols...", I think it is more correct to=
 say: "This document defines a set of security requirements for security so=
lutions for time synchronization protocols..."

=1B$B!!=1B(B

4) Abstract

Refer to "PTP and NTP", rather than "IEEE1588 and NTP "

5) In section 3.1.2 the distinction betwen MITM and Packet Injector is not =
fully clear : "intercept a packet" or "record a packet" look equivalent.

In particular the existing description for packet injector is not fully cle=
ar.

A packet injector doesn't necessarily need to "record a packet" in order to=
 inject traffic in to the network. It is sufficient to know what protocol t=
o use and the necessary parameters needed to launch an attack (e.g. address=
 of the slave and master). It may be possible to argue that in order to get=
 this information, the attack must first intercept a packet with this data.

6) 3.2.2: Could clarify that the spoofing implies generating your own packe=
ts and not relying on recorded or intercepted packets. At least that may cl=
arify the difference with the other attacks.

7) 3.2.3: I think it's important to note that in a replay attack, the messa=
ge is not altered or manipulated.

8) From the description it is not fully clear the difference between Packet=
 Delay Manipulation (3.2.6) and "Replay Attack" (3.2.3). They look equivale=
nt.

Probably the only difference is that in case of Replay attack the recorded =
packet can be injected multiple times ? Some clarifcation could be added.

9) 3.3: In the case of a prolonged "interception and removal" attack, I wou=
ld add DoS as an impact.

This is evident in mobile networks as it will eventually mean, or may preve=
nt the, that the mobile services from being available.

On further thought, I guess one could argue that for certain mobile scenari=
os, all the mentioned attacks could result in the mobile service becoming u=
navailable. I expect that is the end goal when attacking the sync service i=
n a mobile network.

10) 3.3, I think "Master Time source spoofing" attacks may be difficult - i=
n many cases, impossible from outside the network. This is case dependent.

I would propose to remove the " External" from the table

11) 4.2.1.2: a note could be added for the "End to Ent Integrity Protection=
" method, clarifying that it can add complexity because it requires multipl=
e fields to be protected separately and using different keys, presumably.

12) 4.3: even in case of external attacks, Authentication alone is not suff=
icient to prevent DoS attacks, or attackes against availability. It can mit=
igate some risks.

I think when it comes to availability, other mechanisms - possibily in conj=
unction with cryptographic mechanisms - are probably more reliable to addre=
ss the issue.

13) 4.5.1: this section implies a fairly heavy solution; Even if the handli=
ng of the association protocol is not implemented by the clock (but is hand=
led transparently to the sync application as in case of IPsec/MACsec), it i=
ntroduces an additional overhead and complexity when managing large network=
s.

A security association is essentially a set of shared security attributes b=
etween two network elements. How these security attributes are configured/n=
egotiated can be either accomplished with a protocol such as IKEv2 or by ot=
her means, e.g. manual configuration or via NMS/OSS .

By only mentioning "association protocol" the draft is pushing towards a sp=
ecific implementation. .

In conclusion , 4.5.1 should be optional. Other ways to distribute the secu=
rity attributes should be considered

14) 4.7: Comment on the last sentence on MITM.

Because both NTP and PTP have predictable behavior it could be possible to =
launch a successful attack targeting sync packets despite the fact that the=
y are encrypted.

15) 4.8, requirement.

I guess the reason for the MAY is that it may be impossible to distinguish =
between a delay attack from delay introduced by disturbances in the network=
?

16) 4.9: I don't think both "Secure Mode" and "Hybrid Mode" should be explo=
red. Either the security is on or off. Nothing inbetween because that creat=
es the opportunity for a proverbial backdoor.

17) 6.2. Comment on

"Note that if an encryption mechanism is used, it presents a challenge

to the timestamping mechanism, since time protocol packets are

encrypted when traversing the physical interface, and are thus

impossible to identify."

This is dependent on what is encrypted. This has actually not been discusse=
d in the draft. The above statement assumes that the entire IP packet is en=
crypted. But if it is only the "sensitive" information, e.g. the NTP/PTP pa=
yload, then it would be possible to identify sync packets even if they are =
encrypted. On the other hand, if IPsec is used, then the statement is corre=
ct.

18) Section 6.4. As discussed at last TICTOC meeting, it is not mandatory t=
o deliver timing packets in the same IPSEC tunnel used for the traffic, eve=
n in case of Femtocell

The text should be revised, for instance adding "may" in the folloiwng sent=
ence:

A typical example is the 3GPP Femtocell network [3GPP], where IPsec

is used for securing traffic between a Femtocell and the Femto

Gateway. In some cases, all traffic between these two nodes may be secured =
by IPsec,

including the time synchronization protocol traffic. This use-case is

thoroughly discussed in [IPsecSync].

19) Section 6.5 refers to a requirement of being time synchronized: what is=
 the requirent in this case ? 0.5 sec accuracy?

Best Regards

Stefano

________________________________
From: tictoc-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tictoc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Tal Mizrahi
Sent: domenica 17 giugno 2012 9.21
To: tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: [TICTOC] Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02
Hi,

The following changes have been made in this draft compared to the previous=
 draft:

1.       Following feedback from IETF 83, a threat analysis section was add=
ed.

2.       Made various corrections to address comments received on the maili=
ng list.

3.       Wrote section 6, which was previously just a placeholder.

http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt

Comments will be appreciated.

Thanks,
Tal.

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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'c=
olor:#1F497D'>Hi Stefano,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks for the very thorough review. <o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>We will be su=
re to address your comments in the next draft.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Ar=
ial","sans-serif";color:blue'>&gt; 16) 4.9: I don't think both &quot;Secure=
 Mode&quot; and &quot;Hybrid Mode&quot; should be explored. Either the secu=
rity is on or off. Nothing inbetween because that creates the opportunity f=
or a proverbial backdoor.</span><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Strictly as a s=
ecurity enthusiast I agree, but our feeling was that a hybrid mode is calle=
d for. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F4=
97D'>IEEE 1588 Annex K (informative) discusses the need for a mixture of se=
cure and nonsecure nodes. NTP allows a network with a mixture of secure and=
 nonsecure clients.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:#1F497D'>I am not sure whether we can avoid a hybrid mode.<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbs=
p;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thank=
s,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0p=
t;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US=
'>Tal.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F49=
7D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:s=
olid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span=
 style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span><=
/b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Stef=
ano Ruffini [mailto:stefano.ruffini@ericsson.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday,=
 July 10, 2012 2:22 PM<br><b>To:</b> Tal Mizrahi; tictoc@ietf.org<br><b>Sub=
ject:</b> RE: Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>Dear =
Authors</span><span style=3D'color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>I had a=
 look at the security draft (</span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fa=
mily:"Arial","sans-serif"'>draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt<s=
pan style=3D'color:blue'>) and&nbsp;here are some comments/questions/propos=
als. </span></span><o:p></o:p></p><p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>In general I think </span><span lang=
=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue=
'>the document is very good and presents very useful information.</span><sp=
an lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><u><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size=
:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>General considerations=
</span></u><span lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>1) In the=
 introduction it is clarified that this draft addresses time synchronizatio=
n protocols (PTP and NTP) Security requirements and in Section 4 the requir=
ements refer to &quot;security mechanisms&quot; for a timing protocol. </sp=
an><span lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>NTP and PTP are the=
 timing protocols, whereas integrity, authentication, and confidentiality a=
re security mechanisms that can either be introduced to those protocols or =
solved by using other protocols, such as IPsec. </span><span lang=3DSV><o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>The draft mentions both, but it is sometim=
e unclear on which some of the discussion applies.</span><span lang=3DSV><o=
:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-famil=
y:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>It would be clearer if a distinction bet=
ween introducing new security mechanisms to NTP/PTP vs. using other securit=
y protocols is made wherever applicable (e.g. adding some introductory text=
 in section 4).</span><span lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=
=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue=
'>2) A related aspect is that it could be reminded that current packet timi=
ng deployments may not involve any security protocol. </span><span lang=3DS=
V><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>Indeed in some cases it may not be s=
trictly necessary (e.g. due to other security practices in place, and/or th=
e architecture of the network). </span><span lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-se=
rif";color:blue'>In general there needs to be a risk based decision when ap=
plying these security controls. It should also be considered that applying =
multiple security controls may introduce disturbances in the timing service=
.</span><span lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>In addition, t=
he draft provides a good overview and introduction to the subject of packet=
 timing and security, however since it is not targeting a specifc set of ap=
plications and does not set a clear definition of what a reasonable level o=
f security is for timing, the draft may address more than it really needs t=
o. </span><span lang=3DIT><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D=
'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>Benefit vs. =
drawback for a specific application need to be taken into account (for exam=
ple, what is the impact on network timing performance for a specific applic=
ation).</span><span lang=3DIT><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV styl=
e=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>A note a=
ddressing these considerations could be added in the Introduction of the dr=
aft .</span><span lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DJA style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'>=1B$B!!=1B(B</span><span lang=3DSV><o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p><u><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>Detailed comments/questions:</span></u><sp=
an lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10=
.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>3) Abstract: </span><span=
 lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><=
span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";c=
olor:blue'>- Instead of &quot;This document defines a set of requirements f=
or security solutions for time synchronization protocols...&quot;, I think =
it is more correct to say: &quot;This document defines a set of </span><spa=
n lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";colo=
r:red'>security</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family=
:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'> requirements for<s> security solutions f=
or </s>time synchronization protocols...&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><spa=
n lang=3DJA style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:red'>=1B$B!!=1B(B</span><span l=
ang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:r=
ed'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font=
-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>4) Abstract </span><span lang=3DIT=
 style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=
=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue=
'>Refer to &quot;PTP and NTP&quot;, rather than &quot;IEEE1588 and NTP &quo=
t;</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",=
"sans-serif";color:blue'>5) In section 3.1.2 the distinction betwen MITM an=
d Packet Injector is not fully clear : &quot;intercept a packet&quot; or &q=
uot;record a packet&quot; look equivalent.</span><span lang=3DSV style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>In partic=
ular the existing description for packet injector is not fully clear.</span=
><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-se=
rif";color:blue'>A packet injector doesn't necessarily need to &quot;record=
 a packet&quot; in order to inject traffic in to the network. It is suffici=
ent to know what protocol to use and the necessary parameters needed to lau=
nch an attack (e.g. address of the slave and master). It may be possible to=
 argue that in order to get this information, the attack must first interce=
pt a packet with this data. </span><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0p=
t;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:1=
0.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>6) 3.2.2: Could clarify =
that the spoofing implies generating your own packets and not relying on re=
corded or intercepted packets. At least that may clarify the difference wit=
h the other attacks.</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:=
blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;fo=
nt-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>7) 3.2.3: I think it's important=
 to note that in a replay attack, the message is not altered or manipulated=
.</span><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","=
sans-serif";color:blue'>8) From the description it is not fully clear the d=
ifference between Packet Delay Manipulation (3.2.6) and &quot;Replay Attack=
&quot; (3.2.3). They look equivalent.</span><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-s=
ize:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'fo=
nt-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>Probably the on=
ly difference is that in case of Replay attack the recorded packet can be i=
njected multiple times ? Some clarifcation could be added.</span><span lang=
=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:=
blue'>9) 3.3: In the case of a prolonged &quot;interception and removal&quo=
t; attack, I would add DoS as an impact. </span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'fo=
nt-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>This is e=
vident in mobile networks as it will eventually mean, or may prevent the, t=
hat the mobile services from being available. </span><span lang=3DIT style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT s=
tyle=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>On fu=
rther thought, I guess one could argue that for certain mobile scenarios, a=
ll the mentioned attacks could result in the mobile service becoming unavai=
lable. I expect that is the end goal when attacking the sync service in a m=
obile network.</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
"Arial","sans-serif";color:red'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT st=
yle=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>10) 3.=
3, I think &quot;Master Time source spoofing&quot; attacks may be difficult=
 - in many cases, impossible from outside the network. This is case depende=
nt.</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial"=
,"sans-serif";color:blue'>I would propose to remove the &quot; External&quo=
t; from the table</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blu=
e'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>11) 4.2.1.2: a note could be added =
for the &quot;End to Ent Integrity Protection&quot; method, clarifying that=
 it can add complexity because it requires multiple fields to be protected =
separately and using different keys, presumably.</span><span lang=3DIT styl=
e=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>12) =
4.3: even in case of external attacks, Authentication alone is not sufficie=
nt to prevent DoS attacks, or attackes against availability. It can mitigat=
e some risks.</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>I think when it comes to availability, =
other mechanisms - possibily in conjunction with cryptographic mechanisms -=
 are probably more reliable to address the issue.</span><span lang=3DIT sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT=
 style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>13)=
 4.5.1: this section implies a fairly heavy solution; Even if the handling =
of the association protocol is not implemented by the clock (but is handled=
 transparently to the sync application as in case of IPsec/MACsec), it intr=
oduces an additional overhead and complexity when managing large networks.<=
/span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sa=
ns-serif";color:blue'>A security association is essentially a set of shared=
 security attributes between two network elements. How these security attri=
butes are configured/negotiated can be either accomplished with a protocol =
such as IKEv2 or by other means, e.g. manual configuration or via NMS/OSS .=
 </span><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","=
sans-serif";color:blue'>By only mentioning &quot;association protocol&quot;=
 the draft is pushing towards a specific implementation. .</span><span lang=
=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:=
blue'>In conclusion , 4.5.1 should be optional. Other ways to distribute th=
e security attributes should be considered </span><span lang=3DSV style=3D'=
font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>14) 4.7: =
Comment on the last sentence on MITM. </span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-=
size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>Because both N=
TP and PTP have predictable behavior it could be possible to launch a succe=
ssful attack targeting sync packets despite the fact that they are encrypte=
d.</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",=
"sans-serif";color:blue'>15) 4.8, requirement. </span><span lang=3DIT style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT s=
tyle=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>I gue=
ss the reason for the MAY is that it may be impossible to distinguish betwe=
en a delay attack from delay introduced by disturbances in the network?</sp=
an><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-=
serif";color:blue'>16) 4.9: I don't think both &quot;Secure Mode&quot; and =
&quot;Hybrid Mode&quot; should be explored. Either the security is on or of=
f. Nothing inbetween because that creates the opportunity for a proverbial =
backdoor.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt=
;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>17) 6.2. Comment on </span><s=
pan lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><=
p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif=
";color:blue'>&quot;</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Note that if an encryption mechanism is used, i=
t presents a challenge</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family=
:"Arial","sans-serif"'>to the timestamping mechanism, since time protocol p=
ackets are</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sa=
ns-serif"'>encrypted when traversing the physical interface, and are thus</=
span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><s=
pan lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>i=
mpossible to identify.<span style=3D'color:blue'>&quot;</span></span><span =
lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><s=
pan lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";co=
lor:blue'>This is dependent on what is encrypted. This has actually not bee=
n discussed in the draft. The above statement assumes that the entire IP pa=
cket is encrypted. But if it is only the &quot;sensitive&quot; information,=
 e.g. the NTP/PTP payload, then it would be possible to identify sync packe=
ts even if they are encrypted. On the other hand, if IPsec is used, then th=
e statement is correct.</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;col=
or:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt=
;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>18) Section 6.4. As discussed=
 at last TICTOC meeting, it is not mandatory to deliver timing packets in t=
he same IPSEC tunnel used for the traffic, even in case of Femtocell</span>=
<span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p=
><p><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-ser=
if";color:blue'>The text should be revised, for instance adding &quot;may&q=
uot; in the folloiwng sentence:</span><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10=
.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>A typical example is the 3GPP Femtocell netwo=
rk [3GPP], where IPsec<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'fon=
t-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>is used for securing traffic between a F=
emtocell and the Femto<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'fon=
t-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>Gateway. <span style=3D'color:red'>In so=
me cases</span>, all traffic between these two nodes <span style=3D'color:r=
ed'>may be </span>secured by IPsec,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT=
 style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>including the time synchron=
ization protocol traffic. This use-case is<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span la=
ng=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier'>thoroughly discussed=
 in [IPsecSync].<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size=
:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>19) Section 6.5 refers=
 to a requirement of being time synchronized: what is the requirent in this=
 case ? 0.5 sec accuracy?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'=
font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:blue'>Best Regards<=
/span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:blue'><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sa=
ns-serif";color:blue'>Stefano</span><span lang=3DIT style=3D'font-size:10.0=
pt'> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12=
.0pt;font-family:"MS PGothic","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><di=
v class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><span style=
=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"MS PGothic","sans-serif"'><hr size=3D2 wi=
dth=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter></span></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'marg=
in-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","=
sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"T=
ahoma","sans-serif"'> tictoc-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tictoc-bounces@ietf.o=
rg] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Tal Mizrahi<br><b>Sent:</b> domenica 17 giugno 2012=
 9.21<br><b>To:</b> tictoc@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> [TICTOC] Updated dra=
ft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0=
pt;font-family:"MS PGothic","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D=
MsoNormal>Hi,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal>The following changes have been made in this draft compared=
 to the previous draft:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'=
text-indent:-.25in'>1.<span style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;font-family:"Times New=
 Roman","serif"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>Following feed=
back from IETF 83, a threat analysis section was added.<o:p></o:p></p><p cl=
ass=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in'>2.<span style=3D'font-s=
ize:7.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp; </span>Made various corrections to address comments received on =
the mailing list.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-i=
ndent:-.25in'>3.<span style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman=
","serif"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>Wrote section 6, whi=
ch was previously just a placeholder.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o=
:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/id/d=
raft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft=
-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Comments will be appreciate=
d.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10=
.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Tal.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></bo=
dy></html>=

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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02
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Hello Tal and Karen.

I had a look at your I-D which I regard as a valuable contribution to=20
this subject.

Here are my comments:

1) 4.1.1 is a special case of 4.1.2. Therefore, these two cases could be =

summarized under on item "Authentication of Masters". I'd recommend to=20
dismiss the term "Proventication" at all. According to your explanation=20
it describes the process of authentication in a hierarchical organized=20
structure. Thus, it should be worded accordingly.


2) Regarding 6.5. What is the implication of this section?

Best regards
Dieter




Am 17.06.12 09:21, schrieb Tal Mizrahi:
> Hi,
>
> The following changes have been made in this draft compared to the
> previous draft:
>
> 1.Following feedback from IETF 83, a threat analysis section was added.=

>
> 2.Made various corrections to address comments received on the mailing =
list.
>
> 3.Wrote section 6, which was previously just a placeholder.
>
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt
>
> Comments will be appreciated.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Tal.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TICTOC mailing list
> TICTOC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tictoc
>

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From talmi@marvell.com  Thu Jul 12 06:19:13 2012
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From: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>
To: Dieter Sibold <dieter.sibold@ptb.de>, "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2012 16:19:40 +0300
Thread-Topic: [TICTOC] Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02
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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02
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Hi Dieter,

Thanks for your detailed comments.

>1) 4.1.1 is a special case of 4.1.2. Therefore, these two cases could be s=
ummarized under on item "Authentication of Masters". I'd recommend to dismi=
ss the
>term "Proventication" at all. According to your explanation it describes t=
he process of authentication in a hierarchical organized structure. Thus, i=
t should be
>worded accordingly.

I understand this is mostly a terminology issue. I will does some reorganiz=
ing and rephrasing of this section, but I believe mentioning the word "prov=
entication" is called for, to allow the reader to connect this to the AutoK=
ey context.


> 2) Regarding 6.5. What is the implication of this section?

Section 6 in general does not imply any *requirements*.
It includes some discussion about the connection between time synchronizati=
on and security. Specifically, 6.5 discusses the connection between time sy=
nchronization and other security services requiring time synchronization.

Tal.

-----Original Message-----
From: tictoc-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tictoc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Dieter Sibold
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 7:55 PM
To: tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TICTOC] Updated draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02

Hello Tal and Karen.

I had a look at your I-D which I regard as a valuable contribution to this =
subject.

Here are my comments:

1) 4.1.1 is a special case of 4.1.2. Therefore, these two cases could be su=
mmarized under on item "Authentication of Masters". I'd recommend to dismis=
s the term "Proventication" at all. According to your explanation it descri=
bes the process of authentication in a hierarchical organized structure. Th=
us, it should be worded accordingly.


2) Regarding 6.5. What is the implication of this section?

Best regards
Dieter




Am 17.06.12 09:21, schrieb Tal Mizrahi:
> Hi,
>
> The following changes have been made in this draft compared to the=20
> previous draft:
>
> 1.Following feedback from IETF 83, a threat analysis section was added.
>
> 2.Made various corrections to address comments received on the mailing li=
st.
>
> 3.Wrote section 6, which was previously just a placeholder.
>
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-02.txt
>
> Comments will be appreciated.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Tal.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TICTOC mailing list
> TICTOC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tictoc
>

--
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E-Mail: dieter.sibold@ptb.de




From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Mon Jul 16 11:18:19 2012
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Subject: [TICTOC] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tictoc-ptp-mib-02.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Timing over IP Connection and Transfer of=
 Clock Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Precision Time Protocol Version 2 (PTPv2) Management Inf=
ormation Base
	Author(s)       : Vinay Shankarkumar
                          Laurent Montini
                          Tim Frost
                          Greg Dowd
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tictoc-ptp-mib-02.txt
	Pages           : 75
	Date            : 2012-07-16

Abstract:
   This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
   for use with network management protocols in TCP/IP-based internets.
   In particular, it defines objects for managing networks using
   Precision Time Protocol.

   This memo specifies a MIB module in a manner that is both compliant
   to the SNMPv2 SMI, and semantically identical to the peer SNMPv1
   definitions.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tictoc-ptp-mib

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-ptp-mib-02

A diff from previous version is available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tictoc-ptp-mib-02


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From gregory.mirsky@ericsson.com  Wed Jul 25 16:09:08 2012
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From: Gregory Mirsky <gregory.mirsky@ericsson.com>
To: Yaakov Stein <yaakov_s@rad.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "Bocci, Matthew (Matthew)" <matthew.bocci@alcatel-lucent.com>, "Malis, Andrew G (Andy)" <andrew.g.malis@verizon.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2012 19:08:56 -0400
Thread-Topic: Status of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls-02.txt
Thread-Index: Ac1qundHmlCeo+1IQFiYa+Birxd0aQ==
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Subject: [TICTOC] Status of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls-02.txt
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Dear Chairs, et al.,
I found that draft Transporting PTP messages (1588) over MPLS Networks been=
 scheduled for presentation at both TICTOC and PWE3 sessions at IETF-84. AF=
AIK, the draft expired as of April 9, 2012 and that is confirmed by IETF Da=
tatracker https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls/.
Discussion of the version -02 already took place and, according to minutes =
from TICTOC meeting at IETF-83 in Paris, concluded with "Some attendees wis=
h to wait for version 03 before commenting further."
Which version will be presented this time - -02 or else?

        Regards,
                Greg


--_000_FE60A4E52763E84B935532D7D9294FF13924C82A19EUSAACMS0715e_
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<div>Dear Chairs, et al.,</div>
<div>I found that draft Transporting PTP messages (1588) over MPLS Networks=
 been scheduled for presentation at both TICTOC and PWE3 sessions at IETF-8=
4. AFAIK, the draft expired as of April 9, 2012 and that is confirmed by IE=
TF Datatracker <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ticto=
c-1588overmpls/"><font color=3D"#0000FF"><u>https://datatracker.ietf.org/do=
c/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls/</u></font></a>.</div>
<div>Discussion of the version -02 already took place and, according to min=
utes from TICTOC meeting at IETF-83 in Paris, concluded with &quot;Some att=
endees wish to wait for version 03 before commenting further.&quot; </div>
<div>Which version will be presented this time - -02 or else?</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Regards,</div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Greg</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
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From yaakov_s@rad.com  Wed Jul 25 21:47:35 2012
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From: Yaakov Stein <yaakov_s@rad.com>
To: Gregory Mirsky <gregory.mirsky@ericsson.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "Bocci, Matthew (Matthew)" <matthew.bocci@alcatel-lucent.com>, "Malis, Andrew G (Andy)" <andrew.g.malis@verizon.com>
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Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2012 04:47:26 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TICTOC] Status of	http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls-02.txt
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Greg

The draft authors could not generate a new version before the cutoff.

The discussion will be about the 03 version which hopefully resolves all ou=
tstanding issues.
(Note: I call it a 03 version, but actually the document is being split int=
o several documents.)

If I receive a new version I will post it on a non-IETF site before the pre=
sentation at TICTOC.

Y(J)S

From: Gregory Mirsky [mailto:gregory.mirsky@ericsson.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 26, 2012 02:09
To: Yaakov Stein; odonoghue@isoc.org; Bocci, Matthew (Matthew); Malis, Andr=
ew G (Andy)
Cc: tictoc@ietf.org; pwe3 (pwe3@ietf.org)
Subject: Status of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpl=
s-02.txt

Dear Chairs, et al.,
I found that draft Transporting PTP messages (1588) over MPLS Networks been=
 scheduled for presentation at both TICTOC and PWE3 sessions at IETF-84. AF=
AIK, the draft expired as of April 9, 2012 and that is confirmed by IETF Da=
tatracker https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls/.
Discussion of the version -02 already took place and, according to minutes =
from TICTOC meeting at IETF-83 in Paris, concluded with "Some attendees wis=
h to wait for version 03 before commenting further."
Which version will be presented this time - -02 or else?

        Regards,
                Greg


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<div class=3D"Section1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">Greg<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">The draft authors could not generate a new version before th=
e cutoff.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">The discussion will be about the 03 version which hopefully =
resolves all outstanding issues.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">(Note: I call it a 03 version, but actually the document is =
being split into several documents.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">If I receive a new version I will post it on a non-IETF site=
 before the presentation at TICTOC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">Y(J)S<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Gregory =
Mirsky [mailto:gregory.mirsky@ericsson.com]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 26, 2012 02:09<br>
<b>To:</b> Yaakov Stein; odonoghue@isoc.org; Bocci, Matthew (Matthew); Mali=
s, Andrew G (Andy)<br>
<b>Cc:</b> tictoc@ietf.org; pwe3 (pwe3@ietf.org)<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Status of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588=
overmpls-02.txt<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Dear Chairs, et al.,<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">I found that draft Transporting PTP messa=
ges (1588) over MPLS Networks been scheduled for presentation at both TICTO=
C and PWE3 sessions at IETF-84. AFAIK, the draft expired
 as of April 9, 2012 and that is confirmed by IETF Datatracker <a href=3D"h=
ttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls/">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tictoc-1588overmpls/</a>.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Discussion of the version -02 already too=
k place and, according to minutes from TICTOC meeting at IETF-83 in Paris, =
concluded with &quot;Some attendees wish to wait for version
 03 before commenting further.&quot; <o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Which version will be presented this time=
 - -02 or else?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Greg<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Subject: [TICTOC] Fwd: Need volunteers for the NomCom
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Folks,

Here's a reminder that the call for nomcom volunteers is open until the 
Sunday only.

Thanks,
Karen


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	Need volunteers for the NomCom
Date: 	Sun, 29 Jul 2012 20:22:33 -0700
From: 	NomCom Chair <nomcom-chair@ietf.org>
To: 	Working Group Chairs <wgchairs@ietf.org>



We are currently looking for volunteers to serve on the 2012-2013 NomCom.
As you know, the success of the NomCom process depends crucially on
having a large pool of volunteers from throughout the IETF community.
In particular, it is valuable for the pool of volunteers to have strong
representation from all of the technical areas within the IETF.

I understand that not all IETF participants read the IETF announce list
frequently. Therefore, if you would be willing to inform active participants
in your working groups about this year's call for NomCom volunteers, I
would greatly appreciate it.

The NomCom 2012-2013 Call for Volunteers is open until this Sunday,
August 5. Details can be found at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ann/nomcom/49851/

Thank you for your help,
- Matt Lepinski
   mlepinski.ietf@gmail.com
   nomcom-chair@ietf.org





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    Folks, <br>
    <br>
    Here's a reminder that the call for nomcom volunteers is open until
    the Sunday only.<br>
    <br>
    Thanks,<br>
    Karen<br>
    <div class="moz-forward-container"><br>
      <br>
      -------- Original Message --------
      <table class="moz-email-headers-table" border="0" cellpadding="0"
        cellspacing="0">
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Subject:
            </th>
            <td>Need volunteers for the NomCom</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Date: </th>
            <td>Sun, 29 Jul 2012 20:22:33 -0700</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">From: </th>
            <td>NomCom Chair <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:nomcom-chair@ietf.org">&lt;nomcom-chair@ietf.org&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">To: </th>
            <td>Working Group Chairs <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:wgchairs@ietf.org">&lt;wgchairs@ietf.org&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <br>
      <br>
      <pre>We are currently looking for volunteers to serve on the 2012-2013 NomCom.
As you know, the success of the NomCom process depends crucially on 
having a large pool of volunteers from throughout the IETF community. 
In particular, it is valuable for the pool of volunteers to have strong 
representation from all of the technical areas within the IETF. 

I understand that not all IETF participants read the IETF announce list 
frequently. Therefore, if you would be willing to inform active participants 
in your working groups about this year's call for NomCom volunteers, I 
would greatly appreciate it. 

The NomCom 2012-2013 Call for Volunteers is open until this Sunday, 
August 5. Details can be found at: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/ann/nomcom/49851/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/ann/nomcom/49851/</a>

Thank you for your help,
- Matt Lepinski
  <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:mlepinski.ietf@gmail.com">mlepinski.ietf@gmail.com</a>
  <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:nomcom-chair@ietf.org">nomcom-chair@ietf.org</a>
</pre>
      <br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------030701050703050800070900--

From odonoghue@isoc.org  Tue Jul 31 09:43:06 2012
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Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2012 09:43:03 -0700
From: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
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Subject: [TICTOC] reminder for remote participants, ntp/tictoc meeting, 1300 PDT (2000 UTC)
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Folks,

This is just a quick reminder for any remote participants that the 
tictoc and ntp working groups will be meeting jointly later today at 
1:00 pm PDT (8:00 pm UTC) here at IETF84. Links to the audio stream and 
the jabber group are available on the following agenda page:
http://tools.ietf.org/agenda/84/

Karen

From davari@broadcom.com  Tue Jul 31 14:04:30 2012
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From: "Shahram Davari" <davari@broadcom.com>
To: "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Questions regaridng 1588 over MPLS
Thread-Index: Ac1vX/3cqELPcksBSQ64WClgxq4MoQ==
Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2012 21:03:54 +0000
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Subject: [TICTOC] Questions regaridng 1588 over MPLS
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Hi,

During today's TICTOC meeting I raised the following questions. We need you=
r feedback on these questions in order to progress this draft.


  1.  Should CW be mandatory?
     *   If not, then a PTP-LSP needs to carry only one type of PW (either =
with CW or without CW) but not mix so that LSRs can correctly parse the pac=
ket
     *
     *   Without PW the job of LSRs becomes more complex to identify the OA=
M packets
  2.  Should ECMP/Entropy be disallowed?
     *   The current consensus is yes, no ECMP or Entropy shall be used.
  3.  Should PHP (Penultimate Hop Popping) be allowed?
  4.  How to transport 1588 messages that don't need TS or CF update?
     *   Send them over non-PTP LSP?
     *   Let the LSRs do the parsing and perform TS or CF updated based on =
message type?
  5.  Should P2MP LSP & P2MP PW be supported?
  6.  Should protection be supported for PTP-LSP?
     *   FRR, 1:1 and 1+1
  7.  How does LSP/PW connectivity failure interact with 1588?
     *   Does the Slave select another master when a failure happens?
     *   Can the protection make the failure invisible to Salve clock?
  8.  Should only VCCV1 and VCCV4 be allowed?
     *   If not then the VCCV type needs to be the same for all PW in the P=
TP-LSP so that LSRs can correctly parse the packet


Thank you,


[Description: Description: Description: Description: Description: Descripti=
on: Description: Description: Description: Description: cid:image009.jpg@01=
CD505E.7B800DB0]

Shahram Davari | Technical Director, Network Switching Group
Broadcom Corporation | (O) 408-922-7436 | (M) 408-660-5695

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007]<http://broadcom.com/>





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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">During today&#8217;s TICTOC meeting I raised the fol=
lowing questions. We need your feedback on these questions in order to prog=
ress this draft.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ol style=3D"margin-top:0in" start=3D"1" type=3D"1">
<li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1">Should CW be mand=
atory?<o:p></o:p>
<ol style=3D"margin-top:0in" start=3D"1" type=3D"a">
<li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1">If not, then a PT=
P-LSP needs to carry only one type of PW (either with CW or without CW) but=
 not mix so that LSRs can correctly parse the packet<o:p></o:p></li><li cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></li><l=
i class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1">Without PW the job =
of LSRs becomes more complex to identify the OAM packets<o:p></o:p></li></o=
l>
</li><li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1">Should ECMP/=
Entropy be disallowed?<o:p></o:p>
<ol style=3D"margin-top:0in" start=3D"1" type=3D"a">
<li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1">The current conse=
nsus is yes, no ECMP or Entropy shall be used.<o:p></o:p></li></ol>
</li><li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1">Should PHP (=
Penultimate Hop Popping) be allowed?<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoNormal"=
 style=3D"mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1">How to transport 1588 messages that don&=
#8217;t need TS or CF update?<o:p></o:p>
<ol style=3D"margin-top:0in" start=3D"1" type=3D"a">
<li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1">Send them over no=
n-PTP LSP?<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 leve=
l2 lfo1">Let the LSRs do the parsing and perform TS or CF updated based on =
message type?
<o:p></o:p></li></ol>
</li><li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1">Should P2MP =
LSP &amp; P2MP PW be supported?<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoNormal" styl=
e=3D"mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1">Should protection be supported for PTP-LSP?
<o:p></o:p>
<ol style=3D"margin-top:0in" start=3D"1" type=3D"a">
<li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1">FRR, 1:1 and 1&#4=
3;1<o:p></o:p></li></ol>
</li><li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1">How does LSP=
/PW connectivity failure interact with 1588?<o:p></o:p>
<ol style=3D"margin-top:0in" start=3D"1" type=3D"a">
<li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1">Does the Slave se=
lect another master when a failure happens?<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"Mso=
Normal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1">Can the protection make the failu=
re invisible to Salve clock?<o:p></o:p></li></ol>
</li><li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1">Should only =
VCCV1 and VCCV4 be allowed?<o:p></o:p>
<ol style=3D"margin-top:0in" start=3D"1" type=3D"a">
<li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-list:l1 level2 lfo1">If not then the V=
CCV type needs to be the same for all PW in the PTP-LSP so that LSRs can co=
rrectly parse the packet<o:p></o:p></li></ol>
</li></ol>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Thank you,<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><img width=3D"264" height=3D"58" id=3D"Pi=
cture_x0020_1" src=3D"cid:image001.jpg@01CD6F25.515CC600" alt=3D"Descriptio=
n: Description: Description: Description: Description: Description: Descrip=
tion: Description: Description: Description: cid:image009.jpg@01CD505E.7B80=
0DB0"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Shahram Davari |
<span style=3D"color:red">Technical Director, Network Switching Group<br>
Broadcom Corporation </span>|<span style=3D"color:red"> (O) 408-922-7436 </=
span>|<span style=3D"color:red"> (M) 408-660-5695</span><o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
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