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Subject: [TLS] new draft "ECMQV Ciphersuites for TLS" for review
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Dear TLS Working Group:

I am co-author of a new draft "ECMQV Ciphersuites for TLS" 
        http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-dugal-tls-ecmqv-00.txt

This draft describes new ciphersuites and a client authentication mode for 
supporting 
Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone Key Agreement (ECMQV). ECMQV offers 
some 
additional security properties over Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). 

We are hopeful that this draft will be of interest to members of the 
working group. We 
would like to know if the TLS WG is interested in making this a WG work 
item.   If not, 
we are willing to see it progress as an individual submission.   We would 
appreciate 
the TLS WG review and comment.


Thanks,
Robert

-----------------------------------------------
Robert Dugal
Member of Development Group
Certicom Corp.
EMAIL: rdugal@certicom.com
PHONE: (905) 501-3848
FAX  : (905) 507-4230
WEBSITE: www.certicom.com
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<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Dear TLS Working Group:</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">I am co-author of a new draft &quot;ECMQV
Ciphersuites for TLS&quot; </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-dugal-tls-ecmqv-00.txt</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">This draft describes new ciphersuites
and a client authentication mode for supporting </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone Key
Agreement (ECMQV). ECMQV offers some </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">additional security properties over
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). </font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">We are hopeful that this draft will
be of interest to members of the working group. We </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">would like to know if the TLS WG is
interested in making this a WG work item. &nbsp; If not, </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">we are willing to see it progress as
an individual submission. &nbsp; We would appreciate </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">the TLS WG review and comment.</font>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Thanks,</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Robert</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif"><br>
-----------------------------------------------<br>
Robert Dugal<br>
Member of Development Group<br>
Certicom Corp.<br>
EMAIL: rdugal@certicom.com<br>
PHONE: (905) 501-3848<br>
FAX &nbsp;: (905) 507-4230<br>
WEBSITE: www.certicom.com</font>
--=_alternative 00485A6F85257125_=--


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_______________________________________________
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: The TLS Protocol
	Author(s)	: T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
	Filename	: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-00.txt
	Pages		: 112
	Date		: 2006-3-2
	
   This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security
   over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to
   communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, or message forgery.

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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Thu Mar 02 16:37:45 2006
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I just took a quick look at this draft:

> 	Title		: The TLS Protocol
> 	Author(s)	: T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
> 	Filename	: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-00.txt
> 	Pages		: 112
> 	Date		: 2006-3-2

It says:

>    This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
>    (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security
>    over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to
>    communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
>    tampering, or message forgery.

But later in the draft, it says:

   version
       The version of the protocol being employed. This document
-->    describes TLS Version 1.1, which uses the version { 3, 2 }. The
       version value 3.2 is historical: TLS version 1.1 is a minor
       modification to the TLS 1.0 protocol, which was itself a minor
       modification to the SSL 3.0 protocol, which bears the version
       value 3.0. (See Appendix A.1).

Pagination of this ID seems irregular.  See page 13, for example.
It contains only 3 lines, the first 3 lines of a paragraph, the rest of
which is on page 14.

This draft uses the ASCII FormFeed (FF) character as if it was an
end-of-line character.  Please change that so that the last line of a
page ends with the usual end-of-line character(s), and the FF character
begins the next line. Some printers & software only recognize the FF
character if it is the first character on a line, e.g. following an
end-of-line character.  So for maximum compatibility...

-- 
Nelson B

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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Fri Mar 03 18:35:33 2006
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To: nagendra@cs.stanford.edu
From: Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com>
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Hi Nagendra,

I have a few questions and thoughts on the TLS-CTR mode I-D:

On the IV construction:

I see that the nonce is 48 bits in length.  My recollection of David 
McGrew's analysis of CTR mode is that 64 bits of nonce would provide 
128-bit security (for a 128bit key and CTR mode).  My question is on 
the level of security 48-bit nonces provide.  I see that 3686 uses a 
32-bit nonce.  I am confused at what is the right length for the 
nonce.  Some discussion on that might be appropriate in the SEC 
considerations section.  Perhaps David might help clarify (I may have 
misread his paper).

On the block level counter, 3686 specifies a 32-bit counter citing 
IPv6 Jumbograms' requirement.  SRTP makes a note that for multimedia 
apps, that might be safely ignored.  Could you also make a similar 
note in this document, or perhaps you might also want to support 
jumbograms?  (Perhaps IPv6 historians might tell us whether there are 
practical uses for jumbograms).

I don't think it is sufficient to refer to 3686's security 
considerations.  Those notes are written for a different protocol and 
context.  Perhaps you might copy and paste from there and edit the 
text, if you want to reuse text.

best,
Lakshminath

At 03:50 PM 2/28/2006, you wrote:
>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
>directories.
>This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working 
>Group of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : AES Counter Mode Cipher Suites for TLS and DTLS
>         Author(s)       : N. Modadugu, E. Rescorla
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00.txt
>         Pages           : 9
>         Date            : 2006-2-28
>
>    This document describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard
>    (AES) Counter Mode for use as a Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
>    Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) confidentiality mechanism.
>
>A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00.txt
>
>To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to
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>
>
>Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
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>type "cd internet-drafts" and then
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>
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>
>
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>
>Send a message to:
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>
>NOTE:   The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
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>         feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
>         command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
>         a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
>         exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
>         "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
>         up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
>         how to manipulate these messages.
>
>
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>
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>_______________________________________________
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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
To: tls@lists.ietf.org
Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 09:55:39 +0100
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Subject: [TLS] some more questions and comments on draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00.txt
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On Wed 01 Mar 2006 00:50, Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:

Hello,
 I've read the CTR draft and I have some questions on it, phrased below.
I'm not familiar with the counter mode and attacks on it, thus my 
questions are based on facts that were not clear while reading the 
document and after having read rfc3686 (which was mandatory for
me to read to understand the CTR draft).

1. What is the size of IV generated after the ciphersuite is generated? 
128 bits? In that case why not generate only 48 bits if the rest of the
bits are not used?

2. What is the purpose of having the blk_ctr and the seq_num used in the 
counter and reinitialized for every record packet? What do they protect
from?

3. What is the rationale behind constructing a counter block in the
given way? Why not use the full 128 bit IV? 

4. terminology: sometimes different than rfc2246. Say the abreviations 
PT block and CT block are never used in rfc2246. Also "nonce" could be
"random bytes" to match rfc2246.

5. At par 3.1.1. It says "A given counter block MUST never be
 used more than once with the same key.". But this is not up
 to the implementation to choose, thus must instead of MUST
 may be more appropriate.

6. Same paragraph: It gives a brief description of CTR, but I think
it can be confusing to somebody who doesn't know CTR. It says
"Each PT block is XORed with a block of the key stream to generate the
   ciphertext, CT.  The AES encryption of each counter block results in
   128 bits of key stream."
but nowhere before it was mentioned that CTR mode is supposed to 
generate a key stream.

regards,
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos

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Thread-Topic: Review of draft-modadugu-dtls-short-00
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From: "Dondeti, Lakshminath" <ldondeti@qualcomm.com>
To: <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu>
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Subject: [TLS] Review of draft-modadugu-dtls-short-00
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Hi Nagendra,

I didn't understand a few things in the DTLS-SHORT spec., and have some =
questions for my clarification.

* Length field:

>From the description, negotiating the length field is clear, but not how =
it affects the Record format.  Is the field completely eliminated and if =
so is an application layer length field assumed to be reused with the =
encoding specified?  Reusing another SEQ number might be ok, but I am =
not sure whether the specified encoding can always be imposed on the =
said SEQ number.  Any insight into this would be helpful.

* Length field verification:

Are you suggesting that a receiver try various guesses on the SEQ number =
and try them out with MAC verification?  Do you plan to specify any =
limitations on the number of attempts?

* Frequency of change cipher spec:

Ok, before I go into this, I am confused about the mapping between 2B =
epoch + 6B SEQ in DTLS vs. the various possible combinations of lengths =
for epoch and SEQ numbers in the table in DTLS-SHORT and the note =
"without shortening the actual sequence number."  Perhaps I am just =
dense, an explanation will help.

If in fact the shorter epoch, SEQ combinations are going to be used, =
does it mean there is a ChangeCipherSpec every 2^14 records in the =
smallest epoch+SEQ number case?

* Version field:

I have a naive question here (perhaps all of these are naive).  If the =
version field is indeed "mostly redundant" why not just remove it from =
the main DTLS spec?  Perhaps that field is in there for DTLS is TLS =
look-alike reasons?

* Length field:

Is the length field redundant because it can be calculated from length =
fields from elsewhere in a UDP packet, as long as there is only one =
record per fragment?

* implicit header (IH):

The list of fields to be excluded does not inlcude the epoch field.  =
Please explain.

If the SEQ and/or epoch fields are not included, could you explain how =
to maintain those in the presence/absence of application layer (e.g., =
RTP) numbers.

* Order of DTLS header fields in Section 6 (probably just editorial):

I am confused by the order of fields in Section 6 and its impact on the =
processing steps.

The original order of DTLS fields is as follows:

        ContentType type;
        ProtocolVersion version;
        uint16 epoch;               // New field
        uint48 sequence_number;       // New field
        uint16 length;

The order in Section 6 is as follows:

      Content type
      Version
      Length
      Sequence Number

Why is the order changed?

Perhaps it is an error?   It's probably just editorial as I can't think =
of any impact on processing steps as we are dealing with fixed headers.

* IH processing:

"The initial value of ESN (the expected sequence number) is set to 1 + =
(sequence number of the Finished message record), which should be the =
sequence number of the first application data record."

Why "first"?  Can there be more than one record in the packet?

* Trial decryption process:

Bear with me as I walk through the record receipt processing.  I see =
three cases: a record with
  Case 1) excluded the DTLS header, but encrypted from the beginning of =
the application layer header, or
  Case 2) a full DTLS header, or=20
  Case 3) excluded DTLS header and unencrypted application layer header =
(e.g., RTP, RTCP, or it could be anything really).

Case 3 could be interesting as I wonder whether there are any collisions =
between the DTLS header and another application layer header.  Another =
thing that comes to my mind is that there is no reason to stop a future =
application to come up with a payload structure that matches the above.  =
Perhaps it doesn't matter (I haven't worked through the possibilities in =
my mind), or to make things simple, DTLS-SHORT can be ruled out for such =
an application.

Dealing with cases 1 and 2 only, the receiver could try to parse the =
first 13 bytes as a DTLS header:

If the type matches allowed ContentTypes, it can sanity check the =
version, sequence number and length (just in case encrypted text matches =
the type field or something), decrypt using the sequence number as the =
IV (assuming counter mode), verify the MAC and if all is well pass the =
record up to the next layer.

If that fails, the receiver might try to parse the record as an RTP =
header (or other APP-Layer header); in case of RTP, it can extract the =
RTP-SEQ number from there, figure out the IV, verify the MAC and if all =
goes well, accept the record.  One corner case here is a burst loss of =
2^16 or so records and that makes things slightly interesting.  I'd =
assume a few guesses on the IV (e.g., IV =3D higherOrderBits||RTP-SEQ, =
higherOrderBits+1||RTP-SEQ) could be tried.

If those two steps fail, another short cut might be to have a local =
policy that for a given DTLS connection, the record MUST contain either =
a DTLS header or a known APP-Layer header.  That might allow the =
receiver to simply discard the packet without any further processing.

Without such policy-based processing, an adversary may simply put random =
bits at the beginning of the record to confuse the receiver.  The =
concept of trying all sequence numbers based on a replay window might be =
very expensive.  First, that could mean generating as many keystreams as =
the length of the replay window, and second, even that might not be =
sufficient if you want to consider the possibility of records to the =
right side of the replay window.  Wouldn't it be a lot of processing =
without a definitive result?  In other words, if an application layer =
sequence number (a la RTP) is not present, is it possible that receivers =
might discard perfectly legitimate packets (assuming an adversary drops =
or a burst length -- L =3D replay window size -- packets) until one with =
an explicit DTLS header arrives?

I guess I would conclude that the encrypted MAC semantics of TLS/DTLS =
makes this difficult for the generic case.  Have you considered defining =
an extension to change that?

Editorial: Step 5 in the processing steps in the I-D needs =
clarification.  Why "prepend" an application_data header with a sequence =
number?  What does that mean?  That's not how the sender prepares the =
record.

Thanks in advance for your response.

best regards,
Lakshminath

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Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"><HTML =
DIR=3Dltr><HEAD><META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1"></HEAD><BODY><DIV><FONT color=3D#000000 > =
<!--StartFragment -->Hi Nagendra,<BR><BR>I didn't =0A=
understand a few things in the DTLS-SHORT spec., and have some questions =
for my =0A=
clarification.<BR><BR>* Length field:<BR><BR>From the description, =
negotiating =0A=
the length field is clear, but not how it affects the Record =
format.&nbsp; Is =0A=
the field completely eliminated and if so is an application layer length =
field =0A=
assumed to be reused with the encoding specified?&nbsp; Reusing another =
SEQ =0A=
number might be ok, but I am not sure whether the specified encoding can =
always =0A=
be imposed on the said SEQ number.&nbsp; Any insight into this would be =0A=
helpful.<BR><BR>* Length field verification:<BR><BR>Are you suggesting =
that a =0A=
receiver try various guesses on the SEQ number and try them out with MAC =0A=
verification?&nbsp; Do you plan to specify any limitations on the number =
of =0A=
attempts?<BR><BR>* Frequency of change cipher spec:<BR><BR>Ok, before I =
go into =0A=
this, I am confused about the mapping between 2B epoch + 6B SEQ in DTLS =
vs. the =0A=
various possible combinations of lengths for epoch and SEQ numbers in =
the table =0A=
in DTLS-SHORT and the note "without shortening the actual sequence =0A=
number."&nbsp; Perhaps I am just dense, an explanation will =
help.<BR><BR>If in =0A=
fact the shorter epoch, SEQ combinations are going to be used, does it =
mean =0A=
there is a ChangeCipherSpec every 2^14 records in the smallest epoch+SEQ =
number =0A=
case?<BR><BR>* Version field:<BR><BR>I have a naive question here =
(perhaps all =0A=
of these are naive).&nbsp; If the version field is indeed "mostly =
redundant" why =0A=
not just remove it from the main DTLS spec?&nbsp; Perhaps that field is =
in there =0A=
for DTLS is TLS look-alike reasons?<BR><BR>* Length field:<BR><BR>Is the =
length =0A=
field redundant because it can be calculated from length fields from =
elsewhere =0A=
in a UDP packet, as long as there is only one record per =
fragment?<BR><BR>* =0A=
implicit header (IH):<BR><BR>The list of fields to be excluded does not =
inlcude =0A=
the epoch field.&nbsp; Please explain.<BR><BR>If the SEQ and/or epoch =
fields are =0A=
not included, could you explain how to maintain those in the =
presence/absence of =0A=
application layer (e.g., RTP) numbers.<BR><BR>* Order of DTLS header =
fields in =0A=
Section 6 (probably just editorial):<BR><BR>I am confused by the order =
of fields =0A=
in Section 6 and its impact on the processing steps.<BR><BR>The original =
order =0A=
of DTLS fields is as =
follows:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =0A=
ContentType type;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
ProtocolVersion =0A=
version;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; uint16 =0A=
epoch;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =0A=
// New field<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; uint48 =0A=
sequence_number;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; // New =0A=
field<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; uint16 =
length;<BR><BR>The =0A=
order in Section 6 is as follows:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
Content =0A=
type<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
Version<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =0A=
Length<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Sequence Number<BR><BR>Why is =
the order =0A=
changed?<BR><BR>Perhaps it is an error?&nbsp;&nbsp; It's probably just =
editorial =0A=
as I can't think of any impact on processing steps as we are dealing =
with fixed =0A=
headers.<BR><BR>* IH processing:<BR><BR>"The initial value of ESN (the =
expected =0A=
sequence number) is set to 1 + (sequence number of the Finished message =
record), =0A=
which should be the sequence number of the first application data =0A=
record."<BR><BR>Why "first"?&nbsp; Can there be more than one record in =
the =0A=
packet?<BR><BR>* Trial decryption process:<BR><BR>Bear with me as I walk =
through =0A=
the record receipt processing.&nbsp; I see three cases: a record =
with<BR>&nbsp; =0A=
Case 1) excluded the DTLS header, but encrypted from the beginning of =
the =0A=
application layer header, or<BR>&nbsp; Case 2) a full DTLS header, or =
<BR>&nbsp; =0A=
Case 3) excluded DTLS header and unencrypted application layer header =
(e.g., =0A=
RTP, RTCP, or it could be anything really).<BR><BR>Case 3 could be =
interesting =0A=
as I wonder whether there are any collisions between the DTLS header and =
another =0A=
application layer header.&nbsp; Another thing that comes to my mind is =
that =0A=
there is no reason to stop a future application to come up with a =
payload =0A=
structure that matches the above.&nbsp; Perhaps it doesn't matter (I =
haven't =0A=
worked through the possibilities in my mind), or to make things simple, =0A=
DTLS-SHORT can be ruled out for such an application.<BR><BR>Dealing with =
cases 1 =0A=
and 2 only, the receiver could try to parse the first 13 bytes as a DTLS =0A=
header:<BR><BR>If the type matches allowed ContentTypes, it can sanity =
check the =0A=
version, sequence number and length (just in case encrypted text matches =
the =0A=
type field or something), decrypt using the sequence number as the IV =
(assuming =0A=
counter mode), verify the MAC and if all is well pass the record up to =
the next =0A=
layer.<BR><BR>If that fails, the receiver might try to parse the record =
as an =0A=
RTP header (or other APP-Layer header); in case of RTP, it can extract =
the =0A=
RTP-SEQ number from there, figure out the IV, verify the MAC and if all =
goes =0A=
well, accept the record.&nbsp; One corner case here is a burst loss of =
2^16 or =0A=
so records and that makes things slightly interesting.&nbsp; I'd assume =
a few =0A=
guesses on the IV (e.g., IV =3D higherOrderBits||RTP-SEQ, =0A=
higherOrderBits+1||RTP-SEQ) could be tried.<BR><BR>If those two steps =
fail, =0A=
another short cut might be to have a local policy that for a given DTLS =0A=
connection, the record MUST contain either a DTLS header or a known =
APP-Layer =0A=
header.&nbsp; That might allow the receiver to simply discard the packet =
without =0A=
any further processing.<BR><BR>Without such policy-based processing, an =0A=
adversary may simply put random bits at the beginning of the record to =
confuse =0A=
the receiver.&nbsp; The concept of trying all sequence numbers based on =
a replay =0A=
window might be very expensive.&nbsp; First, that could mean generating =
as many =0A=
keystreams as the length of the replay window, and second, even that =
might not =0A=
be sufficient if you want to consider the possibility of records to the =
right =0A=
side of the replay window.&nbsp; Wouldn't it be a lot of processing =
without a =0A=
definitive result?&nbsp; In other words, if an application layer =
sequence number =0A=
(a la RTP) is not present, is it possible that receivers might discard =
perfectly =0A=
legitimate packets (assuming an adversary drops or a burst length -- L =
=3D replay =0A=
window size -- packets) until one with an explicit DTLS header =
arrives?<BR><BR>I =0A=
guess I would conclude that the encrypted MAC semantics of TLS/DTLS =
makes this =0A=
difficult for the generic case.&nbsp; Have you considered defining an =
extension =0A=
to change that?<BR><BR>Editorial: Step 5 in the processing steps in the =
I-D =0A=
needs clarification.&nbsp; Why "prepend" an application_data header with =
a =0A=
sequence number?&nbsp; What does that mean?&nbsp; That's not how the =
sender =0A=
prepares the record.<BR><BR>Thanks in advance for your =
response.<BR><BR>best =0A=
regards,<BR>Lakshminath</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>
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1. It would be nice somewhere around sections 1-2 to have an overview
of the inputs to ECMQV. In particular, the requirement for 
the client to have two key pairs--one of which is always
ephemeral--is sufficiently different from classic DH that
it makes sense to review here.

As usual, it would be nice to have some kind of ladder diagram
that summarizes the exchanges at an abstract level.


S 3.
As a practical matter, how likely is it that client and server
will share a group?

S 4.1.
What about DSA-signed certificates?

S 4.2.
As I understand this scheme, the ECMQV-capable ECDSA key in
the certificate is used to sign the server's ephemeral
ECMQV key. Unless I'm missing something, there's no security
reason why the server's static key needs to be an EC key
at all. It could just as well be an RSA key. True, the
server needs to communicate the group that the ephemeral
key is generated in but that could be sent in the ServerKeyExchange,
as in TLS/ECC. Have I missed something?

You write:

   The client retrieves the server's ephemeral ECMQV public key from the
   ServerKeyExchange message.

Probably worth mentioning that it needs to verify the SKE.


S 4.6.
Nit:    "demonstrate it's control". Should be "its"
Same error in 4.7.
















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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Tue Mar 07 23:27:22 2006
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Subject: [TLS] Improving Bulk data transfer phase in TLS protocol,
	codes needed.
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--===============1426788407==
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	boundary="----=_Part_13114_21808986.1141792034319"

------=_Part_13114_21808986.1141792034319
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Dear TLS working group,
My name is Aidros doing Master study in University Putra Malaysia in SSL
Development.
I'm glad to participate and share knowledge with you. This is the firs
participation.
My project is to Improve Bulk data transfer phase performance (Record Layer=
)
using Parallelism (reducing the processing time).
Unfortunately, Most of developing researchers focusing on Handshake phase
improvement without touching data transfer phase.

Bulk data procedure after fragmentation:
1. Hashing the data using HMAC to calculate MAC value.
2. Encrypting the data plus the MAC value.

To simulate this process I would like to get:
the HMAC code followed by Encryption code,  i mean:
the code has three inputs: MAC key, Encryption key, IV if necessary and
Data.
the one output : (MAC and Data) encrypted and time if available.
I search already in openssl-0.9.7i, but the Encryption, hashing and HMAC
codes are all separated.
I hope you help me how to find this combination code at least you give me
anyone contact for this matter.
Crypto algorithm preferred: AES or RC4 for Encryption, MD5 or SH1 for HMAC.


Thanks for your anticipation help.
we keep in touch.

------=_Part_13114_21808986.1141792034319
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: inline

Dear TLS working group,<br>
My name is Aidros doing Master study in University Putra Malaysia in SSL De=
velopment.<br>
I'm glad to participate and share knowledge with you. This is the firs part=
icipation.<br>
My project is to Improve Bulk data transfer phase performance (Record Layer=
) using Parallelism (reducing the processing time).<br>
Unfortunately, Most of developing researchers focusing on Handshake phase i=
mprovement without touching data transfer phase.<br>
<br>
Bulk data procedure after fragmentation:<br>
1. Hashing the data using HMAC to calculate MAC value.<br>
2. Encrypting the data plus the MAC value.<br>
<br>
To simulate this process I would like to get:<br>
the HMAC code followed by Encryption code,&nbsp; i mean:<br>
the code has three inputs: MAC key, Encryption key, IV if necessary and Dat=
a.<br>
the one output : (MAC and Data) encrypted and time if available.<br>
I search already in openssl-0.9.7i, but the Encryption, hashing and HMAC co=
des are all separated. <br>
I hope you help me how to find this combination code at least you give me a=
nyone contact for this matter.<br>
Crypto algorithm preferred: AES or RC4 for Encryption, MD5 or SH1 for HMAC.=
<br>
<br>
<br>
Thanks for your anticipation help.<br>
we keep in touch. <br>
<br>

------=_Part_13114_21808986.1141792034319--


--===============1426788407==
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_______________________________________________
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--===============1426788407==--




From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Wed Mar 08 20:49:00 2006
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Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2006 17:48:55 -0800
From: Vipul Gupta <Vipul.Gupta@sun.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-dugal-tls-ecmqv-00
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I'm confused by this part of Section 4.6 which reads

" ... demonstrate it's control over the private half of the  
*certified* ECMQV
    public key"

because Section 4.5 appears to allow a case where the client has no
certified ECMQV key

  "If the client has sent a certificate with an MQV key, ecmqv_ephemeral
    will contain the client's ephemeral public key for the MQV  
operation;
    ***otherwise ecmqv_ephemeral will contain an ephemeral public key  
that
    is used as the ephemeral public key for the MQV operation and ecmqv
    will contain a second ECMQV public key which takes the place of the
    certified key***"

What am I missing?

vipul


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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Fri Mar 10 09:45:21 2006
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-dugal-tls-ecmqv-00
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Section 4.6 only applies when the client has a suitable
certificate. In 4.5, the situation when the client cannot produce
a suitable certificate is similar to ECHDE except 2 emphemeral
keys are provided.

Does this improve 4.5:

   Actions of the sender:

      ecqmv_ephemeral MUST contain an ephemeral ECMQV public key.

      If the client has not sent a certificate with an
      ECMQV-capable key, then ecmqv MUST contain a second
      ephemeral ECMQV public key.

On Wed, Mar 08, 2006 at 05:48:55PM -0800, Vipul Gupta wrote:

> I'm confused by this part of Section 4.6 which reads
>
> " ... demonstrate it's control over the private half of the
> *certified* ECMQV public key"
>
> because Section 4.5 appears to allow a case where the client
> has no certified ECMQV key
>
>  "If the client has sent a certificate with an MQV key,
> ecmqv_ephemeral will contain the client's ephemeral public
> key for the MQV operation; ***otherwise ecmqv_ephemeral will
> contain an ephemeral public key that is used as the ephemeral
> public key for the MQV operation and ecmqv will contain a
> second ECMQV public key which takes the place of the certified
> key***"
>
> What am I missing?

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Time	Speaker			Topic
10	EKR			Agenda Bash
15	Brian Minard		draft-dugal-tls-ecmqv-00 
15	Nagendra Modadugu	draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00 
60	EKR			draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346bis-00	

If anyone else wants some time, please let me know.

-Ekr

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Subject: [TLS] Client based approval of multihop TLS in RTSP 2.0
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Hi,

RTSP 2.0 (real-time streaming protocol) draft proposed what I think is a 
quite novel idea of allowing the usage of TLS despite the need for 
proxying the connection. This allows the user to receive and approve the 
certificate of the next hop TLS connection the proxy is establishing on 
behalf of the client. Of course this requires trust in the proxy, but 
seems to be applicable in a number of environments, where the only 
alternative may be to not use TLS at all. For example through company 
firewalls that require auditing.

To help ensuring the correct specification and that we haven't created 
any security holes beyond the one of the trust model we desire your 
review of this proposal. It is documented in section 18.3 of the 
following draft, but please look at 18.2 also:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-mmusic-rfc2326bis-12.txt

All type of feedback is appreciated.

Thanks

Magnus Westerlund

Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVA/A
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone +46 8 4048287
Torshamsgatan 23           | Fax   +46 8 7575550
S-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden | mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com

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From: Brad Hards <bradh@frogmouth.net>
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Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 19:16:17 +1100
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Subject: [TLS] suggested changes for rfc4346-bis-00
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G'day all,

These are mostly editorial. Happy to discuss any that aren't obvious.

Brad


=2D-- draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-00.orig  2006-03-16 21:19:19.000000000 +11=
00
+++ draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-00.txt   2006-03-16 21:56:08.000000000 +1100
@@ -224,11 +224,11 @@

    One advantage of TLS is that it is application protocol independent.
    Higher level protocols can layer on top of the TLS Protocol
=2D   transparently. The TLS standard, however, does not specify how
+   transparently. However the TLS standard does not specify how
    protocols add security with TLS; the decisions on how to initiate TLS
    handshaking and how to interpret the authentication certificates
    exchanged are left up to the judgment of the designers and
=2D   implementors of protocols which run on top of TLS.
+   implementors of the protocols which run on top of TLS.

 1.1 Differences from TLS 1.1
    This document is a revision of the TLS 1.1 [TLS1.1] protocol which
@@ -290,10 +290,10 @@
    between this protocol and SSL 3.0 are not dramatic, but they are
    significant enough that the various versions of TLS and SSL 3.0 do
    not interoperate (although each protocol incorporates a mechanism by
=2D   which an implementation can back down prior versions. This document
+   which an implementation can back down to prior versions). This document
    is intended primarily for readers who will be implementing the
    protocol and those doing cryptographic analysis of it. The
=2D   specification has been written with this in mind, and it is intended
+   specification has been written with these users in mind, and it is=20
intended
    to reflect the needs of those two groups. For that reason, many of
    the algorithm-dependent data structures and rules are included in the
    body of the text (as opposed to in an appendix), providing easier
@@ -307,12 +307,12 @@
 4. Presentation language

    This document deals with the formatting of data in an external
=2D   representation. The following very basic and somewhat casually
=2D   defined presentation syntax will be used. The syntax draws from
=2D   several sources in its structure. Although it resembles the
+   representation. This section presents the very basic and somewhat casua=
lly
+   defined presentation syntax which will be used. The syntax draws from
+   several sources in its structure. Note that although it resembles the
    programming language "C" in its syntax and XDR [XDR] in both its
    syntax and intent, it would be risky to draw too many parallels. The
=2D   purpose of this presentation language is to document TLS only, not to
+   purpose of this presentation syntax is to document TLS only, not to
    have general application beyond that particular goal.


@@ -951,11 +951,7 @@

    version
        The version of the protocol being employed. This document
=2D       describes TLS Version 1.1, which uses the version { 3, 2 }. The
=2D       version value 3.2 is historical: TLS version 1.1 is a minor
=2D       modification to the TLS 1.0 protocol, which was itself a minor
=2D       modification to the SSL 3.0 protocol, which bears the version
=2D       value 3.0. (See Appendix A.1).
+       describes TLS Version 1.2, which uses the version { 3, 3 }.

    length
        The length (in bytes) of the following TLSPlaintext.fragment.
@@ -1110,8 +1106,8 @@
    The MAC is generated as described in Section 6.2.3.1.

    IV
=2D       Unlike previous versions of SSL and TLS, TLS 1.1 uses an explicit
=2D       IV in order to prevent the attacks described by [CBCATT].
+       As of TLS 1.1, an explicit IV is used in order to prevent
+       the attacks described by [CBCATT].
        We recommend the following equivalently strong procedures.
        For clarity we use the following notation.

@@ -1122,7 +1118,7 @@
            plaintext prior to encryption of the first cipher block
            of the record.

=2D       In prior versions of TLS, there was no IV field and the CBC resid=
ue
+       For TLS before version 1.1, there was no IV field and the CBC resid=
ue
        and mask were one and the same. See Sections 6.1, 6.2.3.2 and 6.3,
        of [TLS1.0] for details of TLS 1.0 IV handling.

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Subject: [TLS] Re: Review of draft-modadugu-dtls-short-00
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Hi Lakshminath,

Thanks for your review and apologies for the delay in 
responding.  My comments inline:

> I didn't understand a few things in the DTLS-SHORT spec., and have some questions for my clarification.
> 
> * Length field:
> 
> From the description, negotiating the length field is clear, but not
> how it affects the Record format.  Is the field completely eliminated
> and if so is an application layer length field assumed to be reused
> with the encoding specified?  Reusing another SEQ number might be ok,
> but I am not sure whether the specified encoding can always be imposed
> on the said SEQ number.  Any insight into this would be helpful.

When the length field is completely eliminated, only one record is
transmitted per UDP packet -- the record length is then inferred
from the UDP packet length.

> * Length field verification:
> 
>  Are you suggesting that a receiver try various guesses on the SEQ
>  number and try them out with MAC verification?  Do you plan to specify
> any limitations on the number of attempts?

Yes, that's the idea.  We should have a limit (to the end of the replay window?)
but haven't entirely worked through that yet.  Any ideas would be welcome.

> * Frequency of change cipher spec:
>  Ok, before I go into this, I am confused about the mapping between 2B
> epoch + 6B SEQ in DTLS vs. the various possible combinations of
> lengths for epoch and SEQ numbers in the table in DTLS-SHORT and the
> note "without shortening the actual sequence number."  Perhaps I am
> just dense, an explanation will help.
>
> If in fact the shorter epoch, SEQ combinations are going to be used,
> does it mean there is a ChangeCipherSpec every 2^14 records in the
> smallest epoch+SEQ number case?

I'll add some text to the document to elaborate on this point.  It's
only the 'on-the-wire' representation that is shortened -- the sequence
number range is not reduced compared to DTLS.

> * Version field:
> 
> I have a naive question here (perhaps all of these are naive).  If the
> version field is indeed "mostly redundant" why not just remove it from
> the main DTLS spec?  Perhaps that field is in there for DTLS is TLS
> look-alike reasons?

Precisely.  We didn't want to make changes that were not necessary.

> * Length field:
> 
> Is the length field redundant because it can be calculated from length
> fields from elsewhere in a UDP packet, as long as there is only one
> record per fragment?

Yes.

> * implicit header (IH):
> 
> The list of fields to be excluded does not inlcude the epoch field.
> Please explain.

Writer error.

> If the SEQ and/or epoch fields are not included, could you explain how
> to maintain those in the presence/absence of application layer (e.g.,
> RTP) numbers.

Without:
If there's no packet loss or reordering you can just use a simple
counter of packets.  If you get a packet that doesn't make sense,
you search around the expected sequence number until you get
something that does decrypt/verify properly and then you update
your "next" estimator.

With:
The application code can give a "hint" about the offset between
the application sequence # and the DTLS sequence number.  Then
you just use the procedure above.  That make sense?

> * Order of DTLS header fields in Section 6 (probably just editorial):
> 
> I am confused by the order of fields in Section 6 and its impact on
> the processing steps.
> 
> The original order of DTLS fields is as follows:
> 
>         ContentType type;
>         ProtocolVersion version;
>         uint16 epoch;               // New field
>         uint48 sequence_number;       // New field
>         uint16 length;
> 
> The order in Section 6 is as follows:
> 
>       Content type
>       Version
>       Length
>       Sequence Number
> 
> Why is the order changed?
> 
> Perhaps it is an error?  It's probably just editorial as I can't think
> of any impact on processing steps as we are dealing with fixed
> headers.

Editorial error.

> * IH processing:
> 
> "The initial value of ESN (the expected sequence number) is set to 1 +
> (sequence number of the Finished message record), which should be the
> sequence number of the first application data record."
> 
> Why "first"?  Can there be more than one record in the packet?

The reference is to the first application record in the connection -- right
after the finished.

> * Trial decryption process:
> 
> Bear with me as I walk through the record receipt processing.  I see
> three cases: a record with Case 1) excluded the DTLS header, but
> encrypted from the beginning of the application layer header, or Case
> 2) a full DTLS header, or Case 3) excluded DTLS header and unencrypted
> application layer header (e.g., RTP, RTCP, or it could be anything
> really).

> Case 3 could be interesting as I wonder whether there are any
> collisions between the DTLS header and another application layer
> header.  Another thing that comes to my mind is that there is no
> reason to stop a future application to come up with a payload
> structure that matches the above.  Perhaps it doesn't matter (I
> haven't worked through the possibilities in my mind), or to make
> things simple, DTLS-SHORT can be ruled out for such an application.
>
>
> Dealing with cases 1 and 2 only, the receiver could try to parse the
> first 13 bytes as a DTLS header:
>  If the type matches allowed ContentTypes, it can sanity check the
> version, sequence number and length (just in case encrypted text
> matches the type field or something), decrypt using the sequence
> number as the IV (assuming counter mode), verify the MAC and if all is
> well pass the record up to the next layer.
>
> If that fails, the receiver might try to parse the record as an RTP
> header (or other APP-Layer header); in case of RTP, it can extract the
> RTP-SEQ number from there, figure out the IV, verify the MAC and if
> all goes well, accept the record.  One corner case here is a burst
> loss of 2^16 or so records and that makes things slightly interesting.
> I'd assume a few guesses on the IV (e.g., IV =
> higherOrderBits||RTP-SEQ, higherOrderBits+1||RTP-SEQ) could be tried.

> If those two steps fail, another short cut might be to have a local
> policy that for a given DTLS connection, the record MUST contain
> either a DTLS header or a known APP-Layer header.  That might allow
> the receiver to simply discard the packet without any further
> processing.

Sounds reasonable -- though as you point out, an application may already
know which kind of records are expected.

> Without such policy-based processing, an adversary may simply put
> random bits at the beginning of the record to confuse the receiver.
> The concept of trying all sequence numbers based on a replay window
> might be very expensive.  First, that could mean generating as many
> keystreams as the length of the replay window, and second, even that
> might not be sufficient if you want to consider the possibility of
> records to the right side of the replay window.  Wouldn't it be a lot
> of processing without a definitive result?  In other words, if an
> application layer sequence number (a la RTP) is not present, is it
> possible that receivers might discard perfectly legitimate packets
> (assuming an adversary drops or a burst length -- L = replay window
> size -- packets) until one with an explicit DTLS header arrives?

Yes, that could happen, but in general if you're seeing really large
amounts of packet loss, something pathological has happened in any case.

The bottom line here is that I'm not sure it's that important an attack.
Remember that you can generally force peers to chew up a lot of CPU in
lots of ways.  But, as you say, there are policies to defend against
this sort of thing.

> I guess I would conclude that the encrypted MAC semantics of TLS/DTLS
> makes this difficult for the generic case.  Have you considered
> defining an extension to change that?

HMAC-SHA1 is about the same speed as AES-CTR, so we're not looking
at that dramatic a speedup even with EtA.  I wouldn't think it's
worth the effort of changing.

> Editorial: Step 5 in the processing steps in the I-D needs
> clarification.  Why "prepend" an application_data header with a
> sequence number?  What does that mean?  That's not how the sender
> prepares the record.

Bad writing.  Parse this as "Prepend (an application_data header with
sequence number ESN) to the record."

Thanks,
nagendra


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From: nagendra modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu>
To: Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: Review (Re: [TLS] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00.txt)
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> I have a few questions and thoughts on the TLS-CTR mode I-D:
> 
> On the IV construction:
> 
> I see that the nonce is 48 bits in length.  My recollection of David
> McGrew's analysis of CTR mode is that 64 bits of nonce would provide
> 128-bit security (for a 128bit key and CTR mode).  My question is on
> the level of security 48-bit nonces provide.  I see that 3686 uses a
> 32-bit nonce.  I am confused at what is the right length for the
> nonce.  Some discussion on that might be appropriate in the SEC
> considerations section.  Perhaps David might help clarify (I may have
> misread his paper).

My understanding is that 32-bits of nonce are sufficient to accomodate
for pre-computation attacks on CTR mode.  Though, if there is a problem 
here, then it would apply equally to 3686.

> On the block level counter, 3686 specifies a 32-bit counter citing
> IPv6 Jumbograms' requirement.  SRTP makes a note that for multimedia
> apps, that might be safely ignored.  Could you also make a similar
> note in this document, or perhaps you might also want to support
> jumbograms?  (Perhaps IPv6 historians might tell us whether there are
> practical uses for jumbograms).

The limit on the counter here is to support a TLS record of 2^14 octets.

> I don't think it is sufficient to refer to 3686's security
> considerations.  Those notes are written for a different protocol and
> context.  Perhaps you might copy and paste from there and edit the
> text, if you want to reuse text.

Good point.  That's probably the right thing to do.

Thanks,
nagendra


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From: nagendra modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu>
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] some more questions and comments on
	draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00.txt
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Hi Nikos, sorry about the delay in responding.  My comments inline:

> 1. What is the size of IV generated after the ciphersuite is generated? 
> 128 bits? In that case why not generate only 48 bits if the rest of the
> bits are not used?

Good catch -- I'll clean up this text.

> 2. What is the purpose of having the blk_ctr and the seq_num used in the 
> counter and reinitialized for every record packet? What do they protect
> from?
> 
> 3. What is the rationale behind constructing a counter block in the
> given way? Why not use the full 128 bit IV? 

Agreed, there's nothing wrong with using the full 128-bit IV.  The current
design mimics counter block generation as described in 3686.  This design
also has the minor advantage that no additions are required in order to 
generate the counter block. 

> 4. terminology: sometimes different than rfc2246. Say the abreviations 
> PT block and CT block are never used in rfc2246. Also "nonce" could be
> "random bytes" to match rfc2246.

Is the current description unclear?  2246 doesn't need to use the same
shorthand for plain text and cipher text since ciphering transformations
are only described in prose.  I don't think nonce is used anywhere, or am
I missing something?

> 5. At par 3.1.1. It says "A given counter block MUST never be
>  used more than once with the same key.". But this is not up
>  to the implementation to choose, thus must instead of MUST
>  may be more appropriate.

The goal is to make it clear about the security requirements of
implementing CTR mode, and hence the corresponding requirement
on sequence number usage.  I'm happy to discuss further if
this is an issue.

> 6. Same paragraph: It gives a brief description of CTR, but I think
> it can be confusing to somebody who doesn't know CTR. It says
> "Each PT block is XORed with a block of the key stream to generate the
>    ciphertext, CT.  The AES encryption of each counter block results in
>    128 bits of key stream."
> but nowhere before it was mentioned that CTR mode is supposed to 
> generate a key stream.

I'll clarify in the introduction section.

Thanks,
nagendra


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From: "Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos" <nmav@gnutls.org>
To: "nagendra modadugu" <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu>
Subject: Re: [TLS] some more questions and comments on
	draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00.txt
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On 3/20/06, nagendra modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu> wrote:

Hello Nagendra,

> > 2. What is the purpose of having the blk_ctr and the seq_num used in th=
e
> > counter and reinitialized for every record packet? What do they protect
> > from?
> > 3. What is the rationale behind constructing a counter block in the
> > given way? Why not use the full 128 bit IV?
> Agreed, there's nothing wrong with using the full 128-bit IV.  The curren=
t
> design mimics counter block generation as described in 3686.  This design
> also has the minor advantage that no additions are required in order to
> generate the counter block.

Now that I think of it this construction seems to benefit unreliable
datagrams most
(thus maybe DTLS couldn't work without that, but I don't remember much of d=
tls).

I don't understand the no additions are required though. The additions
are required
anyway since the ctr_blk has to be increased for every block to be encrypte=
d.


> > 4. terminology: sometimes different than rfc2246. Say the abreviations
> > PT block and CT block are never used in rfc2246. Also "nonce" could be
> > "random bytes" to match rfc2246.
> Is the current description unclear?  2246 doesn't need to use the same
> shorthand for plain text and cipher text since ciphering transformations
> are only described in prose.  I don't think nonce is used anywhere, or am
> I missing something?

It might be not that important but the fact that you used nonce
instead of random
bytes it initially made me think that you wanted to distinguish them
with the nonces
used in TLS (say for IV) that are referred to as random bytes.

I also wasn't that familiar with the PT and CT blocks. It might be
better if they are
properly spelled. It is nitpicking but I noticed this stuff on my first rea=
d.


> > 5. At par 3.1.1. It says "A given counter block MUST never be
> >  used more than once with the same key.". But this is not up
> >  to the implementation to choose, thus must instead of MUST
> >  may be more appropriate.
> The goal is to make it clear about the security requirements of
> implementing CTR mode, and hence the corresponding requirement
> on sequence number usage.  I'm happy to discuss further if
> this is an issue.

Yes it indeed makes it clear, but since this is a requirement actually for =
the
author of the specification and not for the implementor, I didn't see much =
point
in having it capitalized.

regards,
Nikos

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Subject: RE: Re: [TLS] Re: Last Call: 'TLS User Mapping Extension' to Proposed
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I was made aware of these comments that in some mysterious way didn't
make its way to my inbox. Sorry for the delay.

Comments in-line;

Stefan Santesson
Program Manager, Standards Liaison
Windows Security

>Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 10:54:35 -0800
>From: Wan-Teh Chang <wtchang@redhat.com>
>To: tls@ietf.org
>Cc: ietf@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: Last Call: 'TLS User Mapping
>         Extension'      toProposedStandard
>
>Russ Housley wrote:
>>
>>We all know that there is not going to be a single name form that is=20
>>useful in all situations.  We also know that you cannot put every=20
>>useful name form into the certificate.  In fact, the appropriate value

>>can change within the normal lifetime of a certificate, so putting it=20
>>in the certificate will result in high revocation rates.
>>This is the reason that I believe this TLS extension will be useful in

>>environments beyond the one that was considered by the Microsoft=20
>>authors.  Your perspective may differ ....
>
>I agree.  A rationale like the above would be a good addition to the=20
>Internet-Draft to strengthen its motivation.
>

<Stefan> This could easily be accommodated in the rationale section.


>Re: EKR's suggested alternatives
>
>While adding a new HandshakeType will incur the costs of a Standards=20
>track RFC, we should not go out of our way to avoid it.  The proposed=20
>solution in the Internet-Draft looks clean and natural to me.
>
>Instead of adding a new HandshakeType, can we extend the Certificate=20
>message to include the user mapping data list as ancillary data?
>

<Stefan> I really don't think we should mess with the certificate
message as it is widely deployed as it is and does not include
extensibility to accommodate name hints.

>Re: draft 02
>
>1. Sec. 5 "Security Considerations" says:
>
>   - The client SHOULD further only send this information
>     if the server belongs to a domain to which the client
>     intends to authenticate using the UPN as identifier.
>
>I have some questions about this paragraph.
>
>How does the client determine which domain the server belongs to=20
>without asking the server?
>

<Stefan> This must be up to local policy. There are many ways the client
can have or obtain this knowledge. E.g. the client could know this from
the host address it is using for connecting to the server.

>Should the server send its domain to the client in the ServerHello=20
>user-mapping extension?  (This would be analogous to the=20
>certificate_authorities field in the CertificateRequest message.)
>

<Stefan> I don't think there is a need for any new mechanisms here.

>Is it possible or common for a client to belong to multiple domains and

>have multiple UPNs?  If so, how does a client that belongs to multiple=20
>domains pick a UPN to send to the server?
>

<Stefan> Yes, that is possible and also a typical issue for local policy
on the application layer. The client application, in cooperation with
the user will know what account it is trying to access, this will
according to local policy translate to a UPN. The protocol we define
here only describes how to communicate that UPN, not how you conclude
the UPN for a client. The important fact is that having many UPNs for a
single user is possible using the same certificate. This standard
proposal enables that.

>2. It would be good to define at least one other UserMappingType as a=20
>proof that the framework can be applied to a non-Microsoft environment.
>

<Stefan> We can't define a new user mapping type just to have one more.
There has to be a use case with a need for one. The current hint can be
used with a wide set of account names in practically any environment
that use the principles of user@domain.

But the extensibility is there in case a new need is there in the
future.
The security AD (Russ) has assisted in developing that part of the
document.

It also worth noting that the RedHat team has publicly said that they
are also considering using this standard with the same name form.

>3. If the UserMappingDataList and Certificate messages may be sent in=20
>either order, it would be good to specify that UserMappingDataList be=20
>sent after Certificate.
>This order would highlight UserMappingDataList's role of providing=20
>additional information to augment the certificate, and the implicit=20
>requirement that UserMappingDataList only be used in conjunction with a

>client certificate.  (I assume that the server cannot send a=20
>ServerHello with user-mapping extension without following with a=20
>CertificateRequest message.)
>

<Stefan> No, you need the user mapping before you can validate the
certificate. The server uses that data to locate the information it
needs to successfully verify the certificate sent in the next step. The
current order is therefore more logical.

>4. I'd be interested in a use case that elaborates how a server uses=20
>the UpnDomainHint and the client certificate to locate a user in a=20
>directory database and what the server can do when the user has been=20
>located.
>

<Stefan> In our current primary use case the UpnDomainHint carries the
name of an domain user account. The server locates that account and
retrieves the certificate of that user that maps to this account. The
server then checks that the validated certificate sent over the TLS
handshake is consistent with the internally retrieved certificate. This
relieves the client from the requirement in current environments to
carry a UPN name in the client's certificate and as such enables use of
legacy PKI deployments.

It is important to note that this relieves the user from dependency on
Microsoft PKI deployment. That is the customer's requirement and the
rationale for doing this.

>Wan-Teh Chang
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Ietf mailing list
>Ietf@ietf.org
>https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
>

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I need to add a point of information regarding "assisted" in the text 
below.  I insisted that the solution support multiple name forms and 
that the solution include a backward compatible mechanism as new name 
forms are registered.  I did offer some guidance during AD Review to 
ensure that these properties were included.

Russ


At 01:35 PM 3/20/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
><Stefan> We can't define a new user mapping type just to have one more.
>There has to be a use case with a need for one. The current hint can be
>used with a wide set of account names in practically any environment
>that use the principles of user@domain.
>
>But the extensibility is there in case a new need is there in the
>future.
>The security AD (Russ) has assisted in developing that part of the
>document.


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From: "Stefan Santesson" <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>,
	<tls@ietf.org>,
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Russ,

Thanks for that clarification.
This is what I poorly was trying to communicate.

Stefan Santesson
Program Manager, Standards Liaison
Windows Security


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 20 mars 2006 14:09
> To: Stefan Santesson; tls@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: Re: [TLS] Re: Last Call: 'TLS User Mapping Extension' to
> Proposed Standard
>=20
> I need to add a point of information regarding "assisted" in the text
> below.  I insisted that the solution support multiple name forms and
> that the solution include a backward compatible mechanism as new name
> forms are registered.  I did offer some guidance during AD Review to
> ensure that these properties were included.
>=20
> Russ
>=20
>=20
> At 01:35 PM 3/20/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> ><Stefan> We can't define a new user mapping type just to have one
more.
> >There has to be a use case with a need for one. The current hint can
be
> >used with a wide set of account names in practically any environment
> >that use the principles of user@domain.
> >
> >But the extensibility is there in case a new need is there in the
> >future.
> >The security AD (Russ) has assisted in developing that part of the
> >document.


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The TLS WG met at 1:00 PM on Wed Mar 22.

Topics covered:

Brian Minard: draft-dugal-tls-ecmqv-00
Brian Minard presented an ECMQV cipher suite for TLS. ECMQV is
an authenticated elliptic curve key establishment protocol that
is part of NSA Suite B. Discussions centered around IPR issues
for ECMQV: Certicom has an IPR statement that includes some
royalty-free licensing, but it's not entirely clear what the
status of certificates containing these keys is. Minard to
check and report back.

Nagendra Modadugu: draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00 
TLS AES Counter Mode is already a work item of the WG. This
document is ready modulo a Security Considerations section.
A new draft will be generated and put out for WG Last Call.

Russ Housley: draft-housley-tls-authz-extns-00
This draft is a mechanism for negotiating the carriage of
some kinds of authentication data (Attribute Certs and
SAML Assertions, etc.) in the TLS handshake. Russ presented
a mechanism for a general payload type for all such data
and then a specific set of extensions for particular types.
This is also intended to resolve last call comments on
draft-santesson-tls-ume, which can use the same payload
type. Stefan Santesson will be drafting the draft for
this payload.


Yngve Petterson: Interoperability
Yngve Petterson presented on a bunch of interop problems 
people are seeing in TLS 1.1, TLS 1.0, and extensions. It's
a bit scary. There was some talk of him doing a draft on
this, but no commitment.

Magnus Westerland: draft-ietf-mmusic-rfc2326bis-12
RTSP makes some innovative uses of TLS. They would like
review. People committed.

EKR: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346bis-00	
TLS has a charter item for TLS 1.2 which is hash replacements,
in particular for the PRF and digitally-signed messages.
There had been discussion on the mailing list of whether this
was a good idea. There was strong consensus in the room for
both doing TLS 1.2 *and* being able to negotiate new PRFs
such as NIST 800-56 and GOST. We agreed to confirm on the
mailing list. 

-Ekr

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The TLS WG meeting minutes have been posted at:

http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/06mar/minutes/tls.html

There's a temporary smart quote glitch which I've fixed but
the site hasn't updated yet.

Thanks very much for Al Arsenault for taking the minutes.

-Ekr


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I'd like to announce the availability of a new
mailing list specifically targeted at implementors
of the "ECC Cipher Suites in TLS" specification.
Current participants include representatives from
Microsoft, OpenSSL, Redhat, and Sun. If you have
an implementation you'd like to test for
interoperability, please send me email.

thanks,

vipul

--
Vipul Gupta, Ph.D.
Sun Microsystems Laboratories
16 Network Circle, MS UMPK16-160
Menlo Park, CA 94025 (USA)
Ph: 650 786 7551
Fax: 650 786 6013


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The document that was briefed at the TLS session in Dallas has been posted.

    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-housley-tls-authz-extns-02.txt

Should this now be posted as a WG document?

Russ


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Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2006 11:49:12 -0800
From: Vipul Gupta <Vipul.Gupta@sun.com>
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Cc: Chris Hawk <chris@corriente.net>, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>,
	Vipul Gupta <Vipul.Gupta@sun.com>,
	Simon Blake-Wilson <simon@blake-wilson.com>
Subject: [TLS] 'ECC Cipher Suites for TLS' (changes from ver 12)
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This note is a follow up to a prior message

http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00489.html

describing some of the changes (from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt)
that will appear in the RFC.

Recently, we discovered another inconsistency in the latest
draft and have received permission from Eric and Russ to
fix it during AUTH48.

The change is as follows (further details included below):

         struct {
-           NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^8-1>
+           NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^16-1>
         } EllipticCurveList;

vipul

--------------------------------------------
[Eric's message]

> From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
> Date: March 27, 2006 10:15:41 AM PST
> Subject: Re: 'ECC Cipher Suites for TLS' to Informational RFC
>
> This works for me.
>
> -Ekr

[Message from Russ (includes our original request and justification)]

> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
> Date: March 29, 2006 6:36:04 AM PST
> Subject: Re: 'ECC Cipher Suites for TLS' to Informational RFC
>
> I see no problem making this correction.  However, please post a  
> message to the TLS WG mail list to notify everyone that this will  
> happen.
>
> Russ
>
> At 06:23 PM 3/24/2006, Vipul Gupta wrote:
>> Hi Eric, Pasi, Sam and Russ,
>>
>>   We (the authors and implementers on the cc list)
>> have recently become aware of an inconsistency
>> in the latest version of the specification and seek
>> your permission to fix it during the AUTH48 period.
>>
>> When going from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-10.txt to
>> draft-ietf-tls-ecc-11.txt, the encoding of named
>> curves was changed from 1 byte to 2 bytes in response
>> to WG feedback. However, the corresponding change
>> in the encoding of the EllipticCurveList length
>> from 1 to 2 bytes was reflected in the examples
>> but not in the EllipticCurveList definition. This
>> made the examples in Section 5.1.1 inconsistent
>> with the adjacent text. We propose fixing the text
>> as follows:
>>
>>         struct {
>> -           NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^8-1>
>> +           NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^16-1>
>>         } EllipticCurveList;
>>
>> This change is consistent with the implementation
>> plans for Microsoft, Redhat, Sun and OpenSSL.
>>
>> We'd appreciate a quick response so we can bring
>> this resolution to the attention of other folks who
>> might be implementing this specification. Thank you
>> for your time.
>>
>> vipul
>>






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Two procedural things:

- Could the minutes have some indication about how many persons were 
present?

- The minutes say:
"A show of hands indicated that while a number of people are interested 
in this item, only two were interested enough to agree to review the 
document and comment. Thus, this item will continue as an individual item."

It is unacceptable to make decision only based on the presence of people 
in a meeting.
According my understanding of working groups, the tls  mailing list are 
used to prepare
such decisions.




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_______________________________________________
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To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Meeting minuts posted
References: <20060327181946.7BC93222418@laser.networkresonance.com>
	<442BF457.6010301@edelweb.fr>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2006 07:17:01 -0800
In-Reply-To: <442BF457.6010301@edelweb.fr> (Peter Sylvester's message of "Thu,
	30 Mar 2006 17:08:07 +0200")
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Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr> writes:

> Two procedural things:
>
> - Could the minutes have some indication about how many persons were
> present?

I don't remember anyone counting, but I would say arund 50.


  
> - The minutes say:
> "A show of hands indicated that while a number of people are
> interested in this item, only two were interested enough to agree to
> review the document and comment. Thus, this item will continue as an
> individual item."
>
> It is unacceptable to make decision only based on the presence of
> people in a meeting.
> According my understanding of working groups, the tls  mailing list
> are used to prepare
> such decisions.

My general practice is to post the minutes (that's been done)
and if people object to a decision that was made in the meeting,
then they can speak up at that point and we'll have a discussion.
I generally only explicitly ask for discussion on the list (as
with the TLS 1.2 issue) when the decision seems controversial.

In this particular case, there hadn't been much interest on
the list and since there wasn't much interest in the meeting,
so I didn't think *not* taking this work on would be particularly
controversial. Do you want to argue that the group should work
on this?

-Ekr


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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Thu Mar 30 13:11:08 2006
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Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2006 20:09:25 +0200
From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>
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To: EKR <ekr@networkresonance.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Meeting minuts posted
References: <20060327181946.7BC93222418@laser.networkresonance.com>	<442BF457.6010301@edelweb.fr>
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	micalg=sha1; boundary="------------ms000009000905030909020108"

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Thanks for the quick answer.
> I don't remember anyone counting, but I would say arund 50.
>   
Good.
>
> My general practice is to post the minutes (that's been done)
> and if people object to a decision that was made in the meeting,
> then they can speak up at that point and we'll have a discussion.
> I generally only explicitly ask for discussion on the list (as
> with the TLS 1.2 issue) when the decision seems controversial.
>   
This is the point. How do you measure this? The list is the audience.
Anyway, we will see what will happen now :-)
> In this particular case, there hadn't been much interest on
> the list and since there wasn't much interest in the meeting,
> so I didn't think *not* taking this work on would be particularly
> controversial. Do you want to argue that the group should work
> on this?
>   
Yes. Here some starter;

I didn't wrote earlier to the list because I expected a presentation at 
the meeting
and I was too busy to comment the current text.

It is known that authorisation statements can be carried somewhere at 
higher levels
like in web services , or even in a HTTP context in an additional header 
similar to
what certain appliances/proxies do with client certs when they map https 
to http.

If one would only look at HTTP, one would need to define a header to
carry this information, in a GLOBAL way, i.e. adding something to
Authentication: Enhanced-withauthorisation,base64 of the assertion

The possibility to use a "separate channel" in TLS looks attractive to 
me, i.e.
a clear separation of the security infomation and the application data.

Concerning the actual text: It seems that since version 0 there are 
considerable
changes, so I haven't really read evrything. So now just some remarks

- Should'nt draft-santesson-tls-supp-00.txt be merged with the text? At
  least subparts?

- The beginning of chapter 2 should probably have all text removed until
  "This document specifies the use .."

- A suggestion to fill in something into the extensions. Asking for 
assertions
  looks somehow similar to what is done with the CertificateRequest. It 
seems
  useful to have some kind of names lists indicating something about the
  entities authorities that provide the assertions (using a reasonable 
default).

- A partner may not be able to resolve an URL, should this be negotiable?
   Or at least, one should announce which type of assertion one will 
provide.

Have fun.

-- 
To verify the signature, see http://edelpki.edelweb.fr/ 
Cela vous permet de charger le certificat de l'autorité; 
die Liste mit zurückgerufenen Zertifikaten finden Sie da auch. 


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To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Meeting minuts posted
References: <20060327181946.7BC93222418@laser.networkresonance.com>
	<442BF457.6010301@edelweb.fr> <86d5g4ezde.fsf@delta.rtfm.com>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2006 11:03:04 -0800
In-Reply-To: <442C1ED5.5080603@edelweb.fr> (Peter Sylvester's message of "Thu,
	30 Mar 2006 20:09:25 +0200")
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Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr> writes:
>> My general practice is to post the minutes (that's been done)
>> and if people object to a decision that was made in the meeting,
>> then they can speak up at that point and we'll have a discussion.
>> I generally only explicitly ask for discussion on the list (as
>> with the TLS 1.2 issue) when the decision seems controversial.
>>
> This is the point. How do you measure this? The list is the audience.

I measure it by discussion on the list and the sense I get from
the meeting. Given that there were basically no comments on the
list on this topic I didn't feel a need to call it out explicitly.
Since you seem to have found it in the minutes just fine, I don't really
see a problem.

>> In this particular case, there hadn't been much interest on
>> the list and since there wasn't much interest in the meeting,
>> so I didn't think *not* taking this work on would be particularly
>> controversial. Do you want to argue that the group should work
>> on this?
>>
> Yes. Here some starter;

Wait. These are arguments about the material, not about whether
the WG should work on it. Do you have an argument for why this
should be worked on in the TLS WG? Do others agree?

-Ekr

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