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From LesaCullen@ccel.org  Fri Feb  1 01:35:32 2008
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 *  1.3 HOST_EQ_DHCP HOST_EQ_DHCP
 *  0.0 STOX_REPLY_TYPE STOX_REPLY_TYPE
 *  1.5 RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_E8_51_100 Razor2 gives engine 8 confidence level
 *      above 50%
 *      [cf: 100]
 *  0.5 RAZOR2_CHECK Listed in Razor2 (http://razor.sf.net/)
 *  0.5 RAZOR2_CF_RANGE_51_100 Razor2 gives confidence level above 50%
 *      [cf: 100]
 *   20 URIBL_BLACK Contains an URL listed in the URIBL blacklist
 *      [URIs: dhumbhar.com]
 *   10 URIBL_AB_SURBL Contains an URL listed in the AB SURBL blocklist
 *      [URIs: dhumbhar.com]
 *   10 URIBL_WS_SURBL Contains an URL listed in the WS SURBL blocklist
 *      [URIs: dhumbhar.com]
 *   10 URIBL_JP_SURBL Contains an URL listed in the JP SURBL blocklist
 *      [URIs: dhumbhar.com]
 *   10 URIBL_OB_SURBL Contains an URL listed in the OB SURBL blocklist
 *      [URIs: dhumbhar.com]
 *   10 URIBL_SC_SURBL Contains an URL listed in the SC SURBL blocklist
 *      [URIs: dhumbhar.com]
 *  1.1 URIBL_RHS_DOB Contains an URI of a new domain (Day Old Bread)
 *      [URIs: dhumbhar.com]
 *  3.0 RCVD_IN_XBL RBL: Received via a relay in Spamhaus XBL
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 *      [83.93.188.135 listed in dnsbl.sorbs.net]
 *  1.9 INVALID_MSGID Message-Id is not valid, according to RFC 2822
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Feb  1 01:54:43 2008
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If you have several servers with DNS load balancing, are the sessions  
actually synchronized between the servers?  Can you set up a session  
with server A and then resume it on B?

If the answer is no, then it makes sense to consider server IP. If the  
answer is yes, it doesn't.

I would like to point out two things, however:

1. Trying to resume a session is essentialy non-cost to the client, so  
why not attempt to resume all the time, even if only the DNS name  
matches?

2. Clients tend to cache DNS results, so even if you have DNS load  
balancing, a client will usually go to the same IP address again and  
again. If you have some other kind of load balancing that keeps a  
constant IP address, then you might have this problem.

On Feb 1, 2008, at 4:30 AM, Nagendra Modadugu wrote:

> I'd like to get some implementation advice about a matter that is not
> covered in the spec.
>
> NSS clients currently only attempt to resume a session if the
> following fields match:
> * server IP
> * server Port
> * session ID
> * server hostname
>
> Looking up sessions in this manner means that dns-load-balancing
> breaks SSL resumes.  Is there a case for checking server IP and port?
>
> nagendra
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
>

_______________________________________________
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Feb  1 02:27:17 2008
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<wg chair hat on>

Eric has posted version -09 of TLS 1.2 spec, which should be 
available in the draft repository shortly. Meanwhile, a temporary 
copy is available from here:

https://svn.resiprocate.org/rep/ietf-drafts/ekr/tls/tls.txt

You're encouraged to take a look at the changes, and check
that nothing was broken or missed.

We intend to send this to Tim for AD evaluation early next
week, but if you don't have time to check this now, the IETF
last call will provide one more opportunity to comment.

Best regards,
Pasi
_______________________________________________
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Three nits from my personal review:

Section 4.7: the example at the end of section isn't any more 
fully correct with the changed definition of digitally-signed 
(since the "digitally-signed" construct now includes the hashing 
step). Suggested rephrasing:

   In the following example

      stream-ciphered struct {
          uint8 field1;
          uint8 field2;
          digitally-signed struct { 
             opaque field3<0..255>;
             uint16 field4;
          };
      } UserType;

   the contents of the inner struct (field3 and field4) are used 
   as input for the signature/hash algorithm, and then the entire
   structure is encrypted with a stream cipher. [...]


7.4.3/A.4.2, ServerKeyExchange definition: the second "case dhe_dss"
should be "case dh_dss".

7.4.3 and A.4.2, KeyExchangeAlgorithm lists dh_anon twice

Also couple of typos (could be fixed later, too):

7.4.3/A.4.2: extra blank lines in definition of ServerKeyExchange.
A.4.2: should delete descriptions of dh_p/dh_g/dh_Ys, since
  the appendix is supposed to contain only the struct definitions
7.4.7/A.4.3, weird indentation (and extra blank lines) in definition
  of ClientKeyExchange.
4.6.1, the example struct has weird indentation around the 
  orange/banana cases.
4.7, "pplus" -> "plus"
7.4.7.1, "premaster_secert" -> "premaster_secret"
References: [IDEA] is not cited anywhere, can be removed 

Best regards,
Pasi
_______________________________________________
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Subject: ietf.org mailing list memberships reminder
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This is a reminder, sent out once a month, about your ietf.org mailing
list memberships.  It includes your subscription info and how to use
it to change it or unsubscribe from a list.

You can visit the URLs to change your membership status or
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http://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls/tls-archive%40megatron.ietf.org
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From: Martin Rex <Martin.Rex@sap.com>
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To: ngm+ietf@google.com (Nagendra Modadugu)
Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2008 15:24:08 +0100 (MET)
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Nagendra Modadugu wrote:
> 
> NSS clients currently only attempt to resume a session if the
> following fields match:
> * server IP
> * server Port
> * server hostname

That are the three parameters that we use in our clients in order
to try an SSL session resume.  When client-side Proxies are involved,
then the server IP alone is insufficient (it would be fairly constant).

>
> * session ID

I don't know what you mean by listing "session ID".
An SSL session resume can only be proposed by a client, not by the
server.  The server can only agree to resume.  So the above three
parameters are the lookup key into the client side SSL session
cache -- the session ID is an attribute of the session itself.


-Martin
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Feb  1 07:42:49 2008
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At Mon, 7 Jan 2008 09:25:20 +0200,
<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:
> 
> <wg chair hat on>
> 
> Mohammad Badra has requested that the TLS WG adopt
> draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk as a WG item. This draft was presented 
> in Vancouver, but few comments have been received so far.
> 
> Please use this thread to comment; not only the technical
> details, but whether you think this is useful; should it be
> done as WG item or individual document; and whether you're
> willing to work on this document.

I think it's generally useful to have a reasonably orthogonal
suite of cipher suites, so it would be good to have PSK usable
with ECDH. I'm willing to commit to reviewing this draft.

-Ekr

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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OK, I've now fixed this stuff in my local copy. I propose we wait
and see if anyone else has anything by like Monday and otherwise
I'll roll -10 and we can submit to Tim. WFY?

-Ekr


At Fri, 1 Feb 2008 12:34:33 +0200,
<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:
> 
> Three nits from my personal review:
> 
> Section 4.7: the example at the end of section isn't any more 
> fully correct with the changed definition of digitally-signed 
> (since the "digitally-signed" construct now includes the hashing 
> step). Suggested rephrasing:

Well, you could double hash, but i take your point.


>    In the following example
> 
>       stream-ciphered struct {
>           uint8 field1;
>           uint8 field2;
>           digitally-signed struct { 
>              opaque field3<0..255>;
>              uint16 field4;
>           };
>       } UserType;
> 
>    the contents of the inner struct (field3 and field4) are used 
>    as input for the signature/hash algorithm, and then the entire
>    structure is encrypted with a stream cipher. [...]
> 
> 
> 7.4.3/A.4.2, ServerKeyExchange definition: the second "case dhe_dss"
> should be "case dh_dss".

Fixed.


> 7.4.3 and A.4.2, KeyExchangeAlgorithm lists dh_anon twice

Doh! I added those cause I thought I had missed them and
my eyes have gone numb.


> Also couple of typos (could be fixed later, too):
> 
> 7.4.3/A.4.2: extra blank lines in definition of ServerKeyExchange.

You mean:

    };

} ServerKeyExchange;

Fixed.


> A.4.2: should delete descriptions of dh_p/dh_g/dh_Ys, since
>   the appendix is supposed to contain only the struct definitions

Agreed. I'm finding it a real pain to keep these harmonized.
Next time I do one of these I'm going to have some auto-appendicizer :)

> 7.4.7/A.4.3, weird indentation (and extra blank lines) in definition
>   of ClientKeyExchange.
The extra blank line was intentional for readability, but now that
you seay it, sure.


> 4.6.1, the example struct has weird indentation around the 
>   orange/banana cases.
These are fixed.

> 4.7, "pplus" -> "plus"
> 7.4.7.1, "premaster_secert" -> "premaster_secret"
> References: [IDEA] is not cited anywhere, can be removed 

Fixed.
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On Jan 31, 2008, at 3:44 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:

> * Yoav Nir:
>
>> The idea is that this shared secret has the properties that (a) it
>> can't be used for anything other than IKEv2 so storing it is
>> presumably OK (why?), and (b) it looks random. The RFC goes on to
>> state this:
>>
>>                                As noted above, deriving the shared
>>   secret from a password is not secure.  This construction is used
>>   because it is anticipated that people will do it anyway.
>
> [RFC 4306]
>
> In retrospect, this is a bit off--it's insecure in what context?

Depends on the usage. If one uses password-derived shared secret to   
authenticate key agreement (using it in HMAC-like construct or  
otherwise in place of a "good" shared secret), or worse - as keying  
material - then it's insecure because an attacker can perform off- 
line brute-forcing on the observed exchange targeting the weak link -  
the password itself. However there are ways (Encrypted Key Exchange  
is the best example) to authenticate DH using password-derived shared  
secret with sufficient security.

Also, the more complex the password is (length, distance from  
dictionary-found words, use of full-spectrum alphabet) - the more  
computing resources the attacker would need to have a reasonable  
chance of success.
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<wg chair hat on>

Only one slightly positive comment has been received so far, 
and nobody has indicated willingness to work on this document 
in TLS WG. Thus, we do not, at this time, have sufficient
support for adopting this document as TLS WG item.

Note that this decision is solely about adopting this document 
as TLS WG item. We are not deciding whether this document can 
be published as RFC, or deciding whether SIV mode in general 
is a good idea. If the authors believe it worthwhile, this 
decision does not prevent them from continuing the work.

Best regards,
Pasi
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<wg chair hat on>

So far, we have four people (in addition to the author) who 
support adopting draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk as TLS WG item, 
and have committed to participating in the work.

While getting more people involved certainly wouldn't hurt, 
I'm judging this to be sufficient interest for a simple
document like this.

Mohamad, please submit draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-00 at your 
convenience (but before the IETF 71 draft cut-off date).

Best regards,
Pasi
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : ECDHE_PSK Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
	Author(s)       : M. Badra
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-00.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2008-02-04

This document extends RFC 4279, RFC 4492 and RFC 4785, and specifies 
a set of ciphersuites that use a pre-shared key (PSK) to authenticate 
an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exchange (ECDH).  These ciphersuites 
provide Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).

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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Feb  4 10:49:01 2008
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   Concerning MAC verification, when (say) a server wants to verify a
MAC appended to a record received from the client, the server must
compute the MAC of that record using the client's MAC write secret and
the client's sequence number, and compare the resulting MAC against
the one received. Is this correct, or am I totally wrong?
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Feb  5 15:00:36 2008
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<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> writes:

> For single-DES, it's easy to explain why using it isn't a good 
> idea; for IDEA, I'd like to see some better text than mine...
> Does anyone know about e.g. cryptographic results for IDEA
> (like attacks more efficient than exhaustive key search)?

I believe weak keys is a sign of historical cipher designs, and both DES
and IDEA have weak keys.  A reference for IDEA is:

http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/daemen93weak.html

I think there are even better results than that paper, but that was one
of the earliest.

One can debate how problematic weak keys are, but I haven't seen anyone
arguing that existence of weak keys improve the security or confidence
in a cipher.

/Simon
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Len Sassaman wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 5 Feb 2008 Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> 
> >    IDEA has a 128-bit key, and thus is not vulnerable to exhaustive
> >    key search. However, IDEA has not seen widespread use, 
> >    and has not
> 
> IDEA has been widely used, particularly in disk and email 
> encryption programs.

I stand corrected -- maybe that could be rephrased to "IDEA cipher
suites for TLS have not seen widespread use"?

> >    received as extensive cryptographic analysis as AES and 
> other more
> 
> IDEA has received a much better "test of time" than AES, and many
> attempts at attacking IDEA have taken place over the last few
> decades.
> 
> IDEA's problem is its patent, nothing more.

In earlier discussions, some folks brought up the issue of rarely used
code. Even if IDEA as algorithm is fine, it's not necessarily a good
idea to include code in TLS libraries that is basically never used
(and thus might contain undetected bugs, impacting potentially both
security and interoperability).

> (If you're going to claim otherwise, I think you need to provide
> citations for both of those, or else you'll find a lot of
> disagreement.)

Yes, I agree that we need citations and/or better arguments.

Best regards,
Pasi
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Date: Wed, 06 Feb 2008 13:37:39 -0800
From: Chris Newman <Chris.Newman@Sun.COM>
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Cc: pasi.eronen@nokia.com, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] password-based authentication (was: Some comments about
 draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01)
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--On January 30, 2008 18:52:01 -0800 Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> 
wrote:

>
>   Hi Chris,
>
> On Wed, January 30, 2008 3:12 pm, Chris Newman wrote:
>> Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote on 1/30/08 9:58 +0200:
>>
>>> Dan Harkins wrote:
>>>
>>>> Personally I would view a password-based authentication scheme
>>>> that assumes the shared key is a low-entropy one or is selected
>>>> from a limited set of keys, like a dictionary, as more useful to
>>>> the real world. I believe that is the predominant access method
>>>> used in the Internet today.
>>>
>>> Just being curious, what would be the main differences between
>>> the authentication scheme you're thinking about, and RFC 5054?
>>
>> On the protocol side, not much.
>>
>> On the implementation side, it would roughly double the complexity of a
>> typical
>> TLS API in order to actually be useful to applications.  The password
>> verifier
>> could be stored in any one of a number of external repositories (LDAP,
>> RADIUS,
>> DIAMETER, SQL, Liberty, some other SOAP/HTTP mechanism, /etc/passwd, NIS,
>> etc)
>> and the application would have to provide the TLS stack with
>> sophisticated configuration knobs related to these protocols.  As a
>> matter of efficiency,
>> some of these protocols are not cheap so high performance servers will
>> have to
>> keep a pool of connections, then fetch and cache the information locally.
>> Attributes that are peripherally related to authentication or unrelated
>> to authentication may also be accessed via these protocols and need to be
>> cached
>> as well to avoid the need for double-fetching of the same entry.  So the
>> API
>> needs a way to put all sorts of controls on the protocols used to fetch
>> this
>> data, timeouts, what attributes are of interest, caching parameters, etc.
>> Then
>> there's need for back-channels to the cache (flushing specific entries on
>> provisioning changes) which means hooking up to a notification mechanism
>> to the
>> caching logic under the TLS stack.
>
> Why would you put all that cruft into the TLS stack? That's what protocol
> layers are for, abstracting out this complexity.

Agreed.  This doesn't belong in the TLS stack so it shouldn't be in the TLS 
protocol.

> What do you do for supporting certificates? For RFC2885 support do you
> have HTTP and FTP support to obtain certificates and CRLs from
> repositories built into the TLS stack? Is the entire OCSP protocol part
> of your TLS stack? What about CMS? Et cetera.

The server I work on only supports client certificates signed by a locally 
stored CA cert (and locally stored CRLs) for TLS authentication and it's 
difficult to keep it working because the extra layering through the TLS 
stack makes it more fragile than other authentication code.  There's OCSP 
support in the TLS stack, but the server doesn't enable it -- it'd probably 
be problematic since the application would have limited control over the 
OCSP connections and that won't be viable in a highly scalable server.

>> Personally, I think TLS stacks are plenty complex enough without all this
>> machinery.  As a matter of architecture, I'd rather keep this machinery
>> completely separate from the TLS stack and use TLS channel bindings when
>> mutual authentication at the application layer is needed.
>
> Channel bindings are orthogonal to a password-based authentication
> protocol.

Not for one that does mutual authentication.

>> Although I'm dubious of the utility of PSK, it seems mostly harmless to
>> the TLS
>> stack as long as it's not a password.  The primary utility I see for PSK
>> would
>> be for server->server connections if it's coupled with an SSH-style
>> zero-configuration key setup mechanism (I don't see it as having much
>> real-world utility without the latter piece).  If PSK proves to be useful
>> than
>> ECC-PSK is also likely to be useful simply because of the improved key
>> scalability.
>
>   Dubious utility? Wow. They are arguably the predominant method used for
> network access in the Internet today, and for the past umpteen years.

I've never seen TLS PSK used so I question your assertion.

>   One lesson I learned very hard from IKE was that if your protocol does
> not handle username/password authentication then people are going to hack
> the hell out of it to put it in, to the detriment of protocol security.
> Why do you think the "do not validate server certificate" checkbox exists?
> Let me give you an actual quote I heard: "to make SSL work".

That's why I'd prefer to keep TLS out of the game of application 
authentication.  The TLS stack is too critical as a mechanism to provide an 
encrypted tunnel (it's debatable if the server authentication in TLS is 
useful for the reason you cite).

IKE got into the game of application authentication because VPNs are the 
primary deployed use for IPsec/IKE and the VPN application has all the 
standard application authentication requirements.

		- Chris

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Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2008 15:19:58 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Cc: pasi.eronen@nokia.com, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] password-based authentication (was: Some comments about
 draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01)
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  Hi Chris,

  It sounds like your TLS implementation is a horribly complex mess.
I'm very sorry about that but please realize that not everyone's is.
It's possible to implement password-based authentication without
"doubling the complexity" (as you claimed) but then maybe not with
all TLS implementations. Your mileage may vary, and apparently may
vary considerably.

  Nobody said anything about "application authentication" so that's
just a red herring.

  Also I don't know what's debatable about the benefits of server-side
authentication in TLS unless you want to enable phishing expeditions.
Most people don't.

  best regards,

  Dan.

On Wed, February 6, 2008 1:37 pm, Chris Newman wrote:
> --On January 30, 2008 18:52:01 -0800 Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>   Hi Chris,
>>
>> On Wed, January 30, 2008 3:12 pm, Chris Newman wrote:
>>> Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote on 1/30/08 9:58 +0200:
>>>
>>>> Dan Harkins wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Personally I would view a password-based authentication scheme
>>>>> that assumes the shared key is a low-entropy one or is selected
>>>>> from a limited set of keys, like a dictionary, as more useful to
>>>>> the real world. I believe that is the predominant access method
>>>>> used in the Internet today.
>>>>
>>>> Just being curious, what would be the main differences between
>>>> the authentication scheme you're thinking about, and RFC 5054?
>>>
>>> On the protocol side, not much.
>>>
>>> On the implementation side, it would roughly double the complexity of a
>>> typical
>>> TLS API in order to actually be useful to applications.  The password
>>> verifier
>>> could be stored in any one of a number of external repositories (LDAP,
>>> RADIUS,
>>> DIAMETER, SQL, Liberty, some other SOAP/HTTP mechanism, /etc/passwd,
>>> NIS,
>>> etc)
>>> and the application would have to provide the TLS stack with
>>> sophisticated configuration knobs related to these protocols.  As a
>>> matter of efficiency,
>>> some of these protocols are not cheap so high performance servers will
>>> have to
>>> keep a pool of connections, then fetch and cache the information
>>> locally.
>>> Attributes that are peripherally related to authentication or unrelated
>>> to authentication may also be accessed via these protocols and need to
>>> be
>>> cached
>>> as well to avoid the need for double-fetching of the same entry.  So
>>> the
>>> API
>>> needs a way to put all sorts of controls on the protocols used to fetch
>>> this
>>> data, timeouts, what attributes are of interest, caching parameters,
>>> etc.
>>> Then
>>> there's need for back-channels to the cache (flushing specific entries
>>> on
>>> provisioning changes) which means hooking up to a notification
>>> mechanism
>>> to the
>>> caching logic under the TLS stack.
>>
>> Why would you put all that cruft into the TLS stack? That's what
>> protocol
>> layers are for, abstracting out this complexity.
>
> Agreed.  This doesn't belong in the TLS stack so it shouldn't be in the
> TLS
> protocol.
>
>> What do you do for supporting certificates? For RFC2885 support do you
>> have HTTP and FTP support to obtain certificates and CRLs from
>> repositories built into the TLS stack? Is the entire OCSP protocol part
>> of your TLS stack? What about CMS? Et cetera.
>
> The server I work on only supports client certificates signed by a locally
> stored CA cert (and locally stored CRLs) for TLS authentication and it's
> difficult to keep it working because the extra layering through the TLS
> stack makes it more fragile than other authentication code.  There's OCSP
> support in the TLS stack, but the server doesn't enable it -- it'd
> probably
> be problematic since the application would have limited control over the
> OCSP connections and that won't be viable in a highly scalable server.
>
>>> Personally, I think TLS stacks are plenty complex enough without all
>>> this
>>> machinery.  As a matter of architecture, I'd rather keep this machinery
>>> completely separate from the TLS stack and use TLS channel bindings
>>> when
>>> mutual authentication at the application layer is needed.
>>
>> Channel bindings are orthogonal to a password-based authentication
>> protocol.
>
> Not for one that does mutual authentication.
>
>>> Although I'm dubious of the utility of PSK, it seems mostly harmless to
>>> the TLS
>>> stack as long as it's not a password.  The primary utility I see for
>>> PSK
>>> would
>>> be for server->server connections if it's coupled with an SSH-style
>>> zero-configuration key setup mechanism (I don't see it as having much
>>> real-world utility without the latter piece).  If PSK proves to be
>>> useful
>>> than
>>> ECC-PSK is also likely to be useful simply because of the improved key
>>> scalability.
>>
>>   Dubious utility? Wow. They are arguably the predominant method used
>> for
>> network access in the Internet today, and for the past umpteen years.
>
> I've never seen TLS PSK used so I question your assertion.
>
>>   One lesson I learned very hard from IKE was that if your protocol does
>> not handle username/password authentication then people are going to
>> hack
>> the hell out of it to put it in, to the detriment of protocol security.
>> Why do you think the "do not validate server certificate" checkbox
>> exists?
>> Let me give you an actual quote I heard: "to make SSL work".
>
> That's why I'd prefer to keep TLS out of the game of application
> authentication.  The TLS stack is too critical as a mechanism to provide
> an
> encrypted tunnel (it's debatable if the server authentication in TLS is
> useful for the reason you cite).
>
> IKE got into the game of application authentication because VPNs are the
> primary deployed use for IPsec/IKE and the VPN application has all the
> standard application authentication requirements.
>
> 		- Chris
>
>


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TLS@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for IDEA/DES document
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On Wed, Feb 06, 2008 at 12:38:44PM +0200, Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> Len Sassaman wrote:
>> On Tue, 5 Feb 2008 Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:

>>>    IDEA has a 128-bit key, and thus is not vulnerable to exhaustive
>>>    key search. However, IDEA has not seen widespread use, 
>>>    and has not

>> IDEA has been widely used, particularly in disk and email 
>> encryption programs.

Indeed.


> I stand corrected -- maybe that could be rephrased to "IDEA cipher
> suites for TLS have not seen widespread use"?

Yes, makes sense.


[...]
>> IDEA's problem is its patent, nothing more.

IDEA's problem also is the 64-bit block length.

With networks getting faster, it is increasingly easier to get
uncomfortably close to the number of blocks where you can no longer
expect full security (around 2^32 blocks, i.e. 32 GB, for CBC
encryption; with a non-neglible probability to have a security failure
well below this limit).

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for IDEA/DES document
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>>> IDEA's problem is its patent, nothing more.
> 
> IDEA's problem also is the 64-bit block length.
> 
> With networks getting faster, it is increasingly easier to get
> uncomfortably close to the number of blocks where you can no longer
> expect full security (around 2^32 blocks, i.e. 32 GB, for CBC
> encryption; with a non-neglible probability to have a security failure
> well below this limit).

Can you explain how security weakens after sending 32GB of data?
Is this just for IDEA or for AES and others as well?  In TLS,
can you just renegotiate the security parameters well before
reaching this threshold?

Thanks,

Mike
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On Wed, 06 Feb 2008 21:53:51 -0800
Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:

> >>> IDEA's problem is its patent, nothing more.
> > 
> > IDEA's problem also is the 64-bit block length.
> > 
> > With networks getting faster, it is increasingly easier to get
> > uncomfortably close to the number of blocks where you can no longer
> > expect full security (around 2^32 blocks, i.e. 32 GB, for CBC
> > encryption; with a non-neglible probability to have a security
> > failure well below this limit).
> 
> Can you explain how security weakens after sending 32GB of data?
> Is this just for IDEA or for AES and others as well?  In TLS,
> can you just renegotiate the security parameters well before
> reaching this threshold?
> 
The problem is the probability of a collision in the ciphertext
blocks.  The blocksize is 64 bits, for DES and IDEA; therefore, it's
collision resistance is O(sqrt(2^64)) or 2^32.  That's why AES has a
128-bit blocksize, to raise that parameter to 2^64 blocks.


		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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Here's an update to the text proposal, incorporating many of 
the comments received so far:

N.  Security Considerations

N.1.  DES Cipher Suites

   DES has an effective key strength of 56 bits, which has been been
   known to be vulnerable to practical brute force attacks for over 20
   years [DH].  A relatively recent 2006 paper by Kumar et al.  [COPA]
   describes a system which performs exhaustive key search in less than
   nine days on average, and costs less than 10,000 USD to build.

   Given these, the single-DES cipher suites SHOULD NOT be implemented
   by TLS libraries.  If a TLS library implements these cipher suites,
   it SHOULD NOT enable them by default.  Experience has also shown that
   rarely used code is a source of security and interoperability
   problems, so existing implementations SHOULD consider removing these
   cipher suites.

N.2.  IDEA Cipher Suites

   IDEA has a 128-bit key, and thus is not vulnerable to exhaustive key
   search.  However, IDEA cipher suites for TLS have not seen widespread
   use: most implementations either do not support them, do not enable
   them by default, or do not negotiate them when other algorithms (such
   as AES, 3DES, or RC4) are available.

   Experience has shown that rarely used code is a source of security
   and interoperability problems; given this, the IDEA cipher suites
   SHOULD NOT be implemented by TLS libraries, and SHOULD be removed
   from existing implementations.  If a TLS library implements these
   cipher suites, it SHOULD NOT enable them by default.

   (To be determined: should we include text speculating why IDEA has
   been rarely used, including e.g. reasons mentioned on the list so
   far?  This would include at least IPR, performance in software, short
   block size, and lack of government approval in many countries.)

The last paragraph of IDEA text obviously needs work (if we choose
to include some of those reasons), and we need to be careful to
distinguish facts (where everyone agrees) and personal opinions
(and in worst case, FUD). 

Comments?

Best regards,
Pasi
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> N.1.  DES Cipher Suites

OK regarding DES.


> N.2.  IDEA Cipher Suites

OK regarding IDEA. As for the last paragraph, you definitely want to bring =
its short block size up. One may mention in one short sentence that in addi=
tion to the above, user of IDEA must make sure he acquired the license to u=
se it.
--
Regards,
Uri


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Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] Proposed text for IDEA/DES document</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-si=
ze:12.0px'><BR>
&gt; N.1. &nbsp;DES Cipher Suites<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>OK regarding DES.<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN ST=
YLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'><BR>
<BR>
&gt; N.2. &nbsp;IDEA Cipher Suites<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12.0px'>OK regarding IDEA. As for the last paragraph, you=
 definitely want to bring its short block size up. One may mention in one s=
hort sentence that in addition to the above, user of IDEA must make sure he=
 acquired the license to use it.<BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for IDEA/DES document
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On Feb 8, 2008 4:16 AM,  <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> wrote:

> Here's an update to the text proposal, incorporating many of
> the comments received so far:

> N.2.  IDEA Cipher Suites
>
>    IDEA has a 128-bit key, and thus is not vulnerable to exhaustive key
>    search.  However, IDEA cipher suites for TLS have not seen widespread
>    use: most implementations either do not support them, do not enable
>    them by default, or do not negotiate them when other algorithms (such
>    as AES, 3DES, or RC4) are available.
>
>    Experience has shown that rarely used code is a source of security
>    and interoperability problems; given this, the IDEA cipher suites
>    SHOULD NOT be implemented by TLS libraries, and SHOULD be removed
>    from existing implementations.  If a TLS library implements these
>    cipher suites, it SHOULD NOT enable them by default.
>
>    (To be determined: should we include text speculating why IDEA has
>    been rarely used, including e.g. reasons mentioned on the list so
>    far?  This would include at least IPR, performance in software, short
>    block size, and lack of government approval in many countries.)
>
> The last paragraph of IDEA text obviously needs work (if we choose
> to include some of those reasons), and we need to be careful to
> distinguish facts (where everyone agrees) and personal opinions
> (and in worst case, FUD).
>
> Comments?

Mentioning the IPR issues can't hurt, but I don't think that any of
that justifies the "should not enable by default" verdict.  I am not
aware of any IDEA-related interoperability or security problems in TLS
in practice: exchanging the block cipher to be used in CBC mode is
simple enough, and even if the specific TLS ciphersuite may not have
been tested a lot, we are talking about IDEA implementations some of
which have been used to implement IDEA encryption with PGP data
formats, successfully demonstrating interoperability at least in this
context.  (And of course with the TLS ciphersuite negotation
mechanism, there are no grounds to deprecate anything just because it
is not used much.  A simple note amounting to "you might not want to
bother implementing these" would do.)

If we were worried about untested code, it's probably the DSA
ciphersuites that we should disallow -- these are much easier to get
dangerously wrong if you have managed to get right your implementation
of, say, TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA!  (Not that I am actually
recommending getting rid of DSA, mind you!)

The reasons to deprecate IDEA ciphersuites in TLS are

1. it's block size is small, with unpleasant security implications, and

2. it won't be missed a lot.

This is what should be covered by the rationale for deprecating the
ciphersuites.

Note that reason #1 similarly applies to all the 3DES ciphersuites as
well.  I think we should note this in the document!  The only reason
that we are keeping 3DES ciphersuites (for now) is that reason #2 does
not apply to them -- 3DES still is frequently used, for historical
reasons on the one hand, and probably because not everyone likes AES
all that much on the other hand.

Bodo
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	Title           : AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for IDEA/DES document
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> 3DES still is frequently used, for historical
> reasons on the one hand, and probably because not everyone likes AES
> all that much on the other hand.

What don't people like about AES?  Is their dislike of it
technically justified, or is it based on personal preference?

Thanks,

Mike
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode
	Author(s)       : E. Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-03.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2008-02-09

RFC 4492 describes elliptic curve cipher suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS).  However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their
MAC algorithm.  This document describes eight new CipherSuites for
TLS/DTLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.  Four use HMAC
with SHA-256 or SHA-384 and four use AES in Galois Counter Mode
(GCM).

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for IDEA/DES document
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Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> writes:

>> 3DES still is frequently used, for historical
>> reasons on the one hand, and probably because not everyone likes AES
>> all that much on the other hand.
>
>What don't people like about AES?  Is their dislike of it technically
>justified, or is it based on personal preference?

There's a number of reasons that I've run into:

- Lots of 3DES legacy hardware/software out there.
- Lots of existing 3DES standards/security specs out there.
- It's a long-time banking standard, and banks are very conservative.
- Some false alarms about AES' security a few years ago.
- ...

All of it adds up.  I'm still using 3DES as the default cipher for protecting
private keys from a combination of "no-one ever got fired for specifying 3DES"
(some users will question use of AES over 3DES, but I don't think anyone's
ever questioned 3DES), and because the data amounts being protected are so
small that there's no speed advantage to be had from AES.  OTOH I make it
user-configurable, so it's up to the users.

Peter.

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FYI: we've sent draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-09 to Tim.
The document shepherd write-up is included below.

Best regards,
Pasi 

--------------

(1.a)  Who is the Document Shepherd for this document?  Has the
       Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
       document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
       version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

Pasi Eronen. Yes.

(1.b)  Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
       and from key non-WG members?  Does the Document Shepherd have
       any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
       have been performed?

The document went through WG last call, and although the number 
people who commented the technical details was rather small, 
I don't have concerns about the depth or breadth. 

(1.c)  Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
       needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
       e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
       AAA, internationalization, or XML?

No concerns.

(1.d)  Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
       issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
       and/or the IESG should be aware of?  For example, perhaps he
       or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
       has concerns whether there really is a need for it.  In any
       event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
       that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
       concerns here.  

No concerns.

       Has an IPR disclosure related to this document been filed?
       If so, please include a reference to the disclosure and
       summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on this issue.

No IPR disclosures have been filed. 

(1.e)  How solid is the WG consensus behind this document?  Does it
       represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
       others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
       agree with it?

The WG as a whole is behind the document.

(1.f)  Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
       discontent?  If so, please summarize the areas of conflict in
       separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director.  (It
       should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
       entered into the ID Tracker.)

Nobody has threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme 
discontent. 

(1.g)  Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
       document satisfies all ID nits?  (See
       http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
       http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/.)  Boilerplate checks are
       not enough; this check needs to be thorough.  

Yes, I have personally verified both the checklist and the idnits 
tool output.

       Has the document met all formal review criteria it needs to,
       such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews?

No such formal review criteria are applicable.

       If the document does not already indicate its intended status
       at the top of the first page, please indicate the intended
       status here.

The intended status, Proposed Standard, is stated on the first page.

(1.h)  Has the document split its references into normative and
       informative?  Are there normative references to documents that
       are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
       state?  If such normative references exist, what is the
       strategy for their completion?  Are there normative references
       that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]?  If
       so, list these downward references to support the Area
       Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

References are split into normative and informative; all normative 
references look acceptable. 

There is one reference whose normativeness might be subject to
different opinions or discussion: RFC 4492 (ECC cipher suites for
TLS). When RFC 4492 was written, TLS 1.0 and 1.1 did not provide
algorithm agility for digital signatures. There are couple of
sentences in RFC 4492 that simply follow what TLS 1.0/1.1 did in
this respect.

TLS 1.2 (this specification) adds such algorithm agility
functionality, and this functionality applies to all TLS cipher
suites which use signatures (either in TLS messages or
certificates).  The document includes a couple of sentences that
explain how exactly this functionality works in the context of RFC
4492; in other words, things that someone implementing both this
specification and RFC 4492 should pay attention to. These topics
are summarized in Appendix A.7.

Given this, the document has "Updates: RFC 4492" on the cover page 
to draw implementors' attention. However, RFC 4492 is listed as an
informative reference, as this specification can be implemented
without understanding RFC 4492. 

(1.i)  Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document's IANA
       Considerations section exists and is consistent with the body
       of the document?  If the document specifies protocol
       extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
       registries?  Are the IANA registries clearly identified?  If
       the document creates a new registry, does it define the
       proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
       procedure for future registrations?  Does it suggest a
       reasonable name for the new registry?  See [RFC2434].  If the
       document describes an Expert Review process, has the Document
       Shepherd conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that
       the IESG can appoint the needed Expert during IESG Evaluation?

Everything looks OK here. 

(1.j)  Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
       document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
       code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
       an automated checker?

The only (semi-)formal language used is the TLS presentation 
language (defined in this document), for which no automated tools 
are available. I have checked them manually.

(1.k)  The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
       Announcement Write-Up.  Please provide such a Document
       Announcement Write-Up.  Recent examples can be found in the
       "Action" announcements for approved documents.  The approval
       announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary
  
   This document specifies version 1.2 of the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) protocol. The most important improvements over
   earlier versions are algorithm agility for digital signatures
   and PRFs, and support for authenticated encryption modes. The
   document also merges in AES cipher suites from RFC 3268 and the
   TLS extension mechanism from RFC 4366. Several requirements have
   been also tightened, and text has been clarified based on
   feedback from implementations of earlier versions of TLS.

Working Group Summary

   This document is a product of the Transport Layer 
   Security (TLS) Working Group.

Document Quality

   There is at least one prototype implementation of an earlier
   version of TLS 1.2 Internet-Draft. Several other vendors have
   participated in the work, and have indicated that they plan to
   implement the specification.

Personnel

   The Document Shepherd for this document is Pasi Eronen, and 
   the Responsible Area Director is Tim Polk.

--------------------------

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Uri Blumenthal wrote:

> One may mention in one short sentence that in addition to the above, 
> user of IDEA must make sure he acquired the license to use it.

This is one thing we *cannot* put in the document, as it would be 
an opinion on the validity of the IPR claim (and RFC 3979
Section 11 explicitly prohibits this).

Best regards,
Pasi
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On Sat, Feb 9, 2008 at 7:35 AM, Mike <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:

> > 3DES still is frequently used, for historical
>  > reasons on the one hand, and probably because not everyone likes AES
>  > all that much on the other hand.

>  What don't people like about AES?  Is their dislike of it
>  technically justified, or is it based on personal preference?

This is a question I'd like to answer 20 years from now, then putting
hindsight to use ;-)

I guess you could say that some people have a personal preference to
think that their dislike of AES is technically justified.  Take a look
here, for example: http://www.cryptosystem.net/aes/  A rather
confusing page (not even just about AES even though it pretends so at
first sight), but then the author *is* a cryptanalysis expert, so his
concerns probably shouldn't be ignored lightly.

Others have complained about AES because its internal structure is
rather prone to side-channel attacks.

I'm not sure who really would recommend 3DES over AES for reasons like
these, but 3DES certainly appears to be fine as long as you don't have
to handle too large an amount of data (the small block length isn't an
issue then), and it has been around for longer -- so arguably we can
expect fewer cryptanalytic surprises regarding 3DES than regarding
AES.

Bodo
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<wg chair hat on>

This message starts a WG last call on the following two drafts:

  draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02
  draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-04

prior to sending them to the IESG for publication as Proposed 
Standard (rsa-aes-gcm) and Informational (ecc-new-mac).

Please send your comments to the WG mailing list by Wednesday 
March 5th. Comments along the lines "I've read it and it looks 
OK" are helpful and encouraged.

Best regards,
Pasi
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode
	Author(s)       : E. Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-04.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2008-02-12

RFC 4492 describes elliptic curve cipher suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS).  However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their
MAC algorithm.  This document describes eight new CipherSuites for
TLS/DTLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.  Four use HMAC
with SHA-256 or SHA-384 and four use AES in Galois Counter Mode
(GCM).

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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for rsa-aes-gcm and ecc-new-mac
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<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> writes:

> <wg chair hat on>
>
> This message starts a WG last call on the following two drafts:
>
>   draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02
>   draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-04
>
> prior to sending them to the IESG for publication as Proposed 
> Standard (rsa-aes-gcm) and Informational (ecc-new-mac).
>
> Please send your comments to the WG mailing list by Wednesday 
> March 5th. Comments along the lines "I've read it and it looks 
> OK" are helpful and encouraged.

With the following fixes, I think the documents are OK.  I haven't
implemented them though, so there may be still be other issues.

For draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-04:

* Section 1 says "This document specifies TLS ECC cipher suites which
  replace SHA-256 and SHA-384 rather than SHA-1.".  I can't parse this.
  s/replace/uses/?

* Section 2.1 and 2.2, where is P_SHA-256 defined etc?  RFC 4346bis
  mentions P_SHA256 but not P_SHA-256.

* Section 2.2, what should be done if AES-GCM decrypt fails?  Unlike
  most others ciphers, AES-GCM can fail to decrypt data.  Either a
  discussion, or a pointer to discussion elsewhere, to specify the
  behaviour in TLS would be useful.  There may be side-channel
  considerations here, so it may be relevant to add that decrypt errors
  should not be leaked.

For draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02:

* Section 1, typo "ciphersutes".

* Section 3, same as for the other document, what should be done if
  AES-GCM decrypt fails?

/Simon
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for rsa-aes-gcm and ecc-new-mac
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draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-04.txt:

Change "AES_128_GCM_SHA384" to "AES_256_GCM_SHA384" (two occurrences).

Wan-Teh
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On Tue, Feb 12, 2008 at 02:42:03PM +0200, Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:

> This message starts a WG last call on the following two drafts:
> 
>   draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02
>   draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-04
> 
> prior to sending them to the IESG for publication as Proposed 
> Standard (rsa-aes-gcm) and Informational (ecc-new-mac).
> 
> Please send your comments to the WG mailing list by Wednesday 
> March 5th. [...]

Given the form of rfc4346-bis that has now evolved, the ecc-new-mac
specification really should include ECDHE_RSA versions of the
ciphersuites that it specifies -- i.e., ciphersuites relying on RSA
for server authentication (since this is what the current base of
installed certificates mostly offers) but on ECDH for forward secrecy.

(Using the RFC 4492 ciphersuite for this purpose would mean using
the legacy TLS PRF.)

For sake of completeness, one might also want to add ECDH_RSA to the
picture.

So I don't really agree with draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-## unless the
following ciphersuites are added, since I wouldn't really like to see
yet another boring ciphersuite specification just to cover these:

       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,XX};
       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,XX};

       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xXX,XX};
       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xXX,XX};

... plus optionally:

       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xXX,XX};
       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xXX,XX};

       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xXX,XX};
       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xXX,XX};

, all with the obvious semantics.

Bodo

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Thread-Topic: [TLS] WGLC for rsa-aes-gcm and ecc-new-mac
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And the point of mixing an RSA-based suite into an ECC-based draft would be..?   The idea is to move from RSA to ECC.

-----Original Message-----
From: tls-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Bodo Moeller
Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2008 12:52 AM
To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for rsa-aes-gcm and ecc-new-mac

On Tue, Feb 12, 2008 at 02:42:03PM +0200, Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:

> This message starts a WG last call on the following two drafts:
>
>   draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02
>   draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-04
>
> prior to sending them to the IESG for publication as Proposed
> Standard (rsa-aes-gcm) and Informational (ecc-new-mac).
>
> Please send your comments to the WG mailing list by Wednesday
> March 5th. [...]

Given the form of rfc4346-bis that has now evolved, the ecc-new-mac
specification really should include ECDHE_RSA versions of the
ciphersuites that it specifies -- i.e., ciphersuites relying on RSA
for server authentication (since this is what the current base of
installed certificates mostly offers) but on ECDH for forward secrecy.

(Using the RFC 4492 ciphersuite for this purpose would mean using
the legacy TLS PRF.)

For sake of completeness, one might also want to add ECDH_RSA to the
picture.

So I don't really agree with draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-## unless the
following ciphersuites are added, since I wouldn't really like to see
yet another boring ciphersuite specification just to cover these:

       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,XX};
       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,XX};

       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xXX,XX};
       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xXX,XX};

... plus optionally:

       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xXX,XX};
       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xXX,XX};

       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xXX,XX};
       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xXX,XX};

, all with the obvious semantics.

Bodo

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Subject: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The Transport Layer
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The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG 
(tls) to consider the following document:

- 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 '
   <draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-09.txt> as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
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ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2008-02-27. Exceptionally, 
comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please 
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Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 10:48:31 -0800
From: "Bodo Moeller" <bmoeller@acm.org>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for rsa-aes-gcm and ecc-new-mac
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On Wed, Feb 13, 2008 at 5:49 AM, Blumenthal, Uri <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> And the point of mixing an RSA-based suite into an ECC-based draft would be..?   The idea is to move from RSA to ECC.

You have just answered your own question, haven't you?

These ciphersuites are part of the transition path, in particulary if
we take into account the intrinsincally different time behavior of
authentication security and encryption security in scenarios where we
have an ephemeral data exchange as in TLS (rather than long-term data
storage) but may require long-term encryption security.

ECDH ciphersuites with RSA-based authentication mean that we can use
ECC with the certificates that are around now (i.e., without having to
obtain additional certificates specificallly for ECC).  Should it
happen that two years from now 2048-bit RSA and 2048-bit DH are
routinely broken but ECDH is unaffected, our current TLS sessions
using one of these mixed ECDHE_RSA ciphersuites will remain secure: An
adversary who now records all the data of our TLS connections won't be
able to decrypt it (but might sooner or later be able to decrypt data
from sessions using DHE_RSA ciphersuites).

Also, the ECDH ciphersuites with RSA for authentication are quite nice
for clients without a lot of computing power, since RSA signature
verification (with e = 0x10001 and the like) is very quickly done
compared to verification in most other signature schemes.

Bodo


>  -----Original Message-----
>  From: tls-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Bodo Moeller
>  Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2008 12:52 AM
>  To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
>  Cc: tls@ietf.org
>  Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for rsa-aes-gcm and ecc-new-mac

>  > This message starts a WG last call on the following two drafts:
>  >
>  >   draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02
>  >   draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-04
[...]
>  Given the form of rfc4346-bis that has now evolved, the ecc-new-mac
>  specification really should include ECDHE_RSA versions of the
>  ciphersuites that it specifies -- i.e., ciphersuites relying on RSA
>  for server authentication (since this is what the current base of
>  installed certificates mostly offers) but on ECDH for forward secrecy.
[...]
>  So I don't really agree with draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-## unless the
>  following ciphersuites are added, since I wouldn't really like to see
>  yet another boring ciphersuite specification just to cover these:
>
>        CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,XX};
>        CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,XX};
>
>        CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xXX,XX};
>        CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xXX,XX};
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : DES and IDEA Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
	Author(s)       : P. Eronen
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-00.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2008-02-13

TLS specification versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346) included
cipher suites based on DES (Data Encryption Standard) and IDEA
(International Data Encryption Algorithm) algorithms.  DES (when used
in single-DES mode) and IDEA are no longer recommended for general
use in TLS, and have been removed from TLS 1.2 main specification
(RFC NNNN).  This document specifies these cipher suites for
completeness, and discusses reasons why their use is no longer
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The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG 
(tls) to consider the following document:

- 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 '
   <draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-09.txt> as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
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The TLS WG will be meeting at IETF 71 in Philadelphia. 

Please submit your requests for agenda items by Monday February 25.

-Ekr
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Keying Material Extractors for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
	Author(s)       : E. Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt
	Pages           : 7
	Date            : 2008-02-20

A number of protocols wish to leverage Transport Layer Security (TLS)
to perform key establishment but then use some of the keying material
for their own purposes.  This document describes a general mechanism
for allowing that.

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions
	Author(s)	: D. Eastlake 3rd
	Filename	: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis-02.txt
	Pages		: 23
	Date		: 2008-2-25
	
This document provides documentation for existing specific TLS
   extensions. It is a companion document for the TLS 1.2 specification,
   draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-07.txt.

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http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis-02.txt

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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Feb 25 13:56:45 2008
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Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 23:33:33 +0200
From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Subject: [TLS] updated TLS-Openpgp protocol
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I've updated the experimental protocol for openpgp keys. The updated 
version can be found at:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mavrogiannopoulos-rfc5081bis-00.txt

The main addition is that it adds support for using subkeys instead of 
the main key of the openpgp certificate. For this reason i'd like to 
revive this protocol as a TLS WG item. For this to be possible there 
must be interest on this protocol, so if there are there people in this 
list supporting this protocol please express it.

Of course comments are always welcome.

regards,
Nikos

PS. Currently there is a module for the apache web server implementing 
the openpgp-tls protocol, available at: 
http://www.outoforder.cc/projects/apache/mod_gnutls/

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From: "Mark Brown" <mark@redphonesecurity.com>
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TLS Supplemental Data [RFC4680] was overlooked, e.g. in section 7.4.2.
Server Certificate,

      The server MUST send a certificate whenever the agreed-upon key
      exchange method uses certificates for authentication (this
      includes all key exchange methods defined in this document except
      DH_anon).  This message will always immediately follow the server
                                   ^--No
      hello message.

Also in section 7.4.7. Client Key Exchange Message,

      This message is always sent by the client. It MUST immediately
                                                    ^--No
      follow the client certificate message, if it is sent. Otherwise it
      MUST be the first message sent by the client after it receives the
      ^--No
      server hello done message.

Instead, per [RFC4680], ServerCertificate may follow a server's
SupplementalData message.  Also, Client Key Exchange follows the client
Certificate message and/or the client SupplementalData message, if these
messages are sent.  

[RFC4680] should also be added to the references section.  It may be helpful
to add SupplementalData to Figure 1 on page 34 of rfc4346-bis as well,
marked with an asterisk *, following Figure 1 in [RFC4680].

--mark

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I wouldn't say it was overlooked; it's simply not in scope of
this document. There are other documents that define new TLS 
handshake messages (at least RFC 4366(bis) and RFC 5077
in addition to RFC 4680), and those messages are not mentioned 
here either (and don't have to be).

Best regards,
Pasi 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Mark Brown
> Sent: 28 February, 2008 22:57
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The 
> TransportLayer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2) to 
> Proposed Standard
> 
> TLS Supplemental Data [RFC4680] was overlooked, e.g. in section 7.4.2.
> Server Certificate,
> 
>       The server MUST send a certificate whenever the agreed-upon key
>       exchange method uses certificates for authentication (this
>       includes all key exchange methods defined in this 
> document except
>       DH_anon).  This message will always immediately follow 
> the server
>                                    ^--No
>       hello message.
> 
> Also in section 7.4.7. Client Key Exchange Message,
> 
>       This message is always sent by the client. It MUST immediately
>                                                     ^--No
>       follow the client certificate message, if it is sent. 
> Otherwise it
>       MUST be the first message sent by the client after it 
> receives the
>       ^--No
>       server hello done message.
> 
> Instead, per [RFC4680], ServerCertificate may follow a server's
> SupplementalData message.  Also, Client Key Exchange follows 
> the client
> Certificate message and/or the client SupplementalData 
> message, if these
> messages are sent.  
> 
> [RFC4680] should also be added to the references section.  It 
> may be helpful
> to add SupplementalData to Figure 1 on page 34 of rfc4346-bis as well,
> marked with an asterisk *, following Figure 1 in [RFC4680].
> 
> --mark
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
_______________________________________________
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From: "Mark Brown" <mark@redphonesecurity.com>
To: <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com>,
	<tls@ietf.org>
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Ok, thanks.  

So, my understanding is that TLS Supplemental Data [RFC4680] is Ok &
Standard to use even though it violates the prohibitions below.  Is that
right?  (Neither 4366-bis nor 5077 violate prohibitions...)

--mark

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com [mailto:Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com]
> Sent: Friday, February 29, 2008 5:29 AM
> To: mark@redphonesecurity.com; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The
> TransportLayer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2) to Proposed Standard
> 
> 
> I wouldn't say it was overlooked; it's simply not in scope of
> this document. There are other documents that define new TLS
> handshake messages (at least RFC 4366(bis) and RFC 5077
> in addition to RFC 4680), and those messages are not mentioned
> here either (and don't have to be).
> 
> Best regards,
> Pasi
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Mark Brown
> > Sent: 28 February, 2008 22:57
> > To: tls@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis (The
> > TransportLayer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2) to
> > Proposed Standard
> >
> > TLS Supplemental Data [RFC4680] was overlooked, e.g. in section 7.4.2.
> > Server Certificate,
> >
> >       The server MUST send a certificate whenever the agreed-upon key
> >       exchange method uses certificates for authentication (this
> >       includes all key exchange methods defined in this
> > document except
> >       DH_anon).  This message will always immediately follow
> > the server
> >                                    ^--No
> >       hello message.
> >
> > Also in section 7.4.7. Client Key Exchange Message,
> >
> >       This message is always sent by the client. It MUST immediately
> >                                                     ^--No
> >       follow the client certificate message, if it is sent.
> > Otherwise it
> >       MUST be the first message sent by the client after it
> > receives the
> >       ^--No
> >       server hello done message.
> >
> > Instead, per [RFC4680], ServerCertificate may follow a server's
> > SupplementalData message.  Also, Client Key Exchange follows
> > the client
> > Certificate message and/or the client SupplementalData
> > message, if these
> > messages are sent.
> >
> > [RFC4680] should also be added to the references section.  It
> > may be helpful
> > to add SupplementalData to Figure 1 on page 34 of rfc4346-bis as well,
> > marked with an asterisk *, following Figure 1 in [RFC4680].
> >
> > --mark
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >

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