
From talmi@marvell.com  Mon Sep  3 07:03:42 2012
Return-Path: <talmi@marvell.com>
X-Original-To: tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA1F521F861C for <tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  3 Sep 2012 07:03:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.277
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.277 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.279, BAYES_50=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DHeFGbu96O-T for <tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  3 Sep 2012 07:03:40 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from galiil.marvell.com (galiil.marvell.com [199.203.130.254]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EAC421F8599 for <tictoc@ietf.org>; Mon,  3 Sep 2012 07:03:40 -0700 (PDT)
From: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>
To: "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2012 17:03:35 +0300
Thread-Topic: draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements - Proventication
Thread-Index: Ac2J3DVybLc3kdEiTSuGMTmFzlwsgw==
Message-ID: <74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8A52810@IL-MB01.marvell.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8A52810ILMB01marve_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: [TICTOC] draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements - Proventication
X-BeenThere: tictoc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Timing over IP Connection and Transfer of Clock BOF <tictoc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tictoc>, <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tictoc>
List-Post: <mailto:tictoc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tictoc>, <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 03 Sep 2012 14:03:42 -0000

--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8A52810ILMB01marve_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi,

One of the main comments from draft 02 was to rephrase the proventication s=
ection.
I am suggesting the phrasing below. The word "proventication" will appear o=
nly once in the document (see the last sentence of the paragraph below).
If you have any comments, I will appreciate if you can send them this week.


4.1.2. Recursive Authentication of Masters (Chain of Trust)
Requirement
The security mechanism MUST support recursive authentication of the master,=
 to be used in cases where end-to-end authentication is not possible.
Discussion
Clocks authenticate masters in order to ensure the authenticity of the time=
 source.
In some cases a slave is connected to an intermediate master, that is not t=
he primary time source. For example, in PTP a slave can be connected to a B=
oundary Clock (BC), which in turn is connected to a grandmaster. A similar =
example in NTP is when a client is connected to a stratum 2 server, which i=
s connected to a stratum 1 server. In both the PTP and the NTP cases, the s=
lave authenticates the intermediate master, and the intermediate master aut=
henticates the primary master. This inductive authentication process is ref=
erred to in [AutoKey] as proventication.

Tal.


--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8A52810ILMB01marve_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:x=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel" xmlns:m=3D"http://schema=
s.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html=
40"><head><meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Du=
s-ascii"><meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 14 (filtered medi=
um)"><style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0in;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
@page WordSection1
	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.25in 1.0in 1.25in;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi,<o:p></o:p></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>One of the=
 main comments from draft 02 was to rephrase the proventication section.<o:=
p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I am suggesting the phrasing below. The wo=
rd &#8220;proventication&#8221; will appear only once in the document (see =
the last sentence of the paragraph below).<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al>If you have any comments, I will appreciate if you can send them this we=
ek.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>4.1.2. Recursive Authentica=
tion of Masters (Chain of Trust)<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Require=
ment<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The security mechanism MUST support=
 recursive authentication of the master, to be used in cases where end-to-e=
nd authentication is not possible.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Discu=
ssion<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Clocks authenticate masters in ord=
er to ensure the authenticity of the time source. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal>In some cases a slave is connected to an intermediate master, =
that is not the primary time source. For example, in PTP a slave can be con=
nected to a Boundary Clock (BC), which in turn is connected to a grandmaste=
r. A similar example in NTP is when a client is connected to a stratum 2 se=
rver, which is connected to a stratum 1 server. In both the PTP and the NTP=
 cases, the slave authenticates the intermediate master, and the intermedia=
te master authenticates the primary master. This inductive authentication p=
rocess is referred to in [AutoKey] as proventication.<o:p></o:p></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Tal.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>=

--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8A52810ILMB01marve_--

From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Fri Sep 14 06:51:54 2012
Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC06121F851B; Fri, 14 Sep 2012 06:51:54 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.333
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.333 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.266, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Uz0eTye7vIPS; Fri, 14 Sep 2012 06:51:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2CEE621F84F5; Fri, 14 Sep 2012 06:51:54 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 4.34
Message-ID: <20120914135154.21574.7671.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2012 06:51:54 -0700
Cc: tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: [TICTOC] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-03.txt
X-BeenThere: tictoc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Timing over IP Connection and Transfer of Clock BOF <tictoc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tictoc>, <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tictoc>
List-Post: <mailto:tictoc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tictoc>, <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2012 13:51:54 -0000

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Timing over IP Connection and Transfer of=
 Clock Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : TICTOC Security Requirements
	Author(s)       : Tal Mizrahi
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-03.txt
	Pages           : 24
	Date            : 2012-09-14

Abstract:
   As time synchronization protocols are becoming increasingly common
   and widely deployed, concern about their exposure to various security
   threats is increasing. This document defines a set of security
   requirements for time synchronization protocols, focusing on the
   Precision Time Protocol (PTP) and the Network Time Protocol (NTP).
   This document also discusses the security impacts of time
   synchronization protocol practices, the time synchronization
   performance implications of external security practices, the
   dependencies between other security services and time
   synchronization.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-=
03


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From talmi@marvell.com  Fri Sep 14 06:55:17 2012
Return-Path: <talmi@marvell.com>
X-Original-To: tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAA3821F84F9 for <tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 14 Sep 2012 06:55:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.598
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.598 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bckpM78qCR1m for <tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 14 Sep 2012 06:55:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from galiil.marvell.com (galiil.marvell.com [199.203.130.254]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1438B21F84F6 for <tictoc@ietf.org>; Fri, 14 Sep 2012 06:55:17 -0700 (PDT)
From: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>
To: "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2012 16:55:12 +0300
Thread-Topic: TICTOC Security Requirements - Draft 03 Posted
Thread-Index: Ac2SgEqbf4wCD1PoT3elNcCZOTJ5dA==
Message-ID: <74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8ACCB0F@IL-MB01.marvell.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8ACCB0FILMB01marve_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: [TICTOC] TICTOC Security Requirements - Draft 03 Posted
X-BeenThere: tictoc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Timing over IP Connection and Transfer of Clock BOF <tictoc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tictoc>, <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tictoc>
List-Post: <mailto:tictoc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tictoc>, <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2012 13:55:18 -0000

--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8ACCB0FILMB01marve_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi,

I have posted draft 03, which addresses all the comments WRT draft 02.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-security-requirements-03

Regards,
Tal.


--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8ACCB0FILMB01marve_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=
=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"><meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Micros=
oft Word 14 (filtered medium)"><style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0in;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
@page WordSection1
	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.25in 1.0in 1.25in;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi,<o:p></o:p></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I have pos=
ted draft 03, which addresses all the comments WRT draft 02.<o:p></o:p></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ticto=
c-security-requirements-03">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tictoc-se=
curity-requirements-03</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Regards,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Tal.<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></htm=
l>=

--_000_74470498B659FA4687F0B0018C19A89C01A0F8ACCB0FILMB01marve_--

From ldg004@earthlink.net  Thu Sep 27 17:26:50 2012
Return-Path: <ldg004@earthlink.net>
X-Original-To: tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57F0821F84FA for <tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 27 Sep 2012 17:26:50 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xj9wfeaweQlr for <tictoc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 27 Sep 2012 17:26:49 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from elasmtp-junco.atl.sa.earthlink.net (elasmtp-junco.atl.sa.earthlink.net [209.86.89.63]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A853721F84CE for <tictoc@ietf.org>; Thu, 27 Sep 2012 17:26:49 -0700 (PDT)
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=dk20050327; d=earthlink.net; b=AF/LOWeJqRuryoivfhOhefC/KWctMnTGwbEa738g3eHj4+SGxUF4ar+KL9Q8WIUQ; h=Received:Message-ID:Date:From:User-Agent:MIME-Version:To:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:X-Forwarded-Message-Id:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:X-ELNK-Trace:X-Originating-IP;
Received: from [96.233.42.129] (helo=[192.168.1.3]) by elasmtp-junco.atl.sa.earthlink.net with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.67) (envelope-from <ldg004@earthlink.net>) id 1THOPo-0001uL-Nc for tictoc@ietf.org; Thu, 27 Sep 2012 20:26:48 -0400
Message-ID: <5064EEAB.2030704@earthlink.net>
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2012 20:26:19 -0400
From: Dan Grossman <ldg004@earthlink.net>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:15.0) Gecko/20120907 Thunderbird/15.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
References: <5064C962.3070004@earthlink.net>
In-Reply-To: <5064C962.3070004@earthlink.net>
X-Forwarded-Message-Id: <5064C962.3070004@earthlink.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-ELNK-Trace: 5fd9b736a583489594f5150ab1c16ac0485087bba56e6009ace03cf1e9b5aaa0a651a7dcc2f66992350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c
X-Originating-IP: 96.233.42.129
Subject: [TICTOC] Security Draft -03
X-BeenThere: tictoc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Timing over IP Connection and Transfer of Clock BOF <tictoc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tictoc>, <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tictoc>
List-Post: <mailto:tictoc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tictoc>, <mailto:tictoc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2012 00:26:50 -0000

Tal,
Looks much better.  Some specific suggestions:

3.1 There is a third category of attacker:  one who attacks a clock
device, rather than the protocol.   I would think that this should be
included for completeness, but taken out of scope.  Thus:
--
3.1.3 Protocol vs Device Attackers
MITM and Packet Injection attacks exploit vulnerabilities in time
synchronization protocols and the underlying network(s) that support them.

A separate category of attacks exploits vulnerabilities in devices; for
example, by installing malware, obtaining credentials to reconfigure the
device, or stealing encryption keys in order to enable insider attacks.
Requirements for securing against device attacks are outside the scope
of this memo, except to the extent that they enable Insider attacks.
--
Alternatively, we could create a requirement later on that requires
"good hygiene" to prevent these kinds of attacks.

Global change: "attackee" to "victim" (or "intended victim"). "Attackee"
doesn't seem to be in the dictionary.

4.1 Discussion, 4.1.1:  clarification needed.  Is the intent of 4.1 that
authentication covers both identification AND authorization, or that is
covers identification OR authorization?  If the latter, does 4.1.1 imply
that the slaves can authenticate the identity but not the authorization
of the master?  And if the former, the words are misleading.   If what
is intended is what I think is intended, then here are some improved words:

"

    In the context of this document, authentication refers to both:

    o Identification: verifying the identity of the peer clock; and,
"

" 4.1.1 Authentication of Masters


Requirement

    The security mechanism MUST support an authentication mechanism,
    allowing slave clocks to authenticate the identity and authorization of master clocks.

"

4.2 change "WHO" to "which device" ("who" implies a person).

4.2.1.2 Change "It should be noted that this approach is more difficult
to implement than the hop-by-hop approach, as it requires separate
layers of protection for the correctionField and for the rest of the
packet, using different cryptographic mechanisms and keys." to "It
should be noted that this approach is more difficult to implement than
the hop-by-hop approach, as it requires  the correctionField to be
protected separately from the other fields of the  packet, possibly
using different cryptographic mechanisms and keys."  How much benefit
would you get from using different mechanisms and keys?

4.5.1 Change "cryptographich" to "cryptographic" (typo)

4.5.3 Change "The association protocol MUST be invoked periodically,
where each instance of the association protocol MUST produce a different
session key." to "The association protocol MUST be periodically invoked
to produce a fresh session key."

While on this subject... shouldn't it be possible to revoke or force
refresh session keys if a compromise is detected?

4.7 If traffic analysis attacks were a concern, there certainly are
mechanisms (random padding of encrypted packets, random dummy packets)
to protect against them.  Is the point here that traffic analysis
attacks are not a consideration?

6.3 Change "that are exposed to the security keys" to "that possess the
security keys".

7 Change "Although this is a cardinal element in any security system, it
is not a security requirement, and is thus not described here." to
"Although this is an essential element of any security system, it is
outside the scope of this document".

Thanks much for the credit!

Regards
Dan Grossman





