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From: "Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos" <nmav@gnutls.org>
To: "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@networkresonance.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
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One more argument for adding those ciphersuites, is that they allow
increasing the security level of a connection to more than 128 bits. Now the
weakest link in a TLS session seems to be the HMAC, if all the other
parameters are negotiated using a 256 bit equivalent security.

Although 256-bit security level might seem too much, I'd note that we
already have AES-256.

On Jan 1, 2008 12:49 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> wrote:

> Someone, I can't remember who, suggested that we add
> HMAC-SHA256-based ciphersuites (i.e., ones that use it as a message
> MAC) directly in TLS 1.2. I'm waffling as to whether it's a good
> idea.
>
> Arguments for:
>
> - We made it the default for the PRF.
> - It's weird to to to all this trouble and not define them.
>
>
> Arguments against:
> - There's nothing known wrong with HMAC-SHA1
> - This revision is about flexibility, not actually adding new
>  digests.
>
> Comments?
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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One more argument for adding those ciphersuites, is that they allow increasing the security level of a connection to more than 128 bits. Now the weakest link in a TLS session seems to be the HMAC, if all the other parameters are negotiated using a 256 bit equivalent security.
<br><br>Although 256-bit security level might seem too much, I&#39;d note that we already have AES-256.<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Jan 1, 2008 12:49 AM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href="mailto:ekr@networkresonance.com">
ekr@networkresonance.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">Someone, I can&#39;t remember who, suggested that we add
<br>HMAC-SHA256-based ciphersuites (i.e., ones that use it as a message<br>MAC) directly in TLS 1.2. I&#39;m waffling as to whether it&#39;s a good<br>idea.<br><br>Arguments for:<br><br>- We made it the default for the PRF.
<br>- It&#39;s weird to to to all this trouble and not define them.<br><br><br>Arguments against:<br>- There&#39;s nothing known wrong with HMAC-SHA1<br>- This revision is about flexibility, not actually adding new<br> &nbsp;digests.
<br><br>Comments?<br><br>-Ekr<br><br><br>_______________________________________________<br>TLS mailing list<br><a href="mailto:TLS@lists.ietf.org">TLS@lists.ietf.org</a><br><a href="https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target="_blank">
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br></blockquote></div><br>

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Subject: RE: [TLS] Status of IDEA
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Hovav Shacham wrote:

> Weighing in late, I support "MUST NOT."  The conservative
> interpretation of an absence of extensive studies of a block cipher
> is that the security of that cipher cannot be relied upon.  And
> there is no reason now to prefer IDEA to AES.  I think "MUST NOT"
> will do the best job of steering implementations towards
> known-secure cipher suites.

IMHO "MUST NOT" is totally inappropriate mechanism for conveying
opinions about the amount and/or quality of security reviews done for=20
some particular algorithm. (RFC 2119 also gives guidance that MUSTs=20
must be used sparingly.)

While most folks will indeed prefer AES over anything else, the
reasons why people prefer one algorithm over another vary. E.g.,
presumably more people have looked at AES than Camellia (RFC 4132)=20
or SEED (RFC 4162), but some folks may be perfectly happy with
the reviews those latter two have received (and may have other
reasons for preferring them).

Best regards,
Pasi


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Subject: RE: [TLS] Including Cert. Practice Statement in issued SSL
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David P. Kemp wrote:

> The fact that policies are useless in general does not
> contradict the fact that the point of the extension is to
> convey useful information.  *IF* there were standardized
> policies that 100+ trust anchors followed (e.g., Policy A =3D
> in-person registration with 2 forms of ID and private key
> on a hardware token, Policy B =3D software cert issued to
> anyone with an email account), then the extension would
> be useful. =20

Isn't this basically what the "Extended validation certificates"=20
work is about? (standardizing a consistent policy to be followed
by large number of CAs, and having the browser to display something=20
different if that policy was used)

(Although some folks have questioned how much this will
actually prevent phishing, giving the tendency of users to
ignore security-related browser warnings etc. Any conference
about security and usability probably has papers about this.)

Best regards,
Pasi


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "tls@lists.ietf.org" <tls@lists.ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2008 12:03:40 -0500
Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA
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IMHO, there are several reasons not to use IDEA - some are security-related=
 and some aren't - and to make sure that standard-compliant implementations=
 avoid using this algorithm (and the surest way to avoid using is not imple=
menting).

IMHO in IETF lingo "MUST NOT" conveys this meaning.


On 1/4/08 4:15 AM, "Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com" <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:

Hovav Shacham wrote:

> Weighing in late, I support "MUST NOT."  The conservative
> interpretation of an absence of extensive studies of a block cipher
> is that the security of that cipher cannot be relied upon.  And
> there is no reason now to prefer IDEA to AES.  I think "MUST NOT"
> will do the best job of steering implementations towards
> known-secure cipher suites.

IMHO "MUST NOT" is totally inappropriate mechanism for conveying
opinions about the amount and/or quality of security reviews done for
some particular algorithm. (RFC 2119 also gives guidance that MUSTs
must be used sparingly.)

While most folks will indeed prefer AES over anything else, the
reasons why people prefer one algorithm over another vary. E.g.,
presumably more people have looked at AES than Camellia (RFC 4132)
or SEED (RFC 4162), but some folks may be perfectly happy with
the reviews those latter two have received (and may have other
reasons for preferring them).

Best regards,
Pasi


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--
Regards,
Uri


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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>I=
MHO, there are several reasons not to use IDEA &#8211; some are security-re=
lated and some aren&#8217;t - and to make sure that standard-compliant impl=
ementations avoid using this algorithm (and the surest way to avoid using i=
s not implementing).<BR>
<BR>
IMHO in IETF lingo &#8220;MUST NOT&#8221; conveys this meaning.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 1/4/08 4:15 AM, &quot;Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com&quot; &lt;Pasi.Eronen@nokia.=
com&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN ST=
YLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>Hovav Shacham wrote:<BR>
<BR>
&gt; Weighing in late, I support &quot;MUST NOT.&quot; &nbsp;The conservati=
ve<BR>
&gt; interpretation of an absence of extensive studies of a block cipher<BR=
>
&gt; is that the security of that cipher cannot be relied upon. &nbsp;And<B=
R>
&gt; there is no reason now to prefer IDEA to AES. &nbsp;I think &quot;MUST=
 NOT&quot;<BR>
&gt; will do the best job of steering implementations towards<BR>
&gt; known-secure cipher suites.<BR>
<BR>
IMHO &quot;MUST NOT&quot; is totally inappropriate mechanism for conveying<=
BR>
opinions about the amount and/or quality of security reviews done for<BR>
some particular algorithm. (RFC 2119 also gives guidance that MUSTs<BR>
must be used sparingly.)<BR>
<BR>
While most folks will indeed prefer AES over anything else, the<BR>
reasons why people prefer one algorithm over another vary. E.g.,<BR>
presumably more people have looked at AES than Camellia (RFC 4132)<BR>
or SEED (RFC 4162), but some folks may be perfectly happy with<BR>
the reviews those latter two have received (and may have other<BR>
reasons for preferring them).<BR>
<BR>
Best regards,<BR>
Pasi<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
TLS mailing list<BR>
TLS@lists.ietf.org<BR>
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'><BR>
<BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT>
</BODY>
</HTML>


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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Mon Jan 07 02:19:23 2008
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Subject: RE: [TLS] SIV Ciphersuites for TLS
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2008 09:18:46 +0200
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From: <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com>
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Some general comments, mostly repeating things said at the=20
Vancouver meeting:

- Being resistant to nonce misuse is indeed a good idea in some
environments (where spec writers and/or implementors may not fully
understand the situation), it doesn't seem very important in TLS.
TLS always derives fresh keys, so the opportunities for getting things
wrong are rather limited.=20

- Certainly an application writer doesn't have to understand the
nuances of nonce management -- that's the job of the TLS library (and
an application programmer who doesn't understand crypto shouldn't
implement his/her own TLS library anyway -- there are many other
things he/she will get wrong.)

- If we're concerned with implementation errors in the TLS library
itself (and think that SIV is harder to get wrong than GCM), we
already have cipher suites which are pretty good in this regard (i.e.,
possibly harder to get wrong than GCM): the CBC mode cipher suites,=20
which have the advantage that everyone implements them already (i.e.,=20
no new code needed, thus less opportunities for new bugs).

- While the SIV mode has slightly smaller per-packet overhead than=20
CBC mode, it's also slower to compute than GCM. So if CBC is good
enough for almost everyone, and those requiring high performance
use GCM, what's the environment where SIV would be good?
(The obvious answer "those who want small per-packet overhead,=20
don't care about computational costs, and don't trust implementors=20
to get GCM right" IMHO seems rather marginal.)

Best regards,
Pasi

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]=20
> Sent: 21 December, 2007 20:48
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: [TLS] SIV Ciphersuites for TLS
>=20
>=20
>   Greetings,
>=20
>   I presented the document RSA AES-SIV Ciphersuites for TLS at the
> last meeting in Vancouver. It is my hope that this document would be
> accepted as a WG document and solicit more review and comments from
> everyone here. The document can be found at:
>=20
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-harkins-tls-rsa-aes-
> siv-00.txt
>=20

>   Since this email is arriving in the midst of a discussion to drop
> support for another cipher-suite I would like to explain why this
> one should be added: SIV is an AEAD mode that is resistant to nonce
> misuse (unlike other counter-mode constructs like GCM) and is
> therefore well-suited for cases where an application writer, who may
> not understand the cryptographic nuances of nonce management for
> other cipher-suites, obtains TLS services for his application by
> linking to an external library.
>=20
>   Please take a look and send comments.
>=20
>   regards,
>=20
>   Dan.


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<wg chair hat on>

Mohammad Badra has requested that the TLS WG adopt
draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk as a WG item. This draft was presented=20
in Vancouver, but few comments have been received so far.

Please use this thread to comment; not only the technical
details, but whether you think this is useful; should it be
done as WG item or individual document; and whether you're
willing to work on this document.

Best regards,
Pasi


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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Mon Jan 07 08:23:07 2008
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA
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Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> 
> IMHO "MUST NOT" is totally inappropriate mechanism for conveying
> opinions about the amount and/or quality of security reviews done for 
> some particular algorithm. (RFC 2119 also gives guidance that MUSTs 
> must be used sparingly.)

I also think that "MUST NOT implement" for IDEA ciphersuites is entirely
inappropriate.  Lacking a convincing reason, I believe that even
"MUST NOT negotiate for TLS v1.2" for the IDEA ciphersuites would
be inappropriate.

> 
> While most folks will indeed prefer AES over anything else, the
> reasons why people prefer one algorithm over another vary. E.g.,
> presumably more people have looked at AES than Camellia (RFC 4132) 
> or SEED (RFC 4162), but some folks may be perfectly happy with
> the reviews those latter two have received (and may have other
> reasons for preferring them).

There are many more crypto algorithms that are uncommon (Gost, CAST,
*fish and other participants of the AES contest.  Reasons for their
use in certain environments are manyfold, including legacy, licensing
and political.  I can not see a compelling reason why IDEA should
be treated any different than the others.


-Martin


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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I strongly believe that ECDHE-PSK is useful and should be done as a WG item=
. Technical comments will follow.

Tnx!
--
Regards,
Uri

On 1/7/08 2:25 AM, "Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com" <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:

<wg chair hat on>

Mohammad Badra has requested that the TLS WG adopt
draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk as a WG item. This draft was presented
in Vancouver, but few comments have been received so far.

Please use this thread to comment; not only the technical
details, but whether you think this is useful; should it be
done as WG item or individual document; and whether you're
willing to work on this document.

Best regards,
Pasi


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<TITLE>Re: [TLS] ECDHE_PSK as WG item?</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>I=
 strongly believe that ECDHE-PSK is useful and should be done as a WG item.=
 Technical comments will follow.<BR>
<BR>
Tnx!<BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri<BR>
<BR>
On 1/7/08 2:25 AM, &quot;Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com&quot; &lt;Pasi.Eronen@nokia.=
com&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN ST=
YLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>&lt;wg chair hat on&gt;<BR>
<BR>
Mohammad Badra has requested that the TLS WG adopt<BR>
draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk as a WG item. This draft was presented<BR>
in Vancouver, but few comments have been received so far.<BR>
<BR>
Please use this thread to comment; not only the technical<BR>
details, but whether you think this is useful; should it be<BR>
done as WG item or individual document; and whether you're<BR>
willing to work on this document.<BR>
<BR>
Best regards,<BR>
Pasi<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
TLS mailing list<BR>
TLS@lists.ietf.org<BR>
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
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Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2008 23:22:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [TLS] SIV Ciphersuites for TLS
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
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  Hi Pasi,

  Thank you very much for your comments on my draft. A few comments on
your comments.

  Deriving a fresh key is not the issue, it's whether one can
guarantee that a nonce will never be misused for a given (fresh) key.

  The other thing I will take issue with is your statement that nonce
management is "the job of the TLS library". That very much depends
on the TLS library. The API to call AES in CBC mode in OpenSSL takes
an IV from the caller-- i.e. the application programmer. Now I can't say
what a call to AES in GCM mode will take since I don't have an OpenSSL
library that implements TLS1.2 but given the way the library is construct=
ed
and used today it is entirely reasonable to assume that nonce management
will be in the hands of the application programmer and not inside the
cryptographic engine.

  I will note that for those of you that are worried about FIPS you shoul=
d
already know that anything that has cryptographic relevance is deemed to =
be
inside the cryptographic boundary. For GCM the nonce is _highly_ relevant=
.
That can automatically pull in large chunks of code which otherwise would
not have been inside the cryptographic boundary: CLI, web browser, etc. F=
or
SIV the nonce is not relevant as security is maintained even when the non=
ce
is misused or reused. Using an SIV-based cipher suite would allow
applications that really aren't cryptographically relevant but may be
forced to manage nonce space to be outside of a FIPS 140 cryptographic
boundary. That can be very beneficial when one considers bug fixing in
things like a web browser: does it require another trip to the FIPS
validation laboratory (and several months) or a letter (and a few weeks)
before we can release the next version of FIPS-validated software.

  When GCM becomes widely used in TLS there is a HUGE assumption being ma=
de.
The entire security of a scheme using GCM depends on one thing that we ar=
e
just blithely stating will not happen. It's not really coding errors per =
se,
it's an honest attempt to use a library by someone who is just not aware
of the nuances surrounding the creation and management of a variable unde=
r
his or her control. Type "man crypto"..."man aes"...note arguments...
create data that does not return an error...on to next coding task. Ship =
it!

  Having a system that does not lose all security in the presence of
unintentional coding errors, unintentional misconfiguration, or intention=
al
stupidity or malfeasance would, in my opinion, be a big benefit. But you
said that benefit seems marginal to you and the silence of the rest of th=
e
list has been noticed.

  best regards,

  Dan.

On Sun, January 6, 2008 11:18 pm, Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> Some general comments, mostly repeating things said at the
> Vancouver meeting:
>
> - Being resistant to nonce misuse is indeed a good idea in some
> environments (where spec writers and/or implementors may not fully
> understand the situation), it doesn't seem very important in TLS.
> TLS always derives fresh keys, so the opportunities for getting things
> wrong are rather limited.
>
> - Certainly an application writer doesn't have to understand the
> nuances of nonce management -- that's the job of the TLS library (and
> an application programmer who doesn't understand crypto shouldn't
> implement his/her own TLS library anyway -- there are many other
> things he/she will get wrong.)
>
> - If we're concerned with implementation errors in the TLS library
> itself (and think that SIV is harder to get wrong than GCM), we
> already have cipher suites which are pretty good in this regard (i.e.,
> possibly harder to get wrong than GCM): the CBC mode cipher suites,
> which have the advantage that everyone implements them already (i.e.,
> no new code needed, thus less opportunities for new bugs).
>
> - While the SIV mode has slightly smaller per-packet overhead than
> CBC mode, it's also slower to compute than GCM. So if CBC is good
> enough for almost everyone, and those requiring high performance
> use GCM, what's the environment where SIV would be good?
> (The obvious answer "those who want small per-packet overhead,
> don't care about computational costs, and don't trust implementors
> to get GCM right" IMHO seems rather marginal.)
>
> Best regards,
> Pasi
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ext Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> Sent: 21 December, 2007 20:48
>> To: tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: [TLS] SIV Ciphersuites for TLS
>>
>>
>>   Greetings,
>>
>>   I presented the document RSA AES-SIV Ciphersuites for TLS at the
>> last meeting in Vancouver. It is my hope that this document would be
>> accepted as a WG document and solicit more review and comments from
>> everyone here. The document can be found at:
>>
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-harkins-tls-rsa-aes-
>> siv-00.txt
>>
>
>>   Since this email is arriving in the midst of a discussion to drop
>> support for another cipher-suite I would like to explain why this
>> one should be added: SIV is an AEAD mode that is resistant to nonce
>> misuse (unlike other counter-mode constructs like GCM) and is
>> therefore well-suited for cases where an application writer, who may
>> not understand the cryptographic nuances of nonce management for
>> other cipher-suites, obtains TLS services for his application by
>> linking to an external library.
>>
>>   Please take a look and send comments.
>>
>>   regards,
>>
>>   Dan.
>




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Subject: RE: [TLS] SIV Ciphersuites for TLS
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Dan Harkins wrote:

>   Hi Pasi,
>=20
>   Thank you very much for your comments on my draft. A few comments on
> your comments.
>=20
>   Deriving a fresh key is not the issue, it's whether one can
> guarantee that a nonce will never be misused for a given (fresh) key.
>=20
>   The other thing I will take issue with is your statement that
> nonce management is "the job of the TLS library". That very much
> depends on the TLS library. The API to call AES in CBC mode in
> OpenSSL takes an IV from the caller-- i.e. the application
> programmer.=20

In OpenSSL, an application programmer using TLS does *not* supply=20
any IVs, and never directly uses any AES CBC mode APIs (or anything
similar -- all that happens inside the TLS part of the library).

An application programmer might use the OpenSSL's AES APIs
for *other* purposes than TLS, and I do agree that there
SIV can be much safer to use than GCM.

Best regards,
Pasi


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Subject: RE: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200
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I agree with Uri that adding SHA256-based suites is reasonable (and
also agree with Ekr's argument, "It's weird to to to all this trouble
and not define them"). And having them in the main 1.2 spec would be
simpler than a separate spec.

To be concrete, I'd suggest adding the following:

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256  =20
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256  =20
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256

(or would 256-bit AES be enough?)

Best regards,
Pasi

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Blumenthal, Uri [mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu]=20
> Sent: 01 January, 2008 03:43
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
>=20
>=20
> I am for adding SHA256-based suites. We want to phase SHA1 out and
> phase its probable replacement in.
>=20
> SHA1 did exhibit some weaknesses. and we hardly want to wait and see
> whether they will turn into exploits some day.
>=20
>=20
> On 12/31/07 5:49 PM, "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@networkresonance.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> > Someone, I can't remember who, suggested that we add
> > HMAC-SHA256-based ciphersuites (i.e., ones that use it as a message
> > MAC) directly in TLS 1.2. I'm waffling as to whether it's a good
> > idea.
> >=20
> > Arguments for:
> >=20
> > - We made it the default for the PRF.
> > - It's weird to to to all this trouble and not define them.
> >=20
> >=20
> > Arguments against:
> > - There's nothing known wrong with HMAC-SHA1
> > - This revision is about flexibility, not actually adding new
> >   digests.
> >=20
> > Comments?
> >=20
> > -Ekr


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2008 11:03:10 -0500
Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
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SHA-1 is being deprecated, AES-128 is not. Therefore I recommend defining A=
ES-128 as well. Might even want to consider AES-192.

Also, I didn't keep track of ECC-based suites addition - I hope they are de=
fined and are using SHA-2.


On 1/8/08 5:53 AM, "Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com" <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:



I agree with Uri that adding SHA256-based suites is reasonable (and
also agree with Ekr's argument, "It's weird to to to all this trouble
and not define them"). And having them in the main 1.2 spec would be
simpler than a separate spec.

To be concrete, I'd suggest adding the following:

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256

(or would 256-bit AES be enough?)

Best regards,
Pasi

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Blumenthal, Uri [mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu]
> Sent: 01 January, 2008 03:43
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
>
>
> I am for adding SHA256-based suites. We want to phase SHA1 out and
> phase its probable replacement in.
>
> SHA1 did exhibit some weaknesses. and we hardly want to wait and see
> whether they will turn into exploits some day.
>
>
> On 12/31/07 5:49 PM, "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@networkresonance.com> wrote:
>
>
> > Someone, I can't remember who, suggested that we add
> > HMAC-SHA256-based ciphersuites (i.e., ones that use it as a message
> > MAC) directly in TLS 1.2. I'm waffling as to whether it's a good
> > idea.
> >
> > Arguments for:
> >
> > - We made it the default for the PRF.
> > - It's weird to to to all this trouble and not define them.
> >
> >
> > Arguments against:
> > - There's nothing known wrong with HMAC-SHA1
> > - This revision is about flexibility, not actually adding new
> >   digests.
> >
> > Comments?
> >
> > -Ekr


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Uri


--_000_C3A908EE210urillmitedu_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>S=
HA-1 is being deprecated, AES-128 is not. Therefore I recommend defining AE=
S-128 as well. Might even want to consider AES-192.<BR>
<BR>
Also, I didn&#8217;t keep track of ECC-based suites addition &#8211; I hope=
 they are defined and are using SHA-2.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 1/8/08 5:53 AM, &quot;Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com&quot; &lt;Pasi.Eronen@nokia.=
com&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN ST=
YLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'><BR>
<BR>
I agree with Uri that adding SHA256-based suites is reasonable (and<BR>
also agree with Ekr's argument, &quot;It's weird to to to all this trouble<=
BR>
and not define them&quot;). And having them in the main 1.2 spec would be<B=
R>
simpler than a separate spec.<BR>
<BR>
To be concrete, I'd suggest adding the following:<BR>
<BR>
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256<BR>
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256<BR>
<BR>
(or would 256-bit AES be enough?)<BR>
<BR>
Best regards,<BR>
Pasi<BR>
<BR>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<BR>
&gt; From: ext Blumenthal, Uri [<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu]">mailto:u=
ri@ll.mit.edu]</a><BR>
&gt; Sent: 01 January, 2008 03:43<BR>
&gt; To: tls@ietf.org<BR>
&gt; Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; I am for adding SHA256-based suites. We want to phase SHA1 out and<BR>
&gt; phase its probable replacement in.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; SHA1 did exhibit some weaknesses. and we hardly want to wait and see<B=
R>
&gt; whether they will turn into exploits some day.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; On 12/31/07 5:49 PM, &quot;Eric Rescorla&quot; &lt;ekr@networkresonanc=
e.com&gt; wrote:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; Someone, I can't remember who, suggested that we add<BR>
&gt; &gt; HMAC-SHA256-based ciphersuites (i.e., ones that use it as a messa=
ge<BR>
&gt; &gt; MAC) directly in TLS 1.2. I'm waffling as to whether it's a good<=
BR>
&gt; &gt; idea.<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; Arguments for:<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; - We made it the default for the PRF.<BR>
&gt; &gt; - It's weird to to to all this trouble and not define them.<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; Arguments against:<BR>
&gt; &gt; - There's nothing known wrong with HMAC-SHA1<BR>
&gt; &gt; - This revision is about flexibility, not actually adding new<BR>
&gt; &gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;digests.<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; Comments?<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; -Ekr<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
TLS mailing list<BR>
TLS@lists.ietf.org<BR>
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'><BR>
<BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT>
</BODY>
</HTML>


--_000_C3A908EE210urillmitedu_--



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From: miura.fumiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp (MIURA, Fumiaki)
To: <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
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At Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200, <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:
> TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256   

Why not SHA512 for AES256?

For example, FIPS 180-2 say that `security (bits)' for SHA-512 is 256
in page 3.


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* Fumiaki MIURA:

> At Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200, <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:
>> TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256=20=20=20
>
> Why not SHA512 for AES256?
>
> For example, FIPS 180-2 say that `security (bits)' for SHA-512 is 256
> in page 3.

Does this estimate also apply when using SHA-512 as a building block
for an HMAC?

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99


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Apparently OpenSSL now supports TLS-PSK in the 0.9.9 dev snapshot, does anyone
know of any public test servers running this?  It'd be good to have one
available for interop testing (just for reference I know about the GnuTLS one,
I'm already using that, but the more, the better).

Peter.


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From: miura.fumiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp (MIURA, Fumiaki)
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
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At Wed, 09 Jan 2008 10:30:17 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> 
> * Fumiaki MIURA:
> 
> > At Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200, <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:
> >> TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256   
> >
> > Why not SHA512 for AES256?
> >
> > For example, FIPS 180-2 say that `security (bits)' for SHA-512 is 256
> > in page 3.
> 
> Does this estimate also apply when using SHA-512 as a building block
> for an HMAC?

I think yes, theoretically.

"Message authentication using hash functions: The HMAC construction"
  <URL: http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/hmac-cb.pdf>  says:
| As shown in [12, 2], birthday attacks, that are
| the basis to finding collisions in cryptographic hash
| functions, can be applied to attack also keyed MAC
| schemes based on iterated functions (including also
| CBC-MAC, and other schemes). These attacks ap-
| ply to most (or all) of the proposed hash-based
| constructions of MACs.

But, I don't know any realistic attacks if we properly refresh the
key.


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<wg chair hat on>

Dan Harkins already asked people to comment draft-harkins-tls-rsa-
aes-siv, but I'd like to repeat the request officially, as the
document is being proposed for WG item.

In particular, please provide comments not only the technical details,
but whether you think this is useful; should it be done as WG item or
individual document; and whether you're willing to work on this
document.

Best regards,
Pasi


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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
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	(Pasi Eronen's message of "Mon, 7 Jan 2008 09:25:20 +0200")
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Subject: [TLS] Re: ECDHE_PSK as WG item?
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<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> writes:

> Mohammad Badra has requested that the TLS WG adopt
> draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk as a WG item. This draft was presented 
> in Vancouver, but few comments have been received so far.
>
> Please use this thread to comment; not only the technical
> details, but whether you think this is useful; should it be
> done as WG item or individual document; and whether you're
> willing to work on this document.

While GnuTLS does not support ECDHE yet, which means we are not likely
to implement the document immediately, I believe the document solve a
clearly described problem and that it should be adopted by the WG.  I'm
willing to review the document.

Some minor issues from a quick review:

* In the abstract RFC 4785 (PSK-NULL) and RFC 4279 (PSK) are mentioned
  in that order, twice.  I think it would be useful to mention them in
  the reverse order.

* Section 2 contains:

   "The PSK identity and identity hint fields have the same 
   meaning as in the previous section (note that the ServerKeyExchange 
   message is always sent, even if no PSK identity hint is provided)."

  What does 'the previous section' refer to?  I can't find any
  discussions of PSK identity earlier in the document.

* The document could say explicitly that the PSK case in
  ClientKeyExchange and ServerKeyExchange should not apply to PSK-ECDHE,
  instead the ec_diffie_hellman_psk case should apply.  I propose:

    When the CipherSuites defined in this document are used, the
    'ec_diffie_hellman_psk' case inside the ServerKeyExchange and
    ClientKeyExchange structure is used, instead of the 'psk' case
    defined in RFC 4279.

Thanks,
/Simon


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Subject: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
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<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> writes:

> Dan Harkins already asked people to comment draft-harkins-tls-rsa-
> aes-siv, but I'd like to repeat the request officially, as the
> document is being proposed for WG item.
>
> In particular, please provide comments not only the technical details,
> but whether you think this is useful; should it be done as WG item or
> individual document; and whether you're willing to work on this
> document.

Generally speaking, I believe the crypto community will produce several
AEAD cipher modes with rather different properties (speed, IV-use,
provable security, patent status, and so on).

Having all those ciphers defined for TLS is an advantage, to allow
interoperable testing.  What is less clear at this point is which of the
alternatives to prefer.  I'm not sure a Standards Track status for any
of them (including GCM) is appropriate at this time.  There is nothing
proven wrong with our existing standard ciphers as far as I know.
Replacing working standards ciphers without a good technical reason
seems wrong to me.

Thus, right now, I think I would prefer to publish all AEAD ciphersuites
for TLS as informational or experimental documents, and wait until one
(or more) of them are implemented and used more widely.  I believe it is
better to develop all these ciphers as WG items, to make sure they are
defined in a correct and consistent way.

I may be missing some convincing reason why an AEAD cipher for TLS needs
to have standards track status, and if so, I would re-consider this
position.

/Simon


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Dear Simon,

Thank you for your comments on the document. Short comments in line...

>
> Some minor issues from a quick review:
>
> * In the abstract RFC 4785 (PSK-NULL) and RFC 4279 (PSK) are mentioned
>   in that order, twice.  I think it would be useful to mention them in
>   the reverse order.
>

OK.

> * Section 2 contains:
>
>    "The PSK identity and identity hint fields have the same
>    meaning as in the previous section (note that the ServerKeyExchange
>    message is always sent, even if no PSK identity hint is provided)."
>
>   What does 'the previous section' refer to?  I can't find any
>   discussions of PSK identity earlier in the document.
>

That's true. I will replace 'as in the previous section' with 'as in
RFC4279' (section 6).


> * The document could say explicitly that the PSK case in
>   ClientKeyExchange and ServerKeyExchange should not apply to PSK-ECDHE,
>   instead the ec_diffie_hellman_psk case should apply.  I propose:
>
>     When the CipherSuites defined in this document are used, the
>     'ec_diffie_hellman_psk' case inside the ServerKeyExchange and
>     ClientKeyExchange structure is used, instead of the 'psk' case
>     defined in RFC 4279.

OK.

Best regards,
Badra


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[CC'd to various lists who might be interested]

Someone recently asked on a security list whether there was a simple way of
putting your public key on a web server based on "a set of goals, hopefully
sufficiently unambitious, so one knows what one wants to do very precisely.
Given those, I suspect a decent spec replacing hundreds of pages of currently
'standard' and useless mechanism could be crafted in about 10 to 30 pages)".
My response was "You've just described RFC 4387 :-)".  The list reaction was
that no-one had known until then that this document even existed, so I'm
posting this to a couple of lists where people might find it useful.

Don't be mislead by the title (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4387.txt), it was
published under the auspices of PKIX but it's really "a simple, fairly
universal means of publishing your public key via HTTP".  The CACert folks
have set up a Wiki page to cover implementation info, feedback, and comments:
http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/RFC4387.

(Please, no religious arguments over this: If you think it's useful, implement
it.  If not, ignore it).

Peter.


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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : RSA based AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS
	Author(s)       : J. Salowey, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt
	Pages           : 9
	Date            : 2008-01-13

This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
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Simon Josefsson wrote:

> Generally speaking, I believe the crypto community will produce
> several AEAD cipher modes with rather different properties (speed,
> IV-use, provable security, patent status, and so on).
>=20
> Having all those ciphers defined for TLS is an advantage, to allow
> interoperable testing.  What is less clear at this point is which of
> the alternatives to prefer.

Many of the arguments made in the recent discussion about IDEA
(e.g., more code means more complexity and less security in
practise, especially if some of that code is rarely used and thus
largely untested; and having too many "vanity" options just causes
problems) would suggest that having *all* those ciphers defined in
TLS would not be a such good idea.

This doesn't mean that we have to decide on a single AEAD mode, but
IMHO for any specs we write, we should have an expectation that it
will see non-insignificant real-world deployment (i.e., ends up
being used, as opposed to just being implemented by some library).

Best regards,
Pasi


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<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> writes:

> Simon Josefsson wrote:
>
>> Generally speaking, I believe the crypto community will produce
>> several AEAD cipher modes with rather different properties (speed,
>> IV-use, provable security, patent status, and so on).
>> 
>> Having all those ciphers defined for TLS is an advantage, to allow
>> interoperable testing.  What is less clear at this point is which of
>> the alternatives to prefer.
>
> Many of the arguments made in the recent discussion about IDEA
> (e.g., more code means more complexity and less security in
> practise, especially if some of that code is rarely used and thus
> largely untested; and having too many "vanity" options just causes
> problems) would suggest that having *all* those ciphers defined in
> TLS would not be a such good idea.

I think there is a significant difference between the IDEA situation and
the AEAD situation: the IDEA ciphersuites are mentioned in the core TLS
specification.  We should (rightly) be more conservative about any
complexity complications in the core document.

As far as I have understood, no single AEAD ciphersuite will be
recommended or specified in the TLS 1.2 specification.

If so, having multiple informational documents on different AEAD
ciphersuites leads to simpler real-world-like comparisons between them.
When we have had some time to evaluate these, and have let the crypto
community scrutinize the various different AEAD modes for some time, we
can chose a small set of them (possibly a single one) to promote to
standards track status.

However, I don't feel strongly about this, and this is just my gut
reaction on how I would prefer to do it.  There may be some compelling
arguments for doing it in some other way that I haven't considered.

Thanks,
/Simon


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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Mon Jan 14 05:03:48 2008
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
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On Jan 14, 2008, at 11:42 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote:

> <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> writes:
>
>> Simon Josefsson wrote:
>>
>>> Generally speaking, I believe the crypto community will produce
>>> several AEAD cipher modes with rather different properties (speed,
>>> IV-use, provable security, patent status, and so on).
>>>
>>> Having all those ciphers defined for TLS is an advantage, to allow
>>> interoperable testing.  What is less clear at this point is which of
>>> the alternatives to prefer.
>>
>> Many of the arguments made in the recent discussion about IDEA
>> (e.g., more code means more complexity and less security in
>> practise, especially if some of that code is rarely used and thus
>> largely untested; and having too many "vanity" options just causes
>> problems) would suggest that having *all* those ciphers defined in
>> TLS would not be a such good idea.
>
> I think there is a significant difference between the IDEA situation  
> and
> the AEAD situation: the IDEA ciphersuites are mentioned in the core  
> TLS
> specification.  We should (rightly) be more conservative about any
> complexity complications in the core document.
>
> As far as I have understood, no single AEAD ciphersuite will be
> recommended or specified in the TLS 1.2 specification.
>
> If so, having multiple informational documents on different AEAD
> ciphersuites leads to simpler real-world-like comparisons between  
> them.
> When we have had some time to evaluate these, and have let the crypto
> community scrutinize the various different AEAD modes for some time,  
> we
> can chose a small set of them (possibly a single one) to promote to
> standards track status.
>
> However, I don't feel strongly about this, and this is just my gut
> reaction on how I would prefer to do it.  There may be some compelling
> arguments for doing it in some other way that I haven't considered.
>

That gives the writers of OpenSSL/GnuTLS/Windows CAPI no guidance. I  
think if we do that, the result would be not what the cyrpto community  
scrutinizes, but what Microsoft did and OpenSSL copied.



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Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2008 11:23:15 +0100
In-Reply-To: <F8391F55-7A63-450D-B821-C6F02D0AF968@checkpoint.com> (Yoav Nir's
	message of "Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:03:40 +0200")
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Subject: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
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Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> writes:

> That gives the writers of OpenSSL/GnuTLS/Windows CAPI no guidance.

I think part of my point is that at this time there is not enough
guidance to give: or do we actually know which properties of the various
AEAD proposals are critical for Internet-wide use?

I don't feel comfortable claiming that the nonce-reuse problem in GCM is
never going to lead to serious security problems.  Nor would I feel
comfortable to claim that GCM is inherently flawed because of it.

If there are specification for several AEAD ciphersuite to chose from,
they would each contain discussions of their applicability.  If we only
specify AES-GCM and kill other proposals, I suspect that will make it
more difficult to re-consider the situation later on.

I guess I have argued my point of view now, so I'll try to shut up and
let others talk.

/Simon


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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Mon Jan 14 05:37:16 2008
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Supporting only GCM has the advantage that it works well with the "In  
NIST we trust" model of cryptographic reasoning.

I'm also missing some performance measurements of AES-GCM vs AES-SIV  
vs AES-CBC+HMAC-SHA1. We have the original papers from the authors,  
who made the measurements on a 1 GHz PPC processor. I'm not sure how  
much of an advantage we'd get with more common processors and with  
optimized code. Right now, I don't know what, if anything, any of the  
AEAD ciphersuites would give me.

I don't think GCM is seriously flawed at least in its use in TLS or  
IPsec. But like you, I'm not comfortable claiming it.  In this it may  
be wise to defer to NIST, unless some cryptographer has a different  
view and would like to weigh in.

On Jan 14, 2008, at 12:23 PM, Simon Josefsson wrote:

> Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> writes:
>
>> That gives the writers of OpenSSL/GnuTLS/Windows CAPI no guidance.
>
> I think part of my point is that at this time there is not enough
> guidance to give: or do we actually know which properties of the  
> various
> AEAD proposals are critical for Internet-wide use?
>
> I don't feel comfortable claiming that the nonce-reuse problem in  
> GCM is
> never going to lead to serious security problems.  Nor would I feel
> comfortable to claim that GCM is inherently flawed because of it.
>
> If there are specification for several AEAD ciphersuite to chose from,
> they would each contain discussions of their applicability.  If we  
> only
> specify AES-GCM and kill other proposals, I suspect that will make it
> more difficult to re-consider the situation later on.
>
> I guess I have argued my point of view now, so I'll try to shut up and
> let others talk.
>
> /Simon
>
> Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
>



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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions
	Author(s)	: D. Eastlake 3rd
	Filename	: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis-01.txt
	Pages		: 22
	Date		: 2008-1-14
	
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On Jan 12, 2008, at 2:17 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:

> Someone recently asked on a security list whether there was a  
> simple way of
> putting your public key on a web server based on "a set of goals,  
> hopefully
> sufficiently unambitious, so one knows what one wants to do very  
> precisely.
> Given those, I suspect a decent spec replacing hundreds of pages of  
> currently
> 'standard' and useless mechanism could be crafted in about 10 to 30  
> pages)".
> My response was "You've just described RFC 4387 :-)".  The list  
> reaction was
> that no-one had known until then that this document even existed,  
> so I'm
> posting this to a couple of lists where people might find it useful.
>
> Don't be mislead by the title (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/ 
> rfc4387.txt), it was
> published under the auspices of PKIX but it's really "a simple, fairly
> universal means of publishing your public key via HTTP".  The  
> CACert folks
> have set up a Wiki page to cover implementation info, feedback, and  
> comments:
> http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/RFC4387.
>
> (Please, no religious arguments over this: If you think it's  
> useful, implement
> it.  If not, ignore it).

Peter--

Very timely; we were just discussing something essentially like this  
around my office last week.  I see you've got cryptlib support, but  
are there any other implementations in the pipeline?

-- Tim


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From: Ken Peirce <thewirelessmacdude@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
To: "MIURA, Fumiaki" <miura.fumiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
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I think that we should provide cipher suites with uniform cryptographic strength. We should use the NIST "bits of security" metric to match the encryption key size and type as well as the hmac type. Use SHA 256 for AES128, etc.
   
  Ken Peirce
   
  
"MIURA, Fumiaki" <miura.fumiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp> wrote:
  At Wed, 09 Jan 2008 10:30:17 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> 
> * Fumiaki MIURA:
> 
> > At Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200, 
wrote:
> >> TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 
> >
> > Why not SHA512 for AES256?
> >
> > For example, FIPS 180-2 say that `security (bits)' for SHA-512 is 256
> > in page 3.
> 
> Does this estimate also apply when using SHA-512 as a building block
> for an HMAC?

I think yes, theoretically.

"Message authentication using hash functions: The HMAC construction"
says:
| As shown in [12, 2], birthday attacks, that are
| the basis to finding collisions in cryptographic hash
| functions, can be applied to attack also keyed MAC
| schemes based on iterated functions (including also
| CBC-MAC, and other schemes). These attacks ap-
| ply to most (or all) of the proposed hash-based
| constructions of MACs.

But, I don't know any realistic attacks if we properly refresh the
key.


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<div>I&nbsp;think that we should provide cipher suites with uniform cryptographic strength. We should use the NIST "bits of security" metric to match the&nbsp;encryption key size and type as well as the hmac type.&nbsp;Use SHA 256 for AES128, etc.</div>  <div>&nbsp;</div>  <div>Ken Peirce</div>  <div>&nbsp;</div>  <div><BR><B><I>"MIURA, Fumiaki" &lt;miura.fumiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp&gt;</I></B> wrote:</div>  <BLOCKQUOTE class=replbq style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid">At Wed, 09 Jan 2008 10:30:17 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; * Fumiaki MIURA:<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; &gt; At Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200, <PASI.ERONEN@NOKIA.COM>wrote:<BR>&gt; &gt;&gt; TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 <BR>&gt; &gt;<BR>&gt; &gt; Why not SHA512 for AES256?<BR>&gt; &gt;<BR>&gt; &gt; For example, FIPS 180-2 say that `security (bits)' for SHA-512 is 256<BR>&gt; &gt; in page 3.<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; Does this estimate also apply when using SHA-512 as a building
 block<BR>&gt; for an HMAC?<BR><BR>I think yes, theoretically.<BR><BR>"Message authentication using hash functions: The HMAC construction"<BR><URL: hmac-cb.pdf papers mihir users www-cse.ucsd.edu http:>says:<BR>| As shown in [12, 2], birthday attacks, that are<BR>| the basis to finding collisions in cryptographic hash<BR>| functions, can be applied to attack also keyed MAC<BR>| schemes based on iterated functions (including also<BR>| CBC-MAC, and other schemes). These attacks ap-<BR>| ply to most (or all) of the proposed hash-based<BR>| constructions of MACs.<BR><BR>But, I don't know any realistic attacks if we properly refresh the<BR>key.<BR><BR><BR>_______________________________________________<BR>TLS mailing list<BR>TLS@lists.ietf.org<BR>https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<BR></BLOCKQUOTE><BR>
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Ken and all,

  I believe this is a very good suggestion and/or approach.

Kindest regards,

Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 277k members/stakeholders strong!)
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
very often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS.
div. of Information Network Eng.  INEG. INC.
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail
jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
My Phone: 214-244-4827

Ken Peirce wrote:

> I think that we should provide cipher suites with uniform
> cryptographic strength. We should use the NIST "bits of security"
> metric to match the encryption key size and type as well as the hmac
> type. Use SHA 256 for AES128, etc. Ken Peirce
> "MIURA, Fumiaki" <miura.fumiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp> wrote:
>
>      At Wed, 09 Jan 2008 10:30:17 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
>      >
>      > * Fumiaki MIURA:
>      >
>      > > At Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200, wrote:
>      > >> TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
>      > >
>      > > Why not SHA512 for AES256?
>      > >
>      > > For example, FIPS 180-2 say that `security (bits)' for
>      SHA-512 is 256
>      > > in page 3.
>      >
>      > Does this estimate also apply when using SHA-512 as a
>      building block
>      > for an HMAC?
>
>      I think yes, theoretically.
>
>      "Message authentication using hash functions: The HMAC
>      construction"
>      says:
>      | As shown in [12, 2], birthday attacks, that are
>      | the basis to finding collisions in cryptographic hash
>      | functions, can be applied to attack also keyed MAC
>      | schemes based on iterated functions (including also
>      | CBC-MAC, and other schemes). These attacks ap-
>      | ply to most (or all) of the proposed hash-based
>      | constructions of MACs.
>
>      But, I don't know any realistic attacks if we properly
>      refresh the
>      key.
>
>
>      _______________________________________________
>      TLS mailing list
>      TLS@lists.ietf.org
>      https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>    ----------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>
Ken and all,
<p>&nbsp; I believe this is a very good suggestion and/or approach.
<p>Kindest regards,
<p>Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 277k members/stakeholders strong!)
<br>"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
<br>&nbsp;&nbsp; Abraham Lincoln
<p>"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
<br>very often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
<p>"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
<br>liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
<br>P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
<br>United States v. Carroll Towing&nbsp; (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
<br>===============================================================
<br>Updated 1/26/04
<br>CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS.
<br>div. of Information Network Eng.&nbsp; INEG. INC.
<br>ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail
<br>jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
<br>My Phone: 214-244-4827
<p>Ken Peirce wrote:
<blockquote TYPE=CITE>I think that we should provide cipher suites with
uniform cryptographic strength. We should use the NIST "bits of security"
metric to match the encryption key size and type as well as the hmac type.
Use SHA 256 for AES128, etc.&nbsp;Ken Peirce&nbsp;&nbsp;
<br><b><i>"MIURA, Fumiaki" &lt;miura.fumiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp></i></b> wrote:
<blockquote class=replbq style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid">At
Wed, 09 Jan 2008 10:30:17 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
<br>>
<br>> * Fumiaki MIURA:
<br>>
<br>> > At Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200,&nbsp;<PASI.ERONEN@NOKIA.COM>wrote:
<br>> >> TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
<br>> >
<br>> > Why not SHA512 for AES256?
<br>> >
<br>> > For example, FIPS 180-2 say that `security (bits)' for SHA-512
is 256
<br>> > in page 3.
<br>>
<br>> Does this estimate also apply when using SHA-512 as a building block
<br>> for an HMAC?
<p>I think yes, theoretically.
<p>"Message authentication using hash functions: The HMAC construction"
<br><URL: hmac-cb.pdf papers mihir users www-cse.ucsd.edu http:>says:
<br>| As shown in [12, 2], birthday attacks, that are
<br>| the basis to finding collisions in cryptographic hash
<br>| functions, can be applied to attack also keyed MAC
<br>| schemes based on iterated functions (including also
<br>| CBC-MAC, and other schemes). These attacks ap-
<br>| ply to most (or all) of the proposed hash-based
<br>| constructions of MACs.
<p>But, I don't know any realistic attacks if we properly refresh the
<br>key.
<br>&nbsp;
<p>_______________________________________________
<br>TLS mailing list
<br>TLS@lists.ietf.org
<br><A HREF="https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</A></blockquote>

<pre>
<hr WIDTH="90%" SIZE=4>_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@lists.ietf.org
<a href="https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a></pre>
</blockquote>
</html>

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Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2008 19:25:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Yoav Nir" <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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  Hi Yoav,

  Actually NIST has commented on this, it's SP 800-38D. GCM is not
flawed provided you abide by the recommendations in that document.
Specifically section 8.2.1 for the deterministic construction of
the IV (which is used by the GCM ciphersuites for TLS). Since the
nonce construction in draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt is partially
implicit the recommendations in section 8.3 should be interpreted
appropriately.

  It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design
consideration. For instance the module responsible for construction
of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for
[the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that are
necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the
power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in
non-volatile memory."

  There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 that lists
questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementation.
It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and
hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSIONAL
WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a
particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).

  So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisfied that
all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is secure. If
you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of those requirements
can be met or if you don't feel comfortable placing the security of the
system in the hands of "the IT professional" who configures it then
maybe it's not for you.

  Now, back to my screaming above for a second. It is this notice in
SP 800-38D that really makes the SIV ciphersuites attractive. All of
the text in SP 800-38D (approx 8 pages of it) do not apply to SIV
because it is secure even in the presence of IV misuse. That is, if
the IT professional intentionally or unintentionally misconfigures,
misdeploys or improperly maintains a GCM module security is voided but
if that module had been a SIV module security would not be voided
(assuming, of course, that the misuse by the IT professional results in
IV misuse which is the a valid assumption since that's the topic of
the quote above).

  The need for a SIV-based ciphersuites depends on whether you have any
discomfort with any of the numerous requirements placed on proper use
of GCM. If you think that the design considerations of SP 800-38D are
met due to the nature of the TLS protocol and that the deployment
considerations either don't apply ("it's your problem if you misconfigure
it so tough luck") or are similarly met due to the nature of the TLS
protocol then SIV-based ciphersuites are probably not important enough
to bring to the WG. If, on the other hand, these design and deployment
considerations make you uncomfortable and that a TLS module implementing
GCM might be too fragile then a misuse-resistant alternative like SIV
becomes important and attractive.

  regards,

  Dan.

On Mon, January 14, 2008 2:37 am, Yoav Nir wrote:
> Supporting only GCM has the advantage that it works well with the "In
> NIST we trust" model of cryptographic reasoning.
>
> I'm also missing some performance measurements of AES-GCM vs AES-SIV
> vs AES-CBC+HMAC-SHA1. We have the original papers from the authors,
> who made the measurements on a 1 GHz PPC processor. I'm not sure how
> much of an advantage we'd get with more common processors and with
> optimized code. Right now, I don't know what, if anything, any of the
> AEAD ciphersuites would give me.
>
> I don't think GCM is seriously flawed at least in its use in TLS or
> IPsec. But like you, I'm not comfortable claiming it.  In this it may
> be wise to defer to NIST, unless some cryptographer has a different
> view and would like to weigh in.
>
> On Jan 14, 2008, at 12:23 PM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>
>> Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> writes:
>>
>>> That gives the writers of OpenSSL/GnuTLS/Windows CAPI no guidance.
>>
>> I think part of my point is that at this time there is not enough
>> guidance to give: or do we actually know which properties of the
>> various
>> AEAD proposals are critical for Internet-wide use?
>>
>> I don't feel comfortable claiming that the nonce-reuse problem in
>> GCM is
>> never going to lead to serious security problems.  Nor would I feel
>> comfortable to claim that GCM is inherently flawed because of it.
>>
>> If there are specification for several AEAD ciphersuite to chose from,
>> they would each contain discussions of their applicability.  If we
>> only
>> specify AES-GCM and kill other proposals, I suspect that will make it
>> more difficult to re-consider the situation later on.
>>
>> I guess I have argued my point of view now, so I'll try to shut up and
>> let others talk.
>>
>> /Simon
>>
>> Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
>>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>




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Dan Harkins wrote:

>   It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design
> consideration. For instance the module responsible for construction
> of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
> And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for
> [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that are
> necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the
> power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in
> non-volatile memory."

This storage requirement applies only to implementations that
also store (or are in some way able to recover or reuse) the key
itself.=20

(Section 9.1, "If the generation unit cannot recover from a loss of
power, then the authenticated encryption function shall enter a
failure state until a fresh key can be established.")

>   There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 that lists
> questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementation.
> It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and
> hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSIONAL
> WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a
> particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).
>=20
>   So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisfied
> that all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is
> secure. If you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of
> those requirements can be met or if you don't feel comfortable
> placing the security of the system in the hands of "the IT
> professional" who configures it then maybe it's not for you.

As far as I can tell, all (or almost all) of these considerations
are about ensuring proper IV generation and other "cryptographic
hygiene" to ensure one given key doesn't end up being used in
different contexts (e.g. across power loss, with different GCM
mode options, etc.). With complications such as system backups,
this will ultimately depend on the IT administration procedures
as well.

Those concerns don't really seem to apply to protocols that
always establish fresh keys, and during that key establishment,
agree on how the key will be used.

Best regards,
Pasi


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I've re-read the section in SP 800-38D and all it says is that the  
same combination of key and IV should never be re-used.

Section 8.2.1 suggests two methods for IV construction: a counter and  
a LFSR. Both should be easy enough to implement in the cryptographic  
library so that the IT professional doesn't need to worry about  
anything. As for keys, that would depend on the IT professional, or at  
least on getting good entropy for the TLS library, but that is no  
different for CBC or SIV.

So I'm not sure I understand what problem SIV solves. We could have  
standards for GCM require either the counter or LFSR, but this can  
also be just recommended.

On Jan 16, 2008, at 5:25 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:

>
>  Hi Yoav,
>
>  Actually NIST has commented on this, it's SP 800-38D. GCM is not
> flawed provided you abide by the recommendations in that document.
> Specifically section 8.2.1 for the deterministic construction of
> the IV (which is used by the GCM ciphersuites for TLS). Since the
> nonce construction in draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt is partially
> implicit the recommendations in section 8.3 should be interpreted
> appropriately.
>
>  It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design
> consideration. For instance the module responsible for construction
> of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
> And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for
> [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that are
> necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the
> power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in
> non-volatile memory."
>
>  There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 that lists
> questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementation.
> It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and
> hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSIONAL
> WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a
> particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).
>
>  So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisfied that
> all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is secure. If
> you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of those  
> requirements
> can be met or if you don't feel comfortable placing the security of  
> the
> system in the hands of "the IT professional" who configures it then
> maybe it's not for you.
>
>  Now, back to my screaming above for a second. It is this notice in
> SP 800-38D that really makes the SIV ciphersuites attractive. All of
> the text in SP 800-38D (approx 8 pages of it) do not apply to SIV
> because it is secure even in the presence of IV misuse. That is, if
> the IT professional intentionally or unintentionally misconfigures,
> misdeploys or improperly maintains a GCM module security is voided but
> if that module had been a SIV module security would not be voided
> (assuming, of course, that the misuse by the IT professional results  
> in
> IV misuse which is the a valid assumption since that's the topic of
> the quote above).
>
>  The need for a SIV-based ciphersuites depends on whether you have any
> discomfort with any of the numerous requirements placed on proper use
> of GCM. If you think that the design considerations of SP 800-38D are
> met due to the nature of the TLS protocol and that the deployment
> considerations either don't apply ("it's your problem if you  
> misconfigure
> it so tough luck") or are similarly met due to the nature of the TLS
> protocol then SIV-based ciphersuites are probably not important enough
> to bring to the WG. If, on the other hand, these design and deployment
> considerations make you uncomfortable and that a TLS module  
> implementing
> GCM might be too fragile then a misuse-resistant alternative like SIV
> becomes important and attractive.
>
>  regards,
>
>  Dan.


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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Wed Jan 16 12:43:37 2008
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Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2008 09:42:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
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  Yes, they are all about "cryptographic hygiene". Notice how the
fact that the key is "fresh" is only one of the considerations in
SP 800-38D? The fact that TLS produces "fresh" keys does not, by
itself, mean that it is secure or complies with requirements listed
in SP 800-38D. That is necessary but in no way is it sufficient.

  You may think that there is some other aspect to TLS that makes it
unique so that it can only be implemented in a way that precludes any
of the problems that the SP 800-38D addresses. Only I don't agree.

  Dan.

On Wed, January 16, 2008 1:26 am, Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> Dan Harkins wrote:
>
>>   It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design
>> consideration. For instance the module responsible for construction
>> of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
>> And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for
>> [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that are
>> necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the
>> power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in
>> non-volatile memory."
>
> This storage requirement applies only to implementations that
> also store (or are in some way able to recover or reuse) the key
> itself.
>
> (Section 9.1, "If the generation unit cannot recover from a loss of
> power, then the authenticated encryption function shall enter a
> failure state until a fresh key can be established.")
>
>>   There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 that lists
>> questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementation.
>> It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and
>> hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSIONAL
>> WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a
>> particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).
>>
>>   So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisfied
>> that all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is
>> secure. If you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of
>> those requirements can be met or if you don't feel comfortable
>> placing the security of the system in the hands of "the IT
>> professional" who configures it then maybe it's not for you.
>
> As far as I can tell, all (or almost all) of these considerations
> are about ensuring proper IV generation and other "cryptographic
> hygiene" to ensure one given key doesn't end up being used in
> different contexts (e.g. across power loss, with different GCM
> mode options, etc.). With complications such as system backups,
> this will ultimately depend on the IT administration procedures
> as well.
>
> Those concerns don't really seem to apply to protocols that
> always establish fresh keys, and during that key establishment,
> agree on how the key will be used.
>
> Best regards,
> Pasi
>




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Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2008 09:57:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Yoav Nir" <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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  The GCM ciphersuites for TLS use the deterministic nonce construction.
You can ignore the other one in SP 800-38D. Just pay attention to the
sections I listed.

  Like I said, if you think that GCM cannot be implemented in TLS in
such a way that it could fall under any of the topics SP 800-38D addresse=
s
then SIV is not for you.

  I, on the other hand, doubt that "IT professionals" on whom the securit=
y
of GCM depends (according to SP 800-38D) will understand the nuance aroun=
d
IV management. In fact, experience shows that "IT professionals" will
routinely cut corners with security to make things be more scalable--
group pre-shared keys anyone? If all you care about when deploying a
security system is to merely get your boss off your back then the special
circumstances surrounding the particular module in the system you deploy
is not of paramount concern.

  But it's fine. If you think that it is impossible to misuse your GCM
implementation then bully for you. Do you also think that it is impossibl=
e
to misuse _ANY_ TLS implementation of GCM? Is there something in TLS that
makes SP 800-38D not apply?

  Dan.

On Wed, January 16, 2008 1:38 am, Yoav Nir wrote:
> I've re-read the section in SP 800-38D and all it says is that the
> same combination of key and IV should never be re-used.
>
> Section 8.2.1 suggests two methods for IV construction: a counter and
> a LFSR. Both should be easy enough to implement in the cryptographic
> library so that the IT professional doesn't need to worry about
> anything. As for keys, that would depend on the IT professional, or at
> least on getting good entropy for the TLS library, but that is no
> different for CBC or SIV.
>
> So I'm not sure I understand what problem SIV solves. We could have
> standards for GCM require either the counter or LFSR, but this can
> also be just recommended.
>
> On Jan 16, 2008, at 5:25 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:
>
>>
>>  Hi Yoav,
>>
>>  Actually NIST has commented on this, it's SP 800-38D. GCM is not
>> flawed provided you abide by the recommendations in that document.
>> Specifically section 8.2.1 for the deterministic construction of
>> the IV (which is used by the GCM ciphersuites for TLS). Since the
>> nonce construction in draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt is partially
>> implicit the recommendations in section 8.3 should be interpreted
>> appropriately.
>>
>>  It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design
>> consideration. For instance the module responsible for construction
>> of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
>> And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for
>> [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that are
>> necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the
>> power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in
>> non-volatile memory."
>>
>>  There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 that lists
>> questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementation.
>> It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and
>> hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSIONAL
>> WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a
>> particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).
>>
>>  So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisfied that
>> all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is secure. If
>> you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of those
>> requirements
>> can be met or if you don't feel comfortable placing the security of
>> the
>> system in the hands of "the IT professional" who configures it then
>> maybe it's not for you.
>>
>>  Now, back to my screaming above for a second. It is this notice in
>> SP 800-38D that really makes the SIV ciphersuites attractive. All of
>> the text in SP 800-38D (approx 8 pages of it) do not apply to SIV
>> because it is secure even in the presence of IV misuse. That is, if
>> the IT professional intentionally or unintentionally misconfigures,
>> misdeploys or improperly maintains a GCM module security is voided but
>> if that module had been a SIV module security would not be voided
>> (assuming, of course, that the misuse by the IT professional results
>> in
>> IV misuse which is the a valid assumption since that's the topic of
>> the quote above).
>>
>>  The need for a SIV-based ciphersuites depends on whether you have any
>> discomfort with any of the numerous requirements placed on proper use
>> of GCM. If you think that the design considerations of SP 800-38D are
>> met due to the nature of the TLS protocol and that the deployment
>> considerations either don't apply ("it's your problem if you
>> misconfigure
>> it so tough luck") or are similarly met due to the nature of the TLS
>> protocol then SIV-based ciphersuites are probably not important enough
>> to bring to the WG. If, on the other hand, these design and deployment
>> considerations make you uncomfortable and that a TLS module
>> implementing
>> GCM might be too fragile then a misuse-resistant alternative like SIV
>> becomes important and attractive.
>>
>>  regards,
>>
>>  Dan.
>
>




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Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2008 13:38:32 -0500
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
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IMHO the assumption is that there aren't going to be many TLS implementatio=
ns - just like there weren't many IPsec implementations.

Those who do find the need (and financial resources :-) to re-implement TLS=
 (as opposed to application writers that usually - always? - take existing =
reference implementations) are likely to know enough to implement GCM the r=
ight way (which isn't so hard after all).

I don't expect "IT professionals" going off re-implementing TLS, not any mo=
re than re-implementing Linux or Windows.

Regarding SIV - let it live like other AEAD modes, with GCM having the adva=
ntage among them of being already recognized and deployed.

On 1/16/08 12:57 PM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:



  The GCM ciphersuites for TLS use the deterministic nonce construction.
You can ignore the other one in SP 800-38D. Just pay attention to the
sections I listed.

  Like I said, if you think that GCM cannot be implemented in TLS in
such a way that it could fall under any of the topics SP 800-38D addresses
then SIV is not for you.

  I, on the other hand, doubt that "IT professionals" on whom the security
of GCM depends (according to SP 800-38D) will understand the nuance around
IV management. In fact, experience shows that "IT professionals" will
routinely cut corners with security to make things be more scalable--
group pre-shared keys anyone? If all you care about when deploying a
security system is to merely get your boss off your back then the special
circumstances surrounding the particular module in the system you deploy
is not of paramount concern.

  But it's fine. If you think that it is impossible to misuse your GCM
implementation then bully for you. Do you also think that it is impossible
to misuse _ANY_ TLS implementation of GCM? Is there something in TLS that
makes SP 800-38D not apply?

  Dan.

On Wed, January 16, 2008 1:38 am, Yoav Nir wrote:
> I've re-read the section in SP 800-38D and all it says is that the
> same combination of key and IV should never be re-used.
>
> Section 8.2.1 suggests two methods for IV construction: a counter and
> a LFSR. Both should be easy enough to implement in the cryptographic
> library so that the IT professional doesn't need to worry about
> anything. As for keys, that would depend on the IT professional, or at
> least on getting good entropy for the TLS library, but that is no
> different for CBC or SIV.
>
> So I'm not sure I understand what problem SIV solves. We could have
> standards for GCM require either the counter or LFSR, but this can
> also be just recommended.
>
> On Jan 16, 2008, at 5:25 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:
>
>>
>>  Hi Yoav,
>>
>>  Actually NIST has commented on this, it's SP 800-38D. GCM is not
>> flawed provided you abide by the recommendations in that document.
>> Specifically section 8.2.1 for the deterministic construction of
>> the IV (which is used by the GCM ciphersuites for TLS). Since the
>> nonce construction in draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt is partially
>> implicit the recommendations in section 8.3 should be interpreted
>> appropriately.
>>
>>  It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design
>> consideration. For instance the module responsible for construction
>> of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
>> And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for
>> [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that are
>> necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the
>> power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in
>> non-volatile memory."
>>
>>  There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 that lists
>> questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementation.
>> It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and
>> hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSIONAL
>> WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a
>> particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).
>>
>>  So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisfied that
>> all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is secure. If
>> you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of those
>> requirements
>> can be met or if you don't feel comfortable placing the security of
>> the
>> system in the hands of "the IT professional" who configures it then
>> maybe it's not for you.
>>
>>  Now, back to my screaming above for a second. It is this notice in
>> SP 800-38D that really makes the SIV ciphersuites attractive. All of
>> the text in SP 800-38D (approx 8 pages of it) do not apply to SIV
>> because it is secure even in the presence of IV misuse. That is, if
>> the IT professional intentionally or unintentionally misconfigures,
>> misdeploys or improperly maintains a GCM module security is voided but
>> if that module had been a SIV module security would not be voided
>> (assuming, of course, that the misuse by the IT professional results
>> in
>> IV misuse which is the a valid assumption since that's the topic of
>> the quote above).
>>
>>  The need for a SIV-based ciphersuites depends on whether you have any
>> discomfort with any of the numerous requirements placed on proper use
>> of GCM. If you think that the design considerations of SP 800-38D are
>> met due to the nature of the TLS protocol and that the deployment
>> considerations either don't apply ("it's your problem if you
>> misconfigure
>> it so tough luck") or are similarly met due to the nature of the TLS
>> protocol then SIV-based ciphersuites are probably not important enough
>> to bring to the WG. If, on the other hand, these design and deployment
>> considerations make you uncomfortable and that a TLS module
>> implementing
>> GCM might be too fragile then a misuse-resistant alternative like SIV
>> becomes important and attractive.
>>
>>  regards,
>>
>>  Dan.
>
>




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--_000_C3B3B9582B4urillmitedu_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>I=
MHO the assumption is that there aren&#8217;t going to be many TLS implemen=
tations &#8211; just like there weren&#8217;t many IPsec implementations. <=
BR>
<BR>
Those who do find the need (and financial resources :-) to re-implement TLS=
 (as opposed to application writers that usually &#8211; always? - take exi=
sting reference implementations) are likely to know enough to implement GCM=
 the right way (which isn&#8217;t so hard after all).<BR>
<BR>
I don&#8217;t expect &#8220;IT professionals&#8221; going off re-implementi=
ng TLS, not any more than re-implementing Linux or Windows.<BR>
<BR>
Regarding SIV &#8211; let it live like other AEAD modes, with GCM having th=
e advantage among them of being already recognized and deployed.<BR>
<BR>
On 1/16/08 12:57 PM, &quot;Dan Harkins&quot; &lt;dharkins@lounge.org&gt; wr=
ote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN ST=
YLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'><BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;The GCM ciphersuites for TLS use the deterministic nonce constr=
uction.<BR>
You can ignore the other one in SP 800-38D. Just pay attention to the<BR>
sections I listed.<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;Like I said, if you think that GCM cannot be implemented in TLS=
 in<BR>
such a way that it could fall under any of the topics SP 800-38D addresses<=
BR>
then SIV is not for you.<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;I, on the other hand, doubt that &quot;IT professionals&quot; o=
n whom the security<BR>
of GCM depends (according to SP 800-38D) will understand the nuance around<=
BR>
IV management. In fact, experience shows that &quot;IT professionals&quot; =
will<BR>
routinely cut corners with security to make things be more scalable--<BR>
group pre-shared keys anyone? If all you care about when deploying a<BR>
security system is to merely get your boss off your back then the special<B=
R>
circumstances surrounding the particular module in the system you deploy<BR=
>
is not of paramount concern.<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;But it's fine. If you think that it is impossible to misuse you=
r GCM<BR>
implementation then bully for you. Do you also think that it is impossible<=
BR>
to misuse _ANY_ TLS implementation of GCM? Is there something in TLS that<B=
R>
makes SP 800-38D not apply?<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;Dan.<BR>
<BR>
On Wed, January 16, 2008 1:38 am, Yoav Nir wrote:<BR>
&gt; I've re-read the section in SP 800-38D and all it says is that the<BR>
&gt; same combination of key and IV should never be re-used.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; Section 8.2.1 suggests two methods for IV construction: a counter and<=
BR>
&gt; a LFSR. Both should be easy enough to implement in the cryptographic<B=
R>
&gt; library so that the IT professional doesn't need to worry about<BR>
&gt; anything. As for keys, that would depend on the IT professional, or at=
<BR>
&gt; least on getting good entropy for the TLS library, but that is no<BR>
&gt; different for CBC or SIV.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; So I'm not sure I understand what problem SIV solves. We could have<BR=
>
&gt; standards for GCM require either the counter or LFSR, but this can<BR>
&gt; also be just recommended.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; On Jan 16, 2008, at 5:25 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;Hi Yoav,<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;Actually NIST has commented on this, it's SP 800-38D. GCM is=
 not<BR>
&gt;&gt; flawed provided you abide by the recommendations in that document.=
<BR>
&gt;&gt; Specifically section 8.2.1 for the deterministic construction of<B=
R>
&gt;&gt; the IV (which is used by the GCM ciphersuites for TLS). Since the<=
BR>
&gt;&gt; nonce construction in draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt is partial=
ly<BR>
&gt;&gt; implicit the recommendations in section 8.3 should be interpreted<=
BR>
&gt;&gt; appropriately.<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design=
<BR>
&gt;&gt; consideration. For instance the module responsible for constructio=
n<BR>
&gt;&gt; of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.<BR=
>
&gt;&gt; And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, &quot=
;for<BR>
&gt;&gt; [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that a=
re<BR>
&gt;&gt; necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the<=
BR>
&gt;&gt; power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in<=
BR>
&gt;&gt; non-volatile memory.&quot;<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 tha=
t lists<BR>
&gt;&gt; questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementatio=
n.<BR>
&gt;&gt; It states, &quot;Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs=
, and<BR>
&gt;&gt; hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSION=
AL<BR>
&gt;&gt; WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a<B=
R>
&gt;&gt; particular system.&quot; (emphasis mine and I apologize for scream=
ing).<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisf=
ied that<BR>
&gt;&gt; all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is secure=
. If<BR>
&gt;&gt; you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of those<BR>
&gt;&gt; requirements<BR>
&gt;&gt; can be met or if you don't feel comfortable placing the security o=
f<BR>
&gt;&gt; the<BR>
&gt;&gt; system in the hands of &quot;the IT professional&quot; who configu=
res it then<BR>
&gt;&gt; maybe it's not for you.<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;Now, back to my screaming above for a second. It is this not=
ice in<BR>
&gt;&gt; SP 800-38D that really makes the SIV ciphersuites attractive. All =
of<BR>
&gt;&gt; the text in SP 800-38D (approx 8 pages of it) do not apply to SIV<=
BR>
&gt;&gt; because it is secure even in the presence of IV misuse. That is, i=
f<BR>
&gt;&gt; the IT professional intentionally or unintentionally misconfigures=
,<BR>
&gt;&gt; misdeploys or improperly maintains a GCM module security is voided=
 but<BR>
&gt;&gt; if that module had been a SIV module security would not be voided<=
BR>
&gt;&gt; (assuming, of course, that the misuse by the IT professional resul=
ts<BR>
&gt;&gt; in<BR>
&gt;&gt; IV misuse which is the a valid assumption since that's the topic o=
f<BR>
&gt;&gt; the quote above).<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;The need for a SIV-based ciphersuites depends on whether you=
 have any<BR>
&gt;&gt; discomfort with any of the numerous requirements placed on proper =
use<BR>
&gt;&gt; of GCM. If you think that the design considerations of SP 800-38D =
are<BR>
&gt;&gt; met due to the nature of the TLS protocol and that the deployment<=
BR>
&gt;&gt; considerations either don't apply (&quot;it's your problem if you<=
BR>
&gt;&gt; misconfigure<BR>
&gt;&gt; it so tough luck&quot;) or are similarly met due to the nature of =
the TLS<BR>
&gt;&gt; protocol then SIV-based ciphersuites are probably not important en=
ough<BR>
&gt;&gt; to bring to the WG. If, on the other hand, these design and deploy=
ment<BR>
&gt;&gt; considerations make you uncomfortable and that a TLS module<BR>
&gt;&gt; implementing<BR>
&gt;&gt; GCM might be too fragile then a misuse-resistant alternative like =
SIV<BR>
&gt;&gt; becomes important and attractive.<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;regards,<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;Dan.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
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TLS mailing list<BR>
TLS@lists.ietf.org<BR>
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'><BR>
<BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT>
</BODY>
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Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2008 11:41:58 +0100
From: "Bodo Moeller" <bmoeller@acm.org>
To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Issue 66: HMAC-256 based ciphersuites
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On Jan 10, 2008 11:37 AM, MIURA, Fumiaki <miura.fumiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp> wrote:
> At Wed, 09 Jan 2008 10:30:17 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> > * Fumiaki MIURA:
> > > At Tue, 8 Jan 2008 12:53:25 +0200, <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:

> > >> TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256

> > > Why not SHA512 for AES256?
> > >
> > > For example, FIPS 180-2 say that `security (bits)' for SHA-512 is 256
> > > in page 3.

> > Does this estimate also apply when using SHA-512 as a building block
> > for an HMAC?

> I think yes, theoretically.

Theoretically, this is true.  (By the way, note that there are now two
generations of research papers with HMAC security results:

http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/hmac.html
http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/hmac-new.html

The latter says that collision attacks against a hash function don't
mean it is bad for HMAC.  Still it's probably a very good idea to
phase out SHA-1.)

However, if we look specifically at TLS, we have a sequence number
space of size 2^64, which is quite far away from the 2^128 where we'd
expect to run into birthday collisions with SHA-256.  So the
theoretical attack doesn't apply, and we should be able to expect more
than 128 bits of security from HMAC-SHA-256 as used in TLS.  In fact,
even 128-bit MAC security should be perfectly fine even for
applications requiring 256-bit encryption security.  This is because
the reason for demanding such a huge security margin is long-term
security -- we are thinking of attackers who might spent half an
eternity trying to break our encryption.  The window for potential
attacks against MAC authentication in TLS, in contrast, is closed once
the connection is over.

Bodo


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
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At Wed, 16 Jan 2008 09:57:36 -0800 (PST),
Dan Harkins wrote:
> 
> 
>   The GCM ciphersuites for TLS use the deterministic nonce construction.
> You can ignore the other one in SP 800-38D. Just pay attention to the
> sections I listed.
> 
>   Like I said, if you think that GCM cannot be implemented in TLS in
> such a way that it could fall under any of the topics SP 800-38D addresses
> then SIV is not for you.
> 
>   I, on the other hand, doubt that "IT professionals" on whom the security
> of GCM depends (according to SP 800-38D) will understand the nuance around
> IV management. In fact, experience shows that "IT professionals" will
> routinely cut corners with security to make things be more scalable--
> group pre-shared keys anyone? If all you care about when deploying a
> security system is to merely get your boss off your back then the special
> circumstances surrounding the particular module in the system you deploy
> is not of paramount concern.
> 
>   But it's fine. If you think that it is impossible to misuse your GCM
> implementation then bully for you. Do you also think that it is impossible
> to misuse _ANY_ TLS implementation of GCM? Is there something in TLS that
> makes SP 800-38D not apply?

Dan,

As I said in the WG meeting, I think this only meets half the burden for
SIV being a good idea. TLS has a block cipher mode which is extremely
resistant to IV reuse: CBC. The reason that GCM is attractive is that
it has good performance and ciphertext size properties as compared to
CBC. Given that SIV doesn't have particularly good performance propoerties,
in what settings would it be significant improvement over CBC?

-Ekr


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Subject: RE: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2008 10:12:40 -0800
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
Thread-Index: AchYaXRrugKbZ1IcQlKhzkbna4MaxAAyhj/g
From: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
To: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>, "Yoav Nir" <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Errors-To: tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org

In the AES-GCM ciphersuite in TLS the nonce is managed by the TLS
implementations.  The segment of "IT professionals" that need to deal
with nonces is not those that deploy systems, rather it is those that
implement the TLS module.  It is possible that an implementer may
incorrectly implement a cryptosystem.   This is true regardless which
mode is used (GCM,SIV,CBC, etc.)

In addition, as Eric mentioned, while GCM and SIV are both AEAD
ciphersuites, they have different performance characteristics.  It is
likely that a user choosing GCM would be unhappy replacing it with SIV.


Cheers,

Joe =20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2008 9:58 AM
> To: Yoav Nir
> Cc: Simon Josefsson; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
>=20
>=20
>   The GCM ciphersuites for TLS use the deterministic nonce=20
> construction.
> You can ignore the other one in SP 800-38D. Just pay=20
> attention to the sections I listed.
>=20
>   Like I said, if you think that GCM cannot be implemented in=20
> TLS in such a way that it could fall under any of the topics=20
> SP 800-38D addresses then SIV is not for you.
>=20
>   I, on the other hand, doubt that "IT professionals" on whom=20
> the security of GCM depends (according to SP 800-38D) will=20
> understand the nuance around IV management. In fact,=20
> experience shows that "IT professionals" will routinely cut=20
> corners with security to make things be more scalable-- group=20
> pre-shared keys anyone? If all you care about when deploying=20
> a security system is to merely get your boss off your back=20
> then the special circumstances surrounding the particular=20
> module in the system you deploy is not of paramount concern.
>=20
>   But it's fine. If you think that it is impossible to misuse=20
> your GCM implementation then bully for you. Do you also think=20
> that it is impossible to misuse _ANY_ TLS implementation of=20
> GCM? Is there something in TLS that makes SP 800-38D not apply?
>=20
>   Dan.
>=20
> On Wed, January 16, 2008 1:38 am, Yoav Nir wrote:
> > I've re-read the section in SP 800-38D and all it says is that the=20
> > same combination of key and IV should never be re-used.
> >
> > Section 8.2.1 suggests two methods for IV construction: a=20
> counter and=20
> > a LFSR. Both should be easy enough to implement in the=20
> cryptographic=20
> > library so that the IT professional doesn't need to worry about=20
> > anything. As for keys, that would depend on the IT=20
> professional, or at=20
> > least on getting good entropy for the TLS library, but that is no=20
> > different for CBC or SIV.
> >
> > So I'm not sure I understand what problem SIV solves. We could have=20
> > standards for GCM require either the counter or LFSR, but this can=20
> > also be just recommended.
> >
> > On Jan 16, 2008, at 5:25 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>  Hi Yoav,
> >>
> >>  Actually NIST has commented on this, it's SP 800-38D. GCM is not=20
> >> flawed provided you abide by the recommendations in that document.
> >> Specifically section 8.2.1 for the deterministic=20
> construction of the=20
> >> IV (which is used by the GCM ciphersuites for TLS). Since=20
> the nonce=20
> >> construction in draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt is partially=20
> >> implicit the recommendations in section 8.3 should be interpreted=20
> >> appropriately.
> >>
> >>  It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design=20
> >> consideration. For instance the module responsible for=20
> construction=20
> >> of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
> >> And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for=20
> >> [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic=20
> elements that are=20
> >> necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the=20
> >> power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in=20
> >> non-volatile memory."
> >>
> >>  There are also operational considerations in section 9.2=20
> that lists=20
> >> questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM=20
> implementation.
> >> It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and=20
> >> hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT=20
> PROFESSIONAL=20
> >> WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a=20
> >> particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).
> >>
> >>  So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are=20
> satisfied that=20
> >> all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM=20
> is secure.=20
> >> If you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of those=20
> >> requirements can be met or if you don't feel comfortable=20
> placing the=20
> >> security of the system in the hands of "the IT professional" who=20
> >> configures it then maybe it's not for you.
> >>
> >>  Now, back to my screaming above for a second. It is this=20
> notice in=20
> >> SP 800-38D that really makes the SIV ciphersuites=20
> attractive. All of=20
> >> the text in SP 800-38D (approx 8 pages of it) do not apply to SIV=20
> >> because it is secure even in the presence of IV misuse.=20
> That is, if=20
> >> the IT professional intentionally or unintentionally=20
> misconfigures,=20
> >> misdeploys or improperly maintains a GCM module security is voided=20
> >> but if that module had been a SIV module security would=20
> not be voided=20
> >> (assuming, of course, that the misuse by the IT=20
> professional results=20
> >> in IV misuse which is the a valid assumption since that's=20
> the topic=20
> >> of the quote above).
> >>
> >>  The need for a SIV-based ciphersuites depends on whether you have=20
> >> any discomfort with any of the numerous requirements=20
> placed on proper=20
> >> use of GCM. If you think that the design considerations of=20
> SP 800-38D=20
> >> are met due to the nature of the TLS protocol and that the=20
> deployment=20
> >> considerations either don't apply ("it's your problem if you=20
> >> misconfigure it so tough luck") or are similarly met due to the=20
> >> nature of the TLS protocol then SIV-based ciphersuites are=20
> probably=20
> >> not important enough to bring to the WG. If, on the other=20
> hand, these=20
> >> design and deployment considerations make you=20
> uncomfortable and that=20
> >> a TLS module implementing GCM might be too fragile then a=20
> >> misuse-resistant alternative like SIV becomes important and=20
> >> attractive.
> >>
> >>  regards,
> >>
> >>  Dan.
> >
> >
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Fri Jan 18 02:51:24 2008
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Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2008 10:39:34 -0800
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
From: mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>, <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <C3B4E0E6.37DF%mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
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Hi Dan,

You seem to be arguing that SIV should be added to TLS because GCM is
deficient.   This line of thinking would sell both of those algorithms
short.

GCM is efficient at high data rates and high connection densities, and has
become the preferred algorithm for such uses.  It should be added to TLS so
that protocol gets those benefits.   It requires distinct nonces, but the
protocol can easily provide these.  You may be right in pointing out that in
some implementation environments, it is burdensome to provide distinct
nonces, but the efficiencies provided by GCM make it a good tradeoff in many
other environments.

It would be wrong to argue that SIV should be adopted because nonce
management for GCM and CTR are tricky.  This line of reasoning ignores other
ciphersuites, such as those using CBC mode, which have no nonce management
requirements, and it misses the fact that SIV does not have the efficiency
advantages of GCM and CTR.

You've pointed out the performance difference yourself in
draft-dharkins-siv-aes, where you say that "SIV can not perform at the same
high throughput rates that other authenticated encryption schemes can (e.g.
[GCM] or [OCB]), due to the requirement for two passes of the data but for
situations where performance is not a limiting factor-- e.g. control plane
applications-- it can provide a robust alternative, especially when
considering its resistance to nonce re-use."   In
draft-harkins-tls-rsa-aes-siv-00, you mention the CAPWAP as an example of a
control plane application where performance is not a limiting factor.  So
maybe we're not in disagreement here, though since TLS is mostly not limited
to control-plane applications, I think something got lost in the discussion
below.  

Now, returning to the comparison between SIV and the use of CBC in TLS, SIV
does well in this competition.  It has the advantage that it does not
require any initialization vector.  It avoids the vulnerabilities that CBC
has to chosen-plaintext attacks whenever the IV is predictable (as it
unfortunately can be in TLS), while not requiring a random IV and not
requiring any nonce management.  Not requiring any random source is a nice
property.  It would be interesting to see if we can put together a
ciphersuite that completely avoids the need for a random source.  Such a
thing could be useful in some constrained environments.  (However, a random
source is fundamental to DHE and to DSA signatures, and is used in RSA
encryption, so this idea needs more research.)   SIV is less appealing than
CBC for hardware implementations, but perhaps this doesn't matter so much
since there are other methods better than both CBC and SIV in that
application.  (Though it is worth noting out that we know that there are
algorithms that are more performance-friendly than SIV mode, such as the one
that uses a polynomial hash, as we'd discussed on the CFRG list.)

I suppose that, for completeness, one should compare SIV based TLS
ciphersuites to ones that use RC4.  I expect that people would agree that it
is desirable to have alternatives to RC4, so the fact that RC4 does not
require a random IV nor a distinct nonce should not really matter in the
discussion of SIV.

On a more positive note, I think that it is useful work to define how to add
a different AEAD to TLS.  It will test out the generality of the AEAD
interface that we've defined for TLS-GCM, and no doubt will improve our
"algorithm agility" story.

Best regards,

David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2008 9:58 AM
> To: Yoav Nir
> Cc: Simon Josefsson; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
> 
> 
>   The GCM ciphersuites for TLS use the deterministic nonce construction.
> You can ignore the other one in SP 800-38D. Just pay attention to the
> sections I listed.
> 
>   Like I said, if you think that GCM cannot be implemented in TLS in
> such a way that it could fall under any of the topics SP 800-38D
> addresses then SIV is not for you.
> 
>   I, on the other hand, doubt that "IT professionals" on whom the
> security of GCM depends (according to SP 800-38D) will understand the
> nuance around IV management. In fact, experience shows that "IT
> professionals" will routinely cut corners with security to make things
> be more scalable-- group pre-shared keys anyone? If all you care about
> when deploying a security system is to merely get your boss off your
> back then the special circumstances surrounding the particular module in
> the system you deploy is not of paramount concern.
> 
>   But it's fine. If you think that it is impossible to misuse your GCM
> implementation then bully for you. Do you also think that it is
> impossible to misuse _ANY_ TLS implementation of GCM? Is there something
> in TLS that makes SP 800-38D not apply?
> 
>   Dan.
> 
> On Wed, January 16, 2008 1:38 am, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> I've re-read the section in SP 800-38D and all it says is that the
>> same combination of key and IV should never be re-used.
>> 
>> Section 8.2.1 suggests two methods for IV construction: a counter and
>> a LFSR. Both should be easy enough to implement in the cryptographic
>> library so that the IT professional doesn't need to worry about
>> anything. As for keys, that would depend on the IT professional, or at
> 
>> least on getting good entropy for the TLS library, but that is no
>> different for CBC or SIV.
>> 
>> So I'm not sure I understand what problem SIV solves. We could have
>> standards for GCM require either the counter or LFSR, but this can
>> also be just recommended.
>> 
>> On Jan 16, 2008, at 5:25 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>>  Hi Yoav,
>>> 
>>>  Actually NIST has commented on this, it's SP 800-38D. GCM is not
>>> flawed provided you abide by the recommendations in that document.
>>> Specifically section 8.2.1 for the deterministic construction of the
>>> IV (which is used by the GCM ciphersuites for TLS). Since the nonce
>>> construction in draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt is partially
>>> implicit the recommendations in section 8.3 should be interpreted
>>> appropriately.
>>> 
>>>  It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design
>>> consideration. For instance the module responsible for construction
>>> of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
>>> And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for
>>> [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that are
>>> necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the
>>> power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in
>>> non-volatile memory."
>>> 
>>>  There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 that lists
>>> questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementation.
>>> It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and
>>> hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSIONAL
>>> WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a
>>> particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).
>>> 
>>>  So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisfied that
> 
>>> all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is secure.
>>> If you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of those
>>> requirements can be met or if you don't feel comfortable placing the
>>> security of the system in the hands of "the IT professional" who
>>> configures it then maybe it's not for you.
>>> 
>>>  Now, back to my screaming above for a second. It is this notice in
>>> SP 800-38D that really makes the SIV ciphersuites attractive. All of
>>> the text in SP 800-38D (approx 8 pages of it) do not apply to SIV
>>> because it is secure even in the presence of IV misuse. That is, if
>>> the IT professional intentionally or unintentionally misconfigures,
>>> misdeploys or improperly maintains a GCM module security is voided
>>> but if that module had been a SIV module security would not be voided
> 
>>> (assuming, of course, that the misuse by the IT professional results
>>> in IV misuse which is the a valid assumption since that's the topic
>>> of the quote above).
>>> 
>>>  The need for a SIV-based ciphersuites depends on whether you have
>>> any discomfort with any of the numerous requirements placed on proper
> 
>>> use of GCM. If you think that the design considerations of SP 800-38D
> 
>>> are met due to the nature of the TLS protocol and that the deployment
> 
>>> considerations either don't apply ("it's your problem if you
>>> misconfigure it so tough luck") or are similarly met due to the
>>> nature of the TLS protocol then SIV-based ciphersuites are probably
>>> not important enough to bring to the WG. If, on the other hand, these
> 
>>> design and deployment considerations make you uncomfortable and that
>>> a TLS module implementing GCM might be too fragile then a
>>> misuse-resistant alternative like SIV becomes important and
>>> attractive.
>>> 
>>>  regards,
>>> 
>>>  Dan.
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



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Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2008 09:36:17 -0800
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
To: mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
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At Thu, 17 Jan 2008 10:39:34 -0800,
mcgrew wrote:
> Now, returning to the comparison between SIV and the use of CBC in TLS, SIV
> does well in this competition.  It has the advantage that it does not
> require any initialization vector.  It avoids the vulnerabilities that CBC
> has to chosen-plaintext attacks whenever the IV is predictable (as it
> unfortunately can be in TLS), while not requiring a random IV and not
> requiring any nonce management.  Not requiring any random source is a nice
> property.


David,

I'm not sure I understand this argument. It's certainly true that
CBC in TLS needs to be used with an unpredictable IV, but this
doesn't require an independent random source. Indeed, RFC 4346
include several suggested methods for generating IVs without one,
for instance, enciphering a dummy block using the encryption
key and the CBC state from the previous record. 

-Ekr


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Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2008 10:32:33 -0800
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
From: mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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Hi Eric,

On 1/18/08 9:36 AM, "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@networkresonance.com> wrote:

> At Thu, 17 Jan 2008 10:39:34 -0800,
> mcgrew wrote:
>> Now, returning to the comparison between SIV and the use of CBC in TLS, SIV
>> does well in this competition.  It has the advantage that it does not
>> require any initialization vector.  It avoids the vulnerabilities that CBC
>> has to chosen-plaintext attacks whenever the IV is predictable (as it
>> unfortunately can be in TLS), while not requiring a random IV and not
>> requiring any nonce management.  Not requiring any random source is a nice
>> property.
> 
> 
> David,
> 
> I'm not sure I understand this argument. It's certainly true that
> CBC in TLS needs to be used with an unpredictable IV, but this
> doesn't require an independent random source. Indeed, RFC 4346
> include several suggested methods for generating IVs without one,
> for instance, enciphering a dummy block using the encryption
> key and the CBC state from the previous record.
> 
> -Ekr

Good point, thanks for mentioning it.

David



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Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2008 06:29:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
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  Hi David,

  I'm not saying GCM is deficient, only more easy to get wrong (with
catastrophic results). Given the choice between the two-- pick one and
only one-- I would pick GCM, for the reasons mentioned by Eric and Uri.
But I believe SIV has a place. Sadly it looks like very few share that
belief.

  regards,

  Dan.

On Thu, January 17, 2008 10:39 am, mcgrew wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
> You seem to be arguing that SIV should be added to TLS because GCM is
> deficient.   This line of thinking would sell both of those algorithms
> short.
>
> GCM is efficient at high data rates and high connection densities, and =
has
> become the preferred algorithm for such uses.  It should be added to TL=
S
> so
> that protocol gets those benefits.   It requires distinct nonces, but t=
he
> protocol can easily provide these.  You may be right in pointing out th=
at
> in
> some implementation environments, it is burdensome to provide distinct
> nonces, but the efficiencies provided by GCM make it a good tradeoff in
> many
> other environments.
>
> It would be wrong to argue that SIV should be adopted because nonce
> management for GCM and CTR are tricky.  This line of reasoning ignores
> other
> ciphersuites, such as those using CBC mode, which have no nonce managem=
ent
> requirements, and it misses the fact that SIV does not have the efficie=
ncy
> advantages of GCM and CTR.
>
> You've pointed out the performance difference yourself in
> draft-dharkins-siv-aes, where you say that "SIV can not perform at the
> same
> high throughput rates that other authenticated encryption schemes can
> (e.g.
> [GCM] or [OCB]), due to the requirement for two passes of the data but =
for
> situations where performance is not a limiting factor-- e.g. control pl=
ane
> applications-- it can provide a robust alternative, especially when
> considering its resistance to nonce re-use."   In
> draft-harkins-tls-rsa-aes-siv-00, you mention the CAPWAP as an example =
of
> a
> control plane application where performance is not a limiting factor.  =
So
> maybe we're not in disagreement here, though since TLS is mostly not
> limited
> to control-plane applications, I think something got lost in the
> discussion
> below.
>
> Now, returning to the comparison between SIV and the use of CBC in TLS,
> SIV
> does well in this competition.  It has the advantage that it does not
> require any initialization vector.  It avoids the vulnerabilities that =
CBC
> has to chosen-plaintext attacks whenever the IV is predictable (as it
> unfortunately can be in TLS), while not requiring a random IV and not
> requiring any nonce management.  Not requiring any random source is a n=
ice
> property.  It would be interesting to see if we can put together a
> ciphersuite that completely avoids the need for a random source.  Such =
a
> thing could be useful in some constrained environments.  (However, a
> random
> source is fundamental to DHE and to DSA signatures, and is used in RSA
> encryption, so this idea needs more research.)   SIV is less appealing
> than
> CBC for hardware implementations, but perhaps this doesn't matter so mu=
ch
> since there are other methods better than both CBC and SIV in that
> application.  (Though it is worth noting out that we know that there ar=
e
> algorithms that are more performance-friendly than SIV mode, such as th=
e
> one
> that uses a polynomial hash, as we'd discussed on the CFRG list.)
>
> I suppose that, for completeness, one should compare SIV based TLS
> ciphersuites to ones that use RC4.  I expect that people would agree th=
at
> it
> is desirable to have alternatives to RC4, so the fact that RC4 does not
> require a random IV nor a distinct nonce should not really matter in th=
e
> discussion of SIV.
>
> On a more positive note, I think that it is useful work to define how t=
o
> add
> a different AEAD to TLS.  It will test out the generality of the AEAD
> interface that we've defined for TLS-GCM, and no doubt will improve our
> "algorithm agility" story.
>
> Best regards,
>
> David
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2008 9:58 AM
>> To: Yoav Nir
>> Cc: Simon Josefsson; tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: SIV as WG item?
>>
>>
>>   The GCM ciphersuites for TLS use the deterministic nonce constructio=
n.
>> You can ignore the other one in SP 800-38D. Just pay attention to the
>> sections I listed.
>>
>>   Like I said, if you think that GCM cannot be implemented in TLS in
>> such a way that it could fall under any of the topics SP 800-38D
>> addresses then SIV is not for you.
>>
>>   I, on the other hand, doubt that "IT professionals" on whom the
>> security of GCM depends (according to SP 800-38D) will understand the
>> nuance around IV management. In fact, experience shows that "IT
>> professionals" will routinely cut corners with security to make things
>> be more scalable-- group pre-shared keys anyone? If all you care about
>> when deploying a security system is to merely get your boss off your
>> back then the special circumstances surrounding the particular module =
in
>> the system you deploy is not of paramount concern.
>>
>>   But it's fine. If you think that it is impossible to misuse your GCM
>> implementation then bully for you. Do you also think that it is
>> impossible to misuse _ANY_ TLS implementation of GCM? Is there somethi=
ng
>> in TLS that makes SP 800-38D not apply?
>>
>>   Dan.
>>
>> On Wed, January 16, 2008 1:38 am, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> I've re-read the section in SP 800-38D and all it says is that the
>>> same combination of key and IV should never be re-used.
>>>
>>> Section 8.2.1 suggests two methods for IV construction: a counter and
>>> a LFSR. Both should be easy enough to implement in the cryptographic
>>> library so that the IT professional doesn't need to worry about
>>> anything. As for keys, that would depend on the IT professional, or a=
t
>>
>>> least on getting good entropy for the TLS library, but that is no
>>> different for CBC or SIV.
>>>
>>> So I'm not sure I understand what problem SIV solves. We could have
>>> standards for GCM require either the counter or LFSR, but this can
>>> also be just recommended.
>>>
>>> On Jan 16, 2008, at 5:25 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Hi Yoav,
>>>>
>>>>  Actually NIST has commented on this, it's SP 800-38D. GCM is not
>>>> flawed provided you abide by the recommendations in that document.
>>>> Specifically section 8.2.1 for the deterministic construction of the
>>>> IV (which is used by the GCM ciphersuites for TLS). Since the nonce
>>>> construction in draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt is partially
>>>> implicit the recommendations in section 8.3 should be interpreted
>>>> appropriately.
>>>>
>>>>  It is also important to look at section 9.1 regarding design
>>>> consideration. For instance the module responsible for construction
>>>> of the nonce must be inside the FIPS140 cryptographic boundary.
>>>> And in the case of power loss of an entity implementing GCM, "for
>>>> [the TLS GCM ciphersuite] all of the deterministic elements that are
>>>> necessary to construct the IV would have to be available when the
>>>> power is restored. For example, these elements could be stored in
>>>> non-volatile memory."
>>>>
>>>>  There are also operational considerations in section 9.2 that lists
>>>> questions that must be answered when deploying a GCM implementation.
>>>> It states, "Compliance with the uniqueness requirement on IVs, and
>>>> hence THE SECURITY OF GCM, ultimately DEPENDS ON THE IT PROFESSIONAL
>>>> WHO CONFIGURES, DEPLOYS, AND MAINTAINS THE GCM MODULESS within a
>>>> particular system." (emphasis mine and I apologize for screaming).
>>>>
>>>>  So yes, defer to NIST. If you read SP 800-38D and are satisfied tha=
t
>>
>>>> all of the relevant requirements are adhered to then GCM is secure.
>>>> If you don't feel it's possible to guarantee that all of those
>>>> requirements can be met or if you don't feel comfortable placing the
>>>> security of the system in the hands of "the IT professional" who
>>>> configures it then maybe it's not for you.
>>>>
>>>>  Now, back to my screaming above for a second. It is this notice in
>>>> SP 800-38D that really makes the SIV ciphersuites attractive. All of
>>>> the text in SP 800-38D (approx 8 pages of it) do not apply to SIV
>>>> because it is secure even in the presence of IV misuse. That is, if
>>>> the IT professional intentionally or unintentionally misconfigures,
>>>> misdeploys or improperly maintains a GCM module security is voided
>>>> but if that module had been a SIV module security would not be voide=
d
>>
>>>> (assuming, of course, that the misuse by the IT professional results
>>>> in IV misuse which is the a valid assumption since that's the topic
>>>> of the quote above).
>>>>
>>>>  The need for a SIV-based ciphersuites depends on whether you have
>>>> any discomfort with any of the numerous requirements placed on prope=
r
>>
>>>> use of GCM. If you think that the design considerations of SP 800-38=
D
>>
>>>> are met due to the nature of the TLS protocol and that the deploymen=
t
>>
>>>> considerations either don't apply ("it's your problem if you
>>>> misconfigure it so tough luck") or are similarly met due to the
>>>> nature of the TLS protocol then SIV-based ciphersuites are probably
>>>> not important enough to bring to the WG. If, on the other hand, thes=
e
>>
>>>> design and deployment considerations make you uncomfortable and that
>>>> a TLS module implementing GCM might be too fragile then a
>>>> misuse-resistant alternative like SIV becomes important and
>>>> attractive.
>>>>
>>>>  regards,
>>>>
>>>>  Dan.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@lists.ietf.org
>> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>




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Subject: [TLS] Re: Public-key distribution via HTTP
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On Jan 12, 2008, at 12:17 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:

>
> Don't be mislead by the title (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4387.txt),  
> it was
> published under the auspices of PKIX but it's really "a simple, fairly
> universal means of publishing your public key via HTTP".  The CACert  
> folks
> have set up a Wiki page to cover implementation info, feedback, and  
> comments:
> http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/RFC4387.
>

I like it.

The only complaint that I have is that the OpenPGP attributes are a  
bit behind the times. I would like to see it updated for 4880 and  
generalized. I think there are some similar issues for X.509, too.

(Actual technical details -- a key fingerprint there is defined to be  
a binary 160 bits. It ought to be a string because we very well may  
come up with a generic way to compute a fingerprint with an arbitrary  
hash. Given that a fingerprint in this context is really just a  
database retrieval handle (note the way I skillfully avoid the word  
"key"), having it be just text is a good thing. Also, in 4880, we  
deprecate the old-style keys. In the new-style keys, a key ID is just  
a truncation of a fingerprint.)

	Jon



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Thread-Topic: Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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Subject: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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<wg chair hat on>

We seem to have quite widespread agreement that single-DES and=20
IDEA are not algorithms you should use in most circumstances, and=20
if you're an implementor, disabling or removing those cipher=20
suites wouldn't usually be a bad idea.

We don't seem to have complete agreement on what exactly,
specification-writing-wise, is the most appropriate way to convey
this agreement. Several people have supported simple "MUST NOT";
others have argued that this is a policy decision, and should not=20
be hardcoded in the spec.

By my latest count, slightly smaller number of people have supported
a total MUST NOT than some form of "not good idea, but not totally=20
prohibited either" recommendation. I believe that changing this to=20
MUST NOT would require significantly stronger support, and therefore=20
we're going for something else.

I'd therefore like to propose two concrete alternatives for the=20
WG to comment:

(1) Remove all mentions of IDEA and single-DES from the TLS 1.2
main specification. Create a separate (1-page) document which lists
the cipher suite numbers, along with some kind of "not really that
good idea usually" advice.

The exact wording of this advice needs to be discussed, but it
could include e.g. SHOULD NOT use, SHOULD NOT implement, SHOULD
remove from existing implementations, and/or SHOULD NOT be enabled
by default. This document would not be on Standards Track (in
other words, either Informational or Historic).

(2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,
but include a short advice along the lines described above.

If you commented the IDEA/DES discussion earlier, please reply
and indicate which of these alternatives (or none or both) would
be acceptable to you.

Speaking as a WG chair, I would prefer an alternative that allows us
to ship the TLS 1.2 main specification to AD Evaluation ASAP. We've
already missed our milestone by more than a year, and I've received
comments from implementors that they'd like to see this finished soon.

I would also not mind having an alternative that would allow us -- if
we so later decide -- to promote TLS 1.2 to Draft Standard without
producing a new document.

<wg chair hat off>
Personally, I think the first option would reasonably satisfy these
goals, and would keep the spirit of including only "good stuff"=20
in the TLS main specification.

Best regards,
Pasi


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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(1)

I think a few mandatory-to-implement ciphersuites are a good idea in  
the base spec. However, that spec should not replace IANA in becoming  
the repository for ciphersuites.  Better to skip any mention of them  
than to add cryptographical discussion there.

On Jan 22, 2008, at 10:41 AM, <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com 
 > wrote:

<snip>
> I'd therefore like to propose two concrete alternatives for the
> WG to comment:
>
> (1) Remove all mentions of IDEA and single-DES from the TLS 1.2
> main specification. Create a separate (1-page) document which lists
> the cipher suite numbers, along with some kind of "not really that
> good idea usually" advice.
>
> The exact wording of this advice needs to be discussed, but it
> could include e.g. SHOULD NOT use, SHOULD NOT implement, SHOULD
> remove from existing implementations, and/or SHOULD NOT be enabled
> by default. This document would not be on Standards Track (in
> other words, either Informational or Historic).
>
> (2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,
> but include a short advice along the lines described above.




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Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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On Jan 22, 2008, at 12:41 AM, <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:

> (1) Remove all mentions of IDEA and single-DES from the TLS 1.2
> main specification. Create a separate (1-page) document which lists
> the cipher suite numbers, along with some kind of "not really that
> good idea usually" advice.

(1) is my preference out of the two options here.

Cheers --
Hovav.


PS:

> Several people have supported simple "MUST NOT";
> others have argued that this is a policy decision, and should not
> be hardcoded in the spec.

I happen to think that the TLS spec is exactly where policy that has  
security implications should be hardcoded.  Any other approach is  
inviting insecurity.


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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(2)  Keep all the information together (until the day it becomes too unwieldy,
say in excess of 100 pages); otherwise people will miss crucial information, not
understanding how to find all the relevant facts (see a recent discussion on the
main IETF list demonstrating that).

Tom Petch


----- Original Message -----
From: <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com>
To: <tls@ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 9:41 AM
Subject: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)


<wg chair hat on>

We seem to have quite widespread agreement that single-DES and
IDEA are not algorithms you should use in most circumstances, and
if you're an implementor, disabling or removing those cipher
suites wouldn't usually be a bad idea.

We don't seem to have complete agreement on what exactly,
specification-writing-wise, is the most appropriate way to convey
this agreement. Several people have supported simple "MUST NOT";
others have argued that this is a policy decision, and should not
be hardcoded in the spec.

By my latest count, slightly smaller number of people have supported
a total MUST NOT than some form of "not good idea, but not totally
prohibited either" recommendation. I believe that changing this to
MUST NOT would require significantly stronger support, and therefore
we're going for something else.

I'd therefore like to propose two concrete alternatives for the
WG to comment:

(1) Remove all mentions of IDEA and single-DES from the TLS 1.2
main specification. Create a separate (1-page) document which lists
the cipher suite numbers, along with some kind of "not really that
good idea usually" advice.

The exact wording of this advice needs to be discussed, but it
could include e.g. SHOULD NOT use, SHOULD NOT implement, SHOULD
remove from existing implementations, and/or SHOULD NOT be enabled
by default. This document would not be on Standards Track (in
other words, either Informational or Historic).

(2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,
but include a short advice along the lines described above.

If you commented the IDEA/DES discussion earlier, please reply
and indicate which of these alternatives (or none or both) would
be acceptable to you.

Speaking as a WG chair, I would prefer an alternative that allows us
to ship the TLS 1.2 main specification to AD Evaluation ASAP. We've
already missed our milestone by more than a year, and I've received
comments from implementors that they'd like to see this finished soon.

I would also not mind having an alternative that would allow us -- if
we so later decide -- to promote TLS 1.2 to Draft Standard without
producing a new document.

<wg chair hat off>
Personally, I think the first option would reasonably satisfy these
goals, and would keep the spirit of including only "good stuff"
in the TLS main specification.

Best regards,
Pasi


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From: Martin Rex <Martin.Rex@sap.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 15:25:29 +0100 (MET)
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Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> 
> (1) Remove all mentions of IDEA and single-DES from the TLS 1.2
> main specification. Create a separate (1-page) document which lists
> the cipher suite numbers, along with some kind of "not really that
> good idea usually" advice.
> 
> The exact wording of this advice needs to be discussed, but it
> could include e.g. SHOULD NOT use, SHOULD NOT implement, SHOULD
> remove from existing implementations, and/or SHOULD NOT be enabled
> by default. This document would not be on Standards Track (in
> other words, either Informational or Historic).

Fine with me.


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 09:28:20 -0500
Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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I support preference (1). Exact wording of that separate document - along t=
he lines of: SHOULD NOT implement, SHOULD NOT use, MUST NOT be enabled by d=
efault. I'd be even happier with "MUST NOT" in all the three places.

On 1/22/08 3:41 AM, "Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com" <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:

<wg chair hat on>

We seem to have quite widespread agreement that single-DES and
IDEA are not algorithms you should use in most circumstances, and
if you're an implementor, disabling or removing those cipher
suites wouldn't usually be a bad idea.

We don't seem to have complete agreement on what exactly,
specification-writing-wise, is the most appropriate way to convey
this agreement. Several people have supported simple "MUST NOT";
others have argued that this is a policy decision, and should not
be hardcoded in the spec.

By my latest count, slightly smaller number of people have supported
a total MUST NOT than some form of "not good idea, but not totally
prohibited either" recommendation. I believe that changing this to
MUST NOT would require significantly stronger support, and therefore
we're going for something else.

I'd therefore like to propose two concrete alternatives for the
WG to comment:

(1) Remove all mentions of IDEA and single-DES from the TLS 1.2
main specification. Create a separate (1-page) document which lists
the cipher suite numbers, along with some kind of "not really that
good idea usually" advice.

The exact wording of this advice needs to be discussed, but it
could include e.g. SHOULD NOT use, SHOULD NOT implement, SHOULD
remove from existing implementations, and/or SHOULD NOT be enabled
by default. This document would not be on Standards Track (in
other words, either Informational or Historic).

(2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,
but include a short advice along the lines described above.

If you commented the IDEA/DES discussion earlier, please reply
and indicate which of these alternatives (or none or both) would
be acceptable to you.

Speaking as a WG chair, I would prefer an alternative that allows us
to ship the TLS 1.2 main specification to AD Evaluation ASAP. We've
already missed our milestone by more than a year, and I've received
comments from implementors that they'd like to see this finished soon.

I would also not mind having an alternative that would allow us -- if
we so later decide -- to promote TLS 1.2 to Draft Standard without
producing a new document.

<wg chair hat off>
Personally, I think the first option would reasonably satisfy these
goals, and would keep the spirit of including only "good stuff"
in the TLS main specification.

Best regards,
Pasi


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--
Regards,
Uri


--_000_C3BB67B4323urillmitedu_
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>I=
 support preference (1). Exact wording of that separate document &#8211; al=
ong the lines of: SHOULD NOT implement, SHOULD NOT use, MUST NOT be enabled=
 by default. I&#8217;d be even happier with &#8220;MUST NOT&#8221; in all t=
he three places.<BR>
<BR>
On 1/22/08 3:41 AM, &quot;Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com&quot; &lt;Pasi.Eronen@nokia=
.com&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN ST=
YLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>&lt;wg chair hat on&gt;<BR>
<BR>
We seem to have quite widespread agreement that single-DES and<BR>
IDEA are not algorithms you should use in most circumstances, and<BR>
if you're an implementor, disabling or removing those cipher<BR>
suites wouldn't usually be a bad idea.<BR>
<BR>
We don't seem to have complete agreement on what exactly,<BR>
specification-writing-wise, is the most appropriate way to convey<BR>
this agreement. Several people have supported simple &quot;MUST NOT&quot;;<=
BR>
others have argued that this is a policy decision, and should not<BR>
be hardcoded in the spec.<BR>
<BR>
By my latest count, slightly smaller number of people have supported<BR>
a total MUST NOT than some form of &quot;not good idea, but not totally<BR>
prohibited either&quot; recommendation. I believe that changing this to<BR>
MUST NOT would require significantly stronger support, and therefore<BR>
we're going for something else.<BR>
<BR>
I'd therefore like to propose two concrete alternatives for the<BR>
WG to comment:<BR>
<BR>
(1) Remove all mentions of IDEA and single-DES from the TLS 1.2<BR>
main specification. Create a separate (1-page) document which lists<BR>
the cipher suite numbers, along with some kind of &quot;not really that<BR>
good idea usually&quot; advice.<BR>
<BR>
The exact wording of this advice needs to be discussed, but it<BR>
could include e.g. SHOULD NOT use, SHOULD NOT implement, SHOULD<BR>
remove from existing implementations, and/or SHOULD NOT be enabled<BR>
by default. This document would not be on Standards Track (in<BR>
other words, either Informational or Historic).<BR>
<BR>
(2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,<BR>
but include a short advice along the lines described above.<BR>
<BR>
If you commented the IDEA/DES discussion earlier, please reply<BR>
and indicate which of these alternatives (or none or both) would<BR>
be acceptable to you.<BR>
<BR>
Speaking as a WG chair, I would prefer an alternative that allows us<BR>
to ship the TLS 1.2 main specification to AD Evaluation ASAP. We've<BR>
already missed our milestone by more than a year, and I've received<BR>
comments from implementors that they'd like to see this finished soon.<BR>
<BR>
I would also not mind having an alternative that would allow us -- if<BR>
we so later decide -- to promote TLS 1.2 to Draft Standard without<BR>
producing a new document.<BR>
<BR>
&lt;wg chair hat off&gt;<BR>
Personally, I think the first option would reasonably satisfy these<BR>
goals, and would keep the spirit of including only &quot;good stuff&quot;<B=
R>
in the TLS main specification.<BR>
<BR>
Best regards,<BR>
Pasi<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
TLS mailing list<BR>
TLS@lists.ietf.org<BR>
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'><BR>
<BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT>
</BODY>
</HTML>


--_000_C3BB67B4323urillmitedu_--



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Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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At 10:56 AM +0200 1/22/08, Yoav Nir wrote:
>(1)
>
>I think a few mandatory-to-implement ciphersuites are a good idea in 
>the base spec. However, that spec should not replace IANA in 
>becoming the repository for ciphersuites.  Better to skip any 
>mention of them than to add cryptographical discussion there.

I agree with this logic.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium


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Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote, On 2008-01-22 00:41:

> (2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,
> but include a short advice along the lines described above.

I strongly prefer that choice.

If we say "MUST NOT" or even merely remove the definitions of those
suites from TLS 1.2, then interoperability problems will certainly
arise.  Servers will be created that reject client hellos that contain
those cipher suite numbers, even if those hellos also include other
cipher suite numbers that are acceptable.

I'd even go so far as to suggest that text be added stating that
compliant TLS 1.2 implementations MUST NOT reject client hellos simply
because those client hellos contain cipher suite numbers that are
deprecated, or undefined in TLS 1.2, or are "MUST NOT" (as in export
cipher suites) for TLS 1.2.  If no acceptable cipher suite is found,
that's a problem but no server should ever reject a client hello simply
because it contains one or more cipher suite numbers that are unpopular.

(Yes, I have seen servers that actually do that.)


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At 1:02 PM -0800 1/22/08, Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
>Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote, On 2008-01-22 00:41:
>
>>  (2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,
>>  but include a short advice along the lines described above.
>
>I strongly prefer that choice.
>
>If we say "MUST NOT" or even merely remove the definitions of those
>suites from TLS 1.2, then interoperability problems will certainly
>arise.  Servers will be created that reject client hellos that contain
>those cipher suite numbers, even if those hellos also include other
>cipher suite numbers that are acceptable.
>
>I'd even go so far as to suggest that text be added stating that
>compliant TLS 1.2 implementations MUST NOT reject client hellos simply
>because those client hellos contain cipher suite numbers that are
>deprecated, or undefined in TLS 1.2, or are "MUST NOT" (as in export
>cipher suites) for TLS 1.2.  If no acceptable cipher suite is found,
>that's a problem but no server should ever reject a client hello simply
>because it contains one or more cipher suite numbers that are unpopular.
>
>(Yes, I have seen servers that actually do that.)

Yeesh. New levels of cluelessness among developers are discovered every day.

If we add the text you want (which seems fine to me), would you then 
prefer #1 over #2?

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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Paul and all,

  I ad the same question Paul.

Regards,

Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 277k members/stakeholders strong!)
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
very often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS.
div. of Information Network Eng.  INEG. INC.
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail
jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
My Phone: 214-244-4827

Paul Hoffman wrote:

> At 1:02 PM -0800 1/22/08, Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
> >Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote, On 2008-01-22 00:41:
> >
> >>  (2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,
> >>  but include a short advice along the lines described above.
> >
> >I strongly prefer that choice.
> >
> >If we say "MUST NOT" or even merely remove the definitions of those
> >suites from TLS 1.2, then interoperability problems will certainly
> >arise.  Servers will be created that reject client hellos that contain
> >those cipher suite numbers, even if those hellos also include other
> >cipher suite numbers that are acceptable.
> >
> >I'd even go so far as to suggest that text be added stating that
> >compliant TLS 1.2 implementations MUST NOT reject client hellos simply
> >because those client hellos contain cipher suite numbers that are
> >deprecated, or undefined in TLS 1.2, or are "MUST NOT" (as in export
> >cipher suites) for TLS 1.2.  If no acceptable cipher suite is found,
> >that's a problem but no server should ever reject a client hello simply
> >because it contains one or more cipher suite numbers that are unpopular.
> >
> >(Yes, I have seen servers that actually do that.)
>
> Yeesh. New levels of cluelessness among developers are discovered every day.
>
> If we add the text you want (which seems fine to me), would you then
> prefer #1 over #2?
>
> --Paul Hoffman, Director
> --VPN Consortium
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2008 12:46:04 +0000
Subject: RE: [TLS] RE: WGLC - Stepping up Hash
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For the record, I'm fine with this change proposal.

Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kemp, David P. [mailto:DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil]
> Sent: den 14 december 2007 17:21
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [TLS] RE: WGLC - Stepping up Hash
>
> I agree with Martin Rex that permitting implicit (meta-knowledge-based)
> signaling could inhibit implementation of proper signaling,
> and that the interoperability disadvantage (when meta-knowledge
> turns out to be wrong) outweighs any advantage of being able
> to use step-up hash with clients that support additional hash
> algorithms but do not send the extension.  Such clients,
> if there are any, should be fixed.
>
> The spec should be modified along the lines suggested below
> to remove ambiguity from the requirement for explicit
> signaling.
>
> Dave
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com [mailto:Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com]
> Sent: Friday, December 14, 2007 2:34 AM
> To: stefans@microsoft.com
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [TLS] RE: WGLC - Stepping up Hash
>
> Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> > > I don't understand why it's a problem to simply have the client
> > > offer the extension in these special cases.
> >
> > It is not. But what if it doesn't. This should clearly be the
> > implementation goal for all clients. However, theory and
> > practice don't always meet and we should not create rules
> > that prevents the server from safely step up the security
> > level in case the client fail to send this info. Or we should
> > REQUIRE the client to provide this extension in these cases
> > (e.g. for some cipher suites). The client is after all not
> > required to provide this in the current spec.
>
> I think the source of this confusion is the sentence "Clients
> SHOULD send this extension if they support any hash algorithm
> other than SHA-1" (in Section 7.4.1.4.1)
>
> This is not quite correct. It should say something along
> the lines:
>
>   "If the client supports other hash and signature
>   algorithms (than the defaults listed in this section),
>   and it is willing to use them for verifying messages
>   sent by server (server certificates and server key exchange),
>   it MUST send the signature_algorithms extension listing
>   the algorithms it is willing to accept."
>
> (IMHO this is what the current spec implicitly means.)
>
> Best regards,
> Pasi
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
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Subject: RE: [TLS] Status of IDEA and single-DES (ticket #64)
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Nelson B Bolyard wrote:

> Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote, On 2008-01-22 00:41:
>=20
> > (2) Keep IDEA and single-DES in the TLS 1.2 main specification,
> > but include a short advice along the lines described above.
>=20
> I strongly prefer that choice.
>=20
> If we say "MUST NOT" or even merely remove the definitions of those
> suites from TLS 1.2, then interoperability problems will certainly
> arise.  Servers will be created that reject client hellos that contain
> those cipher suite numbers, even if those hellos also include other
> cipher suite numbers that are acceptable.

Well, TLS 1.2 is *not* the master list of cipher suites, so if
servers reject client hellos that contain ciphers not listed
in TLS 1.2 spec, they will also break with clients that implement=20
e.g. RFC 2712, 4132, 4162, 4279, 4492, 4785, or 5054.

(And option 1 wasn't proposing merely removing these suites from=20
TLS 1.2 spec; it also included creating a new spec to contain
them.)

> I'd even go so far as to suggest that text be added stating that
> compliant TLS 1.2 implementations MUST NOT reject client hellos
> simply because those client hellos contain cipher suite numbers that
> are deprecated, or undefined in TLS 1.2, or are "MUST NOT" (as in
> export cipher suites) for TLS 1.2.  If no acceptable cipher suite is
> found, that's a problem but no server should ever reject a client
> hello simply because it contains one or more cipher suite numbers
> that are unpopular.
>=20
> (Yes, I have seen servers that actually do that.)

I have to agree with Paul's comment about "new levels of cluelessness
among developers" here -- IMHO that behavior isn't compliant with the
spec even with the current text.

However, if you've actually seen that, then perhaps adding some
clarifying text would be in order. How about adding something along=20
these lines, to the end of paragraph starting "The CipherSuite list.."
in 7.4.1.2:

   If the list contains cipher suites the server does not recognize,
   support, or wish to use, the server MUST ignore those cipher
   suites, and process the remaining ones as usual.

Best regards,
Pasi=20


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    I am trying to become thoroughly familiar with the TLS
specification, and I have reached a point at which I have a doubt that
the spec does not seem to dispel. Or, if it does, I have been unable
to find where. My apologies in advance for that.

   My questions are to do with record layer padding. The spec
describes how to do it when using a block cipher. What is not clear
from the spec is the following:

   What happens when the length of the record layer data to be
encrypted happens to be a multiple of the block cipher's block size?
Does one have to add a padding block the same size as the cipher's
block size, or is one to set the closing padding length byte to zero,
without adding any explicit padding? I'd be inclined to do the former,
but I do not know if this is what the spec intended.

   Also, what happens to record layers put together before encryption
kicks in? Is one supposed not to use the padding length byte at all?
That's what I would do myself but, again, I am not sure.

   Any feedback will be most welcome.



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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Fri Jan 25 01:34:46 2008
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Subject: RE: [TLS] Record layer padding
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2008 08:34:09 +0200
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JCA (1.41421@gmail.com) wrote:
>=20
>     I am trying to become thoroughly familiar with the TLS
> specification, and I have reached a point at which I have a doubt
> that the spec does not seem to dispel. Or, if it does, I have been
> unable to find where. My apologies in advance for that.
>=20
>    My questions are to do with record layer padding. The spec
> describes how to do it when using a block cipher. What is not clear
> from the spec is the following:
>=20
>    What happens when the length of the record layer data to be
> encrypted happens to be a multiple of the block cipher's block size?
> Does one have to add a padding block the same size as the cipher's
> block size, or is one to set the closing padding length byte to
> zero, without adding any explicit padding? I'd be inclined to do the
> former, but I do not know if this is what the spec intended.

The data-to-be-encrypted consists of the actual record layer content
(GenericBlockCipher.content), the MAC, the padding (zero or more
bytes) and the padding_length byte. The sum of these has to be a
multiple of the block size (and the padding_length byte is always
present).

So, for example, if you're using AES_128_CBC_SHA, and have 27
bytes of actual content, you could set padding_length to 0=20
(since 27+20+1 =3D 48 =3D 3*16)

>    Also, what happens to record layers put together before
> encryption kicks in? Is one supposed not to use the padding length
> byte at all?  That's what I would do myself but, again, I am not
> sure.

Each TLS record is encrypted separately, and the padding_length
byte is present in each of them. (If you e.g. combine several
handshake messages in one TLS record -- well, that's done
before the record layer, so it's just one record then.)

Best regards,
Pasi


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On Jan 24, 2008 10:34 PM,  <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:
> JCA (1.41421@gmail.com) wrote:
> >
> >    What happens when the length of the record layer data to be
> > encrypted happens to be a multiple of the block cipher's block size?
> > Does one have to add a padding block the same size as the cipher's
> > block size, or is one to set the closing padding length byte to
> > zero, without adding any explicit padding? I'd be inclined to do the
> > former, but I do not know if this is what the spec intended.
>
> The data-to-be-encrypted consists of the actual record layer content
> (GenericBlockCipher.content), the MAC, the padding (zero or more
> bytes) and the padding_length byte. The sum of these has to be a
> multiple of the block size (and the padding_length byte is always
> present).
>
> So, for example, if you're using AES_128_CBC_SHA, and have 27
> bytes of actual content, you could set padding_length to 0
> (since 27+20+1 = 48 = 3*16)

    Thanks, that clarifies it. In fact, on rereading the relevant part
of the spec that seems to be implied. I would also seem to be implied
that one is free to add as many padding blocks as one wishes (and fit
the bill,) provided the padding length is less than 256 bytes, right?
Even more: If I am understand it correctly, implementations are
encouraged to do so in order to foil traffic analysis-based cracking
attempts.

> >    Also, what happens to record layers put together before
> > encryption kicks in? Is one supposed not to use the padding length
> > byte at all?  That's what I would do myself but, again, I am not
> > sure.
>
> Each TLS record is encrypted separately, and the padding_length
> byte is present in each of them. (If you e.g. combine several
> handshake messages in one TLS record -- well, that's done
> before the record layer, so it's just one record then.)

   Hmm.... I am not sure I follow here. My understanding is that all
TLS data will be exchanged encapsulated within TLS record layers. From
this it would seem that messages in the same record must be either
encrypted or unencrypted, but not both. That is, what one encrypts (or
not) are whole records, not individual messages. And analogously for
the MAC computation. Is this what the spec means?

   To answer my own question, again on rereading the spec my take is
that unencrypted records are just records encrypted with the Null
cipher - which, according to the spec (and just like stream ciphers)
does not require padding, and therefore no padding length byte.

   Thanks very much for your feedback.


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JCA (1.41421@gmail.com) wrote:

>     Thanks, that clarifies it. In fact, on rereading the relevant part
> of the spec that seems to be implied. I would also seem to be implied
> that one is free to add as many padding blocks as one wishes (and fit
> the bill,) provided the padding length is less than 256 bytes, right?

Yes.

> Even more: If I am understand it correctly, implementations are
> encouraged to do so in order to foil traffic analysis-based cracking
> attempts.

Well, "encouraged" is perhaps an overstatement: as far as I know,
most existing TLS implementations don't this. (When some versions
of GnuTLS shipped with this feature enabled, it was discovered
that Symbian TLS implementation didn't like receiving that=20
extra padding -- a bug that hadn't been discovered in probably 5+
years, suggesting that nobody else sends such records. There were
some messages on the list back in November, I think.)

> > > Also, what happens to record layers put together before
> > > encryption kicks in? Is one supposed not to use the padding length
> > > byte at all?  That's what I would do myself but, again, I am not
> > > sure.
> >
> > Each TLS record is encrypted separately, and the padding_length
> > byte is present in each of them. (If you e.g. combine several
> > handshake messages in one TLS record -- well, that's done
> > before the record layer, so it's just one record then.)
>=20
>    Hmm.... I am not sure I follow here. My understanding is that all
> TLS data will be exchanged encapsulated within TLS record
> layers. From this it would seem that messages in the same record
> must be either encrypted or unencrypted, but not both. That is, what
> one encrypts (or not) are whole records, not individual
> messages. And analogously for the MAC computation. Is this what the
> spec means?

Yes, you encrypt and MAC whole records, not individual messages.
But the relationship between records and e.g. TLS handshake messages
is loose: one TLS handshake message can be split to multiple records,
and one record can contain more than one handshake message.

>    To answer my own question, again on rereading the spec my take is
> that unencrypted records are just records encrypted with the Null
> cipher - which, according to the spec (and just like stream ciphers)
> does not require padding, and therefore no padding length byte.

Yes, you're right -- unencrypted records don't have the padding length
byte, because they don't use the GenericBlockCipher structure.

Best regards,
Pasi


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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
	Author(s)	: T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
	Filename	: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-08.txt
	Pages		: 100
	Date		: 2008-1-25
	
This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security
   over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to
   communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, or message forgery.

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Subject: [TLS] Fwd: RFC 5114 on Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with
 IETF 	Standards
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>A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
>
>        
>         RFC 5114
>
>         Title:      Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use
>                     with IETF Standards
>         Author:     M. Lepinski, S. Kent
>         Status:     Informational
>         Date:       January 2008
>         Mailbox:    mlepinski@bbn.com,
>                     kent@bbn.com
>         Pages:      23
>         Characters: 49565
>         Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso:   None
>
>         I-D Tag:    draft-lepinski-dh-groups-03.txt
>
>         URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5114.txt
>
>This document describes eight Diffie-Hellman groups that can be used
>in conjunction with IETF protocols to provide security for Internet
>communications.  The groups allow implementers to use the same groups
>with a variety of security protocols, e.g., SMIME, Secure SHell (SSH),
>Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Internet Key Exchange (IKE).
>
>All of these groups comply in form and structure with relevant
>standards from ISO, ANSI, NIST, and the IEEE.  These groups are
>compatible with all IETF standards that make use of Diffie-Hellman or
>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman cryptography.
>
>These groups and the associated test data are defined by NIST on
>their web site [EX80056A], but have not yet (as of this writing) been
>published in a formal NIST document.  Publication of these groups and
>associated test data, as well as describing how to use Diffie-Hellman
>and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman for key agreement in all of the
>protocols cited below, in one RFC, will facilitate development of
>interoperable implementations and support the Federal Information
>Processing Standard (FIPS) validation of
>implementations that make use of these groups.  This memo provides
>information for the Internet community.
>
>
>INFORMATIONAL: This memo provides information for the Internet community.
>It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution
>of this memo is unlimited.

TLS implementers should see especially section 3.1 and 3.3.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium


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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Mon Jan 28 06:49:45 2008
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<wg chair hat on>

Of the people who have commented this topic, majority
have preferred removing IDEA/single-DES from the TLS 1.2=20
main specification, and moving them to a separate document=20
with appropriate "should not"-like advise (the exact text=20
is still to be decided).

So, let's move forward with this approach.

Nelson also suggested clarifying the text about server
behavior when client hello includes cipher suites the
server does not recognize, support, or wish to use.
IMHO this seems just clarifying what servers are=20
supposed to do anyway, so unless there are objections,
I'd be fine with including text along those lines.

Best regards,
Pasi


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<not wearing any hats>

Overall comment: While the technical solution is reasonably defined=20
and scoped, do we have any evidence that someone cares about it?
I.e., do we have information suggesting that if this was specified,
it would actually be used in real world? If we don't, let's not=20
spend WG time on it...

Some additional comments based on a quick read:

Abstract, "This document updates RFC 4785 and 4279..."; it=20
doesn't "update" either of them (in the sense the word "update"=20
is usually used when talking about relationships between RFCs);
it just defines additional cipher suites.

Section 2, "First, perform the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
computation in the same way as for other Diffie-Hellman-based
ciphersuites in [TLS1.0] or [TLS1.1]" Neither document contains
information on how to perform ECDH computations.

Section 2, "Let Z be the value produced by this computation",
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman is somewhat different in this
respect; text should be consistent with RFC 4492 Section 5.10.

Typos/grammar:
"These ciphersuites provides.."
"It specifies as well one.."

>From idnits: Unused Reference: 'RFC2119' is defined on line 160,=20
but no explicit reference was found in the text

Best regards,
Pasi=20


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Dear Pasi,

> Overall comment: While the technical solution is reasonably defined 
> and scoped, do we have any evidence that someone cares about it?
> I.e., do we have information suggesting that if this was specified,
> it would actually be used in real world? If we don't, let's not 
> spend WG time on it...

A few of volunteers already reviewed the document. As you said early, 
the technical solution is reasonably defined and scoped and therefore I 
don't think that we need enough time to spend on it. The evidence that 
someone cares about it depends on the TLS-PSK itself: why someone care 
on RSA_PSK and DH_PSK but not on ECDHE_PSK? However, I do support any 
opinion poll on that through asking that someone: Do you support 
adopting that document?


> Some additional comments based on a quick read:
> 
> Abstract, "This document updates RFC 4785 and 4279..."; it 
> doesn't "update" either of them (in the sense the word "update" 
> is usually used when talking about relationships between RFCs);
> it just defines additional cipher suites.

OK, I will replace "update" with "extend".


> Section 2, "First, perform the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
> computation in the same way as for other Diffie-Hellman-based
> ciphersuites in [TLS1.0] or [TLS1.1]" Neither document contains
> information on how to perform ECDH computations.

This is a mistake, I will replace "[TLS1.0] or [TLS1.1]" with "RFC4492".


> Section 2, "Let Z be the value produced by this computation",
> Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman is somewhat different in this
> respect; text should be consistent with RFC 4492 Section 5.10.

What about replacing:

    The premaster secret is formed as follows. First, perform the
    Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman computation in the same way as for
    other Diffie-Hellman-based ciphersuites in [TLS1.0] or [TLS1.1]. Let
    Z be the value produced by this computation. Concatenate a uint16
    containing the length of Z (in octets), Z itself, a uint16
    containing the length of the PSK (in octets), and the PSK itself.

With:

    The premaster secret is formed as follows. First, perform the
    Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman computation in the same way as for
    other Diffie-Hellman-based ciphersuites defined in RFC4492 to
    generate the octet string [RFC4492]. Next, concatenate a uint16
    containing the length of the octet string (in octets), the octet
    strinf itself, a uint16 containing the length of the PSK (in octets),
    and the PSK itself.

> Typos/grammar:
> "These ciphersuites provides.."
> "It specifies as well one.."

OK.

> 
>>From idnits: Unused Reference: 'RFC2119' is defined on line 160, 
> but no explicit reference was found in the text

OK.

> 
> Best regards,
> Pasi 

Many thanks!
Best regards,
-- 
Mohamad Badra
CNRS - LIMOS Laboratory



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From: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2008 11:01:23 -0500
Subject: Re: [TLS] Some comments about draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01
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I believe this document is relevant to WG - we slowly but surely move towar=
ds ECC (as part of Suite B).
--
Regards,
Uri

On 1/29/08 7:51 AM, "Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com" <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:

<not wearing any hats>

Overall comment: While the technical solution is reasonably defined
and scoped, do we have any evidence that someone cares about it?
I.e., do we have information suggesting that if this was specified,
it would actually be used in real world? If we don't, let's not
spend WG time on it...


--_000_C3C4B8033AAurillmitedu_
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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] Some comments about draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>I=
 believe this document is relevant to WG - we slowly but surely move toward=
s ECC (as part of Suite B).<BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri<BR>
<BR>
On 1/29/08 7:51 AM, &quot;Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com&quot; &lt;Pasi.Eronen@nokia=
.com&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN ST=
YLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>&lt;not wearing any hats&gt;<BR>
<BR>
Overall comment: While the technical solution is reasonably defined<BR>
and scoped, do we have any evidence that someone cares about it?<BR>
I.e., do we have information suggesting that if this was specified,<BR>
it would actually be used in real world? If we don't, let's not<BR>
spend WG time on it...<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'><BR>
</SPAN></FONT>
</BODY>
</HTML>


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Dear all,

Is there any RFC with recommendations for deriving shared secrets from 
passwords?

Thanks!
-- 
Mohamad Badra
CNRS - LIMOS Laboratory



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From tls-bounces@lists.ietf.org Tue Jan 29 13:52:38 2008
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Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2008 10:52:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: [TLS] Some comments about draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
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  Hi Pasi,

On Tue, January 29, 2008 4:51 am, Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> <not wearing any hats>
>
> Overall comment: While the technical solution is reasonably defined
> and scoped, do we have any evidence that someone cares about it?
> I.e., do we have information suggesting that if this was specified,
> it would actually be used in real world? If we don't, let's not
> spend WG time on it...

  Personally I would view a password-based authentication scheme that
assumes the shared key is a low-entropy one or is selected from a limited
set of keys, like a dictionary, as more useful to the real world. I
believe that is the predominant access method used in the Internet today.

  IEEE P1363.2 has a draft out describing password-based authentication
protocols using elliptic curves.

  While a password-based authentication scheme would be _more_ useful
I still think there's value in pursuing a PSK-based scheme using elliptic
curves. It's an efficient alternative to the existing PSK cipher suites
that use groups based on exponentiation modulus a large prime.

  Dan.





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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: badra@isima.fr, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] shared secrets from passwords
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Mohamad Badra <badra@isima.fr> writes:

>Is there any RFC with recommendations for deriving shared secrets from
>passwords?

Not yet but I'm working on it for use with TLS-PSK, TLS-SRP, and others.

Peter.


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To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
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At Wed, 30 Jan 2008 09:46:32 +1300,
Peter Gutmann wrote:
> 
> Mohamad Badra <badra@isima.fr> writes:
> 
> >Is there any RFC with recommendations for deriving shared secrets from
> >passwords?
> 
> Not yet but I'm working on it for use with TLS-PSK, TLS-SRP, and others.

Maybe I'm dense today, but why would you need to do that for SRP,
which is designed to use passwords directly.

-Ekr


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RFC 2898
    PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0.
      B. Kaliski. September 2000.

At 11:11 AM 1/29/2008, Mohamad Badra wrote:
>Dear all,
>
>Is there any RFC with recommendations for deriving shared secrets 
>from passwords?
>
>Thanks!
>--
>Mohamad Badra
>CNRS - LIMOS Laboratory
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
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>



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Mohamad Badra <badra@isima.fr> wrote:
>> Is there any RFC with recommendations for deriving shared secrets from
>> passwords?

My recommendation would be to strongly advise TLS implementors against any
form of deriving shared authentication or encryption secrets from passwords.

One fact about shared secrets: If the users are humanly capable of giving
them away, they will do so.  The simplest way to get a user's password is
typically to simply ask him for it.  If the user's shared authentication
secret can be derived from a password, then the attack will be to get the
user to divulge his password to the wrong party.
(Here's a cute example: http://wdl.lug.ro/funny/pictures/credit.jpg )

A system in which the user cannot easily give away his shared authentication
secret, even if he wants to, because he does not have it in his head and he
cannot get his system to show it to him, will be much more secure than one
in which the shared secret itself can be given away from memory or by reading.

I suggest you consider a "two factor" system, wherein (say) the user's
password only serves to locally unlock/decrypt a local copy of a shared
secret that was previously generated from a random source, and where that
shared secret cannot be seen by the user.  The user can give away his password
but doing so will not, by itself, give away his shared authentication secret.



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Subject: Re: [TLS] shared secrets from passwords
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On Tue, 29 Jan 2008 20:16:42 -0800
Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.com> wrote:

> Mohamad Badra <badra@isima.fr> wrote:
> >> Is there any RFC with recommendations for deriving shared secrets
> >> from passwords?
> 
> My recommendation would be to strongly advise TLS implementors
> against any form of deriving shared authentication or encryption
> secrets from passwords.
> 
> One fact about shared secrets: If the users are humanly capable of
> giving them away, they will do so.  The simplest way to get a user's
> password is typically to simply ask him for it.  If the user's shared
> authentication secret can be derived from a password, then the attack
> will be to get the user to divulge his password to the wrong party.
> (Here's a cute example: http://wdl.lug.ro/funny/pictures/credit.jpg )
> 
> A system in which the user cannot easily give away his shared
> authentication secret, even if he wants to, because he does not have
> it in his head and he cannot get his system to show it to him, will
> be much more secure than one in which the shared secret itself can be
> given away from memory or by reading.
> 
> I suggest you consider a "two factor" system, wherein (say) the user's
> password only serves to locally unlock/decrypt a local copy of a
> shared secret that was previously generated from a random source, and
> where that shared secret cannot be seen by the user.  The user can
> give away his password but doing so will not, by itself, give away
> his shared authentication secret.
> 
There are lots of ways to implement bad security; passwords are only
one.  See, for example, http://www.xkcd.com/364/.  Alternatively,
consider http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/01/leaked-document.html
-- and remember Gene Spafford's famous line about using crypto on the
Internet with its very weak endpoints.

Past that, there's the human element.  Suppose people do use
client-side certificates.  The bad guys -- those who don't just hack
the client machine -- will implement MITM attacks, since people will
*not* validate the server's certificate properly
(http://research.microsoft.com/copyright/accept.asp?path=http://www.research.microsoft.com/sn/dss/papers/pip.pdf&pub=15).  

Perhaps more to the point, where will the secret key be stored?  I
regularly use five different (believed-to-be-secure) machines.  Which
should have the key?  If one of them is my work machine, does
management have access to the key?

I'd like passwords go go away, too.  I doubt that they will any time
soon.  Preshared secrets for TLS keys are much better than plaintext
passwords transmitted over TLS-protected connections -- and that's what
the issue here is.


		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb


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Subject: RE: [TLS] password-based authentication (was: Some comments about
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Dan Harkins wrote:

> Personally I would view a password-based authentication scheme=20
> that assumes the shared key is a low-entropy one or is selected=20
> from a limited set of keys, like a dictionary, as more useful to=20
> the real world. I believe that is the predominant access method=20
> used in the Internet today.

Just being curious, what would be the main differences between
the authentication scheme you're thinking about, and RFC 5054?

Best regards,
Pasi


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Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2008 23:29:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [TLS] password-based authentication (was: Some comments about 
	draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
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  Technically nothing.

  Dan.

On Tue, January 29, 2008 10:58 pm, Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> Dan Harkins wrote:
>
>> Personally I would view a password-based authentication scheme
>> that assumes the shared key is a low-entropy one or is selected
>> from a limited set of keys, like a dictionary, as more useful to
>> the real world. I believe that is the predominant access method
>> used in the Internet today.
>
> Just being curious, what would be the main differences between
> the authentication scheme you're thinking about, and RFC 5054?
>
> Best regards,
> Pasi
>




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Several RFC's have such a recommendation. RFC 4306 (IKEv2) has this  
construction to make a shared secret out of a password (section 2.15):

   prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2")

The idea is that this shared secret has the properties that (a) it  
can't be used for anything other than IKEv2 so storing it is  
presumably OK (why?), and (b) it looks random. The RFC goes on to  
state this:

                                As noted above, deriving the shared
   secret from a password is not secure.  This construction is used
   because it is anticipated that people will do it anyway.


On Jan 29, 2008, at 6:11 PM, Mohamad Badra wrote:

> Dear all,
>
> Is there any RFC with recommendations for deriving shared secrets  
> from passwords?
>
> Thanks!
> -- 
> Mohamad Badra
> CNRS - LIMOS Laboratory
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
>



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Dear Yoav, Nelson and all,

 > My recommendation would be to strongly advise TLS implementors
 > against any form of deriving shared authentication or encryption
 > secrets from passwords.


I understand your recommendation, but I think the password is currently 
the predominant access method used in the Internet applications.


 > I suggest you consider a "two factor" system, wherein (say) the user's
 > password only serves to locally unlock/decrypt a local copy of a
 > shared secret that was previously generated from a random source, and
 > where that shared secret cannot be seen by the user.  The user can
 > give away his password but doing so will not, by itself, give away
 > his shared authentication secret.


Your suggestion is more suitable for the secret storage, my question is 
how can I combine between password databases and rfc4279?

IMO, the only way to make password and rfc4279 working together or to 
make a coherent link between password databases and that RFC is to rely 
on the password to compute the PSK and then to derive the premaster secret.

It is possible to rely on rfc2898 to do that but this document is 
designed for the case where a password is going to be used for 
encryption and/or for integrity. Since it uses salts, extending TLS is a 
must to send the username in the ClientHello.

It is also possible to derive PSKs from passwords in the same way as 
defined in rfc4306 as following (and keep the same statement):

PSK = Alg(Alg(password + username + "Key Pad for Application")
           + psk_identity_hint))

Alg could be SHA-1 or the hash algorithm in the ServerHello.cipher_suite.

Best regards,
Badra



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Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2008 15:12:42 -0800
From: Chris Newman <Chris.Newman@Sun.COM>
Subject: RE: [TLS] password-based authentication (was: Some comments about
	draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01)
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Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote on 1/30/08 9:58 +0200:

> Dan Harkins wrote:
>
>> Personally I would view a password-based authentication scheme
>> that assumes the shared key is a low-entropy one or is selected
>> from a limited set of keys, like a dictionary, as more useful to
>> the real world. I believe that is the predominant access method
>> used in the Internet today.
>
> Just being curious, what would be the main differences between
> the authentication scheme you're thinking about, and RFC 5054?

On the protocol side, not much.

On the implementation side, it would roughly double the complexity of a typical 
TLS API in order to actually be useful to applications.  The password verifier 
could be stored in any one of a number of external repositories (LDAP, RADIUS, 
DIAMETER, SQL, Liberty, some other SOAP/HTTP mechanism, /etc/passwd, NIS, etc) 
and the application would have to provide the TLS stack with sophisticated 
configuration knobs related to these protocols.  As a matter of efficiency, 
some of these protocols are not cheap so high performance servers will have to 
keep a pool of connections, then fetch and cache the information locally. 
Attributes that are peripherally related to authentication or unrelated to 
authentication may also be accessed via these protocols and need to be cached 
as well to avoid the need for double-fetching of the same entry.  So the API 
needs a way to put all sorts of controls on the protocols used to fetch this 
data, timeouts, what attributes are of interest, caching parameters, etc.  Then 
there's need for back-channels to the cache (flushing specific entries on 
provisioning changes) which means hooking up to a notification mechanism to the 
caching logic under the TLS stack.

Personally, I think TLS stacks are plenty complex enough without all this 
machinery.  As a matter of architecture, I'd rather keep this machinery 
completely separate from the TLS stack and use TLS channel bindings when mutual 
authentication at the application layer is needed.

Although I'm dubious of the utility of PSK, it seems mostly harmless to the TLS 
stack as long as it's not a password.  The primary utility I see for PSK would 
be for server->server connections if it's coupled with an SSH-style 
zero-configuration key setup mechanism (I don't see it as having much 
real-world utility without the latter piece).  If PSK proves to be useful than 
ECC-PSK is also likely to be useful simply because of the improved key 
scalability.

                - Chris



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Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2008 18:52:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [TLS] password-based authentication (was: Some comments about 
	draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Chris Newman" <Chris.Newman@sun.com>
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  Hi Chris,

On Wed, January 30, 2008 3:12 pm, Chris Newman wrote:
> Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote on 1/30/08 9:58 +0200:
>
>> Dan Harkins wrote:
>>
>>> Personally I would view a password-based authentication scheme
>>> that assumes the shared key is a low-entropy one or is selected
>>> from a limited set of keys, like a dictionary, as more useful to
>>> the real world. I believe that is the predominant access method
>>> used in the Internet today.
>>
>> Just being curious, what would be the main differences between
>> the authentication scheme you're thinking about, and RFC 5054?
>
> On the protocol side, not much.
>
> On the implementation side, it would roughly double the complexity of a
> typical
> TLS API in order to actually be useful to applications.  The password
> verifier
> could be stored in any one of a number of external repositories (LDAP,
> RADIUS,
> DIAMETER, SQL, Liberty, some other SOAP/HTTP mechanism, /etc/passwd, NI=
S,
> etc)
> and the application would have to provide the TLS stack with sophistica=
ted
> configuration knobs related to these protocols.  As a matter of
> efficiency,
> some of these protocols are not cheap so high performance servers will
> have to
> keep a pool of connections, then fetch and cache the information locall=
y.
> Attributes that are peripherally related to authentication or unrelated=
 to
> authentication may also be accessed via these protocols and need to be
> cached
> as well to avoid the need for double-fetching of the same entry.  So th=
e
> API
> needs a way to put all sorts of controls on the protocols used to fetch
> this
> data, timeouts, what attributes are of interest, caching parameters, et=
c.
> Then
> there's need for back-channels to the cache (flushing specific entries =
on
> provisioning changes) which means hooking up to a notification mechanis=
m
> to the
> caching logic under the TLS stack.

Why would you put all that cruft into the TLS stack? That's what protocol
layers are for, abstracting out this complexity.

What do you do for supporting certificates? For RFC2885 support do you ha=
ve
HTTP and FTP support to obtain certificates and CRLs from repositories bu=
ilt
into the TLS stack? Is the entire OCSP protocol part of your TLS stack?
What about CMS? Et cetera.

> Personally, I think TLS stacks are plenty complex enough without all th=
is
> machinery.  As a matter of architecture, I'd rather keep this machinery
> completely separate from the TLS stack and use TLS channel bindings whe=
n
> mutual
> authentication at the application layer is needed.

Channel bindings are orthogonal to a password-based authentication
protocol.

> Although I'm dubious of the utility of PSK, it seems mostly harmless to
> the TLS
> stack as long as it's not a password.  The primary utility I see for PS=
K
> would
> be for server->server connections if it's coupled with an SSH-style
> zero-configuration key setup mechanism (I don't see it as having much
> real-world utility without the latter piece).  If PSK proves to be usef=
ul
> than
> ECC-PSK is also likely to be useful simply because of the improved key
> scalability.

  Dubious utility? Wow. They are arguably the predominant method used for
network access in the Internet today, and for the past umpteen years.

  One lesson I learned very hard from IKE was that if your protocol does
not handle username/password authentication then people are going to hack
the hell out of it to put it in, to the detriment of protocol security.
Why do you think the "do not validate server certificate" checkbox exists=
?
Let me give you an actual quote I heard: "to make SSL work".

  Dan.





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Subject: [TLS] Re: Record layer padding
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<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> writes:

>> Even more: If I am understand it correctly, implementations are
>> encouraged to do so in order to foil traffic analysis-based cracking
>> attempts.
>
> Well, "encouraged" is perhaps an overstatement: as far as I know,
> most existing TLS implementations don't this. (When some versions
> of GnuTLS shipped with this feature enabled, it was discovered
> that Symbian TLS implementation didn't like receiving that 
> extra padding -- a bug that hadn't been discovered in probably 5+
> years, suggesting that nobody else sends such records. There were
> some messages on the list back in November, I think.)

GnuTLS still pad records randomly, for security reasons, and has done so
since basically forever as far as I know.  I see no reason to disable it
by default.  There has been relatively few reports about problems caused
by this, and only from Symbian TLS users.

What has changed since it was discovered that record padding was
problematic in some environments is that we offer a mechanism for
applications to disable it.  We recommend that application authors use
the defaults (i.e., record padding enabled), and only that users disable
it on their own initiative, and further, that they only do so on a
per-IP or per-account basis if possible.

I would encourage all implementers to enable record padding.

/Simon


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From: Mohamad Badra <badra@isima.fr>
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To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Updated version of draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk
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Dear Pasi & Eric,

According to the comments of Uri, Pasi and Simon, I posted a new version 
of "ECDHE_PSK Ciphersuites for TLS" to the IETF repository.

I hope the document is ready to be adopted as WG item, especially 
because some WG members paid attention to what can be the "value-added" 
and that they are willing to work on this document.

Best regards,
-- 
Mohamad Badra
CNRS - LIMOS Laboratory



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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jan 31 18:29:20 2008
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From: "Nagendra Modadugu" <ngm+ietf@google.com>
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Subject: [TLS] SSL session caching & lookups
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I'd like to get some implementation advice about a matter that is not
covered in the spec.

NSS clients currently only attempt to resume a session if the
following fields match:
* server IP
* server Port
* session ID
* server hostname

Looking up sessions in this manner means that dns-load-balancing
breaks SSL resumes.  Is there a case for checking server IP and port?

nagendra
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