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Thread-Topic: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01
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Here's my proposal for addressing the WGLC comments for
draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01:

Paul Hoffman wrote on 2008-05-16:
> - If it is meant to be an Informational RFC, it should not 
> have SHOULD and MUST requirements

Russ already replied to this one; we're using MUST/SHOULD requirements
in other Informational documents as well (e.g. RFC 4492), so I suggest 
we keep them as is.

> - Even if were meant for BCP or standards track, it is better to put
> SHOULD and MUST requirements in the main body of the document
> instead of in the Security Considerations section because they are
> requirements, not considerations.

We don't have any MUST requirements, and the SHOULD requirements in
the Security Considerations section IMHO need the surrounding text
(<10 lines) to be understandable.

We could move all the text to Sections 2 and 3, and just have a
Security Considerations text saying "The security considerations are
described in Sections 2 and 3", but I'm not sure if this would
really improve the readability. (The document is extremely short
anyway).

So, I suggest we keep them in Section 4 (but if someone comes up
with more readable text, I'm open to including it).


Tom Petch wrote on 2008-05-21:
> 1) In the abstract, RFC NNNN refers to the new TLS1.2 RFC; in s.5,
> RFCnnnn refers to the I-D itself.  I suggest adding notes to the RFC
> Editor spelling out which is which.

TLS 1.2 will be RFC 5246, so I'll change NNNN to 5246.

> 2) s.3, s4.2
> 'IDEA Cipher Suites' but there is only one; make it singular?

Ok, will fix.

> 3) s.3
> s/IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm) is block cipher/IDEA
> (International Data Encryption Algorithm) is a block cipher/

Ok, will fix.

> 4) 3.4.1
> s/Given these/Given this/

Ok, will fix.

Chairs: I'm ready to submit an updated draft with these changes once
I get a go-ahead from you.

Best regards,
Pasi
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun  5 20:38:54 2008
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Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 10:11:34 -0700
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
To: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 Finished label spec.
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At Sat, 24 May 2008 17:49:09 -0700,
Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> At Fri, 23 May 2008 09:18:10 -0700,
> Mike wrote:
> > 
> > Is it too late to make an editorial change to the TLS 1.2
> > RFC?  I found a problem with the specification of the
> > finished_label in draft 10:
> > 
> > finished_label
> >     For Finished messages sent by the client, the string "client
> >     finished". For Finished messages sent by the server, the string
> >     "server finished".
> > 
> > The problem is that "client finished" is broken across lines;
> > that paragraph should probably be reformatted so that both
> > labels appear unbroken.
> 
> This seems like a small enough change that unless someone
> objects I'll make it as part of AUTH48.
> 
> 
> > Another problem which is less important is that the text
> > states that Certificate is the only handshake message that
> > is sent by both client and server (section 7.4), but the
> > Finished message is as well.
> 
> This as well.

Rereading the text, I don't think it says tht the certificate is
the only message sent by both, merely that it's the only one presented out of order,
which is correct

-Ekr
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This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Datagram Transport Layer Security version 1.2
	Author(s)	: E. Rescorla, N. Modadugu
	Filename	: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4347-bis-00.txt
	Pages		: 27
	Date		: 2008-6-1
	
This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol.  The DTLS protocol provides communications
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   applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent
   eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.  The DTLS protocol is
   based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and provides
   equivalent security guarantees.  Datagram semantics of the underlying
   transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document updates DTLS 1.0 to work with TLS version 1.2.


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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jun 10 12:21:48 2008
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Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 12:27:58 -0700
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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Hi,

Nagendra and I have posted a new draft of DTLS 1.2. This draft

- Clarifies all the ambiguities we know about
- Cleans up PMTU text
- Updates to match TLS 1.2

We'd love to get comments, especially from people who have
implemented DTLS (Rob, Joe...). Our intention is to put out 
another draft before Dublin.

Thanks,
-Ekr
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jun 11 15:07:54 2008
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Final sanity checks on TLS
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I was making my final Auth-48 pass on TLS and I ran into
two issues I wanted to raise:

1. In case of mismatch of the version number in the RSA encrypted PMS,
   the current draft, as suggested by Pasi, ends up with the server
   using the version number offered by the client, and overwriting
   those two bytes in the PMS. I.e.

   pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || M[2..47]

   I don't see any immediate attack on this, but it gives me the
   willies, since in case of a mismatch, we're using a PMS that
   differs from the real PMS by only those two predictable bytes.
   I wonder if this could be used to probe the values a la Bleichanbacher.

   It seems to me that it would be safer to explicitly randomize the
   entire string. I.e.,

      1. Generate a string R of 46 random bytes

      2. Decrypt the message to recover the plaintext M

      3. If the PKCS#1 padding is not correct, or the length of
         message M is not exactly 48 bytes
            pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
         else If ClientHello.client_version <= TLS 1.0, and
         version number check is explicitly disabled:
            pre_master_secret = M
         else:
            if version number matches:
              pre_master_secret = M
            else
              pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R

Thoughts?


2. S 7.4.6 reads:

      ecdsa_sign          ECDSA-capable public key; the certificate MUST
                          allow the key to be used for signing with the
                          hash algorithm that will be employed in the
                          certificate verify message; the public key
                          MUST use a curve and point format supported by
                          the server.

Unless I've missed something, in RFC 4492 the server doesn't advertise
the curves it knows, so this should be restated to be:
   
 the public key
                          MUST use a point format supported by
                          the server.

Note that this means that the client may provide a certificate the
server can't use, but that's a deficiency in 4492, ISTM..

Comments?
-Ekr



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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jun 11 16:06:23 2008
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From: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Final sanity checks on TLS
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Its hard for me to envision how the current algorithm could be exploited
in first issue, but it does seem to be a place where problems could
creep in. I would prefer to use the randomized string in the revised
text. 

For the second issue I agree that seems to be a deficiency in 4492.
The text seems accurate as it stands.  In order to interoperate the
client must present a certificate with a curve that the server can use;
the client just can't get this information from the server.  How big of
an issue is this in real deployments?  

Joe

> -----Original Message-----
> From: tls-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Eric Rescorla
> Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2008 3:15 PM
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: [TLS] Final sanity checks on TLS
> 
> I was making my final Auth-48 pass on TLS and I ran into two 
> issues I wanted to raise:
> 
> 1. In case of mismatch of the version number in the RSA encrypted PMS,
>    the current draft, as suggested by Pasi, ends up with the server
>    using the version number offered by the client, and overwriting
>    those two bytes in the PMS. I.e.
> 
>    pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || M[2..47]
> 
>    I don't see any immediate attack on this, but it gives me the
>    willies, since in case of a mismatch, we're using a PMS that
>    differs from the real PMS by only those two predictable bytes.
>    I wonder if this could be used to probe the values a la 
> Bleichanbacher.
> 
>    It seems to me that it would be safer to explicitly randomize the
>    entire string. I.e.,
> 
>       1. Generate a string R of 46 random bytes
> 
>       2. Decrypt the message to recover the plaintext M
> 
>       3. If the PKCS#1 padding is not correct, or the length of
>          message M is not exactly 48 bytes
>             pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
>          else If ClientHello.client_version <= TLS 1.0, and
>          version number check is explicitly disabled:
>             pre_master_secret = M
>          else:
>             if version number matches:
>               pre_master_secret = M
>             else
>               pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> 
> 2. S 7.4.6 reads:
> 
>       ecdsa_sign          ECDSA-capable public key; the 
> certificate MUST
>                           allow the key to be used for 
> signing with the
>                           hash algorithm that will be employed in the
>                           certificate verify message; the public key
>                           MUST use a curve and point format 
> supported by
>                           the server.
> 
> Unless I've missed something, in RFC 4492 the server doesn't 
> advertise the curves it knows, so this should be restated to be:
>    
>  the public key
>                           MUST use a point format supported by
>                           the server.
> 
> Note that this means that the client may provide a 
> certificate the server can't use, but that's a deficiency in 
> 4492, ISTM..
> 
> Comments?
> -Ekr
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jun 11 16:07:23 2008
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Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 16:14:47 -0700
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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At Wed, 11 Jun 2008 16:07:31 -0700,
Joe Salowey wrote:
> 
> Its hard for me to envision how the current algorithm could be exploited
> in first issue, but it does seem to be a place where problems could
> creep in. I would prefer to use the randomized string in the revised
> text. 
> 
> For the second issue I agree that seems to be a deficiency in 4492.
> The text seems accurate as it stands.  In order to interoperate the
> client must present a certificate with a curve that the server can use;
> the client just can't get this information from the server. 

Fair point. I could go either way on this change...

-Ekr
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Final sanity checks on TLS
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> 1. In case of mismatch of the version number in the RSA encrypted PMS,
>    the current draft, as suggested by Pasi, ends up with the server
>    using the version number offered by the client, and overwriting
>    those two bytes in the PMS. I.e.
> 
>    pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || M[2..47]
> 
>    I don't see any immediate attack on this, but it gives me the
>    willies, since in case of a mismatch, we're using a PMS that
>    differs from the real PMS by only those two predictable bytes.
>    I wonder if this could be used to probe the values a la Bleichanbacher.
> 
>    It seems to me that it would be safer to explicitly randomize the
>    entire string. I.e.,
> 
>       1. Generate a string R of 46 random bytes
> 
>       2. Decrypt the message to recover the plaintext M
> 
>       3. If the PKCS#1 padding is not correct, or the length of
>          message M is not exactly 48 bytes
>             pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
>          else If ClientHello.client_version <= TLS 1.0, and
>          version number check is explicitly disabled:
>             pre_master_secret = M
>          else:
>             if version number matches:
>               pre_master_secret = M
>             else
>               pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
> 
> Thoughts?

In this situation, the goal is to have the connection fail (but not
right away), so a bogus premaster secret is used to generate the
master secret.  It seems to me that simply generating 48 bytes of
random data is the simplest way to achieve that.  What value is
there in taking the time to join the client_version to 46 bytes of
random data?  It's just wasted effort.

My code substitutes 48 bytes of random data for the PMS if the
decrypted PMS is not 48 bytes long or if the version in the PMS is
greater than the version extracted from ClientHello.  I don't think
it's necessary to enable/disable the check if done this way.

And actually I question the need for this check at all since it is
redundant.  If an attacker has modified the client hello to show a
lower version number, the Finished messages will not verify, and
the connection will fail.  DH exchanges don't have this feature,
and don't need it either.

Mike
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On Wed, Jun 11, 2008 at 03:15:17PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> I was making my final Auth-48 pass on TLS and I ran into
> two issues I wanted to raise:
> 
> 1. In case of mismatch of the version number in the RSA encrypted PMS,
>    the current draft, as suggested by Pasi, ends up with the server
>    using the version number offered by the client, and overwriting
>    those two bytes in the PMS. I.e.
> 
>    pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || M[2..47]
> 
>    I don't see any immediate attack on this, but it gives me the
>    willies, since in case of a mismatch, we're using a PMS that
>    differs from the real PMS by only those two predictable bytes.
>    I wonder if this could be used to probe the values a la Bleichanbacher.
> 
>    It seems to me that it would be safer to explicitly randomize the
>    entire string. I.e.,
> 
>       1. Generate a string R of 46 random bytes
> 
>       2. Decrypt the message to recover the plaintext M
> 
>       3. If the PKCS#1 padding is not correct, or the length of
>          message M is not exactly 48 bytes
>             pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
>          else If ClientHello.client_version <= TLS 1.0, and
>          version number check is explicitly disabled:
>             pre_master_secret = M

I don't see the point of specifying in a TLS 1.2 document this variant
where the version number check is disabled.  This case explicitly only
applies if the client speaks just TLS 1.0 and lower, and implicitly
only applies if the server speaks SSL 3.0 but not TLS 1.0!

(If you must include it, don't just ignore the version number included
in the encrypted premaster secret.  Instead it seems more prudent to
check that it's either one of those that you'd expect to see there,
i.e. either the version offered by the client [0x03 0x01] or the
version chosen by the server [0x03 0x00].)


>          else:
>             if version number matches:
>               pre_master_secret = M
>             else
>               pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
> 
> Thoughts?

There shouldn't be an actual problem with the

            premaster secret = ClientHello.client_version || M[2..47]

that draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10.txt uses instead of comparing the
version number, but still I'd prefer to use the random bytes if the
numbers don't match -- this even is simpler, after all:

R is always prepared anyway, and you don't really need *two*
pseudocode lines both assigning randomness to pre_master_secret (you
can rearrange the control flow to use just one of these).

And why bother to include the actual value of ClientHello.client_version
when using R?  Why not use 48 random bytes for R?



> 2. S 7.4.6 reads:
> 
>       ecdsa_sign          ECDSA-capable public key; the certificate MUST
>                           allow the key to be used for signing with the
>                           hash algorithm that will be employed in the
>                           certificate verify message; the public key
>                           MUST use a curve and point format supported by
>                           the server.
> 
> Unless I've missed something, in RFC 4492 the server doesn't advertise
> the curves it knows, so this should be restated to be:
>    
>  the public key
>                           MUST use a point format supported by
>                           the server.

True.


> Note that this means that the client may provide a certificate the
> server can't use, but that's a deficiency in 4492, ISTM..

This is intentional.  In the past, nothing in the TLS specification
has ever imposed explicit restrictions covering a complete certificate
chain -- which for complete coverage not only would have to provide
means to specify cryptographic capabilities of each party (which TLS
1.2 now does for hash and signature algorithms), but also which
critical X.509 extensions they can interpret, and a whole lot more.
You could include arbitrarily much of this in the handshake, but where
would you stop?

Fortunately, you usually don't need all this overhead anyway because
you'd choose CAs that are reasonable and tame when issuing
certificates.  TLS certificate verification even hopes that there's
just one public key for each distinguished name, at least for CAs, and
hoping that the certificates signed by your trusted CAs follow some
common pattern isn't too far off.  Specifically, many ECC CAs will
have all certificates signed by them use the same curve.  Others might
allow all kinds of curves, but you'd just picke these as preferred CAs
if you are able to verify whatever their policy allows -- just like
you would only pick CA if you agree with their policy regarding
critical extensions.  And if you are overly optimistic regarding some
CA's issuing policy, the worst that will happen is that you can't
verify a certificate: the handshake still can procede, just with
incomplete authentication.

Bodo

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On Wed, Jun 11, 2008 at 04:20:16PM -0700, Mike wrote:

[...]
> And actually I question the need for this check at all since it is
> redundant.  If an attacker has modified the client hello to show a
> lower version number, the Finished messages will not verify, and
> the connection will fail.  DH exchanges don't have this feature,
> and don't need it either.

The idea behind this check is that if there is some exploitable
weakness in protocol version x that has been fixed in version y
(y > x), you want to be able to prevent attackers from doing a
protocol downgrade attack if the client and server do both support the
y protocol.  I.e., the attacker would modify the client hello in
transmission to force the parties to use the weak x protocol,
for which we assume it could even forge the Finished messages.

Now it certainly doesn't seem that any current protocol version is
quite that bad.  Still, if you can rely on such a version check,
the analysis becomes simpler.

Bodo

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Eric Rescorla wrote:

> I was making my final Auth-48 pass on TLS and I ran into
> two issues I wanted to raise:
> 
> 1. In case of mismatch of the version number in the RSA encrypted PMS,
>    the current draft, as suggested by Pasi, ends up with the server
>    using the version number offered by the client, and overwriting
>    those two bytes in the PMS. I.e.
> 
>    pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || M[2..47]
> 
>    I don't see any immediate attack on this, but it gives me the
>    willies, since in case of a mismatch, we're using a PMS that
>    differs from the real PMS by only those two predictable bytes.
>    I wonder if this could be used to probe the values a la 
>    Bleichanbacher.
> 
>    It seems to me that it would be safer to explicitly randomize the
>    entire string. I.e.,
> 
>       1. Generate a string R of 46 random bytes
> 
>       2. Decrypt the message to recover the plaintext M
> 
>       3. If the PKCS#1 padding is not correct, or the length of
>          message M is not exactly 48 bytes
>             pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
>          else If ClientHello.client_version <= TLS 1.0, and
>          version number check is explicitly disabled:
>             pre_master_secret = M
>          else:
>             if version number matches:
>               pre_master_secret = M
>             else
>               pre_master_secret = ClientHello.client_version || R
> 
> Thoughts?

The text in the current draft is based on the paper by Klima et al.,
Section 6.2 [KPR03]. It looks like Section 6.1.2 of the paper
describes the variation you're proposing, and the reasons why they
didn't choose that one.

Best regards,
Pasi
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Joe and Eric: I'm waiting for your reply about this.

Best regards,
Pasi 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: tls-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of ext Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
> Sent: 01 June, 2008 21:37
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01
> 
> Here's my proposal for addressing the WGLC comments for
> draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01:
> 
> Paul Hoffman wrote on 2008-05-16:
> > - If it is meant to be an Informational RFC, it should not 
> > have SHOULD and MUST requirements
> 
> Russ already replied to this one; we're using MUST/SHOULD requirements
> in other Informational documents as well (e.g. RFC 4492), so 
> I suggest 
> we keep them as is.
> 
> > - Even if were meant for BCP or standards track, it is better to put
> > SHOULD and MUST requirements in the main body of the document
> > instead of in the Security Considerations section because they are
> > requirements, not considerations.
> 
> We don't have any MUST requirements, and the SHOULD requirements in
> the Security Considerations section IMHO need the surrounding text
> (<10 lines) to be understandable.
> 
> We could move all the text to Sections 2 and 3, and just have a
> Security Considerations text saying "The security considerations are
> described in Sections 2 and 3", but I'm not sure if this would
> really improve the readability. (The document is extremely short
> anyway).
> 
> So, I suggest we keep them in Section 4 (but if someone comes up
> with more readable text, I'm open to including it).
> 
> 
> Tom Petch wrote on 2008-05-21:
> > 1) In the abstract, RFC NNNN refers to the new TLS1.2 RFC; in s.5,
> > RFCnnnn refers to the I-D itself.  I suggest adding notes to the RFC
> > Editor spelling out which is which.
> 
> TLS 1.2 will be RFC 5246, so I'll change NNNN to 5246.
> 
> > 2) s.3, s4.2
> > 'IDEA Cipher Suites' but there is only one; make it singular?
> 
> Ok, will fix.
> 
> > 3) s.3
> > s/IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm) is block 
> cipher/IDEA
> > (International Data Encryption Algorithm) is a block cipher/
> 
> Ok, will fix.
> 
> > 4) 3.4.1
> > s/Given these/Given this/
> 
> Ok, will fix.
> 
> Chairs: I'm ready to submit an updated draft with these changes once
> I get a go-ahead from you.
> 
> Best regards,
> Pasi
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Sun Jun 22 11:09:56 2008
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Dear all,

The draft http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.

  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.

   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of the 
KDF functions.

   For centralized architectures they are delivered through containers,
   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.

   I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dublin, and i hope to present
   more precisely the scope of this proposal

Best Regards

Pascal



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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Sun Jun 22 11:25:04 2008
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It might be better to use a label other than "key expansion" in the KDF
since that is already used in TLS.

Mike


Pascal Urien wrote:
> Dear all,
> 
> The draft http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
>  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.
> 
>  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
>  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.
> 
>   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of the KDF 
> functions.
> 
>   For centralized architectures they are delivered through containers,
>   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.
> 
>   I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dublin, and i hope to present
>   more precisely the scope of this proposal
> 
> Best Regards
> 
> Pascal
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 23 01:20:11 2008
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Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 10:20:03 +0200
To: Mike <mike-list@pobox.com>,tls@ietf.org
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Hi Mike,

   I agree on that point.

    Maybe the label used with KDF could be different according
   to different uses

Pascal

At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:
>It might be better to use a label other than "key expansion" in the KDF
>since that is already used in TLS.
>
>Mike
>
>
>Pascal Urien wrote:
>>Dear all,
>>The draft http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
>>  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.
>>  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
>>  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.
>>   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of 
>> the KDF functions.
>>   For centralized architectures they are delivered through containers,
>>   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.
>>   I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dublin, and i hope to present
>>   more precisely the scope of this proposal
>>Best Regards
>>Pascal
>_______________________________________________
>TLS mailing list
>TLS@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 23 05:21:03 2008
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It is a good idea to use different labels for different key usage.
Further, I would consider interactions between your document and the
following WG document:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt

You could refer to this for key label discussions.

/Simon

Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr> writes:

> Hi Mike,
>
>   I agree on that point.
>
>    Maybe the label used with KDF could be different according
>   to different uses
>
> Pascal
>
> At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:
>>It might be better to use a label other than "key expansion" in the KDF
>>since that is already used in TLS.
>>
>>Mike
>>
>>
>>Pascal Urien wrote:
>>>Dear all,
>>>The draft http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
>>>  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.
>>>  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
>>>  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.
>>>   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of
>>> the KDF functions.
>>>   For centralized architectures they are delivered through containers,
>>>   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.
>>>   I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dublin, and i hope to present
>>>   more precisely the scope of this proposal
>>>Best Regards
>>>Pascal
>>_______________________________________________
>>TLS mailing list
>>TLS@ietf.org
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 23 09:11:15 2008
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To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
From: Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
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Hi All,

  - There is a common point between the two proposals, i.e. use of 
TLS for key generation

  - In draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt the TLS PRF function is used
  - In draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt a separate KDF function is used.
    Krawczyk, H (one of the HMAC designer) wrote a very interesting 
paper about tthe design of KDF functions
   "On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions and an HMAC-based 
KDF", http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/, March 2008

   - The point that is not addressed by 
draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt, is the case for which keys are 
pushed by server and not computed by
     both parties (client and server)

Pascal




At 14:20 23/06/2008, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>It is a good idea to use different labels for different key usage.
>Further, I would consider interactions between your document and the
>following WG document:
>
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt
>
>You could refer to this for key label discussions.
>
>/Simon
>
>Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr> writes:
>
> > Hi Mike,
> >
> >   I agree on that point.
> >
> >    Maybe the label used with KDF could be different according
> >   to different uses
> >
> > Pascal
> >
> > At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:
> >>It might be better to use a label other than "key expansion" in the KDF
> >>since that is already used in TLS.
> >>
> >>Mike
> >>
> >>
> >>Pascal Urien wrote:
> >>>Dear all,
> >>>The draft 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
> >>>  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.
> >>>  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
> >>>  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.
> >>>   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of
> >>> the KDF functions.
> >>>   For centralized architectures they are delivered through containers,
> >>>   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.
> >>>   I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dublin, and i hope to present
> >>>   more precisely the scope of this proposal
> >>>Best Regards
> >>>Pascal
> >>_______________________________________________
> >>TLS mailing list
> >>TLS@ietf.org
> >>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


_______________________________________________
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 23 10:34:38 2008
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	tls chair <tls-chairs@tools.ietf.org>,
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Subject: [TLS] Protocol Action: 'AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS' to Proposed
 Standard
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The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS '
   <draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-03.txt> as a Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working 
Group. 

The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-03.txt

Technical Summary

   This document specifies new TLS cipher suites that use AES in
   Galois Counter Mode for data encryption and message integrity.
   These cipher suites use existing TLS authentication and key
   establishment mechanisms.

Working Group Summary

   This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   Working Group.

Document Quality

   This document represents consensus of the TLS WG.

Personnel

   The Document Shepherd for this document is Eric Rescorla, and the
   responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.

RFC Editor Note

   Document title:
   OLD:
      AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS
   NEW:
      AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS

   Abstract:
   OLD:
      This memo defines TLS cipher suites that use AES-GCM with RSA,
      DSS and Diffie-Hellman based key exchange mechanisms.
   NEW:
      This memo defines TLS cipher suites that use AES-GCM with RSA,
      DSA and Diffie-Hellman based key exchange mechanisms.
      
   Section 1:
   OLD:
      The following sections define cipher suites based on RSA, DSS
      and Diffie-Hellman key exchanges; ECC based cipher suites are
      defined in a separate document [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].
   NEW:
      The following sections define cipher suites based on RSA, DSA
      and Diffie-Hellman key exchanges; ECC based cipher suites are
      defined in a separate document [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].

   Section 3:
   OLD: 
      Note that each of these AEAD algorithms uses a 128-bit
      authentication tag with GCM.
   NEW:
      Note that each of these AEAD algorithms uses a 128-bit
      authentication tag with GCM (in particular, as described
      in Section 3.5 of [RFC4366], the "truncated_hmac" extension
      does not have an effect on cipher suites that do not use HMAC).

   Section 3:
   OLD:
      struct{
   NEW:
      struct {

   Section 6.1, end of section:
   ADD NEW PARAGRAPH;
      Implementers should also understand the practical 
      considerations of IV handling outlined in Section 9 of [GCM].

   Section 8.2:
   add [RFC4366] to reference list

_______________________________________________
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TLS@ietf.org
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 23 10:36:52 2008
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Subject: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
 SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Informational RFC
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The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois 
   Counter Mode '
   <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working 
Group. 

The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt

Technical Summary

   This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
   specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
   SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).

Working Group Summary

   This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
   working group.

Document Quality

   There has been significant review of the document by members of
   the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
   improve the document based on these reviews.

Personnel

   The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph Salowey, and the
   responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.

RFC Editor Note

   In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"

   Abstract:
   OLD:
      However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
      algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
      for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
   NEW:
      However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
      algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
      for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.

   Section 3.1
   OLD:
      These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
      cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
      of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
      algorithms.
   NEW:
      These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
      cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
      of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
      algorithms.

_______________________________________________
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jun 24 08:08:43 2008
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From: Rob Dugal <rdugal@certicom.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
	SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Informational RFC
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
 SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Informational RFC
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Have ciphersuite IDs for this document been assigned by IANA yet?
Same question for draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-03.txt

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ietf-announce-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ietf-announce-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of The IESG
> Sent: Monday, June 23, 2008 1:37 PM
> To: IETF-Announce
> Cc: Internet Architecture Board; tls mailing list; tls chair; RFC Editor
> Subject: Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter
> Mode' to Informational RFC
>
> The IESG has approved the following document:
>
> - 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
>    Counter Mode '
>    <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC
>
> This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working
> Group.
>
> The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.
>
> A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt
>
> Technical Summary
>
>    This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
>    specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
>    SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
>
> Working Group Summary
>
>    This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
>    Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
>    working group.
>
> Document Quality
>
>    There has been significant review of the document by members of
>    the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
>    improve the document based on these reviews.
>
> Personnel
>
>    The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph Salowey, and the
>    responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.
>
> RFC Editor Note
>
>    In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"
>
>    Abstract:
>    OLD:
>       However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
>       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
>       for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
>    NEW:
>       However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
>       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
>       for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.
>
>    Section 3.1
>    OLD:
>       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
>       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
>       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
>       algorithms.
>    NEW:
>       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
>       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
>       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
>       algorithms.
>
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
_______________________________________________
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After a brief look, the algorithm seems OK. But why not just use straight h=
ash (say SHA) instead of HMAC in key derivation function?


 1.  If SHA (or whatever) hash function output possesses random properties =
- what's the advantage of employing HMAC construct? What does it add that h=
asn't been there already?
 2.  If SHA does not produce pseudo-random output - how does HMAC improve t=
he situation?

(Yes I'm aware of HMAC advantages for MACing, but this is different. I've r=
ead <http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf>,  and still am not con=
vinced.)


On 6/23/08 12:11 PM, "Pascal Urien" <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr> wrote:

Hi All,

  - There is a common point between the two proposals, i.e. use of
TLS for key generation

  - In draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt the TLS PRF function is used
  - In draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt a separate KDF function is used.
    Krawczyk, H (one of the HMAC designer) wrote a very interesting
paper about tthe design of KDF functions
   "On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions and an HMAC-based
KDF", http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/, March 2008

   - The point that is not addressed by
draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt, is the case for which keys are
pushed by server and not computed by
     both parties (client and server)

Pascal




At 14:20 23/06/2008, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>It is a good idea to use different labels for different key usage.
>Further, I would consider interactions between your document and the
>following WG document:
>
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt
>
>You could refer to this for key label discussions.
>
>/Simon
>
>Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr> writes:
>
> > Hi Mike,
> >
> >   I agree on that point.
> >
> >    Maybe the label used with KDF could be different according
> >   to different uses
> >
> > Pascal
> >
> > At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:
> >>It might be better to use a label other than "key expansion" in the KDF
> >>since that is already used in TLS.
> >>
> >>Mike
> >>
> >>
> >>Pascal Urien wrote:
> >>>Dear all,
> >>>The draft
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
> >>>  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.
> >>>  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
> >>>  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.
> >>>   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of
> >>> the KDF functions.
> >>>   For centralized architectures they are delivered through containers=
,
> >>>   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.
> >>>   I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dublin, and i hope to pre=
sent
> >>>   more precisely the scope of this proposal
> >>>Best Regards
> >>>Pascal
> >>_______________________________________________
> >>TLS mailing list
> >>TLS@ietf.org
> >>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


_______________________________________________
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Uri         uri@ll.mit.edu

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<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:=
12pt'>After a brief look, the algorithm seems OK. But why not just use stra=
ight hash (say SHA) instead of HMAC in <U>key derivation</U> function?<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><OL><LI><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SP=
AN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'>If SHA (or whatever) hash function output posse=
sses random properties &#8211; what&#8217;s the advantage of employing HMAC=
 construct? What does it add that hasn&#8217;t been there already?
</SPAN></FONT><LI><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'>If SHA does not produce pseudo-random output &#8211=
; how does HMAC improve the situation?<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></OL><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN =
STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><BR>
(Yes I&#8217;m aware of HMAC advantages for MACing, but this is different. =
I&#8217;ve read &lt;<a href=3D"http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.p=
df">http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf</a>&gt;, &nbsp;and still=
 am not convinced.)<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 6/23/08 12:11 PM, &quot;Pascal Urien&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"Pascal.Urien@e=
nst.fr">Pascal.Urien@enst.fr</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"=
><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'>Hi All,<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;- There is a common point between the two proposals, i.e. use o=
f<BR>
TLS for key generation<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;- In draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt the TLS PRF function is us=
ed<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;- In draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt a separate KDF function is u=
sed.<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Krawczyk, H (one of the HMAC designer) wrote a very=
 interesting<BR>
paper about tthe design of KDF functions<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&quot;On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions and=
 an HMAC-based<BR>
KDF&quot;, <a href=3D"http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/">http://www.e=
e.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/</a>, March 2008<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;- The point that is not addressed by<BR>
draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt, is the case for which keys are<BR>
pushed by server and not computed by<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;both parties (client and server)<BR>
<BR>
Pascal<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
At 14:20 23/06/2008, Simon Josefsson wrote:<BR>
&gt;It is a good idea to use different labels for different key usage.<BR>
&gt;Further, I would consider interactions between your document and the<BR=
>
&gt;following WG document:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor=
-01.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.tx=
t</a><BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;You could refer to this for key label discussions.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;/Simon<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;Pascal Urien &lt;<a href=3D"Pascal.Urien@enst.fr">Pascal.Urien@enst.fr<=
/a>&gt; writes:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; Hi Mike,<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;I agree on that point.<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Maybe the label used with KDF could be differen=
t according<BR>
&gt; &gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;to different uses<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; Pascal<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;It might be better to use a label other than &quot;key expansi=
on&quot; in the KDF<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;since that is already used in TLS.<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;Mike<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;Pascal Urien wrote:<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Dear all,<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;The draft<BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-=
00.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt</=
a><BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;proposes a &nbsp;keying infrastructure based on the=
 TLS protocol.<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution=
 Function (KDF)<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.<BR=
>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;In a peer to peer mode keys are directly prod=
uced as inputs of<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; the KDF functions.<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;For centralized architectures they are delive=
red through containers,<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;secured with keys derived from the KDF functi=
on.<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dub=
lin, and i hope to present<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;more precisely the scope of this proposal<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Best Regards<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Pascal<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;_______________________________________________<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;TLS mailing list<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<a href=3D"TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://=
www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><BR>
<BR>
<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
TLS mailing list<BR>
<a href=3D"TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><BR>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial=
"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=3D"uri@ll.mit.e=
du">uri@ll.mit.edu</a><BR>
</SPAN></FONT>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01
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From: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01
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I don't have a problem with MUSTs and SHOULDs in the security
considerations.  The introduction and abstract are clear in stating that
the cipher suites are no longer recommended.  

I'm OK with this resolution of the last call comments.   

Joe

> -----Original Message-----
> From: tls-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
> Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 2:09 AM
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01
> 
> Joe and Eric: I'm waiting for your reply about this.
> 
> Best regards,
> Pasi 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: tls-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of 
> > ext Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com
> > Sent: 01 June, 2008 21:37
> > To: tls@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01
> > 
> > Here's my proposal for addressing the WGLC comments for
> > draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-01:
> > 
> > Paul Hoffman wrote on 2008-05-16:
> > > - If it is meant to be an Informational RFC, it should not have 
> > > SHOULD and MUST requirements
> > 
> > Russ already replied to this one; we're using MUST/SHOULD 
> requirements 
> > in other Informational documents as well (e.g. RFC 4492), 
> so I suggest 
> > we keep them as is.
> > 
> > > - Even if were meant for BCP or standards track, it is 
> better to put 
> > > SHOULD and MUST requirements in the main body of the document 
> > > instead of in the Security Considerations section because 
> they are 
> > > requirements, not considerations.
> > 
> > We don't have any MUST requirements, and the SHOULD requirements in 
> > the Security Considerations section IMHO need the surrounding text 
> > (<10 lines) to be understandable.
> > 
> > We could move all the text to Sections 2 and 3, and just have a 
> > Security Considerations text saying "The security 
> considerations are 
> > described in Sections 2 and 3", but I'm not sure if this 
> would really 
> > improve the readability. (The document is extremely short anyway).
> > 
> > So, I suggest we keep them in Section 4 (but if someone 
> comes up with 
> > more readable text, I'm open to including it).
> > 
> > 
> > Tom Petch wrote on 2008-05-21:
> > > 1) In the abstract, RFC NNNN refers to the new TLS1.2 
> RFC; in s.5, 
> > > RFCnnnn refers to the I-D itself.  I suggest adding notes 
> to the RFC 
> > > Editor spelling out which is which.
> > 
> > TLS 1.2 will be RFC 5246, so I'll change NNNN to 5246.
> > 
> > > 2) s.3, s4.2
> > > 'IDEA Cipher Suites' but there is only one; make it singular?
> > 
> > Ok, will fix.
> > 
> > > 3) s.3
> > > s/IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm) is block
> > cipher/IDEA
> > > (International Data Encryption Algorithm) is a block cipher/
> > 
> > Ok, will fix.
> > 
> > > 4) 3.4.1
> > > s/Given these/Given this/
> > 
> > Ok, will fix.
> > 
> > Chairs: I'm ready to submit an updated draft with these 
> changes once I 
> > get a go-ahead from you.
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > Pasi
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
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Thread-Topic: Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
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From: <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com>
To: <rdugal@certicom.com>, <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
	SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Informational RFC
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IANA assigns the numbers after the document has been
approved, usually within couple of weeks. Once the
assignments have been done, they're immediately visible
here:

http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters,

Best regards,
Pasi 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Rob Dugal [mailto:rdugal@certicom.com] 
> Sent: 24 June, 2008 18:07
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Cc: Eronen Pasi (Nokia-NRC/Helsinki)
> Subject: RE: Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher 
> Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to 
> Informational RFC
> 
> Have ciphersuite IDs for this document been assigned by IANA yet?
> Same question for draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-03.txt
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: ietf-announce-bounces@ietf.org 
> [mailto:ietf-announce-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of The IESG
> > Sent: Monday, June 23, 2008 1:37 PM
> > To: IETF-Announce
> > Cc: Internet Architecture Board; tls mailing list; tls 
> chair; RFC Editor
> > Subject: Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites 
> with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter
> > Mode' to Informational RFC
> >
> > The IESG has approved the following document:
> >
> > - 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
> >    Counter Mode '
> >    <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC
> >
> > This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working
> > Group.
> >
> > The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.
> >
> > A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt
> >
> > Technical Summary
> >
> >    This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
> >    specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
> >    SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
> >
> > Working Group Summary
> >
> >    This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
> >    Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
> >    working group.
> >
> > Document Quality
> >
> >    There has been significant review of the document by members of
> >    the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
> >    improve the document based on these reviews.
> >
> > Personnel
> >
> >    The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph 
> Salowey, and the
> >    responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.
> >
> > RFC Editor Note
> >
> >    In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"
> >
> >    Abstract:
> >    OLD:
> >       However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
> >       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
> >       for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
> >    NEW:
> >       However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
> >       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
> >       for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.
> >
> >    Section 3.1
> >    OLD:
> >       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
> >       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in 
> "_SHA" in place
> >       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
> >       algorithms.
> >    NEW:
> >       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
> >       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in 
> "_SHA" in place
> >       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
> >       algorithms.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > IETF-Announce mailing list
> > IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
> 
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : DES and IDEA Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
	Author(s)       : P. Eronen
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-02.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2008-06-25

TLS specification versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346) included
cipher suites based on DES (Data Encryption Standard) and IDEA
(International Data Encryption Algorithm) algorithms.  DES (when used
in single-DES mode) and IDEA are no longer recommended for general
use in TLS, and have been removed from TLS 1.2 main specification
(RFC 5246).  This document specifies these cipher suites for
completeness, and discusses reasons why their use is no longer
recommended.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-des-idea-02.txt

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_______________________________________________
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Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 17:56:28 +0200
To: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>,"tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
From: Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
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Hi All,

In RFC 4306 (IKEV2) some PRF functions are already HMAC BASED

SKEYSEED is computed as PRK.

According to RFC 4306
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

For Transform Type 2 (Pseudo-random Function), defined Transform IDs are:

Name                             Number               Defined In
RESERVED                        0
PRF_HMAC_MD5                1                 (RFC 2104), [MD5]
PRF_HMAC_SHA1               2                 (RFC 2104), [SHA]
PRF_HMAC_TIGER              3                 (RFC 2104)
PRF_AES128_XCBC             4                 (RFC 3664)


Keying material is generated accorking to the selected prf

prf+(K,S) =3D T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ...

where:
T1 =3D prf (K, S | 0x01)
T2 =3D prf (K, T1 | S | 0x02)
T3 =3D prf (K, T2 | S | 0x03)
T4 =3D prf (K, T3 | S | 0x04)


SKEYSEED =3D prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)
{SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi |=20
SK_pr } =3D prf+(SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr )



KEYMAT =3D prf+(SK_d, Ni | Nr)
or
KEYMAT =3D prf+(SK_d, g^ir | Ni | Nr )



Pascal




At 21:48 24/06/2008, Blumenthal, Uri wrote:
>Content-Language: en
>Content-Type: multipart/alternative;=
 boundary=3D"_000_C486C7E8D23urillmitedu_"
>
>After a brief look, the algorithm seems OK. But=20
>why not just use straight hash (say SHA) instead=20
>of HMAC in key derivation function?
>
>    * If SHA (or whatever) hash function output=20
> possesses random properties =96 what=92s the=20
> advantage of employing HMAC construct? What=20
> does it add that hasn=92t been there already?
>    * If SHA does not produce pseudo-random=20
> output =96 how does HMAC improve the situation?
>
>(Yes I=92m aware of HMAC advantages for MACing,=20
>but this is different. I=92ve read=20
><<http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf>http://www.ee.technion.ac.=
il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf>,=20
>and still am not convinced.)
>
>
>On 6/23/08 12:11 PM, "Pascal Urien"=20
><<Pascal.Urien@enst.htm>Pascal.Urien@enst.fr> wrote:
>
>Hi All,
>
>   - There is a common point between the two proposals, i.e. use of
>TLS for key generation
>
>   - In draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt the TLS PRF function is used
>   - In draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt a separate KDF function is used.
>     Krawczyk, H (one of the HMAC designer) wrote a very interesting
>paper about tthe design of KDF functions
>    "On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions and an HMAC-based
>KDF",=20
><http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/>http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo=
/kdf/,=20
>March 2008
>
>    - The point that is not addressed by
>draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt, is the case for which keys are
>pushed by server and not computed by
>      both parties (client and server)
>
>Pascal
>
>
>
>
>At 14:20 23/06/2008, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> >It is a good idea to use different labels for different key usage.
> >Further, I would consider interactions between your document and the
> >following WG document:
> >
> ><http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf=20
>=
 -tls-extractor-01.txt>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ex=
tractor-01.txt
> >
> >You could refer to this for key label discussions.
> >
> >/Simon
> >
> >Pascal Urien <<Pascal.Urien@enst.htm>Pascal.Urien@enst.fr> writes:
> >
> > > Hi Mike,
> > >
> > >   I agree on that point.
> > >
> > >    Maybe the label used with KDF could be different according
> > >   to different uses
> > >
> > > Pascal
> > >
> > > At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:
> > >>It might be better to use a label other than "key expansion" in the=
 KDF
> > >>since that is already used in TLS.
> > >>
> > >>Mike
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>Pascal Urien wrote:
> > >>>Dear all,
> > >>>The draft
> >=20
>=
 <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt>http://w=
ww.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
> > >>>  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.
> > >>>  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
> > >>>  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.
> > >>>   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of
> > >>> the KDF functions.
> > >>>   For centralized architectures they are delivered through=
 containers,
> > >>>   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.
> > >>>   I will attend to the next IETF meeting=20
> in Dublin, and i hope to present
> > >>>   more precisely the scope of this proposal
> > >>>Best Regards
> > >>>Pascal
> > >>_______________________________________________
> > >>TLS mailing list
> > >><TLS@ietf.htm>TLS@ietf.org
> > >>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>TLS mailing list
><TLS@ietf.htm>TLS@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>--
>Regards,
>Uri         <uri@ll.mit.htm>uri@ll.mit.edu
>_______________________________________________
>TLS mailing list
>TLS@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<html>
<body>
Hi All,<br><br>
In RFC 4306 (IKEV2) some PRF functions are already HMAC BASED<br><br>
SKEYSEED is computed as PRK.<br><br>
According to RFC 4306<br>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br><br>
For Transform Type 2 (Pseudo-random Function), defined Transform IDs
are:<br><br>
Name&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Number&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Defined In<br>
RESERVED&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
0<br>
PRF_HMAC_MD5&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
(RFC 2104), [MD5]<br>
PRF_HMAC_SHA1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
2&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
(RFC 2104), [SHA]<br>
PRF_HMAC_TIGER&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
3&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
(RFC 2104)<br>
PRF_AES128_XCBC&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;
4&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
(RFC 3664)<br><br>
<br>
Keying material is generated accorking to the selected prf<br><br>
prf+(K,S) =3D T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ...<br><br>
where:<br>
T1 =3D prf (K, S | 0x01)<br>
T2 =3D prf (K, T1 | S | 0x02)<br>
T3 =3D prf (K, T2 | S | 0x03)<br>
T4 =3D prf (K, T3 | S | 0x04)<br><br>
<br>
SKEYSEED =3D prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)<br>
{SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr } =3D prf+(SKEYSEED,
Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr )<br><br>
<br><br>
KEYMAT =3D prf+(SK_d, Ni | Nr)<br>
or<br>
KEYMAT =3D prf+(SK_d, g^ir | Ni | Nr )<br><br>
<br><br>
Pascal<br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
At 21:48 24/06/2008, Blumenthal, Uri wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">Content-Language: en<br>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary=3D&quot;_000_C486C7E8D23urillmitedu_&quot;<br><br>
<font face=3D"Calibri">After a brief look, the algorithm seems OK. But why
not just use straight hash (say SHA) instead of HMAC in <u>key
derivation</u> function?<br><br>
<ol>
<li>If SHA (or whatever) hash function output possesses random properties
=96 what=92s the advantage of employing HMAC construct? What does it add tha=
t
hasn=92t been there already?=20
<li>If SHA does not produce pseudo-random output =96 how does HMAC improve
the situation?
</ol><br>
(Yes I=92m aware of HMAC advantages for MACing, but this is different. I=92v=
e
read
&lt;<a href=3D"http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf">
http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf</a>&gt;,&nbsp; and still
am not convinced.)<br><br>
<br>
On 6/23/08 12:11 PM, &quot;Pascal Urien&quot;
&lt;<a href=3D"Pascal.Urien@enst.htm">Pascal.Urien@enst.fr</a>&gt;
wrote:<br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd>Hi All,<br><br>

<dd>&nbsp; - There is a common point between the two proposals, i.e. use
of<br>

<dd>TLS for key generation<br><br>

<dd>&nbsp; - In draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt the TLS PRF function is
used<br>

<dd>&nbsp; - In draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt a separate KDF function is
used.<br>

<dd>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Krawczyk, H (one of the HMAC designer) wrote a
very interesting<br>

<dd>paper about tthe design of KDF functions<br>

<dd>&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions
and an HMAC-based<br>

<dd>KDF&quot;,
<a href=3D"http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/">
http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/</a>, March 2008<br><br>

<dd>&nbsp;&nbsp; - The point that is not addressed by<br>

<dd>draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt, is the case for which keys are<br>

<dd>pushed by server and not computed by<br>

<dd>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; both parties (client and server)<br><br>

<dd>Pascal<br><br>
<br><br>
<br>

<dd>At 14:20 23/06/2008, Simon Josefsson wrote:<br>

<dd>&gt;It is a good idea to use different labels for different key
usage.<br>

<dd>&gt;Further, I would consider interactions between your document and
the<br>

<dd>&gt;following WG document:<br>

<dd>&gt;<br>

<dd>
&gt;<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-=
01.txt">
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt</a>
<br>

<dd>&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt;You could refer to this for key label discussions.<br>

<dd>&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt;/Simon<br>

<dd>&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt;Pascal Urien
&lt;<a href=3D"Pascal.Urien@enst.htm">Pascal.Urien@enst.fr</a>&gt;
writes:<br>

<dd>&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt; Hi Mike,<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; I agree on that point.<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Maybe the label used with KDF could be
different according<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; to different uses<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt; Pascal<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt; At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;It might be better to use a label other than &quot;key
expansion&quot; in the KDF<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;since that is already used in TLS.<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;Mike<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;Pascal Urien wrote:<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Dear all,<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;The draft<br>

<dd>&gt;
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt=
">
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt</a><br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp; proposes a&nbsp; keying infrastructure based
on the TLS protocol.<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp; It suggests defining an additional Key
Distribution Function (KDF)<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp; in order to deliver a set of cryptographic
keys.<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; In a peer to peer mode keys are
directly produced as inputs of<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; the KDF functions.<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; For centralized architectures they are
delivered through containers,<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; secured with keys derived from the KDF
function.<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; I will attend to the next IETF meeting
in Dublin, and i hope to present<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; more precisely the scope of this
proposal<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Best Regards<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Pascal<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;_______________________________________________<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;TLS mailing list<br>

<dd>&gt; &gt;&gt;<a href=3D"TLS@ietf.htm">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>

<dd>&gt;
&gt;&gt;<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" eudora=3D"auto=
url">
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br><br>
<br>

<dd>_______________________________________________<br>

<dd>TLS mailing list<br>

<dd><a href=3D"TLS@ietf.htm">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>

<dd><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" eudora=3D"autourl"=
>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br><br>

</dl><br>
-- <br>
Regards,<br>
Uri&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
<a href=3D"uri@ll.mit.htm">uri@ll.mit.edu</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 13:16:39 -0400
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>  In RFC 4306 (IKEV2) some PRF functions are already HMAC BASED

This does not answer my question. What benefits over SHA does HMAC-SHA prov=
ide here?

I suggest replacing HMAC-SHA with SHA for KDF, or providing rationale for u=
sing HMAC construct on top of SHA - and rationale better than "somebody els=
e considered it a good idea". Showing how randomness of the output is measu=
rably improved, or how an attack against key derivation mechanism is foiled=
 by this mechanism could justify extra cost.



At 21:48 24/06/2008, Blumenthal, Uri wrote:
Content-Language: en
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=3D"_000_C486C7E8D23urillmited=
u_"

After a brief look, the algorithm seems OK. But why not just use straight h=
ash (say SHA) instead of HMAC in key derivation function?


 1.  If SHA (or whatever) hash function output possesses random properties =
- what's the advantage of employing HMAC construct? What does it add that h=
asn't been there already?
 2.  If SHA does not produce pseudo-random output - how does HMAC improve t=
he situation?

(Yes I'm aware of HMAC advantages for MACing, but this is different. I've r=
ead < http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf <http://www.ee.technio=
n.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf> >,  and still am not convinced.)


On 6/23/08 12:11 PM, "Pascal Urien" <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr <Pascal.Urien@ens=
t.htm> > wrote:

Hi All,

  - There is a common point between the two proposals, i.e. use of
TLS for key generation

  - In draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt the TLS PRF function is used
  - In draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt a separate KDF function is used.
    Krawczyk, H (one of the HMAC designer) wrote a very interesting
paper about tthe design of KDF functions
   "On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions and an HMAC-based
KDF", http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/, March 2008

   - The point that is not addressed by
draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt, is the case for which keys are
pushed by server and not computed by
     both parties (client and server)

Pascal




At 14:20 23/06/2008, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>It is a good idea to use different labels for different key usage.
>Further, I would consider interactions between your document and the
>following WG document:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt <http=
://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt>
>
>You could refer to this for key label discussions.
>
>/Simon
>
>Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr <Pascal.Urien@enst.htm> > writes:
>
> > Hi Mike,
> >
> >   I agree on that point.
> >
> >    Maybe the label used with KDF could be different according
> >   to different uses
> >
> > Pascal
> >
> > At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:
> >>It might be better to use a label other than "key expansion" in the KDF
> >>since that is already used in TLS.
> >>
> >>Mike
> >>
> >>
> >>Pascal Urien wrote:
> >>>Dear all,
> >>>The draft
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
> >>>  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.
> >>>  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
> >>>  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.
> >>>   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of
> >>> the KDF functions.
> >>>   For centralized architectures they are delivered through containers=
,
> >>>   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.
> >>>   I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dublin, and i hope to pre=
sent
> >>>   more precisely the scope of this proposal
> >>>Best Regards
> >>>Pascal
> >>_______________________________________________
> >>TLS mailing list
> >>TLS@ietf.org <TLS@ietf.htm>
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls <https://www.ietf.org/mailma=
n/listinfo/tls>


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
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Uri

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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:=
12pt'>&gt; &nbsp;In RFC 4306 (IKEV2) some PRF functions are already HMAC BA=
SED<BR>
<BR>
<FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF">This does not answer my question. What benefits ove=
r SHA does HMAC-SHA provide <U>here</U>? &nbsp;<BR>
<BR>
I suggest replacing HMAC-SHA with SHA for KDF, or providing rationale for u=
sing HMAC construct on top of SHA &#8211; and rationale better than &#8220;=
somebody else considered it a good idea&#8221;. Showing how randomness of t=
he output is measurably improved, or how an attack against key derivation m=
echanism is foiled by this mechanism could justify extra cost.<BR>
</FONT></SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica,=
 Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><BR>
<BR>
<BR>
At 21:48 24/06/2008, Blumenthal, Uri wrote:<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"=
><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'>Content-Language: en<BR>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=3D&quot;_000_C486C7E8D23urill=
mitedu_&quot;<BR>
<BR>
After a brief look, the algorithm seems OK. But why not just use straight h=
ash (say SHA) instead of HMAC in <U>key derivation</U> function?<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><OL><LI><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SP=
AN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'>If SHA (or whatever) hash function output posse=
sses random properties &#8211; what&#8217;s the advantage of employing HMAC=
 construct? What does it add that hasn&#8217;t been there already?=20
</SPAN></FONT><LI><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN S=
TYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'>If SHA does not produce pseudo-random output &#8211=
; how does HMAC improve the situation? <BR>
</SPAN></FONT></OL><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN =
STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><BR>
(Yes I&#8217;m aware of HMAC advantages for MACing, but this is different. =
I&#8217;ve read &lt; <a href=3D"http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.=
pdf">http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf</a> &lt;<a href=3D"http=
://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf">http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~h=
ugo/kdf/kdf.pdf</a>&gt; &gt;, &nbsp;and still am not convinced.)<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 6/23/08 12:11 PM, &quot;Pascal Urien&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"Pascal.Urien@e=
nst.fr">Pascal.Urien@enst.fr</a> &lt;<a href=3D"Pascal.Urien@enst.htm">Pasc=
al.Urien@enst.htm</a>&gt; &gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
Hi All,<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;- There is a common point between the two proposals, i.e. use o=
f<BR>
TLS for key generation<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;- In draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt the TLS PRF function is us=
ed<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;- In draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt a separate KDF function is u=
sed.<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Krawczyk, H (one of the HMAC designer) wrote a very=
 interesting<BR>
paper about tthe design of KDF functions<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&quot;On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions and=
 an HMAC-based<BR>
KDF&quot;, <a href=3D"http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/">http://www.e=
e.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/</a>, March 2008<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;- The point that is not addressed by<BR>
draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt, is the case for which keys are<BR>
pushed by server and not computed by<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;both parties (client and server)<BR>
<BR>
Pascal<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
At 14:20 23/06/2008, Simon Josefsson wrote:<BR>
&gt;It is a good idea to use different labels for different key usage.<BR>
&gt;Further, I would consider interactions between your document and the<BR=
>
&gt;following WG document:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extracto=
r-01.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.t=
xt</a> &lt;<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ex=
tractor-01.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extracto=
r-01.txt</a>&gt; <BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;You could refer to this for key label discussions.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;/Simon<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;Pascal Urien &lt;<a href=3D"Pascal.Urien@enst.fr">Pascal.Urien@enst.fr<=
/a> &lt;<a href=3D"Pascal.Urien@enst.htm">Pascal.Urien@enst.htm</a>&gt; &gt=
; writes:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; Hi Mike,<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;I agree on that point.<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Maybe the label used with KDF could be differen=
t according<BR>
&gt; &gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;to different uses<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; Pascal<BR>
&gt; &gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt; At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;It might be better to use a label other than &quot;key expansi=
on&quot; in the KDF<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;since that is already used in TLS.<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;Mike<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;Pascal Urien wrote:<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Dear all,<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;The draft<BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-=
00.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt</=
a><BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;proposes a &nbsp;keying infrastructure based on the=
 TLS protocol.<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution=
 Function (KDF)<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.<BR=
>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;In a peer to peer mode keys are directly prod=
uced as inputs of<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; the KDF functions.<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;For centralized architectures they are delive=
red through containers,<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;secured with keys derived from the KDF functi=
on.<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dub=
lin, and i hope to present<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;more precisely the scope of this proposal<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Best Regards<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;Pascal<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;_______________________________________________<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;TLS mailing list<BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<a href=3D"TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"TLS@i=
etf.htm">TLS@ietf.htm</a>&gt; <BR>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https:/=
/www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a> &lt;<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>&gt; <BR=
>
<BR>
<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
TLS mailing list<BR>
<a href=3D"TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"TLS@ietf.htm">TLS@=
ietf.htm</a>&gt; <BR>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Hel=
vetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><BR>
</SPAN><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri</SPAN><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><BR>
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From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
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Gentle people,

I can find no patent disclosures on this document listed on the IETF IPR 
search page at https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/ using 
draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac as the I-D Filename.

Elliptic curve cryptography is a heavilly patented area, and it seems 
impossible that this draft does not involve an existing patent.

I also seemed to have missed the discussion of non-patented 
alternatives, as required by RFC3979.

Surely the IESG would not approve a document AGAIN that did not disclose 
its patent status in violation of RFC3979 et al!?!   

I have to object to the approval of this draft on those grounds.  I am
very concerned that the IESG would not be more circumspect and careful
in light of the previous TLS-Authz scandal. See
http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/Housley/index.html
http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/TimPolk/index.html 
for more information about TLS-Authz.

		--Dean


On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, The IESG wrote:

> The IESG has approved the following document:
> 
> - 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois 
>    Counter Mode '
>    <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC
> 
> This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working 
> Group. 
> 
> The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.
> 
> A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt
> 
> Technical Summary
> 
>    This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
>    specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
>    SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
> 
> Working Group Summary
> 
>    This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
>    Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
>    working group.
> 
> Document Quality
> 
>    There has been significant review of the document by members of
>    the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
>    improve the document based on these reviews.
> 
> Personnel
> 
>    The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph Salowey, and the
>    responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.
> 
> RFC Editor Note
> 
>    In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"
> 
>    Abstract:
>    OLD:
>       However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
>       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
>       for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
>    NEW:
>       However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
>       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
>       for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.
> 
>    Section 3.1
>    OLD:
>       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
>       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
>       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
>       algorithms.
>    NEW:
>       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
>       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
>       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
>       algorithms.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
> 

-- 
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_______________________________________________
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jun 25 12:20:15 2008
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
	SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Informational RFC
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Hi Dean.

It's debatable whether or not ECC is really heavily patented,  
considering that the original articles are from the early 80s. AFAIK  
all the IPR claims that may matter are from Certicom. You may have  
found this statement in your search: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/750/

In that disclosure, Certicom grants a license to use their IPR for ECC  
in all IKE, IKEv2 and TLS protocols. This may be the reason why there  
are no disclosure specific to this draft.

Yoav

On Jun 25, 2008, at 9:53 PM, Dean Anderson wrote:

> Gentle people,
>
> I can find no patent disclosures on this document listed on the IETF  
> IPR
> search page at https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/ using
> draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac as the I-D Filename.
>
> Elliptic curve cryptography is a heavilly patented area, and it seems
> impossible that this draft does not involve an existing patent.
>
> I also seemed to have missed the discussion of non-patented
> alternatives, as required by RFC3979.
>
> Surely the IESG would not approve a document AGAIN that did not  
> disclose
> its patent status in violation of RFC3979 et al!?!
>
> I have to object to the approval of this draft on those grounds.  I am
> very concerned that the IESG would not be more circumspect and careful
> in light of the previous TLS-Authz scandal. See
> http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/Housley/index.html
> http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/TimPolk/index.html
> for more information about TLS-Authz.
>
> 		--Dean
>
>
> On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, The IESG wrote:
>
>> The IESG has approved the following document:
>>
>> - 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
>>   Counter Mode '
>>   <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC
>>
>> This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working
>> Group.
>>
>> The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.
>>
>> A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt
>>
>> Technical Summary
>>
>>   This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
>>   specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
>>   SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
>>
>> Working Group Summary
>>
>>   This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
>>   Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
>>   working group.
>>
>> Document Quality
>>
>>   There has been significant review of the document by members of
>>   the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
>>   improve the document based on these reviews.
>>
>> Personnel
>>
>>   The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph Salowey, and the
>>   responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.
>>
>> RFC Editor Note
>>
>>   In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"
>>
>>   Abstract:
>>   OLD:
>>      However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
>>      algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
>>      for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
>>   NEW:
>>      However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
>>      algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
>>      for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.
>>
>>   Section 3.1
>>   OLD:
>>      These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
>>      cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
>>      of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
>>      algorithms.
>>   NEW:
>>      These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
>>      cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
>>      of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
>>      algorithms.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>
> -- 
> Av8 Internet   Prepared to pay a premium for better service?
> www.av8.net         faster, more reliable, better service
> 617 344 9000
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
>

_______________________________________________
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jun 25 13:43:21 2008
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Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 16:26:39 -0400
To: tls@ietf.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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 >
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http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/certicom-ipr-rfc-3446.pdf  seem to cover 
TLS and ECC.  However, I agree that Certicom should be asked to 
update the IPR statement to cover TLS 1.2 as well as the recent 
Internet-Drafts.

Russ


At 02:53 PM 6/25/2008, Dean Anderson wrote:
>Gentle people,
>
>I can find no patent disclosures on this document listed on the IETF IPR
>search page at https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/ using
>draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac as the I-D Filename.
>
>Elliptic curve cryptography is a heavilly patented area, and it seems
>impossible that this draft does not involve an existing patent.
>
>I also seemed to have missed the discussion of non-patented
>alternatives, as required by RFC3979.
>
>Surely the IESG would not approve a document AGAIN that did not disclose
>its patent status in violation of RFC3979 et al!?!
>
>I have to object to the approval of this draft on those grounds.  I am
>very concerned that the IESG would not be more circumspect and careful
>in light of the previous TLS-Authz scandal. See
>http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/Housley/index.html
>http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/TimPolk/index.html
>for more information about TLS-Authz.
>
>                 --Dean
>
>
>On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, The IESG wrote:
>
> > The IESG has approved the following document:
> >
> > - 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
> >    Counter Mode '
> >    <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC
> >
> > This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working
> > Group.
> >
> > The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.
> >
> > A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
> > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt
> >
> > Technical Summary
> >
> >    This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
> >    specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
> >    SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
> >
> > Working Group Summary
> >
> >    This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
> >    Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
> >    working group.
> >
> > Document Quality
> >
> >    There has been significant review of the document by members of
> >    the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
> >    improve the document based on these reviews.
> >
> > Personnel
> >
> >    The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph Salowey, and the
> >    responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.
> >
> > RFC Editor Note
> >
> >    In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"
> >
> >    Abstract:
> >    OLD:
> >       However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
> >       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
> >       for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
> >    NEW:
> >       However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
> >       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
> >       for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.
> >
> >    Section 3.1
> >    OLD:
> >       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
> >       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
> >       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
> >       algorithms.
> >    NEW:
> >       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
> >       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
> >       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
> >       algorithms.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
> >
>
>--
>Av8 Internet   Prepared to pay a premium for better service?
>www.av8.net         faster, more reliable, better service
>617 344 9000

_______________________________________________
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Hello Yoav, 

If I understand correctly, Certicom has over 130 patents in ECC and
public key crypto and has sold 26 patents and patent applications on the
subject to the US National Security Agency. The NSA controls licening
rights on those patents, not Certicom. The licensing situation is much
more clouded by that sale.

As for the Certicom licence grant on its remaining patents, that grant
identifies specific drafts and doesn't include this draft. The grant in
'750 you mention specifically restricts the grant to the drafts listed:  
"The licence granted does not extend, either explicitly or implicitly,
to other IETF protocols".

__But none of these issues were discussed or reported on this particular
draft.__   

I think the lack of discussion and non-disclosure is really the first,
core problem.  We can discuss and debate patent issues only if people
who know or should know that the patents exist, report those patents as
required by IETF policy.

Also, in fact, I can see no consensus for this draft either: The working
group was entirely silent on the draft for its last call. The last
message I have (before today), is the IESG Last Call message.  I can see
no evidence of the consensus which is required by IETF procedures
(RFC2026 et al) for publication.

		--Dean
		

On Wed, 25 Jun 2008, Yoav Nir wrote:

> Hi Dean.
> 
> It's debatable whether or not ECC is really heavily patented,  
> considering that the original articles are from the early 80s. AFAIK  
> all the IPR claims that may matter are from Certicom. You may have  
> found this statement in your search: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/750/
> 
> In that disclosure, Certicom grants a license to use their IPR for ECC  
> in all IKE, IKEv2 and TLS protocols. This may be the reason why there  
> are no disclosure specific to this draft.
> 
> Yoav
> 
> On Jun 25, 2008, at 9:53 PM, Dean Anderson wrote:
> 
> > Gentle people,
> >
> > I can find no patent disclosures on this document listed on the IETF  
> > IPR
> > search page at https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/ using
> > draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac as the I-D Filename.
> >
> > Elliptic curve cryptography is a heavilly patented area, and it seems
> > impossible that this draft does not involve an existing patent.
> >
> > I also seemed to have missed the discussion of non-patented
> > alternatives, as required by RFC3979.
> >
> > Surely the IESG would not approve a document AGAIN that did not  
> > disclose
> > its patent status in violation of RFC3979 et al!?!
> >
> > I have to object to the approval of this draft on those grounds.  I am
> > very concerned that the IESG would not be more circumspect and careful
> > in light of the previous TLS-Authz scandal. See
> > http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/Housley/index.html
> > http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/TimPolk/index.html
> > for more information about TLS-Authz.
> >
> > 		--Dean
> >
> >
> > On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, The IESG wrote:
> >
> >> The IESG has approved the following document:
> >>
> >> - 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
> >>   Counter Mode '
> >>   <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC
> >>
> >> This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working
> >> Group.
> >>
> >> The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.
> >>
> >> A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
> >> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt
> >>
> >> Technical Summary
> >>
> >>   This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
> >>   specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
> >>   SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
> >>
> >> Working Group Summary
> >>
> >>   This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
> >>   Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
> >>   working group.
> >>
> >> Document Quality
> >>
> >>   There has been significant review of the document by members of
> >>   the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
> >>   improve the document based on these reviews.
> >>
> >> Personnel
> >>
> >>   The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph Salowey, and the
> >>   responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.
> >>
> >> RFC Editor Note
> >>
> >>   In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"
> >>
> >>   Abstract:
> >>   OLD:
> >>      However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
> >>      algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
> >>      for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
> >>   NEW:
> >>      However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
> >>      algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
> >>      for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.
> >>
> >>   Section 3.1
> >>   OLD:
> >>      These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
> >>      cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
> >>      of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
> >>      algorithms.
> >>   NEW:
> >>      These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
> >>      cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
> >>      of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
> >>      algorithms.
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> TLS mailing list
> >> TLS@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >>
> >>
> >
> > -- 
> > Av8 Internet   Prepared to pay a premium for better service?
> > www.av8.net         faster, more reliable, better service
> > 617 344 9000
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
> > Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
> >
> 
> 
> 

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Dean:

>If I understand correctly, Certicom has over 130 patents in ECC and
>public key crypto and has sold 26 patents and patent applications on the
>subject to the US National Security Agency. The NSA controls licening
>rights on those patents, not Certicom. The licensing situation is much
>more clouded by that sale.

You do not understand correctly. NSA and Certicom gave briefings at 
the SAAG session at the last IETF meeting held in Washington, 
DC.  The slides and other information from that session are in the proceedings.

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04nov/slides/saag-2/sld1.htm
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04nov/slides/saag-5.pdf
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04nov/slides/saag-4/sld1.htm

Russ 

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On Wed, 25 Jun 2008, Russ Housley wrote:

> Dean:
> 
> >If I understand correctly, Certicom has over 130 patents in ECC and
> >public key crypto and has sold 26 patents and patent applications on the
> >subject to the US National Security Agency. The NSA controls licening
> >rights on those patents, not Certicom. The licensing situation is much
> >more clouded by that sale.
> 
> You do not understand correctly. NSA and Certicom gave briefings at 
> the SAAG session at the last IETF meeting held in Washington, 
> DC.  The slides and other information from that session are in the proceedings.

Thanks. It appears my only misconception was thinking that Certicom sold
the patents outright---it did not. Rather, it sold the _licensing_
rights to 26 patents to the NSA.

However, this misconception is hardly relevant to the concerns I raised.  

Indeed, it appears to be the case that I was correct on the principle
issue:  That the general public is not licenced to use these patents on
implementing this draft.


> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04nov/slides/saag-2/sld1.htm

The above presentation doesn't give the general public or the IETF the
right to use the patents. The presentation just reviews the NSA's rights
to licence the patents, and explains how to get an NSA license.  The
presentation seems to suggest that only USG purposes (as opposed to
private commercial) will be granted by the NSA. This may seem kind of
odd, since the USG can always use patents---you can't sue the US
government for infringement.  Of course, the NSA also wants to give the
technology to foreign governments, which would be covered by a US
Patent, so the NSA purchase does make sense.  Nowhere in the
presentation does it say that anyone who asks will be granted a license.

As slide 5 shows, licensing is for a NSA-approved products and those are
defined as being products for use by "Federal, State or Local government
agencis protecting classified or mission critical national security
information, or" [next slide] "-Foreign government agencies..."  That
doesn't seem to cover the IETF or the general public.

> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04nov/slides/saag-5.pdf

The above identifies the 26 patents the NSA can licence. Thanks.

> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04nov/slides/saag-4/sld1.htm

The above presentation just covers software that Certicom will give to
NSA users, not to the general public.

	--Dean


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> > >If I understand correctly, Certicom has over 130 patents in ECC and
> > >public key crypto and has sold 26 patents and patent applications
on the
> > >subject to the US National Security Agency. The NSA controls
licening
> > >rights on those patents, not Certicom. The licensing situation is
much
> > >more clouded by that sale.
> >
> > You do not understand correctly. NSA and Certicom gave briefings at
> > the SAAG session at the last IETF meeting held in Washington,
> > DC.  The slides and other information from that session are in the
proceedings.
> 
> Thanks. It appears my only misconception was thinking that Certicom
sold
> the patents outright---it did not. Rather, it sold the _licensing_
rights to 26 patents to the NSA.

NSA has the right to sub-license. Certicom retains the rights to license
the patents. 

William
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From: "Hugo Krawczyk" <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
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Pascal asked me to comment on this, especially in regards to Uri's question=
s.

Let me say that I did not read Pascal's document but I understand it
is based on the KDF scheme I have proposed and thoroughly analyzed in
the paper he cites, so I will respond on that basis.

Please refer to the page
http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/
for details of the proposal, rationale, analysis etc.

As for Uri's questions.

I would have hoped that you would find answers to these questions in
the very detailed rationale in the paper. I suggest you read it
carefully.

The main reason for me to write such a paper is that the KDF subject
is non-trivial (even if it may seem that KDFs should be easy and
straightforward to build) and it raises many questions that one cannot
just answer in an email exchange.

Here are some points where using HMAC instead of the plain hash in
KDFs provides for a (much) better design:

- KDF functionality is a superset of PRF functionality (i.e., a KDF
needs to include the  PRF functionality for key expansion but it also
needs additional properties). Therefore, if one accepts that HMAC is
better as a PRF that a plain hash function such as SHA (and better
than the plain hash with a concatenated key) then the same is
certainly true for KDF which has more stringent requirements than PRF.

- HMAC as a mode of operation for hash functions preserves important
properties of the underlying hash function such as pseudo-randomness
(e.g. PRF), randomness (e.g. "random oracle"), and some important
extraction properties that are central (and crucial) for a good KDF.
Please refer to the paper for a comprehensive list of results on the
relevant cryptographic properties achieved by HMAC (and not by the
plain hash function). In particular, these results quantify the
quality of (pseudo) randomness output by the KDF as a function of the
assumptions on the underlying hash function.

- If you believe that SHA (or any other hash function) behaves as an
ideal random function then you can replace HMAC with the plain hash in
part of the KDF design (but even then you have to be careful, e.g. to
avoid extension attacks). But I do not think we should be in the
"mood" of over-trusting our hash functions. The last years have
reminded us of how shaky these functions can be so it is a prudent
engineering principle (and a sound theoretical methodology) to go for
designs that put as little trust as possible on the hash functions.
HMAC as a MAC and PRF is an example of such prudent methodology. There
is no reason not to apply the same principles to a basic primitive
such as a KDF.

- It is NOT true that you need to assume that the hash function is
"ideally random" to justify its use with HMAC in the KDF context. Much
weaker assumptions suffice for many applications and settings
(including instances of IKE and TLS). The paper explains these issues
in detail (maybe too much detail? :). The plain hash function does not
give you such guarantees. In particular, Merkle-Damgard iteration of
the compression function (e.g., plain SHA) does not preserve
pseudorandom or extraction properties even if the compression function
had them.

- If you follow the methodology of this proposal (what I call the
"extract-then-expand" paradigm), you can replace hash functions with
block ciphers if you prefer to trust those more than hash functions.

- There is no need to wait to see practical breakings of systems to
move to better designs, especially when the better designs have little
(if any) performance penalty (in the case of KDFs the extra block
hashed with HMAC is insignificant performance-wise).  It is enough
with the structural weaknesses and pitfalls presented by ad-hoc
schemes based on plain hash functions, and also discussed at length in
the paper,  to indicate that they are not the best designs we can wish
for.

I will stop here or I will start duplicating the many pages in my
paper (which hopefully is better written, and certainly more complete,
than anything said here).

Hugo

PS: I will be away for several weeks starting next week so I will not
be able to participate in discussions of these issues during that time
(but do not see that as a sign that I agree with everything that is
being said... :)


2008/6/25 Blumenthal, Uri <uri@ll.mit.edu>:
>>  In RFC 4306 (IKEV2) some PRF functions are already HMAC BASED
>
> This does not answer my question. What benefits over SHA does HMAC-SHA
> provide here?
>
> I suggest replacing HMAC-SHA with SHA for KDF, or providing rationale for
> using HMAC construct on top of SHA =96 and rationale better than "somebody
> else considered it a good idea". Showing how randomness of the output is
> measurably improved, or how an attack against key derivation mechanism is
> foiled by this mechanism could justify extra cost.
>
>
>
> At 21:48 24/06/2008, Blumenthal, Uri wrote:
>
> Content-Language: en
> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=3D"_000_C486C7E8D23urillmit=
edu_"
>
> After a brief look, the algorithm seems OK. But why not just use straight
> hash (say SHA) instead of HMAC in key derivation function?
>
> If SHA (or whatever) hash function output possesses random properties =96
> what's the advantage of employing HMAC construct? What does it add that
> hasn't been there already?
> If SHA does not produce pseudo-random output =96 how does HMAC improve the
> situation?
>
> (Yes I'm aware of HMAC advantages for MACing, but this is different. I've
> read < http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf
> <http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/kdf.pdf> >,  and still am not
> convinced.)
>
>
> On 6/23/08 12:11 PM, "Pascal Urien" <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr
> <Pascal.Urien@enst.htm> > wrote:
>
> Hi All,
>
>   - There is a common point between the two proposals, i.e. use of
> TLS for key generation
>
>   - In draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt the TLS PRF function is used
>   - In draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt a separate KDF function is used.
>     Krawczyk, H (one of the HMAC designer) wrote a very interesting
> paper about tthe design of KDF functions
>    "On Extract-then-Expand Key Derivation Functions and an HMAC-based
> KDF", http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/kdf/, March 2008
>
>    - The point that is not addressed by
> draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt, is the case for which keys are
> pushed by server and not computed by
>      both parties (client and server)
>
> Pascal
>
>
>
>
> At 14:20 23/06/2008, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>>It is a good idea to use different labels for different key usage.
>>Further, I would consider interactions between your document and the
>>following WG document:
>>
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt
>> <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-01.txt>
>>
>>You could refer to this for key label discussions.
>>
>>/Simon
>>
>>Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr <Pascal.Urien@enst.htm> > writes:
>>
>> > Hi Mike,
>> >
>> >   I agree on that point.
>> >
>> >    Maybe the label used with KDF could be different according
>> >   to different uses
>> >
>> > Pascal
>> >
>> > At 20:24 22/06/2008, Mike wrote:
>> >>It might be better to use a label other than "key expansion" in the KDF
>> >>since that is already used in TLS.
>> >>
>> >>Mike
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>Pascal Urien wrote:
>> >>>Dear all,
>> >>>The draft
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-urien-tls-keygen-00.txt
>> >>>  proposes a  keying infrastructure based on the TLS protocol.
>> >>>  It suggests defining an additional Key Distribution Function (KDF)
>> >>>  in order to deliver a set of cryptographic keys.
>> >>>   In a peer to peer mode keys are directly produced as inputs of
>> >>> the KDF functions.
>> >>>   For centralized architectures they are delivered through container=
s,
>> >>>   secured with keys derived from the KDF function.
>> >>>   I will attend to the next IETF meeting in Dublin, and i hope to
>> >>> present
>> >>>   more precisely the scope of this proposal
>> >>>Best Regards
>> >>>Pascal
>> >>_______________________________________________
>> >>TLS mailing list
>> >>TLS@ietf.org <TLS@ietf.htm>
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org <TLS@ietf.htm>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
> --
> Regards,
> Uri
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: dean@av8.com, ynir@checkpoint.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
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Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com> writes:

>As for the Certicom licence grant on its remaining patents, that grant
>identifies specific drafts and doesn't include this draft. The grant in '750
>you mention specifically restricts the grant to the drafts listed: "The
>licence granted does not extend, either explicitly or implicitly, to other
>IETF protocols".

Another issue with the various patents is that there is sufficient FUD
surrounding them that users (at least in my experience) are unwilling to go
near them because it's easier to just use unencumbered RSA (or whatever).
Specifically, given the choice between having lawyers spend forever trying to
ensure they won't get sued and just going ahead and using the de facto method,
they've all gone for the de facto one (the EKE patent mess is another example
of this in action).  So there are really two issues, whether there is
technically an issue and whether there is legally an issue, i.e. whether
people are going to be happy using this with the threat of lawsuits hanging
over them.  Without a clear and unambigous statement from any patent
stakeholders saying that nothing will happen to you for implementing this, I
can't see customers going for it, it's all risk and no benefit.

Peter.

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 10:35:00 -0400
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
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That sums it up nicely (for the industry at least) - thanks Peter.
--
Regards,
Uri
<Disclaimer>

On 6/26/08 01:22 AM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:

>As for the Certicom licence grant on its remaining patents, that grant
>identifies specific drafts and doesn't include this draft. The grant in '7=
50
>you mention specifically restricts the grant to the drafts listed: "The
>licence granted does not extend, either explicitly or implicitly, to other
>IETF protocols".

Another issue with the various patents is that there is sufficient FUD
surrounding them that users (at least in my experience) are unwilling to go
near them because it's easier to just use unencumbered RSA (or whatever).
Specifically, given the choice between having lawyers spend forever trying =
to
ensure they won't get sued and just going ahead and using the de facto meth=
od,
they've all gone for the de facto one (the EKE patent mess is another examp=
le
of this in action).  So there are really two issues, whether there is
technically an issue and whether there is legally an issue, i.e. whether
people are going to be happy using this with the threat of lawsuits hanging
over them.  Without a clear and unambigous statement from any patent
stakeholders saying that nothing will happen to you for implementing this, =
I
can't see customers going for it, it's all risk and no benefit.

Peter.

--_000_C4892154D70urillmitedu_
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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SH=
A-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Informational RFC</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:=
12pt'>That sums it up nicely (for the industry at least) &#8211; thanks Pet=
er.<BR>
-- <BR>
Regards,<BR>
Uri<BR>
&lt;Disclaimer&gt;<BR>
<BR>
On 6/26/08 01:22 AM, &quot;Peter Gutmann&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"pgut001@cs.au=
ckland.ac.nz">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"=
><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><BR>
&gt;As for the Certicom licence grant on its remaining patents, that grant<=
BR>
&gt;identifies specific drafts and doesn't include this draft. The grant in=
 '750<BR>
&gt;you mention specifically restricts the grant to the drafts listed: &quo=
t;The<BR>
&gt;licence granted does not extend, either explicitly or implicitly, to ot=
her<BR>
&gt;IETF protocols&quot;.<BR>
<BR>
Another issue with the various patents is that there is sufficient FUD<BR>
surrounding them that users (at least in my experience) are unwilling to go=
<BR>
near them because it's easier to just use unencumbered RSA (or whatever).<B=
R>
Specifically, given the choice between having lawyers spend forever trying =
to<BR>
ensure they won't get sued and just going ahead and using the de facto meth=
od,<BR>
they've all gone for the de facto one (the EKE patent mess is another examp=
le<BR>
of this in action). &nbsp;So there are really two issues, whether there is<=
BR>
technically an issue and whether there is legally an issue, i.e. whether<BR=
>
people are going to be happy using this with the threat of lawsuits hanging=
<BR>
over them. &nbsp;Without a clear and unambigous statement from any patent<B=
R>
stakeholders saying that nothing will happen to you for implementing this, =
I<BR>
can't see customers going for it, it's all risk and no benefit.<BR>
<BR>
Peter.<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
</BODY>
</HTML>


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_______________________________________________
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Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 11:00:03 -0400
To: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Dean:

>Thanks. It appears my only misconception was thinking that Certicom sold
>the patents outright---it did not. Rather, it sold the _licensing_
>rights to 26 patents to the NSA.

It is a nonexclusive relationship.  That is important too.

>However, this misconception is hardly relevant to the concerns I raised.
>
>Indeed, it appears to be the case that I was correct on the principle
>issue:  That the general public is not licenced to use these patents on
>implementing this draft.

Right.  This is the reason the document is a candidate for the 
standards track.  The idea of the informational specification is so 
that anyone that chooses to use this technology can do so in an 
interoperable way.

Russ

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On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Russ Housley wrote:

> >Indeed, it appears to be the case that I was correct on the principle
> >issue:  That the general public is not licenced to use these patents on
> >implementing this draft.
> 
> Right.  This is the reason the document is a candidate for the 
> standards track.  

So, you (Russ--chair of IETF) knew of the patent encumbrances, but
failed to report those facts in an IETF 'IPR' (patent) disclosure?  And
the WG failed to discuss non-patent alternatives in the working group as
required by RFC3979?  This seems to be almost the same issues as with
TLS-Authz.  It is too bad that Sam Hartman is no longer on the IESG,
this time.


> The idea of the informational specification is so that anyone that
> chooses to use this technology can do so in an interoperable way.

The above reason does not seem to be a proper use of the Informational
category.

4.2.2  Informational

   An "Informational" specification is published for the general
   information of the Internet community, and does not represent an
   Internet community consensus or recommendation.  The Informational
   designation is intended to provide for the timely publication of a
   very broad range of responsible informational documents from many
   sources, subject only to editorial considerations and to verification
   that there has been adequate coordination with the standards process
   (see section 4.2.3).

   Specifications that have been prepared outside of the Internet
   community and are not incorporated into the Internet Standards
   Process by any of the provisions of section 10 may be published as
   Informational RFCs, with the permission of the owner and the
   concurrence of the RFC Editor.


Particularly, Section 4.2.3 states

   To ensure that the non-standards track Experimental and Informational
   designations are not misused to circumvent the Internet Standards
   Process, the IESG and the RFC Editor have agreed that the RFC Editor
   will refer to the IESG any document submitted for Experimental or
   Informational publication which, in the opinion of the RFC Editor,
   may be related to work being done, or expected to be done, within the
   IETF community.  The IESG shall review such a referred document
   within a reasonable period of time, and recommend either that it be
   published as originally submitted or referred to the IETF as a
   contribution to the Internet Standards Process.

This document is related to work that has been done within the IETF 
community.

		--Dean

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At Fri, 27 Jun 2008 13:02:28 -0400 (EDT),
Dean Anderson wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Russ Housley wrote:
> Particularly, Section 4.2.3 states
> 
>    To ensure that the non-standards track Experimental and Informational
>    designations are not misused to circumvent the Internet Standards
>    Process, the IESG and the RFC Editor have agreed that the RFC Editor
>    will refer to the IESG any document submitted for Experimental or
>    Informational publication which, in the opinion of the RFC Editor,
>    may be related to work being done, or expected to be done, within the
>    IETF community.  The IESG shall review such a referred document
>    within a reasonable period of time, and recommend either that it be
>    published as originally submitted or referred to the IETF as a
>    contribution to the Internet Standards Process.
> 
> This document is related to work that has been done within the IETF 
> community.

This paragraph only refers to documents which did not go through
the IETF process, as implied by the first sentence of 4.2.3.

   Unless they are the result of IETF Working Group action, documents
   intended to be published with Experimental or Informational status
   should be submitted directly to the RFC Editor.

This document was a TLS WG document, so had already been
coordinated with the IETF community.

-Ekr

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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Jun 27 12:56:13 2008
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On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> 
> This paragraph only refers to documents which did not go through
> the IETF process, as implied by the first sentence of 4.2.3.

Indeed. And this document indeed did not properly follow the IETF
process because it did not disclose IPR in accordance with RFC3979 and
because it did not discuss non-patented alternatives, also in accordance
with RFC3979.  The intent of 4.2.3 is to prevent the circumvention of
the rules, and the IETF rules are not being followed.

>    Unless they are the result of IETF Working Group action, documents
>    intended to be published with Experimental or Informational status
>    should be submitted directly to the RFC Editor.
> 
> This document was a TLS WG document, so had already been
> coordinated with the IETF community.

That is precisely the point: it has NOT been properly coordinated with
the internet community: Not all the pertinent facts were disclosed to
the internet community.  

I think the recent events surrounding TLS-Authz at least indicate that
the internet community is keenly interested in facts of patent
encumbrance. These facts were apparently known to IESG managers and
those managers also knew these facts would be important to the
community, but kept the community in the dark, made false 
representations in the draft, and failed to follow IETF policy.

The following paragraph in the 'ecc-new-mac draft is a false
representation:

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

What was claimed to be an innocent mistake in TLS-Authz cannot be
repeated by essentially the same people and still be considered an
innocent mistake.  Twice is not a mistake. Especially after all the fuss
that was made about TLS-Authz.


		--Dean

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  Dean,

On Fri, June 27, 2008 10:02 am, Dean Anderson wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Russ Housley wrote:
>
>> >Indeed, it appears to be the case that I was correct on the principle
>> >issue:  That the general public is not licenced to use these patents on
>> >implementing this draft.
>>
>> Right.  This is the reason the document is a candidate for the
>> standards track.
>
> So, you (Russ--chair of IETF) knew of the patent encumbrances, but
> failed to report those facts in an IETF 'IPR' (patent) disclosure?  And
> the WG failed to discuss non-patent alternatives in the working group as
> required by RFC3979?  This seems to be almost the same issues as with
> TLS-Authz.  It is too bad that Sam Hartman is no longer on the IESG,
> this time.

  I think you are _assuming_ that there are patent encumbrances.
Certicom has patents in ECC but it is not clear that any of them
necessarily apply to this draft. Maybe they do; maybe they don't. But
given that uncertainty there isn't a whole lot to "disclose". Keep in
mind it's hard to prove a negative ("no patents are infringed....") so
the most innocent of I-Ds could, maybe, possibly infringe on some weird
patent somewhere.

  Certicom would, of course, love to license all sorts of things to you
whether you need them or not. They would like everyone to believe that
_any_ use of elliptic curves requires licensing from them but that is
just FUD.

  regards,

  Dan.

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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At Fri, 27 Jun 2008 15:56:06 -0400 (EDT),
Dean Anderson wrote:
> 
> On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> > 
> > This paragraph only refers to documents which did not go through
> > the IETF process, as implied by the first sentence of 4.2.3.
> 
> Indeed. And this document indeed did not properly follow the IETF
> process because it did not disclose IPR in accordance with RFC3979 and
> because it did not discuss non-patented alternatives, also in accordance
> with RFC3979.  The intent of 4.2.3 is to prevent the circumvention of
> the rules, and the IETF rules are not being followed.
>
> >    Unless they are the result of IETF Working Group action, documents
> >    intended to be published with Experimental or Informational status
> >    should be submitted directly to the RFC Editor.
> > 
> > This document was a TLS WG document, so had already been
> > coordinated with the IETF community.
> 
> That is precisely the point: it has NOT been properly coordinated with
> the internet community: Not all the pertinent facts were disclosed to
> the internet community.  
> 
> I think the recent events surrounding TLS-Authz at least indicate that
> the internet community is keenly interested in facts of patent
> encumbrance. These facts were apparently known to IESG managers and
> those managers also knew these facts would be important to the
> community, but kept the community in the dark, made false 
> representations in the draft, and failed to follow IETF policy.
> 
> The following paragraph in the 'ecc-new-mac draft is a false
> representation:
> 
>    By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
>    applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
>    have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
>    aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

As I've stated already, the relevant IPR claims had already been
disclosed WRT RFC 4492, which this document lists as a normative
reference, as well as explicitly mentioning it in the abstract and
throughout the document, and it just didn't occur to me to file a
separate IPR disclosure listing this document specifically. As I
indicated earlier, I'll leave it to Joe and the ADs to determine
whether such disclosure was required by the process, process
violation, but from a practical perspective, I find it hard to believe
that any significant number of people reviewing the document were
unaware of the IPR situation, given the extensive discussion on this
topic when 4492 was approved.

-Ekr
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If there is any uncertainty, the the proper course of action is to
disclose the possibility (because its relevant), and then contact the
patent holder. Infringing the patent because you "can't be certain",
doesn't exempt one from the criminal penalties of intentional
infringement, nor the civil penalties of unintentional infringement.
Otherwise, everyone would simply claim that they "weren't certain", and
just ignore patents altogether. Instead, one's obligation is to get
certainty, or get permission.  "Uncertainty" is a frivolous assertion
that also doesn't exempt one from the law or from following RFC3979.

If one wants to dispute a specific patent claim, that's your
business--there are procedures for doing that--I encourage that.  
However, deceiving the internet community into unwitting and unwilling
patent infringement is not a proper (or lawful) method of fighting
patents. But I don't think the authors or IETF managers intend to
secretly fight patents through failure to disclose these patents to the
internet community.  I don't think object of the present
misrepresentation is to get the internet community to unwittingly
infringe, and subsequently be forced to help fight the Certicom patents.

In the TLS-Authz case, at least, the author (Housley) was working
directly for the patent holder.  I don't think Housley intended to (by
the misreprentation of TLS-Authz patent status)  fight the patent by
secretly imposing the burden of disputing the TLS-Authz patent on the
internet community.

Failure to disclose the patents prevents the internet community from
looking for and finding non-infringing alternatives.  Non-infringing
alternatives is by far the cheapest method of fighting patents.  
RFC3979 requires disclosure and requires that a discussion of
non-patented alternatives take place. A submarine-patented standard
obtained through deception is the very worst scenario--except for the
patent holder--who can make a _LOT_ of money on a patented STANDARD that
they own and that everyone else is forced to use or committed to using.


		--Dean

On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Dan Harkins wrote:

> 
>   Dean,
> 
> On Fri, June 27, 2008 10:02 am, Dean Anderson wrote:
> > On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Russ Housley wrote:
> >
> >> >Indeed, it appears to be the case that I was correct on the principle
> >> >issue:  That the general public is not licenced to use these patents on
> >> >implementing this draft.
> >>
> >> Right.  This is the reason the document is a candidate for the
> >> standards track.
> >
> > So, you (Russ--chair of IETF) knew of the patent encumbrances, but
> > failed to report those facts in an IETF 'IPR' (patent) disclosure?  And
> > the WG failed to discuss non-patent alternatives in the working group as
> > required by RFC3979?  This seems to be almost the same issues as with
> > TLS-Authz.  It is too bad that Sam Hartman is no longer on the IESG,
> > this time.
> 
>   I think you are _assuming_ that there are patent encumbrances.
> Certicom has patents in ECC but it is not clear that any of them
> necessarily apply to this draft. Maybe they do; maybe they don't. But
> given that uncertainty there isn't a whole lot to "disclose". Keep in
> mind it's hard to prove a negative ("no patents are infringed....") so
> the most innocent of I-Ds could, maybe, possibly infringe on some weird
> patent somewhere.
> 
>   Certicom would, of course, love to license all sorts of things to you
> whether you need them or not. They would like everyone to believe that
> _any_ use of elliptic curves requires licensing from them but that is
> just FUD.
> 
>   regards,
> 
>   Dan.
> 
> 
> 

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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Jun 27 15:18:39 2008
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That disclosure specifically states that it doesn't apply to any other
drafts, and this draft isn't listed.  That disclosure doesn't apply to
this document.

The failure to disclose is only the first process violation. I count:

2. No discussion of non-patented alternatives per RFC3979.

3. No consensus on WG, despite relationship to prior and future
standards-track work on TLS.

4. This is a protocol-altering document, altering TLS protocol--it is
not really an Informational document. Nor indeed is RFC4492 properly
categorized as informational.  The informational category is being used
as an end-run around the consensus requirements.

The consequence appears to be another submarine-patented standard. I
don't think this can dismissed as "it just didn't occur to me", after
TLS-Authz.

This also isn't the first time ECC patents have failed to be disclosed
to the IETF.  In 2005, I complained of DNSEXT drafts that were
describing ECC without patent disclosures. In that case, I was told by
Steven Bellovin (then chair of IPR-WG) that RFC3979 wasn't the policy of
the IETF(?!!!?).  The DNSEXT Chair (Austein) told me to drop discussion
about non-patented alternatives (?!!!?).  The IETF Lawyer later refuted
Bellovin's false claims, but the DNSEXT group continues to suppress
discussion on false pretenses.  I'm very concerned about such blatantly
false statements, and concerned by the attempt to dismiss them as mere
mistakes that 'they didn't think of'.

		--Dean


On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> As I've stated already, the relevant IPR claims had already been
> disclosed WRT RFC 4492, which this document lists as a normative
> reference, as well as explicitly mentioning it in the abstract and
> throughout the document, and it just didn't occur to me to file a
> separate IPR disclosure listing this document specifically. As I
> indicated earlier, I'll leave it to Joe and the ADs to determine
> whether such disclosure was required by the process, process
> violation, but from a practical perspective, I find it hard to believe
> that any significant number of people reviewing the document were
> unaware of the IPR situation, given the extensive discussion on this
> topic when 4492 was approved.
> 
> -Ekr
> 
> 

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At Fri, 27 Jun 2008 18:16:58 -0400 (EDT),
Dean Anderson wrote:
> 
> That disclosure specifically states that it doesn't apply to any other
> drafts, and this draft isn't listed.  That disclosure doesn't apply to
> this document.
> 
> The failure to disclose is only the first process violation. I count:
> 
> 2. No discussion of non-patented alternatives per RFC3979.

It's not clear what that means in the context of cipher suites.
Recall that TLS has a set of mandatory to implement cipher suites
based on RSA. Those *are* the non-patented (well, patent
expired) alternatives. So, the question is really whether IETF
should issue code points to algorithms which may potentially
be encumbered. The practice of the TLS WG has been historically
to do so, but to issue the RFCs as Informational. The S/MIME
WG appears to have done the same.


> 3. No consensus on WG, despite relationship to prior and future
> standards-track work on TLS.

Again, I'll refer this to Pasi, who ran this WGLC as chair.


> 4. This is a protocol-altering document, altering TLS protocol--it is
> not really an Informational document. Nor indeed is RFC4492 properly
> categorized as informational.  The informational category is being used
> as an end-run around the consensus requirements.

I don't agree with this claim. RFC 4346, which represents the consensus
of the WG, explicitly contemplates that new cipher suite code points
may be defined via Informational documents:

   Section A.5 describes a TLS Cipher Suite Registry to be maintained by
   the IANA, and it defines a number of such cipher suite identifiers.
   Cipher suite values with the first byte in the range 0-191 (decimal)
   inclusive are assigned via RFC 2434 Standards Action.  Values with
   the first byte in the range 192-254 (decimal) are assigned via RFC
   2434 Specification Required.  Values with the first byte 255
   (decimal) are reserved for RFC 2434 Private Use.  The registry will
   initially be populated with the values from Section A.5 of this
   document, [TLSAES], and from Section 3 of [TLSKRB].


Similarly, RFC 4366 explicitly contemplates that new extensions
may be defined by IETF Consensus [RFC 2434]:

   Sections 2.3 and 5 describe a registry of ExtensionType values to be
   maintained by the IANA.  ExtensionType values are to be assigned via
   IETF Consensus as defined in RFC 2434 [IANA].  The initial registry
   corresponds to the definition of "ExtensionType" in Section 2.3.

Informational documents fall squarely within this category.


> The consequence appears to be another submarine-patented standard. I
> don't think this can dismissed as "it just didn't occur to me", after
> TLS-Authz.

I don't really understand this paragraph. What are you suggesting?

-Ekr
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This will hopefully be a moot argument as the patentability
of software is being investigated at the moment by the CAFC
and will probably end up being decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court, who has in the past suggested it is not patentable.
See http://endsoftpatents.org/bilski if you are interested.

Mike
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Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 16:34:24 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
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  Look, no one is "deceiving the internet community"! And I'm not
encouraging people to knowingly infringe on patents.

  There is no known patent necessary to implement this draft (basically
ECDH). There may be unknown ones but that possibility exists for most
every I-D and one cannot disclose the existence of an unknown patent.

  You're spreading FUD. Please stop.

  Dan.

On Fri, June 27, 2008 2:43 pm, Dean Anderson wrote:
> If there is any uncertainty, the the proper course of action is to
> disclose the possibility (because its relevant), and then contact the
> patent holder. Infringing the patent because you "can't be certain",
> doesn't exempt one from the criminal penalties of intentional
> infringement, nor the civil penalties of unintentional infringement.
> Otherwise, everyone would simply claim that they "weren't certain", and
> just ignore patents altogether. Instead, one's obligation is to get
> certainty, or get permission.  "Uncertainty" is a frivolous assertion
> that also doesn't exempt one from the law or from following RFC3979.
>
> If one wants to dispute a specific patent claim, that's your
> business--there are procedures for doing that--I encourage that.
> However, deceiving the internet community into unwitting and unwilling
> patent infringement is not a proper (or lawful) method of fighting
> patents. But I don't think the authors or IETF managers intend to
> secretly fight patents through failure to disclose these patents to the
> internet community.  I don't think object of the present
> misrepresentation is to get the internet community to unwittingly
> infringe, and subsequently be forced to help fight the Certicom patents.
>
> In the TLS-Authz case, at least, the author (Housley) was working
> directly for the patent holder.  I don't think Housley intended to (by
> the misreprentation of TLS-Authz patent status)  fight the patent by
> secretly imposing the burden of disputing the TLS-Authz patent on the
> internet community.
>
> Failure to disclose the patents prevents the internet community from
> looking for and finding non-infringing alternatives.  Non-infringing
> alternatives is by far the cheapest method of fighting patents.
> RFC3979 requires disclosure and requires that a discussion of
> non-patented alternatives take place. A submarine-patented standard
> obtained through deception is the very worst scenario--except for the
> patent holder--who can make a _LOT_ of money on a patented STANDARD that
> they own and that everyone else is forced to use or committed to using.
>
>
> 		--Dean
>
> On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Dan Harkins wrote:
>
>>
>>   Dean,
>>
>> On Fri, June 27, 2008 10:02 am, Dean Anderson wrote:
>> > On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Russ Housley wrote:
>> >
>> >> >Indeed, it appears to be the case that I was correct on the
>> principle
>> >> >issue:  That the general public is not licenced to use these patents
>> on
>> >> >implementing this draft.
>> >>
>> >> Right.  This is the reason the document is a candidate for the
>> >> standards track.
>> >
>> > So, you (Russ--chair of IETF) knew of the patent encumbrances, but
>> > failed to report those facts in an IETF 'IPR' (patent) disclosure?
>> And
>> > the WG failed to discuss non-patent alternatives in the working group
>> as
>> > required by RFC3979?  This seems to be almost the same issues as with
>> > TLS-Authz.  It is too bad that Sam Hartman is no longer on the IESG,
>> > this time.
>>
>>   I think you are _assuming_ that there are patent encumbrances.
>> Certicom has patents in ECC but it is not clear that any of them
>> necessarily apply to this draft. Maybe they do; maybe they don't. But
>> given that uncertainty there isn't a whole lot to "disclose". Keep in
>> mind it's hard to prove a negative ("no patents are infringed....") so
>> the most innocent of I-Ds could, maybe, possibly infringe on some weird
>> patent somewhere.
>>
>>   Certicom would, of course, love to license all sorts of things to you
>> whether you need them or not. They would like everyone to believe that
>> _any_ use of elliptic curves requires licensing from them but that is
>> just FUD.
>>
>>   regards,
>>
>>   Dan.
>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> Av8 Internet   Prepared to pay a premium for better service?
> www.av8.net         faster, more reliable, better service
> 617 344 9000
>
>
>


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    This will hopefully be a moot argument as the patentability
    of software is being investigated at the moment by the CAFC
    and will probably end up being decided by the U.S. Supreme
    Court, who has in the past suggested it is not patentable.
    See http://endsoftpatents.org/bilski if you are interested.

We hope the Supreme Court will eliminate software patents in the US,
but we cannot take that for granted.  We have to prepare for other
outcomes.
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On Fri, 27 Jun 2008, Dan Harkins wrote:

>   Look, no one is "deceiving the internet community"! And I'm not
> encouraging people to knowingly infringe on patents.

It seems you are indeed advocating knowing infringement.  No patent
lawyer would assert you can knowingly infringe a patent because you
merely claimed to be 'uncertain'.

The deception of the internet community is found in the false
representation in the draft, as I previously quoted. There is no 
disclosure for this draft, even though the authors knew the algorithms 
were patented.

> There is no known patent necessary to implement this draft (basically
> ECDH). There may be unknown ones but that possibility exists for most
> every I-D and one cannot disclose the existence of an unknown patent.

Your statement above is plainly not true. RFC4492 has a grant of
permission on patents applying to '4492, and this work certainly uses
algorithms derived from the patented ECC algorithms used in '4492.  
There is no credible argument that this work isn't covered by the same
patents as cover '4492.

>   You're spreading FUD. Please stop.

You're spreading baseless, willful ignorance---which doesn't alter any
facts for any infringement claim. Anyone following your advice and uses
this algorithm without permission, infringes.  You have no credible
basis to assert there is no infringement.  Please stop.

		--Dean

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I hate to respond to my own message, but this deserves some elaboration.

> You're spreading baseless, willful ignorance---which doesn't alter any
> facts for any infringement claim. Anyone following your advice and uses
> this algorithm without permission, infringes.  You have no credible
> basis to assert there is no infringement.  Please stop.

I have discussed this with lawyers. The only time you can use ignorance
as an intentional infringement defense is if you've never conducted a
patent search. Patent lawyers I've talked with advise engineers against
conducting patent searches for this reason. Once you conduct a patent
search, that is enough evidence to show that you knew of the
patent---even if you actually incompetently performed the patent search
and really, truly didn't find the patent due to incompentence.  
Performing a patent search is evidence of knowledge of the patent.  A
self-serving claim that one didn't find what was actually there is not
going to be very credible. In this case, you actually know specifics of
the patents.

Willful ignorance is no defense to intentional infringement--it would
probably be used to support the plaintiff, in fact. Unreasonable
actions--those that vary from what a hypothetical reasonable person
(usually the jury) would do, are usually evidence supporting the
complaint.  Reasonable people respect the law, and are expected to
perform their lawful duties to their fellow citizens, even when they
don't like to.  Indeed, unreasonble actions and a disregard for the law
are the foundation of criminal intent. Just ask Bernie Ebbers.

If you want to argue a patent doesn't apply to your work, you better
have very solid reasons that will stand up in court---Something that
proves that it is reasonably impossible that the patent could apply to
your activities. And you obviously don't have that in this case.

		--Dean

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On Sat, June 28, 2008 12:19 pm, Dean Anderson wrote:
>                                                      There is no
> disclosure for this draft, even though the authors knew the algorithms
> were patented.

  What's the patent then? And please don't just regurgitate Certicom's
list of patents it asserts are necessary. For you to make such a specific
statement ("the algorithms were patented") you must know which specific
claim in what specific patent applies. So, what is it?

  Dan.



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On Sat, 28 Jun 2008, Dan Harkins wrote:

> 
> 
> On Sat, June 28, 2008 12:19 pm, Dean Anderson wrote:
> >                                                      There is no
> > disclosure for this draft, even though the authors knew the algorithms
> > were patented.
> 
>   What's the patent then? And please don't just regurgitate Certicom's
> list of patents it asserts are necessary. For you to make such a specific
> statement ("the algorithms were patented") you must know which specific
> claim in what specific patent applies. So, what is it?

There is already general agreement that the RFC4492 algorithms are
patented, and covered by 26 patents. The algorithms in the current draft
are derived from those in RFC4492.  Derived algorithms are covered by
the patent on the original algorithms.  It is up to you to prove that
these new algorithms are NOT derived from the patented algorithms. Given
the obvious derivation, you can't show the current algorithms to be
original, and thus have no reason to doubt their patent status.

I also note that Rescorla's 2001 TLS book has a paragraph on Elliptic
Curve cipher suites. In the book, Rescorla describes the patent status
as vague and notes the cipher itself may be patented. It seems that 7
years is plenty of time to get clarity. In fact, there seems to be some
greater clarity on the patent status since 2001. But in any case, one
can't pretend to be uncertain forever.  


		--Dean

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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 30 06:52:12 2008
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And by the way, if you really do want to dispute the patent status,
_you_ have to sit down with all 26 patents, go through every claim, and
show that each claim is either not overlapped in the draft, or invalid
through prior art.

One can't ignore a patent simply because you think that is too much work
for _the_infringer_ to do, or that the patent holder has to _prove_
something before the patent applies to the _infringer_. The patent
holder only has show to the court that the patent claims overlap the
infringer's work. And if the infringer can't prove there is no overlap
or invalidate the claims, then patent holder is _entitled_ to get
penalties, restitution, injunction [Well, that is, absent some egregious
conduct by the patent-holder, such as fraud on a standards body, as
happened in a court case involving a patented ITU standard]. Intentional
violation of a patent is a criminal offense that is prosecuted on people
who know of the patent but infringe anyway; its a crime in order to
deter people from doing that.


		--Dean

On Mon, 30 Jun 2008, Dean Anderson wrote:

> On Sat, 28 Jun 2008, Dan Harkins wrote:
> 
> > 
> > 
> > On Sat, June 28, 2008 12:19 pm, Dean Anderson wrote:
> > >                                                      There is no
> > > disclosure for this draft, even though the authors knew the algorithms
> > > were patented.
> > 
> >   What's the patent then? And please don't just regurgitate Certicom's
> > list of patents it asserts are necessary. For you to make such a specific
> > statement ("the algorithms were patented") you must know which specific
> > claim in what specific patent applies. So, what is it?
> 
> There is already general agreement that the RFC4492 algorithms are
> patented, and covered by 26 patents. The algorithms in the current draft
> are derived from those in RFC4492.  Derived algorithms are covered by
> the patent on the original algorithms.  It is up to you to prove that
> these new algorithms are NOT derived from the patented algorithms. Given
> the obvious derivation, you can't show the current algorithms to be
> original, and thus have no reason to doubt their patent status.
> 
> I also note that Rescorla's 2001 TLS book has a paragraph on Elliptic
> Curve cipher suites. In the book, Rescorla describes the patent status
> as vague and notes the cipher itself may be patented. It seems that 7
> years is plenty of time to get clarity. In fact, there seems to be some
> greater clarity on the patent status since 2001. But in any case, one
> can't pretend to be uncertain forever.  
> 
> 
> 		--Dean
> 
> 

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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 30 10:04:13 2008
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Dean,

I really do not understand why you're making such a big fuzz.

Discussing IPR issues burns a whole lot of resources in a useless fashion.
The last time we debated IPR issues on this list was about TLS-SRP,
and while discussing it, we did _ALSO_ talk about the certicom
patent claims for ECC and their effect on the ECC ciphersuites.

For TLS, the standards-track ciphersuites are not affected by 
Certicoms ECC patent claims.  So there is simply no necessity to
_discuss_ alternatives in the informational RFC on the ECC ciphersuites.

The existence of these claims could have been indicated
more prominently.  Maybe we're just to accustomed to patent claims
(like the expired DH and RSA patents) for TLS that we only worry
and focus on IPR issues for the standards track.  A lot of people
are sick of beating the dead horse -- there are parties interested
in implementing the technology, and we let them publish a spec
as informational, on which they can base their interoperable
implementations.


See e.g. Peter Gutmann's message:

: From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
: To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, ynir@checkpoint.com
: Subject: Re: [TLS] Straw poll on TLS SRP status
: In-Reply-To: <991F5FF9-FB79-4627-9DBD-7C3D1168F083@checkpoint.com>
: Message-Id: <E1HvUhu-0001XL-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
: Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2007 20:48:02 +1200
:
: [...]
:
: It's irrelevant what the software has built in, if no-one's using it
: then it may as well not be there (that's just a paraphrasing of the
: prime directive of security UI, "If the user doesn't understand your
: feature, it doesn't exist").  Certicom issued their "royalty-free
: license" for ECC in TLS last year some time, and I still haven't seen
: any use of it by anyone outside the USG and its dependents as part of
: the Suite B mandate.  Although I can't speak for vendors like Microsoft,
: I would imagine their only reason for putting it in IE was for
: that particular market (I've talked to non-MS developers and they've
: told me that's the sole reason why they added it to their product).
:
: (Again, I don't know about the IKE situation).
:
: Anyway, this is all going off on a bit of a tangent...


The most irritating for me (last time I checked) about the Certicom
license was that it was NOT royalty-free.  Instead, it used a business
model that did not charge for the implementation (of the communication
protocols), but instead it wants a premium for every EC certificate
issued by a CA.

What happens if a customer / end user living in a country where the
Certicom patent is valid purchases certificates from a CA which
operates in a country where the Certicom patents do not exist
(or are invalid/inapplicable, e.g. to Software)?

Who will Certicom sue in such a situation (if any)?  The end user?
The provider of the protocol implementation?

Waiting for the patents to expire is IMHO a workable approach for
the ECC ciphersuites.  Waiting worked for us with the DH and RSA patents,
when there weren't any alternatives, let alone a working installed base.


-Martin
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In regards to the recent email activity concerning Certicom's IPR and the 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode', it is Certicom's continuing intention to foster the adoption of elliptic curve cryptography.  As such we will be extending the IETF grant to cover TLS 1.2 as specified in http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10.txt,  when used with
      A. "ECC Cipher Suites for TLS" draft http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4492.txt or,
        B. The ECC cipher suites with SHA256/384 and AES Counter Mode http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt,

under the same terms that appear in the January 2006 IETF Contribution Letter.  This letter and an FAQ concerning that letter can be found at, http://www.certicom.com/index.php/ip-contributions

Once the updated letter has been finalize we will post it to the TLS Working Group.

Regards,
   Matthew Campagna


Matthew Campagna
Certicom Research
mcampagna@certicom.com
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 30 16:03:47 2008
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From: Richard M Stallman <rms@gnu.org>
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    Discussing IPR issues burns a whole lot of resources in a useless fashion.

Since "IPR" refers to a congeries of different laws, any general
statement about "IPR issues" is almost always an overgeneralization.
Your statement is one.

Copyright issues and trademark issues generally do NOT cause serious
problems for a proposed technique, because it is easy enough to work
around them.  To discuss them here at length would probably be
superfluous.

By contrast, patent problems are often fatal, and there is no remedy
except to wait as much as 20 years.  Thus, discussing whether a
proposed technique is patented is absolutely crucial.

Lumping together things which are so different in their effects is
encouraging confusion.  Thus, using the term "IPR" does only harm.
Avoiding it is easy, so let's avoid it.  When referring to patent
issues, let's call them "patent issues".
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 30 23:21:50 2008
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From: "Mark Tillinghast" <m.tillinghast1@verizon.net>
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Hello,
I did want to encourage people to have a look at Matthew Campagna's post.
I am not sure that people hav seen this. And it is authoritative-- I 
instigated this though my contacts at certicom to clarify their position on 
this issue in the hope that we could marshall our way past these issues..
Please have a look as it should alay doubts or misgivings; surely those 
related to Certicom's "patent issues" involvement in ECC.
Thank You,
Mark
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Richard M Stallman" <rms@gnu.org>
To: <martin.rex@sap.com>
Cc: <tls@ietf.org>; <iesg@ietf.org>
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2008 4:03 PM
Subject: Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with


>    Discussing IPR issues burns a whole lot of resources in a useless 
> fashion.
>
> Since "IPR" refers to a congeries of different laws, any general
> statement about "IPR issues" is almost always an overgeneralization.
> Your statement is one.
>
> Copyright issues and trademark issues generally do NOT cause serious
> problems for a proposed technique, because it is easy enough to work
> around them.  To discuss them here at length would probably be
> superfluous.
>
> By contrast, patent problems are often fatal, and there is no remedy
> except to wait as much as 20 years.  Thus, discussing whether a
> proposed technique is patented is absolutely crucial.
>
> Lumping together things which are so different in their effects is
> encouraging confusion.  Thus, using the term "IPR" does only harm.
> Avoiding it is easy, so let's avoid it.  When referring to patent
> issues, let's call them "patent issues".
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls 

_______________________________________________
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TLS@ietf.org
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From tls-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 30 23:29:41 2008
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OK, but Martin is correct about patent issues as well. We can discuss  
patent issue on and on, but we can't really get to any solid  
conclusions.

None of us on the TLS mailing list is a lawyer, definitely not a  
patent lawyer, and even if we were, the discussion about whether or  
not a patent applies will usually never terminate. The only way to  
really know is to implement, wait for the lawsuit, and see who wins.  
Unfortunately, most implementers, especially commercial ones are not  
willing to take this route.

Looking for unencumbered alternatives is even more tricky.  We know  
(or think) that TLS-SRP is encumbered. Suppose we took these guys'  
proposal to create an unencumbered alternative:
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/05/29/j-pake/

They claim that JPAKE is unencumbered, so TLS-JPAKE should be  
unencumbered, no?  Well, we don't really know - it's hard to prove a  
negative. If we go ahead and specify and implement TLS-JPAKE, somebody  
might come out of the woodwork and claim we are infringing.  All the  
discussion on the TLS or IESG mailing lists is not going to change that.


On Jul 1, 2008, at 2:03 AM, Richard M Stallman wrote:

>    Discussing IPR issues burns a whole lot of resources in a useless  
> fashion.
>
> Since "IPR" refers to a congeries of different laws, any general
> statement about "IPR issues" is almost always an overgeneralization.
> Your statement is one.
>
> Copyright issues and trademark issues generally do NOT cause serious
> problems for a proposed technique, because it is easy enough to work
> around them.  To discuss them here at length would probably be
> superfluous.
>
> By contrast, patent problems are often fatal, and there is no remedy
> except to wait as much as 20 years.  Thus, discussing whether a
> proposed technique is patented is absolutely crucial.
>
> Lumping together things which are so different in their effects is
> encouraging confusion.  Thus, using the term "IPR" does only harm.
> Avoiding it is easy, so let's avoid it.  When referring to patent
> issues, let's call them "patent issues".
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
>

_______________________________________________
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Dean,

The ECC algorithms are specified in RFC 4492, not in this document. 
In other words, you cannot implement this document without reading 
and implementing large parts of RFC 4492.

When a "base document" of some protocol or feature has IPR
disclosures, it hasn't been common to submit IPR disclosures for
"extension documents" or features (which also require implementing the
base protocol/feature), unless the extension itself has some new IPRs.

For example, the SIP base protocol (RFC 3261) has an IPR disclosure, 
but when doing an IPR disclosure search for some SIP extension (say,
draft-vanelburg-sipping-served-user) on the IETF page, you get only
IPR disclosures specific to that extension. Perhaps adding a
"recursive IPR disclosure search" feature would be useful, though.

Given this, I don't find the situation at all similar to TLS-Authz;
the necessary IPR disclosures have been filed. Certicom has also
promised to update the licensing statement (which is not required
by BCP79) to make it clearer that it applies to this document as 
well. 

Non-patended (non-ECC-based) alternatives were discussed in the 
WG, and a document specifying them (TLS cipher suites that use 
non-ECC key exchange with GCM mode), draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm,  
was approved on the same day as this document.

Best regards,
Pasi 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: tls-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of ext Dean Anderson
> Sent: 25 June, 2008 21:54
> To: The IESG
> Cc: rms@gnu.org; tls chair; Internet Architecture Board; tls 
> mailing list; IETF-Announce; RFC Editor
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Document Action: 'TLS Elliptic Curve 
> Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' 
> to Informational RFC
> 
> Gentle people,
> 
> I can find no patent disclosures on this document listed on 
> the IETF IPR 
> search page at https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/ using 
> draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac as the I-D Filename.
> 
> Elliptic curve cryptography is a heavilly patented area, and it seems 
> impossible that this draft does not involve an existing patent.
> 
> I also seemed to have missed the discussion of non-patented 
> alternatives, as required by RFC3979.
> 
> Surely the IESG would not approve a document AGAIN that did 
> not disclose 
> its patent status in violation of RFC3979 et al!?!   
> 
> I have to object to the approval of this draft on those grounds.  I am
> very concerned that the IESG would not be more circumspect and careful
> in light of the previous TLS-Authz scandal. See
> http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/Housley/index.html
> http://www.av8.net/IETF-watch/People/TimPolk/index.html 
> for more information about TLS-Authz.
> 
> 		--Dean
> 
> 
> On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, The IESG wrote:
> 
> > The IESG has approved the following document:
> > 
> > - 'TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois 
> >    Counter Mode '
> >    <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt> as an Informational RFC
> > 
> > This document is the product of the Transport Layer 
> Security Working 
> > Group. 
> > 
> > The IESG contact persons are Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk.
> > 
> > A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-07.txt
> > 
> > Technical Summary
> > 
> >    This document describes new ECC cipher suites for TLS which
> >    specify stronger MAC algorithms. Eight use HMAC with SHA-256 or
> >    SHA-384 and eight use AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
> > 
> > Working Group Summary
> > 
> >    This document is a product of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
> >    Working Group. The document represents the consensus of the TLS
> >    working group.
> > 
> > Document Quality
> > 
> >    There has been significant review of the document by members of
> >    the TLS working group on the document and changes were made to
> >    improve the document based on these reviews.
> > 
> > Personnel
> > 
> >    The Document Shepherd for this document is Joseph 
> Salowey, and the
> >    responsible Area Director is Pasi Eronen.
> > 
> > RFC Editor Note
> > 
> >    In document title, expand "GCM" to "Galois Counter Mode (GCM)"
> > 
> >    Abstract:
> >    OLD:
> >       However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their MAC
> >       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
> >       for TLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.
> >    NEW:
> >       However, all those cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
> >       algorithm.  This document describes sixteen new cipher suites
> >       for TLS which specify stronger MAC algorithms.
> > 
> >    Section 3.1
> >    OLD:
> >       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
> >       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in 
> "_SHA" in place
> >       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF
> >       algorithms.
> >    NEW:
> >       These eight cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
> >       cipher suites in RFC 4492 (with names ending in 
> "_SHA" in place
> >       of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the MAC and PRF
> >       algorithms.
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > 
> > 
> 
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