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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Aloha!

Hilarie Orman wrote:
> An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge
> data/send data".

No, they are not. The Cortex M0+ is aimed at these kinds of very simple
systems that runs for many years on a single battery.

Look at the STM32L0 series from ST for example. These devices can run on
energy harvesting and very tiny physically and very, very cheap (ten-ish
cents in high volume):

http://www.st.com/content/st_com/en/products/microcontrollers/stm32-32-bit-arm-cortex-mcus/stm32l0-series.html?querycriteria=productId=SS1817

The STM32L021 has an AES-128 core. Not very fast (200+ cycles), but
several times faster than SW. You can also run the AES core wile the CPU
core is in power save mode.

Another example is the Zero Gecko from Silicon Labs. Same price range, a
huge number of power modes. And an AES core that is really fast. 50+
cycles for AES-128, which basically means 4 cycles/round (which implies
4 S-boxes)

https://www.silabs.com/products/mcu/32-bit/efm32-zero-gecko/pages/efm32-zero-gecko.aspx

Pre-shared key is whats easiest. But I've implemented Curve25519 for key
exchange on the STM32 device and can achieve <1 sec performance with
about 1 kByte RAM and 8 kByte code. I'm sure Peter Schwabe has some much
better results.


Yes, you can limit yourself to an 8-bit MCU and shave off some cents and
a little bit of power. But for most applications I see, a Cortex M0+
meets technical and commercial requirements too.

- -- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
========================================================================
 Joachim Strömbergson          Secworks AB          joachim@secworks.se
========================================================================
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 -> TLS 2.0?
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> On Aug 31, 2016, at 10:01 PM, Eric Mill <eric@konklone.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> FWIW, I've definitely seen real-world confusion about SSLv3 being a =
more recent protocol than TLS 1.X, by organizations that should know =
better. If there's interest and consensus, this could be a good =
opportunity to reset the situation with TLS/2 or TLS 4.0.=20
>=20
> I like TLS/2 aesthetically, and represents a similar level of =
progress/reset that HTTP saw when it jumped from 1.1 to /2.
>=20
> -- Eric

If it was called TLS/2, I suspect most people would still view it as TLS =
2.0 - personally I see the <protocol>/<version> naming scheme as more of =
a aesthetic choice than something that meaningfully impacts perception.

The mistakes that were made that set up the potential confusion between =
SSL 2 and TLS 2 were made long ago, and are likely beyond correction at =
this point. While we could go with TLS 3.4 (to match the version on the =
wire), or TLS 4.0 (to jump past the SSL versions), I agree with those =
that stated that it would cause additional confusion. And there=E2=80=99s =
more than enough confusion out there thanks to SSL vs. TLS, no need to =
further complicate matters.

As for moving from TLS 1.3 to TLS 2.0 - this is something that will have =
to be dealt with at some point. Calling this version 2.0 was debated =
quite some time ago, and as I recall, the consensus then was to go with =
1.3 and keep the changes minimal, saving 2.0 for a later, larger set of =
changes. Looking at the current version of the draft, calling this 2.0 =
seems fitting to me - as the changes have been fairly significant, not =
the overhaul that some wanted, but still significant.

Personally, I don=E2=80=99t think what we call it actually has that much =
impact though - calling it 2.0 could cause some to jump on it quicker, =
could cause those that are highly risk-adverse to delay it, I doubt =
either of these groups would be large enough to have an impact. It=E2=80=99=
s still a new version, and will be treated the same as new versions were =
in the past, no matter what we call it.

Overall, I=E2=80=99m indifferent on calling it 2.0, generally against =
/2, 3.4, 4.0, etc. and perfectly fine leaving it as 1.3.

--=20
Adam Caudill
adam@adamcaudill.com
http://adamcaudill.com/


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On Wednesday, 31 August 2016 11:23:11 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 31, 2016 at 11:14 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Current draft has the following text in it:
> >     If any of these checks fail, the server MUST NOT respond
> >     with the extension and must discard all the remaining first
> >     flight data (thus falling back to 1-RTT). If the client attempts
> >     a 0-RTT handshake but the server rejects it, it will generally
> >     not have the 0-RTT record protection keys and must instead
> >     trial decrypt each record with the 1-RTT handshake keys
> >     until it finds one that decrypts properly, and then pick up
> >     the handshake from that point.
> >=20
> > My understanding of that, in case client does 0-RTT but server rejects =
it
> > (because the PSK is too old or its time is different enough) is that the
> > server needs to keep on reading arbitrarily large amounts of data it has
> > no
> > idea what to do with
> >=20
> > Why is there no limit on the amount of data that can be encrypted using
> > PSK keys (0-RTT)?
>=20
> I don't think this would usefully improve things.

there's also second angle:

I'm afraid that requiring the server to keep the connection open for=20
essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage data is not=
=20
unlike the Apache slowloris attack.
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 05:48:02 -0700
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Wednesday, 31 August 2016 11:23:11 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 31, 2016 at 11:14 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
> wrote:
> > > Current draft has the following text in it:
> > >     If any of these checks fail, the server MUST NOT respond
> > >     with the extension and must discard all the remaining first
> > >     flight data (thus falling back to 1-RTT). If the client attempts
> > >     a 0-RTT handshake but the server rejects it, it will generally
> > >     not have the 0-RTT record protection keys and must instead
> > >     trial decrypt each record with the 1-RTT handshake keys
> > >     until it finds one that decrypts properly, and then pick up
> > >     the handshake from that point.
> > >
> > > My understanding of that, in case client does 0-RTT but server reject=
s
> it
> > > (because the PSK is too old or its time is different enough) is that
> the
> > > server needs to keep on reading arbitrarily large amounts of data it
> has
> > > no
> > > idea what to do with
> > >
> > > Why is there no limit on the amount of data that can be encrypted usi=
ng
> > > PSK keys (0-RTT)?
> >
> > I don't think this would usefully improve things.
>
> there's also second angle:
>
> I'm afraid that requiring the server to keep the connection open for
> essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage data is no=
t
> unlike the Apache slowloris attack.
>

It's not required to. It can close the connection at any time.

-Ekr

--
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Wedne=
sday, 31 August 2016 11:23:11 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Wed, Aug 31, 2016 at 11:14 AM, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:h=
kario@redhat.com">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; Current draft has the following text in it:<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0If any of these checks fail, the server MUST N=
OT respond<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0with the extension and must discard all the re=
maining first<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0flight data (thus falling back to 1-RTT). If t=
he client attempts<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0a 0-RTT handshake but the server rejects it, i=
t will generally<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0not have the 0-RTT record protection keys and =
must instead<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0trial decrypt each record with the 1-RTT hands=
hake keys<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0until it finds one that decrypts properly, and=
 then pick up<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the handshake from that point.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; My understanding of that, in case client does 0-RTT but server re=
jects it<br>
&gt; &gt; (because the PSK is too old or its time is different enough) is t=
hat the<br>
&gt; &gt; server needs to keep on reading arbitrarily large amounts of data=
 it has<br>
&gt; &gt; no<br>
&gt; &gt; idea what to do with<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt; Why is there no limit on the amount of da=
ta that can be encrypted using<br>
&gt; &gt; PSK keys (0-RTT)?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I don&#39;t think this would usefully improve things.<br>
<br>
</span>there&#39;s also second angle:<br>
<br>
I&#39;m afraid that requiring the server to keep the connection open for<br=
>
essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage data is not<=
br>
unlike the Apache slowloris attack.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It&=
#39;s not required to. It can close the connection at any time.</div><div><=
br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</d=
iv></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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On Thursday, 1 September 2016 05:48:02 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Wednesday, 31 August 2016 11:23:11 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > On Wed, Aug 31, 2016 at 11:14 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
> >=20
> > wrote:
> > > > Current draft has the following text in it:
> > > >     If any of these checks fail, the server MUST NOT respond
> > > >     with the extension and must discard all the remaining first
> > > >     flight data (thus falling back to 1-RTT). If the client attempts
> > > >     a 0-RTT handshake but the server rejects it, it will generally
> > > >     not have the 0-RTT record protection keys and must instead
> > > >     trial decrypt each record with the 1-RTT handshake keys
> > > >     until it finds one that decrypts properly, and then pick up
> > > >     the handshake from that point.
> > > >=20
> > > > My understanding of that, in case client does 0-RTT but server reje=
cts
> >=20
> > it
> >=20
> > > > (because the PSK is too old or its time is different enough) is that
> >=20
> > the
> >=20
> > > > server needs to keep on reading arbitrarily large amounts of data it
> >=20
> > has
> >=20
> > > > no
> > > > idea what to do with
> > > >=20
> > > > Why is there no limit on the amount of data that can be encrypted
> > > > using
> > > > PSK keys (0-RTT)?
> > >=20
> > > I don't think this would usefully improve things.
> >=20
> > there's also second angle:
> >=20
> > I'm afraid that requiring the server to keep the connection open for
> > essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage data is =
not
> > unlike the Apache slowloris attack.
>=20
> It's not required to. It can close the connection at any time.

Then how about making it explicit by including following paragraph:

    To protect against denial of service attacks, servers MAY close the=20
    connection at any point when processing records with
    trial decryption, but SHOULD process at least four records before doing=
=20
    so. This is so that server can find the second Finished message in case=
=20
    client sent just one record of Application Data.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 05:48:02AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > I'm afraid that requiring the server to keep the connection open for
> > essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage data is not
> > unlike the Apache slowloris attack.
> 
> It's not required to. It can close the connection at any time.

Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
early_data extension?


-Ilari


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 06:45:29 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBMUA8tzsPr_6pC6kRzhPifxuz4YjSRo1KB2V52SiGWstw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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--001a114d85ceba6c11053b726fa0
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 05:48:02AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > I'm afraid that requiring the server to keep the connection open for
> > > essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage data is
> not
> > > unlike the Apache slowloris attack.
> >
> > It's not required to. It can close the connection at any time.
>
> Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
> Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
> early_data extension?
>

I thought that was implicit, but i'd take a PR that did that.

-Ekr


>
> -Ilari
>

--001a114d85ceba6c11053b726fa0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara=
@welho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"">On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 05:48:02AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hka=
rio@redhat.com">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt; I&#39;m afraid that requiring the server =
to keep the connection open for<br>
&gt; &gt; essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage da=
ta is not<br>
&gt; &gt; unlike the Apache slowloris attack.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It&#39;s not required to. It can close the connection at any time.<br>
<br>
</span>Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send<=
br>
Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without<br>
early_data extension?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I thought that wa=
s implicit, but i&#39;d take a PR that did that.</div><div><br></div><div>-=
Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a114d85ceba6c11053b726fa0--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 01 Sep 2016 14:29:00 +0000
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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--94eb2c196fb896904b053b730916
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 05:48:02AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>> > >
>> > > I'm afraid that requiring the server to keep the connection open for
>> > > essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage data
>> is not
>> > > unlike the Apache slowloris attack.
>> >
>> > It's not required to. It can close the connection at any time.
>>
>> Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
>> Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
>> early_data extension?
>>
>
> I thought that was implicit, but i'd take a PR that did that.
>

(s/EncryptedExtensions/ServerHello/, but whatever.)

At this point the client must do much more than cut transfer anyway. It
probably should be phrased as starting over and retrying or so. Everything
sent has been rejected and all you thought you knew about the connection
may have changed, like ALPN. At sufficiently high layers, you should
probably just pretend you got a fresh connection and are repeating the
request (or whatever) from scratch.

In the general case, you may even need to bounce to a new connection.
Consider if our session was established with h2, we try to 0-RTT-resume it,
send 20 replayable HTTP requests across it... and only then to hear from
server, "Nope, no 0-RTT for you, try again. Oh, by the way, we're talking
http/1.1 now." At least 19 of those 20 requests must get fresh connections
anyway.

David

--94eb2c196fb896904b053b730916
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 1,=
 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtf=
m.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1, 201=
6 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilari=
liusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at =
05:48:02AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:31 AM, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hka=
rio@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
</span><span>&gt; &gt; I&#39;m afraid that requiring the server to keep the=
 connection open for<br>
&gt; &gt; essentially arbitrary amount of time while it consumes garbage da=
ta is not<br>
&gt; &gt; unlike the Apache slowloris attack.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It&#39;s not required to. It can close the connection at any time.<br>
<br>
</span>Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send<=
br>
Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without<br>
early_data extension?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>I t=
hought that was implicit, but i&#39;d take a PR that did that.</div></div><=
/div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>(s/EncryptedExtensions/ServerHe=
llo/, but whatever.)=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>At this point the clien=
t must do much more than cut transfer anyway. It probably should be phrased=
 as starting over and retrying or so. Everything sent has been rejected and=
 all you thought you knew about the connection may have changed, like ALPN.=
 At sufficiently high layers, you should probably just pretend you got a fr=
esh connection and are repeating the request (or whatever) from scratch.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>In the general case, you may even need to bounce to =
a new connection. Consider if our session was established with h2, we try t=
o 0-RTT-resume it, send 20 replayable HTTP requests across it... and only t=
hen to hear from server, &quot;Nope, no 0-RTT for you, try again. Oh, by th=
e way, we&#39;re talking http/1.1 now.&quot; At least 19 of those 20 reques=
ts must get fresh connections anyway.</div><div><br></div><div>David</div><=
/div></div>

--94eb2c196fb896904b053b730916--


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Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 18:22:03 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Message-ID: <20160901152203.hivko6qm2jdguqc6@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:29:00PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> >>
> >> Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
> >> Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
> >> early_data extension?
> >>
> >
> > I thought that was implicit, but i'd take a PR that did that.
> >
> 
> (s/EncryptedExtensions/ServerHello/, but whatever.)

According to the table it is EncryptedExtensions (but there have been
errors in it before)...
 
> At this point the client must do much more than cut transfer anyway. It
> probably should be phrased as starting over and retrying or so. Everything
> sent has been rejected and all you thought you knew about the connection
> may have changed, like ALPN. At sufficiently high layers, you should
> probably just pretend you got a fresh connection and are repeating the
> request (or whatever) from scratch.

So server is supposed to continue on 0-RTT fail, but not client?


-Ilari


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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 11:31:18 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 -> TLS 2.0?
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On Thursday, September 01, 2016 02:05:25 am Judson Wilson wrote:
> > I like TLS/2 aesthetically, and represents a similar level of
> > progress/reset that HTTP saw when it jumped from 1.1 to /2.
> 
> What is the slash in the name all about? Is it simply playing off the HTTP
> start line specification? Does it have any relevance to TLS?

Did this slash form start with HTTP/2, or was there some other progenitor? Why did they go with that, anyway? I just find it to be a weird choice. If we actually have a consensus that it'd be better to go with TLS/2 than TLS 2.0, officially, I'd only be ok with it if someone can actually explain why. :|


Dave


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 08:25:11 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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--001a1141826a42d6c6053b73d48b
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 8:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:29:00PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > >>
> > >> Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
> > >> Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
> > >> early_data extension?
> > >>
> > >
> > > I thought that was implicit, but i'd take a PR that did that.
> > >
> >
> > (s/EncryptedExtensions/ServerHello/, but whatever.)
>
> According to the table it is EncryptedExtensions (but there have been
> errors in it before)...
>

It goes in EE, because it should be encrypted.


> At this point the client must do much more than cut transfer anyway. It
> > probably should be phrased as starting over and retrying or so.
> Everything
> > sent has been rejected and all you thought you knew about the connection
> > may have changed, like ALPN. At sufficiently high layers, you should
> > probably just pretend you got a fresh connection and are repeating the
> > request (or whatever) from scratch.
>
> So server is supposed to continue on 0-RTT fail, but not client?


There are plenty of scenarios where the client can continue. For instance,
if the server has forgotten the ticket but is otherwise unchanged.

-Ekr


>
> -Ilari
>

--001a1141826a42d6c6053b73d48b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 8:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara=
@welho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"">On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:29:00PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:<br=
>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ek=
r@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt;&gt; Should there be recommendation for cl=
ients to cut transfer and send<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;&gt; early_data extension?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I thought that was implicit, but i&#39;d take a PR that did that.=
<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (s/EncryptedExtensions/<wbr>ServerHello/, but whatever.)<br>
<br>
</span>According to the table it is EncryptedExtensions (but there have bee=
n<br>
errors in it before)...<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It goes in EE, =
because it should be encrypted.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc s=
olid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt; At this point the client must do much more than cut transfer anyway. I=
t<br>
&gt; probably should be phrased as starting over and retrying or so. Everyt=
hing<br>
&gt; sent has been rejected and all you thought you knew about the connecti=
on<br>
&gt; may have changed, like ALPN. At sufficiently high layers, you should<b=
r>
&gt; probably just pretend you got a fresh connection and are repeating the=
<br>
&gt; request (or whatever) from scratch.<br>
<br>
</span>So server is supposed to continue on 0-RTT fail, but not client?</bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>There are plenty of scenarios where the client=
 can continue. For instance,</div><div>if the server has forgotten the tick=
et but is otherwise unchanged.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"=
#888888"><br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1141826a42d6c6053b73d48b--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 01 Sep 2016 15:46:20 +0000
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 11:25 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 8:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:29:00PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
>> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <
>> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
>> > >>
>> > >> Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
>> > >> Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
>> > >> early_data extension?
>> > >>
>> > >
>> > > I thought that was implicit, but i'd take a PR that did that.
>> > >
>> >
>> > (s/EncryptedExtensions/ServerHello/, but whatever.)
>>
>> According to the table it is EncryptedExtensions (but there have been
>> errors in it before)...
>>
>
> It goes in EE, because it should be encrypted.
>

Hrm. Most of the text currently says ServerHello, except for the table
which says EncryptedExtensions.

ServerHello:
https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.4.2.6
https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.2.3

EncryptedExtensions:
https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.10

I'm a little wary of putting something that tells you the handshake "shape"
in EncryptedExtensions. Accepting early_data comes with a host of
constraints  the client must enforce like ALPN not being allowed to change,
etc. But I think all the current constraints are with EncryptedExtensions,
so maybe it's fine?

(The failure mode for getting this wrong is a risk of serious
implementation complexity and bugs, similar to why client
EncryptedExtensions was a problem. E.g. if ALPN were in SH but early_data
in EE , there would be a window of time where we have a new ALPN but aren't
sure if it's a 0-RTT reject or fatal error. It makes things a mess.)


> > At this point the client must do much more than cut transfer anyway. It
>> > probably should be phrased as starting over and retrying or so.
>> Everything
>> > sent has been rejected and all you thought you knew about the connection
>> > may have changed, like ALPN. At sufficiently high layers, you should
>> > probably just pretend you got a fresh connection and are repeating the
>> > request (or whatever) from scratch.
>>
>> So server is supposed to continue on 0-RTT fail, but not client?
>
>
> There are plenty of scenarios where the client can continue. For instance,
> if the server has forgotten the ticket but is otherwise unchanged.
>

Right, I mean it's a logical starting over. I imagine most cases one can
keep affinity with the old transport socket just fine, but data does likely
need to be reset. (Although in some cases you can't.)

David


> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>> -Ilari
>>
>
>

--001a113f6d5e21c21b053b741e21
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 1,=
 2016 at 11:25 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtf=
m.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1, 201=
6 at 8:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilari=
liusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at =
02:29:00PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ek=
r@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</=
a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
</span><span>&gt; &gt;&gt; Should there be recommendation for clients to cu=
t transfer and send<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;&gt; early_data extension?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I thought that was implicit, but i&#39;d take a PR that did that.=
<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (s/EncryptedExtensions/ServerHello/, but whatever.)<br>
<br>
</span>According to the table it is EncryptedExtensions (but there have bee=
n<br>
errors in it before)...<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>I=
t goes in EE, because it should be encrypted.</div></div></div></div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>Hrm. Most of the text currently says ServerHello=
, except for the table which says EncryptedExtensions.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>ServerHello:</div><div><a href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#=
rfc.section.4.2.6">https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.4.2.6</a=
><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.=
2.3">https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.2.3</a><br></div><div>=
<br></div><div>EncryptedExtensions:</div><div><a href=3D"https://tlswg.gith=
ub.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.10">https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.s=
ection.10</a></div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m a little wary of putting som=
ething that tells you the handshake &quot;shape&quot; in EncryptedExtension=
s. Accepting early_data comes with a host of constraints =C2=A0the client m=
ust enforce like ALPN not being allowed to change, etc. But I think all the=
 current constraints are with EncryptedExtensions, so maybe it&#39;s fine?<=
/div><div><br></div><div>(The failure mode for getting this wrong is a risk=
 of serious implementation complexity and bugs, similar to why client Encry=
ptedExtensions was a problem. E.g. if ALPN were in SH but early_data in EE =
, there would be a window of time where we have a new ALPN but aren&#39;t s=
ure if it&#39;s a 0-RTT reject or fatal error. It makes things a mess.)<br>=
</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex"><span>
&gt; At this point the client must do much more than cut transfer anyway. I=
t<br>
&gt; probably should be phrased as starting over and retrying or so. Everyt=
hing<br>
&gt; sent has been rejected and all you thought you knew about the connecti=
on<br>
&gt; may have changed, like ALPN. At sufficiently high layers, you should<b=
r>
&gt; probably just pretend you got a fresh connection and are repeating the=
<br>
&gt; request (or whatever) from scratch.<br>
<br>
</span>So server is supposed to continue on 0-RTT fail, but not client?</bl=
ockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>There are plenty of scenarios wh=
ere the client can continue. For instance,</div><div>if the server has forg=
otten the ticket but is otherwise unchanged.</div></div></div></div></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>Right, I mean it&#39;s a logical starting over. I=
 imagine most cases one can keep affinity with the old transport socket jus=
t fine, but data does likely need to be reset. (Although in some cases you =
can&#39;t.)</div><div><br></div><div>David</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x"><span class=3D"m_4380997135185995177HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>

--001a113f6d5e21c21b053b741e21--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 -> TLS 2.0?
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> On 1 Sep 2016, at 6:31 PM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Thursday, September 01, 2016 02:05:25 am Judson Wilson wrote:
>>> I like TLS/2 aesthetically, and represents a similar level of
>>> progress/reset that HTTP saw when it jumped from 1.1 to /2.
>>=20
>> What is the slash in the name all about? Is it simply playing off the =
HTTP
>> start line specification? Does it have any relevance to TLS?
>=20
> Did this slash form start with HTTP/2, or was there some other =
progenitor? Why did they go with that, anyway? I just find it to be a =
weird choice. If we actually have a consensus that it'd be better to go =
with TLS/2 than TLS 2.0, officially, I'd only be ok with it if someone =
can actually explain why. :|

HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 had these strings as part of the on-the-wire =
format:

   GET / HTTP/1.1

The slash rather than a space makes it easier to parse with strtok(), I =
guess.

HTTP/2 is more binary so there is no =E2=80=9CHTTP/2=E2=80=9D string =
inside, but the name kept the format.

Yoav



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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 09:01:27 -0700
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] 0-RTT encrypted data limits
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 8:46 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 11:25 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 8:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:29:00PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
>>> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <
>>> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
>>> > >> Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
>>> > >> early_data extension?
>>> > >>
>>> > >
>>> > > I thought that was implicit, but i'd take a PR that did that.
>>> > >
>>> >
>>> > (s/EncryptedExtensions/ServerHello/, but whatever.)
>>>
>>> According to the table it is EncryptedExtensions (but there have been
>>> errors in it before)...
>>>
>>
>> It goes in EE, because it should be encrypted.
>>
>
> Hrm. Most of the text currently says ServerHello, except for the table
> which says EncryptedExtensions.
>
> ServerHello:
> https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.4.2.6
> https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.2.3
>
> EncryptedExtensions:
> https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.10
>
> I'm a little wary of putting something that tells you the handshake
> "shape" in EncryptedExtensions. Accepting early_data comes with a host of
> constraints  the client must enforce like ALPN not being allowed to change,
> etc. But I think all the current constraints are with EncryptedExtensions,
> so maybe it's fine?
>

ALPN is also in EE. My general principle was that only things that were
required
to decrypt the handshake messages should be in SH. Arguably, btw, this means
that Server.signature_algorithms should be in EE, but I chickened out.

-Ekr




> > At this point the client must do much more than cut transfer anyway. It
>>> > probably should be phrased as starting over and retrying or so.
>>> Everything
>>> > sent has been rejected and all you thought you knew about the
>>> connection
>>> > may have changed, like ALPN. At sufficiently high layers, you should
>>> > probably just pretend you got a fresh connection and are repeating the
>>> > request (or whatever) from scratch.
>>>
>>> So server is supposed to continue on 0-RTT fail, but not client?
>>
>>
>> There are plenty of scenarios where the client can continue. For instance,
>> if the server has forgotten the ticket but is otherwise unchanged.
>>
>
> Right, I mean it's a logical starting over. I imagine most cases one can
> keep affinity with the old transport socket just fine, but data does likely
> need to be reset. (Although in some cases you can't.)
>
> David
>
>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>>
>>> -Ilari
>>>
>>
>>

--001a114d85ceee9dc1053b7455dd
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 8:46 AM, David Benjamin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.=
org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep =
1, 2016 at 11:25 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 8:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@w=
elho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>On=
 Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:29:00PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:01 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ek=
r@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</=
a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
</span><span>&gt; &gt;&gt; Should there be recommendation for clients to cu=
t transfer and send<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;&gt; early_data extension?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I thought that was implicit, but i&#39;d take a PR that did that.=
<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (s/EncryptedExtensions/<wbr>ServerHello/, but whatever.)<br>
<br>
</span>According to the table it is EncryptedExtensions (but there have bee=
n<br>
errors in it before)...<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>I=
t goes in EE, because it should be encrypted.</div></div></div></div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div></span><div>Hrm. Most of the text currently says Serv=
erHello, except for the table which says EncryptedExtensions.</div><div><br=
></div><div>ServerHello:</div><div><a href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13=
-spec/#rfc.section.4.2.6" target=3D"_blank">https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-<=
wbr>spec/#rfc.section.4.2.6</a><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://tlswg.gith=
ub.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.2.3" target=3D"_blank">https://tlswg.github.i=
o/tls13-<wbr>spec/#rfc.section.2.3</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Encrypt=
edExtensions:</div><div><a href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.=
section.10" target=3D"_blank">https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-<wbr>spec/#rfc.=
section.10</a></div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m a little wary of putting so=
mething that tells you the handshake &quot;shape&quot; in EncryptedExtensio=
ns. Accepting early_data comes with a host of constraints =C2=A0the client =
must enforce like ALPN not being allowed to change, etc. But I think all th=
e current constraints are with EncryptedExtensions, so maybe it&#39;s fine?=
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>ALPN is also in EE. My g=
eneral principle was that only things that were required</div><div>to decry=
pt the handshake messages should be in SH. Arguably, btw, this means</div><=
div>that Server.signature_algorithms should be in EE, but I chickened out.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><span class=3D""><div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex"><span>
&gt; At this point the client must do much more than cut transfer anyway. I=
t<br>
&gt; probably should be phrased as starting over and retrying or so. Everyt=
hing<br>
&gt; sent has been rejected and all you thought you knew about the connecti=
on<br>
&gt; may have changed, like ALPN. At sufficiently high layers, you should<b=
r>
&gt; probably just pretend you got a fresh connection and are repeating the=
<br>
&gt; request (or whatever) from scratch.<br>
<br>
</span>So server is supposed to continue on 0-RTT fail, but not client?</bl=
ockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>There are plenty of scenarios wh=
ere the client can continue. For instance,</div><div>if the server has forg=
otten the ticket but is otherwise unchanged.</div></div></div></div></block=
quote><div><br></div></span><div>Right, I mean it&#39;s a logical starting =
over. I imagine most cases one can keep affinity with the old transport soc=
ket just fine, but data does likely need to be reset. (Although in some cas=
es you can&#39;t.)</div><div><br></div><div>David</div><div>=C2=A0</div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><di=
v class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex"><span><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a114d85ceee9dc1053b7455dd--


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 01 Sep 2016 18:07:50 +0200
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Subject: [TLS] TLSv1.2 connection renegotiation to TLSv1.3
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I didn't notice in the -15 draft anything explicitly prohibiting sending a=
=20
TLSv1.3 Client Hello inside established TLSv1.x connection (where x < 3).

Is this something that the protocol should allow? If yes, renegotiation_inf=
o=20
extension status would probably need to be updated. If not, then I think th=
e=20
document should be a bit more explicit about it.
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]     3DES diediedie
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joachim@secworks.se writes:

>  Aloha!

Aloha auinala.

>  Hilarie Orman wrote:
>  > An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge
>  > data/send data".

>  No, they are not. The Cortex M0+ is aimed at these kinds of very simple
>  systems that runs for many years on a single battery.

>  Look at the STM32L0 series from ST for example. These devices can run on
>  energy harvesting and very tiny physically and very, very cheap (ten-ish
>  cents in high volume):

>  http://www.st.com/content/st_com/en/products/microcontrollers/stm32-32-bit-arm-cortex-mcus/stm32l0-series.html?querycriteria=productId=SS1817

>  The STM32L021 has an AES-128 core. Not very fast (200+ cycles), but
>  several times faster than SW. You can also run the AES core wile the CPU
>  core is in power save mode.

>  Another example is the Zero Gecko from Silicon Labs. Same price range, a
>  huge number of power modes. And an AES core that is really fast. 50+
>  cycles for AES-128, which basically means 4 cycles/round (which implies
>  4 S-boxes)

>  https://www.silabs.com/products/mcu/32-bit/efm32-zero-gecko/pages/efm32-zero-gecko.aspx

For devices you refer to, how many AES blocks can they encrypt on a AA
battery, assuming that the usage is to encrypt one block every 10 minutes?

Hilarie


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 09:19:46 -0700
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This should be prohibited. A PR for this would be welcome.

-Ekr


On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 9:07 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> I didn't notice in the -15 draft anything explicitly prohibiting sending =
a
> TLSv1.3 Client Hello inside established TLSv1.x connection (where x < 3).
>
> Is this something that the protocol should allow? If yes,
> renegotiation_info
> extension status would probably need to be updated. If not, then I think
> the
> document should be a bit more explicit about it.
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">This should be prohibited. A PR for this would be welcome.=
<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 9:07 AM, Hubert Kario <span di=
r=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario=
@redhat.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I didn&=
#39;t notice in the -15 draft anything explicitly prohibiting sending a<br>
TLSv1.3 Client Hello inside established TLSv1.x connection (where x &lt; 3)=
.<br>
<br>
Is this something that the protocol should allow? If yes, renegotiation_inf=
o<br>
extension status would probably need to be updated. If not, then I think th=
e<br>
document should be a bit more explicit about it.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</f=
ont></span><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--94eb2c0779ce7cc801053b74977d--


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On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 09:01:27AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >
> 
> ALPN is also in EE. My general principle was that only things that were
> required
> to decrypt the handshake messages should be in SH. Arguably, btw, this means
> that Server.signature_algorithms should be in EE, but I chickened out.

What the server.signature_algorithms is about BTW? To me, it looks like
a footgun if used outside PSK mode (anonymous connections?) and not
expressive enough (what are the semantics of authentication?) if used
with PSK mode.



-Ilari


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done:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/614

On Thursday, 1 September 2016 09:19:46 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> This should be prohibited. A PR for this would be welcome.
>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 9:07 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > I didn't notice in the -15 draft anything explicitly prohibiting sendin=
g a
> > TLSv1.3 Client Hello inside established TLSv1.x connection (where x < 3=
).
> >=20
> > Is this something that the protocol should allow? If yes,
> > renegotiation_info
> > extension status would probably need to be updated. If not, then I think
> > the
> > document should be a bit more explicit about it.
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Hubert Kario
> > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't TLSv1.3=
=20
include signatures with those hashes then?

I think at least the following signature algorithms should be added:
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha3_256
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha3_384
ecdsa_secp521r1_sha3_512

rsa_pss_sha3_256
rsa_pss_sha3_384
rsa_pss_sha3_512

 1 - https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-19181/
announcing-approval-of-federal-information-processing-standard-fips-202-sha=
=2D3-
standard
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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On 09/01/2016 12:38 PM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't TLSv1.3 
> include signatures with those hashes then?

Why does it need to be part of the core spec instead of a separate document?

>  1 - https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-19181/
> announcing-approval-of-federal-information-processing-standard-fips-202-sha-3-
> standard
>

I think we generally end up with a RFC specifying how to use them in
IETF protocols and then cite the RFC instead of the NIST publication
directly.

-Ben

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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    On 09/01/2016 12:38 PM, Hubert Kario wrote:<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:7755682.Cma8FBTrvx@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't TLSv1.3 
include signatures with those hashes then?
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Why does it need to be part of the core spec instead of a separate
    document?<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:7755682.Cma8FBTrvx@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap=""> 1 - <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-19181/">https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-19181/</a>
announcing-approval-of-federal-information-processing-standard-fips-202-sha-3-
standard
</pre>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I think we generally end up with a RFC specifying how to use them in
    IETF protocols and then cite the RFC instead of the NIST publication
    directly.<br>
    <br>
    -Ben<br>
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From nobody Thu Sep  1 10:57:34 2016
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Aloha!

Hilarie Orman wrote:
> For devices you refer to, how many AES blocks can they encrypt on a
> AA battery, assuming that the usage is to encrypt one block every 10
> minutes?

That is actually a very interesting, but hard question to answer. Will
the MCU be doing anything else in between? What kind of I/O will the
resulting block be sent over? The AES core itself can be switched off
from power on a single cycle

What I have seen is projects where one of those devices are being used
to send data at about that rate (AES-CTR encrypted) powered by a small
cell battery with a lifespan of at least 8 years. It does very little in
between though. Rough calculation gives 420k events, but each message
generated by an event is larger than a single AES block.

One thing to note is that 8-bit MCUs are commonly manufactured in older
chip processes with bigger transistors and power hungry I/Os, less power
modes than these newer ARM devices.

- -- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
========================================================================
 Joachim Strömbergson          Secworks AB          joachim@secworks.se
========================================================================
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Thursday, 1 September 2016 12:43:31 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On 09/01/2016 12:38 PM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't TLSv=
1.3
> > include signatures with those hashes then?
>=20
> Why does it need to be part of the core spec instead of a separate docume=
nt?

because: we also are adding RSA-PSS to TLSv1.2 in this document,
I don't see why it needs to be delayed. Finally, TLSv1.2 added SHA-2 just l=
ike=20
that, it was not tacked on later.

Note that I do not suggest that implementation of SHA-3 signature algorithm=
s=20
should be recommended, let alone mandatory for TLSv1.3, just that the stand=
ard=20
include the codepoints.

> >  1 - https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-19181/
> >=20
> > announcing-approval-of-federal-information-processing-standard-fips-202=
=2Dsh
> > a-3- standard
>=20
> I think we generally end up with a RFC specifying how to use them in
> IETF protocols and then cite the RFC instead of the NIST publication
> directly.

I would see that as necessary for RSASSA-PKCS1_v1.5, as it needs the values=
=20
for hash info, but neither ECDSA nor RSASSA-PSS require them. I think that =
RFC=20
3447 is enough to implement RSASSA-PSS with SHA-3.

Also, is see RFC 5246 referencing the NIST publication directly, not the RF=
C=20
4634...

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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Cc: "David McGrew \(mcgrew\)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 5:00 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

>
> we have enough problems weeding out implementation mistakes in TLS, we
> don't
> need yet another protocol and two dozen implementations that come with it
>

Strongly agreed.

Focusing energy on getting "something" working for low-power devices is
putting the cart before the horse. Security has to be a primary objective
here, in the standards world in general and in CFRG in particular. We can
surely consider tradeoffs---more frequent key rotations, security
guarantees reduced in a well-defined way, shorter lifetimes for
credentials, etc.---but these should be explicitly chosen, not determined
after the fact based on what happened to be in our toolbox at the time.
Keeping 3DES around in a general-purpose protocol headed for
standardization in spite of the known problems with small block sizes is
almost certain to create more work in the coming years for everyone simply
to benefit implementors of systems for which security is clearly not the
primary concern.

>From following the discussion, low power crypto seems like a research area
at this point, not an implementation effort. (Of course, the flaws in
whatever ill-advised schemes get implemented will generate their own
research efforts and inevitable transitive trust problems with supposedly
more-secure systems. Alas, we haven't yet figured out a way to keep people
from generating sufficient rope to hang themselves with.)

Kyle

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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 5:00 AM, Hubert Kario <span dir=3D=
"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@red=
hat.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span class=
=3D""><br>
</span>we have enough problems weeding out implementation mistakes in TLS, =
we don&#39;t<br>
need yet another protocol and two dozen implementations that come with it<b=
r>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Strongly agreed.<br><br></div><div>Focusin=
g energy on getting &quot;something&quot; working for low-power devices is =
putting the cart before the horse. Security has to be a primary objective h=
ere, in the standards world in general and in CFRG in particular. We can su=
rely consider tradeoffs---more frequent key rotations, security guarantees =
reduced in a well-defined way, shorter lifetimes for credentials, etc.---bu=
t these should be explicitly chosen, not determined after the fact based on=
 what happened to be in our toolbox at the time. Keeping 3DES around in a g=
eneral-purpose protocol headed for standardization in spite of the known pr=
oblems with small block sizes is almost certain to create more work in the =
coming years for everyone simply to benefit implementors of systems for whi=
ch security is clearly not the primary concern.<br><br>From following the d=
iscussion, low power crypto seems like a research area at this point, not a=
n implementation effort. (Of course, the flaws in whatever ill-advised sche=
mes get implemented will generate their own research efforts and inevitable=
 transitive trust problems with supposedly more-secure systems. Alas, we ha=
ven&#39;t yet figured out a way to keep people from generating sufficient r=
ope to hang themselves with.)<br></div></div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">Kyle<br></div></div>

--001a113f3d023feac7053b76b45b--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Terminology clarification around SSL & TLS
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Hi,

>> The technology is SSL, and is sometimes also refered to as
>> SSL/TLS.
>
> please no. the technology is TLS.
+
> i would like to continue to be able to say unambiguously that all
> known versions of SSL are badly broken and should be avoided. Let's
> not muddy those waters further.
+
> Let's not use a proprietary protocol name for a standard protocol.
> Conveniently, all SSL is broken now, long live TLS!

There's still something I find confusing:  on the one hand, SSL is badly 
broken and "diediedied", it is a proprietary protocol name, and the 
consensus in the TLS WG seems to be "long live TLS" but on the other 
hand major SSL/TLS implementations keep the SSL name living.

When people look for TLS implementations, they will find OpenSSL, 
BoringSSL, LibreSSL, MatrixSSL, wolfSSL, etc.
Besides, a developer will often use "-lssl" to link against TLS libraries.

So, if the consensus is to prevent people who speak about or work on TLS 
from constantly viewing the SSL name, will forthcoming software releases 
change their name?
Otherwise, confusion keeps being sustained...

-- 
Julien ÉLIE

« En voyant le lit vide, il le devint. » (Ponson du Terrail)


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Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 15:49:42 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 -> TLS 2.0?
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+1

On Wed, Aug 31, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> I am in total agreement with Nick here.  "TLS 1.3" accurately describes what
> we're doing here, and it's consistent with our past naming scheme.
>
> There is no upside to changing away from 1.3, and as Nick notes, lots of
> potential downside.
>
> --Richard
>
> On Wednesday, August 31, 2016, Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> I am reluctant to endorse a name change from TLS 1.3 to TLS 2.0. I see a
>> few immediate issues with the proposal:
>> - it causes confusion with SSL 2.0
>> - it implies wire incompatibility with TLS 1.2
>> - it suggests there will be a forthcoming TLS 2.1 with only minor changes
>>
>> If we're dead set on bumping the major version for a mostly backwards
>> compatible protocol change, we should just drop the minor version and go
>> with TLS/2.
>>
>> Nick
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 31, 2016 at 12:24 PM Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> We could call it TLS 3.4 which would match the internal ID. :-)
>>>
>>> BTW, I think using something other than 1.3 is a good idea.
>>>
>>> Cheers - Bill
>>>
>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Bill Frantz        | When it comes to the world     | Periwinkle
>>> (408)356-8506      | around us, is there any choice | 16345 Englewood Ave
>>> www.pwpconsult.com | but to explore? - Lisa Randall | Los Gatos, CA 95032
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



-- 
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Chief Technologist, Center for Democracy & Technology [https://www.cdt.org]
1401 K ST NW STE 200, Washington DC 20005-3497
e: joe@cdt.org, p: 202.407.8825, pgp: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key
Fingerprint: 3CA2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3 4B10  1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871


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Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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I have created a PR for this at:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/611

As it seems there was rough consensus for this change, I will merge this
weekend
absent some violent objections or direction to the contrary from the chairs.

-Ekr


On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 3:06 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> Eric:
>
> > Yes, I agree separate ladders would fix this. I don't necessarily object
> to this
> > change, but I'm not sure it's that big a deal either, because you really
> only get
> > into this case when there's a big asymmetry in sending rate, so much that
> > one side wants to send multiple updates before the other side has sent
> > any data at all.
>
> I can think of many situations where one side sends a lot more data than
> the other.
>
> > Note: it's also possible to avoid the rollback problem with the existing
> > single-ladder system: when you send a key update you compute:
> >
> > traffic_secret_N+1
> > read_key_N+1
> > write_key_N+1
> >
> > You then discard traffic_secret N, write_key_N, but key read_key_N, so
> if you
> > are M updates ahead of the other side, you have M read keys outstanding,
> > but these cannot be used to produce the write keys. However, this
> probably
> > isn't simpler than just running two ladders if we think this is
> important.
>
> That seems to work.  However, I think that splitting the ladders seems to
> marry well with the many situations where one side sends a lot more than
> the other.  So, I suggest that we split the ladders.
>
> Russ
>
>

--001a114d85cefcc745053b779aa4
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I have created a PR for this at:<div><a href=3D"https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/611">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pul=
l/611</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>As it seems there was rough consensu=
s for this change, I will merge this weekend</div><div>absent some violent =
objections or direction to the contrary from the chairs.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 3:06 PM, Russ Housley <span di=
r=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" target=3D"_blank">hou=
sley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">E=
ric:<br>
<span class=3D"im HOEnZb"><br>
&gt; Yes, I agree separate ladders would fix this. I don&#39;t necessarily =
object to this<br>
&gt; change, but I&#39;m not sure it&#39;s that big a deal either, because =
you really only get<br>
&gt; into this case when there&#39;s a big asymmetry in sending rate, so mu=
ch that<br>
&gt; one side wants to send multiple updates before the other side has sent=
<br>
&gt; any data at all.<br>
<br>
</span><span class=3D"im HOEnZb">I can think of many situations where one s=
ide sends a lot more data than the other.<br>
<br>
</span><span class=3D"im HOEnZb">&gt; Note: it&#39;s also possible to avoid=
 the rollback problem with the existing<br>
&gt; single-ladder system: when you send a key update you compute:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; traffic_secret_N+1<br>
&gt; read_key_N+1<br>
&gt; write_key_N+1<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; You then discard traffic_secret N, write_key_N, but key read_key_N, so=
 if you<br>
&gt; are M updates ahead of the other side, you have M read keys outstandin=
g,<br>
&gt; but these cannot be used to produce the write keys. However, this prob=
ably<br>
&gt; isn&#39;t simpler than just running two ladders if we think this is im=
portant.<br>
<br>
</span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">That seems to work.=C2=A0 Ho=
wever, I think that splitting the ladders seems to marry well with the many=
 situations where one side sends a lot more than the other.=C2=A0 So, I sug=
gest that we split the ladders.<br>
<br>
Russ<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114d85cefcc745053b779aa4--


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On Aug 25, 2016 04:08, "Tony Arcieri" <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:

> Should there be a 3DES "diediedie"?

Strongly +1.

Makers of tiny devices with legacy chips will simply keep on using whatever
they want anyway. This is not a good reason to drag risk for everyone with
us forevermore.

Richard

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<p dir="ltr">On Aug 25, 2016 04:08, &quot;Tony Arcieri&quot; &lt;<a href="mailto:bascule@gmail.com">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</p>
<p dir="ltr">&gt; Should there be a 3DES &quot;diediedie&quot;?</p>
<p dir="ltr">Strongly +1.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Makers of tiny devices with legacy chips will simply keep on using whatever they want anyway. This is not a good reason to drag risk for everyone with us forevermore.<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">Richard</p>

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Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 00:09:52 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 12:55:29PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I have created a PR for this at:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/611
> 
> As it seems there was rough consensus for this change, I will merge this
> weekend
> absent some violent objections or direction to the contrary from the chairs.
> 
> -Ekr

I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue:

The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client
Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed after
that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic
secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished.

So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have two
overlapping client traffic secrets.

Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend
up to Client Finished would solve the issue.

Additionally:
- That would make the implementation look nicely symmetric
- Would also prevent having "not yet" keys. One can derive keys
  from present state and install them immediately.



-Ilari


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From: Keith Winstein <keithw@cs.stanford.edu>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 14:11:13 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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I think we have to oppose a change to KeyUpdate that adds P4 (bounded
write obligations) but not P3 (ability to learn that a KeyUpdate was
read by other side). These are orthogonal and easily achievable with a
pretty small tweak. Here are four options that would work for us:

1. No change to message structures. Forbid implementations from
sending an update_not_requested KeyUpdate unless it is triggered by an
update_requested KeyUpdate.

2. Add a uint8 field to KeyUpdate representing the sender's current
receive generation (lower 8 bits).

3. Keep request_update an 8-bit field (same width as it is in the PR),
and define the high bit as representing the update_requested boolean,
and the remaining bits represent the lower 7 bits of the sender's
current receive generation

4. Keep request_update an 8-bit field (same width as it is in the PR),
define the high bit as representing the update_requested boolean, and
the remaining bits represent a 7-bit opaque value that must be echoed
in the response. (If multiple update_requested KeyUpdates arrive, any
of their values can be the one that gets echoed.)

Approach 1 seems like it might be generally acceptable here, even
understanding the concerns of the list. I am happy to draft sample
text if helpful.

-Keith

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 12:55 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> I have created a PR for this at:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/611
>
> As it seems there was rough consensus for this change, I will merge this
> weekend
> absent some violent objections or direction to the contrary from the chairs.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 3:06 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>>
>> Eric:
>>
>> > Yes, I agree separate ladders would fix this. I don't necessarily object
>> > to this
>> > change, but I'm not sure it's that big a deal either, because you really
>> > only get
>> > into this case when there's a big asymmetry in sending rate, so much
>> > that
>> > one side wants to send multiple updates before the other side has sent
>> > any data at all.
>>
>> I can think of many situations where one side sends a lot more data than
>> the other.
>>
>> > Note: it's also possible to avoid the rollback problem with the existing
>> > single-ladder system: when you send a key update you compute:
>> >
>> > traffic_secret_N+1
>> > read_key_N+1
>> > write_key_N+1
>> >
>> > You then discard traffic_secret N, write_key_N, but key read_key_N, so
>> > if you
>> > are M updates ahead of the other side, you have M read keys outstanding,
>> > but these cannot be used to produce the write keys. However, this
>> > probably
>> > isn't simpler than just running two ladders if we think this is
>> > important.
>>
>> That seems to work.  However, I think that splitting the ladders seems to
>> marry well with the many situations where one side sends a lot more than the
>> other.  So, I suggest that we split the ladders.
>>
>> Russ
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 14:20:02 -0700
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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--94eb2c059d865690ad053b78c9fa
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 12:55:29PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > I have created a PR for this at:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/611
> >
> > As it seems there was rough consensus for this change, I will merge this
> > weekend
> > absent some violent objections or direction to the contrary from the
> chairs.
> >
> > -Ekr
>
> I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue:
>
> The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client
> Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed after
> that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic
> secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished.
>
> So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have two
> overlapping client traffic secrets.
>
> Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend
> up to Client Finished would solve the issue.
>

Hmm.... having the keys in one direction cover the client's certificate and
certverify
and the keys in the other direction not seems pretty sketchy.

As I understand this, it's just an aesthetic issue, right?

-Ekr



>
> Additionally:
> - That would make the implementation look nicely symmetric
> - Would also prevent having "not yet" keys. One can derive keys
>   from present state and install them immediately.
>
>
>
> -Ilari
>

--94eb2c059d865690ad053b78c9fa
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara=
@welho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"">On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 12:55:29PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; I have created a PR for this at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/611" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/611</=
a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; As it seems there was rough consensus for this change, I will merge th=
is<br>
&gt; weekend<br>
&gt; absent some violent objections or direction to the contrary from the c=
hairs.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -Ekr<br>
<br>
</span>I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue:<br>
<br>
The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client<br>
Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed after<br>
that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic<br>
secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished.<br>
<br>
So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have two<br>
overlapping client traffic secrets.<br>
<br>
Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend<br>
up to Client Finished would solve the issue.<br></blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>Hmm.... having the keys in one direction cover the client&#39;s certi=
ficate and certverify</div><div>and the keys in the other direction not see=
ms pretty sketchy.</div><div><br></div><div>As I understand this, it&#39;s =
just an aesthetic issue, right?</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br=
></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Additionally:<br>
- That would make the implementation look nicely symmetric<br>
- Would also prevent having &quot;not yet&quot; keys. One can derive keys<b=
r>
=C2=A0 from present state and install them immediately.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c059d865690ad053b78c9fa--


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From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:20:02PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue:
> >
> > The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client
> > Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed after
> > that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic
> > secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished.
> >
> > So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have two
> > overlapping client traffic secrets.
> >
> > Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend
> > up to Client Finished would solve the issue.
> >
> 
> Hmm.... having the keys in one direction cover the client's certificate and
> certverify
> and the keys in the other direction not seems pretty sketchy.
> 
> As I understand this, it's just an aesthetic issue, right?

I don't think this is just aesthetic issue:

- If you derive the traffic secret at the moment the right hash is
  available, you need to stash the traffic secret for later (one
  can't overwrite the existing one, since you will need that for
  ClientFinished).
- If you derive the traffic secret just before use, you need to
  have saved the hash value used for derivation, since the
  ClientFinished (and possibly Certificate(Verify)) has altered it.


-Ilari


From nobody Thu Sep  1 14:33:26 2016
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References: <CAMzhQmM+msOti4rChS=dwRpo5YGh4VMpnqQvy4x=GG=rKA7kew@mail.gmail.com> <20160825042343.w6bg6kg75tujhexg@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi> <CAMzhQmPFwE7H5gN-Ua1unGyFCpxh8aZuX4-2u55R0hmLD52FKQ@mail.gmail.com> <CABcZeBNjRvvKWctCy0oNYDpqgFoTck2Ai8iYuVeYQg1d5Jyk-g@mail.gmail.com> <20160828184105.yvrnbispbnpomk4s@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi> <CABcZeBM=3RPpmGygMmrTU8DMNHQo=k0VTweKjCrY53GR3X4p1A@mail.gmail.com> <95C31431-189C-41ED-A2D2-E370A5FB8F7A@vigilsec.com> <CABcZeBNA_MVO5e-bsnPML4epRjSDVUBf4tewqQ6EY+F1sqooPA@mail.gmail.com> <20160901210952.hj34o2ycel2ssd65@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi> <CABcZeBPNrNziYoE7T9UcjxUYZr4RN3COm=hazikAsmVF6A11_A@mail.gmail.com> <20160901212923.wixkxurtmyxmnsi2@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 14:32:41 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBNkS+0R-gpRAt2AOJpeoyJSrR6E_L_R7SpMfJ310Q28rQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:29 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:20:02PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue:
> > >
> > > The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client
> > > Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed after
> > > that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic
> > > secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished.
> > >
> > > So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have two
> > > overlapping client traffic secrets.
> > >
> > > Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend
> > > up to Client Finished would solve the issue.
> > >
> >
> > Hmm.... having the keys in one direction cover the client's certificate
> and
> > certverify
> > and the keys in the other direction not seems pretty sketchy.
> >
> > As I understand this, it's just an aesthetic issue, right?
>
> I don't think this is just aesthetic issue:
>

Perhaps I should have said "minor implementation inconvenience"


- If you derive the traffic secret at the moment the right hash is
>   available, you need to stash the traffic secret for later (one
>   can't overwrite the existing one, since you will need that for
>   ClientFinished).
>

Yes, but this was already true for handshake_secret, no?

-Ekr

- If you derive the traffic secret just before use, you need to
>   have saved the hash value used for derivation, since the
>   ClientFinished (and possibly Certificate(Verify)) has altered it.
>
>
> -Ilari
>

--001a11c03ea093928d053b78f66c
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:29 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara=
@welho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"">On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:20:02PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt; I tried to implement this, and discovered=
 an issue:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client=
<br>
&gt; &gt; Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed af=
ter<br>
&gt; &gt; that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic=
<br>
&gt; &gt; secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have tw=
o<br>
&gt; &gt; overlapping client traffic secrets.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend<=
br>
&gt; &gt; up to Client Finished would solve the issue.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hmm.... having the keys in one direction cover the client&#39;s certif=
icate and<br>
&gt; certverify<br>
&gt; and the keys in the other direction not seems pretty sketchy.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; As I understand this, it&#39;s just an aesthetic issue, right?<br>
<br>
</span>I don&#39;t think this is just aesthetic issue:<br></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>Perhaps I should have said &quot;minor implementation incon=
venience&quot;</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex">
- If you derive the traffic secret at the moment the right hash is<br>
=C2=A0 available, you need to stash the traffic secret for later (one<br>
=C2=A0 can&#39;t overwrite the existing one, since you will need that for<b=
r>
=C2=A0 ClientFinished).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, but this w=
as already true for handshake_secret, no?</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</di=
v><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8=
ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- If you derive the traffic secret just before use, you need to<br>
=C2=A0 have saved the hash value used for derivation, since the<br>
=C2=A0 ClientFinished (and possibly Certificate(Verify)) has altered it.<br=
>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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In-Reply-To: <20160901212923.wixkxurtmyxmnsi2@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi>
From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 01 Sep 2016 21:35:46 +0000
Message-ID: <CAF8qwaDR+qQyGKVFaHc=GHR=MaBshcqhk5Sh0qPMOhpvxXef0Q@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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--001a114abf70c3c79b053b78ffa2
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 5:29 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:20:02PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue:
> > >
> > > The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client
> > > Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed after
> > > that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic
> > > secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished.
> > >
> > > So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have two
> > > overlapping client traffic secrets.
> > >
> > > Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend
> > > up to Client Finished would solve the issue.
> > >
> >
> > Hmm.... having the keys in one direction cover the client's certificate
> and
> > certverify
> > and the keys in the other direction not seems pretty sketchy.
> >
> > As I understand this, it's just an aesthetic issue, right?
>
> I don't think this is just aesthetic issue:
>
> - If you derive the traffic secret at the moment the right hash is
>   available, you need to stash the traffic secret for later (one
>   can't overwrite the existing one, since you will need that for
>   ClientFinished).
> - If you derive the traffic secret just before use, you need to
>   have saved the hash value used for derivation, since the
>   ClientFinished (and possibly Certificate(Verify)) has altered it.
>

I do rather like never splitting the DeriveTrafficKey() and UseTrafficKey()
operations. We have to hold on to an extra copy of traffic_secret_0 today
in the single-ladder version for very similar reasons. That only one set of
keys covesr the client certificate is certainly kind of weird. Although I
assume we can just analyze as if it didn't since we were clearly okay with
not including it before.

David

--001a114abf70c3c79b053b78ffa2
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 1,=
 2016 at 5:29 PM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho=
.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex">On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:20:02PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<b=
r>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client=
<br>
&gt; &gt; Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed af=
ter<br>
&gt; &gt; that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic=
<br>
&gt; &gt; secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have tw=
o<br>
&gt; &gt; overlapping client traffic secrets.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend<=
br>
&gt; &gt; up to Client Finished would solve the issue.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hmm.... having the keys in one direction cover the client&#39;s certif=
icate and<br>
&gt; certverify<br>
&gt; and the keys in the other direction not seems pretty sketchy.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; As I understand this, it&#39;s just an aesthetic issue, right?<br>
<br>
I don&#39;t think this is just aesthetic issue:<br>
<br>
- If you derive the traffic secret at the moment the right hash is<br>
=C2=A0 available, you need to stash the traffic secret for later (one<br>
=C2=A0 can&#39;t overwrite the existing one, since you will need that for<b=
r>
=C2=A0 ClientFinished).<br>
- If you derive the traffic secret just before use, you need to<br>
=C2=A0 have saved the hash value used for derivation, since the<br>
=C2=A0 ClientFinished (and possibly Certificate(Verify)) has altered it.<br=
></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I do rather like never splitting the Deri=
veTrafficKey() and UseTrafficKey() operations. We have to hold on to an ext=
ra copy of traffic_secret_0 today in the single-ladder version for very sim=
ilar reasons. That only one set of keys covesr the client certificate is ce=
rtainly kind of weird. Although I assume we can just analyze as if it didn&=
#39;t since we were clearly okay with not including it before.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>David=C2=A0</div></div></div>

--001a114abf70c3c79b053b78ffa2--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 15:04:21 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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Folks,

I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"

  https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615

I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
anything important.


OVERVIEW
This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the redundancy
of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:

- Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
  ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
- Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
  the ClientHello.hello_finished.


RATIONALE
The reasoning for this change is:

- With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
  knows the PSK.

- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
  guarantees) via the Finished message.

- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
  transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
  the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the Finished.

So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
but unfortunately:

1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK because
   that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
   (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).

2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
   currently offer multiple PSK identities.

The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
PR enacts that.


FAQS
- What gets included in the handshake transcript?
  The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished extension.

- Isn't this a hassle to implement?
  It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point where
  the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it doesn't
  yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I believe
  other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing only
  part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite easy.


POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:

1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
   early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
   for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
   make this change.

2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
   prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not significantly
   harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
   you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
   "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
   on buffering.

3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
   work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
   the ClientHello. E.g,,

      opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;

      struct {
         FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
      } HelloFinished;

   Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
   so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
   changes weren't totally coupled.

4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
   might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
   into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
   it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
   with the default being empty.

5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
   the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
   that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten this
   and text on that point would be appreciated.

Comments welcome.
-Ekr

--001a114f8db2cac95f053b796750
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Folks,</div><div><br></div><div>I have just posted a =
WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffing&quot;</div><div><br=
></div><div>=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615"=
>https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615</a></div><div><br></div><div>=
I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing</div><d=
iv>anything important.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>OVERVIEW</di=
v><div>This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#39;ve had about the re=
dundancy</div><div>of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the follow=
ing changes:</div><div><br></div><div>- Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an =
extension you send in the</div><div>=C2=A0 ClientHello *whenever* you do PS=
K.</div><div>- Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by=
</div><div>=C2=A0 the ClientHello.hello_finished.</div><div><br></div><div>=
<br></div><div>RATIONALE</div><div>The reasoning for this change is:</div><=
div><br></div><div>- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t get any assurance that=
 the other side</div><div>=C2=A0 knows the PSK.</div><div><br></div><div>- =
With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay</div><div>=C2=A0 =
guarantees) via the Finished message.</div><div><br></div><div>- If we were=
 to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake</div><div>=C2=A0 tr=
anscript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption context because</div><di=
v>=C2=A0 the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the Finished=
.</div><div><br></div><div>So the natural thing to do would be to always se=
nd 0-RTT Finished</div><div>but unfortunately:</div><div><br></div><div>1. =
You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK because</div=
><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2=
 networks</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0(the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at =
least that&#39;s opt-in).</div><div><br></div><div>2. You also can&#39;t se=
nd the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0curre=
ntly offer multiple PSK identities.</div><div><br></div><div>The on-list di=
scussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and</div><div>only have =
one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the</div><div>Finishe=
d in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This</div><div>PR =
enacts that.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>FAQS</div><div>- What =
gets included in the handshake transcript?</div><div>=C2=A0 The whole Clien=
tHello including the computed hello_finished extension.</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=
=A0</div><div>- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?</div><div>=C2=A0 It t=
urns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point where</div><div>=
=C2=A0 the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it doesn&=
#39;t</div><div>=C2=A0 yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so N=
SS (and I believe</div><div>=C2=A0 other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in=
 plaintext, so hashing only</div><div>=C2=A0 part of it is easy. I&#39;ve d=
one it in NSS and this part is quite easy.</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div=
><br></div><div>POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs</div><div>There are a number of =
possible variations we might want to look at:</div><div><br></div><div>1. M=
oving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of</div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay</div><di=
v>=C2=A0 =C2=A0for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should<=
/div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0make this change.</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div>=
2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello</div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not significa=
ntly</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0harder or easier to implement and basically dep=
ends on whether</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0you prefer the invariant of &quot;al=
ways hash complete messages&quot; or</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;always ha=
sh valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for notes</div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0on buffering.</div><div><br></div><div>3. Allow multiple PSKs. Techni=
cally you could make this design</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0work with &gt;1 PSK=
 but stuffing multiple verify_data values in</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0the Cli=
entHello. E.g,,</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 opaque Finish=
edValue&lt;0..255&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Fini=
shedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } Hell=
oFinished;</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Based on the list discussi=
on, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0so I think=
 one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0ch=
anges weren&#39;t totally coupled.</div><div><br></div><div>4. External con=
text values. Several people have pointed out that it</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0might be convenient to have an external context value hashed</div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include</d=
iv><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0it under the Finished. That&#39;s not difficult if peo=
ple want to,</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0with the default being empty.</div><div=
><br></div><div>5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very cl=
ear that</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0the &quot;hello_finished&quot; is being use=
d to bind the handshakes and</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0that it depends on coll=
ision resistance. I have not forgotten this</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0and text=
 on that point would be appreciated.</div><div><br></div><div>Comments welc=
ome.</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>

--001a114f8db2cac95f053b796750--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 15:18:49 -0700
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--001a114f8db28bca23053b799bff
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I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit simpler
because:

1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately upon
receiving the ClientHello
without waiting for Finished.
2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.

>From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing around with
the ClientHello buffer.
-Ekr


On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> Folks,
>
> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>
>   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>
> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
> anything important.
>
>
> OVERVIEW
> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the redundancy
> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>
> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>   ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>   the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>
>
> RATIONALE
> The reasoning for this change is:
>
> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>   knows the PSK.
>
> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>   guarantees) via the Finished message.
>
> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>   transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>   the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the Finished.
>
> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
> but unfortunately:
>
> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK because
>    that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>    (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>
> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>    currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>
> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
> PR enacts that.
>
>
> FAQS
> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>   The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished extension.
>
> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>   It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point where
>   the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it doesn't
>   yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I believe
>   other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing only
>   part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite easy.
>
>
> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>
> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>    early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>    for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>    make this change.
>
> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>    prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not significantly
>    harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>    you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>    "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>    on buffering.
>
> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>    work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>    the ClientHello. E.g,,
>
>       opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>
>       struct {
>          FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>       } HelloFinished;
>
>    Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>    so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>    changes weren't totally coupled.
>
> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>    might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>    into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>    it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>    with the default being empty.
>
> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>    the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>    that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten this
>    and text on that point would be appreciated.
>
> Comments welcome.
> -Ekr
>
>

--001a114f8db28bca23053b799bff
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I should also mention that this makes the implementation a=
 fair bit simpler because:<div><br></div><div>1. You can make all the decis=
ions on the server side immediately upon receiving the ClientHello</div><di=
v>without waiting for Finished.</div><div>2. You don&#39;t need to derive e=
arly handshake traffic keys.</div><div><br></div><div>From an implementor&#=
39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing around with the ClientHello bu=
ffer.</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla=
 <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ek=
r@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div>Folks,</div><div><br></div><div>I have just posted a WIP PR f=
or what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffing&quot;</div><div><br></div><=
div>=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" target=
=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/615</a></div><div=
><br></div><div>I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am=
 missing</div><div>anything important.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><=
div>OVERVIEW</div><div>This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#39;ve =
had about the redundancy</div><div>of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR =
makes the following changes:</div><div><br></div><div>- Replace the 0-RTT F=
inished with an extension you send in the</div><div>=C2=A0 ClientHello *whe=
never* you do PSK.</div><div>- Get rid of resumption context (because it is=
 now replaced by</div><div>=C2=A0 the ClientHello.hello_finished.</div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><div>RATIONALE</div><div>The reasoning for this c=
hange is:</div><div><br></div><div>- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t get an=
y assurance that the other side</div><div>=C2=A0 knows the PSK.</div><div><=
br></div><div>- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay</=
div><div>=C2=A0 guarantees) via the Finished message.</div><div><br></div><=
div>- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake</di=
v><div>=C2=A0 transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption context =
because</div><div>=C2=A0 the transcript would transitively include the PSK =
via the Finished.</div><div><br></div><div>So the natural thing to do would=
 be to always send 0-RTT Finished</div><div>but unfortunately:</div><div><b=
r></div><div>1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do =
PSK because</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0that causes potential compat problems wi=
th mixed 1.3/1.2 networks</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0(the same ones we have wit=
h 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).</div><div><br></div><div>2. You a=
lso can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can</div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0currently offer multiple PSK identities.</div><div><br></div><=
div>The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and</d=
iv><div>only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the=
</div><div>Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). =
This</div><div>PR enacts that.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>FAQS=
</div><div>- What gets included in the handshake transcript?</div><div>=C2=
=A0 The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished extension.<=
/div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?</d=
iv><div>=C2=A0 It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the poin=
t where</div><div>=C2=A0 the client sends the ClientHello and the server pr=
ocesses, it doesn&#39;t</div><div>=C2=A0 yet know which Hash will be chosen=
 for HKDF and so NSS (and I believe</div><div>=C2=A0 other stacks) buffers =
the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing only</div><div>=C2=A0 part of it i=
s easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite easy.</div><div>=C2=
=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs</div><div>The=
re are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:</div><div>=
<br></div><div>1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of=
</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0early_data_indication). This provides additional an=
ti-replay</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I =
believe we should</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0make this change.</div><div>=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0</div><div>2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the Client=
Hello</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This =
is not significantly</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0harder or easier to implement a=
nd basically depends on whether</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0you prefer the invar=
iant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for notes<=
/div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0on buffering.</div><div><br></div><div>3. Allow mult=
iple PSKs. Technically you could make this design</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0wo=
rk with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0the ClientHello. E.g,,</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=
=A0</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 } HelloFinished;</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Based on =
the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,</div><div>=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these</div><di=
v>=C2=A0 =C2=A0changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it</div>=
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0might be convenient to have an external context value has=
hed</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0into the transcript. One way to do this would be=
 to include</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0it under the Finished. That&#39;s not di=
fficult if people want to,</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0with the default being em=
pty.</div><div><br></div><div>5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need t=
o make very clear that</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0the &quot;hello_finished&quot=
; is being used to bind the handshakes and</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0that it d=
epends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten this</div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0and text on that point would be appreciated.</div><div><br></div><div=
>Comments welcome.</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114f8db28bca23053b799bff--


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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2016 19:22:18 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Thursday, September 01, 2016 02:30:54 pm Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrote:
> > On Thursday, 1 September 2016 12:43:31 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > On 09/01/2016 12:38 PM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't
> > > > TLSv1.3 include signatures with those hashes then?
> > >
> > > Why does it need to be part of the core spec instead of a separate
> > document?
> > 
> > because: we also are adding RSA-PSS to TLSv1.2 in this document, I don't see
> > why it needs to be delayed. Finally, TLSv1.2 added SHA-2 just like that, it was
> > not tacked on later.
> 
> IIRC, SHA-2 was a special case; SHA-1 was demonstrated to be cryptographically weaker than expected and so we needed to have a secure alternative ASAP.
> 
> The SHA-3 is not like that; there's no evidence that suggests that SHA-2 is weak; the only incentive to implementing SHA-3 is "we'll, it is a standard, and so we might as well support it".

The reason I see is that we currently specify exactly one valid hash algorithm (in a variety of sizes). The precedent argument is good enough for me. I think adding it in this document is definitely worth considering. I don't want to wait until SHA-2 is considered weak to provide an alternative, if we can avoid it.


Dave


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On Thursday, September 01, 2016 03:17:50 pm Julien =C9LIE wrote:
> There's still something I find confusing:  on the one hand, SSL is badly=
=20
> broken and "diediedied", it is a proprietary protocol name, and the=20
> consensus in the TLS WG seems to be "long live TLS" but on the other=20
> hand major SSL/TLS implementations keep the SSL name living.

Arguably, renaming SSL to TLS and restarting the version numbering was a ba=
d decision. SSL/TLS is a 21 year old protocol. It's got more than a few bad=
 decisions in it, at least in hindsight.

I too wish that major organizations would ditch the SSL naming for TLS, how=
ever until very recently many still supported SSL in some form (which is it=
's own problem). It is unfortunately not easy to convince everyone to updat=
e things.


Dave


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Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 11:05:37 +0300
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Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:32:41PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:29 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:20:02PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <
> > ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > > wrote:
> >
> > I don't think this is just aesthetic issue:
> >
> 
> Perhaps I should have said "minor implementation inconvenience"

Yeah, turns out the easiest way is to save the hash (used a new field
instead of just trashing client_random/server_random with this value,
because that is less effort to do).
 

-Ilari


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Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 11:42:43 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Keith Winstein <keithw@cs.stanford.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:11:13PM -0700, Keith Winstein wrote:
> I think we have to oppose a change to KeyUpdate that adds P4 (bounded
> write obligations) but not P3 (ability to learn that a KeyUpdate was
> read by other side). These are orthogonal and easily achievable with a
> pretty small tweak. Here are four options that would work for us:

Unfortunately, one can get into situations like this (saw this
in testing):

1) Client send KeyUpdate[req=true] (and continues blasting data)
2) Server receives the KeyUpdate[req=true]
3) Server queues a KeyUpdate[req=false], it gets stuck.
4) Client send KeyUpdate[req=true] (and continues blasting data)
5) Server receives the KeyUpdate[req=true]
6) Server quenches the KeyUpdate, since it has fresh keys.
7) Client send KeyUpdate[req=true] (and continues blasting data)
8) Server receives the KeyUpdate[req=true]
9) Server quenches the KeyUpdate, since it has fresh keys.
10) Server sends something, the KeyUpdate gets unstuck.
11) The client receives the KeyUpdate[req=false]


Considering those KeyUpdates are triggered every ~5min (by volume
trigger[1]), effective RTT was something like ~10-15min (despite sub-
millisecond transport latencies). And the 1 server-sent KeyUpdate
was in reaction to first client KeyUpdate, not the last...


[1] Set at 10,000,000 records (even for 0x1303, which can handle
far far more).


-Ilari


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From: Keith Winstein <keithw@cs.stanford.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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You seem to be raising a complaint with my option #1, the "1-bit" option.

You're correct -- in that scheme, a node can only assume that the
other side has read as many KeyUpdates as it has gotten in response.
If the client decides to send KeyUpdates every 5 minutes, but the
other side is only writing every 10 minutes and coalescing its
responses, the client's knowledge that its KeyUpdates have been read
will get further and further behind. In the interests of compromise, I
think we would say that in situations where the other side is only
writing very infrequently, we would just give up on trying to get
assurance that a KeyUpdate got read, since it was probably not very
useful anyway. (The other side might never write to its socket ever
again! Then it really is hopeless under any scheme.)

Obviously if we had our choice, we'd prefer a 7- or 8-bit field
(options #2, #3, and #4) or a 64-bit field (as in PR #426/580), all of
which address your concern. But, trying to get to consensus here.

-Keith

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 1:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
<ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 02:11:13PM -0700, Keith Winstein wrote:
>> I think we have to oppose a change to KeyUpdate that adds P4 (bounded
>> write obligations) but not P3 (ability to learn that a KeyUpdate was
>> read by other side). These are orthogonal and easily achievable with a
>> pretty small tweak. Here are four options that would work for us:
>
> Unfortunately, one can get into situations like this (saw this
> in testing):
>
> 1) Client send KeyUpdate[req=true] (and continues blasting data)
> 2) Server receives the KeyUpdate[req=true]
> 3) Server queues a KeyUpdate[req=false], it gets stuck.
> 4) Client send KeyUpdate[req=true] (and continues blasting data)
> 5) Server receives the KeyUpdate[req=true]
> 6) Server quenches the KeyUpdate, since it has fresh keys.
> 7) Client send KeyUpdate[req=true] (and continues blasting data)
> 8) Server receives the KeyUpdate[req=true]
> 9) Server quenches the KeyUpdate, since it has fresh keys.
> 10) Server sends something, the KeyUpdate gets unstuck.
> 11) The client receives the KeyUpdate[req=false]
>
>
> Considering those KeyUpdates are triggered every ~5min (by volume
> trigger[1]), effective RTT was something like ~10-15min (despite sub-
> millisecond transport latencies). And the 1 server-sent KeyUpdate
> was in reaction to first client KeyUpdate, not the last...
>
>
> [1] Set at 10,000,000 records (even for 0x1303, which can handle
> far far more).
>
>
> -Ilari


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Thursday, 1 September 2016 19:22:18 CEST Dave Garrett wrote:
> On Thursday, September 01, 2016 02:30:54 pm Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrot=
e:
> > > On Thursday, 1 September 2016 12:43:31 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > On 09/01/2016 12:38 PM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > > The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't
> > > > > TLSv1.3 include signatures with those hashes then?
> > > >=20
> > > > Why does it need to be part of the core spec instead of a separate
> > >=20
> > > document?
> > >=20
> > > because: we also are adding RSA-PSS to TLSv1.2 in this document, I do=
n't
> > > see why it needs to be delayed. Finally, TLSv1.2 added SHA-2 just like
> > > that, it was not tacked on later.
> >=20
> > IIRC, SHA-2 was a special case; SHA-1 was demonstrated to be
> > cryptographically weaker than expected and so we needed to have a secure
> > alternative ASAP.
> >=20
> > The SHA-3 is not like that; there's no evidence that suggests that SHA-2
> > is weak; the only incentive to implementing SHA-3 is "we'll, it is a
> > standard, and so we might as well support it".
> The reason I see is that we currently specify exactly one valid hash
> algorithm (in a variety of sizes). The precedent argument is good enough
> for me. I think adding it in this document is definitely worth considerin=
g.
> I don't want to wait until SHA-2 is considered weak to provide an
> alternative, if we can avoid it.

I've created a PR for it: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/616

I haven't changed any recommendations, the recommended hashes to implement =
are=20
still SHA-2 based, and I don't think we should change that given that=20
certificates just now are transitioning to SHA-256 because of incompatibili=
ty=20
fears.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 12:08:47PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Thursday, 1 September 2016 19:22:18 CEST Dave Garrett wrote:
> >
> > The reason I see is that we currently specify exactly one valid hash
> > algorithm (in a variety of sizes). The precedent argument is good enough
> > for me. I think adding it in this document is definitely worth considering.
> > I don't want to wait until SHA-2 is considered weak to provide an
> > alternative, if we can avoid it.
> 
> I've created a PR for it: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/616
> 
> I haven't changed any recommendations, the recommended hashes to implement are 
> still SHA-2 based, and I don't think we should change that given that 
> certificates just now are transitioning to SHA-256 because of incompatibility 
> fears.

Just tweaking the signatures is not enough. There is also the PRF hash,
and using weak hash there has, umm... rather bad consequences.

I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being
its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get the
needed registrations: informative RFC would do).


-Ilari


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On Friday, 2 September 2016 13:42:40 CEST Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 12:08:47PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > On Thursday, 1 September 2016 19:22:18 CEST Dave Garrett wrote:
> > > The reason I see is that we currently specify exactly one valid hash
> > > algorithm (in a variety of sizes). The precedent argument is good eno=
ugh
> > > for me. I think adding it in this document is definitely worth
> > > considering.
> > > I don't want to wait until SHA-2 is considered weak to provide an
> > > alternative, if we can avoid it.
> >=20
> > I've created a PR for it: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/616
> >=20
> > I haven't changed any recommendations, the recommended hashes to implem=
ent
> > are still SHA-2 based, and I don't think we should change that given th=
at
> > certificates just now are transitioning to SHA-256 because of
> > incompatibility fears.
>=20
> Just tweaking the signatures is not enough. There is also the PRF hash,
> and using weak hash there has, umm... rather bad consequences.

SHA-3 ciphersuites added

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 04:32:06 -0700
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 12:08:47PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > On Thursday, 1 September 2016 19:22:18 CEST Dave Garrett wrote:
> > >
> > > The reason I see is that we currently specify exactly one valid hash
> > > algorithm (in a variety of sizes). The precedent argument is good
> enough
> > > for me. I think adding it in this document is definitely worth
> considering.
> > > I don't want to wait until SHA-2 is considered weak to provide an
> > > alternative, if we can avoid it.
> >
> > I've created a PR for it: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/616
> >
> > I haven't changed any recommendations, the recommended hashes to
> implement are
> > still SHA-2 based, and I don't think we should change that given that
> > certificates just now are transitioning to SHA-256 because of
> incompatibility
> > fears.
>
> Just tweaking the signatures is not enough. There is also the PRF hash,
> and using weak hash there has, umm... rather bad consequences.
>
> I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being
> its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get the
> needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
>

I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we defined
SHA-2 in
a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had to make
significant
changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to be that
case.

-Ekr


>
> -Ilari
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara=
@welho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"">On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 12:08:47PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote:<br>
&gt; On Thursday, 1 September 2016 19:22:18 CEST Dave Garrett wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt; The reason I see is that we currently spe=
cify exactly one valid hash<br>
&gt; &gt; algorithm (in a variety of sizes). The precedent argument is good=
 enough<br>
&gt; &gt; for me. I think adding it in this document is definitely worth co=
nsidering.<br>
&gt; &gt; I don&#39;t want to wait until SHA-2 is considered weak to provid=
e an<br>
&gt; &gt; alternative, if we can avoid it.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve created a PR for it: <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls1=
3-spec/pull/616" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tl=
swg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/616</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I haven&#39;t changed any recommendations, the recommended hashes to i=
mplement are<br>
&gt; still SHA-2 based, and I don&#39;t think we should change that given t=
hat<br>
&gt; certificates just now are transitioning to SHA-256 because of incompat=
ibility<br>
&gt; fears.<br>
<br>
</span>Just tweaking the signatures is not enough. There is also the PRF ha=
sh,<br>
and using weak hash there has, umm... rather bad consequences.<br>
<br>
I also don&#39;t see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being<b=
r>
its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get the<br>
needed registrations: informative RFC would do).<br></blockquote><div><br><=
/div><div>I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we=
 defined SHA-2 in</div><div>a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking wea=
k and (b) we had to make significant</div><div>changes to TLS to allow the =
use of SHA-2. This does not seem to be that case.</div><div><br></div><div>=
-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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Speaking of PRF hash, I want to bring up the fact that=E2=80=8E SHA-3 is a =
better PRF by design, as that was one of the explicitly stated competition =
requirements (unlike MD*, SHA-1, and SHA-2).

Sent=C2=A0from=C2=A0my=C2=A0BlackBerry=C2=A010=C2=A0smartphone=C2=A0on=C2=
=A0the Verizon=C2=A0Wireless=C2=A04G=C2=A0LTE=C2=A0network.
=C2=A0 Original Message =C2=A0
From: Ilari Liusvaara
Sent: Friday, September 2, 2016 06:44
To: Hubert Kario
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme

On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 12:08:47PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Thursday, 1 September 2016 19:22:18 CEST Dave Garrett wrote:
> >
> > The reason I see is that we currently specify exactly one valid hash
> > algorithm (in a variety of sizes). The precedent argument is good enough
> > for me. I think adding it in this document is definitely worth consider=
ing.
> > I don't want to wait until SHA-2 is considered weak to provide an
> > alternative, if we can avoid it.
>=20
> I've created a PR for it: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/616
>=20
> I haven't changed any recommendations, the recommended hashes to implemen=
t are=20
> still SHA-2 based, and I don't think we should change that given that=20
> certificates just now are transitioning to SHA-256 because of incompatibi=
lity=20
> fears.

Just tweaking the signatures is not enough. There is also the PRF hash,
and using weak hash there has, umm... rather bad consequences.

I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being
its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get the
needed registrations: informative RFC would do).


-Ilari

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



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--===============1684456817==--


From nobody Fri Sep  2 07:30:43 2016
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Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 17:30:37 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 01:29:28PM +0000, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
> Speaking of PRF hash, I want to bring up the fact thatâ€Ž SHA-3 is a
> better PRF by design, as that was one of the explicitly stated
> competition requirements (unlike MD*, SHA-1, and SHA-2).

Well, the name "prf-hash" comes from SSLv3-TLS 1.2 days, before it
was noticed that you need collision resistance too, which is much
stronger requirement than being a good prf (in constructions like
HMAC or HKDF).


-Ilari


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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> > I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being
> > its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get the
> > needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
> 
> I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we defined SHA-2 in
> a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had to make significant
> changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to be that case.

I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually and we can do it now and get people to consider implementing it more easily as part of a larger spec than later as a subsequent standalone. Doing it now gives it far greater visibility and should be relatively simple and quick to do.


Dave


From nobody Fri Sep  2 10:00:34 2016
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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
References: <CAHOTMV+r5PVxqnSozYyqJqq_YocMKV06aAa-43t+5Huzh7Lo=A@mail.gmail.com> <F42128A0-9682-4042-8C7E-E3686743B314@cisco.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4D0473F@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <B749662D-B518-46E0-A51D-4AD1D30A8ED2@cisco.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4D0528F@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <3401C8F7-5A74-4D02-96F5-057E9A45F8B0@cisco.com> <89A46793-73A1-4C71-9954-37BF6ED6F297@callas.org> <5CF32AA8-59CC-4918-8951-A2ACBD233C19@cs.columbia.edu> <sjmfuplvx8q.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <1468330B-F858-4E89-B791-B83507475C48@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 13:00:17 -0400
In-Reply-To: <1468330B-F858-4E89-B791-B83507475C48@cs.columbia.edu> (Steven M. Bellovin's message of "Wed, 31 Aug 2016 22:54:13 -0400")
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Cc: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, tls@ietf.org, Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
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"Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu> writes:

> On 31 Aug 2016, at 10:17, Derek Atkins wrote:
>
>> "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu> writes:
>>
>>> Yes.  To a large extent, the "IoT devices are too puny for real
>>> crypto" is a hangover from several years ago. It was once true; for
>>> the most part, it isn't today, but people haven't flushed their cache
>>> from the old received wisdom.
>>
>> This is certainly true for AES, mostly because many small chips are
>> including AES accelerators in hardware.  It's not quite true for public
>> key solutions; there are still very small devices where even ECC takes
>> too long (and yes, there are cases where 200-400ms is still too long).
>>
> Certainly plausible.  What I'm saying is (a) don't assert, measure; and
> (b) measure again next year because tech keeps improving.
>
> As for your specific points: if AES is indeed feasible, we don't need
> new ciphers.

It is feasible in many cases.  It may not be feasible in all cases.

>     If elliptic curve is too slow, the only answer is architectures
> that don't use public key at all; we're not going to find new, cheaper
> public key algorithms without a *lot* of effort and the people who can
> do that sort of thing are too busy working on post-quantum crypto.

Nothing says these two aren't the same problem ;)

> The remaining approach is a cheaper protocol than TLS.  That shouldn't
> be hard at all, especially if we're going back to KDCs.

True.

>         --Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant


From nobody Fri Sep  2 10:05:14 2016
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 10:04:29 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> > > I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being
> > > its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get the
> > > needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
> >
> > I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we
> defined SHA-2 in
> > a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had to make
> significant
> > changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to be that
> case.
>
> I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think it's a
> good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually


I'm not sure that that's true.

-Ekr

--001a11408d48400a80053b89552d
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">davemgarrett@gmail.=
com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"=
">On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt; I also don&#39;t see why this should be i=
n TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being<br>
&gt; &gt; its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get =
the<br>
&gt; &gt; needed registrations: informative RFC would do).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we defi=
ned SHA-2 in<br>
&gt; a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had to mak=
e significant<br>
&gt; changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to be tha=
t case.<br>
<br>
</span>I don&#39;t think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think=
 it&#39;s a good idea given that we&#39;ll need to do it eventually </block=
quote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not sure that that&#39;s true.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

--001a11408d48400a80053b89552d--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 10:05:45 -0700
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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--001a113d4af0c00659053b8959eb
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On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 10:04 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <
>> ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
>> > > I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being
>> > > its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get the
>> > > needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
>> >
>> > I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we
>> defined SHA-2 in
>> > a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had to make
>> significant
>> > changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to be that
>> case.
>>
>> I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think it's a
>> good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually
>
>
> I'm not sure that that's true.
>

To clarify: we might need to do this for one of several reasons:

- Some sort of completeness theory
- SHA-256 starts to look much weaker

The second could certainly happen, but if it doesn't, it's not clear that
there's really a completeness need.

-Ekr


>
> -Ekr
>
>

--001a113d4af0c00659053b8959eb
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 10:04 AM, Eric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D"">On Fri, Sep 2, 2=
016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davemg=
arrett@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">davemgarrett@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>On Friday, September 02, 2016=
 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br>
</span><span>&gt; &gt; I also don&#39;t see why this should be in TLS 1.3 s=
pec, instead of being<br>
&gt; &gt; its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to get =
the<br>
&gt; &gt; needed registrations: informative RFC would do).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we defi=
ned SHA-2 in<br>
&gt; a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had to mak=
e significant<br>
&gt; changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to be tha=
t case.<br>
<br>
</span>I don&#39;t think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think=
 it&#39;s a good idea given that we&#39;ll need to do it eventually </block=
quote><div><br></div></span><div>I&#39;m not sure that that&#39;s true.</di=
v></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>To clarify: we might n=
eed to do this for one of several reasons:</div><div><br></div><div>- Some =
sort of completeness theory</div><div>- SHA-256 starts to look much weaker<=
/div><div><br></div><div>The second could certainly happen, but if it doesn=
&#39;t, it&#39;s not clear that there&#39;s really a completeness need.</di=
v><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a113d4af0c00659053b8959eb--


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To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com
> <mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
>     > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
>     <ilariliusvaara@welho.com <mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>> wrote:
>     > > I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being
>     > > its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to
>     get the
>     > > needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
>     >
>     > I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason
>     we defined SHA-2 in
>     > a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
>     to make significant
>     > changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
>     be that case.
>
>     I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
>     it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually 
>
>
> I'm not sure that that's true.
>

Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.
>From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspective, I still
don't see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not add it now.

-Ben

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    On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CABcZeBOSn-JJgCYPP12wzy3TPEXBGHiCs-qZKosc_cVdwfvFuQ@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <div dir="ltr"><br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave
            Garrett <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com" target="_blank">davemgarrett@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span
                class="">On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric
                Rescorla wrote:<br>
                &gt; On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
                &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                  href="mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt;
                wrote:<br>
              </span><span class="">&gt; &gt; I also don't see why this
                should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of being<br>
                &gt; &gt; its own spec (I looked up how much process BS
                it would be to get the<br>
                &gt; &gt; needed registrations: informative RFC would
                do).<br>
                &gt;<br>
                &gt; I also am not following why we need to do this now.
                The reason we defined SHA-2 in<br>
                &gt; a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak
                and (b) we had to make significant<br>
                &gt; changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does
                not seem to be that case.<br>
                <br>
              </span>I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now,
              however I think it's a good idea given that we'll need to
              do it eventually </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>I'm not sure that that's true.</div>
            <br>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.<br>
    From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspective, I
    still don't see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not
    add it now.<br>
    <br>
    -Ben<br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:06:55 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com
> >=20
> > <mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >     On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >     > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
> >    =20
> >     <ilariliusvaara@welho.com <mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>> wrote:
> >     > > I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of
> >     > > being
> >     > > its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to
> >    =20
> >     get the
> >    =20
> >     > > needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
> >     >=20
> >     > I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason
> >    =20
> >     we defined SHA-2 in
> >    =20
> >     > a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
> >    =20
> >     to make significant
> >    =20
> >     > changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
> >    =20
> >     be that case.
> >    =20
> >     I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
> >     it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually
> >=20
> > I'm not sure that that's true.
>=20
> Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.
>=20
> >From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspective, I still
>=20
> don't see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not add it now.

what would be the reasons not to add it now?

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 19:31:52 +0200
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Subject: [TLS] handling of duplication of extensions between ServerHello and EncryptedExtensions
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So, the draft has following text:

    The same extension types MUST NOT appear in both the ServerHello and
    EncryptedExtensions.  If the same extension appears in both locations,
    the client MUST rely only on the value in the EncryptedExtensions
    block.=20

if the extension "MUST NOT" be in both ServerHello and EncryptedExtensions,=
=20
why the client should continue with the handshake if a server makes such a=
=20
major mistake? Why aborting the connection in such situation isn't safer?
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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References: <7755682.Cma8FBTrvx@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CABcZeBOSn-JJgCYPP12wzy3TPEXBGHiCs-qZKosc_cVdwfvFuQ@mail.gmail.com> <f43ef409-0f1b-03ae-08cb-1b0f8c1d3676@akamai.com> <4536302.2GJhFoeUiN@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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> On 2 Sep 2016, at 8:27 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:06:55 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com
>>>=20
>>> <mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>    On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
>>>=20
>>>    <ilariliusvaara@welho.com <mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>> =
wrote:
>>>>> I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of
>>>>> being
>>>>> its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to
>>>=20
>>>    get the
>>>=20
>>>>> needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
>>>>=20
>>>> I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason
>>>=20
>>>    we defined SHA-2 in
>>>=20
>>>> a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
>>>=20
>>>    to make significant
>>>=20
>>>> changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
>>>=20
>>>    be that case.
>>>=20
>>>    I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
>>>    it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually
>>>=20
>>> I'm not sure that that's true.
>>=20
>> Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.
>>=20
>>> =46rom a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspective, I =
still
>>=20
>> don't see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not add it =
now.
>=20
> what would be the reasons not to add it now?

Several reasons:
 - This is a core spec. Those don=E2=80=99t traditionally specify new =
algorithms unless they=E2=80=99re MTI (like SHA-256 is TLS 1.2 and =
RSAPSS here)
 - For now, SHA-3 is yet another national algorithm. Why add this and =
not Streebog? [1]
 - Who=E2=80=99s to tell whether SHA-2 breaks earlier than SHA-3?

So absent a desire to change MTI algorithms, I think publishing a =
=E2=80=9CSHA-3 and its use in TLS/IPsec/SSH/other=E2=80=9D document is a =
fine idea, but not as part of any core protocol.

Yoav

[1] I=E2=80=99m sure there are excellent reasons why SHA-3 is better. We =
don=E2=80=99t just add any national standard unless we think we need it.




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https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/619

implementations should verify signatures after making them to protect again=
st=20
private key leaks
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 18:53:45 +0000
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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Keeping TLS extension points working
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I've finally gotten to uploading
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-grease-01 which hopefully
resolves the procedural issues (thanks again!). I've also revised the text
slightly after some off-list feedback about the risks of non-deterministic
failures.

I didn't add text about what middleboxes are allowed to do since I wasn't
sure what text would be useful. Looking at all the changes we've done in
TLS 1.3, they can do is syntax-check the ClientHello. Anything beyond that
we've been considering fair game to change. TLS 1.3's ServerHello is not
compatible with TLS 1.2's ServerHello. The first message may even not be
ServerHello and instead HelloRetryRequest.

David

On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 4:02 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

>
> > On Jul 26, 2016, at 11:11, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote=
:
> >
> > 1) =E2=80=9CUpdates: 5246 (if approved)=E2=80=9D because typically exte=
nsion documents
> don=E2=80=99t =E2=80=9Cupdate=E2=80=9D the base specification.  If you ar=
e suggesting that all
> implementations must support these values then an updates header makes
> sense.  Note I=E2=80=99m sure somewhere along the way an extension that i=
sn=E2=80=99t
> expected to be supported by all implementation has an updates header but
> what I described is how we=E2=80=99re doing it now.
> >
> > I wasn't sure and mimicked RFC 7507 and RFC 7685 which both did this.
> >
> > I expect that all servers will "support" this specification in so far a=
s
> it says nothing useful for servers. TLS servers are supposed to ignore
> unknown values. I would certainly like for as many clients to do it as
> possible so the ecosystem effects work out, but I certainly don't intend
> for it to be any kind of requirement. (I suppose the text says MAY so
> existing clients also "support" it by default.)
> >
> > Is it better to remove that line in this case? Happy to do whatever
> works.
>
> I=E2=80=99d probably lean towards removing it.
>
> spt

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;ve finally gotten to uploading=C2=A0<a href=3D"https=
://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-grease-01">https://tools.ietf.org=
/html/draft-davidben-tls-grease-01</a>=C2=A0which hopefully resolves the pr=
ocedural issues (thanks again!). I&#39;ve also revised the text slightly af=
ter some off-list feedback about the risks of non-deterministic failures.<d=
iv><br></div><div>I didn&#39;t add text about what middleboxes are allowed =
to do since I wasn&#39;t sure what text would be useful. Looking at all the=
 changes we&#39;ve done in TLS 1.3, they can do is syntax-check the ClientH=
ello. Anything beyond that we&#39;ve been considering fair game to change. =
TLS 1.3&#39;s ServerHello is not compatible with TLS 1.2&#39;s ServerHello.=
 The first message may even not be ServerHello and instead HelloRetryReques=
t.<br><div><br></div><div>David<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 4:02 PM Sean Turner &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
sean@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex"><br>
&gt; On Jul 26, 2016, at 11:11, David Benjamin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidb=
en@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1) =E2=80=9CUpdates: 5246 (if approved)=E2=80=9D because typically ext=
ension documents don=E2=80=99t =E2=80=9Cupdate=E2=80=9D the base specificat=
ion.=C2=A0 If you are suggesting that all implementations must support thes=
e values then an updates header makes sense.=C2=A0 Note I=E2=80=99m sure so=
mewhere along the way an extension that isn=E2=80=99t expected to be suppor=
ted by all implementation has an updates header but what I described is how=
 we=E2=80=99re doing it now.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I wasn&#39;t sure and mimicked RFC 7507 and RFC 7685 which both did th=
is.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I expect that all servers will &quot;support&quot; this specification =
in so far as it says nothing useful for servers. TLS servers are supposed t=
o ignore unknown values. I would certainly like for as many clients to do i=
t as possible so the ecosystem effects work out, but I certainly don&#39;t =
intend for it to be any kind of requirement. (I suppose the text says MAY s=
o existing clients also &quot;support&quot; it by default.)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Is it better to remove that line in this case? Happy to do whatever wo=
rks.<br>
<br>
I=E2=80=99d probably lean towards removing it.<br>
<br>
spt</blockquote></div></div></div></div>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 12:01:56 -0700
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> > On 2 Sep 2016, at 8:27 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:06:55 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> >> On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com
> >>>
> >>> <mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>    On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
> >>>
> >>>    <ilariliusvaara@welho.com <mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>> wrote=
:
> >>>>> I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of
> >>>>> being
> >>>>> its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to
> >>>
> >>>    get the
> >>>
> >>>>> needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
> >>>>
> >>>> I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason
> >>>
> >>>    we defined SHA-2 in
> >>>
> >>>> a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
> >>>
> >>>    to make significant
> >>>
> >>>> changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
> >>>
> >>>    be that case.
> >>>
> >>>    I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
> >>>    it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually
> >>>
> >>> I'm not sure that that's true.
> >>
> >> Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.
> >>
> >>> From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspective, I
> still
> >>
> >> don't see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not add it
> now.
> >
> > what would be the reasons not to add it now?
>
> Several reasons:
>  - This is a core spec. Those don=E2=80=99t traditionally specify new alg=
orithms
> unless they=E2=80=99re MTI (like SHA-256 is TLS 1.2 and RSAPSS here)
>  - For now, SHA-3 is yet another national algorithm. Why add this and not
> Streebog? [1]
>

I'm 100% in favor of adding any algorithm called Streebog. Also, perhaps
Orcslayer.

-Ekr


>  - Who=E2=80=99s to tell whether SHA-2 breaks earlier than SHA-3?
>
> So absent a desire to change MTI algorithms, I think publishing a =E2=80=
=9CSHA-3
> and its use in TLS/IPsec/SSH/other=E2=80=9D document is a fine idea, but =
not as
> part of any core protocol.
>
> Yoav
>
> [1] I=E2=80=99m sure there are excellent reasons why SHA-3 is better. We =
don=E2=80=99t
> just add any national standard unless we think we need it.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Yoav Nir <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div><br>
&gt; On 2 Sep 2016, at 8:27 PM, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@r=
edhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:06:55 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:davemgarrett@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">davemgarrett@gmail.com</a><b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com" target=3D=
"_blank">davemgarrett@gmail.com</a><wbr>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Re=
scorla wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.c<wbr>om</=
a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I also don&#39;t see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spe=
c, instead of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; being<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would=
 be to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 get the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; needed registrations: informative RFC would do).<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I also am not following why we need to do this now. The re=
ason<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 we defined SHA-2 in<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) w=
e had<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 to make significant<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not se=
em to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 be that case.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 I don&#39;t think we strictly _need_ to do this n=
ow, however I think<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 it&#39;s a good idea given that we&#39;ll need to=
 do it eventually<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;m not sure that that&#39;s true.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspectiv=
e, I still<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; don&#39;t see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not=
 add it now.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; what would be the reasons not to add it now?<br>
<br>
</div></div>Several reasons:<br>
=C2=A0- This is a core spec. Those don=E2=80=99t traditionally specify new =
algorithms unless they=E2=80=99re MTI (like SHA-256 is TLS 1.2 and RSAPSS h=
ere)<br>
=C2=A0- For now, SHA-3 is yet another national algorithm. Why add this and =
not Streebog? [1]<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m 100% in favor=
 of adding any algorithm called Streebog. Also, perhaps Orcslayer.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
=C2=A0- Who=E2=80=99s to tell whether SHA-2 breaks earlier than SHA-3?<br>
<br>
So absent a desire to change MTI algorithms, I think publishing a =E2=80=9C=
SHA-3 and its use in TLS/IPsec/SSH/other=E2=80=9D document is a fine idea, =
but not as part of any core protocol.<br>
<br>
Yoav<br>
<br>
[1] I=E2=80=99m sure there are excellent reasons why SHA-3 is better. We do=
n=E2=80=99t just add any national standard unless we think we need it.<br>
<div><div><br>
<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 21:08:36 +0200
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Subject: [TLS] Specify handling of errors by peers
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While the specification already details a lot of situations that "MUST NOT"=
=20
happen or that are errors, it doesn't specify how those situations should b=
e=20
handled by peers.

Add information that they need to cause the receiving side to send a fatal=
=20
alert with appropriate description.

Most of the additions in this pull request[1] should be uncontroversial, on=
e=20
I'm not sure sure about is the alert type to send in case of invalid value =
in=20
=46inished message, do we want to hide it in bad_record_mac, or should it b=
e=20
typical for such cases illegal_parameter? (Currently what a peer is suppose=
d=20
to do if the Finished value does not match the expected one is not specifie=
d)

 1 - https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/621
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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On 09/02/2016 12:27 PM, Hubert Kario wrote:
>
> what would be the reasons not to add it now?
>

It seems that Yoav was faster than me, but the two main ones I had in
mind were:

We want the core protocol to be as small as possible while still
fulfilling its goals.  We already have extension mechanisms for adding
new ciphers, so there is no need to have another one in the core spec as
a backup [unless it's MTI].

We want to keep the number of changes down as we approach a final
version, to lower the burden of (re)review, particularly by the
cryptographers who are gracious enough to engage in analysis of the
pre-final versions.

-Ben

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    On 09/02/2016 12:27 PM, Hubert Kario wrote:<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:4536302.2GJhFoeUiN@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <pre wrap="">what would be the reasons not to add it now?

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    It seems that Yoav was faster than me, but the two main ones I had
    in mind were:<br>
    <br>
    We want the core protocol to be as small as possible while still
    fulfilling its goals.Â  We already have extension mechanisms for
    adding new ciphers, so there is no need to have another one in the
    core spec as a backup [unless it's MTI].<br>
    <br>
    We want to keep the number of changes down as we approach a final
    version, to lower the burden of (re)review, particularly by the
    cryptographers who are gracious enough to engage in analysis of the
    pre-final versions.<br>
    <br>
    -Ben<br>
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</html>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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On Friday, 2 September 2016 21:38:33 CEST Yoav Nir wrote:
> > On 2 Sep 2016, at 8:27 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> >=20
> > On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:06:55 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> >> On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com
> >>>=20
> >>> <mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>    On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
> >>>>=20
> >>>    <ilariliusvaara@welho.com <mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>> wrote:
> >>>>> I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of
> >>>>> being
> >>>>> its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to
> >>>>>=20
> >>>    get the
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
> >>>>=20
> >>>> I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason
> >>>>=20
> >>>    we defined SHA-2 in
> >>>>=20
> >>>> a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
> >>>>=20
> >>>    to make significant
> >>>>=20
> >>>> changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
> >>>>=20
> >>>    be that case.
> >>>   =20
> >>>    I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
> >>>    it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually
> >>>=20
> >>> I'm not sure that that's true.
> >>=20
> >> Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.
> >>=20
> >>> From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspective, I st=
ill
> >>=20
> >> don't see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not add it
> >> now.
> >=20
> > what would be the reasons not to add it now?
>=20
> Several reasons:
>  - This is a core spec. Those don=E2=80=99t traditionally specify new alg=
orithms
> unless they=E2=80=99re MTI (like SHA-256 is TLS 1.2 and RSAPSS here)=20
> - For now,
> SHA-3 is yet another national algorithm. Why add this and not Streebog? [=
1]
> - Who=E2=80=99s to tell whether SHA-2 breaks earlier than SHA-3?

But then we have:
* AES and ChaCha (two modes for the former one even)
* RSA and ECDSA
* NIST curves and Bernstein curves
* ECDHE key exchange an DHE key exchange

only the SHA-2 stands alone...

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 19:21:10 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] handling of duplication of extensions between ServerHello and EncryptedExtensions
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Huh. I agree that text is weird. We should probably remove it. I think we
actually get something akin to what you suggest basically implicitly:

Servers aren't allowed to send unsolicited extensions, so your SH and EE
parsers should be rejecting any unknown extensions. If you combine that
with not accepting known extensions in the wrong context (unencrypted ALPN
or encrypted key_share) since extensions already specify which messages
they may live in, this all works out.

So even if we explicitly say this rule, I don't think reflecting it in code
is the cleanest implementation strategy. (It requires one keep a list of SH
extensions and compare against it.) It might be better to say that
extensions in unexpected contexts should be rejected like any other
unexpected extension.

David


On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 1:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> So, the draft has following text:
>
>     The same extension types MUST NOT appear in both the ServerHello and
>     EncryptedExtensions.  If the same extension appears in both locations=
,
>     the client MUST rely only on the value in the EncryptedExtensions
>     block.
>
> if the extension "MUST NOT" be in both ServerHello and EncryptedExtension=
s,
> why the client should continue with the handshake if a server makes such =
a
> major mistake? Why aborting the connection in such situation isn't safer?
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech
> Republic_______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Huh. I agree that text is weird. We should probably r=
emove it. I think we actually get something akin to what you suggest basica=
lly implicitly:</div><div><br></div><div>Servers aren&#39;t allowed to send=
 unsolicited extensions, so your SH and EE parsers should be rejecting any =
unknown extensions. If you combine that with not accepting known extensions=
 in the wrong context (unencrypted ALPN or encrypted key_share) since exten=
sions already specify which messages they may live in, this all works out.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>So even if we explicitly say this rule, I don&#39;=
t think reflecting it in code is the cleanest implementation strategy. (It =
requires one keep a list of SH extensions and compare against it.) It might=
 be better to say that extensions in unexpected contexts should be rejected=
 like any other unexpected extension.</div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr"></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">David</=
div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 1:31 PM Hubert Kar=
io &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat=
.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">So, the draft h=
as following text:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The same extension types MUST NOT appear in both the ServerHe=
llo and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 EncryptedExtensions.=C2=A0 If the same extension appears in b=
oth locations,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the client MUST rely only on the value in the EncryptedExtens=
ions<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 block.<br>
<br>
if the extension &quot;MUST NOT&quot; be in both ServerHello and EncryptedE=
xtensions,<br>
why the client should continue with the handshake if a server makes such a<=
br>
major mistake? Why aborting the connection in such situation isn&#39;t safe=
r?<br>
--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic___=
____________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div>

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On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:21 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Friday, 2 September 2016 21:38:33 CEST Yoav Nir wrote:
> > > On 2 Sep 2016, at 8:27 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:06:55 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > >> On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > >>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.co=
m
> > >>>
> > >>> <mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > >>>    On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > >>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
> > >>>>
> > >>>    <ilariliusvaara@welho.com <mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>>
> wrote:
> > >>>>> I also don't see why this should be in TLS 1.3 spec, instead of
> > >>>>> being
> > >>>>> its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it would be to
> > >>>>>
> > >>>    get the
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> needed registrations: informative RFC would do).
> > >>>>
> > >>>> I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason
> > >>>>
> > >>>    we defined SHA-2 in
> > >>>>
> > >>>> a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
> > >>>>
> > >>>    to make significant
> > >>>>
> > >>>> changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
> > >>>>
> > >>>    be that case.
> > >>>
> > >>>    I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
> > >>>    it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually
> > >>>
> > >>> I'm not sure that that's true.
> > >>
> > >> Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.
> > >>
> > >>> From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) perspective, I
> still
> > >>
> > >> don't see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons to not add i=
t
> > >> now.
> > >
> > > what would be the reasons not to add it now?
> >
> > Several reasons:
> >  - This is a core spec. Those don=E2=80=99t traditionally specify new a=
lgorithms
> > unless they=E2=80=99re MTI (like SHA-256 is TLS 1.2 and RSAPSS here)
> > - For now,
> > SHA-3 is yet another national algorithm. Why add this and not Streebog?
> [1]
> > - Who=E2=80=99s to tell whether SHA-2 breaks earlier than SHA-3?
>
> But then we have:
> * AES and ChaCha (two modes for the former one even)
> * RSA and ECDSA
> * NIST curves and Bernstein curves
> * ECDHE key exchange an DHE key exchange
>
> only the SHA-2 stands alone...
>

We have SHA-256 and SHA-384.

-Ekr


>
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:21 PM, Hubert Kario <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><d=
iv class=3D"h5">On Friday, 2 September 2016 21:38:33 CEST Yoav Nir wrote:<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; On 2 Sep 2016, at 8:27 PM, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hka=
rio@redhat.com">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:06:55 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;&gt; On 09/02/2016 12:04 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:25 AM, Dave Garrett &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com">davemgarrett@gmail.com</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com">dave=
mgarrett@gmail.com</a><wbr>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 On Friday, September 02, 2016 07:32:06 am Er=
ic Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Ilari Liusvaara<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.c=
om">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaar=
a@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.<wbr>com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I also don&#39;t see why this should be in TLS 1.=
3 spec, instead of<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; being<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; its own spec (I looked up how much process BS it =
would be to<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 get the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; needed registrations: informative RFC would do).<=
br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I also am not following why we need to do this now. T=
he reason<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 we defined SHA-2 in<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and =
(b) we had<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 to make significant<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does n=
ot seem to<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 be that case.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 I don&#39;t think we strictly _need_ to do t=
his now, however I think<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 it&#39;s a good idea given that we&#39;ll ne=
ed to do it eventually<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;m not sure that that&#39;s true.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Predicting future needs is not always reliable, yes.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; From a release-engineering (standards-engineering?) persp=
ective, I still<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; don&#39;t see any reasons to add it now, and do see reasons t=
o not add it<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; now.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; what would be the reasons not to add it now?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Several reasons:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 - This is a core spec. Those don=E2=80=99t traditionally specify=
 new algorithms<br>
&gt; unless they=E2=80=99re MTI (like SHA-256 is TLS 1.2 and RSAPSS here)<b=
r>
&gt; - For now,<br>
&gt; SHA-3 is yet another national algorithm. Why add this and not Streebog=
? [1]<br>
&gt; - Who=E2=80=99s to tell whether SHA-2 breaks earlier than SHA-3?<br>
<br>
</div></div>But then we have:<br>
* AES and ChaCha (two modes for the former one even)<br>
* RSA and ECDSA<br>
* NIST curves and Bernstein curves<br>
* ECDHE key exchange an DHE key exchange<br>
<br>
only the SHA-2 stands alone...<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We have =
SHA-256 and SHA-384.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</d=
iv></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
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rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a11492ce8c36741053b8b4114--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 12:23:03 -0700
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] handling of duplication of extensions between ServerHello and EncryptedExtensions
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--001a114f8db2c71c81053b8b44be
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I agree. FWIW, this is how NSS behaves. A clarifying PR would be welcome
here.

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:21 PM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> Huh. I agree that text is weird. We should probably remove it. I think we
> actually get something akin to what you suggest basically implicitly:
>
> Servers aren't allowed to send unsolicited extensions, so your SH and EE
> parsers should be rejecting any unknown extensions. If you combine that
> with not accepting known extensions in the wrong context (unencrypted ALP=
N
> or encrypted key_share) since extensions already specify which messages
> they may live in, this all works out.
>
> So even if we explicitly say this rule, I don't think reflecting it in
> code is the cleanest implementation strategy. (It requires one keep a lis=
t
> of SH extensions and compare against it.) It might be better to say that
> extensions in unexpected contexts should be rejected like any other
> unexpected extension.
>
> David
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 1:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>> So, the draft has following text:
>>
>>     The same extension types MUST NOT appear in both the ServerHello and
>>     EncryptedExtensions.  If the same extension appears in both location=
s,
>>     the client MUST rely only on the value in the EncryptedExtensions
>>     block.
>>
>> if the extension "MUST NOT" be in both ServerHello and
>> EncryptedExtensions,
>> why the client should continue with the handshake if a server makes such=
 a
>> major mistake? Why aborting the connection in such situation isn't safer=
?
>> --
>> Regards,
>> Hubert Kario
>> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
>> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
>> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech
>> Republic_______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I agree. FWIW, this is how NSS behaves. A clarifying PR wo=
uld be welcome here.<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote">On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:21 PM, David Benjamin <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chrom=
ium.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div>Huh. I agree that text is weird. We should probably remove it. I=
 think we actually get something akin to what you suggest basically implici=
tly:</div><div><br></div><div>Servers aren&#39;t allowed to send unsolicite=
d extensions, so your SH and EE parsers should be rejecting any unknown ext=
ensions. If you combine that with not accepting known extensions in the wro=
ng context (unencrypted ALPN or encrypted key_share) since extensions alrea=
dy specify which messages they may live in, this all works out.</div><div><=
br></div><div>So even if we explicitly say this rule, I don&#39;t think ref=
lecting it in code is the cleanest implementation strategy. (It requires on=
e keep a list of SH extensions and compare against it.) It might be better =
to say that extensions in unexpected contexts should be rejected like any o=
ther unexpected extension.</div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D=
"ltr"></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">David</div></div><=
/div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te"><div><div class=3D"h5"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 1:31 PM =
Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hka=
rio@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div></div></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5">So, the draft has following text:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The same extension types MUST NOT appear in both the ServerHe=
llo and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 EncryptedExtensions.=C2=A0 If the same extension appears in b=
oth locations,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the client MUST rely only on the value in the EncryptedExtens=
ions<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 block.<br>
<br>
if the extension &quot;MUST NOT&quot; be in both ServerHello and EncryptedE=
xtensions,<br>
why the client should continue with the handshake if a server makes such a<=
br>
major mistake? Why aborting the connection in such situation isn&#39;t safe=
r?<br>
--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br></div></div>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic___=
___________________<wbr>_________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a114f8db2c71c81053b8b44be--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 19:28:03 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On 9/2/16, 15:22 , "TLS on behalf of Eric Rescorla" <tls-bounces@ietf.org o=
n behalf of ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

But then we have:
* AES and ChaCha (two modes for the former one even)
* RSA and ECDSA
* NIST curves and Bernstein curves
* ECDHE key exchange an DHE key exchange

only the SHA-2 stands alone...

=20

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 We have SHA-256 and SHA-384.

=20

No. By the same token we have AES-128, AES-256, ECDHE over P256, etc.

=20

I support adding SHA-3 to the core.=20

=20

Alternatively, feel free to throw ChaCha out and define it separately. Same=
 with Bernstein=E2=80=99s curves. Why keeping them all in the core?


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v class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;co=
lor:black'>On 9/2/16, 15:22 , &quot;TLS on behalf of Eric Rescorla&quot; &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a> on behalf of=
 <a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</span><o:p></o:p>=
</p><div><div><div><div><div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:soli=
d #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in=
'><p class=3DMsoNormal>But then we have:<br>* AES and ChaCha (two modes for th=
e former one even)<br>* RSA and ECDSA<br>* NIST curves and Bernstein curves<=
br>* ECDHE key exchange an DHE key exchange<br><br>only the SHA-2 stands alo=
ne...<o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 We have SHA-256 and SHA-384.<o:p></=
o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al>No. By the same token we have AES-128, AES-256, ECDHE over P256, etc.<o:p=
></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I supp=
ort adding SHA-3 to the core. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Alternatively, feel free to throw ChaCha out and=
 define it separately. Same with Bernstein&#8217;s curves. Why keeping them =
all in the core?<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>

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From nobody Fri Sep  2 12:35:44 2016
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 21:35:39 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] handling of duplication of extensions between ServerHello and EncryptedExtensions
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On Friday, 2 September 2016 12:23:03 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I agree. FWIW, this is how NSS behaves. A clarifying PR would be welcome
> here.

that was an easy one: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/622

since there's already text prohibiting that situation:

  The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are              =20
  required to establish the cryptographic context. Currently the only      =
    =20
  such extensions are "key_share", "pre_shared_key", and "early_data".     =
    =20
  Clients MUST check the ServerHello for the presence of any forbidden     =
    =20
  extensions and if any are found MUST terminate the handshake with a      =
    =20
  "illegal_parameter" alert.

and

   Extensions which are designated to              =20
   appear in ServerHello MUST NOT appear in EncryptedExtensions. Clients   =
          =20
   MUST check EncryptedExtensions for the presence of any forbidden        =
       =20
   extensions and if any are found MUST terminate the handshake with an    =
       =20
   "illegal_parameter" alert.
=20
> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:21 PM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
>=20
> wrote:
> > Huh. I agree that text is weird. We should probably remove it. I think =
we
> > actually get something akin to what you suggest basically implicitly:
> >=20
> > Servers aren't allowed to send unsolicited extensions, so your SH and EE
> > parsers should be rejecting any unknown extensions. If you combine that
> > with not accepting known extensions in the wrong context (unencrypted A=
LPN
> > or encrypted key_share) since extensions already specify which messages
> > they may live in, this all works out.
> >=20
> > So even if we explicitly say this rule, I don't think reflecting it in
> > code is the cleanest implementation strategy. (It requires one keep a l=
ist
> > of SH extensions and compare against it.) It might be better to say that
> > extensions in unexpected contexts should be rejected like any other
> > unexpected extension.
> >=20
> > David
> >=20
> > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 1:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> So, the draft has following text:
> >>     The same extension types MUST NOT appear in both the ServerHello a=
nd
> >>     EncryptedExtensions.  If the same extension appears in both
> >>     locations,
> >>     the client MUST rely only on the value in the EncryptedExtensions
> >>     block.
> >>=20
> >> if the extension "MUST NOT" be in both ServerHello and
> >> EncryptedExtensions,
> >> why the client should continue with the handshake if a server makes su=
ch
> >> a
> >> major mistake? Why aborting the connection in such situation isn't saf=
er?
> >> --
> >> Regards,
> >> Hubert Kario
> >> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> >> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> >> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech
> >> Republic_______________________________________________
> >> TLS mailing list
> >> TLS@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS 1.3 -> TLS 2.0?
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Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>The HTTP/2 spec explicitly refers to TLS 1.3 and up as not needing the=0A=
>security restrictions on TLS 1.2 it lays out.=0A=
=0A=
Given that LTS fixes all (known) problems in TLS 1.2 and earlier (hey, if y=
ou=0A=
know of weaknesses/attacks, say so now), it doesn't seem like it'd need any=
=0A=
extra security restrictions from HTTP://2, so this seems like a non-issue.=
=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Colm_MacC=C3=A1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 09:12:05 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 -> TLS 2.0?
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On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
wrote:

>  I think it's time we just renamed TLS 1.3 to TLS 2.0.


+0.7

--
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Dave Garrett <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">davemgarrett@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204=
,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">=C2=A0I think it&#39;s time=
 we just renamed TLS 1.3 to TLS 2.0. </blockquote><div><br></div><div>+0.7<=
br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div>--</div><div>Colm</div></div>
</div></div>

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References: <7755682.Cma8FBTrvx@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <4536302.2GJhFoeUiN@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <BC6013EC-26EF-4EF7-AE5C-37D70D9CFF50@gmail.com> <1489216.MHQYH3hEiU@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CABcZeBNJaKSNSWko+zCKURTNHS0iAcmFtm4keQrFLwoZazM4cg@mail.gmail.com> <788EC484-6FFE-4A0E-BAAA-0C29EBECEF12@ll.mit.edu>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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> On 2 Sep 2016, at 10:28 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL =
<uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>      We have SHA-256 and SHA-384.
>=20
> No. By the same token we have AES-128, AES-256, ECDHE over P256, etc.
>=20
> I support adding SHA-3 to the core.
>=20
> Alternatively, feel free to throw ChaCha out and define it separately. =
Same with Bernstein=E2=80=99s curves. Why keeping them all in the core?

ChaCha is in RFC 7905
DJB=E2=80=99s curves are in RFC4492bis

The core spec just mentions them because it is revising the registry.

If there had been a =E2=80=9CSHA-3 and its use in TLS=E2=80=9D that =
applied to TLS 1.2, we=E2=80=99d mention it as well.

Yoav



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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 2 Sep 2016, at 10:28 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" class=3D"">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div class=3D""><div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: =
WordSection1; font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, =
255);"><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman';" =
class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;We have SHA-256 and SHA-384.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman';" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman';" class=3D"">No.=
 By the same token we have AES-128, AES-256, ECDHE over P256, etc.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman';" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman';" class=3D"">I support =
adding SHA-3 to the core.<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman';" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman';" =
class=3D"">Alternatively, feel free to throw ChaCha out and define it =
separately. Same with Bernstein=E2=80=99s curves. Why keeping them all =
in the core?<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><b=
r class=3D""></div><div>ChaCha is in RFC 7905</div><div>DJB=E2=80=99s =
curves are in RFC4492bis</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>The core =
spec just mentions them because it is revising the =
registry.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>If there had been a =
=E2=80=9CSHA-3 and its use in TLS=E2=80=9D that applied to TLS 1.2, =
we=E2=80=99d mention it as well.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Yoav</div><div><br class=3D""></div><br =
class=3D""></body></html>=

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Subject: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624

We currently have code points assigned for

 user_mapping [RFC4681]
 client_authz [RFC5878]
 server_authz [RFC5878]

These aren't well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 and my sense is that they
are barely used. Any objections to just banning them? If not, I'll merge
this
PR end of next week.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/6=
24">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624</a><br></div><div><br></di=
v>We currently have code points assigned for<div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0=
user_mapping [RFC4681] =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0client_authz [RF=
C5878] =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0server_authz [RFC5878]=C2=A0</d=
iv></div><div><br></div><div>These aren&#39;t well-specified for use in TLS=
 1.3 and my sense is that they</div><div>are barely used. Any objections to=
 just banning them? If not, I&#39;ll merge this</div><div>PR end of next we=
ek.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div></div>

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Sep 2016 16:07:17 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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Thanks for flagging this. Looks like it can just go right before
Certificate in the client's second flight...

-Ekr


On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 2:44 PM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> Hi Eric,
>
>
>
> MS TLS stack uses the user_mapping extension (to map TLS clients to
> Windows domain users). We do not implement client/server_authz.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> Andrei
>
>
>
> *From:* TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Rescorla
> *Sent:* Saturday, September 3, 2016 12:54 PM
> *To:* tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
>
>
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624
>
>
>
> We currently have code points assigned for
>
>
>
>  user_mapping [RFC4681]
>
>  client_authz [RFC5878]
>
>  server_authz [RFC5878]
>
>
>
> These aren't well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 and my sense is that they
>
> are barely used. Any objections to just banning them? If not, I'll merge
> this
>
> PR end of next week.
>
>
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

--001a113d4e7e8c1e15053ba284b5
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for flagging this. Looks like it can just go right =
before Certificate in the client&#39;s second flight...<div><br></div><div>=
-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 2:44 PM, Andrei Popov <span dir=3D"ltr=
">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Andre=
i.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Hi Eric,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">MS TLS stack uses the user_mapping extension (to ma=
p TLS clients to Windows domain users). We do not implement client/server_a=
uthz.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Cheers,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Andrei<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;=
font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif"> TLS [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:=
tls-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Eric Rescorla<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, September 3, 2016 12:54 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</=
a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3<u></u>=
<u></u></span></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/=
624" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/624</a=
><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We currently have code points assigned for<u></u><u>=
</u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0user_mapping [RFC4681] =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0<u><=
/u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0client_authz [RFC5878] =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<u>=
</u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0server_authz [RFC5878]=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">These aren&#39;t well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 a=
nd my sense is that they<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">are barely used. Any objections to just banning them=
? If not, I&#39;ll merge this<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">PR end of next week.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-Ekr<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113d4e7e8c1e15053ba284b5--


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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Date: Sun, 4 Sep 2016 13:56:37 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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How are the OIDs and values in CertificateRequest extensions encoded
exactly (I can't make it out from the text)?


Does the OID part have the ASN.1 OID TLV tag and length (e.g.
is EKU 0x55 0x1D 0x25 or 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x1D 0x25)?


And how is the value encoded? Using the same encoding as
extnValue payload of respective extension in X.509 certifcates?
Or is it OID-specific (and if it is, what exactly goes to it
for EKU and KU? RFC 5280 ExtKeyUsageSyntax and KeyUsage?)


(Currently the text just refers to DER encoding, and in a
way that could be read to apply to just to values).


-Ilari


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Sun, 04 Sep 2016 17:41:47 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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--001a1143ad4e8e33b5053bb21484
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I have no involvement in systems that would want this (our implementation
just ignores it), but it seems a TLS-style registry would be better than
using OIDs anyway. Concretely:

A CertificateExtension is a hint to the client about what kind of
certificates are acceptable. We have a registry of u16s for them. Clients
ignore extensions they don't understand, so it is ultimately on the server
to check the certificate is acceptable (as it always is). If we wish to
filter on OIDs, we define, e.g., a key_usage value whose contents have some
KeyUsage-specific meaning.

That would buy us:

- More consistency with other TLS fields.

- More compact encoding. (At the cost of going getting to define 2^16 rule
types, but this seems to have been everywhere else.)

- It is easy to look up what a CertificateExtension means and avoid
conflicts. I can go to the registry and see that type 43 means "match
KeyUsage in this way". For OIDs, it's not obvious whether

- Relatedly, we can define multiple kinds of matching rules on the same
OID. Suppose we define it one way and we realize we got it wrong. The OID
scheme means we're stuck with it. The TLS-style scheme allows us to define
key_usage_v2 if needed.

- Less confusion about known OIDs with unknown matching rules. The text is
a little funny right now. There are plenty of known extension OIDs right
now with unknown matching rules. Do we fallback to exact match (which means
we can never change this) or should clients ignore those? That enforcing
known OIDs is a MUST-level requirement makes this messier.

- More flexibility in defining future rule types. Perhaps we want to say
some extension is not present. Or some rule is really a combination of two
OIDs. Or not an OID at all like "your RSA key must be at least 2048 bits".

What do folks think?

David

On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 6:56 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> How are the OIDs and values in CertificateRequest extensions encoded
> exactly (I can't make it out from the text)?
>
>
> Does the OID part have the ASN.1 OID TLV tag and length (e.g.
> is EKU 0x55 0x1D 0x25 or 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x1D 0x25)?
>
>
> And how is the value encoded? Using the same encoding as
> extnValue payload of respective extension in X.509 certifcates?
> Or is it OID-specific (and if it is, what exactly goes to it
> for EKU and KU? RFC 5280 ExtKeyUsageSyntax and KeyUsage?)
>
>
> (Currently the text just refers to DER encoding, and in a
> way that could be read to apply to just to values).
>
>
> -Ilari
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a1143ad4e8e33b5053bb21484
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I have no involvement in systems that would want this (our=
 implementation just ignores it), but it seems a TLS-style registry would b=
e better than using OIDs anyway. Concretely:<div><br></div><div>A Certifica=
teExtension is a hint to the client about what kind of certificates are acc=
eptable. We have a registry of u16s for them. Clients ignore extensions the=
y don&#39;t understand, so it is ultimately on the server to check the cert=
ificate is acceptable (as it always is). If we wish to filter on OIDs, we d=
efine, e.g., a key_usage value whose contents have some KeyUsage-specific m=
eaning.<br><div><div><br></div><div>That would buy us:<div><br></div><div>-=
 More consistency with other TLS fields.</div><div><br></div><div>- More co=
mpact encoding. (At the cost of going getting to define 2^16 rule types, bu=
t this seems to have been everywhere else.)</div><div><br></div><div>- It i=
s easy to look up what a CertificateExtension means and avoid conflicts. I =
can go to the registry and see that type 43 means &quot;match KeyUsage in t=
his way&quot;. For OIDs, it&#39;s not obvious whether=C2=A0</div><div><br><=
/div><div>- Relatedly, we can define multiple kinds of matching rules on th=
e same OID. Suppose we define it one way and we realize we got it wrong. Th=
e OID scheme means we&#39;re stuck with it. The TLS-style scheme allows us =
to define key_usage_v2 if needed.</div><div><br></div><div>- Less confusion=
 about known OIDs with unknown matching rules. The text is a little funny r=
ight now. There are plenty of known extension OIDs right now with unknown m=
atching rules. Do we fallback to exact match (which means we can never chan=
ge this) or should clients ignore those? That enforcing known OIDs is a MUS=
T-level requirement makes this messier.</div><div><br></div><div>- More fle=
xibility in defining future rule types. Perhaps we want to say some extensi=
on is not present. Or some rule is really a combination of two OIDs. Or not=
 an OID at all like &quot;your RSA key must be at least 2048 bits&quot;.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>What do folks think?</div><div><br></div><div></div>=
</div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div>David</div></div></d=
iv></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div><div><br><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 6:56 AM Ilari Liusvaar=
a &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilarili=
usvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Ho=
w are the OIDs and values in CertificateRequest extensions encoded<br>
exactly (I can&#39;t make it out from the text)?<br>
<br>
<br>
Does the OID part have the ASN.1 OID TLV tag and length (e.g.<br>
is EKU 0x55 0x1D 0x25 or 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x1D 0x25)?<br>
<br>
<br>
And how is the value encoded? Using the same encoding as<br>
extnValue payload of respective extension in X.509 certifcates?<br>
Or is it OID-specific (and if it is, what exactly goes to it<br>
for EKU and KU? RFC 5280 ExtKeyUsageSyntax and KeyUsage?)<br>
<br>
<br>
(Currently the text just refers to DER encoding, and in a<br>
way that could be read to apply to just to values).<br>
<br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>

--001a1143ad4e8e33b5053bb21484--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Sun, 04 Sep 2016 17:43:31 +0000
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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Apologies, I hit 'Send' too early. Finished a sentence below:

On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 1:41 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:

> I have no involvement in systems that would want this (our implementation
> just ignores it), but it seems a TLS-style registry would be better than
> using OIDs anyway. Concretely:
>
> A CertificateExtension is a hint to the client about what kind of
> certificates are acceptable. We have a registry of u16s for them. Clients
> ignore extensions they don't understand, so it is ultimately on the server
> to check the certificate is acceptable (as it always is). If we wish to
> filter on OIDs, we define, e.g., a key_usage value whose contents have some
> KeyUsage-specific meaning.
>
> That would buy us:
>
> - More consistency with other TLS fields.
>
> - More compact encoding. (At the cost of going getting to define 2^16 rule
> types, but this seems to have been everywhere else.)
>
> - It is easy to look up what a CertificateExtension means and avoid
> conflicts. I can go to the registry and see that type 43 means "match
> KeyUsage in this way". For OIDs, it's not obvious whether
>

For OIDs, it's not obvious whether a given OID has had a matching rule
defined. (Existing X.509 extensions do not have TLS-level matching rules
defined. I expect new ones will be defined without them too.)


> - Relatedly, we can define multiple kinds of matching rules on the same
> OID. Suppose we define it one way and we realize we got it wrong. The OID
> scheme means we're stuck with it. The TLS-style scheme allows us to define
> key_usage_v2 if needed.
>
> - Less confusion about known OIDs with unknown matching rules. The text is
> a little funny right now. There are plenty of known extension OIDs right
> now with unknown matching rules. Do we fallback to exact match (which means
> we can never change this) or should clients ignore those? That enforcing
> known OIDs is a MUST-level requirement makes this messier.
>
> - More flexibility in defining future rule types. Perhaps we want to say
> some extension is not present. Or some rule is really a combination of two
> OIDs. Or not an OID at all like "your RSA key must be at least 2048 bits".
>
> What do folks think?
>
> David
>
> On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 6:56 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
>
>> How are the OIDs and values in CertificateRequest extensions encoded
>> exactly (I can't make it out from the text)?
>>
>>
>> Does the OID part have the ASN.1 OID TLV tag and length (e.g.
>> is EKU 0x55 0x1D 0x25 or 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x1D 0x25)?
>>
>>
>> And how is the value encoded? Using the same encoding as
>> extnValue payload of respective extension in X.509 certifcates?
>> Or is it OID-specific (and if it is, what exactly goes to it
>> for EKU and KU? RFC 5280 ExtKeyUsageSyntax and KeyUsage?)
>>
>>
>> (Currently the text just refers to DER encoding, and in a
>> way that could be read to apply to just to values).
>>
>>
>> -Ilari
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Apologies, I hit &#39;Send=
&#39; too early. Finished a sentence below:</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div=
><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 1:41 PM David Benjamin &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br><=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I have no involvement =
in systems that would want this (our implementation just ignores it), but i=
t seems a TLS-style registry would be better than using OIDs anyway. Concre=
tely:<div><br></div><div>A CertificateExtension is a hint to the client abo=
ut what kind of certificates are acceptable. We have a registry of u16s for=
 them. Clients ignore extensions they don&#39;t understand, so it is ultima=
tely on the server to check the certificate is acceptable (as it always is)=
. If we wish to filter on OIDs, we define, e.g., a key_usage value whose co=
ntents have some KeyUsage-specific meaning.<br><div><div><br></div><div>Tha=
t would buy us:<div><br></div><div>- More consistency with other TLS fields=
.</div><div><br></div><div>- More compact encoding. (At the cost of going g=
etting to define 2^16 rule types, but this seems to have been everywhere el=
se.)</div><div><br></div><div>- It is easy to look up what a CertificateExt=
ension means and avoid conflicts. I can go to the registry and see that typ=
e 43 means &quot;match KeyUsage in this way&quot;. For OIDs, it&#39;s not o=
bvious whether=C2=A0</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></d=
iv><div>For OIDs, it&#39;s not obvious whether a given OID has had a matchi=
ng rule defined. (Existing X.509 extensions do not have TLS-level matching =
rules defined. I expect new ones will be defined without them too.)</div><d=
iv>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><d=
iv><div>- Relatedly, we can define multiple kinds of matching rules on the =
same OID. Suppose we define it one way and we realize we got it wrong. The =
OID scheme means we&#39;re stuck with it. The TLS-style scheme allows us to=
 define key_usage_v2 if needed.</div><div><br></div><div>- Less confusion a=
bout known OIDs with unknown matching rules. The text is a little funny rig=
ht now. There are plenty of known extension OIDs right now with unknown mat=
ching rules. Do we fallback to exact match (which means we can never change=
 this) or should clients ignore those? That enforcing known OIDs is a MUST-=
level requirement makes this messier.</div><div><br></div><div>- More flexi=
bility in defining future rule types. Perhaps we want to say some extension=
 is not present. Or some rule is really a combination of two OIDs. Or not a=
n OID at all like &quot;your RSA key must be at least 2048 bits&quot;.</div=
><div><br></div><div>What do folks think?</div><div><br></div><div></div></=
div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div=
>David</div></div></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div><div><div><div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">O=
n Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 6:56 AM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilarili=
usvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bor=
der-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">How are the OIDs and values in Ce=
rtificateRequest extensions encoded<br>
exactly (I can&#39;t make it out from the text)?<br>
<br>
<br>
Does the OID part have the ASN.1 OID TLV tag and length (e.g.<br>
is EKU 0x55 0x1D 0x25 or 0x06 0x03 0x55 0x1D 0x25)?<br>
<br>
<br>
And how is the value encoded? Using the same encoding as<br>
extnValue payload of respective extension in X.509 certifcates?<br>
Or is it OID-specific (and if it is, what exactly goes to it<br>
for EKU and KU? RFC 5280 ExtKeyUsageSyntax and KeyUsage?)<br>
<br>
<br>
(Currently the text just refers to DER encoding, and in a<br>
way that could be read to apply to just to values).<br>
<br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><=
/div></div>

--001a113f6d5eb3f37d053bb21a58--


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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2016 10:17:58 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Fri, 2016-09-02 at 10:04 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> > > I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we
> > defined SHA-2 in
> > > a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
> > to make significant
> > > changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
> > be that case.
> > 
> > I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
> > it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventuallyÂ 
> 
> I'm not sure that that's true.

It is unclear to me what is the intention. Due to the semantics of the
signatureAlgorithms extension in TLS 1.3, if the TLS 1.3 draft doesn't
define SHA3, it effectively _bans_ the usage of SHA3 in all certificate
chains intended to be used by TLS 1.3. If that's the intention then
yes, SHA3 should not be included.

In that case implementations of TLS 1.3 will have to wait for a SHA3
RFC to be published in order to enable the algorithm. That would
introduce a delay, and in certain occasions (e.g., firmware) we will
have TLS 1.3 implementations which may never support SHA3.

IMO, unless there are doubts about SHA3's adoption as a certificate
algorithm, it should be part of the TLS 1.3 spec.

regards,
Nikos


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To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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> On 5 Sep 2016, at 11:17 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Fri, 2016-09-02 at 10:04 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>=20
>>>> I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we
>>> defined SHA-2 in
>>>> a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
>>> to make significant
>>>> changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
>>> be that case.
>>>=20
>>> I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
>>> it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventually=20
>>=20
>> I'm not sure that that's true.
>=20
> It is unclear to me what is the intention. Due to the semantics of the
> signatureAlgorithms extension in TLS 1.3, if the TLS 1.3 draft doesn't
> define SHA3, it effectively _bans_ the usage of SHA3 in all =
certificate
> chains intended to be used by TLS 1.3. If that's the intention then
> yes, SHA3 should not be included.

I don=E2=80=99t think that=E2=80=99s anyone=E2=80=99s intention.

> In that case implementations of TLS 1.3 will have to wait for a SHA3
> RFC to be published in order to enable the algorithm. That would
> introduce a delay, and in certain occasions (e.g., firmware) we will
> have TLS 1.3 implementations which may never support SHA3.

Not necessarily. If you write a SHA-3 document now, and it is simple as =
such documents tend to be, it could go through the last calls before the =
TLS 1.3 document. If it makes a reference to the TLS 1.3 document it =
will end up waiting for TLS 1.3 in the RFC editor=E2=80=99s queue.

The upside is that this adds support for SHA-3 certificates even for TLS =
1.2 implementations, which makes sense to me. If there are SHA-3 =
certificates out there, their use and deployment should not depend on =
TLS 1.3 implementations.

> IMO, unless there are doubts about SHA3's adoption as a certificate
> algorithm, it should be part of the TLS 1.3 spec.

I have doubts. If you=E2=80=99re a CA and you=E2=80=99re going to issue =
a certificate, are you going to use SHA-2 that is supported by nearly =
everything, or SHA-3 that is supported by nothing. How about in 5 years =
when SHA-3 is supported by all updated browsers, but not by old browsers =
and dozens of different programmatic clients?

Besides, maybe we=E2=80=99ll all be using EdDSA and won=E2=80=99t need a =
hash at all.

I think the hard part for SHA-3 is not using it as a certificate hash =
but using it as a PRF.

Yoav


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From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Mon, Sep 05, 2016 at 10:17:58AM +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-09-02 at 10:04 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> > > > I also am not following why we need to do this now. The reason we
> > > defined SHA-2 in
> > > > a new RFC was because (a) SHA-1 was looking weak and (b) we had
> > > to make significant
> > > > changes to TLS to allow the use of SHA-2. This does not seem to
> > > be that case.
> > > 
> > > I don't think we strictly _need_ to do this now, however I think
> > > it's a good idea given that we'll need to do it eventuallyÂ 
> > 
> > I'm not sure that that's true.
> 
> It is unclear to me what is the intention. Due to the semantics of the
> signatureAlgorithms extension in TLS 1.3, if the TLS 1.3 draft doesn't
> define SHA3, it effectively _bans_ the usage of SHA3 in all certificate
> chains intended to be used by TLS 1.3. If that's the intention then
> yes, SHA3 should not be included.

Huh? Can you explain your logic on how you arrived at that conclusion?

AFAICT, there is nothing preventing assigning new SignatureAlgorithm IDs
from 0705...FDFF range, with possible legacy type specified (for TLS 1.2
compatiblity).

So SHA-3 SignatureSchemes can be added to TLS 1.3 _and_ 1.2 post-hoc.


If the above is wrong, there is IMO a serious issue with the draft.



-Ilari


From nobody Mon Sep  5 04:07:53 2016
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Subject: [TLS] draft-davidben-tls-grease-01
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On Friday, 2 September 2016 18:53:45 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> I've finally gotten to uploading
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-grease-01 which hopefully
> resolves the procedural issues (thanks again!). I've also revised the text
> slightly after some off-list feedback about the risks of non-deterministic
> failures.


   Clients SHOULD balance diversity in GREASE advertisements with
   determinism.  For example, a client which randomly varies GREASE
   value positions for each connection may only fail against a broken
   server with some probability.  This risks the failure being masked by
   automatic retries.  A client which positions GREASE values
   deterministically over a period of time (such as a single software
   release) stresses fewer cases but is more likely to detect bugs from
   those cases.

How about adding "In particular, it is RECOMMENDED that for a given browsin=
g=20
session, used GREASE values for a given server are constant."?

   Clients MUST reject GREASE values when negotiated by the server.
   When processing a ServerHello containing a GREASE value in the
   ServerHello.cipher_suite or ServerHello.extensions fields, the client
   MUST fail the connection.  When processing an ECParameters structure
   with a GREASE value in the ECParameter.namedcurve field, the client
   MUST fail the connection.

   Note that this requires no special processing on the client.  Clients
   are already required to reject unknown values selected by the server.

Don't the other RFCs just say that clients should reject values not adverti=
sed=20
by client? Since GREASE values are advertised by clients, I don't think the=
=20
"no special processing" applies. As such, handling how connections in which=
=20
server selects GREASE values should be specified precisely.
(I haven't checked the RFCs for that so I may be mistaken, but still is a b=
it=20
dicey to say that programmers don't need to check error handling in their=20
code...)
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2016 14:48:55 +0000
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On Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 7:07 AM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Friday, 2 September 2016 18:53:45 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> > I've finally gotten to uploading
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-grease-01 which hopefully
> > resolves the procedural issues (thanks again!). I've also revised the
> text
> > slightly after some off-list feedback about the risks of
> non-deterministic
> > failures.
>
>
>    Clients SHOULD balance diversity in GREASE advertisements with
>    determinism.  For example, a client which randomly varies GREASE
>    value positions for each connection may only fail against a broken
>    server with some probability.  This risks the failure being masked by
>    automatic retries.  A client which positions GREASE values
>    deterministically over a period of time (such as a single software
>    release) stresses fewer cases but is more likely to detect bugs from
>    those cases.
>
> How about adding "In particular, it is RECOMMENDED that for a given
> browsing
> session, used GREASE values for a given server are constant."?
>

So, at least the naive way of doing that gives a blatant tracking vector,
which is pretty bad. Hence the example of varying over software versions.
We already assume those are distinguishable because everyone offers
different things and we keep tweaking them. (Apart from clients which try
to mimic other software's ClientHello, but those weren't going to play this
game anyway.)

I guess this is an obvious thing to toss into security considerations. Will
add it to the next iteration.

I think it's actually fine to vary the values per connection. I want it to
be immediately obvious that ClientHellos are allowed to vary so do not
special-case the one GREASE value we picked. This was meant to be a
replacement for the old text. I'd previously envisioned going at the front
or back with 50% probability which I'm not sure would work well?

I dunno. One can just freely toy around with dumb ideas and see what works.
:-) Spec-wise, the only thing of substance in this document is burning a
bunch of values.


>    Clients MUST reject GREASE values when negotiated by the server.
>    When processing a ServerHello containing a GREASE value in the
>    ServerHello.cipher_suite or ServerHello.extensions fields, the client
>    MUST fail the connection.  When processing an ECParameters structure
>    with a GREASE value in the ECParameter.namedcurve field, the client
>    MUST fail the connection.
>
>    Note that this requires no special processing on the client.  Clients
>    are already required to reject unknown values selected by the server.
>
> Don't the other RFCs just say that clients should reject values not
> advertised
> by client? Since GREASE values are advertised by clients, I don't think the
> "no special processing" applies. As such, handling how connections in which
> server selects GREASE values should be specified precisely.
> (I haven't checked the RFCs for that so I may be mistaken, but still is a
> bit
> dicey to say that programmers don't need to check error handling in their
> code...)
>

Right. That's why this one says "no special processing" rather than
"restatements or corollaries of existing [client] requirements" as in the
server section. In the implementation I've tossed together, this never
makes it into the list of values the client believes it has advertised. The
serialization code just adds some u16s without remembering them anywhere.
As a result, all the existing logic works just fine.

David

--94eb2c05bce833915d053bc3c831
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Sep 5,=
 2016 at 7:07 AM Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com">hkar=
io@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Fri=
day, 2 September 2016 18:53:45 CEST David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve finally gotten to uploading<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-grease-01" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-david=
ben-tls-grease-01</a> which hopefully<br>
&gt; resolves the procedural issues (thanks again!). I&#39;ve also revised =
the text<br>
&gt; slightly after some off-list feedback about the risks of non-determini=
stic<br>
&gt; failures.<br>
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Clients SHOULD balance diversity in GREASE advertisements with=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0determinism.=C2=A0 For example, a client which randomly varies=
 GREASE<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0value positions for each connection may only fail against a br=
oken<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server with some probability.=C2=A0 This risks the failure bei=
ng masked by<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0automatic retries.=C2=A0 A client which positions GREASE value=
s<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0deterministically over a period of time (such as a single soft=
ware<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0release) stresses fewer cases but is more likely to detect bug=
s from<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0those cases.<br>
<br>
How about adding &quot;In particular, it is RECOMMENDED that for a given br=
owsing<br>
session, used GREASE values for a given server are constant.&quot;?<br></bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>So, at least the naive way of doing that gives=
 a blatant tracking vector, which is pretty bad. Hence the example of varyi=
ng over software versions. We already assume those are distinguishable beca=
use everyone offers different things and we keep tweaking them. (Apart from=
 clients which try to mimic other software&#39;s ClientHello, but those wer=
en&#39;t going to play this game anyway.)</div><div><br></div><div>I guess =
this is an obvious thing to toss into security considerations. Will add it =
to the next iteration.</div><div><br></div><div>I think it&#39;s actually f=
ine to vary the values per connection. I want it to be immediately obvious =
that ClientHellos are allowed to vary so do not special-case the one GREASE=
 value we picked. This was meant to be a replacement for the old text. I&#3=
9;d previously envisioned going at the front or back with 50% probability w=
hich I&#39;m not sure would work well?</div><div><br></div><div>I dunno. On=
e can just freely toy around with dumb ideas and see what works. :-) Spec-w=
ise, the only thing of substance in this document is burning a bunch of val=
ues.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Clients MUST reject GREASE values when negotiated by the serve=
r.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0When processing a ServerHello containing a GREASE value in the=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0ServerHello.cipher_suite or ServerHello.extensions fields, the=
 client<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0MUST fail the connection.=C2=A0 When processing an ECParameter=
s structure<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0with a GREASE value in the ECParameter.namedcurve field, the c=
lient<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0MUST fail the connection.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Note that this requires no special processing on the client.=
=C2=A0 Clients<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are already required to reject unknown values selected by the =
server.<br>
<br>
Don&#39;t the other RFCs just say that clients should reject values not adv=
ertised<br>
by client? Since GREASE values are advertised by clients, I don&#39;t think=
 the<br>
&quot;no special processing&quot; applies. As such, handling how connection=
s in which<br>
server selects GREASE values should be specified precisely.<br>
(I haven&#39;t checked the RFCs for that so I may be mistaken, but still is=
 a bit<br>
dicey to say that programmers don&#39;t need to check error handling in the=
ir<br>
code...)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Right. That&#39;s why this one=
 says &quot;no special processing&quot; rather than &quot;restatements or c=
orollaries of existing [client] requirements&quot; as in the server section=
. In the implementation I&#39;ve tossed together, this never makes it into =
the list of values the client believes it has advertised. The serialization=
 code just adds some u16s without remembering them anywhere. As a result, a=
ll the existing logic works just fine.</div><div><br></div><div>David</div>=
</div></div>

--94eb2c05bce833915d053bc3c831--


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2016 16:59:23 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-davidben-tls-grease-01
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On Monday, 5 September 2016 14:48:55 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 7:07 AM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Friday, 2 September 2016 18:53:45 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> > > I've finally gotten to uploading
> > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-grease-01 which hopefu=
lly
> > > resolves the procedural issues (thanks again!). I've also revised the

> >    Clients MUST reject GREASE values when negotiated by the server.
> >    When processing a ServerHello containing a GREASE value in the
> >    ServerHello.cipher_suite or ServerHello.extensions fields, the client
> >    MUST fail the connection.  When processing an ECParameters structure
> >    with a GREASE value in the ECParameter.namedcurve field, the client
> >    MUST fail the connection.
> >   =20
> >    Note that this requires no special processing on the client.  Clients
> >    are already required to reject unknown values selected by the server.
> >=20
> > Don't the other RFCs just say that clients should reject values not
> > advertised
> > by client? Since GREASE values are advertised by clients, I don't think
> > the
> > "no special processing" applies. As such, handling how connections in
> > which
> > server selects GREASE values should be specified precisely.
> > (I haven't checked the RFCs for that so I may be mistaken, but still is=
 a
> > bit
> > dicey to say that programmers don't need to check error handling in the=
ir
> > code...)
>=20
> Right. That's why this one says "no special processing" rather than
> "restatements or corollaries of existing [client] requirements" as in the
> server section. In the implementation I've tossed together, this never
> makes it into the list of values the client believes it has advertised. T=
he
> serialization code just adds some u16s without remembering them anywhere.
> As a result, all the existing logic works just fine.

On the other hand, the implementation I work on keeps the sent Client Hello=
 on=20
hand and checks the server response against the exact values it sent.

So for it, server selecting GREASE value would be fine, it would fail at ke=
y=20
exchange processing time.

Keeping the Client Hello in case server asks for certificate verification i=
s=20
not entirely unheard of either.

So I think it's best to keep the specification implementation agnostic,=20
without any assumptions about how the code is written, and describe just th=
e=20
externally visible behaviour. But describe it fully.
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2016 15:55:49 +0000
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On Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 10:59 AM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Monday, 5 September 2016 14:48:55 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 7:07 AM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > On Friday, 2 September 2016 18:53:45 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> > > > I've finally gotten to uploading
> > > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-grease-01 which
> hopefully
> > > > resolves the procedural issues (thanks again!). I've also revised the
>
> > >    Clients MUST reject GREASE values when negotiated by the server.
> > >    When processing a ServerHello containing a GREASE value in the
> > >    ServerHello.cipher_suite or ServerHello.extensions fields, the
> client
> > >    MUST fail the connection.  When processing an ECParameters structure
> > >    with a GREASE value in the ECParameter.namedcurve field, the client
> > >    MUST fail the connection.
> > >
> > >    Note that this requires no special processing on the client.
> Clients
> > >    are already required to reject unknown values selected by the
> server.
> > >
> > > Don't the other RFCs just say that clients should reject values not
> > > advertised
> > > by client? Since GREASE values are advertised by clients, I don't think
> > > the
> > > "no special processing" applies. As such, handling how connections in
> > > which
> > > server selects GREASE values should be specified precisely.
> > > (I haven't checked the RFCs for that so I may be mistaken, but still
> is a
> > > bit
> > > dicey to say that programmers don't need to check error handling in
> their
> > > code...)
> >
> > Right. That's why this one says "no special processing" rather than
> > "restatements or corollaries of existing [client] requirements" as in the
> > server section. In the implementation I've tossed together, this never
> > makes it into the list of values the client believes it has advertised.
> The
> > serialization code just adds some u16s without remembering them anywhere.
> > As a result, all the existing logic works just fine.
>
> On the other hand, the implementation I work on keeps the sent Client
> Hello on
> hand and checks the server response against the exact values it sent.
>
> So for it, server selecting GREASE value would be fine, it would fail at
> key
> exchange processing time.
>
> Keeping the Client Hello in case server asks for certificate verification
> is
> not entirely unheard of either.
>
> So I think it's best to keep the specification implementation agnostic,
> without any assumptions about how the code is written, and describe just
> the
> externally visible behaviour. But describe it fully.
>

The document does that, no? Or are you simply asking that I remove the "no
special processing sentence. Happy to do that.

(I'm assuming your implementation then handles the renegotiate_info SCSV
and FALLBACK_SCSV similarly special? It's the same story with those two.)

David

--001a113ee30a6f9b62053bc4b7a4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Sep 5,=
 2016 at 10:59 AM Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">On Monday, 5 September 2016 14:48:55 CEST David Benjamin wrot=
e:<br>
&gt; On Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 7:07 AM Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkar=
io@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; On Friday, 2 September 2016 18:53:45 CEST David Benjamin wrote:<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; &gt; I&#39;ve finally gotten to uploading<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-gr=
ease-01" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/d=
raft-davidben-tls-grease-01</a> which hopefully<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; resolves the procedural issues (thanks again!). I&#39;ve als=
o revised the<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Clients MUST reject GREASE values when negotiated by=
 the server.<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 When processing a ServerHello containing a GREASE va=
lue in the<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ServerHello.cipher_suite or ServerHello.extensions f=
ields, the client<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MUST fail the connection.=C2=A0 When processing an E=
CParameters structure<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 with a GREASE value in the ECParameter.namedcurve fi=
eld, the client<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MUST fail the connection.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note that this requires no special processing on the=
 client.=C2=A0 Clients<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 are already required to reject unknown values select=
ed by the server.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Don&#39;t the other RFCs just say that clients should reject valu=
es not<br>
&gt; &gt; advertised<br>
&gt; &gt; by client? Since GREASE values are advertised by clients, I don&#=
39;t think<br>
&gt; &gt; the<br>
&gt; &gt; &quot;no special processing&quot; applies. As such, handling how =
connections in<br>
&gt; &gt; which<br>
&gt; &gt; server selects GREASE values should be specified precisely.<br>
&gt; &gt; (I haven&#39;t checked the RFCs for that so I may be mistaken, bu=
t still is a<br>
&gt; &gt; bit<br>
&gt; &gt; dicey to say that programmers don&#39;t need to check error handl=
ing in their<br>
&gt; &gt; code...)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Right. That&#39;s why this one says &quot;no special processing&quot; =
rather than<br>
&gt; &quot;restatements or corollaries of existing [client] requirements&qu=
ot; as in the<br>
&gt; server section. In the implementation I&#39;ve tossed together, this n=
ever<br>
&gt; makes it into the list of values the client believes it has advertised=
. The<br>
&gt; serialization code just adds some u16s without remembering them anywhe=
re.<br>
&gt; As a result, all the existing logic works just fine.<br>
<br>
On the other hand, the implementation I work on keeps the sent Client Hello=
 on<br>
hand and checks the server response against the exact values it sent.<br>
<br>
So for it, server selecting GREASE value would be fine, it would fail at ke=
y<br>
exchange processing time.<br>
<br>
Keeping the Client Hello in case server asks for certificate verification i=
s<br>
not entirely unheard of either.<br>
<br>
So I think it&#39;s best to keep the specification implementation agnostic,=
<br>
without any assumptions about how the code is written, and describe just th=
e<br>
externally visible behaviour. But describe it fully.<br></blockquote><div><=
br></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><div>The document does that, no? Or are you simply asking that I remove th=
e &quot;no special processing sentence. Happy to do that.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>(I&#39;m assuming your implementation then handles the renegotiate_=
info SCSV and FALLBACK_SCSV similarly special? It&#39;s the same story with=
 those two.)</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>David=C2=A0</div></div></div></di=
v></div>

--001a113ee30a6f9b62053bc4b7a4--


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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On Monday, 5 September 2016 15:55:49 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 10:59 AM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On the other hand, the implementation I work on keeps the sent Client
> > Hello on
> > hand and checks the server response against the exact values it sent.
> >=20
> > So for it, server selecting GREASE value would be fine, it would fail at
> > key
> > exchange processing time.
> >=20
> > Keeping the Client Hello in case server asks for certificate verificati=
on
> > is
> > not entirely unheard of either.
> >=20
> > So I think it's best to keep the specification implementation agnostic,
> > without any assumptions about how the code is written, and describe just
> > the
> > externally visible behaviour. But describe it fully.
>=20
> The document does that, no? Or are you simply asking that I remove the "no
> special processing sentence. Happy to do that.
>=20
> (I'm assuming your implementation then handles the renegotiate_info SCSV
> and FALLBACK_SCSV similarly special? It's the same story with those two.)

yes, it handles them specially, but that's actually by a happy coincidence:=
=20
client needs to verify that the ciphersuite can be negotiated with a TLS=20
version selected by server and you can't negotiate those two ciphers with a=
ny=20
version (in other words, this is a result of self-consistency check on serv=
er=20
hello, not explicit check against them)

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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Subject: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625

Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under various
fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but
instead
just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we should
relax
the requirement.

At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage
sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a specific
one.
I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link above).
This
PR:

- Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I missed
  a couple of places)
- Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions to
avoid
  having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
- Relaxes the requirement as listed above.

Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide to
continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one location not
scattered around the spec.

I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the requirement to
send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to handle
this PR.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr">PR: <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/62=
5">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625</a><br><div><br></div><div>=
Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under variou=
s</div><div>fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don&#39;t send =
alerts but instead</div><div>just terminate the connection. Several people =
have argued that we should relax</div><div>the requirement.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead enco=
urage</div><div>sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you s=
end a specific one.</div><div>I&#39;ve finally gotten around to producing a=
 PR that does this (link above). This</div><div>PR:</div><div><br></div><di=
v>- Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I miss=
ed</div><div>=C2=A0 a couple of places)</div><div><div>- Tries to make whic=
h alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions to avoid</div><div>=C2=
=A0 having to specify individually how to handle every decision.</div></div=
><div>- Relaxes the requirement as listed above.</div><div><br></div><div>N=
ote that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide to<=
br></div><div>continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in o=
ne location not</div><div>scattered around the spec.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>I know that there wasn&#39;t universal consensus on relaxing the require=
ment to</div><div>send, so I&#39;ll await WG discussion and the chairs deci=
sion on how to handle this PR.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><di=
v><br></div></div>

--001a11408d48dc006a053bc67f0f--


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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 19:25:39 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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--001a1142f196b6b0a3053bc6ce67
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On 31 August 2016 at 20:48, Hilarie Orman <hilarie@purplestreak.com> wrote:

> >  From: Brian Sniffen <bsniffen@akamai.com>
>
> >  >>  From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
> >  >>  Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2016 10:17:25 -0400
> >  >
> >  >>  "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu> writes:
> >  >
> >  >>  > Yes.  To a large extent, the "IoT devices are too puny for real
> >  >>  > crypto" is a hangover from several years ago. It was once true;
> for
> >  >>  > the most part, it isn't today, but people haven't flushed their
> cache
> >  >>  > from the old received wisdom.
> >  >
> >  >>  This is certainly true for AES, mostly because many small chips are
> >  >>  including AES accelerators in hardware.  It's not quite true for
> public
> >  >>  key solutions; there are still very small devices where even ECC
> takes
> >  >>  too long (and yes, there are cases where 200-400ms is still too
> long).
> >  >
> >  >>  > It pays to look again at David Wagner's slides from 2005, on
> sensor
> >  >>  > nets and crypto:
> >  >>  > https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/talks/sens-oak05.pdf
> >  >>  >
> >  >
> >  > Unattended sensors with wifi present an unsolved crypto problem.  They
> >  > can last 10 years on an AA battery without crypto, probably well less
> >  > than a year if they have to do any kind of encryption.  These things
> >  > will be everywhere, providing the data that will underly all kinds of
> >  > decision-making.
>
> >  Assuming there are *some* integrity requirements for the data, and that
> >  they are deploying 32-bit ARM with AES support (stipulating that ~every
> >  CPU will have AES support in a few years, as ~every CPU sold does
> >  today), we're talking about *either* an ECDHE negotiation every few
> >  months or a pre-shared key, good for ten years.
>
> >  AES-GCM with hardware support compares favorably to SHA-2 without
> >  hardware support, so if they've been able to last 10 years before, they
> >  should do just fine in the future.  The old devices won't last forever,
> >  and probably can't run TLS 1.3---that's fine, TLS 1.2 will be with us
> >  for ten years after 1.3 is out.
>
> >  -Brian
>
> >  > Although much of the solution may lie in hardware innovation, the
> >  > world really does need minimal crypto algorithms.
> >  >
> >  > Hilarie
> >  >
>
> An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge data/send
> data".
>

The question is not "how much hardware?" but "price?" - with  ARMs
including h/w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to explain
why you\d want to use a less powerful CPU...


>
> Hilarie
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

--001a1142f196b6b0a3053bc6ce67
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 31 August 2016 at 20:48, Hilarie Orman <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:hilarie@purplestreak.com" target=3D"_blank">hilarie@purplestreak=
.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">&gt;=C2=A0 Fro=
m: Brian Sniffen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bsniffen@akamai.com">bsniffen@akamai=
.com</a>&gt;<br>
<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 From: Derek Atkins &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:derek@ih=
tfp.com">derek@ihtfp.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2016 10:17:25 -0400<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &quot;Steven M. Bellovin&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:smb@cs.columbia.edu">smb@cs.columbia.edu</a>&gt; writes:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; Yes.=C2=A0 To a large extent, the &quot;IoT =
devices are too puny for real<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; crypto&quot; is a hangover from several year=
s ago. It was once true; for<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; the most part, it isn&#39;t today, but peopl=
e haven&#39;t flushed their cache<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; from the old received wisdom.<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 This is certainly true for AES, mostly because ma=
ny small chips are<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 including AES accelerators in hardware.=C2=A0 It&=
#39;s not quite true for public<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 key solutions; there are still very small devices=
 where even ECC takes<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 too long (and yes, there are cases where 200-400m=
s is still too long).<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; It pays to look again at David Wagner&#39;s =
slides from 2005, on sensor<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; nets and crypto:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; <a href=3D"https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/=
~daw/talks/sens-oak05.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://peo=
ple.eecs.berkeley.<wbr>edu/~daw/talks/sens-oak05.pdf</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; Unattended sensors with wifi present an unsolved crypto pro=
blem.=C2=A0 They<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; can last 10 years on an AA battery without crypto, probably=
 well less<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; than a year if they have to do any kind of encryption.=C2=
=A0 These things<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; will be everywhere, providing the data that will underly al=
l kinds of<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; decision-making.<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 Assuming there are *some* integrity requirements for the data, a=
nd that<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 they are deploying 32-bit ARM with AES support (stipulating that=
 ~every<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 CPU will have AES support in a few years, as ~every CPU sold doe=
s<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 today), we&#39;re talking about *either* an ECDHE negotiation ev=
ery few<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 months or a pre-shared key, good for ten years.<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 AES-GCM with hardware support compares favorably to SHA-2 withou=
t<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 hardware support, so if they&#39;ve been able to last 10 years b=
efore, they<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 should do just fine in the future.=C2=A0 The old devices won&#39=
;t last forever,<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 and probably can&#39;t run TLS 1.3---that&#39;s fine, TLS 1.2 wi=
ll be with us<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 for ten years after 1.3 is out.<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 -Brian<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; Although much of the solution may lie in hardware innovatio=
n, the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; world really does need minimal crypto algorithms.<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; Hilarie<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
<br>
</div></div>An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at &quot;read sensor/m=
unge data/send data&quot;.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The question=
 is not &quot;how much hardware?&quot; but &quot;price?&quot; - with =C2=A0=
ARMs including h/w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to expla=
in why you\d want to use a less powerful CPU...</div><div>=C2=A0</div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Hilarie<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.irtf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1142f196b6b0a3053bc6ce67--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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>  On 31 August 2016 at 20:48, Hilarie Orman <hilarie@purplestreak.com> wrote:

>  > >  From: Brian Sniffen <bsniffen@akamai.com>
>  >
>  > >  >>  From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
>  > >  >>  Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2016 10:17:25 -0400
>  > >  >
>  > >  >>  "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu> writes:
>  > >  >
>  > >  >>  > Yes.  To a large extent, the "IoT devices are too puny for real
>  > >  >>  > crypto" is a hangover from several years ago. It was once true;
>  > for
>  > >  >>  > the most part, it isn't today, but people haven't flushed their
>  > cache
>  > >  >>  > from the old received wisdom.
>  > >  >
>  > >  >>  This is certainly true for AES, mostly because many small chips are
>  > >  >>  including AES accelerators in hardware.  It's not quite true for
>  > public
>  > >  >>  key solutions; there are still very small devices where even ECC
>  > takes
>  > >  >>  too long (and yes, there are cases where 200-400ms is still too
>  > long).
>  > >  >
>  > >  >>  > It pays to look again at David Wagner's slides from 2005, on
>  > sensor
>  > >  >>  > nets and crypto:
>  > >  >>  > https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/talks/sens-oak05.pdf
>  > >  >>  >
>  > >  >
>  > >  > Unattended sensors with wifi present an unsolved crypto problem.  They
>  > >  > can last 10 years on an AA battery without crypto, probably well less
>  > >  > than a year if they have to do any kind of encryption.  These things
>  > >  > will be everywhere, providing the data that will underly all kinds of
>  > >  > decision-making.
>  >
>  > >  Assuming there are *some* integrity requirements for the data, and that
>  > >  they are deploying 32-bit ARM with AES support (stipulating that ~every
>  > >  CPU will have AES support in a few years, as ~every CPU sold does
>  > >  today), we're talking about *either* an ECDHE negotiation every few
>  > >  months or a pre-shared key, good for ten years.
>  >
>  > >  AES-GCM with hardware support compares favorably to SHA-2 without
>  > >  hardware support, so if they've been able to last 10 years before, they
>  > >  should do just fine in the future.  The old devices won't last forever,
>  > >  and probably can't run TLS 1.3---that's fine, TLS 1.2 will be with us
>  > >  for ten years after 1.3 is out.
>  >
>  > >  -Brian
>  >
>  > >  > Although much of the solution may lie in hardware innovation, the
>  > >  > world really does need minimal crypto algorithms.
>  > >  >
>  > >  > Hilarie
>  > >  >
>  >
>  > An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge data/send
>  > data".
>  >

>  The question is not "how much hardware?" but "price?" - with  ARMs
>  including h/w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to explain
>  why you\d want to use a less powerful CPU...


>  >
>  > Hilarie
>  >

Power.

Hilarie


From nobody Mon Sep  5 13:44:56 2016
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 21:44:50 +0100
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To: Hilarie Orman <hilarie@purplestreak.com>
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Cc: cfrg@irtf.org, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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On 5 September 2016 at 20:06, Hilarie Orman <hilarie@purplestreak.com> wrote:
> At some time when attribution was hard, I wrote:
> >  On 31 August 2016 at 20:48, Hilarie Orman <hilarie@purplestreak.com> wrote:
> >  > An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge data/send
> >  > data".
>
> >  The question is not "how much hardware?" but "price?" - with  ARMs
> >  including h/w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to explain
> >  why you\d want to use a less powerful CPU...
>
> Power.

AIUI the main power sink is comms.


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2016 01:04:33 +0000
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To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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On Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 5:46 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> =C3=98  A CertificateExtension is a hint to the client about what kind of
> certificates are acceptable. We have a registry of u16s for them. Clients
> ignore extensions they don't understand, so it is ultimately on the serve=
r
> to check the certificate is acceptable (as it always is). If we wish to
> filter on OIDs, we define, e.g., a key_usage value whose contents have so=
me
> KeyUsage-specific meaning.
>
>
>
> Do we need to make it this flexible? The idea was to avoid adding
> complexity to the certificate filtering code in the TLS stack, and instea=
d
> filter by OIDs in the PKI library. PKI libraries already inspect and matc=
h
> OID values, so this should be a relatively small change for them.
>
But it's OID-specific how the matching works, isn't it? Or are you
envisioning that everything but the two exceptions listed here is just
going to be an exact contents match? That there were exceptions was what
seemed off to me.

My gut feeling is exceptions would be the norm and we actually want to be
very precise here or we'll just implicitly standardize whatever one PKI
library does. (I haven't heard of X.509 extension specs defining matchers.)
Doing something TLS-style means we have much clearer semantics. We'd need
to do a bit more work defining a bunch of code points for each OID matcher
we want, but it's something that ought to be written down anyway.

Or is my gut feeling wrong and most of them just an exact match? What is
your PKI library's filter interface?

(Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I don't
feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I thought I'd
suggest this.)

David

--001a1141fa94d863c9053bcc6115
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Sep 5,=
 2016 at 5:46 PM Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.=
com" target=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_-6347781523463309710m_2896426911809655592WordSection1">
<p class=3D"m_-6347781523463309710m_2896426911809655592MsoListParagraph"><s=
pan style=3D"font-family:Wingdings">=C3=98<span style=3D"font-variant-numer=
ic:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:7pt;line-height:normal;font-family:=
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0
</span></span><u></u>A CertificateExtension is a hint to the client about w=
hat kind of certificates are acceptable. We have a registry of u16s for the=
m. Clients ignore extensions they don&#39;t understand, so it is ultimately=
 on the server to check the
 certificate is acceptable (as it always is). If we wish to filter on OIDs,=
 we define, e.g., a key_usage value whose contents have some KeyUsage-speci=
fic meaning.<br><u></u></p></div></div><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vl=
ink=3D"purple"><div class=3D"m_-6347781523463309710m_2896426911809655592Wor=
dSection1"><p class=3D"m_-6347781523463309710m_2896426911809655592MsoListPa=
ragraph"><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Do we need to make it this flexible? The idea was t=
o avoid adding complexity to the certificate filtering code in the TLS stac=
k, and instead filter by OIDs in the PKI library.
 PKI libraries already inspect and match OID values, so this should be a re=
latively small change for them.</span></p></div></div></blockquote></div><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>But it&#39;s OID-specific ho=
w the matching works, isn&#39;t it? Or are you envisioning that everything =
but the two exceptions listed here is just going to be an exact contents ma=
tch? That there were exceptions was what seemed off to me.</div><div><br></=
div><div>My gut feeling is exceptions would be the norm and we actually wan=
t to be very precise here or we&#39;ll just implicitly standardize whatever=
 one PKI library does. (I haven&#39;t heard of X.509 extension specs defini=
ng matchers.) Doing something TLS-style means we have much clearer semantic=
s. We&#39;d need to do a bit more work defining a bunch of code points for =
each OID matcher we want, but it&#39;s something that ought to be written d=
own anyway.</div><div><br></div><div>Or is my gut feeling wrong and most of=
 them just an exact match? What is your PKI library&#39;s filter interface?=
</div><div><br></div><div>(Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on=
 ignoring it, so I don&#39;t feel about this all too strongly. But the topi=
c came up so I thought I&#39;d suggest this.)</div></div></div><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>David</div></div></div>=
</div>

--001a1141fa94d863c9053bcc6115--


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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Aloha!

Hilarie Orman wrote:
>> On 31 August 2016 at 20:48, Hilarie Orman
>> <hilarie@purplestreak.com> wrote:
> 
>>>> From: Brian Sniffen <bsniffen@akamai.com>
> 
>> The question is not "how much hardware?" but "price?" - with  ARMs 
>> including h/w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to
>> explain why you\d want to use a less powerful CPU...
> 
> 
> Power.
> 
> Hilarie

Did you look at the ARM Cortex M0+ Gecko Zero I pointed to? I'd
recommend that you compare its power consumption to a PIC.

The PIC is manufactured using larger geometries that consumes more
power/gate/MHz. The Gecko Zero has more power modes allowing it to
enable/disable different functions very fast, and is able to scale its
own internal clock frequency very flexibly. The Gecko Zero (and other
M0+ devices) can also do more/cycle so that total power up time is
shortened, saving power.

Specifically (since we talked about it before), the AES core in the
Gecko Zero takes about 50 cycles to process one block (and the CPU core
can be powered down at the same time). Googling for cycles to perform
AES on PIC I found:

Encryption
PIC16F877 : 3834 cycles
PIC16F84 : 7157 cycles

https://edipermadi.wordpress.com/2008/02/09/an-aes-implementation-on-pic16f877/

So on the PIC you need to have the CPU core powered up and running about
80 times longer (in terms of cycles) than the Gecko needs to run its AES
core.

And even if you don't have an AES core, the ARM can do AES in fewer
cycles. This one shows 2270 cycles for AES-128

http://www.cryptovia.com/ARM_Thumb_AES.html


Selecting 8/16 bit MCUs like AVR, PIC, 8051 in 2016 for power reasons
without looking at modern 32-bit MCUs based on ARM or MIPS is a mistake
imho.

- -- 
Med vÃ¤nlig hÃ¤lsning, Yours

Joachim StrÃ¶mbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svÃ¤ngning.
========================================================================
 Joachim StrÃ¶mbergson          Secworks AB          joachim@secworks.se
========================================================================
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From: Gilles Van Assche <gilles.vanassche@st.com>
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Hello,

For RSA PSS, I would suggest to consider:
rsa_pss_shake128
rsa_pss_shake256
where SHAKE128 (or 256), as an exendable output function (XOF), directly
replaces the mask generating function MGF.

This would make RSA PSS simpler and more efficient.

Kind regards,
Gilles


On 01/09/16 19:38, Hubert Kario wrote:
> The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't TLSv1.3 
> include signatures with those hashes then?
>
> I think at least the following signature algorithms should be added:
> ecdsa_secp256r1_sha3_256
> ecdsa_secp384r1_sha3_384
> ecdsa_secp521r1_sha3_512
>
> rsa_pss_sha3_256
> rsa_pss_sha3_384
> rsa_pss_sha3_512
>
>  1 - https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-19181/
> announcing-approval-of-federal-information-processing-standard-fips-202-sha-3-
> standard


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+1

 

On 9/6/16, 7:47 , "TLS on behalf of Gilles Van Assche" <tls-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of gilles.vanassche@st.com> wrote:

 

Hello,

 

For RSA PSS, I would suggest to consider:

rsa_pss_shake128

rsa_pss_shake256

where SHAKE128 (or 256), as an exendable output function (XOF), directly

replaces the mask generating function MGF.

 

This would make RSA PSS simpler and more efficient.

 

Kind regards,

Gilles

 

 

On 01/09/16 19:38, Hubert Kario wrote:

The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't TLSv1.3 

include signatures with those hashes then?

 

I think at least the following signature algorithms should be added:

ecdsa_secp256r1_sha3_256

ecdsa_secp384r1_sha3_384

ecdsa_secp521r1_sha3_512

 

rsa_pss_sha3_256

rsa_pss_sha3_384

rsa_pss_sha3_512

 

  1 - https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-19181/

announcing-approval-of-federal-information-processing-standard-fips-202-sha-3-

standard

 


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v class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;co=
lor:black'>+1<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-fami=
ly:Consolas;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><spa=
n style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>On 9/6/16, 7:47 , &quot;TLS on be=
half of Gilles Van Assche&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">tl=
s-bounces@ietf.org</a> on behalf of <a href=3D"mailto:gilles.vanassche@st.com"=
>gilles.vanassche@st.com</a>&gt; wrote:</span><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>Hello,</span><o:p></o:p></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>For RSA PSS, I would sugge=
st to consider:</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>rsa_pss_shake128</span><o:p></o:p></p>=
</div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'=
>rsa_pss_shake256</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>where SHAKE128 (or 256), as an exend=
able output function (XOF), directly</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>replaces the mask=
 generating function MGF.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family=
:Consolas;color:black'>This would make RSA PSS simpler and more efficient.</=
span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>Kind=
 regards,</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-family:Consolas;color:black'>Gilles</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;co=
lor:black'>On 01/09/16 19:38, Hubert Kario wrote:</span><o:p></o:p></p></div=
><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in =
0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-right:0in' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTI=
ON_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;col=
or:black'>The SHA-3 standard is already published and accepted[1], shouldn't=
 TLSv1.3 </span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-family:Consolas;color:black'>include signatures with those hashes then?</=
span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>I th=
ink at least the following signature algorithms should be added:</span><o:p>=
</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;co=
lor:black'>ecdsa_secp256r1_sha3_256</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>ecdsa_secp384r1_sh=
a3_384</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
family:Consolas;color:black'>ecdsa_secp521r1_sha3_512</span><o:p></o:p></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>rsa_pss_sha3_256</span><o=
:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas=
;color:black'>rsa_pss_sha3_384</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>rsa_pss_sha3_512</span>=
<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>&nbsp;&nb=
sp;1 - <a href=3D"https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-191=
81/">https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/08/05/2015-19181/</a></sp=
an><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:Con=
solas;color:black'>announcing-approval-of-federal-information-processing-sta=
ndard-fips-202-sha-3-</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal sty=
le=3D'margin-left:12.0pt'><span style=3D'font-family:Consolas;color:black'>stand=
ard</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>

--B_3555995743_516211623--

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--B_3555995743_178483354--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I don't f=
eel=0A=
>about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I thought I'd sugges=
t=0A=
>this.=0A=
=0A=
I ignore it too.  Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy, that =
I'm=0A=
not going to make things harder on users by adding complex and opaque=0A=
filtering to prevent them from working.  My approach is to specify as few=
=0A=
constraints as possible, the client submits whatever certificate it has, an=
d=0A=
it's then decided based on a whitelist for which the server can very clearl=
y=0A=
report "not on the whitelist" when it rejects it.  The design seems to be=
=0A=
based on the idea that each client has a smorgasbord of certs and the serve=
r=0A=
can specify in precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in realit=
y=0A=
each client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just=
=0A=
want the one they've got to work.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes:
>
>> Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I don't feel
>> about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I thought I'd suggest
>> this.
>
> I ignore it too.  Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy, that I'm
> not going to make things harder on users by adding complex and opaque
> filtering to prevent them from working.  My approach is to specify as few
> constraints as possible, the client submits whatever certificate it has, and
> it's then decided based on a whitelist for which the server can very clearly
> report "not on the whitelist" when it rejects it.  The design seems to be
> based on the idea that each client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server
> can specify in precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality
> each client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just
> want the one they've got to work.

May I add some nuances here?

Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box communication.
Existing selection methods suffice (there's usually none on the client side).

Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a small
and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors dropping support
for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use case which make
improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.

Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through proprietary
("FIDO like") application level protocols is fairly big.  Half of the Swedish
population use such a scheme for e-government and bank access.  It uses an ugly
(and non-secure) OOB-method to make it "Web compatible".  This use-case is
(of course) not of an issue for the TLS WG but may be of some interest for
people currently using client certificates for Web authentication.

Anders


>
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


From nobody Tue Sep  6 10:04:02 2016
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, "Ilari Liusvaara" <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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> The design seems to be based on the idea that each=20
> client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in=20
> precise detail in advance which one it wants...
This is actually a pretty good description of a number of deployments our c=
ustomers have. On the other hand, a lot of Web clients can do without OID-b=
ased client cert filtering, so certificate_extensions support is optional (=
and if this is not clear, we should fix the language).

> Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box communic=
ation.
Correct, and this adds to the smorgasborg of client certs.

> But it's OID-specific how the matching works, isn't it?
Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the OID=
s I've got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want to de=
fine matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This new p=
roposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which certainl=
y increases flexibility.

David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that we c=
an discuss the specifics?

Thanks,

Andrei

-----Original Message-----
From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; David Benjamin <davidben@chr=
omium.org>; Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>; Ilari Liusvaara <ila=
riliusvaara@welho.com>; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding

On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes:
>
>> Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I=20
>> don't feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I=20
>> thought I'd suggest this.
>
> I ignore it too.  Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy,=20
> that I'm not going to make things harder on users by adding complex=20
> and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.  My approach is to=20
> specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever=20
> certificate it has, and it's then decided based on a whitelist for=20
> which the server can very clearly report "not on the whitelist" when=20
> it rejects it.  The design seems to be based on the idea that each=20
> client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in=20
> precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each=20
> client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just wa=
nt the one they've got to work.

May I add some nuances here?

Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box communicat=
ion.
Existing selection methods suffice (there's usually none on the client side=
).

Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a s=
mall and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors dropping=
 support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use case wh=
ich make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.

Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through prop=
rietary ("FIDO like") application level protocols is fairly big.  Half of t=
he Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government and bank access.  =
It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it "Web compatible".  T=
his use-case is (of course) not of an issue for the TLS WG but may be of so=
me interest for people currently using client certificates for Web authenti=
cation.

Anders


>
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> writes:

> David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes:
> 
> >Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I don't feel
> >about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I thought I'd suggest
> >this.
> 
> I ignore it too.  Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy, that I'm
> not going to make things harder on users by adding complex and opaque
> filtering to prevent them from working.  My approach is to specify as few
> constraints as possible, the client submits whatever certificate it has, and
> it's then decided based on a whitelist for which the server can very clearly
> report "not on the whitelist" when it rejects it.  The design seems to be
> based on the idea that each client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server
> can specify in precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality
> each client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just
> want the one they've got to work.

A typical macOS system will have many issued certs, typically with at
most one that will work for any particular web site or web API.  So
the filter is somewhat important for client certs to work there in any
kind of user-friendly way.  In particular if the server provides no
guidance, the UI will ask the user, presenting a dialog containing
many certificates the user is not aware they have, leading to complete
user confusion.


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2016 18:57:45 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids giving the
early Finished such a strange relationship with the handshake transcript.
Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK identities if we don't need it.

As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into the
traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one epoch off of
the same traffic secret. Combine that with the two-ladder KeyUpdate and we
no longer need any concatenation or other label-munging at all. Simply use
labels "key" and "iv" and the record-layer just exposes a single
UseTrafficSecret function which saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate),
derives the traffic keys, and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without
mucking about with phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or
server, etc.

David

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
> simpler because:
>
> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately upon
> receiving the ClientHello
> without waiting for Finished.
> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>
> From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing around with
> the ClientHello buffer.
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> Folks,
>>
>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>>
>>   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>>
>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
>> anything important.
>>
>>
>> OVERVIEW
>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the redundancy
>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>>
>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>>   ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>>   the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>>
>>
>> RATIONALE
>> The reasoning for this change is:
>>
>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>>   knows the PSK.
>>
>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>>   guarantees) via the Finished message.
>>
>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>>   transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>>   the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the Finished.
>>
>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>> but unfortunately:
>>
>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK because
>>    that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>>    (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>>
>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>>    currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>>
>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
>> PR enacts that.
>>
>>
>> FAQS
>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>>   The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished extension.
>>
>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>>   It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point where
>>   the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it doesn't
>>   yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I believe
>>   other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing only
>>   part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite easy.
>>
>>
>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>>
>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>>    early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>>    for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>>    make this change.
>>
>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>>    prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not significantly
>>    harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>>    you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>>    "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>>    on buffering.
>>
>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>>    work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>>    the ClientHello. E.g,,
>>
>>       opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>>
>>       struct {
>>          FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>>       } HelloFinished;
>>
>>    Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>>    so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>>    changes weren't totally coupled.
>>
>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>>    might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>>    into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>>    it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>>    with the default being empty.
>>
>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>>    the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>>    that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten this
>>    and text on that point would be appreciated.
>>
>> Comments welcome.
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a114abf70f3d984053bdb5f4e
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I think this is a good idea. It&#39;s kind of weird, but i=
t avoids giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the han=
dshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK identities if=
 we don&#39;t need it.<br><br>As a bonus, this removes the need to route a =
&quot;phase&quot; parameter into the traffic key calculation since we&#39;l=
l never derive more than one epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine =
that with the two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation =
or other label-munging at all. Simply use labels &quot;key&quot; and &quot;=
iv&quot; and the record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret functi=
on which saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys=
, and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with phases, =
traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.<div><div><br></di=
v><div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>David</div></div></div><div d=
ir=3D"ltr"><div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu=
, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I should also mention that this makes the imple=
mentation a fair bit simpler because:<div><br></div><div>1. You can make al=
l the decisions on the server side immediately upon receiving the ClientHel=
lo</div><div>without waiting for Finished.</div><div>2. You don&#39;t need =
to derive early handshake traffic keys.</div><div><br></div><div>From an im=
plementor&#39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing around with the Cli=
entHello buffer.</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Er=
ic Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D=
"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Folks,</div><div><br></div><div>I have just posted=
 a WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffing&quot;</div><div>=
<br></div><div>=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/6=
15" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615</a></div=
><div><br></div><div>I would welcome comments on this direction and whether=
 I am missing</div><div>anything important.</div><div><br></div><div><br></=
div><div>OVERVIEW</div><div>This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#3=
9;ve had about the redundancy</div><div>of Finished and resumption_ctx. Thi=
s PR makes the following changes:</div><div><br></div><div>- Replace the 0-=
RTT Finished with an extension you send in the</div><div>=C2=A0 ClientHello=
 *whenever* you do PSK.</div><div>- Get rid of resumption context (because =
it is now replaced by</div><div>=C2=A0 the ClientHello.hello_finished.</div=
><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>RATIONALE</div><div>The reasoning for t=
his change is:</div><div><br></div><div>- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t g=
et any assurance that the other side</div><div>=C2=A0 knows the PSK.</div><=
div><br></div><div>- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-rep=
lay</div><div>=C2=A0 guarantees) via the Finished message.</div><div><br></=
div><div>- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshak=
e</div><div>=C2=A0 transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption con=
text because</div><div>=C2=A0 the transcript would transitively include the=
 PSK via the Finished.</div><div><br></div><div>So the natural thing to do =
would be to always send 0-RTT Finished</div><div>but unfortunately:</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever yo=
u do PSK because</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0that causes potential compat proble=
ms with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0(the same ones we hav=
e with 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).</div><div><br></div><div>2. =
You also can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can</div><d=
iv>=C2=A0 =C2=A0currently offer multiple PSK identities.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and=
</div><div>only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing =
the</div><div>Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier=
). This</div><div>PR enacts that.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>F=
AQS</div><div>- What gets included in the handshake transcript?</div><div>=
=C2=A0 The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished extensio=
n.</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?=
</div><div>=C2=A0 It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the p=
oint where</div><div>=C2=A0 the client sends the ClientHello and the server=
 processes, it doesn&#39;t</div><div>=C2=A0 yet know which Hash will be cho=
sen for HKDF and so NSS (and I believe</div><div>=C2=A0 other stacks) buffe=
rs the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing only</div><div>=C2=A0 part of i=
t is easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite easy.</div><div>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs</div><div>=
There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out=
 of</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0early_data_indication). This provides additional=
 anti-replay</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point.=
 I believe we should</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0make this change.</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0</div><div>2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the Cli=
entHello</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. Th=
is is not significantly</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0harder or easier to implemen=
t and basically depends on whether</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0you prefer the in=
variant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or</div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for not=
es</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0on buffering.</div><div><br></div><div>3. Allow m=
ultiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0work with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in</div><di=
v>=C2=A0 =C2=A0the ClientHello. E.g,,</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } HelloFinished;</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Ba=
sed on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,</div><div=
>=C2=A0 =C2=A0so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these</=
div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.</div><div><br></=
div><div>4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that i=
t</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0might be convenient to have an external context va=
lue hashed</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0into the transcript. One way to do this w=
ould be to include</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0it under the Finished. That&#39;s=
 not difficult if people want to,</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0with the default b=
eing empty.</div><div><br></div><div>5. Hugo brought up on the list that we=
 need to make very clear that</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0the &quot;hello_finish=
ed&quot; is being used to bind the handshakes and</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0th=
at it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten this</div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0and text on that point would be appreciated.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Comments welcome.</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div>

--001a114abf70f3d984053bdb5f4e--


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References: <4863811.CEEb377QKO@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CY1PR15MB0778325C9D42BFC71EA4C360FFEC0@CY1PR15MB0778.namprd15.prod.outlook.com> <CABcZeBNdbi_QKi29ctz5eMfq-97DyY+-4kc_xzOOWwEkkG786A@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] IANA Alert registry does not include ALPN alert
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Will do.  Might not make the -00 version but we can add it as an issue =
to fix in -01.

spt

> On Aug 26, 2016, at 10:41, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> I believe the chairs are preparing an IANA update RFC. We can cram it =
in there.
>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
>=20
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 7:27 AM, Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com> =
wrote:
> I guess the reason is that this new alert is not mentioned in the IANA =
Considerations section in RFC7301. I don=E2=80=99t know how to fix it =
though.
>=20
> =20
> Best,
>=20
> Xiaoyin
>=20
> =20
> =20
> =20
> From: Hubert Kario
> Sent: Friday, August 26, 2016 10:03
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: [TLS] IANA Alert registry does not include ALPN alert
>=20
> =20
> The IANA TLS Alert Registry[1] does not include the=20
> no_application_protocol(120) alert from RFC7301[2] (a.k.a. =
Application-Layer=20
> Protocol Negotiation Extension)
>=20
> What's the procedure to fix it?
>=20
>  1 - =
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-p=
arameters-6
>  2 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301#section-3.2
> --=20
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech =
Republic
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
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Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> writes:

>     An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge data/s=
end
>     data".
>
> The question is not "how much hardware?" but "price?" - with =C2=A0ARMs i=
ncluding h
> /w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to explain why you\d w=
ant
> to use a less powerful CPU...

Because this is a light bulb that sells for $6-10.  Adding $2 to the price
is just completely unreasonable.  The price point needs to be pennies.
Note that this is just one example, but yes, these level of products are
getting "smarter" and we, as security professionals, should encourage
"as strong security as possble" without getting the manufacturers to
just say "sorry, too expensive, I'll go without."  (which is,
unfortunately, exactly what's been happening)

>     Hilarie

-derek
--=20
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant


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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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All,

The chairs would like to get some eyes on this PR by this Friday (Sept =
9th) so that we can draw it to close.

Thanks,

J&S

> On Sep 05, 2016, at 14:02, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
>=20
> Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under =
various
> fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but =
instead
> just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we =
should relax
> the requirement.
>=20
> At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage
> sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a =
specific one.
> I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link =
above). This
> PR:
>=20
> - Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I =
missed
>   a couple of places)
> - Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions =
to avoid
>   having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
> - Relaxes the requirement as listed above.
>=20
> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we =
decide to
> continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one =
location not
> scattered around the spec.
>=20
> I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the =
requirement to
> send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to =
handle this PR.=20
>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 14:59:57 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 2:33 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> All,
>
> The chairs would like to get some eyes on this PR by this Friday (Sept 9th) so that we can draw it to close.

So I'd like to know if there are places this PR weakens the
requirement beyond what common practice is. Why is the unexpected
message alert removed, for instance? Do we always want to permit just
terminating as an option?
>
> Thanks,
>
> J&S
>
>> On Sep 05, 2016, at 14:02, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
>>
>> Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under various
>> fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but instead
>> just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we should relax
>> the requirement.
>>
>> At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage
>> sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a specific one.
>> I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link above). This
>> PR:
>>
>> - Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I missed
>>   a couple of places)
>> - Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions to avoid
>>   having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
>> - Relaxes the requirement as listed above.
>>
>> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide to
>> continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one location not
>> scattered around the spec.
>>
>> I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the requirement to
>> send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to handle this PR.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



-- 
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Cc: cfrg@irtf.org, Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>, Hilarie Orman <hilarie@purplestreak.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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On Tuesday, September 06, 2016 04:40:30 pm Derek Atkins wrote:
> Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> writes:
> >     An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge data/send
> >     data".
> >
> > The question is not "how much hardware?" but "price?" - with  ARMs including h
> > /w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to explain why you\d want
> > to use a less powerful CPU...
> 
> Because this is a light bulb that sells for $6-10.  Adding $2 to the price
> is just completely unreasonable.  The price point needs to be pennies.
> Note that this is just one example, but yes, these level of products are
> getting "smarter" and we, as security professionals, should encourage
> "as strong security as possble" without getting the manufacturers to
> just say "sorry, too expensive, I'll go without."  (which is,
> unfortunately, exactly what's been happening)

Personally, I'd just say "stop putting chips in light bulbs", instead. Companies making these things are unfortunately just not going to be making good security decisions. Bad or no security is cheaper than competent security, and selling light bulbs with bad security is not illegal. We'll be more successful focusing our effort on dealing with light bulb botnets than trying to get people to make secure "smart" light bulbs. There is no good solution on our end, and debating the price of chips for light bulbs is not a good way to make security decisions in TLS.


Dave


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References: <m2lgzcyhxi.fsf@bos-mpeve.kendall.corp.akamai.com> <CABrd9STOCbBo=g22XySRnWofHwVZkrC-ripZY38yLRZV2kQh3A@mail.gmail.com> <sjminu8vk1t.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <201609062017.29697.davemgarrett@gmail.com>
From: Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 20:28:13 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
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Hi Dave,

Might work for lightbulbs.  Doesn't work for automotive sensors and ECUs,
which already have proprietary security (undisclosed algorithms) and badly
need to have standards-based security.  Cents in cost really matter here.
ARM CPUs are not and will not become the only answer in automotive.

Cheers,
- Ira


Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic
http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc
mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
Jan-April: 579 Park Place  Saline, MI  48176  734-944-0094
May-Dec: PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839  906-494-2434


On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 8:17 PM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tuesday, September 06, 2016 04:40:30 pm Derek Atkins wrote:
> > Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> writes:
> > >     An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge
> data/send
> > >     data".
> > >
> > > The question is not "how much hardware?" but "price?" - with  ARMs
> including h
> > > /w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to explain why
> you\d want
> > > to use a less powerful CPU...
> >
> > Because this is a light bulb that sells for $6-10.  Adding $2 to the
> price
> > is just completely unreasonable.  The price point needs to be pennies.
> > Note that this is just one example, but yes, these level of products are
> > getting "smarter" and we, as security professionals, should encourage
> > "as strong security as possble" without getting the manufacturers to
> > just say "sorry, too expensive, I'll go without."  (which is,
> > unfortunately, exactly what's been happening)
>
> Personally, I'd just say "stop putting chips in light bulbs", instead.
> Companies making these things are unfortunately just not going to be making
> good security decisions. Bad or no security is cheaper than competent
> security, and selling light bulbs with bad security is not illegal. We'll
> be more successful focusing our effort on dealing with light bulb botnets
> than trying to get people to make secure "smart" light bulbs. There is no
> good solution on our end, and debating the price of chips for light bulbs
> is not a good way to make security decisions in TLS.
>
>
> Dave
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div><div>Hi Dave,<br><br></div>Might work =
for lightbulbs.=C2=A0 Doesn&#39;t work for automotive sensors and ECUs,<br>=
</div>which already have proprietary security (undisclosed algorithms) and =
badly<br></div>need to have standards-based security.=C2=A0 Cents in cost r=
eally matter here.<br></div><div>ARM CPUs are not and will not become the o=
nly answer in automotive.<br></div><div><br></div>Cheers,<br></div><div>- I=
ra<br><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br clear=3D"all"><div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)<br>=
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG<br>Chair - Linux Foundation Op=
en Printing WG<br>Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group<br>Co-Chair -=
 IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG<br>IETF Designated Expert - IP=
P &amp; Printer MIB<br>Blue Roof Music / High North Inc<br><a style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(51,51,255)" href=3D"http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic" targe=
t=3D"_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic</a><br><a style=3D"=
color:rgb(102,0,204)" href=3D"http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc</a><br>mailto: <a=
 href=3D"mailto:blueroofmusic@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">blueroofmusic@gm=
ail.com</a><br>Jan-April: 579 Park Place=C2=A0 Saline, MI=C2=A0 48176=C2=A0=
 734-944-0094<br>May-Dec: PO Box 221=C2=A0 Grand Marais, MI 49839=C2=A0 906=
-494-2434<br><br><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div style=3D"display:=
inline"></div><div style=3D"display:inline"></div><div></div><div></div><di=
v></div><div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 8:17 PM, Dave Garrett=
 <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davemgarrett@gmail.com" target=3D"=
_blank">davemgarrett@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Tuesday, September 06, 2016 04:40:30 pm D=
erek Atkins wrote:<br>
&gt; Ben Laurie &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:benl@google.com">benl@google.com</a>&=
gt; writes:<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at &q=
uot;read sensor/munge data/send<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0data&quot;.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The question is not &quot;how much hardware?&quot; but &quot;pric=
e?&quot; - with=C2=A0 ARMs including h<br>
&gt; &gt; /w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to explain why=
 you\d want<br>
&gt; &gt; to use a less powerful CPU...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Because this is a light bulb that sells for $6-10.=C2=A0 Adding $2 to =
the price<br>
&gt; is just completely unreasonable.=C2=A0 The price point needs to be pen=
nies.<br>
&gt; Note that this is just one example, but yes, these level of products a=
re<br>
&gt; getting &quot;smarter&quot; and we, as security professionals, should =
encourage<br>
&gt; &quot;as strong security as possble&quot; without getting the manufact=
urers to<br>
&gt; just say &quot;sorry, too expensive, I&#39;ll go without.&quot;=C2=A0 =
(which is,<br>
&gt; unfortunately, exactly what&#39;s been happening)<br>
<br>
</span>Personally, I&#39;d just say &quot;stop putting chips in light bulbs=
&quot;, instead. Companies making these things are unfortunately just not g=
oing to be making good security decisions. Bad or no security is cheaper th=
an competent security, and selling light bulbs with bad security is not ill=
egal. We&#39;ll be more successful focusing our effort on dealing with ligh=
t bulb botnets than trying to get people to make secure &quot;smart&quot; l=
ight bulbs. There is no good solution on our end, and debating the price of=
 chips for light bulbs is not a good way to make security decisions in TLS.=
<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
Dave<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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The market is moving to ARM Cortex Ms, in part because of their clean I/O ar=
chitecture and good SoC support. An M0 with integrated BLE chipset is easily=
 <1$ today at small scale. Extrapolate a few years and to volume of millions=
 between large companies rather than small startups.  Software like mBed OS a=
nd 6lowpan support helps too.=20

You or I might not want chips in our light bulbs, but some people will, and s=
o it is part of the Internet landscape we need to keep in mind.=20

Phil [sent from a phone]

> On Sep 6, 2016, at 5:17 PM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On Tuesday, September 06, 2016 04:40:30 pm Derek Atkins wrote:
>> Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> writes:
>>>    An ARM is far too much hardware to throw at "read sensor/munge data/s=
end
>>>    data".
>>>=20
>>> The question is not "how much hardware?" but "price?" - with  ARMs inclu=
ding h
>>> /w AES coming in at $2 for a single unit, its hard to explain why you\d w=
ant
>>> to use a less powerful CPU...
>>=20
>> Because this is a light bulb that sells for $6-10.  Adding $2 to the pric=
e
>> is just completely unreasonable.  The price point needs to be pennies.
>> Note that this is just one example, but yes, these level of products are
>> getting "smarter" and we, as security professionals, should encourage
>> "as strong security as possble" without getting the manufacturers to
>> just say "sorry, too expensive, I'll go without."  (which is,
>> unfortunately, exactly what's been happening)
>=20
> Personally, I'd just say "stop putting chips in light bulbs", instead. Com=
panies making these things are unfortunately just not going to be making goo=
d security decisions. Bad or no security is cheaper than competent security,=
 and selling light bulbs with bad security is not illegal. We'll be more suc=
cessful focusing our effort on dealing with light bulb botnets than trying t=
o get people to make secure "smart" light bulbs. There is no good solution o=
n our end, and debating the price of chips for light bulbs is not a good way=
 to make security decisions in TLS.
>=20
>=20
> Dave
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Tue Sep  6 21:00:46 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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I agree that client_authz and server_authz have not enjoyed much =
implementation.

Russ


On Sep 3, 2016, at 3:54 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624
>=20
> We currently have code points assigned for
>=20
>  user_mapping [RFC4681]    =20
>  client_authz [RFC5878]     =20
>  server_authz [RFC5878]=20
>=20
> These aren't well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 and my sense is that =
they
> are barely used. Any objections to just banning them? If not, I'll =
merge this
> PR end of next week.
>=20
> -Ekr


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">I =
agree that client_authz and server_authz have not enjoyed much =
implementation.<div><br></div><div>Russ</div><div><br></div><div><br><div>=
<div>On Sep 3, 2016, at 3:54 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div><a =
href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624">https://github.com/t=
lswg/tls13-spec/pull/624</a><br></div><div><br></div>We currently have =
code points assigned for<div><br></div><div><div>&nbsp;user_mapping =
[RFC4681] &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp;client_authz [RFC5878] =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp;server_authz =
[RFC5878]&nbsp;</div></div><div><br></div><div>These aren't =
well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 and my sense is that =
they</div><div>are barely used. Any objections to just banning them? If =
not, I'll merge this</div><div>PR end of next =
week.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div></div></blockquote></div><br></di=
v></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_DA2C5600-CD5E-484A-92BC-7F6776744743--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [TLS] 3DES diediedie
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OK, so I said I'd get some notes on the environment within which IoT crypto=
=0A=
has to function, here's what the peanut gallery came up with.  A lot of thi=
s=0A=
isn't my own work and I don't claim it to be, it's a collaboration created =
by=0A=
people who for various business/legal reasons can't attach their names to=
=0A=
public comments.  Note that every one of the for-instances given below are=
=0A=
actual real-life examples, not something someone invented to make a good=0A=
story.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=
=0A=
IoT Crypto, What you Need to Know=0A=
---------------------------------=0A=
=0A=
  The problem we have is not how to get stronger crypto in place, it's how =
to=0A=
  get more crypto in place.=0A=
    -- Ian Grigg, 28 August 2016.=0A=
=0A=
  ... and to raise the level of security of the rest of the system so that=
=0A=
  attackers are actually forced to target the crypto rather than just=0A=
  strolling around it.=0A=
    -- Peter Gutmann, in corollary.=0A=
=0A=
The device may be operating under severe power constraints.  There are IoT=
=0A=
devices that need to run for several years on a single battery pack.  If=0A=
you're lucky, it's a bundle of 18650s.  If you're less lucky, it's a CR2032=
.=0A=
=0A=
Renegotiating protocol state on every wake event is incompatible with low=
=0A=
power consumption.  The crypto should be able to resume from a pause an=0A=
arbitrary amount of time later.=0A=
=0A=
Even if the device is constantly powered, many components will be powered o=
nly=0A=
when needed, and will lose state when powered off (they work by warm-starti=
ng=0A=
very quickly rather than saving state across restarts).=0A=
=0A=
Some IoT chips can't cost more than a few cents each.  If you're lucky,=0A=
they're allowed to cost tens of cents.  Any fancy crypto hardware will brea=
k=0A=
the budget.=0A=
=0A=
When crypto hardware support is available, it's universally AES, occasional=
ly=0A=
SHA-1 and/or DES, and very rarely RSA and/or DH and/or ECDSA (there are als=
o=0A=
oddballs like ones that do SHA-1 but not AES, but they're pretty special=0A=
cases, and AES in software is very efficient in any case).  Any crypto had=
=0A=
therefore better be based mostly, or exclusively, around AES.  As a conveni=
ent=0A=
side-effect of this, you won't have to worry about which flavour of PKC wil=
l=0A=
be in fashion in ten years' time, or what keysize they're wearing in Paris=
=0A=
that year.=0A=
=0A=
Even if the device includes crypto hardware, the HAL or vendor-supplied=0A=
firmware may not make it available.  In addition the crypto engine will be =
in=0A=
a separate IP core that's effectively an external peripheral, and accessing=
 it=0A=
is so painful that it's quicker to do it in software (you never get AES=0A=
instructions, you get something that you talk to via PIO).  As a result you=
=0A=
have to run your crypto in software while the crypto hardware sits idle.=0A=
=0A=
Devices have a design lifetime of ten to twenty years, possibly more.  Ther=
e=0A=
is hardware deployed today that was designed when the people now maintainin=
g=0A=
it were in kindergarten.=0A=
=0A=
Firmware is never updated, and frequently *can* never be updated.  This is=
=0A=
typically because it's not writeable, or there's no room (the code already=
=0A=
occupies 120% of available storage, brought down to 100% by replacing the=
=0A=
certificate-handling code with a memcpy() for encoding and a seek + read of=
 {=0A=
n, e } for decoding, see below), leaving 0% available for firmware updates.=
=0A=
Alternatively, there's no connectivity to anything to provide updates, eith=
er=0A=
of firmware or anything else (for example in one globally-deployed system t=
he=0A=
CRL arrives once every 6-12 months via sneakernet, although I'm not sure wh=
y=0A=
they use CRLs since they can just disable the certificate or device=0A=
centrally).  Or the device, once approved and operational, can't ever be=0A=
changed.  Like children, make one mistake here and you have to live with it=
=0A=
for the next 15-20 years.=0A=
=0A=
Even if the hardware and/or firmware could be updated, the rest of the=0A=
infrastructure often can't.  Some firmware needs to be built with a guarant=
eed=0A=
correspondence between the source code and the binary.  This means not only=
=0A=
using approved compilers from the late 1990s that cleanly translate the cod=
e=0A=
without using any tricks or fancy optimisations, but also scouring eBay for=
=0A=
the appropriate late-1990s hardware because it's not guaranteed that the=0A=
compiler running on current CPUs will produce the same result.=0A=
=0A=
Don't bother asking "have you thought about using $shiny_new_thing from=0A=
$vendor" (or its closely-related overgeneralisation "Moore's Law means that=
=0A=
real soon now infinite CPU/memory/crypto will be available to anyone for=0A=
free").  They're already aware of $shiny_new_thing, $shiny_other_thing, and=
=0A=
$shiny_thing_you_havent_even_heard_of_yet, but aren't about to redo their=
=0A=
entire hardware design, software toolchain, BSP, system firmware,=0A=
certification, licensing, and product roadmap for any of them, no matter ho=
w=0A=
shiny they are.=0A=
=0A=
The device may have no or only inadequate entropy sources.  Alternatively, =
if=0A=
there is an entropy source, it may lose state when it's powered off (see th=
e=0A=
earlier comment on power management), requiring it to perform a time-consum=
ing=0A=
entropy collection step before it can be used.  Since this can trigger the=
=0A=
watchdog (see the comment further down), it'll end up not being used.  Any=
=0A=
crypto protocol should therefore allow the entropy used in it to be injecte=
d=0A=
by both parties like TLS' client and server random values, because one part=
y=0A=
may not have any entropy to inject.  In addition, it's best to prefer=0A=
algorithms that aren't dependent on high-quality randomness (ECDSA is a pri=
me=0A=
example of something that fails catastrophically when there are problems wi=
th=0A=
randomness).=0A=
=0A=
Many SoCs have different portions developed by different vendors, and the o=
nly=0A=
way to communicate between them is via predefined APIs.  If you need entrop=
y=0A=
for your crypto and the entropy source is on a separate piece of IP that=0A=
doesn't provide an entropy-extraction interface, you either need to spend=
=0A=
twelve months negotiating access to the source, and pay handsomely for the=
=0A=
privilege, or do without.=0A=
=0A=
(The following is a special case that only applies to very constrained=0A=
devices: As a variant of the above, there may be no accessible writeable no=
n-=0A=
volatile memory on your section of the device.  Storing a seed for crypto k=
eys=0A=
may work when you bake it into the firmware, but you can't update it once t=
he=0A=
firmware is installed because there's no access to writeable nonvolatile=0A=
memory, unless you negotiate it with one of the vendors whose IP has access=
 to=0A=
it).=0A=
=0A=
Fuses are expensive and per-device provisioning is prohibitively expensive =
for=0A=
low-cost IoT chips.=0A=
=0A=
As mentioned previously, certificates are handled by memcpy()ing a pre-enco=
ded=0A=
certificate blob to the output and seeking to the appropriate location in a=
n=0A=
incoming certificate and extracting { n, e } (note that that's { n, e }, no=
t =0A=
{ p, q, g, y } or { p, a, b, G, n, ... }).  If you've ever wondered why you=
=0A=
can feed a device an expired, digital-signature-only certificate and use it=
=0A=
for encryption, this is why (but see also the point on error handling below=
).=0A=
This is precisely what you get when you take a hardware spec targeted at=0A=
Cortex M0s, Coldfire's, AVRs, and MSP430s, and write a security spec that=
=0A=
requires the use of a PKI.=0A=
=0A=
The whole device may be implemented as a single event-driven loop, with no=
=0A=
processes, threads, or different address spaces.  In addition there are har=
d=0A=
real-time constraints on processing.  You can't go off and do ECC or RSA or=
 DH=0A=
and halt all other processing while you do so because the system watchdog w=
ill=0A=
hard-reset the CPU if you spend too long on something.  While it is possibl=
e,=0A=
with some effort, to write a manually-timesliced modmult implementation, th=
e=0A=
result is horribly inefficient and a goldmine of timing channels.  It's als=
o=0A=
painful to implement, and a specific implementation is completely tied to a=
=0A=
particular CPU architecture and clock speed.=0A=
=0A=
MSP 430s.  Apologies to all the embedded devs who have just gone into=0A=
anaphylactic shock at the mention of that name.  There are billions of thes=
e=0A=
things in active use.  For a very recent one (August 2016), look at=0A=
http://www.ti.com/lit/ds/slase78a/slase78a.pdf.=0A=
=0A=
Hardware-wise, a Raspberry Pi is a desktop PC, not an embedded device.  So =
is=0A=
an Alix APU, a BeagleBoard, a SheevaPlug, a CI20, a CubieBoard, a C.H.I.P, =
and=0A=
any number of similar things that people like to cite as examples of IoT=0A=
devices.=0A=
=0A=
In general terms, errors are divided into two classes, recoverable and=0A=
nonrecoverable (this really is generalising a lot in order to avoid writing=
 a=0A=
small essay).  Recoverable errors are typically handled by trying to find a=
=0A=
way to continue, possibly in slightly degraded form.  Non-recoverable error=
s=0A=
are typically handled by forcing a hard-fault, which restarts the system in=
 a=0A=
known-good state.  For example one system that uses the event-loop model ha=
s,=0A=
sprinkled throughout the code, "if ( errType =3D=3D FATAL ) while ( 55 );" =
(the 55=0A=
has no special significance, it's just a way to force an endless loop, whic=
h=0A=
causes the watchdog to reset the system).  An expired certificate or incorr=
ect=0A=
key usage is a soft error for which the appropriate handling action is to=
=0A=
continue, so there's no point in even checking for it (see a previous point=
 on=0A=
the lack of checking for this sort of thing).=0A=
=0A=
(The equivalent in standard PCs - which includes tablets, phones, and other=
=0A=
devices - is to dump responsibility on the user, popping up a dialog that t=
hey=0A=
have to click past in order to continue, but at least now it's the user's=
=0A=
fault and not the developer's.  Embedded systems developers don't have the=
=0A=
luxury of doing this but have to explicitly manage these types of error=0A=
conditions themselves.  So when a protocol spec says SHOULD NOT or MUST NOT=
=0A=
then for standard PCs it means "throw up a warning/error dialog and blame t=
he=0A=
user if they continue" and for embedded devices it means "continue if=0A=
possible".  Have you ever seen a security spec of any kind that tells you w=
hat=0A=
step to take next when a problem occurs?).=0A=
=0A=
Development will be done by embedded systems engineers who are good at maki=
ng=0A=
things work in tough environments but aren't crypto experts.  In addition,=
=0A=
portions of the device won't always work as they should.  Any crypto used h=
ad=0A=
better be able to take a huge amount of of abuse without failing.  AES-CBC,=
=0A=
even in the worst-case scenario of a constant, all-zero IV, at worst degrad=
es=0A=
to AES-ECB.  AES-GCM (and related modes like AES-CTR), on the other hand, f=
ail=0A=
completely for both confidentiality and integrity protection.  And you don'=
t=0A=
even want to think about all the ways ECDSA can fail (see, for example, the=
=0A=
issues with entropy, and timing issues, above).=


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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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Hi Folks,

The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please respond
with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this issue.

Thanks,

J&S

On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids giving the
> early Finished such a strange relationship with the handshake transcript.
> Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK identities if we don't need it.
>
> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into the
> traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one epoch off of
> the same traffic secret. Combine that with the two-ladder KeyUpdate and we
> no longer need any concatenation or other label-munging at all. Simply use
> labels "key" and "iv" and the record-layer just exposes a single
> UseTrafficSecret function which saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate),
> derives the traffic keys, and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without
> mucking about with phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or
> server, etc.
>
> David
>
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
>> simpler because:
>>
>> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately upon
>> receiving the ClientHello
>> without waiting for Finished.
>> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>>
>> From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing around with
>> the ClientHello buffer.
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Folks,
>>>
>>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>>>
>>>   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>>>
>>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
>>> anything important.
>>>
>>>
>>> OVERVIEW
>>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the redundancy
>>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>>>
>>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>>>   ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>>>   the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>>>
>>>
>>> RATIONALE
>>> The reasoning for this change is:
>>>
>>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>>>   knows the PSK.
>>>
>>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>>>   guarantees) via the Finished message.
>>>
>>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>>>   transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>>>   the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the Finished.
>>>
>>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>>> but unfortunately:
>>>
>>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK because
>>>    that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>>>    (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>>>
>>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>>>    currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>>>
>>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
>>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
>>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
>>> PR enacts that.
>>>
>>>
>>> FAQS
>>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>>>   The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished extension.
>>>
>>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>>>   It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point where
>>>   the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it doesn't
>>>   yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I believe
>>>   other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing only
>>>   part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite easy.
>>>
>>>
>>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>>>
>>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>>>    early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>>>    for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>>>    make this change.
>>>
>>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>>>    prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not significantly
>>>    harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>>>    you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>>>    "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>>>    on buffering.
>>>
>>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>>>    work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>>>    the ClientHello. E.g,,
>>>
>>>       opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>>>
>>>       struct {
>>>          FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>>>       } HelloFinished;
>>>
>>>    Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>>>    so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>>>    changes weren't totally coupled.
>>>
>>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>>>    might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>>>    into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>>>    it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>>>    with the default being empty.
>>>
>>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>>>    the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>>>    that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten this
>>>    and text on that point would be appreciated.
>>>
>>> Comments welcome.
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Folks,<div><br></div><div>The chairs want to make sure =
this gets some proper review. =C2=A0 Please respond with comments by Friday=
 so we can make some progress on this issue.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div=
>Thanks,</div><div><br></div><div>J&amp;S</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David =
Benjamin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" tar=
get=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I think this is a good idea. It&#39;s ki=
nd of weird, but it avoids giving the early Finished such a strange relatio=
nship with the handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple=
 PSK identities if we don&#39;t need it.<br><br>As a bonus, this removes th=
e need to route a &quot;phase&quot; parameter into the traffic key calculat=
ion since we&#39;ll never derive more than one epoch off of the same traffi=
c secret. Combine that with the two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need =
any concatenation or other label-munging at all. Simply use labels &quot;ke=
y&quot; and &quot;iv&quot; and the record-layer just exposes a single UseTr=
afficSecret function which saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derive=
s the traffic keys, and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking a=
bout with phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.=
<div><div><br></div><div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>David</div>=
</div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>=
<div class=3D"h5"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Resc=
orla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div></div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div c=
lass=3D"h5"><div dir=3D"ltr">I should also mention that this makes the impl=
ementation a fair bit simpler because:<div><br></div><div>1. You can make a=
ll the decisions on the server side immediately upon receiving the ClientHe=
llo</div><div>without waiting for Finished.</div><div>2. You don&#39;t need=
 to derive early handshake traffic keys.</div><div><br></div><div>From an i=
mplementor&#39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing around with the Cl=
ientHello buffer.</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, E=
ric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=
=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Folks,</div><div><br></div><div>I have just pos=
ted a WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffing&quot;</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pul=
l/615" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/615<=
/a></div><div><br></div><div>I would welcome comments on this direction and=
 whether I am missing</div><div>anything important.</div><div><br></div><di=
v><br></div><div>OVERVIEW</div><div>This PR follows on a bunch of discussio=
ns we&#39;ve had about the redundancy</div><div>of Finished and resumption_=
ctx. This PR makes the following changes:</div><div><br></div><div>- Replac=
e the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the</div><div>=C2=A0 Cli=
entHello *whenever* you do PSK.</div><div>- Get rid of resumption context (=
because it is now replaced by</div><div>=C2=A0 the ClientHello.hello_finish=
ed.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>RATIONALE</div><div>The reasoni=
ng for this change is:</div><div><br></div><div>- With ordinary PSK you don=
&#39;t get any assurance that the other side</div><div>=C2=A0 knows the PSK=
.</div><div><br></div><div>- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual =
anti-replay</div><div>=C2=A0 guarantees) via the Finished message.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the =
handshake</div><div>=C2=A0 transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resump=
tion context because</div><div>=C2=A0 the transcript would transitively inc=
lude the PSK via the Finished.</div><div><br></div><div>So the natural thin=
g to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished</div><div>but unfortunately:=
</div><div><br></div><div>1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whe=
never you do PSK because</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0that causes potential compa=
t problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0(the same one=
s we have with 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).</div><div><br></div>=
<div>2. You also can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can=
</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0currently offer multiple PSK identities.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax conditio=
n #2 and</div><div>only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by s=
tuffing the</div><div>Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make thi=
s easier). This</div><div>PR enacts that.</div><div><br></div><div><br></di=
v><div>FAQS</div><div>- What gets included in the handshake transcript?</di=
v><div>=C2=A0 The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished e=
xtension.</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to imp=
lement?</div><div>=C2=A0 It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that a=
t the point where</div><div>=C2=A0 the client sends the ClientHello and the=
 server processes, it doesn&#39;t</div><div>=C2=A0 yet know which Hash will=
 be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I believe</div><div>=C2=A0 other stacks=
) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing only</div><div>=C2=A0 pa=
rt of it is easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite easy.</div=
><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs</div=
><div>There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:</=
div><div><br></div><div>1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extensio=
n (out of</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0early_data_indication). This provides addi=
tional anti-replay</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending =
point. I believe we should</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0make this change.</div><d=
iv>=C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div>2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash t=
he ClientHello</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0prefix without the 0-filled verify_da=
ta. This is not significantly</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0harder or easier to im=
plement and basically depends on whether</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0you prefer =
the invariant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for=
 notes</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0on buffering.</div><div><br></div><div>3. All=
ow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design</div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0work with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in</div>=
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0the ClientHello. E.g,,</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;</div><div=
>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } HelloFinished;</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,</div=
><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that th=
ese</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.</div><div><=
br></div><div>4. External context values. Several people have pointed out t=
hat it</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0might be convenient to have an external conte=
xt value hashed</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0into the transcript. One way to do t=
his would be to include</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0it under the Finished. That&=
#39;s not difficult if people want to,</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0with the defa=
ult being empty.</div><div><br></div><div>5. Hugo brought up on the list th=
at we need to make very clear that</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0the &quot;hello_f=
inished&quot; is being used to bind the handshakes and</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten this</div>=
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0and text on that point would be appreciated.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>Comments welcome.</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Hash: SHA256

Aloha!

Derek Atkins wrote:
> Because this is a light bulb that sells for $6-10.  Adding $2 to the
> price is just completely unreasonable.  The price point needs to be
> pennies. Note that this is just one example, but yes, these level of
> products are getting "smarter" and we, as security professionals,
> should encourage "as strong security as possble" without getting the
> manufacturers to just say "sorry, too expensive, I'll go without."
> (which is, unfortunately, exactly what's been happening)

There are connected light bulbs and LEDs that contains ARM based MCUs on
the market today. Those MCUs costs less then 10 cents in high volume.

- -- 
Med vÃ¤nlig hÃ¤lsning, Yours

Joachim StrÃ¶mbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svÃ¤ngning.
========================================================================
 Joachim StrÃ¶mbergson          Secworks AB          joachim@secworks.se
========================================================================
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Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 10:31:50 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 04:15:05AM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:

> Firmware is never updated, and frequently *can* never be updated.  This is
> typically because it's not writeable, or there's no room (the code already
> occupies 120% of available storage, brought down to 100% by replacing the
> certificate-handling code with a memcpy() for encoding and a seek + read of {
> n, e } for decoding, see below), leaving 0% available for firmware updates.
> Alternatively, there's no connectivity to anything to provide updates, either
> of firmware or anything else (for example in one globally-deployed system the
> CRL arrives once every 6-12 months via sneakernet, although I'm not sure why
> they use CRLs since they can just disable the certificate or device
> centrally).  Or the device, once approved and operational, can't ever be
> changed.  Like children, make one mistake here and you have to live with it
> for the next 15-20 years.

So one needs to do _really_ careful design (good luck with that, most
device design is utter garbage).

And also really careful implementation (good luck with that too).

Also, with 20 year time horizon from now, quantum computing is a serious
risk. Mostly concerns use of any asymmetric algorithms, since symmetric
algorithms should survive rather well[1].

> The device may have no or only inadequate entropy sources.  Alternatively, if
> there is an entropy source, it may lose state when it's powered off (see the
> earlier comment on power management), requiring it to perform a time-consuming
> entropy collection step before it can be used.  Since this can trigger the
> watchdog (see the comment further down), it'll end up not being used.  Any
> crypto protocol should therefore allow the entropy used in it to be injected
> by both parties like TLS' client and server random values, because one party
> may not have any entropy to inject.  In addition, it's best to prefer
> algorithms that aren't dependent on high-quality randomness (ECDSA is a prime
> example of something that fails catastrophically when there are problems with
> randomness).

Lack of entropy is going to make things nasty. Especially with any sort of
asymmetric encryption or key exchange.

The TLS-style asymmetric designs don't come even close to cutting it if
client lacks good entropy source.

> As mentioned previously, certificates are handled by memcpy()ing a pre-encoded
> certificate blob to the output and seeking to the appropriate location in an
> incoming certificate and extracting { n, e } (note that that's { n, e }, not 
> { p, q, g, y } or { p, a, b, G, n, ... }).  If you've ever wondered why you
> can feed a device an expired, digital-signature-only certificate and use it
> for encryption, this is why (but see also the point on error handling below).
> This is precisely what you get when you take a hardware spec targeted at
> Cortex M0s, Coldfire's, AVRs, and MSP430s, and write a security spec that
> requires the use of a PKI.

Use of PKI in many cases is just dumb idea, and even if you have case
where you need some form of PKI, X.509 is probably a bad idea to do it.
 
> Hardware-wise, a Raspberry Pi is a desktop PC, not an embedded device.  So is
> an Alix APU, a BeagleBoard, a SheevaPlug, a CI20, a CubieBoard, a C.H.I.P, and
> any number of similar things that people like to cite as examples of IoT
> devices.

Heck, I have seen board advertised for "IoT" applications where the
way I loaded new software was to transfer the C++11 source via either
USB stick or via TCP/IP over ethernet and then use GCC on the board
itself to make a binary...

Basically, if one can do that at all, it is pretty much sky is the limit
with the crypto...
 
> Development will be done by embedded systems engineers who are good at making
> things work in tough environments but aren't crypto experts.  In addition,
> portions of the device won't always work as they should.  Any crypto used had
> better be able to take a huge amount of of abuse without failing.  AES-CBC,
> even in the worst-case scenario of a constant, all-zero IV, at worst degrades
> to AES-ECB.  AES-GCM (and related modes like AES-CTR), on the other hand, fail
> completely for both confidentiality and integrity protection.  And you don't
> even want to think about all the ways ECDSA can fail (see, for example, the
> issues with entropy, and timing issues, above).

If you need symmetric encryption that can actually take abuse, you need
MRAE (heck, the M and R is pretty much synonym for can cope with serious
abuse).


[1] Even the algorithms that would have sub-par "security levels" are
likely formidable challenge to attack, even with quantum computer, due
to make-or-break-attack factors ignored by such simplistic analysis.



-Ilari


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Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 11:24:58 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On Tue, Sep 06, 2016 at 01:47:48PM +0200, Gilles Van Assche wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> For RSA PSS, I would suggest to consider:
> rsa_pss_shake128
> rsa_pss_shake256
> where SHAKE128 (or 256), as an exendable output function (XOF), directly
> replaces the mask generating function MGF.
> 
> This would make RSA PSS simpler and more efficient.

Well, my opinion on this thing still is:

- There is no real sense of urgent concern about SHA-2.
- This was not true with MD5/SHA-1 when TLS 1.2 was designed. There
  definitely was urgent concern.
- Therefore a few month delay for a separate spec is not a major issue.
- Delaying TLS 1.3 for that would be a major issue.
- TLS 1.3 has sufficient hooks to add this later (if you disagree,
  speak up, because it would be a major flaw).
- I don't expect people to implement stuff just because it is in TLS 1.3
  spec (but we shouldn't put crap there in case they do), so the
  "visibility loss" would be pretty minimal.


Therefore I think that this work should be pursued in a separate spec,
not in TLS 1.3 core.


-Ilari


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From: Richard Hartmann <richih.mailinglist@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
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On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:15 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
> [a lot of really interesting stuff]

Thanks for the write-up. To focus what you wrote back on the thread at hand:

Is it correct when I say that the embedded programmers you talked to
don't care about any form of DES as they need/must/prefer to do AES,
anyway?

If yes, there's no reason in the embedded world that would prevent a diediedie.


Richard


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 10:38:35 +0000
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References: <m2lgzcyhxi.fsf@bos-mpeve.kendall.corp.akamai.com> <201608311948.u7VJmChl018731@rumpleteazer.rhmr.com> <CABrd9STOCbBo=g22XySRnWofHwVZkrC-ripZY38yLRZV2kQh3A@mail.gmail.com> <sjminu8vk1t.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <1473221674611.89839@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <20160907073150.resfacwewdfw67uu@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>The TLS-style asymmetric designs don't come even close to cutting it if=0A=
>client lacks good entropy source.=0A=
=0A=
Actually they're fine, see the comment about using entropy from both sides.=
=0A=
You can run one side of a TLS communication with zero entropy (just a fixed=
=0A=
secret) if you mix the client and server hello into your PRNG alongside the=
=0A=
fixed secret data.=0A=
=0A=
>Heck, I have seen board advertised for "IoT" applications where the way I=
=0A=
>loaded new software was to transfer the C++11 source via either USB stick =
or=0A=
>via TCP/IP over ethernet and then use GCC on the board itself to make a=0A=
>binary...=0A=
=0A=
That's how you do development work for the CI20.  It's actually rather=0A=
convenient, you just plug it in, SSH over, and you're ready to go.=0A=
=0A=
Maybe that's one way to identify whether your "IoT device" falls into the=
=0A=
desktop-PC equivalent class, if it can self-host its own build tools it's a=
=0A=
PC.  If you upload a single solid blob that's the BSP/OS and application al=
l=0A=
in one over a serial port and debug it using whatever cavemen used to debug=
=0A=
fire then it's embedded/IoT/SCADA/whatever.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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To: =?utf-8?B?Sm9hY2hpbSBTdHLDtm1iZXJnc29u?= <joachim@secworks.se>, "Derek Atkins" <derek@ihtfp.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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From: Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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Hi,

This proposal does require careful security review as it addresses a 
known weakness in non-resumption PSK (see 
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg20637.html) and 
also affects the security proof of PSK even in the resumption case.

Regarding the removal of multiple PSK identities offered by the client, 
it may weaken the PSK identity negotiation if the client has no choice 
but to try again with a different PSK (thus leaving the choice of the 
PSK to the adversary). This is somewhat comparable to the 
SupportedGroups/KeyShares situation; in that sense, if there is evidence 
that some clients will support multiple PSKs (e.g. for ticket updating, 
as mentioned recently on the list) it may be better to either send 
multiple stuffed finished, or to offer alternative PSK identities 
without stuffed finished and let the server ask for a hello retry.

Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript 
for the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the 
incremental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the 
placeholder, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it 
must be rolled back.


Best,

Antoine

Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a Ã©critÂ :
> Hi Folks,
> 
> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this
> issue.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> J&S
> 
> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin
> <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
> 
>> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
>> giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
>> handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
>> identities if we don't need it.
>> 
>> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into
>> the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one
>> epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the
>> two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or
>> other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and the
>> record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
>> saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,
>> and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with
>> phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.
>> 
>> David
>> 
>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> 
>> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
>> simpler because:
>> 
>> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately
>> upon receiving the ClientHello
>> without waiting for Finished.
>> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>> 
>> From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing around
>> with the ClientHello buffer.
>> -Ekr
>> 
>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Folks,
>> 
>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>> 
>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615 [1]
>> 
>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
>> anything important.
>> 
>> OVERVIEW
>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the
>> redundancy
>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>> 
>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>> ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>> the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>> 
>> RATIONALE
>> The reasoning for this change is:
>> 
>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>> knows the PSK.
>> 
>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>> guarantees) via the Finished message.
>> 
>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>> transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>> the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the
>> Finished.
>> 
>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>> but unfortunately:
>> 
>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
>> because
>> that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>> (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>> 
>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>> currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>> 
>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
>> PR enacts that.
>> 
>> FAQS
>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>> The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished
>> extension.
>> 
>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>> It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point
>> where
>> the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it
>> doesn't
>> yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
>> believe
>> other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing
>> only
>> part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite
>> easy.
>> 
>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>> 
>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>> early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>> for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>> make this change.
>> 
>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>> prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
>> significantly
>> harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>> you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>> "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>> on buffering.
>> 
>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>> work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>> the ClientHello. E.g,,
>> 
>> opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>> 
>> struct {
>> FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>> } HelloFinished;
>> 
>> Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>> so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>> changes weren't totally coupled.
>> 
>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>> might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>> into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>> it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>> with the default being empty.
>> 
>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>> the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>> that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten
>> this
>> and text on that point would be appreciated.
>> 
>> Comments welcome.
>> -Ekr
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
> 
> _______________________________________________
>  TLS mailing list
>  TLS@ietf.org
>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
> 
> 
> 
> Links:
> ------
> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
> [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Wed Sep  7 08:11:49 2016
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 08:11:02 -0700
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To: Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <
antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> This proposal does require careful security review as it addresses a know=
n
> weakness in non-resumption PSK (see https://www.ietf.org/mail-arch
> ive/web/tls/current/msg20637.html) and also affects the security proof of
> PSK even in the resumption case.
>

Yes.


Regarding the removal of multiple PSK identities offered by the client, it
> may weaken the PSK identity negotiation if the client has no choice but t=
o
> try again with a different PSK (thus leaving the choice of the PSK to the
> adversary). This is somewhat comparable to the SupportedGroups/KeyShares
> situation; in that sense, if there is evidence that some clients will
> support multiple PSKs (e.g. for ticket updating, as mentioned recently on
> the list) it may be better to either send multiple stuffed finished, or t=
o
> offer alternative PSK identities without stuffed finished and let the
> server ask for a hello retry.


Here are some initial thoughts on this:
First, it's not clear to me what the scenario is actually for multiple PSKs
for resumption. As
David Benjamin points out, this is handled more easily by just having the
server have overlapping
ticket keys. This is doubly true because you can't offer multiple 0-RTT
flights under different
keys, so really the only thing the client saves by offering multiple keys
is some reduced
cryptographic cost, which is a pretty modest advantage.

The primary reason I am aware of for allowing multiple PSKs is that
resumption of PSK-established
connections will be problematic (in that you would have to go through HRR).
That's unfortunate,
but TBH I'm not sure how important a scenario this is. Perhaps this is
something Hannes could weigh in
on. As noted, we can support the multi-PSK scenario with a bit more
complexity, but I'd rather not
unless we absolutely have to.

As far as security goes, it seems like the scenario here is that the client
has n keys that might be usable
with the server, but it doesn't know which if any of them is available. In
the current draft it offers
K_0 ... K_n in the ClientHello and the ServerHello selects one (WLOG,
assume that the server
would prefer K_0) and because the selected key is used to generate the
Finished, then any changes
to the handshake to cause the server to prefer K_i (i !=3D 0) will also cau=
se
a Finished failure unless
the attacker can somehow forge a Finished with K_i

In the PR, the client only offers K_j (which is its most preferred, but
perhaps not the server's) and the server
then would have to either accept it or reject it with HRR. Realistically,
the client then falls back to its next
most preferred or perhaps to one hinted by the server if that works. At the
end of the day, we then get
K_k (k!=3Dj), with the entire transcript MACed with K_k. So, again, I would
argue that the attacker can't
influence the selection without being able to forge a Finished with K_k.



> Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript
> for the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the
> incremental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the
> placeholder, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it
> must be rolled back.
>

This isn't a big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either way,
because of the actual way we compute the hash.

-Ekr


>
> Best,
>
> Antoine
>
>
> Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit :
>
>> Hi Folks,
>>
>> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
>> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this
>> issue.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> J&S
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin
>> <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
>>
>> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
>>> giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
>>> handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
>>> identities if we don't need it.
>>>
>>> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into
>>> the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one
>>> epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the
>>> two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or
>>> other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and the
>>> record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
>>> saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,
>>> and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with
>>> phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
>>> simpler because:
>>>
>>> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately
>>> upon receiving the ClientHello
>>> without waiting for Finished.
>>> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>>>
>>> From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing around
>>> with the ClientHello buffer.
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Folks,
>>>
>>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>>>
>>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615 [1]
>>>
>>>
>>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
>>> anything important.
>>>
>>> OVERVIEW
>>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the
>>> redundancy
>>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>>>
>>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>>> ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>>> the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>>>
>>> RATIONALE
>>> The reasoning for this change is:
>>>
>>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>>> knows the PSK.
>>>
>>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>>> guarantees) via the Finished message.
>>>
>>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>>> transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>>> the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the
>>> Finished.
>>>
>>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>>> but unfortunately:
>>>
>>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
>>> because
>>> that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>>> (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>>>
>>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>>> currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>>>
>>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
>>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
>>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
>>> PR enacts that.
>>>
>>> FAQS
>>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>>> The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished
>>> extension.
>>>
>>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>>> It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point
>>> where
>>> the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it
>>> doesn't
>>> yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
>>> believe
>>> other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing
>>> only
>>> part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite
>>> easy.
>>>
>>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>>>
>>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>>> early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>>> for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>>> make this change.
>>>
>>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>>> prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
>>> significantly
>>> harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>>> you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>>> "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>>> on buffering.
>>>
>>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>>> work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>>> the ClientHello. E.g,,
>>>
>>> opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>>>
>>> struct {
>>> FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>>> } HelloFinished;
>>>
>>> Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>>> so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>>> changes weren't totally coupled.
>>>
>>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>>> might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>>> into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>>> it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>>> with the default being empty.
>>>
>>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>>> the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>>> that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten
>>> this
>>> and text on that point would be appreciated.
>>>
>>> Comments welcome.
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>>  TLS mailing list
>>  TLS@ietf.org
>>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>
>>
>>
>> Links:
>> ------
>> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>> [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a1142e722b2a245053bec549a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <span dir=3D"lt=
r">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr" target=3D"_blank">anto=
ine@delignat-lavaud.fr</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex">Hi,<br>
<br>
This proposal does require careful security review as it addresses a known =
weakness in non-resumption PSK (see <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-ar=
chive/web/tls/current/msg20637.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg20637.h<wbr>tml</a=
>) and also affects the security proof of PSK even in the resumption case.<=
br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div><br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Regarding the removal of multiple PSK identities offered by the client, it =
may weaken the PSK identity negotiation if the client has no choice but to =
try again with a different PSK (thus leaving the choice of the PSK to the a=
dversary). This is somewhat comparable to the SupportedGroups/KeyShares sit=
uation; in that sense, if there is evidence that some clients will support =
multiple PSKs (e.g. for ticket updating, as mentioned recently on the list)=
 it may be better to either send multiple stuffed finished, or to offer alt=
ernative PSK identities without stuffed finished and let the server ask for=
 a hello retry.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Here are some initial thoug=
hts on this:<br></div><div>First, it&#39;s not clear to me what the scenari=
o is actually for multiple PSKs for resumption. As</div><div>David Benjamin=
 points out, this is handled more easily by just having the server have ove=
rlapping</div><div>ticket keys. This is doubly true because you can&#39;t o=
ffer multiple 0-RTT flights under different</div><div>keys, so really the o=
nly thing the client saves by offering multiple keys is some reduced</div><=
div>cryptographic cost, which is a pretty modest advantage.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>The primary reason I am aware of for allowing multiple PSKs is th=
at resumption of PSK-established</div><div>connections will be problematic =
(in that you would have to go through HRR). That&#39;s unfortunate,</div><d=
iv>but TBH I&#39;m not sure how important a scenario this is. Perhaps this =
is something Hannes could weigh in</div><div>on. As noted, we can support t=
he multi-PSK scenario with a bit more complexity, but I&#39;d rather not</d=
iv><div>unless we absolutely have to.</div><div><br></div><div>As far as se=
curity goes, it seems like the scenario here is that the client has n keys =
that might be usable</div><div>with the server, but it doesn&#39;t know whi=
ch if any of them is available. In the current draft it offers</div><div>K_=
0 ... K_n in the ClientHello and the ServerHello selects one (WLOG, assume =
that the server</div><div>would prefer K_0) and because the selected key is=
 used to generate the Finished, then any changes</div><div>to the handshake=
 to cause the server to prefer K_i (i !=3D 0) will also cause a Finished fa=
ilure unless</div><div>the attacker can somehow forge a Finished with K_i</=
div><div><br></div><div>In the PR, the client only offers K_j (which is its=
 most preferred, but perhaps not the server&#39;s) and the server</div><div=
>then would have to either accept it or reject it with HRR. Realistically, =
the client then falls back to its next</div><div>most preferred or perhaps =
to one hinted by the server if that works. At the end of the day, we then g=
et</div><div>K_k (k!=3Dj), with the entire transcript MACed with K_k. So, a=
gain, I would argue that the attacker can&#39;t</div><div>influence the sel=
ection without being able to forge a Finished with K_k.</div><div><br></div=
><div>=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript fo=
r the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the incr=
emental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the placeholde=
r, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it must be roll=
ed back.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This isn&#39;t a big deal for =
me (or I think any other implementor) either way, because of the actual way=
 we compute the hash.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
<br>
Antoine<div><div><br>
<br>
Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
Hi Folks,<br>
<br>
The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Plea=
se<br>
respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this<br>
issue.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
J&amp;S<br>
<br>
On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chr=
omium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
I think this is a good idea. It&#39;s kind of weird, but it avoids<br>
giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the<br>
handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK<br>
identities if we don&#39;t need it.<br>
<br>
As a bonus, this removes the need to route a &quot;phase&quot; parameter in=
to<br>
the traffic key calculation since we&#39;ll never derive more than one<br>
epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the<br>
two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or<br>
other label-munging at all. Simply use labels &quot;key&quot; and &quot;iv&=
quot; and the<br>
record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which<br>
saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,<br>
and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with<br>
phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.<br>
<br>
David<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit<br>
simpler because:<br>
<br>
1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately<br>
upon receiving the ClientHello<br>
without waiting for Finished.<br>
2. You don&#39;t need to derive early handshake traffic keys.<br>
<br>
>From an implementor&#39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing around<br=
>
with the ClientHello buffer.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtf=
m.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
Folks,<br>
<br>
I have just posted a WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffin=
g&quot;<br>
<br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pul=
l/615</a> [1]<div><div><br>
<br>
I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing<br>
anything important.<br>
<br>
OVERVIEW<br>
This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#39;ve had about the<br>
redundancy<br>
of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:<br>
<br>
- Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the<br>
ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.<br>
- Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by<br>
the ClientHello.hello_finished.<br>
<br>
RATIONALE<br>
The reasoning for this change is:<br>
<br>
- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t get any assurance that the other side<br>
knows the PSK.<br>
<br>
- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay<br>
guarantees) via the Finished message.<br>
<br>
- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake<br>
transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption context because<br>
the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the<br>
Finished.<br>
<br>
So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished<br>
but unfortunately:<br>
<br>
1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK<br>
because<br>
that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks<br>
(the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).<br>
<br>
2. You also can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can<br>
currently offer multiple PSK identities.<br>
<br>
The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and<br>
only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the<br>
Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This<br>
PR enacts that.<br>
<br>
FAQS<br>
- What gets included in the handshake transcript?<br>
The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished<br>
extension.<br>
<br>
- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?<br>
It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point<br>
where<br>
the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it<br>
doesn&#39;t<br>
yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I<br>
believe<br>
other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing<br>
only<br>
part of it is easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite<br>
easy.<br>
<br>
POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs<br>
There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:<br>
<br>
1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of<br>
early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay<br>
for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should<br>
make this change.<br>
<br>
2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello<br>
prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not<br>
significantly<br>
harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether<br>
you prefer the invariant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or<br=
>
&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for notes<br>
on buffering.<br>
<br>
3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design<br>
work with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in<br>
the ClientHello. E.g,,<br>
<br>
opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;<br>
<br>
struct {<br>
FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
} HelloFinished;<br>
<br>
Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,<br>
so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these<br>
changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.<br>
<br>
4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it<br>
might be convenient to have an external context value hashed<br>
into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include<br>
it under the Finished. That&#39;s not difficult if people want to,<br>
with the default being empty.<br>
<br>
5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that<br>
the &quot;hello_finished&quot; is being used to bind the handshakes and<br>
that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten<br>
this<br>
and text on that point would be appreciated.<br>
<br>
Comments welcome.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
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/a> [2]<br>
</blockquote><span>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
=C2=A0TLS mailing list<br>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br=
></span>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a> [2=
]<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Links:<br>
------<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/615</a=
><br>
[2] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><span=
><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
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<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</span></blockquote><div><div>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 07 Sep 2016 15:25:19 +0000
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <
> antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr> wrote:
>
> Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript
> for the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the
> incremental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the
> placeholder, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it
> must be rolled back.
>
>
> This isn't a big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either
> way, because of the actual way we compute the hash.
>

To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is not known at the time we
send ClientHello, most implementations I've seen just buffer the full
transcript before this point.

But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs (there's
all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think that's a good
argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For implementations
keeping a buffer, I don't think it matters, so let's keep both strategies
happy.

David



> -Ekr
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Antoine
>
>
> Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit :
>
> Hi Folks,
>
> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this
> issue.
>
> Thanks,
>
> J&S
>
> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin
> <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
> giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
> handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
> identities if we don't need it.
>
> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into
> the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one
> epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the
> two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or
> other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and the
> record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
> saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,
> and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with
> phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.
>
> David
>
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
> simpler because:
>
> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately
> upon receiving the ClientHello
> without waiting for Finished.
> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>
> >From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing around
> with the ClientHello buffer.
> -Ekr
>
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
> Folks,
>
> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615 [1]
>
>
> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
> anything important.
>
> OVERVIEW
> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the
> redundancy
> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>
> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
> ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
> the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>
> RATIONALE
> The reasoning for this change is:
>
> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
> knows the PSK.
>
> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
> guarantees) via the Finished message.
>
> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
> transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
> the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the
> Finished.
>
> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
> but unfortunately:
>
> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
> because
> that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
> (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>
> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
> currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>
> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
> PR enacts that.
>
> FAQS
> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
> The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished
> extension.
>
> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
> It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point
> where
> the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it
> doesn't
> yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
> believe
> other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing
> only
> part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite
> easy.
>
> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>
> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
> early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
> for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
> make this change.
>
> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
> prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
> significantly
> harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
> you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
> "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
> on buffering.
>
> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
> work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
> the ClientHello. E.g,,
>
> opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>
> struct {
> FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
> } HelloFinished;
>
> Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
> so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
> changes weren't totally coupled.
>
> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
> might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
> into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
> it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
> with the default being empty.
>
> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
> the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
> that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten
> this
> and text on that point would be appreciated.
>
> Comments welcome.
> -Ekr
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>
>
> _______________________________________________
>  TLS mailing list
>  TLS@ietf.org
>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>
>
>
> Links:
> ------
> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
> [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
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>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Sep 7,=
 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtf=
m.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"lt=
r" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_extra gmail_msg"><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote gmail_msg">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lava=
ud <span dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:antoine@deli=
gnat-lavaud.fr" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">antoine@delignat-lava=
ud.fr</a>&gt;</span> wrote:</div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmai=
l_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_extra gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail=
_msg"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript fo=
r the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the incr=
emental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the placeholde=
r, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it must be roll=
ed back.<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></blockquote><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg"></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_=
msg"><div class=3D"gmail_extra gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_m=
sg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">This isn&#39;t a big deal for me (or I think a=
ny other implementor) either way, because of the actual way we compute the =
hash.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>To expand on =
that, because the final PRF hash is not known at the time we send ClientHel=
lo, most implementations I&#39;ve seen just buffer the full transcript befo=
re this point.</div><div><br></div><div>But one could also keep a rolling h=
ash of all the supported PRFs (there&#39;s all of two of them if you lose T=
LS 1.1 and below), so I think that&#39;s a good argument for using the pref=
ix rather than zeros. For implementations keeping a buffer, I don&#39;t thi=
nk it matters, so let&#39;s keep both strategies happy.</div><div><br></div=
><div>David</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_extra gmail_m=
sg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">-Ekr</div=
></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_=
msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_m=
sg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
>
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Best,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Antoine<div class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail=
_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br class=3D"gmail_m=
sg">
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"gmail_ms=
g"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">
Hi Folks,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Plea=
se<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
issue.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Thanks,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
J&amp;S<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"=
_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"gmail_ms=
g"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">
I think this is a good idea. It&#39;s kind of weird, but it avoids<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
identities if we don&#39;t need it.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
As a bonus, this removes the need to route a &quot;phase&quot; parameter in=
to<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
the traffic key calculation since we&#39;ll never derive more than one<br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">
epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or<br class=3D=
"gmail_msg">
other label-munging at all. Simply use labels &quot;key&quot; and &quot;iv&=
quot; and the<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
David<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
simpler because:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
upon receiving the ClientHello<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
without waiting for Finished.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
2. You don&#39;t need to derive early handshake traffic keys.<br class=3D"g=
mail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;From an implementor&#39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing aroun=
d<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
with the ClientHello buffer.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
-Ekr<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtf=
m.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br=
 class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Folks,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
I have just posted a WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffin=
g&quot;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</div></div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg=
/tls13-spec/pull/615</a> [1]<div class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_ms=
g"><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
anything important.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
OVERVIEW<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#39;ve had about the<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
redundancy<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
- Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
- Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
the ClientHello.hello_finished.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
RATIONALE<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
The reasoning for this change is:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t get any assurance that the other side<br =
class=3D"gmail_msg">
knows the PSK.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
guarantees) via the Finished message.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption context because<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the<br class=3D"gmail=
_msg">
Finished.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
but unfortunately:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
because<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
(the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
2. You also can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can<br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">
currently offer multiple PSK identities.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
PR enacts that.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
FAQS<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
- What gets included in the handshake transcript?<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
extension.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point<br class=3D"g=
mail_msg">
where<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it<br class=3D"g=
mail_msg">
doesn&#39;t<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I<br class=3D"g=
mail_msg">
believe<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
only<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
part of it is easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
easy.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of<br class=3D"gm=
ail_msg">
early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay<br class=3D"gm=
ail_msg">
for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
make this change.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not<br class=3D"gmail_msg"=
>
significantly<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
you prefer the invariant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or<br=
 class=3D"gmail_msg">
&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for notes<br =
class=3D"gmail_msg">
on buffering.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
work with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in<br class=3D=
"gmail_msg">
the ClientHello. E.g,,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
struct {<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
} HelloFinished;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
might be convenient to have an external context value hashed<br class=3D"gm=
ail_msg">
into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
it under the Finished. That&#39;s not difficult if people want to,<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
with the default being empty.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
the &quot;hello_finished&quot; is being used to bind the handshakes and<br =
class=3D"gmail_msg">
that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten<br class=3D"g=
mail_msg">
this<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
and text on that point would be appreciated.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Comments welcome.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
-Ekr<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">TLS@i=
etf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</div></div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"no=
referrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailma=
n/listinfo/tls</a> [2]<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</blockquote><span class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
=C2=A0TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank"=
>TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></span>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/list=
info/tls</a> [2]<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Links:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
------<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
[1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-s=
pec/pull/615</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
[2] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listin=
fo/tls</a><span class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">TLS@i=
etf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/t=
ls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</span></blockquote><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">TLS@i=
etf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/t=
ls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">TLS@i=
etf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/t=
ls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 08:26:14 -0700
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Cc: Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 8:25 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <
>> antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr> wrote:
>>
>>> Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcrip=
t
>>> for the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates th=
e
>>> incremental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the
>>> placeholder, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, i=
t
>>> must be rolled back.
>>>
>>
>> This isn't a big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either
>> way, because of the actual way we compute the hash.
>>
>
> To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is not known at the time we
> send ClientHello, most implementations I've seen just buffer the full
> transcript before this point.
>
> But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs (there's
> all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think that's a go=
od
> argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For implementations
> keeping a buffer, I don't think it matters, so let's keep both strategies
> happy.
>

This is certainly fine with me.

-Ekr


>
> David
>
>
>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Antoine
>>>
>>>
>>> Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit :
>>>
>>>> Hi Folks,
>>>>
>>>> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
>>>> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this
>>>> issue.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>>
>>>> J&S
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin
>>>> <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
>>>>> giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
>>>>> handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
>>>>> identities if we don't need it.
>>>>>
>>>>> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into
>>>>> the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one
>>>>> epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the
>>>>> two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or
>>>>> other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and the
>>>>> record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
>>>>> saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,
>>>>> and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with
>>>>> phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> David
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
>>>>> simpler because:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately
>>>>> upon receiving the ClientHello
>>>>> without waiting for Finished.
>>>>> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>>>>>
>>>>> >From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing around
>>>>> with the ClientHello buffer.
>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Folks,
>>>>>
>>>>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>>>>>
>>>>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615 [1]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
>>>>> anything important.
>>>>>
>>>>> OVERVIEW
>>>>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the
>>>>> redundancy
>>>>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>>>>>
>>>>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>>>>> ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>>>>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>>>>> the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>>>>>
>>>>> RATIONALE
>>>>> The reasoning for this change is:
>>>>>
>>>>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>>>>> knows the PSK.
>>>>>
>>>>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>>>>> guarantees) via the Finished message.
>>>>>
>>>>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>>>>> transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>>>>> the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the
>>>>> Finished.
>>>>>
>>>>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>>>>> but unfortunately:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
>>>>> because
>>>>> that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>>>>> (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>>>>> currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>>>>>
>>>>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
>>>>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
>>>>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
>>>>> PR enacts that.
>>>>>
>>>>> FAQS
>>>>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>>>>> The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished
>>>>> extension.
>>>>>
>>>>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>>>>> It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point
>>>>> where
>>>>> the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it
>>>>> doesn't
>>>>> yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
>>>>> believe
>>>>> other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing
>>>>> only
>>>>> part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite
>>>>> easy.
>>>>>
>>>>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>>>>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>>>>> early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>>>>> for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>>>>> make this change.
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>>>>> prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
>>>>> significantly
>>>>> harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>>>>> you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>>>>> "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>>>>> on buffering.
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>>>>> work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>>>>> the ClientHello. E.g,,
>>>>>
>>>>> opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>>>>>
>>>>> struct {
>>>>> FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>>>>> } HelloFinished;
>>>>>
>>>>> Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>>>>> so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>>>>> changes weren't totally coupled.
>>>>>
>>>>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>>>>> might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>>>>> into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>>>>> it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>>>>> with the default being empty.
>>>>>
>>>>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>>>>> the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>>>>> that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten
>>>>> this
>>>>> and text on that point would be appreciated.
>>>>>
>>>>> Comments welcome.
>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>  TLS mailing list
>>>>  TLS@ietf.org
>>>>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Links:
>>>> ------
>>>> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>>>> [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>

--94eb2c0689ac0baf35053bec8b04
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 8:25 AM, David Benjamin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.=
org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Sep =
7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div></span><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><span class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat=
-Lavaud <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr"=
 target=3D"_blank">antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr</a>&gt;</span> wrote:</div></=
div></div></span><span class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript fo=
r the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the incr=
emental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the placeholde=
r, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it must be roll=
ed back.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>This isn&#39;t a=
 big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either way, because of =
the actual way we compute the hash.</div></div></div></div></span></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is no=
t known at the time we send ClientHello, most implementations I&#39;ve seen=
 just buffer the full transcript before this point.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs (there&#=
39;s all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think that&#39=
;s a good argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For implementati=
ons keeping a buffer, I don&#39;t think it matters, so let&#39;s keep both =
strategies happy.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is=
 certainly fine with me.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div><div>David<=
/div></font></span><div><div class=3D"h5"><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>-Ekr</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
<br>
Antoine<div><div><br>
<br>
Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
Hi Folks,<br>
<br>
The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Plea=
se<br>
respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this<br>
issue.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
J&amp;S<br>
<br>
On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chr=
omium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
I think this is a good idea. It&#39;s kind of weird, but it avoids<br>
giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the<br>
handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK<br>
identities if we don&#39;t need it.<br>
<br>
As a bonus, this removes the need to route a &quot;phase&quot; parameter in=
to<br>
the traffic key calculation since we&#39;ll never derive more than one<br>
epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the<br>
two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or<br>
other label-munging at all. Simply use labels &quot;key&quot; and &quot;iv&=
quot; and the<br>
record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which<br>
saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,<br>
and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with<br>
phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.<br>
<br>
David<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit<br>
simpler because:<br>
<br>
1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately<br>
upon receiving the ClientHello<br>
without waiting for Finished.<br>
2. You don&#39;t need to derive early handshake traffic keys.<br>
<br>
&gt;From an implementor&#39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing aroun=
d<br>
with the ClientHello buffer.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtf=
m.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
Folks,<br>
<br>
I have just posted a WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffin=
g&quot;<br>
<br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pul=
l/615</a> [1]<div><div><br>
<br>
I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing<br>
anything important.<br>
<br>
OVERVIEW<br>
This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#39;ve had about the<br>
redundancy<br>
of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:<br>
<br>
- Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the<br>
ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.<br>
- Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by<br>
the ClientHello.hello_finished.<br>
<br>
RATIONALE<br>
The reasoning for this change is:<br>
<br>
- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t get any assurance that the other side<br>
knows the PSK.<br>
<br>
- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay<br>
guarantees) via the Finished message.<br>
<br>
- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake<br>
transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption context because<br>
the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the<br>
Finished.<br>
<br>
So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished<br>
but unfortunately:<br>
<br>
1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK<br>
because<br>
that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks<br>
(the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).<br>
<br>
2. You also can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can<br>
currently offer multiple PSK identities.<br>
<br>
The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and<br>
only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the<br>
Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This<br>
PR enacts that.<br>
<br>
FAQS<br>
- What gets included in the handshake transcript?<br>
The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished<br>
extension.<br>
<br>
- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?<br>
It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point<br>
where<br>
the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it<br>
doesn&#39;t<br>
yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I<br>
believe<br>
other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing<br>
only<br>
part of it is easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite<br>
easy.<br>
<br>
POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs<br>
There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:<br>
<br>
1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of<br>
early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay<br>
for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should<br>
make this change.<br>
<br>
2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello<br>
prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not<br>
significantly<br>
harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether<br>
you prefer the invariant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or<br=
>
&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for notes<br>
on buffering.<br>
<br>
3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design<br>
work with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in<br>
the ClientHello. E.g,,<br>
<br>
opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;<br>
<br>
struct {<br>
FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
} HelloFinished;<br>
<br>
Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,<br>
so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these<br>
changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.<br>
<br>
4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it<br>
might be convenient to have an external context value hashed<br>
into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include<br>
it under the Finished. That&#39;s not difficult if people want to,<br>
with the default being empty.<br>
<br>
5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that<br>
the &quot;hello_finished&quot; is being used to bind the handshakes and<br>
that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten<br>
this<br>
and text on that point would be appreciated.<br>
<br>
Comments welcome.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls<=
/a> [2]<br>
</blockquote><span>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
=C2=A0TLS mailing list<br>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br=
></span>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a> [2=
]<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Links:<br>
------<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/615</a=
><br>
[2] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><span=
><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</span></blockquote><div><div>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></div>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
>=20
> Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under vari=
ous
> fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts

the only popular stack I found that does not seem to send alerts is the=20
schannel from Microsoft

=465, FortiOS, OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, Java, mbedTLS, botan, axtls, Go=20
implementation of TLS, all send alert messages

> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide =
to
> continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one location =
not
> scattered around the spec.

In my opinion, putting the information how to handle errors in processing=20
given message near the definition of a message makes it easier for=20
implementers to implement and makes it less likely that they'll miss error=
=20
handling.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 10:19:02 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 10:05 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
> >
> > Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under
> various
> > fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts
>
> the only popular stack I found that does not seem to send alerts is the
> schannel from Microsoft
>

Well, that's a fairly popular stack.



> F5, FortiOS, OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, Java, mbedTLS, botan, axtls, Go
> implementation of TLS, all send alert messages
>

My understanding is that this is situation-dependent and that some systems
do not send alerts all the time.


> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide
> to
> > continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one locatio=
n
> not
> > scattered around the spec.
>
> In my opinion, putting the information how to handle errors in processing
> given message near the definition of a message makes it easier for
> implementers to implement and makes it less likely that they'll miss erro=
r
> handling.
>

Fair enough. I think this is a question of editor discretion.

-Ekr


> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 10:05 AM, Hubert Kario <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>On Monday, 5 Septe=
mber 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; PR: <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/6=
25</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under v=
arious<br>
&gt; fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don&#39;t send alerts<=
br>
<br>
</span>the only popular stack I found that does not seem to send alerts is =
the<br>
schannel from Microsoft<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, that&#39;=
s a fairly popular stack.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex">
F5, FortiOS, OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, Java, mbedTLS, botan, axtls, Go<br>
implementation of TLS, all send alert messages<br></blockquote><div><br></d=
iv><div>My understanding is that this is situation-dependent and that some =
systems</div><div>do not send alerts all the time.</div><div><br></div><div=
><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bor=
der-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>
&gt; Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we deci=
de to<br>
&gt; continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one locati=
on not<br>
&gt; scattered around the spec.<br>
<br>
</span>In my opinion, putting the information how to handle errors in proce=
ssing<br>
given message near the definition of a message makes it easier for<br>
implementers to implement and makes it less likely that they&#39;ll miss er=
ror<br>
handling.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Fair enough. I think this is =
a question of editor discretion.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</f=
ont></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Wednesday, 7 September 2016 10:19:02 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 10:05 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
> > >=20
> > > Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under
> >=20
> > various
> >=20
> > > fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts
> >=20
> > the only popular stack I found that does not seem to send alerts is the
> > schannel from Microsoft
>=20
> Well, that's a fairly popular stack.

just pointing out that "one does not many make" :)

> > F5, FortiOS, OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, Java, mbedTLS, botan, axtls, Go
> > implementation of TLS, all send alert messages
>=20
> My understanding is that this is situation-dependent and that some systems
> do not send alerts all the time.

which points out that some messages (both valid and invalid) may not be=20
handled as well as they should

while making a protocol definition that is precise and allows for=20
interoperability is the primary objective of this work group, I think we ca=
n=20
all agree that helping developers actually implement it correctly and with =
no=20
bugs (a la heartbleed) is not something we should completely ignore

In my opinion, precise definition of error handling does that (even if=20
implementation decides not to send alerts at all).
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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--94eb2c0689ac377b25053beefaef
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> > > the only popular stack I found that does not seem to send alerts is
> > > the schannel from Microsoft
>
> To clarify, schannel does generate alerts per RFC, but the HTTP stack
> (which actually owns the socket) sees no value in sending them.
>

My impression is that this sometimes applies to Chrome as well.

-Ekr


> Cheers,
>
> Andrei
>

--94eb2c0689ac377b25053beefaef
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Andrei Popov <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@m=
icrosoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span =
class=3D"">&gt; &gt; the only popular stack I found that does not seem to s=
end alerts is<br>
&gt; &gt; the schannel from Microsoft<br>
<br>
</span>To clarify, schannel does generate alerts per RFC, but the HTTP stac=
k (which actually owns the socket) sees no value in sending them.<br></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>My impression is that this sometimes applies to =
Chrome as well.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex">
Cheers,<br>
<br>
Andrei<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c0689ac377b25053beefaef--


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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Andrei Popov wrote:
>>> the only popular stack I found that does not seem to send alerts is 
>>> the schannel from Microsoft
> 
> To clarify, schannel does generate alerts per RFC, but the HTTP stack
> (which actually owns the socket) sees no value in sending them.

"Pillows don't hit people, people do." ;-)

When operating with a transport-less (i.e. opaque-PDUs-only) API,
it is somewhat unusal to having an API call _fail_ *and* return output
parameters & transport requests at the same time.  Higher layer programmers
(and the exception-style programming) often do not expect having to
deal with both.

I actually notice just now that Microsoft Win32 SSPI DeleteSecurityContext()
(Microsoft's incarnation of GSS-API) does not have a final/context-deletion
token output parameter.

In the original (DEC given to IETF) GSS-API design, the "final token"
was not meant to be emitted by a failing context iterator call along with
a fatal error code, but by a _successful_ call to gss_delete_sec_context().

I'm actually confused--where does SChannel return that TLS alert PDU
(and along with with what kind of API return code)?



Admittedly, for applications on top of GSS-API (rfc2743/rfc2744) it is
quite common to _not_ bother conveying the optional(!) context deletion
token that may be produced by GSS-API's gss_delete_sec_context(), and
the GSS-APIv2 spec acknowledged this being a common app behaviour,
and deprecated the context deletion token.

-Martin


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 07 Sep 2016 18:46:25 +0000
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 2:21 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
> wrote:
>
> > > the only popular stack I found that does not seem to send alerts is
> > > the schannel from Microsoft
>
> To clarify, schannel does generate alerts per RFC, but the HTTP stack
> (which actually owns the socket) sees no value in sending them.
>
>
> My impression is that this sometimes applies to Chrome as well.
>

Chrome doesn't send close_notify. I'm not sure if error alerts get
swallowed or not. I thought they did, but they do seem to make it through
some layers in the stack. Probably whether they manage to get sent depends
on how long higher layers happen to hold on to objects when an error is
reported.

For Chrome, writing to a socket is asynchronous (we have some
callback-based interface which ultimately uses select/poll/whatever +
non-blocking write/send on POSIX), but tearing down a socket or its owners
is synchronous (it's just C++ delete), so we would attempt to post the
write but then immediately cancel everything if it's just before everything
gets torn down. Trying to wait for that write to actually clear (and then
account for timing it out if it takes forever, etc) would be a ton of
trouble and not actually do much useful. I imagine Andrei's story with the
HTTP stack is similar.

David

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Sep 7,=
 2016 at 2:21 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm=
.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_extra gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote gmail_msg">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Andrei Popov <span di=
r=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.=
com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gm=
ail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex"><span class=3D"gmail_msg">&gt; &gt; the only popular stack I found th=
at does not seem to send alerts is<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; the schannel from Microsoft<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</span>To clarify, schannel does generate alerts per RFC, but the HTTP stac=
k (which actually owns the socket) sees no value in sending them.<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg"></blockquote><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg=
"></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div class=
=3D"gmail_msg">My impression is that this sometimes applies to Chrome as we=
ll.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Chrome doesn&#3=
9;t send close_notify. I&#39;m not sure if error alerts get swallowed or no=
t. I thought they did, but they do seem to make it through some layers in t=
he stack. Probably whether they manage to get sent depends on how long high=
er layers happen to hold on to objects when an error is reported.</div><div=
><br></div><div>For Chrome, writing to a socket is asynchronous (we have so=
me callback-based interface which ultimately uses select/poll/whatever + no=
n-blocking write/send on POSIX), but tearing down a socket or its owners is=
 synchronous (it&#39;s just C++ delete), so we would attempt to post the wr=
ite but then immediately cancel everything if it&#39;s just before everythi=
ng gets torn down. Trying to wait for that write to actually clear (and the=
n account for timing it out if it takes forever, etc) would be a ton of tro=
uble and not actually do much useful. I imagine Andrei&#39;s story with the=
 HTTP stack is similar.</div><div><br></div><div>David</div></div></div>

--94eb2c0579783d66ce053bef559b--


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Subject: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
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Here is a draft that proposes changes to a number of TLS-related =
registries, e.g., adding notes to indicate orphaned extensions and =
registries, adding the missing no_application_protocol alert.  The =
motivation for this draft was to not have everything that needs to be =
fixed be done in the TLS1.3 draft.  We=E2=80=99re positive it needs =
review.

A repo for the draft can be found at:
https://github.com/seanturner/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates
PRs welcome.

spt

> Begin forwarded message:
>=20
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: New Version Notification for =
draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
> Date: September 07, 2016 at 14:10:25 EDT
> To: "Joe Salowey" <joe@salowey.net>, "Sean Turner" <sean@sn3rd.com>, =
<none-chairs@ietf.org>, "Joseph A. Salowey" <joe@salowey.net>
>=20
>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Sean Turner and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>=20
> Name:		draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates
> Revision:	00
> Title:		D/TLS IANA Registry Updates
> Document date:	2016-09-07
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		8
> URL:            =
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates=
-00.txt
> Status:         =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates/
> Htmlized:       =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00
>=20
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document changes the IANA registry policy for a number of =
D/TLS-
>   related registries, renames some of the registries for consistency,
>   and adds notes to many of the registries.  As a result, this =
document
>   updates many RFCs (see updates header).
>=20
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> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
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> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
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> The IETF Secretariat
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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From nobody Wed Sep  7 12:25:11 2016
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Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 22:24:47 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Timothy Jackson <tjackson@mobileiron.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 06:57:43PM +0000, Timothy Jackson wrote:
> We probably want to discuss the potential for side-channels introduced by
> alerting. Iâ€™ve seen at least one case where there were two possible
> classes of errors at a particular state in the protocol. One caused an
> alert, the other caused the TLS stack to close the channel.
> Unfortunately, this difference in behavior could give information to an
> attacker. The only viable solution was to modify the TLS stack to close
> the channel in both cases.
> 
> If weâ€™re going to continue having alerts, I think we would need to be
> sure that an implementations following the RFC will not wind up in this
> situation. I suspect that will be difficult at best.

IMO, no-alert (not even tried) closes are only acceptable if:

- Association was never created (bad HelloVerifyRequest or
  HelloRetryRequest in DTLS).
- Association has been lost (transport error).
- The association state is corrupt.


The bad alerts that leak info are:

- Depend on secret values and
- Substantial probability to not trigger alert for first cause(s).


IIRC, TLS 1.0-1.2 blockmode had one of those.

Note that if you have an alert which could leak information, very
probably it is a timing attack vector as well. And there just closing
the connection won't help.


-Ilari


From nobody Wed Sep  7 12:35:16 2016
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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I've been reading this.

I think we should get rid of the "abort" concept.  There's a clean shutdown=
 and there's everything else which is an abrupt or unclean closing of the c=
onnection.  The "send alert" and "close connection" concepts are separable =
and I think we should do that.

I think writing things this way will make it more clear.  And then we can b=
ikeshed over which alerts are MAY MUST SHOULD, knowing all along that ECONN=
RESET means the other side gave up.


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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 12:45:14 -0700
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On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 9:15 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> When crypto hardware support is available, it's universally AES,
> occasionally
> SHA-1 and/or DES, and very rarely RSA and/or DH and/or ECDSA


EMV chip cards support RSA digital signatures. Granted earlier EMV cards
used ridiculously small key lengths (i.e. 320-bits), but they have been
gradually ratcheted up to e.g. 768 or 1024-bits.

These cards number in the billions (10s of billions?) and the chips are
priced in the penny range.

I don't think it's impractical to ship hardware accelerated asymmetric
crypto primitives on chips that meet the specifications you're describing.
The payments industry has definitely shown it's possible.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
ue, Sep 6, 2016 at 9:15 PM, Peter Gutmann <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.=
nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">When crypto hard=
ware support is available, it&#39;s universally AES, occasionally<br>
SHA-1 and/or DES, and very rarely RSA and/or DH and/or ECDSA=C2=A0</blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>EMV chip cards support RSA digital signatures. Gran=
ted earlier EMV cards used ridiculously small key lengths (i.e. 320-bits), =
but they have been gradually ratcheted up to e.g. 768 or 1024-bits.</div></=
div><div><br></div><div>These cards number in the billions (10s of billions=
?) and the chips are priced in the penny range.</div><div><br></div><div>I =
don&#39;t think it&#39;s impractical to ship hardware accelerated asymmetri=
c crypto primitives on chips that meet the specifications you&#39;re descri=
bing. The payments industry has definitely shown it&#39;s possible.</div><d=
iv><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_=
signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div>
</div></div>

--001a11440bb62536de053bf028bc--


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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Salz, Rich wrote:
>
> I've been reading this.
> 
> I think we should get rid of the "abort" concept.  There's a clean
> shutdown and there's everything else which is an abrupt or unclean
> closing of the connection.  The "send alert" and "close connection"
> concepts are separable and I think we should do that.
> 
> I think writing things this way will make it more clear.
> And then we can bikeshed over which alerts are MAY MUST SHOULD,
> knowing all along that ECONNRESET means the other side gave up.

For TLS handshake failures, the presence of Alerts on-the-wire can
significantly facilitate troubleshooting.

For terminating application data flows after successful TLS handshakes
an ECONNRESET may actually be preferable to graceful TLS closure alerts
in certain scenarios (but this means that applications will have to
perform proper application-level end-of-data signaling).

If the backend uses a multi-tier architecture (such as a reverse proxy
in a DMZ), then its easier to notice (and process) ECONNRESET than
a TLS closure alert, and cancel processing of the active request
in the backend.

This becomes even more important when the stupid idea of hiding the
content type is not removed from TLSv1.3/TLSv2.0.  Recognizing
ECONNRESET is trivial.  Peeking and recognizing a pending TLS Alert
is doable in TLS up to v1.2, but this is going to be a royal PITA
in an Alert-ContentType-concealing TLSv1.3/TLSv2.0.


-Martin


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Sorry, I left off the semi-serious joking indicator on the second paragraph=
.

Here is the main, real, point I want to bring up:
> > I think we should get rid of the "abort" concept.  There's a clean
> > shutdown and there's everything else which is an abrupt or unclean
> > closing of the connection.  The "send alert" and "close connection"
> > concepts are separable and I think we should do that.



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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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I don't  understand the proposal.
Are you proposing to eliminate resumption_context (RC) from All its current
uses and replace it with the hello_finished extension? Or is this to affect
only certain uses of RC? Which ones?

One important property of RC is that it serves as a binding with the
original context that generated a resumption PSK, in particular a binding
with the server's identity (certificate). This is not achieved by the
hello_finished extension, is it?

I also have a problem with names. "Resumption context" is very explicit
about providing, well, resumption context.
"Hello_Finished", in turn, means nothing.
Also, RC may better match the notion of "binder" hence more naturally
requiring collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TLS (1.3 and
before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits are good enough)
and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses.

Anyways, maybe this is just the result of my misunderstanding of the
proposal.

Hugo


On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 8:25 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <
>>> antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the
>>>> transcript for the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it
>>>> violates the incremental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops
>>>> before the placeholder, it can be resumed with the computed finished;
>>>> otherwise, it must be rolled back.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This isn't a big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either
>>> way, because of the actual way we compute the hash.
>>>
>>
>> To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is not known at the time w=
e
>> send ClientHello, most implementations I've seen just buffer the full
>> transcript before this point.
>>
>> But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs (there'=
s
>> all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think that's a g=
ood
>> argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For implementations
>> keeping a buffer, I don't think it matters, so let's keep both strategie=
s
>> happy.
>>
>
> This is certainly fine with me.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Antoine
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit :
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Folks,
>>>>>
>>>>> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
>>>>> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this
>>>>> issue.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>
>>>>> J&S
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin
>>>>> <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
>>>>>> giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
>>>>>> handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
>>>>>> identities if we don't need it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into
>>>>>> the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one
>>>>>> epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the
>>>>>> two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or
>>>>>> other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and the
>>>>>> record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
>>>>>> saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,
>>>>>> and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with
>>>>>> phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
>>>>>> simpler because:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately
>>>>>> upon receiving the ClientHello
>>>>>> without waiting for Finished.
>>>>>> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing aroun=
d
>>>>>> with the ClientHello buffer.
>>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Folks,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615 [1]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
>>>>>> anything important.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OVERVIEW
>>>>>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the
>>>>>> redundancy
>>>>>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>>>>>> ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>>>>>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>>>>>> the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> RATIONALE
>>>>>> The reasoning for this change is:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>>>>>> knows the PSK.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>>>>>> guarantees) via the Finished message.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>>>>>> transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>>>>>> the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the
>>>>>> Finished.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>>>>>> but unfortunately:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
>>>>>> because
>>>>>> that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>>>>>> (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>>>>>> currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
>>>>>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
>>>>>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
>>>>>> PR enacts that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> FAQS
>>>>>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>>>>>> The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished
>>>>>> extension.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>>>>>> It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point
>>>>>> where
>>>>>> the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it
>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>> yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
>>>>>> believe
>>>>>> other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing
>>>>>> only
>>>>>> part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite
>>>>>> easy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>>>>>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>>>>>> early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>>>>>> for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>>>>>> make this change.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>>>>>> prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
>>>>>> significantly
>>>>>> harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>>>>>> you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>>>>>> "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>>>>>> on buffering.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>>>>>> work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>>>>>> the ClientHello. E.g,,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> struct {
>>>>>> FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>>>>>> } HelloFinished;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>>>>>> so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>>>>>> changes weren't totally coupled.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>>>>>> might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>>>>>> into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>>>>>> it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>>>>>> with the default being empty.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>>>>>> the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>>>>>> that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> and text on that point would be appreciated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Comments welcome.
>>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>  TLS mailing list
>>>>>  TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Links:
>>>>> ------
>>>>> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>>>>> [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--001a1149334678a78a053bf2e95b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,=
sans-serif;font-size:small">I don&#39;t =C2=A0understand the proposal.=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-ser=
if;font-size:small">Are you proposing to eliminate resumption_context (RC) =
from All its current uses and replace it with the hello_finished extension?=
 Or is this to affect only certain uses of RC? Which ones?</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"=
><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-s=
erif;font-size:small">One important property of RC is that it serves as a b=
inding with the original context that generated a resumption PSK, in partic=
ular a binding with the server&#39;s identity (certificate). This is not ac=
hieved by the hello_finished extension, is it?</div><div class=3D"gmail_def=
ault" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:small">I also have a problem with names. &quot;Resumption context&quot; i=
s very explicit about providing, well, resumption context.=C2=A0</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall">&quot;Hello_Finished&quot;, in turn, means nothing.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"=
>Also, RC may better match the notion of &quot;binder&quot; hence more natu=
rally requiring collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TLS (1.3 a=
nd before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits are good enou=
gh) and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-=
serif;font-size:small">Anyways, maybe this is just the result of my misunde=
rstanding of the proposal.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_de=
fault" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hugo</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-si=
ze:small"><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Eric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</=
span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D"">On Wed,=
 Sep 7, 2016 at 8:25 AM, David Benjamin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt;=
</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><span><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Er=
ic Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div></span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed=
, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr" target=3D"_blank">antoine@delign=
at-lavaud.fr</a>&gt;</span> wrote:</div></div></div></span><span><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex">
Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript fo=
r the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the incr=
emental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the placeholde=
r, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it must be roll=
ed back.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>This isn&#39;t a=
 big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either way, because of =
the actual way we compute the hash.</div></div></div></div></span></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is no=
t known at the time we send ClientHello, most implementations I&#39;ve seen=
 just buffer the full transcript before this point.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs (there&#=
39;s all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think that&#39=
;s a good argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For implementati=
ons keeping a buffer, I don&#39;t think it matters, so let&#39;s keep both =
strategies happy.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>=
This is certainly fine with me.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><di=
v class=3D"h5"><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></di=
v><div>David</div></font></span><div><div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>-Ekr</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
<br>
Antoine<div><div><br>
<br>
Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
Hi Folks,<br>
<br>
The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Plea=
se<br>
respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this<br>
issue.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
J&amp;S<br>
<br>
On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chr=
omium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
I think this is a good idea. It&#39;s kind of weird, but it avoids<br>
giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the<br>
handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK<br>
identities if we don&#39;t need it.<br>
<br>
As a bonus, this removes the need to route a &quot;phase&quot; parameter in=
to<br>
the traffic key calculation since we&#39;ll never derive more than one<br>
epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the<br>
two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or<br>
other label-munging at all. Simply use labels &quot;key&quot; and &quot;iv&=
quot; and the<br>
record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which<br>
saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,<br>
and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with<br>
phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.<br>
<br>
David<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit<br>
simpler because:<br>
<br>
1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately<br>
upon receiving the ClientHello<br>
without waiting for Finished.<br>
2. You don&#39;t need to derive early handshake traffic keys.<br>
<br>
&gt;From an implementor&#39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing aroun=
d<br>
with the ClientHello buffer.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtf=
m.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
Folks,<br>
<br>
I have just posted a WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffin=
g&quot;<br>
<br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pul=
l/615</a> [1]<div><div><br>
<br>
I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing<br>
anything important.<br>
<br>
OVERVIEW<br>
This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#39;ve had about the<br>
redundancy<br>
of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:<br>
<br>
- Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the<br>
ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.<br>
- Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by<br>
the ClientHello.hello_finished.<br>
<br>
RATIONALE<br>
The reasoning for this change is:<br>
<br>
- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t get any assurance that the other side<br>
knows the PSK.<br>
<br>
- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay<br>
guarantees) via the Finished message.<br>
<br>
- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake<br>
transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption context because<br>
the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the<br>
Finished.<br>
<br>
So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished<br>
but unfortunately:<br>
<br>
1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK<br>
because<br>
that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks<br>
(the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).<br>
<br>
2. You also can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can<br>
currently offer multiple PSK identities.<br>
<br>
The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and<br>
only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the<br>
Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This<br>
PR enacts that.<br>
<br>
FAQS<br>
- What gets included in the handshake transcript?<br>
The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished<br>
extension.<br>
<br>
- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?<br>
It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point<br>
where<br>
the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it<br>
doesn&#39;t<br>
yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I<br>
believe<br>
other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing<br>
only<br>
part of it is easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite<br>
easy.<br>
<br>
POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs<br>
There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:<br>
<br>
1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of<br>
early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay<br>
for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should<br>
make this change.<br>
<br>
2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello<br>
prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not<br>
significantly<br>
harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether<br>
you prefer the invariant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or<br=
>
&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for notes<br>
on buffering.<br>
<br>
3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design<br>
work with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in<br>
the ClientHello. E.g,,<br>
<br>
opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;<br>
<br>
struct {<br>
FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
} HelloFinished;<br>
<br>
Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,<br>
so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these<br>
changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.<br>
<br>
4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it<br>
might be convenient to have an external context value hashed<br>
into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include<br>
it under the Finished. That&#39;s not difficult if people want to,<br>
with the default being empty.<br>
<br>
5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that<br>
the &quot;hello_finished&quot; is being used to bind the handshakes and<br>
that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten<br>
this<br>
and text on that point would be appreciated.<br>
<br>
Comments welcome.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls<=
/a> [2]<br>
</blockquote><span>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
=C2=A0TLS mailing list<br>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br=
></span>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a> [2=
]<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Links:<br>
------<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/615</a=
><br>
[2] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><span=
><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 16:18:56 -0700
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To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
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Cc: Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
wrote:

> I don't  understand the proposal.
> Are you proposing to eliminate resumption_context (RC) from All its
> current uses and replace it with the hello_finished extension?
>

Yes.



> Or is this to affect only certain uses of RC? Which ones?
>
One important property of RC is that it serves as a binding with the
> original context that generated a resumption PSK, in particular a binding
> with the server's identity (certificate). This is not achieved by the
> hello_finished extension, is it?
>

It is supposed to do so. The reasoning is:

- RMS is unchanged and therefore derived from the server certificate
- The HelloFinished computation is HKDF(F(RMS), <ClientHello>) and
therefore also is derived from the server certificate.

Is that insufficient.


I also have a problem with names. "Resumption context" is very explicit
> about providing, well, resumption context.
> "Hello_Finished", in turn, means nothing.
> Also, RC may better match the notion of "binder" hence more naturally
> requiring collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TLS (1.3 and
> before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits are good enoug=
h)
> and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses.
>

Two points about this:

1. The Finished in TLS 1.3 is always Hash.length, and our minimum hash is
SHA-256, so I believe we have enough strength here. We could of course
require a minimum size.
2. I wouldn't object to changing names here, of course.

Best,
-Ekr


> Anyways, maybe this is just the result of my misunderstanding of the
> proposal.
>
> Hugo
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 8:25 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <
>>>> antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the
>>>>> transcript for the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that i=
t
>>>>> violates the incremental nature of the session hash. If the hash stop=
s
>>>>> before the placeholder, it can be resumed with the computed finished;
>>>>> otherwise, it must be rolled back.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This isn't a big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either
>>>> way, because of the actual way we compute the hash.
>>>>
>>>
>>> To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is not known at the time
>>> we send ClientHello, most implementations I've seen just buffer the ful=
l
>>> transcript before this point.
>>>
>>> But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs
>>> (there's all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think
>>> that's a good argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For
>>> implementations keeping a buffer, I don't think it matters, so let's ke=
ep
>>> both strategies happy.
>>>
>>
>> This is certainly fine with me.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> -Ekr
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>> Antoine
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit :
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Folks,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
>>>>>> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this
>>>>>> issue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> J&S
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin
>>>>>> <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
>>>>>>> giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
>>>>>>> handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
>>>>>>> identities if we don't need it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter into
>>>>>>> the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one
>>>>>>> epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the
>>>>>>> two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or
>>>>>>> other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and th=
e
>>>>>>> record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
>>>>>>> saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,
>>>>>>> and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with
>>>>>>> phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> David
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit
>>>>>>> simpler because:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately
>>>>>>> upon receiving the ClientHello
>>>>>>> without waiting for Finished.
>>>>>>> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing arou=
nd
>>>>>>> with the ClientHello buffer.
>>>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Folks,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing=
"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615 [1]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
>>>>>>> anything important.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> OVERVIEW
>>>>>>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the
>>>>>>> redundancy
>>>>>>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes=
:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>>>>>>> ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>>>>>>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>>>>>>> the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> RATIONALE
>>>>>>> The reasoning for this change is:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>>>>>>> knows the PSK.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>>>>>>> guarantees) via the Finished message.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>>>>>>> transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>>>>>>> the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the
>>>>>>> Finished.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>>>>>>> but unfortunately:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>> that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>>>>>>> (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>>>>>>> currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 an=
d
>>>>>>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
>>>>>>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). Thi=
s
>>>>>>> PR enacts that.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> FAQS
>>>>>>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>>>>>>> The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished
>>>>>>> extension.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>>>>>>> It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point
>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>> the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it
>>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>> yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
>>>>>>> believe
>>>>>>> other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing
>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>> part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite
>>>>>>> easy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>>>>>>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>>>>>>> early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>>>>>>> for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>>>>>>> make this change.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>>>>>>> prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
>>>>>>> significantly
>>>>>>> harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>>>>>>> you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>>>>>>> "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>>>>>>> on buffering.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>>>>>>> work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>>>>>>> the ClientHello. E.g,,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> struct {
>>>>>>> FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>>>>>>> } HelloFinished;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>>>>>>> so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>>>>>>> changes weren't totally coupled.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>>>>>>> might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>>>>>>> into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>>>>>>> it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>>>>>>> with the default being empty.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>>>>>>> the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>>>>>>> that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>> and text on that point would be appreciated.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Comments welcome.
>>>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>  TLS mailing list
>>>>>>  TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Links:
>>>>>> ------
>>>>>> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>>>>>> [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il" target=3D"_blank">hugo@ee.technion.a=
c.il</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">I don&#39;=
t =C2=A0understand the proposal.=C2=A0</div><div style=3D"font-family:verda=
na,sans-serif;font-size:small">Are you proposing to eliminate resumption_co=
ntext (RC) from All its current uses and replace it with the hello_finished=
 extension?</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
 style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"> Or is this to af=
fect only certain uses of RC? Which ones?</div></div></blockquote><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:small">One important property of RC is that it serves as=
 a binding with the original context that generated a resumption PSK, in pa=
rticular a binding with the server&#39;s identity (certificate). This is no=
t achieved by the hello_finished extension, is it?<br></div></div></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>It is supposed to do so. The reasoning is:</div><di=
v><br></div><div>- RMS is unchanged and therefore derived from the server c=
ertificate</div><div>- The HelloFinished computation is HKDF(F(RMS), &lt;Cl=
ientHello&gt;) and therefore also is derived from the server certificate.</=
div><div><br></div><div>Is that insufficient.</div><div><br></div><div><br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-fa=
mily:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">I also have a problem with names. =
&quot;Resumption context&quot; is very explicit about providing, well, resu=
mption context.=C2=A0<br></div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif=
;font-size:small">&quot;Hello_Finished&quot;, in turn, means nothing.</div>=
<div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">Also, RC may =
better match the notion of &quot;binder&quot; hence more naturally requirin=
g collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TLS (1.3 and before) hav=
e a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits are good enough) and it wou=
ld be better not to abuse them for other uses.</div></div></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>Two points about this:</div><div><br></div><div>1. The Fini=
shed in TLS 1.3 is always Hash.length, and our minimum hash is SHA-256, so =
I believe we have enough strength here. We could of course require a minimu=
m size.</div><div>2. I wouldn&#39;t object to changing names here, of cours=
e.</div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div>-Ekr<br></div><div><br></div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:ver=
dana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:verdan=
a,sans-serif;font-size:small">Anyways, maybe this is just the result of my =
misunderstanding of the proposal.</div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=
=3D"#888888"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">=
<br></div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hug=
o</div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></=
div></font></span></div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:2=
6 AM, Eric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><span>On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 8:25 AM, David Benjamin <span=
 dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span><div dir=3D"ltr">On W=
ed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.co=
m" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div></span><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex"><span><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lav=
aud <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr" tar=
get=3D"_blank">antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr</a>&gt;</span> wrote:</div></div>=
</div></span><span><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8=
ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript fo=
r the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the incr=
emental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the placeholde=
r, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it must be roll=
ed back.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>This isn&#39;t a=
 big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either way, because of =
the actual way we compute the hash.</div></div></div></div></span></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is no=
t known at the time we send ClientHello, most implementations I&#39;ve seen=
 just buffer the full transcript before this point.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs (there&#=
39;s all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think that&#39=
;s a good argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For implementati=
ons keeping a buffer, I don&#39;t think it matters, so let&#39;s keep both =
strategies happy.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>=
This is certainly fine with me.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><di=
v><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><span><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div><div>David<=
/div></font></span><div><div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><div>-Ekr</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
<br>
Antoine<div><div><br>
<br>
Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
Hi Folks,<br>
<br>
The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Plea=
se<br>
respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this<br>
issue.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
J&amp;S<br>
<br>
On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chr=
omium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
I think this is a good idea. It&#39;s kind of weird, but it avoids<br>
giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the<br>
handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK<br>
identities if we don&#39;t need it.<br>
<br>
As a bonus, this removes the need to route a &quot;phase&quot; parameter in=
to<br>
the traffic key calculation since we&#39;ll never derive more than one<br>
epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the<br>
two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or<br>
other label-munging at all. Simply use labels &quot;key&quot; and &quot;iv&=
quot; and the<br>
record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which<br>
saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,<br>
and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with<br>
phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.<br>
<br>
David<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit<br>
simpler because:<br>
<br>
1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately<br>
upon receiving the ClientHello<br>
without waiting for Finished.<br>
2. You don&#39;t need to derive early handshake traffic keys.<br>
<br>
&gt;From an implementor&#39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing aroun=
d<br>
with the ClientHello buffer.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtf=
m.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
Folks,<br>
<br>
I have just posted a WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffin=
g&quot;<br>
<br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pul=
l/615</a> [1]<div><div><br>
<br>
I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing<br>
anything important.<br>
<br>
OVERVIEW<br>
This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#39;ve had about the<br>
redundancy<br>
of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:<br>
<br>
- Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the<br>
ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.<br>
- Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by<br>
the ClientHello.hello_finished.<br>
<br>
RATIONALE<br>
The reasoning for this change is:<br>
<br>
- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t get any assurance that the other side<br>
knows the PSK.<br>
<br>
- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay<br>
guarantees) via the Finished message.<br>
<br>
- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake<br>
transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption context because<br>
the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the<br>
Finished.<br>
<br>
So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished<br>
but unfortunately:<br>
<br>
1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK<br>
because<br>
that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks<br>
(the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).<br>
<br>
2. You also can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can<br>
currently offer multiple PSK identities.<br>
<br>
The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and<br>
only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the<br>
Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This<br>
PR enacts that.<br>
<br>
FAQS<br>
- What gets included in the handshake transcript?<br>
The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished<br>
extension.<br>
<br>
- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?<br>
It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point<br>
where<br>
the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it<br>
doesn&#39;t<br>
yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I<br>
believe<br>
other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing<br>
only<br>
part of it is easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite<br>
easy.<br>
<br>
POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs<br>
There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:<br>
<br>
1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of<br>
early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay<br>
for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should<br>
make this change.<br>
<br>
2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello<br>
prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not<br>
significantly<br>
harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether<br>
you prefer the invariant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or<br=
>
&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for notes<br>
on buffering.<br>
<br>
3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design<br>
work with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in<br>
the ClientHello. E.g,,<br>
<br>
opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;<br>
<br>
struct {<br>
FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
} HelloFinished;<br>
<br>
Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,<br>
so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these<br>
changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.<br>
<br>
4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it<br>
might be convenient to have an external context value hashed<br>
into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include<br>
it under the Finished. That&#39;s not difficult if people want to,<br>
with the default being empty.<br>
<br>
5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that<br>
the &quot;hello_finished&quot; is being used to bind the handshakes and<br>
that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten<br>
this<br>
and text on that point would be appreciated.<br>
<br>
Comments welcome.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls<=
/a> [2]<br>
</blockquote><span>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
=C2=A0TLS mailing list<br>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br=
></span>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a> [2=
]<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Links:<br>
------<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/615</a=
><br>
[2] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><span=
><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</span></blockquote><div><div>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></div>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div><br></div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 7:18 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
> wrote:
>
>> I don't  understand the proposal.
>> Are you proposing to eliminate resumption_context (RC) from All its
>> current uses and replace it with the hello_finished extension?
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>> Or is this to affect only certain uses of RC? Which ones?
>>
> One important property of RC is that it serves as a binding with the
>> original context that generated a resumption PSK, in particular a bindin=
g
>> with the server's identity (certificate). This is not achieved by the
>> hello_finished extension, is it?
>>
>
> It is supposed to do so. The reasoning is:
>
> - RMS is unchanged and therefore derived from the server certificate
> - The HelloFinished computation is HKDF(F(RMS), <ClientHello>) and
> therefore also is derived from the server certificate.
>
> Is that insufficient.
>

=E2=80=8BMaybe it is, but in a very convoluted way.  There is no crypto-log=
ic
reason in the world to think of RMS as a collision resistant binding value
=E2=80=8B. These non-explicit requirements/assumptions are very dangerous. =
A recipe
for future trouble.


>
> I also have a problem with names. "Resumption context" is very explicit
>> about providing, well, resumption context.
>> "Hello_Finished", in turn, means nothing.
>> Also, RC may better match the notion of "binder" hence more naturally
>> requiring collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TLS (1.3 and
>> before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits are good enou=
gh)
>> and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses.
>>
>
> Two points about this:
>
> 1. The Finished in TLS 1.3 is always Hash.length, and our minimum hash is
> SHA-256, so I believe we have enough strength here. We could of course
> require a minimum size.
>

=E2=80=8BIf you keep this, you definitely need to have a minimum size speci=
fication
in boldface.
=E2=80=8B


> 2. I wouldn't object to changing names here, of course.
>

=E2=80=8BI think that's a must. "Finished" says absolutely nothing about th=
e
functionality of this extension (it may actually mislead to think of it as
a MAC of some sorts).
Call it something that can be understood as  "PSK Creation Binder" and make
sure to specify (and explain in English) that all the values in the key
derivation chain to lead to this value are collision resistant mappings of
the original handshake context (including the server's certificate).

BTW, what would this "original handshake context" be in a setting where
everything is derived from a PSK without server certificates?

Hugo

PS: A mostly unrelated comment:  Finished in 0-RTT was potentially useful
to enable client authentication of 0-RTT traffic but since the latter is
not in (current) scope I guess this should not be a consideration to keep
that Finished message (which can be added when deciding to do such client
authentication).

=E2=80=8B


>
> Best,
> -Ekr
>
>
>> Anyways, maybe this is just the result of my misunderstanding of the
>> proposal.
>>
>> Hugo
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 8:25 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <
>>>>> antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the
>>>>>> transcript for the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that =
it
>>>>>> violates the incremental nature of the session hash. If the hash sto=
ps
>>>>>> before the placeholder, it can be resumed with the computed finished=
;
>>>>>> otherwise, it must be rolled back.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This isn't a big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) eithe=
r
>>>>> way, because of the actual way we compute the hash.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is not known at the time
>>>> we send ClientHello, most implementations I've seen just buffer the fu=
ll
>>>> transcript before this point.
>>>>
>>>> But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs
>>>> (there's all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think
>>>> that's a good argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For
>>>> implementations keeping a buffer, I don't think it matters, so let's k=
eep
>>>> both strategies happy.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is certainly fine with me.
>>>
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> David
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Antoine
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Folks,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
>>>>>>> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on thi=
s
>>>>>>> issue.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> J&S
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin
>>>>>>> <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
>>>>>>>> giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
>>>>>>>> handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
>>>>>>>> identities if we don't need it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter int=
o
>>>>>>>> the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more than one
>>>>>>>> epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the
>>>>>>>> two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or
>>>>>>>> other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and t=
he
>>>>>>>> record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
>>>>>>>> saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys=
,
>>>>>>>> and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with
>>>>>>>> phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> David
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bi=
t
>>>>>>>> simpler because:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately
>>>>>>>> upon receiving the ClientHello
>>>>>>>> without waiting for Finished.
>>>>>>>> 2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing
>>>>>>>> around
>>>>>>>> with the ClientHello buffer.
>>>>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote=
:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Folks,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffin=
g"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615 [1]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missin=
g
>>>>>>>> anything important.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> OVERVIEW
>>>>>>>> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the
>>>>>>>> redundancy
>>>>>>>> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following change=
s:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>>>>>>>> ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>>>>>>>> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>>>>>>>> the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> RATIONALE
>>>>>>>> The reasoning for this change is:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other sid=
e
>>>>>>>> knows the PSK.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>>>>>>>> guarantees) via the Finished message.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshak=
e
>>>>>>>> transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>>>>>>>> the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the
>>>>>>>> Finished.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
>>>>>>>> but unfortunately:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>>> that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>>>>>>>> (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>>>>>>>> currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 a=
nd
>>>>>>>> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing th=
e
>>>>>>>> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). Th=
is
>>>>>>>> PR enacts that.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> FAQS
>>>>>>>> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>>>>>>>> The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished
>>>>>>>> extension.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>>>>>>>> It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point
>>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>> the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it
>>>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>>> yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
>>>>>>>> believe
>>>>>>>> other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing
>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>> part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite
>>>>>>>> easy.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>>>>>>>> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at=
:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>>>>>>>> early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>>>>>>>> for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>>>>>>>> make this change.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>>>>>>>> prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
>>>>>>>> significantly
>>>>>>>> harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>>>>>>>> you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>>>>>>>> "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>>>>>>>> on buffering.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>>>>>>>> work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>>>>>>>> the ClientHello. E.g,,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> struct {
>>>>>>>> FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>>>>>>>> } HelloFinished;
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>>>>>>>> so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>>>>>>>> changes weren't totally coupled.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that i=
t
>>>>>>>> might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>>>>>>>> into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>>>>>>>> it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>>>>>>>> with the default being empty.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear tha=
t
>>>>>>>> the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>>>>>>>> that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>> and text on that point would be appreciated.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Comments welcome.
>>>>>>>> -Ekr
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>  TLS mailing list
>>>>>>>  TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>>>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Links:
>>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>>>>>>> [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>>
>>
>

--94eb2c06a37a34e46d053bf37e8f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,=
sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 7:18 PM, Eric Rescorla <span di=
r=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=
=3D"">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il" target=3D"_blank">hugo@ee.technion=
.ac.il</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">I don&#3=
9;t =C2=A0understand the proposal.=C2=A0</div><div style=3D"font-family:ver=
dana,sans-serif;font-size:small">Are you proposing to eliminate resumption_=
context (RC) from All its current uses and replace it with the hello_finish=
ed extension?</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Yes.</div>=
<span class=3D""><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:small"> Or is this to affect only certain uses of RC? Which ones?</div></=
div></blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8=
ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=
=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">One important property =
of RC is that it serves as a binding with the original context that generat=
ed a resumption PSK, in particular a binding with the server&#39;s identity=
 (certificate). This is not achieved by the hello_finished extension, is it=
?<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>It is supposed to =
do so. The reasoning is:</div><div><br></div><div>- RMS is unchanged and th=
erefore derived from the server certificate</div><div>- The HelloFinished c=
omputation is HKDF(F(RMS), &lt;ClientHello&gt;) and therefore also is deriv=
ed from the server certificate.</div><div><br></div><div>Is that insufficie=
nt.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"g=
mail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;displ=
ay:inline">=E2=80=8BMaybe it is, but in a very convoluted way.=C2=A0 There =
is no crypto-logic reason in the world to think of RMS as a collision resis=
tant binding value</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:v=
erdana,sans-serif;display:inline">=E2=80=8B. These non-explicit requirement=
s/assumptions are very dangerous. A recipe for future trouble.=C2=A0</div><=
/div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-se=
rif;display:inline"><br></div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=
=3D""><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">I al=
so have a problem with names. &quot;Resumption context&quot; is very explic=
it about providing, well, resumption context.=C2=A0<br></div><div style=3D"=
font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">&quot;Hello_Finished&quot;,=
 in turn, means nothing.</div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;=
font-size:small">Also, RC may better match the notion of &quot;binder&quot;=
 hence more naturally requiring collision resistance, while all Finished us=
es in TLS (1.3 and before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bi=
ts are good enough) and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses=
.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Two points about this:=
</div><div><br></div><div>1. The Finished in TLS 1.3 is always Hash.length,=
 and our minimum hash is SHA-256, so I believe we have enough strength here=
. We could of course require a minimum size.</div></div></div></div></block=
quote><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family=
:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">=E2=80=8BIf you keep th=
is, you definitely need to have a minimum size specification in boldface.</=
div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">=E2=80=8B</div>=C2=A0</div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div>2. I wouldn&#39;t object to changing names here, o=
f course.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small=
;display:inline">=E2=80=8BI think that&#39;s a must. &quot;Finished&quot; s=
ays absolutely nothing about the functionality of this extension (it may ac=
tually mislead to think of it as a MAC of some sorts).=C2=A0</div></div><di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font=
-size:small;display:inline">Call it something that can be understood as =C2=
=A0&quot;PSK Creation Binder&quot; and make sure to specify (and explain in=
 English) that all the values in the key derivation chain to lead to this v=
alue are collision resistant mappings of the original handshake context (in=
cluding the server&#39;s certificate).=C2=A0</div></div><div><div class=3D"=
gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;disp=
lay:inline"><br></div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font=
-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">BTW, what would =
this &quot;original handshake context&quot; be in a setting where everythin=
g is derived from a PSK without server certificates?</div></div><div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:sm=
all;display:inline"><br></div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">Hugo</di=
v></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans=
-serif;font-size:small;display:inline"><br></div></div><div><div class=3D"g=
mail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;displ=
ay:inline">PS: A mostly unrelated comment: =C2=A0Finished in 0-RTT was pote=
ntially useful to enable client authentication of 0-RTT traffic but since t=
he latter is not in (current) scope I guess this should not be a considerat=
ion to keep that Finished message (which can be added when deciding to do s=
uch client authentication).</div></div><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;displa=
y:inline">=E2=80=8B</div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></=
div><div>Best,</div><div>-Ekr<br></div><div><div class=3D"h5"><div><br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family=
:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:ve=
rdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">Anyways, maybe this is just the result of=
 my misunderstanding of the proposal.</div><span><font color=3D"#888888"><d=
iv style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div =
style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hugo</div><div sty=
le=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div></font></sp=
an></div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Eric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span>On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 8:=
25 AM, David Benjamin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chro=
mium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<span><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:11 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div></span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8=
ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 6:=
54 AM, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:anto=
ine@delignat-lavaud.fr" target=3D"_blank">antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:</div></div></div></span><span><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Regarding whether the placeholder zeros should be part of the transcript fo=
r the stuffed finished, an argument against it is that it violates the incr=
emental nature of the session hash. If the hash stops before the placeholde=
r, it can be resumed with the computed finished; otherwise, it must be roll=
ed back.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>This isn&#39;t a=
 big deal for me (or I think any other implementor) either way, because of =
the actual way we compute the hash.</div></div></div></div></span></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>To expand on that, because the final PRF hash is no=
t known at the time we send ClientHello, most implementations I&#39;ve seen=
 just buffer the full transcript before this point.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>But one could also keep a rolling hash of all the supported PRFs (there&#=
39;s all of two of them if you lose TLS 1.1 and below), so I think that&#39=
;s a good argument for using the prefix rather than zeros. For implementati=
ons keeping a buffer, I don&#39;t think it matters, so let&#39;s keep both =
strategies happy.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>=
This is certainly fine with me.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><di=
v><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><span><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div><div>David<=
/div></font></span><div><div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><div>-Ekr</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
<br>
Antoine<div><div><br>
<br>
Le 2016-09-07 05:49, Joseph Salowey a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
Hi Folks,<br>
<br>
The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Plea=
se<br>
respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this<br>
issue.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
J&amp;S<br>
<br>
On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chr=
omium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
I think this is a good idea. It&#39;s kind of weird, but it avoids<br>
giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the<br>
handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK<br>
identities if we don&#39;t need it.<br>
<br>
As a bonus, this removes the need to route a &quot;phase&quot; parameter in=
to<br>
the traffic key calculation since we&#39;ll never derive more than one<br>
epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with the<br>
two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation or<br>
other label-munging at all. Simply use labels &quot;key&quot; and &quot;iv&=
quot; and the<br>
record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which<br>
saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the traffic keys,<br>
and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without mucking about with<br>
phases, traffic directions, whether we are client or server, etc.<br>
<br>
David<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
I should also mention that this makes the implementation a fair bit<br>
simpler because:<br>
<br>
1. You can make all the decisions on the server side immediately<br>
upon receiving the ClientHello<br>
without waiting for Finished.<br>
2. You don&#39;t need to derive early handshake traffic keys.<br>
<br>
&gt;From an implementor&#39;s perspective, this outweighs the messing aroun=
d<br>
with the ClientHello buffer.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtf=
m.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
Folks,<br>
<br>
I have just posted a WIP PR for what I&#39;m calling &quot;Finished Stuffin=
g&quot;<br>
<br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pul=
l/615</a> [1]<div><div><br>
<br>
I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing<br>
anything important.<br>
<br>
OVERVIEW<br>
This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we&#39;ve had about the<br>
redundancy<br>
of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:<br>
<br>
- Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the<br>
ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.<br>
- Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by<br>
the ClientHello.hello_finished.<br>
<br>
RATIONALE<br>
The reasoning for this change is:<br>
<br>
- With ordinary PSK you don&#39;t get any assurance that the other side<br>
knows the PSK.<br>
<br>
- With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay<br>
guarantees) via the Finished message.<br>
<br>
- If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake<br>
transcript, then we wouldn&#39;t need the resumption context because<br>
the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the<br>
Finished.<br>
<br>
So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished<br>
but unfortunately:<br>
<br>
1. You can&#39;t just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK<br>
because<br>
that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks<br>
(the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that&#39;s opt-in).<br>
<br>
2. You also can&#39;t send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can<br>
currently offer multiple PSK identities.<br>
<br>
The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and<br>
only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the<br>
Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This<br>
PR enacts that.<br>
<br>
FAQS<br>
- What gets included in the handshake transcript?<br>
The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished<br>
extension.<br>
<br>
- Isn&#39;t this a hassle to implement?<br>
It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point<br>
where<br>
the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it<br>
doesn&#39;t<br>
yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I<br>
believe<br>
other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing<br>
only<br>
part of it is easy. I&#39;ve done it in NSS and this part is quite<br>
easy.<br>
<br>
POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs<br>
There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:<br>
<br>
1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of<br>
early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay<br>
for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should<br>
make this change.<br>
<br>
2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello<br>
prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not<br>
significantly<br>
harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether<br>
you prefer the invariant of &quot;always hash complete messages&quot; or<br=
>
&quot;always hash valid pieces of transcript&quot;. See above for notes<br>
on buffering.<br>
<br>
3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design<br>
work with &gt;1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in<br>
the ClientHello. E.g,,<br>
<br>
opaque FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;<br>
<br>
struct {<br>
FinishedValue finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
} HelloFinished;<br>
<br>
Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants &gt;1 PSK,<br>
so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these<br>
changes weren&#39;t totally coupled.<br>
<br>
4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it<br>
might be convenient to have an external context value hashed<br>
into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include<br>
it under the Finished. That&#39;s not difficult if people want to,<br>
with the default being empty.<br>
<br>
5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that<br>
the &quot;hello_finished&quot; is being used to bind the handshakes and<br>
that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten<br>
this<br>
and text on that point would be appreciated.<br>
<br>
Comments welcome.<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
</div></div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls<=
/a> [2]<br>
</blockquote><span>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
=C2=A0TLS mailing list<br>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br=
></span>
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a> [2=
]<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Links:<br>
------<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/615</a=
><br>
[2] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><span=
><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</span></blockquote><div><div>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></div>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div><br></div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c06a37a34e46d053bf37e8f--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Richard Hartmann <richih.mailinglist@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
Thread-Index: AQHSCOYwtgYqMp52KUWzQpy/H6FTjaBvGI68
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 05:53:29 +0000
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References: <m2lgzcyhxi.fsf@bos-mpeve.kendall.corp.akamai.com> <201608311948.u7VJmChl018731@rumpleteazer.rhmr.com> <CABrd9STOCbBo=g22XySRnWofHwVZkrC-ripZY38yLRZV2kQh3A@mail.gmail.com> <sjminu8vk1t.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <1473221674611.89839@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <CAD77+gSWkttd1_r75GFvZgWotqMZtH0ry5Qw62n-jZkU8mJQGA@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
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Richard Hartmann <richih.mailinglist@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Is it correct when I say that the embedded programmers you talked to don't=
 =0A=
>care about any form of DES as they need/must/prefer to do AES, anyway?=0A=
=0A=
The only data point I have is that every time I've tried to disable DES in=
=0A=
a new release (and by DES I mean single DES, not 3DES) I've had a chorus of=
 =0A=
complaints about it vanishing.  Unfortunately I don't have anything more=0A=
than that, you only find out about things like this when they break stuff.=
=0A=
Certainly DES still sees a surprising amount of use, and in many cases it's=
=0A=
quite justified, whatever you're protecting is adequately safeguarded with=
=0A=
DES.  For example burglar alarms, if they use real encryption (far too many=
=0A=
use "encryption" that would more accurately be described as data masking),=
=0A=
often use DES, no doubt based on Microchip App Note 583 or freely available=
=0A=
source like despiccable, which runs in 20 bytes of RAM (if your burglar ala=
rm=0A=
is advertised as having a "RISC based CPU" then it's probably using a PIC,=
=0A=
having a processor so spartan it can barely add is now a marketing feature =
if=0A=
you use the right name for it).  They'll be using DES forever, because the =
=0A=
entire environment they operate in runs DES.=0A=
=0A=
>If yes, there's no reason in the embedded world that would prevent a =0A=
>diediedie.=0A=
=0A=
See above.  You're not going to get rid of DES.  And, as I've pointed out=
=0A=
earlier, the embedded world won't even know your diediedie exists, and if=
=0A=
it's pointed out to them they'll ignore it.  Alarms, for example, send data=
=0A=
quantities measured in bytes, so some academic attack that would take 500 =
=0A=
million years to acquire the necessary data isn't going to lose anyone any =
=0A=
sleep.  It's a nice piece of work, but you need to look at what practical =
=0A=
effect it has on real, deployed systems...=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 07:43:53PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 7:18 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> 
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
> > wrote:
> >
> > I also have a problem with names. "Resumption context" is very explicit
> >> about providing, well, resumption context.
> >> "Hello_Finished", in turn, means nothing.
> >> Also, RC may better match the notion of "binder" hence more naturally
> >> requiring collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TLS (1.3 and
> >> before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits are good enough)
> >> and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses.
> >>
> >
> > Two points about this:
> >
> > 1. The Finished in TLS 1.3 is always Hash.length, and our minimum hash is
> > SHA-256, so I believe we have enough strength here. We could of course
> > require a minimum size.
> >
> 
> â€‹If you keep this, you definitely need to have a minimum size specification
> in boldface.

Well, the PRF hash is already assumed to be CR, and if HKDF is used with
certain restrictions, it preserves CR:

- The hash has output length at most input length (true for all SHA-2 variants)
- HKDF-extract salt length is constant (in current draft, always hash_olen)
- HKDF-expand PRK length is constant (in current draft, always hash_olen)
- The HKDF-expand output output length is at least hash output length
  (in current draft, hash_olen except in key expansions).

Furthermore Finished construction uses HMAC. There for CR-preserving,
one needs key to be of constant length (it always is hash_olen).


Then there's things that are "nonces":

- Exporter master secret
- Resumption master secret
- hello_finished
- Some outputs of TLS exporter (depending on application).

So I would be more concerned about some future extension changing the
way things are computed, breaking CR-preserving, or someone adding a
weak PRF hash. â€‹


(Of course, if SHA-2 breaks, we have really messy practical problem
too...)

 
> > 2. I wouldn't object to changing names here, of course.
> >
> 
> â€‹I think that's a must. "Finished" says absolutely nothing about the
> functionality of this extension (it may actually mislead to think of it as
> a MAC of some sorts).
> Call it something that can be understood as  "PSK Creation Binder" and make
> sure to specify (and explain in English) that all the values in the key
> derivation chain to lead to this value are collision resistant mappings of
> the original handshake context (including the server's certificate).

It is a bit more problematic than that:

The hello_finished / "PSK Creation Binder" derives from the PSK key.

Deriving separate value in context of dynamic PSK provisioning does not
work properly as "static" PSKs lack this value, and if one then tries to
use such key with combined authentication, you got an attack[1].


[1] Apparently combined authentication is to be in separate spec[2], but
the main spec needs to be safe with it.

[2] There apparently the server signature_algorithms to "support" that,
except I can't figure out _any_ use for that except a footgun[3].

[3] If using PSK, it has ill-defined semantics. If not, it pretty much
only useful for attacking the client.



-Ilari


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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
References: <m2lgzcyhxi.fsf@bos-mpeve.kendall.corp.akamai.com> <201608311948.u7VJmChl018731@rumpleteazer.rhmr.com> <CABrd9STOCbBo=g22XySRnWofHwVZkrC-ripZY38yLRZV2kQh3A@mail.gmail.com> <sjminu8vk1t.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <1473221674611.89839@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAHOTMVKJJAOz+a0d6jej2mYpM9LiBnt65XtYVVTH6dKzN_UCxA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 08 Sep 2016 11:01:24 -0400
In-Reply-To: <CAHOTMVKJJAOz+a0d6jej2mYpM9LiBnt65XtYVVTH6dKzN_UCxA@mail.gmail.com> (Tony Arcieri's message of "Wed, 7 Sep 2016 12:45:14 -0700")
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]   3DES diediedie
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Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> writes:

> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 9:15 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
> wrote:
>
>     When crypto hardware support is available, it's universally AES,
>     occasionally
>     SHA-1 and/or DES, and very rarely RSA and/or DH and/or ECDSA=C2=A0
>
> EMV chip cards support RSA digital signatures. Granted earlier EMV cards =
used
> ridiculously small key lengths (i.e. 320-bits), but they have been gradua=
lly
> ratcheted up to e.g. 768 or 1024-bits.

So they are finally up to 80-bit security?  Woohoo!
That makes me feel so safe.

> These cards number in the billions (10s of billions?) and the chips are p=
riced
> in the penny range.
>
> I don't think it's impractical to ship hardware accelerated asymmetric cr=
ypto
> primitives on chips that meet the specifications you're describing. The
> payments industry has definitely shown it's possible.

Payments are a very poor example..  Several seconds per transaction?
That's not usable performance.  Look at all the pushback from consumers
that have been happening since the changeover to chip cards in the US
this past year.

> Tony Arcieri

-derek
--=20
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant


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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
References: <m2lgzcyhxi.fsf@bos-mpeve.kendall.corp.akamai.com> <201608311948.u7VJmChl018731@rumpleteazer.rhmr.com> <CABrd9STOCbBo=g22XySRnWofHwVZkrC-ripZY38yLRZV2kQh3A@mail.gmail.com> <sjminu8vk1t.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <1473221674611.89839@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAD77+gSWkttd1_r75GFvZgWotqMZtH0ry5Qw62n-jZkU8mJQGA@mail.gmail.com> <1473314009688.88774@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Thu, 08 Sep 2016 11:21:00 -0400
In-Reply-To: <1473314009688.88774@cs.auckland.ac.nz> (Peter Gutmann's message of "Thu, 8 Sep 2016 05:53:29 +0000")
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]   3DES diediedie
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Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> writes:

> Richard Hartmann <richih.mailinglist@gmail.com> writes:
>
>>Is it correct when I say that the embedded programmers you talked to don't 
>>care about any form of DES as they need/must/prefer to do AES, anyway?
>
> The only data point I have is that every time I've tried to disable DES in
> a new release (and by DES I mean single DES, not 3DES) I've had a chorus of 
> complaints about it vanishing.  Unfortunately I don't have anything more
> than that, you only find out about things like this when they break stuff.
> Certainly DES still sees a surprising amount of use, and in many cases it's
> quite justified, whatever you're protecting is adequately safeguarded with
> DES.  For example burglar alarms, if they use real encryption (far too many
> use "encryption" that would more accurately be described as data masking),
> often use DES, no doubt based on Microchip App Note 583 or freely available
> source like despiccable, which runs in 20 bytes of RAM (if your burglar alarm
> is advertised as having a "RISC based CPU" then it's probably using a PIC,
> having a processor so spartan it can barely add is now a marketing feature if
> you use the right name for it).  They'll be using DES forever, because the 
> entire environment they operate in runs DES.
>
>>If yes, there's no reason in the embedded world that would prevent a 
>>diediedie.
>
> See above.  You're not going to get rid of DES.  And, as I've pointed out
> earlier, the embedded world won't even know your diediedie exists, and if
> it's pointed out to them they'll ignore it.  Alarms, for example, send data
> quantities measured in bytes, so some academic attack that would take 500 
> million years to acquire the necessary data isn't going to lose anyone any 
> sleep.  It's a nice piece of work, but you need to look at what practical 
> effect it has on real, deployed systems...

EXACTLY!

> Peter.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant


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Subject: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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--001a114abf70928b58053c012f9f
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Hi folks,

I=E2=80=99d like to revisit the question of version negotiation.

EKR wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an extension:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632

I would like us to adopt this proposal.

In Berlin, this really got framed as a pragmatic question: the current
version negotiation has a lot of intolerance and so let=E2=80=99s work arou=
nd that.
So, understandably, this seemed like a =E2=80=9Clet=E2=80=99s adopt a hack =
forever=E2=80=9D
proposal. I think that framing is wrong. The intolerance situation is
serious, but I think there=E2=80=99s also a strong argument that the curren=
t scheme
isn=E2=80=99t very good.

The current scheme is very simple. The client advertises a maximum version
and the server selects based on that. This is the only piece of TLS
negotiation which works this way. Elsewhere (extensions, cipher suites,
signature algorithms), one side offers a list and the other side picks out
of it. I think it=E2=80=99s clear now that strategy is more robust: every t=
ime
we=E2=80=99ve bumped version numbers, we=E2=80=99ve had intolerance problem=
s and this time
is no exception (see below). By contrast, we regularly introduce new cipher
suites, extensions, etc., and while we do see the occasional failure, they
are much rarer and typically within the level of breakage that clients can
tolerate and deal with by reaching out to affected servers. Moreover, lists
lend themselves to future-proofing via draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a
way the current scheme does not.

An additional benefit is lists make it much easier to roll out
prototype/draft versions. Currently, we are using a hack where the client
offers {3, 4} but also includes a draft version number in an extension.
This does work, but requires servers process that extension in perpetuity
or at least until all draft version clients go away.  With a list, it=E2=80=
=99s
trivial to offer a draft version by just including it. This is the strategy
HTTP/2 used (via ALPN) and it worked well.

Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn=E2=80=99t be worth fixing vers=
ion
negotiation in 1.3 except for intolerance. Unfortunately, this fourth time,
it=E2=80=99s the same story as before. A probe of Alexa top million sites w=
ith
BoringSSL=E2=80=99s TLS 1.3 code (the Go version), shows 1.63% of TLS-capab=
le hosts
reject a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. Note these are top sites and traffic is
top-heavy, so we can expect much higher usage-weighted numbers. Qualys SSL
Pulse reports 3.6%:
https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-intolerance-in-ssl-p=
ulse

(Ignore the drop in the graph. We=E2=80=99ve long fixed the ClientHello
record-layer at {3, 1}. TLS 1.3 only codified existing practice here.) If
instead we use a TLS 1.3 ClientHello with version TLS 1.2, the breakage
drops to 0.017%. (Some of this is an NSS signature algorithms bug, fixed
last year, which we hope to clear by deploying RSA-PSS in browsers early.
The rest appears to be noise from transient errors which crop up in large
tests.)

These numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as damage, which
means that they (at least browsers) will be forced to do fallback. This
represents a security risk (cf. POODLE) as well as hides serious interop
problems. The situation is even worse for non-browser clients, which may be
unable to deploy at all (Ubuntu 12.04, despite shipping an OpenSSL release
with TLS 1.2, had to disable it on the client.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments/4 )

The major arguments against this change seem to be:

1. It=E2=80=99s inelegant to have two mechanisms.
2. We should fix broken servers

The first is true, but as with other changes, EKR=E2=80=99s PR replaces the=
 1.2
mechanism with one for 1.3, so we=E2=80=99ll just have one going forward. T=
he
second would be nice, but as a practical matter, I spend a lot of time
trying to get those servers fixed and it doesn=E2=80=99t work very well her=
e.
Better is simply to move to a situation where once those servers upgrade
they will be correctly behaving forever (instead of just handling 1.3
correctly and breaking with 1.4). This change does that.

Thanks,

David

--001a114abf70928b58053c012f9f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks,</div><div><br></div><div>I=E2=80=99d like t=
o revisit the question of version negotiation.</div><div><br></div><div>EKR=
 wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an extension:</div><d=
iv><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632">https://github.=
com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632</a></div><div><br></div><div>I would like us =
to adopt this proposal.</div><div><br></div><div>In Berlin, this really got=
 framed as a pragmatic question: the current version negotiation has a lot =
of intolerance and so let=E2=80=99s work around that. So, understandably, t=
his seemed like a =E2=80=9Clet=E2=80=99s adopt a hack forever=E2=80=9D prop=
osal. I think that framing is wrong. The intolerance situation is serious, =
but I think there=E2=80=99s also a strong argument that the current scheme =
isn=E2=80=99t very good.</div><div><br></div><div>The current scheme is ver=
y simple. The client advertises a maximum version and the server selects ba=
sed on that. This is the only piece of TLS negotiation which works this way=
. Elsewhere (extensions, cipher suites, signature algorithms), one side off=
ers a list and the other side picks out of it. I think it=E2=80=99s clear n=
ow that strategy is more robust: every time we=E2=80=99ve bumped version nu=
mbers, we=E2=80=99ve had intolerance problems and this time is no exception=
 (see below). By contrast, we regularly introduce new cipher suites, extens=
ions, etc., and while we do see the occasional failure, they are much rarer=
 and typically within the level of breakage that clients can tolerate and d=
eal with by reaching out to affected servers. Moreover, lists lend themselv=
es to future-proofing via draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a way the current=
 scheme does not.</div><div><br></div><div>An additional benefit is lists m=
ake it much easier to roll out prototype/draft versions. Currently, we are =
using a hack where the client offers {3, 4} but also includes a draft versi=
on number in an extension. This does work, but requires servers process tha=
t extension in perpetuity or at least until all draft version clients go aw=
ay.=C2=A0 With a list, it=E2=80=99s trivial to offer a draft version by jus=
t including it. This is the strategy HTTP/2 used (via ALPN) and it worked w=
ell.</div><div><br></div><div>Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn=
=E2=80=99t be worth fixing version negotiation in 1.3 except for intoleranc=
e. Unfortunately, this fourth time, it=E2=80=99s the same story as before. =
A probe of Alexa top million sites with BoringSSL=E2=80=99s TLS 1.3 code (t=
he Go version), shows 1.63% of TLS-capable hosts reject a TLS 1.3 ClientHel=
lo. Note these are top sites and traffic is top-heavy, so we can expect muc=
h higher usage-weighted numbers. Qualys SSL Pulse reports 3.6%:</div><div><=
a href=3D"https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-intoleranc=
e-in-ssl-pulse">https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-into=
lerance-in-ssl-pulse</a></div><div><br></div><div>(Ignore the drop in the g=
raph. We=E2=80=99ve long fixed the ClientHello record-layer at {3, 1}. TLS =
1.3 only codified existing practice here.) If instead we use a TLS 1.3 Clie=
ntHello with version TLS 1.2, the breakage drops to 0.017%. (Some of this i=
s an NSS signature algorithms bug, fixed last year, which we hope to clear =
by deploying RSA-PSS in browsers early. The rest appears to be noise from t=
ransient errors which crop up in large tests.)</div><div><br></div><div>The=
se numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as damage, which means =
that they (at least browsers) will be forced to do fallback. This represent=
s a security risk (cf. POODLE) as well as hides serious interop problems. T=
he situation is even worse for non-browser clients, which may be unable to =
deploy at all (Ubuntu 12.04, despite shipping an OpenSSL release with TLS 1=
.2, had to disable it on the client.</div><div><a href=3D"https://bugs.laun=
chpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments/4">https://bugs.laun=
chpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments/4</a> )</div><div><b=
r></div><div>The major arguments against this change seem to be:</div><div>=
<br></div><div>1. It=E2=80=99s inelegant to have two mechanisms.</div><div>=
2. We should fix broken servers</div><div><br></div><div>The first is true,=
 but as with other changes, EKR=E2=80=99s PR replaces the 1.2 mechanism wit=
h one for 1.3, so we=E2=80=99ll just have one going forward. The second wou=
ld be nice, but as a practical matter, I spend a lot of time trying to get =
those servers fixed and it doesn=E2=80=99t work very well here. Better is s=
imply to move to a situation where once those servers upgrade they will be =
correctly behaving forever (instead of just handling 1.3 correctly and brea=
king with 1.4). This change does that.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</di=
v><div><br></div><div>David</div></div>

--001a114abf70928b58053c012f9f--


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References: <m2lgzcyhxi.fsf@bos-mpeve.kendall.corp.akamai.com> <201608311948.u7VJmChl018731@rumpleteazer.rhmr.com> <CABrd9STOCbBo=g22XySRnWofHwVZkrC-ripZY38yLRZV2kQh3A@mail.gmail.com> <sjminu8vk1t.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <1473221674611.89839@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAD77+gSWkttd1_r75GFvZgWotqMZtH0ry5Qw62n-jZkU8mJQGA@mail.gmail.com> <1473314009688.88774@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 12:08:13 -0400
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
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--001a114a8c86bf8867053c013cc0
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On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 1:53 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> The only data point I have is that every time I've tried to disable DES in
> a new release (and by DES I mean single DES, not 3DES) I've had a chorus of
> complaints about it vanishing.

...

>  Alarms, for example, send data
> quantities measured in bytes, so some academic attack that would take 500
> million years to acquire the necessary data isn't going to lose anyone any
> sleep.  It's a nice piece of work, but you need to look at what practical
> effect it has on real, deployed systems...
>

To this class of examples, the problem seems to be less the implications
for security of the specific systems making use of weak crypto, and more
the effect the survival of weak options for crypto might have on other
systems. We don't want more general systems to be subject to attacks that
may not be applicable to the resource-constrained target systems, but that
requires us to answer a few questions about those constrained systems:

(1) Is the target system isolated, such that a compromise cannot either
leverage transitive trust to another system or provide an attacker a beach
head from which to attack (surreptitiously probe, etc.) other systems?

(2) Is the weak crypto being used by the target system in a way that
renders both the known and expected attacks inapplicable?

If we can answer #1 "yes", then all a user is dealing with is a device that
might malfunction in a well-defined/delineable way upon compromise, with no
impact on other systems. It might be hard to definitively answer because,
for instance, a light bulb malfunctioning might create a safety incident if
the light bulb is a control panel indicator for some problem, so I don't
want to minimize the difficulty of coming to a "yes" answer here.

If the answer to #1 is "no" or is too difficult to answer, however, then we
have to actually analyze the weaknesses in the crypto with respect to how
the device could be used.

Where I'm going with this is that #1 is going to be particularly difficult
to answer if the protocol making use of the weak crypto is TLS and the
device is connected to the internet, simply because the potential for
complex interactions is so high. The safest course may be to continue to
deprecate weak crypto for TLS, IPsec, etc. under the assumption that the
systems making use of those protocols are both powerful enough and
well-connected enough to cause a problem if compromised. Nothing stops
resource-constrained systems from continuing to use old implementations of
TLS that do support weak crypto, though I question the wisdom of producing
parts with no upgrade path that speak such a complex, general transport
protocol rather than something naturally 0-RTT in the steady state that
would use less CPU and power, have a smaller TCB, and not rely on an ASN.1
implementation for domain isolation (e.g., Kerberos).

Which leads directly into the issue of the potential for implementation
vulnerabilities, something that is probably even more likely to lead to
loss of control than weak crypto, and which may ultimately force users to
demand IoT devices for which the answer to #1 is always "yes". So I wonder
if all the worrying about weak crypto is just a red herring compared with
the exploits we are actually going to encounter.

Kyle

--001a114a8c86bf8867053c013cc0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 1:53 AM, Peter Gutmann <span dir=3D=
"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pg=
ut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">The only data po=
int I have is that every time I&#39;ve tried to disable DES in<br>
a new release (and by DES I mean single DES, not 3DES) I&#39;ve had a choru=
s of<br>
complaints about it vanishing.=C2=A0</blockquote><div>... <br></div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex">=C2=A0Alarms, for example, send data<br>
quantities measured in bytes, so some academic attack that would take 500<b=
r>
million years to acquire the necessary data isn&#39;t going to lose anyone =
any<br>
sleep.=C2=A0 It&#39;s a nice piece of work, but you need to look at what pr=
actical<br>
effect it has on real, deployed systems...<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>To this clas=
s of examples, the problem seems to be less the implications for security o=
f the specific systems making use of weak crypto, and more the effect the s=
urvival of weak options for crypto might have on other systems. We don&#39;=
t want more general systems to be subject to attacks that may not be applic=
able to the resource-constrained target systems, but that requires us to an=
swer a few questions about those constrained systems:<br><br></div><div>(1)=
 Is the target system isolated, such that a compromise cannot either levera=
ge transitive trust to another system or provide an attacker a beach head f=
rom which to attack (surreptitiously probe, etc.) other systems?<br><br></d=
iv><div>(2) Is the weak crypto being used by the target system in a way tha=
t renders both the known and expected attacks inapplicable?<br><br></div><d=
iv>If we can answer #1 &quot;yes&quot;, then all a user is dealing with is =
a device that might malfunction in a well-defined/delineable way upon compr=
omise, with no impact on other systems. It might be hard to definitively an=
swer because, for instance, a light bulb malfunctioning might create a safe=
ty incident if the light bulb is a control panel indicator for some problem=
, so I don&#39;t want to minimize the difficulty of coming to a &quot;yes&q=
uot; answer here.<br><br></div><div>If the answer to #1 is &quot;no&quot; o=
r is too difficult to answer, however, then we have to actually analyze the=
 weaknesses in the crypto with respect to how the device could be used.<br>=
</div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Where I&#39;m going with this is=
 that #1 is going to be particularly difficult to answer if the protocol ma=
king use of the weak crypto is TLS and the device is connected to the inter=
net, simply because the potential for complex interactions is so high. The =
safest course may be to continue to deprecate weak crypto for TLS, IPsec, e=
tc. under the assumption that the systems making use of those protocols are=
 both powerful enough and well-connected enough to cause a problem if compr=
omised. Nothing stops resource-constrained systems from continuing to use o=
ld implementations of TLS that do support weak crypto, though I question th=
e wisdom of producing parts with no upgrade path that speak such a complex,=
 general transport protocol rather than something naturally 0-RTT in the st=
eady state that would use less CPU and power, have a smaller TCB, and not r=
ely on an ASN.1 implementation for domain isolation (e.g., Kerberos).<br><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Which leads directly into the issue of t=
he potential for implementation vulnerabilities, something that is probably=
 even more likely to lead to loss of control than weak crypto, and which ma=
y ultimately force users to demand IoT devices for which the answer to #1 i=
s always &quot;yes&quot;. So I wonder if all the worrying about weak crypto=
 is just a red herring compared with the exploits we are actually going to =
encounter.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote">Kyle<br></div></div></div>

--001a114a8c86bf8867053c013cc0--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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I think an introductory section on "normal and exceptional flow of control"=
 or such would help.  It could also define consistent terminology to be use=
d in the rest of the document.  To take a stab at it:
	Close -- means cleanly close the connection at some point after the necess=
ary alerts have been sent etc
	Teminate -- to close the connection unexpectedly, such as when an one side=
 detects an error.  In these cases, an alert SHOULD be sent before the TCP =
connection is closed.  (Do we bind/imply TCP?)  I would use this instead of=
 the term abort.

Yes, most of that text is in lines 3422ff.  Put them up earlier.

Then, throughout the rest of the doc, we use things like "if not consistent=
, terminate the handshake with illegal_parameter"

I can live with the current PR tho.	=20


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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 09:28:26 -0700
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To: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg]  3DES diediedie
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On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 8:01 AM, Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com> wrote:

> So they are finally up to 80-bit security?  Woohoo!
> That makes me feel so safe.
>

1024-bit RSA is certainly less than ideal, but certainly better than
nothing, which was the claim about devices in this class.

Comparisons with symmetric cryptography aren't exactly fungible like that
either: though I personally consider 1024-bit RSA keys to be weak, to my
knowledge one has not been factored successfully by the general public.

Payments are a very poor example..  Several seconds per transaction?
> That's not usable performance.  Look at all the pushback from consumers
> that have been happening since the changeover to chip cards in the US
> this past year.
>

The cryptography is not the bottleneck in this case: poor implementations
of the protocol are. Use the same card for an NFC transaction (provided
it's capable) and the delay will be considerably less.

Also, an asymmetric primitive is something you'd use to exchange keys and
sign transcripts for session initialization, after which all subsequent
communication is symmetric. Does a second of handshaking actually matter if
all subsequent communication is hardware accelerated symmetric
cryptography? (I'm sure it might for some, but won't for many others)

The real point is that if verticals within the "IoT space" were to
standardize on a particular set of asymmetric primitives and ship them en
masse like the payments industry did, economies of scale can drive the
costs down to the levels they deem acceptable. But they seem unwilling to
do the up-front development work and want to continue using the MCUs
they're already using, many of which have no crypto accelerators
whatsoever...

--001a113cd3ca35128a053c0186b2
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
hu, Sep 8, 2016 at 8:01 AM, Derek Atkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:derek@ihtfp.com" target=3D"_blank">derek@ihtfp.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">So they are finally up to 80-bit secu=
rity?=C2=A0 Woohoo!<br>
That makes me feel so safe.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>1024-bit RS=
A is certainly less than ideal, but certainly better than nothing, which wa=
s the claim about devices in this class.</div><div><br></div><div>Compariso=
ns with symmetric cryptography aren&#39;t exactly fungible like that either=
: though I personally consider 1024-bit RSA keys to be weak, to my knowledg=
e one has not been factored successfully by the general public.</div><div><=
br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Payments are a very poor example..=
=C2=A0 Several seconds per transaction?<br>
That&#39;s not usable performance.=C2=A0 Look at all the pushback from cons=
umers<br>
that have been happening since the changeover to chip cards in the US<br>
this past year.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The cryptography is not=
 the bottleneck in this case: poor implementations of the protocol are. Use=
 the same card for an NFC transaction (provided it&#39;s capable) and the d=
elay will be considerably less.</div><div><br></div><div>Also, an asymmetri=
c primitive is something you&#39;d use to exchange keys and sign transcript=
s for session initialization, after which all subsequent communication is s=
ymmetric. Does a second of handshaking actually matter if all subsequent co=
mmunication is hardware accelerated symmetric cryptography? (I&#39;m sure i=
t might for some, but won&#39;t for many others)</div><div><br></div><div>T=
he real point is that if verticals within the &quot;IoT space&quot; were to=
 standardize on a particular set of asymmetric primitives and ship them en =
masse like the payments industry did, economies of scale can drive the cost=
s down to the levels they deem acceptable. But they seem unwilling to do th=
e up-front development work and want to continue using the MCUs they&#39;re=
 already using, many of which have no crypto accelerators whatsoever...</di=
v></div>
</div></div>

--001a113cd3ca35128a053c0186b2--


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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 19:46:00 +0300
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References: <m2lgzcyhxi.fsf@bos-mpeve.kendall.corp.akamai.com> <201608311948.u7VJmChl018731@rumpleteazer.rhmr.com> <CABrd9STOCbBo=g22XySRnWofHwVZkrC-ripZY38yLRZV2kQh3A@mail.gmail.com> <sjminu8vk1t.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <1473221674611.89839@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAD77+gSWkttd1_r75GFvZgWotqMZtH0ry5Qw62n-jZkU8mJQGA@mail.gmail.com> <1473314009688.88774@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAJU8_nVZSEwAyJC1KL_jOg77DzOkeQv6T5UBKFnn8DUgAUaM0w@mail.gmail.com>
To: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
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> On 8 Sep 2016, at 7:08 PM, Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org> wrote:
>=20
> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 1:53 AM, Peter Gutmann =
<pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz <mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>> wrote:
> The only data point I have is that every time I've tried to disable =
DES in
> a new release (and by DES I mean single DES, not 3DES) I've had a =
chorus of
> complaints about it vanishing.=20
> ...=20
>  Alarms, for example, send data
> quantities measured in bytes, so some academic attack that would take =
500
> million years to acquire the necessary data isn't going to lose anyone =
any
> sleep.  It's a nice piece of work, but you need to look at what =
practical
> effect it has on real, deployed systems...
>=20
> To this class of examples, the problem seems to be less the =
implications for security of the specific systems making use of weak =
crypto, and more the effect the survival of weak options for crypto =
might have on other systems. We don't want more general systems to be =
subject to attacks that may not be applicable to the =
resource-constrained target systems, but that requires us to answer a =
few questions about those constrained systems:
>=20
> (1) Is the target system isolated, such that a compromise cannot =
either leverage transitive trust to another system or provide an =
attacker a beach head from which to attack (surreptitiously probe, etc.) =
other systems?
>=20
> (2) Is the weak crypto being used by the target system in a way that =
renders both the known and expected attacks inapplicable?

Good questions, no doubt. But I don=E2=80=99t think they can be =
answered.

Someone is going to specify protocols and algorithms. This could be the =
IETF. This could be the ITU, or IEEE, or some other SDO. Makes no =
difference.
Someone is going to implement these protocols and algorithms in some =
combination of hardware and software.
Someone is going to combine this implementation with other parts like =
network stack, wired or wireless communications, memory to create a =
=E2=80=9Cbrains=E2=80=9D for IoT devices.
Someone is going to build a sensor or an actuator that includes that =
=E2=80=9Cbrains=E2=80=9D plus hardware and software. This could be a =
lightbulb, and smoke detector, a temperature sensor.
Someone is going to use this sensor or actuator as part of a system: a =
car, a refrigerator, an HVAC system, a door alarm.
Someone is going to deploy these systems in a home, in a data center, in =
a plane, in a nuclear power plant.=20

It=E2=80=99s that last step that determines how attractive this is going =
to be to attackers and what value is going to be protected by a device =
using these protocols and algorithms. And the last two steps determine =
how isolated the =E2=80=9Cthing=E2=80=9D will be. We as an SDO are 7 =
steps removed from this, so we can=E2=80=99t make that determination. We =
can be sure that if we specify a protocol that will prove successful (as =
in adopted) by industry, that protocol will protect lightbulbs, but it =
will also end up protecting critical infrastructure, high-value targets =
and probably even lives.

We can=E2=80=99t even make Peter=E2=80=99s assumption that these things =
send only a few bytes of data, because many things send very little =
data. But some things will send a lot of data. And putting =E2=80=9Cno =
more than 1 MB per day=E2=80=9D in the security considerations section =
is an exercise in futility.

Yoav



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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 8 Sep 2016, at 7:08 PM, Kyle Rose &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:krose@krose.org" class=3D"">krose@krose.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 1:53 AM, Peter Gutmann =
<span dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">The only data =
point I have is that every time I've tried to disable DES in<br =
class=3D"">
a new release (and by DES I mean single DES, not 3DES) I've had a chorus =
of<br class=3D"">
complaints about it vanishing.&nbsp;</blockquote><div class=3D"">... <br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">&nbsp;Alarms, for =
example, send data<br class=3D"">
quantities measured in bytes, so some academic attack that would take =
500<br class=3D"">
million years to acquire the necessary data isn't going to lose anyone =
any<br class=3D"">
sleep.&nbsp; It's a nice piece of work, but you need to look at what =
practical<br class=3D"">
effect it has on real, deployed systems...<br class=3D"">
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"></span></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">To this class of examples, the problem =
seems to be less the implications for security of the specific systems =
making use of weak crypto, and more the effect the survival of weak =
options for crypto might have on other systems. We don't want more =
general systems to be subject to attacks that may not be applicable to =
the resource-constrained target systems, but that requires us to answer =
a few questions about those constrained systems:<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">(1) Is the target system isolated, such =
that a compromise cannot either leverage transitive trust to another =
system or provide an attacker a beach head from which to attack =
(surreptitiously probe, etc.) other systems?<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">(2) Is the weak crypto being used by =
the target system in a way that renders both the known and expected =
attacks inapplicable?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Good questions, no doubt. But I don=E2=80=99t =
think they can be answered.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Someone =
is going to specify protocols and algorithms. This could be the IETF. =
This could be the ITU, or IEEE, or some other SDO. Makes no =
difference.</div><div>Someone is going to implement these protocols and =
algorithms in some combination of hardware and =
software.</div><div>Someone is going to combine this implementation with =
other parts like network stack, wired or wireless communications, memory =
to create a =E2=80=9Cbrains=E2=80=9D for IoT devices.</div><div>Someone =
is going to build a sensor or an actuator that includes that =
=E2=80=9Cbrains=E2=80=9D plus hardware and software. This could be a =
lightbulb, and smoke detector, a temperature sensor.</div><div>Someone =
is going to use this sensor or actuator as part of a system: a car, a =
refrigerator, an HVAC system, a door alarm.</div><div>Someone is going =
to deploy these systems in a home, in a data center, in a plane, in a =
nuclear power plant.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>It=E2=80=99=
s that last step that determines how attractive this is going to be to =
attackers and what value is going to be protected by a device using =
these protocols and algorithms. And the last two steps determine how =
isolated the =E2=80=9Cthing=E2=80=9D will be. We as an SDO are 7 steps =
removed from this, so we can=E2=80=99t make that determination. We can =
be sure that if we specify a protocol that will prove successful (as in =
adopted) by industry, that protocol will protect lightbulbs, but it will =
also end up protecting critical infrastructure, high-value targets and =
probably even lives.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>We can=E2=80=99t =
even make Peter=E2=80=99s assumption that these things send only a few =
bytes of data, because many things send very little data. But some =
things will send a lot of data. And putting =E2=80=9Cno more than 1 MB =
per day=E2=80=9D in the security considerations section is an exercise =
in futility.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Yoav</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_A70BBB31-C6AF-4EE9-98FC-BE3CDE0AB57D--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 13:36:57 -0400
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 12:46 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Good questions, no doubt. But I don=E2=80=99t think they can be answered.
>
> Someone is going to specify protocols and algorithms. This could be the
> IETF. This could be the ITU, or IEEE, or some other SDO. Makes no
> difference.
> Someone is going to implement these protocols and algorithms in some
> combination of hardware and software.
> Someone is going to combine this implementation with other parts like
> network stack, wired or wireless communications, memory to create a
> =E2=80=9Cbrains=E2=80=9D for IoT devices.
> Someone is going to build a sensor or an actuator that includes that
> =E2=80=9Cbrains=E2=80=9D plus hardware and software. This could be a ligh=
tbulb, and smoke
> detector, a temperature sensor.
> Someone is going to use this sensor or actuator as part of a system: a
> car, a refrigerator, an HVAC system, a door alarm.
> Someone is going to deploy these systems in a home, in a data center, in =
a
> plane, in a nuclear power plant.
>
> It=E2=80=99s that last step that determines how attractive this is going =
to be to
> attackers and what value is going to be protected by a device using these
> protocols and algorithms. And the last two steps determine how isolated t=
he
> =E2=80=9Cthing=E2=80=9D will be.
>

Not necessarily. Manufacturers may be able to push some of those isolation
properties higher into the list. E.g., if the silicon simply cannot speak a
more general protocol even if compromised, or has some other physical
constraint (e.g., data rate, CPU power, etc.) that limits its
expressiveness, you may be able to make provable statements about the
potential impact of compromise. We obviously can't impose those
restrictions on manufacturers, but I don't know if it's completely hopeless
to create standards or compile best practices for mitigating compromise of
insecure devices.

But this brings me back to my earlier post where I said this sounds like a
research problem: the IETF is not anywhere near being in the position of
making such recommendations. And I'm not convinced that this path is a
productive use of our time, when hardware being hardware means that
increased functionality (better crypto, upgradability) gets cheaper all the
time.

OTOH, manufacturers being manufacturers means that security and
upgradability are baked in only when users demand it, and users being users
means that no one demands either until it's too late. So it's possible
there's real value in doing the research and then creating safety standards
for classes of devices that seem to be designed to atrophy, but it's
probably more useful for that standardization to focus on network isolation
rather than on crypto since the crypto is only one small part of the TCB.

Is the era in which the marginal cost of upgradability is too expensive to
support a short one, or is this a problem we're going to be dealing with
for a long time? If the latter, then I'm starting to see some value in not
having everything be globally-routable or even talk IP.

Kyle

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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 12:46 PM, Yoav Nir <span dir=3D"ltr=
">&lt;<a target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com">ynir.ietf@gm=
ail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote"><blockquote style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class=3D"gmail_quote"><br><div styl=
e=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><span class=3D"gmail-"></span>Good questions, no=
 doubt. But I don=E2=80=99t think they can be answered.<div><br></div><div>=
Someone is going to specify protocols and algorithms. This could be the IET=
F. This could be the ITU, or IEEE, or some other SDO. Makes no difference.<=
/div><div>Someone is going to implement these protocols and algorithms in s=
ome combination of hardware and software.</div><div>Someone is going to com=
bine this implementation with other parts like network stack, wired or wire=
less communications, memory to create a =E2=80=9Cbrains=E2=80=9D for IoT de=
vices.</div><div>Someone is going to build a sensor or an actuator that inc=
ludes that =E2=80=9Cbrains=E2=80=9D plus hardware and software. This could =
be a lightbulb, and smoke detector, a temperature sensor.</div><div>Someone=
 is going to use this sensor or actuator as part of a system: a car, a refr=
igerator, an HVAC system, a door alarm.</div><div>Someone is going to deplo=
y these systems in a home, in a data center, in a plane, in a nuclear power=
 plant.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>It=E2=80=99s that last step that det=
ermines how attractive this is going to be to attackers and what value is g=
oing to be protected by a device using these protocols and algorithms. And =
the last two steps determine how isolated the =E2=80=9Cthing=E2=80=9D will =
be.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Not necessarily. Manufactur=
ers may be able to push some of those isolation properties higher into the =
list. E.g., if the silicon simply cannot speak a more general protocol even=
 if compromised, or has some other physical constraint (e.g., data rate, CP=
U power, etc.) that limits its expressiveness, you may be able to make prov=
able statements about the potential impact of compromise. We obviously can&=
#39;t impose those restrictions on manufacturers, but I don&#39;t know if i=
t&#39;s completely hopeless to create standards or compile best practices f=
or mitigating compromise of insecure devices.<br><br>But this brings me bac=
k to my earlier post where I said this sounds like a research problem: the =
IETF is not anywhere near being in the position of making such recommendati=
ons. And I&#39;m not convinced that this path is a productive use of our ti=
me, when hardware being hardware means that increased functionality (better=
 crypto, upgradability) gets cheaper all the time.<br><br>OTOH, manufacture=
rs being manufacturers means that security and upgradability are baked in o=
nly when users demand it, and users being users means that no one demands e=
ither until it&#39;s too late. So it&#39;s possible there&#39;s real value =
in doing the research and then creating safety standards for classes of dev=
ices that seem to be designed to atrophy, but it&#39;s probably more useful=
 for that standardization to focus on network isolation rather than on cryp=
to since the crypto is only one small part of the TCB.<br><br></div><div>Is=
 the era in which the marginal cost of upgradability is too expensive to su=
pport a short one, or is this a problem we&#39;re going to be dealing with =
for a long time? If the latter, then I&#39;m starting to see some value in =
not having everything be globally-routable or even talk IP.<br></div><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Kyle<br></div></div></div>

--001a114f1b34fe6d7f053c0279a6--


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625

=46inally found some time to take a look at it.

So in general I like the change to "abort the handshake with a <type> alert=
",=20
the "send a fatal <type> alert and close the connection" was a bit clunky. =
I=20
was actually planning to do something like this myself.

=46ew other items carried over from my proposed PR[1]:

=2D--

I still think we should include generic advice for handling parser errors i=
n=20
the parser (Presentation Language/Vectors and Constructed Types) section;=20
something like this:

   Peers that receive a encoding of a vector in a message with a length tha=
t=20
   does not match specification MUST abort the connection with a=20
   "decode_error" alert unless more specific section states otherwise.

and this:

   Peers that receive messages that doesn't match the expected constructed=
=20
   type in expected message MUST abort the connection with a "decode_error"=
=20
   alert unless more specific section states otherwise.

=2D--

I think it's a bit confusing to have this sentence:

   Servers MUST select the lower of the highest supported server version and
   the version offered by the client in the ClientHello. In particular,
   servers MUST accept ClientHello messages with versions higher than those
   supported and negotiate the highest mutually supported version.

in the Server Hello section. Everything before the very last "and" is more=
=20
applicable to ClientHello.

=2D--=20

I think that this sentence in Handshake Protocol:

   Sending handshake messages in an unexpected order results in an
   "unexpected_message" fatal error.

should use a MUST and be prescribed to the receiving side, for example:

   Peer that receives handshake messages in unexpected order MUST abort the
   handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert.

=2D--

Description what should client do when the ServerHello.cipher_suite is the =
one=20
it did not advertise in ClientHello.cipher_suites is missing.

So is description of how to handle ServerHello.version being higher than=20
ClientHello.max_supported_version.

At least, I don't see it in Server Hello section.

=2D--

missing_extension description in Alert Protocol probably should be extended=
=20
from:

   Sent by endpoints that receive a hello message not containing an extensi=
on=20
   that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version.

to:

   Sent by endpoints that receive a hello message not containing an extensi=
on=20
   that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version or the offered key=
=20
   exchange mechanisms.

(thinking of handling situations where "key_share" or "pre_shared_key" is=20
missing)

=2D--

Hello Extensions section doesn't specify how to handle messages with duplic=
ate=20
extensions (e.g. second "key_share" extension added in the second ClientHel=
lo=20
message in connection)

=2D--

Signature Algorithms doesn't say how to handle RSA-SSA signatures with salt=
=20
length that doesn't match hash size.

=2D--

Key Share doesn't say how to handle server_share that doesn't match=20
client_shares.

=2D--

=46inished section doesn't describe what to do if the contents don't match =
the=20
expected value.

Should it be illegal_parameter or bad_record_mac is more appropriate?

=2D--

Record Layer doesn't describe what to do if a record with zero-length paylo=
ad=20
and handshake or alert type is received.

=2D--

Record Layer includes

   legacy_record_version : (...) This field is deprecated and MUST be ignor=
ed
   for all purposes.

Record Layer Protection does not.

=2D--

1 - https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/621
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: "Short, Todd" <tshort@akamai.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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From: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/03cReHfjHvVYhYzm13qeGRC_VGs>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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I support this proposal.

Xiaoyin

From: David Benjamin<mailto:davidben@chromium.org>
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2016 12:09 PM
To: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two

Hi folks,

I'd like to revisit the question of version negotiation.

EKR wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an extension:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632

I would like us to adopt this proposal.

In Berlin, this really got framed as a pragmatic question: the current vers=
ion negotiation has a lot of intolerance and so let's work around that. So,=
 understandably, this seemed like a "let's adopt a hack forever" proposal. =
I think that framing is wrong. The intolerance situation is serious, but I =
think there's also a strong argument that the current scheme isn't very goo=
d.

The current scheme is very simple. The client advertises a maximum version =
and the server selects based on that. This is the only piece of TLS negotia=
tion which works this way. Elsewhere (extensions, cipher suites, signature =
algorithms), one side offers a list and the other side picks out of it. I t=
hink it's clear now that strategy is more robust: every time we've bumped v=
ersion numbers, we've had intolerance problems and this time is no exceptio=
n (see below). By contrast, we regularly introduce new cipher suites, exten=
sions, etc., and while we do see the occasional failure, they are much rare=
r and typically within the level of breakage that clients can tolerate and =
deal with by reaching out to affected servers. Moreover, lists lend themsel=
ves to future-proofing via draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a way the curren=
t scheme does not.

An additional benefit is lists make it much easier to roll out prototype/dr=
aft versions. Currently, we are using a hack where the client offers {3, 4}=
 but also includes a draft version number in an extension. This does work, =
but requires servers process that extension in perpetuity or at least until=
 all draft version clients go away.  With a list, it's trivial to offer a d=
raft version by just including it. This is the strategy HTTP/2 used (via AL=
PN) and it worked well.

Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn't be worth fixing version nego=
tiation in 1.3 except for intolerance. Unfortunately, this fourth time, it'=
s the same story as before. A probe of Alexa top million sites with BoringS=
SL's TLS 1.3 code (the Go version), shows 1.63% of TLS-capable hosts reject=
 a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. Note these are top sites and traffic is top-heavy, =
so we can expect much higher usage-weighted numbers. Qualys SSL Pulse repor=
ts 3.6%:
https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-intolerance-in-ssl-p=
ulse

(Ignore the drop in the graph. We've long fixed the ClientHello record-laye=
r at {3, 1}. TLS 1.3 only codified existing practice here.) If instead we u=
se a TLS 1.3 ClientHello with version TLS 1.2, the breakage drops to 0.017%=
. (Some of this is an NSS signature algorithms bug, fixed last year, which =
we hope to clear by deploying RSA-PSS in browsers early. The rest appears t=
o be noise from transient errors which crop up in large tests.)

These numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as damage, which mea=
ns that they (at least browsers) will be forced to do fallback. This repres=
ents a security risk (cf. POODLE) as well as hides serious interop problems=
. The situation is even worse for non-browser clients, which may be unable =
to deploy at all (Ubuntu 12.04, despite shipping an OpenSSL release with TL=
S 1.2, had to disable it on the client.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments/4 )

The major arguments against this change seem to be:

1. It's inelegant to have two mechanisms.
2. We should fix broken servers

The first is true, but as with other changes, EKR's PR replaces the 1.2 mec=
hanism with one for 1.3, so we'll just have one going forward. The second w=
ould be nice, but as a practical matter, I spend a lot of time trying to ge=
t those servers fixed and it doesn't work very well here. Better is simply =
to move to a situation where once those servers upgrade they will be correc=
tly behaving forever (instead of just handling 1.3 correctly and breaking w=
ith 1.4). This change does that.

Thanks,

David

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I support this proposal.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Xiaoyin</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;,serif">&nbsp;</span></p>
<div style=3D"border:none; border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt; padding:3.0pt 0i=
n 0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"border:none; padding:0in"><b>From: </b><a h=
ref=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org">David Benjamin</a><br>
<b>Sent: </b>Thursday, September 8, 2016 12:09 PM<br>
<b>To: </b><a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject: </b>[TLS] Version negotiation, take two</p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;,serif">&nbsp;</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div>Hi folks,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I&#8217;d like to revisit the question of version negotiation.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>EKR wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an extension:=
</div>
<div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632">https://githu=
b.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I would like us to adopt this proposal.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In Berlin, this really got framed as a pragmatic question: the current=
 version negotiation has a lot of intolerance and so let&#8217;s work aroun=
d that. So, understandably, this seemed like a &#8220;let&#8217;s adopt a h=
ack forever&#8221; proposal. I think that framing is wrong.
 The intolerance situation is serious, but I think there&#8217;s also a str=
ong argument that the current scheme isn&#8217;t very good.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The current scheme is very simple. The client advertises a maximum ver=
sion and the server selects based on that. This is the only piece of TLS ne=
gotiation which works this way. Elsewhere (extensions, cipher suites, signa=
ture algorithms), one side offers
 a list and the other side picks out of it. I think it&#8217;s clear now th=
at strategy is more robust: every time we&#8217;ve bumped version numbers, =
we&#8217;ve had intolerance problems and this time is no exception (see bel=
ow). By contrast, we regularly introduce new cipher
 suites, extensions, etc., and while we do see the occasional failure, they=
 are much rarer and typically within the level of breakage that clients can=
 tolerate and deal with by reaching out to affected servers. Moreover, list=
s lend themselves to future-proofing
 via draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a way the current scheme does not.</di=
v>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>An additional benefit is lists make it much easier to roll out prototy=
pe/draft versions. Currently, we are using a hack where the client offers {=
3, 4} but also includes a draft version number in an extension. This does w=
ork, but requires servers process
 that extension in perpetuity or at least until all draft version clients g=
o away.&nbsp; With a list, it&#8217;s trivial to offer a draft version by j=
ust including it. This is the strategy HTTP/2 used (via ALPN) and it worked=
 well.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn&#8217;t be worth fixing v=
ersion negotiation in 1.3 except for intolerance. Unfortunately, this fourt=
h time, it&#8217;s the same story as before. A probe of Alexa top million s=
ites with BoringSSL&#8217;s TLS 1.3 code (the Go version),
 shows 1.63% of TLS-capable hosts reject a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. Note these =
are top sites and traffic is top-heavy, so we can expect much higher usage-=
weighted numbers. Qualys SSL Pulse reports 3.6%:</div>
<div><a href=3D"https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-into=
lerance-in-ssl-pulse">https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-versio=
n-intolerance-in-ssl-pulse</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>(Ignore the drop in the graph. We&#8217;ve long fixed the ClientHello =
record-layer at {3, 1}. TLS 1.3 only codified existing practice here.) If i=
nstead we use a TLS 1.3 ClientHello with version TLS 1.2, the breakage drop=
s to 0.017%. (Some of this is an NSS signature
 algorithms bug, fixed last year, which we hope to clear by deploying RSA-P=
SS in browsers early. The rest appears to be noise from transient errors wh=
ich crop up in large tests.)</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>These numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as damage, whic=
h means that they (at least browsers) will be forced to do fallback. This r=
epresents a security risk (cf. POODLE) as well as hides serious interop pro=
blems. The situation is even worse
 for non-browser clients, which may be unable to deploy at all (Ubuntu 12.0=
4, despite shipping an OpenSSL release with TLS 1.2, had to disable it on t=
he client.</div>
<div><a href=3D"https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/&#43;source/openssl/&#43;=
bug/1256576/comments/4">https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/&#43;source/opens=
sl/&#43;bug/1256576/comments/4</a> )</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The major arguments against this change seem to be:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1. It&#8217;s inelegant to have two mechanisms.</div>
<div>2. We should fix broken servers</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The first is true, but as with other changes, EKR&#8217;s PR replaces =
the 1.2 mechanism with one for 1.3, so we&#8217;ll just have one going forw=
ard. The second would be nice, but as a practical matter, I spend a lot of =
time trying to get those servers fixed and it
 doesn&#8217;t work very well here. Better is simply to move to a situation=
 where once those servers upgrade they will be correctly behaving forever (=
instead of just handling 1.3 correctly and breaking with 1.4). This change =
does that.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>David</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 21:59:22 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 5:29 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 07:43:53PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 7:18 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il=
>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > I also have a problem with names. "Resumption context" is very explic=
it
> > >> about providing, well, resumption context.
> > >> "Hello_Finished", in turn, means nothing.
> > >> Also, RC may better match the notion of "binder" hence more naturall=
y
> > >> requiring collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TLS (1.3
> and
> > >> before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits are good
> enough)
> > >> and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses.
> > >>
> > >
> > > Two points about this:
> > >
> > > 1. The Finished in TLS 1.3 is always Hash.length, and our minimum has=
h
> is
> > > SHA-256, so I believe we have enough strength here. We could of cours=
e
> > > require a minimum size.
> > >
> >
> > =E2=80=8BIf you keep this, you definitely need to have a minimum size
> specification
> > in boldface.
>
> Well, the PRF hash is already assumed to be CR, and if HKDF is used with
> certain restrictions, it preserves CR:
>
> - The hash has output length at most input length (true for all SHA-2
> variants)
>

Just curious: Can you explain the need for this property? Note that if a
key to HMAC is  =E2=80=8Blarger than the (compression) function output size=
 then
this key is first hashed into a full output hence preserving CR.


- HKDF-extract salt length is constant (in current draft, always hash_olen)
> - HKDF-expand PRK length is constant (in current draft, always hash_olen)
> - The HKDF-expand output output length is at least hash output length
>   (in current draft, hash_olen except in key expansions).
>

These are a lot of restrictions that no one has spelled out as conditions
on the KDF and they do not follow from the natural properties of KDFs.
Collision resistance is never needed as far as I can tell for generation of
keys or to compute PRF and/or MAC values (e.g., for the original
functionality of Finished that is essentially a MAC/PRF on the transcript).
The reason we find ourselves considering the CR properties of HKDF is that
we are using it to derive *strings* that serve as binders/digests of past
transcripts. Luckily, HKDF with the right hash functions can provide that
functionality but it is not a native KDF functionality.

I do not mean this as an academic discussion (although we could have that
too) but as a warning for future (if not present) misuse and an obstacle in
replacing HKDF in the future.
I would be much happier if we had a clear distinction between PRF/MAC
=E2=80=8Bcomputations, KDF computations and digest computations., even if w=
e
currently used HKDF for all these functions.


> Furthermore Finished construction uses HMAC. There for CR-preserving,
> one needs key to be of constant length (it always is hash_olen).
>
>
> Then there's things that are "nonces":
>
> - Exporter master secret
> - Resumption master secret
> - hello_finished
> - Some outputs of TLS exporter (depending on application).
>
> So I would be more concerned about some future extension changing the
> way things are computed, breaking CR-preserving, or someone adding a
> weak PRF hash. =E2=80=8B
>
>
=E2=80=8BAgreed.
=E2=80=8B
=E2=80=8B


>
> (Of course, if SHA-2 breaks, we have really messy practical problem
> too...)
>
>
> > > 2. I wouldn't object to changing names here, of course.
> > >
> >
> > =E2=80=8BI think that's a must. "Finished" says absolutely nothing abou=
t the
> > functionality of this extension (it may actually mislead to think of it
> as
> > a MAC of some sorts).
> > Call it something that can be understood as  "PSK Creation Binder" and
> make
> > sure to specify (and explain in English) that all the values in the key
> > derivation chain to lead to this value are collision resistant mappings
> of
> > the original handshake context (including the server's certificate).
>
> It is a bit more problematic than that:
>
> The hello_finished / "PSK Creation Binder" derives from the PSK key.
>
> Deriving separate value in context of dynamic PSK provisioning does not
> work properly as "static" PSKs lack this value, and if one then tries to
> use such key with combined authentication, you got an attack[1].
>
>
> [1] Apparently combined authentication is to be in separate spec[2], but
> the main spec needs to be safe with it.
>
> [2] There apparently the server signature_algorithms to "support" that,
> except I can't figure out _any_ use for that except a footgun[3].
>
> [3] If using PSK, it has ill-defined semantics. If not, it pretty much
> only useful for attacking the client.
>

=E2=80=8BI could not follow this argument.

Hugo
=E2=80=8B


>
> =E2=80=8B
>
>
> -Ilari
>

--94eb2c191dfa96465b053c0980c5
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,=
sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 5:29 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <span =
dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 07:43:53PM -0400, Hugo Kr=
awczyk wrote:<br>
&gt; On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 7:18 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ek=
r@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Hugo Krawczyk &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il">hugo@ee.technion.ac.il</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt; I also have a problem with names. &quot;R=
esumption context&quot; is very explicit<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; about providing, well, resumption context.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &quot;Hello_Finished&quot;, in turn, means nothing.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Also, RC may better match the notion of &quot;binder&quot; he=
nce more naturally<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; requiring collision resistance, while all Finished uses in TL=
S (1.3 and<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; before) have a MAC functionality (for which, say, 128 bits ar=
e good enough)<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; and it would be better not to abuse them for other uses.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Two points about this:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; 1. The Finished in TLS 1.3 is always Hash.length, and our minimum=
 hash is<br>
&gt; &gt; SHA-256, so I believe we have enough strength here. We could of c=
ourse<br>
&gt; &gt; require a minimum size.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =E2=80=8BIf you keep this, you definitely need to have a minimum size =
specification<br>
&gt; in boldface.<br>
<br>
</span>Well, the PRF hash is already assumed to be CR, and if HKDF is used =
with<br>
certain restrictions, it preserves CR:<br>
<br>
- The hash has output length at most input length (true for all SHA-2 varia=
nts)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">Just cur=
ious: Can you explain the need for this property? Note that if a key to HMA=
C is =C2=A0=E2=80=8Blarger than the (compression) function output size then=
 this key is first hashed into a full output hence preserving CR.</div></di=
v><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif=
;font-size:small;display:inline"><br></div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_d=
efault" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inl=
ine"><br></div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- HKDF-extract salt length is constant (in current draft, always hash_olen)=
<br>
- HKDF-expand PRK length is constant (in current draft, always hash_olen)<b=
r>
- The HKDF-expand output output length is at least hash output length<br>
=C2=A0 (in current draft, hash_olen except in key expansions).<br></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:v=
erdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">These are a lot of restri=
ctions that no one has spelled out as conditions on the KDF and they do not=
 follow from the natural properties of KDFs.=C2=A0</div></div><div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:smal=
l;display:inline">Collision resistance is never needed as far as I can tell=
 for generation of keys or to compute PRF and/or MAC values (e.g., for the =
original functionality of Finished that is essentially a MAC/PRF on the tra=
nscript).=C2=A0</div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">The reason we fin=
d ourselves considering the CR properties of HKDF is that we are using it t=
o derive *strings* that serve as binders/digests of past transcripts. Lucki=
ly, HKDF with the right hash functions can provide that functionality but i=
t is not a native KDF functionality.</div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_de=
fault" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inli=
ne"><br></div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:=
verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">I do not mean this as an=
 academic discussion (although we could have that too) but as a warning for=
 future (if not present) misuse and an obstacle in replacing HKDF in the fu=
ture.=C2=A0</div><span style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif">I would be =
much happier if we had a clear distinction between PRF/MAC=C2=A0<div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
display:inline">=E2=80=8Bcomputations, KDF computations and digest computat=
ions., even if we currently used HKDF for all these functions.</div></span>=
</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Furthermore Finished construction uses HMAC. There for CR-preserving,<br>
one needs key to be of constant length (it always is hash_olen).<br>
<br>
<br>
Then there&#39;s things that are &quot;nonces&quot;:<br>
<br>
- Exporter master secret<br>
- Resumption master secret<br>
- hello_finished<br>
- Some outputs of TLS exporter (depending on application).<br>
<br>
So I would be more concerned about some future extension changing the<br>
way things are computed, breaking CR-preserving, or someone adding a<br>
weak PRF hash. =E2=80=8B<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">=E2=80=8BAgreed.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"=
>=E2=80=8B</div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verd=
ana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">=E2=80=8B</div>=C2=A0</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
(Of course, if SHA-2 breaks, we have really messy practical problem<br>
too...)<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; 2. I wouldn&#39;t object to changing names here, of course.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =E2=80=8BI think that&#39;s a must. &quot;Finished&quot; says absolute=
ly nothing about the<br>
&gt; functionality of this extension (it may actually mislead to think of i=
t as<br>
&gt; a MAC of some sorts).<br>
&gt; Call it something that can be understood as=C2=A0 &quot;PSK Creation B=
inder&quot; and make<br>
&gt; sure to specify (and explain in English) that all the values in the ke=
y<br>
&gt; derivation chain to lead to this value are collision resistant mapping=
s of<br>
&gt; the original handshake context (including the server&#39;s certificate=
).<br>
<br>
</span>It is a bit more problematic than that:<br>
<br>
The hello_finished / &quot;PSK Creation Binder&quot; derives from the PSK k=
ey.<br>
<br>
Deriving separate value in context of dynamic PSK provisioning does not<br>
work properly as &quot;static&quot; PSKs lack this value, and if one then t=
ries to<br>
use such key with combined authentication, you got an attack[1].<br>
<br>
<br>
[1] Apparently combined authentication is to be in separate spec[2], but<br=
>
the main spec needs to be safe with it.<br>
<br>
[2] There apparently the server signature_algorithms to &quot;support&quot;=
 that,<br>
except I can&#39;t figure out _any_ use for that except a footgun[3].<br>
<br>
[3] If using PSK, it has ill-defined semantics. If not, it pretty much<br>
only useful for attacking the client.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><=
div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-si=
ze:small;display:inline">=E2=80=8BI could not follow this argument.</div></=
div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-ser=
if;font-size:small;display:inline"><br></div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail=
_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:i=
nline">Hugo</div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fami=
ly:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">=E2=80=8B</div>=C2=A0=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br><div class=3D"gmail_defa=
ult" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline=
">=E2=80=8B</div><br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c191dfa96465b053c0980c5--


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On 1 September 2016 at 23:45, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> Should there be recommendation for clients to cut transfer and send
>> Finished if the client receives EncryptedExtensions without
>> early_data extension?
>
>
> I thought that was implicit, but i'd take a PR that did that.

Note that this is something you might want to do with
HelloRetryRequest as well (my drafty implementation in NSS cuts off
0-RTT at that point as well).


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 14:20:32 +1000
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On 7 September 2016 at 18:24, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> Therefore I think that this work should be pursued in a separate spec,
> not in TLS 1.3 core.

I think that Ilari has it here.


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Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 11:22:38 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Message-ID: <20160909082237.pvl4dh2g62zrqcsg@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Thu, Sep 08, 2016 at 09:59:22PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 5:29 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 07:43:53PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
> >
> > - The hash has output length at most input length (true for all SHA-2
> > variants)
> >
> 
> Just curious: Can you explain the need for this property? Note that if a
> key to HMAC is  â€‹larger than the (compression) function output size then
> this key is first hashed into a full output hence preserving CR.

Simply me not bothering to figure out what the heck HMAC does if this
isn't true (or if it is even well-defined in all cases).

> - HKDF-extract salt length is constant (in current draft, always hash_olen)
> > - HKDF-expand PRK length is constant (in current draft, always hash_olen)
> > - The HKDF-expand output output length is at least hash output length
> >   (in current draft, hash_olen except in key expansions).
> >
> 
> These are a lot of restrictions that no one has spelled out as conditions
> on the KDF and they do not follow from the natural properties of KDFs.
> Collision resistance is never needed as far as I can tell for generation of
> keys or to compute PRF and/or MAC values (e.g., for the original
> functionality of Finished that is essentially a MAC/PRF on the transcript).
> The reason we find ourselves considering the CR properties of HKDF is that
> we are using it to derive *strings* that serve as binders/digests of past
> transcripts. Luckily, HKDF with the right hash functions can provide that
> functionality but it is not a native KDF functionality.

So I presume some more text for Security Considerations...
 
> I do not mean this as an academic discussion (although we could have that
> too) but as a warning for future (if not present) misuse and an obstacle in
> replacing HKDF in the future.
> I would be much happier if we had a clear distinction between PRF/MAC
> â€‹computations, KDF computations and digest computations., even if we
> currently used HKDF for all these functions.

Unfortunately there are things like exporter outputs, that need to be
both "secret" (i.e. "keys") and "nonces" (i.e. "binders"). At least if
application wants so... Dropping either would cause MAJOR security
problems.

I think those and the dynamically provisioned PSKs are the only ones
that have that property of being both key and binder.

> > It is a bit more problematic than that:
> >
> > The hello_finished / "PSK Creation Binder" derives from the PSK key.
> >
> > Deriving separate value in context of dynamic PSK provisioning does not
> > work properly as "static" PSKs lack this value, and if one then tries to
> > use such key with combined authentication, you got an attack[1].
> >
> 
> â€‹I could not follow this argument.
 
Basically, one can't make a distinction between static ("non-resumption)
and dynamic ("resumption") PSKs here. Because such distinction would
run into security problems with some other features.



-Ilari


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On 9 September 2016 at 18:22, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> Basically, one can't make a distinction between static ("non-resumption)
> and dynamic ("resumption") PSKs here. Because such distinction would
> run into security problems with some other features.


You mean that there is no inherent property that forces separation
between sessions that use resumption vs. those that use a regular PSK.
Though the former is bound to an ALPN value and cipher suite (and
maybe some other things, like server identity) and cannot be used
unless those values remain fixed, whereas the latter is not.

We're imposing those restrictions artificially for convenience for the
most part, though 0-RTT can be used to justify the two values I
mentioned.  Given that you need the same coupling of PSK to
ALPN+cipher suite if you intend to use a non-resumption PSK for 0-RTT,
maybe instead we can fix your "problem" by identifying what needs to
be bound and forcing them to remain bound for all PSKs.  (I use scare
quotes here because I'm not convinced that it is a problem worth
worrying about.)

That limits choice, but it would remove any divergence between the two.

Note that we already couple the hash function to a PSK for very good
reasons.  So you can't use both ChaCha and AES-256 with the same PSK.


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From: Gilles Van Assche <gilles.vanassche@st.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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I don't mind if this is done in a separate spec.

My point was technically how to best use FIPS 202 in RSA PSS, and we (as
Keccak team) would be more than happy to help in that area.

Kind regards,
Gilles


On 09/09/16 06:20, Martin Thomson wrote:
> On 7 September 2016 at 18:24, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
>> Therefore I think that this work should be pursued in a separate spec,
>> not in TLS 1.3 core.
> I think that Ilari has it here.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SHA-3 in SignatureScheme
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On 9 September 2016 at 20:02, Gilles Van Assche <gilles.vanassche@st.com> wrote:
> My point was technically how to best use FIPS 202 in RSA PSS, and we (as
> Keccak team) would be more than happy to help in that area.

And I'm more than happy to have the work happen, but I think that we
can do things in stages.


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Subject: [TLS] Zero-RTT Data & PSK
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Hi all,

the current spec says:

---
2.3. Zero-RTT Data

When resuming via a PSK with an appropriate ticket (i.e., one with the 
â€œallow_early_dataâ€� flag), clients can also send data on their first 
flight (â€œearly dataâ€�).
---

I am wondering why I cannot use Zero-RTT with just PSK-based 
authentication (without a prior ticket change).

Ciao
Hannes


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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Hi Ekr,

I have no problems with the suggested change but I would like to note 
that we are losing one feature with this change.

Limiting the client to only send a single psk_identity prevents the 
client from sending a ticket together with the long-term PSK identity in 
the same message. This was previously possible and useful since the 
server could delete state (based on local policy) prior to the indicated 
ticket lifetime.

Ciao
Hannes

On 09/02/2016 12:04 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Folks,
>
> I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished Stuffing"
>
>   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>
> I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I am missing
> anything important.
>
>
> OVERVIEW
> This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about the redundancy
> of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the following changes:
>
> - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>   ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
> - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>   the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>
>
> RATIONALE
> The reasoning for this change is:
>
> - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the other side
>   knows the PSK.
>
> - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>   guarantees) via the Finished message.
>
> - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the handshake
>   transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context because
>   the transcript would transitively include the PSK via the Finished.
>
> So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT Finished
> but unfortunately:
>
> 1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK because
>    that causes potential compat problems with mixed 1.3/1.2 networks
>    (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's opt-in).
>
> 2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because you can
>    currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>
> The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax condition #2 and
> only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by stuffing the
> Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this easier). This
> PR enacts that.
>
>
> FAQS
> - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>   The whole ClientHello including the computed hello_finished extension.
>
> - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>   It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the point where
>   the client sends the ClientHello and the server processes, it doesn't
>   yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I believe
>   other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so hashing only
>   part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is quite easy.
>
>
> POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
> There are a number of possible variations we might want to look at:
>
> 1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>    early_data_indication). This provides additional anti-replay
>    for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>    make this change.
>
> 2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>    prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not significantly
>    harder or easier to implement and basically depends on whether
>    you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete messages" or
>    "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for notes
>    on buffering.
>
> 3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>    work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data values in
>    the ClientHello. E.g,,
>
>       opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>
>       struct {
>          FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>       } HelloFinished;
>
>    Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody wants >1 PSK,
>    so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>    changes weren't totally coupled.
>
> 4. External context values. Several people have pointed out that it
>    might be convenient to have an external context value hashed
>    into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>    it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people want to,
>    with the default being empty.
>
> 5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very clear that
>    the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the handshakes and
>    that it depends on collision resistance. I have not forgotten this
>    and text on that point would be appreciated.
>
> Comments welcome.
> -Ekr
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


From nobody Fri Sep  9 07:07:28 2016
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
References: <CAF8qwaA86yytg29QOD_N7ARimh9QcNGU_nnr_OrxqCrvrk2MBg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/DCcU1VG7jIjdxLDrOrxdrr4qQUw>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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I like this approach.

On 09/08/2016 06:04 PM, David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi folks,
>
> I’d like to revisit the question of version negotiation.
>
> EKR wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an extension:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632
>
> I would like us to adopt this proposal.
>
> In Berlin, this really got framed as a pragmatic question: the current
> version negotiation has a lot of intolerance and so let’s work around
> that. So, understandably, this seemed like a “let’s adopt a hack
> forever” proposal. I think that framing is wrong. The intolerance
> situation is serious, but I think there’s also a strong argument that
> the current scheme isn’t very good.
>
> The current scheme is very simple. The client advertises a maximum
> version and the server selects based on that. This is the only piece of
> TLS negotiation which works this way. Elsewhere (extensions, cipher
> suites, signature algorithms), one side offers a list and the other side
> picks out of it. I think it’s clear now that strategy is more robust:
> every time we’ve bumped version numbers, we’ve had intolerance problems
> and this time is no exception (see below). By contrast, we regularly
> introduce new cipher suites, extensions, etc., and while we do see the
> occasional failure, they are much rarer and typically within the level
> of breakage that clients can tolerate and deal with by reaching out to
> affected servers. Moreover, lists lend themselves to future-proofing via
> draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a way the current scheme does not.
>
> An additional benefit is lists make it much easier to roll out
> prototype/draft versions. Currently, we are using a hack where the
> client offers {3, 4} but also includes a draft version number in an
> extension. This does work, but requires servers process that extension
> in perpetuity or at least until all draft version clients go away.  With
> a list, it’s trivial to offer a draft version by just including it. This
> is the strategy HTTP/2 used (via ALPN) and it worked well.
>
> Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn’t be worth fixing version
> negotiation in 1.3 except for intolerance. Unfortunately, this fourth
> time, it’s the same story as before. A probe of Alexa top million sites
> with BoringSSL’s TLS 1.3 code (the Go version), shows 1.63% of
> TLS-capable hosts reject a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. Note these are top sites
> and traffic is top-heavy, so we can expect much higher usage-weighted
> numbers. Qualys SSL Pulse reports 3.6%:
> https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-intolerance-in-ssl-pulse
>
> (Ignore the drop in the graph. We’ve long fixed the ClientHello
> record-layer at {3, 1}. TLS 1.3 only codified existing practice here.)
> If instead we use a TLS 1.3 ClientHello with version TLS 1.2, the
> breakage drops to 0.017%. (Some of this is an NSS signature algorithms
> bug, fixed last year, which we hope to clear by deploying RSA-PSS in
> browsers early. The rest appears to be noise from transient errors which
> crop up in large tests.)
>
> These numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as damage, which
> means that they (at least browsers) will be forced to do fallback. This
> represents a security risk (cf. POODLE) as well as hides serious interop
> problems. The situation is even worse for non-browser clients, which may
> be unable to deploy at all (Ubuntu 12.04, despite shipping an OpenSSL
> release with TLS 1.2, had to disable it on the client.
> https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments/4 )
>
> The major arguments against this change seem to be:
>
> 1. It’s inelegant to have two mechanisms.
> 2. We should fix broken servers
>
> The first is true, but as with other changes, EKR’s PR replaces the 1.2
> mechanism with one for 1.3, so we’ll just have one going forward. The
> second would be nice, but as a practical matter, I spend a lot of time
> trying to get those servers fixed and it doesn’t work very well here.
> Better is simply to move to a situation where once those servers upgrade
> they will be correctly behaving forever (instead of just handling 1.3
> correctly and breaking with 1.4). This change does that.
>
> Thanks,
>
> David
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Subject: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to 
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to 
properly handle MIME multipart messages.

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Dear all,

we are working on an approach/framework for testing TLS implementations =
(currently only servers, but clients are planned for the future as well). =
While running our tests against a bunch of different TLS (server) =
implementations, we found several types of suspicious behaviour (see =
below). As the TLS specification left me with doubts on what the correct =
behaviour should be, I'd like to raise this questions here (please let me =
know if this is not the appropriate place or this has been answered =
before).

(1) Several server implementations seem to ignore the list of proposed =
compression methods in a ClientHello and simply select null compression =
even if that has not been in the ClientHello's list. The specification is =
rather clear that null compression MUST be part of the list. However, I'm =
not aware of any clear statement about what a compliant server should do =
in case it receives a ClientHello without null compression. My best guess =
would have been that in such cases the server should abort the handshake =
(at least if it does not support whatever the client proposed).

(2) In a ClientHello several server implementations don't ignore data =
following the extension list. That is, they somehow seem to ignore the =
length field of the extension list and simply consider everything =
following the list of compression methods as extensions. Aside from this =
certainly being a deviation from the specification, I was wondering =
whether a server should silently ignore data following the extension list =
(e.g. for the sake of upward compatibility) or (as one could infer from =
RFC5246, p. 42) send e.g. a "decode_error" alert.

(3) If a ClientHello contains multiple extensions of the same type, =
several server implementations proceed with the handshake (even if they =
parse these specific extensions). The specification again is clear that =
"there MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type". However, =
what should a server do in case there are? Again, my guess would be that =
it should abort the handshake. Should this also be the case for extensions =
that a server simply ignores (as it e.g. doesn't know them)?

Thank you very much.

Cheers,
Andi



--=__PartC0F648E8.1__=
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Description: HTML

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8"><META name=3D"Author" content=3D"GroupWise WebAccess"><sty=
le type=3D"text/css"> =0Abody p =0A{ =0A	margin: 0px; =0A}=0A</style=
></head><body style=3D'font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; =
font-size: 13px; '>Dear all,<br><br>we are working on an approach/framework=
 for testing TLS implementations (currently only servers, but clients are =
planned for the future as well). While running our tests against a bunch =
of different TLS (server) implementations, we found several types of =
suspicious behaviour (see below). As the TLS specification left me with =
doubts on what the correct behaviour should be, I'd like to raise this =
questions here (please let me know if this is not the appropriate place or =
this has been answered before).<br><br>(1) Several server implementations =
seem to ignore the list of proposed compression methods in a ClientHello =
and simply select null compression even if that has not been in the =
ClientHello's list. The specification is rather clear that null compression=
 MUST be part of the list. However, I'm not aware of any clear statement =
about what a compliant server should do in case it receives a ClientHello =
without null compression. My best guess would have been that in such cases =
the server should abort the handshake (at least if it does not support =
whatever the client proposed).<br><br>(2) In a ClientHello several server =
implementations don't ignore data following the extension list. That is, =
they somehow seem to ignore the length field of the extension list and =
simply consider everything following the list of compression methods as =
extensions. Aside from this certainly being a deviation from the specificat=
ion, I was wondering whether a server should silently ignore data =
following the extension list (e.g. for the sake of upward compatibility) =
or (as one could infer from RFC5246, p. 42) send e.g. a "decode_error" =
alert.<br><br>(3) If a ClientHello contains multiple extensions of the =
same type, several server implementations proceed with the handshake (even =
if they parse these specific extensions). The specification again is clear =
that "there MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type". =
However, what should a server do in case there are? Again, my guess would =
be that it should abort the handshake. Should this also be the case for =
extensions that a server simply ignores (as it e.g. doesn't know them)?<br>=
<br>Thank you very much.<br><br>Cheers,<br>Andi<br><br></body></html>

--=__PartC0F648E8.1__=--

--=__PartC0F648E8.0__=--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Short Authentication Strings for TLS
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Hi Christian,

could you provide a bit more background why you are working on such a 
solution?

Ciao
Hannes


On 08/18/2016 07:47 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
> Daniel Kaiser and I are working on a “pairing” specification in the
> context of DNS SD. Short Authentication Strings are one of the preferred
> methods for verifying pairings. I would like to use TLS as much as
> possible in the pairing protocol. EKR pointed me to the expired draft by
> Ian Miers, Matthew Green and him:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miers-tls-sas-00. I am interested in
> reviving that draft.
>
>
>
> The draft implements a classic “coin flipping” protocol into TLS, using
> a “commit before disclose” logic to prevent Nessie from hiding as an
> MITM between Alice and Bob. From my superficial reading, this looks
> fine. I could use a reference to
> http://people.csail.mit.edu/shaih/pubs/hm96.pdf, both to explain why the
> attack by Halevi and Micali does not apply to this particular construct,
> and also to provide a 20 years old reference to similar algorithms,
> which may be useful in this day and age.
>
>
>
> One nit, though. If Nessie has infinite computing resource, she can
> build a catalog of multiple random values that all hash to the same
> string, and then use that catalog to work around the commitment
> protocol. The scheme in the draft prevents that attack by using a hash
> keyed with the master secret, which defeats catalog attacks, and also by
> limiting the length of the nonce to be below the length of the hash,
> which in theory prevents collision attacks. Explaining that would be neat.
>
>
>
> As I said, I am interested in reviving that draft, and adapting it to
> TLS 1.3. Does someone else share the feeling?
>
>
>
> -- Christian Huitema
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Hi Ekr,

I read through the text and I think it is an improvement.

I only had one question that is only slightly related to your edits 
because it came up in the interop testing with the Mint implementation.

"
Servers requiring this extension SHOULD respond to a ClientHello
lacking a "server_name" extension by terminating the connection
with a "missing_extension" alert.
"

I personally would find it more useful to have an alert saying 
"missing_server_name_extension" instead of just returning 
"missing_extension" for a number of different extensions since this 
gives the client no chance to fix the problem without human intervention.

Ciao
Hannes

On 09/05/2016 08:02 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
>
> Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under various
> fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but
> instead
> just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we should
> relax
> the requirement.
>
> At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage
> sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a
> specific one.
> I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link
> above). This
> PR:
>
> - Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I missed
>   a couple of places)
> - Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions
> to avoid
>   having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
> - Relaxes the requirement as listed above.
>
> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide to
> continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one location not
> scattered around the spec.
>
> I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the requirement to
> send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to
> handle this PR.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Pre_shared_key Extension Question
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Hi Ekr,

thanks for the response.

The psk_identity_hint in RFC 4279 was sent from the server to the client 
and was a mechanism that was believed to be needed by the 3GPP in their 
bootstrapping architecture, which in the end was never widely used (as 
far as I know). So, not necessarily a super important features, as it 
seems.

As mentioned in my other mail regarding sending the ticket together with 
the long-term PSK identity could be addressed better by clarifying the 
server is intending to keep the ticket cached for the time indicated in 
ticket_lifetime (rather than saying the opposite which may lead 
implementers to care less).

Hence, I would mind if you delete the following two sentences in Section 
4.5.1 "New Session Ticket Message":

"
It MAY delete the ticket earlier based on local policy. A server MAY 
treat a ticket as valid for a shorter period of time than what is stated 
in the ticket_lifetime.
"

Ciao
Hannes


On 08/18/2016 12:17 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> The intention here was to compensate for not having psk_identity_hint.
> However, it also allows you to do resumption of PSK-established sessions.
>
> It would be a fairly significant simplification to say you could only
> have one PSK, because then we could easily require the client to prove
> knowledge of the key, for instance by stuffing a MAC at the end of the
> ClientHello as we discussed in Berlin.
>
> So:
> Is there any demand for multiple identities? I do not believe there is
> any in the Web context. If not, we should remove this feature.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 1:39 AM, Hannes Tschofenig
> <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net <mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>> wrote:
>
>     Hi all,
>
>     the currently defined â€œpre_shared_keyâ€� extension allows clients to send
>     a list of the identities. I was wondering in what use cases this is
>     useful and what policy guides the server to pick the most appropriate
>     psk identity. I couldn't find any discussion in the document about this
>     aspect.
>
>     Ciao
>     Hannes
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     TLS mailing list
>     TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>
>


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Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Pre_shared_key Extension Question
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Hi Benjamin,

regarding the use case you describe below: at least for us at ARM this 
is not the way how we plan to use PSK. We use a key distribution 
protocol (namely OMA LWM2M) to provision the PSK identity and the PSK 
secret used with TLS.

So, from that point of view there is no need for a PSK rollover as you 
describe below.

Ciao
Hannes

On 08/18/2016 05:47 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On 08/18/2016 10:29 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 8:18 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com
>> <mailto:bkaduk@akamai.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     On 08/17/2016 05:17 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>     It would be a fairly significant simplification to say you could
>>>     only have one PSK, because then we could easily require the
>>>     client to prove knowledge of the key, for instance by stuffing a
>>>     MAC at the end of the ClientHello as we discussed in Berlin.
>>>
>>>     So:
>>>     Is there any demand for multiple identities? I do not believe
>>>     there is any in the Web context. If not, we should remove this
>>>     feature.
>>>
>>
>>     Then at PSK rollover time, clients are expected to fall back to a
>>     new TLS connection using the other PSK?
>>
>>
>> I'm not sure I follow. Can you say more?
>>
>
> With caveat that I don't deploy PSK-based systems and this is before my
> morning coffee ... suppose I have a related group of IoT devices that
> use TLS+PSK to communicate.  But, I don't want the long-term
> cryptographic secret (the PSK) to be permanent and unchanging, since
> that's not best practices and leaves me in a tough spot if it ever
> leaks.  So, I generate a new PSK every three months, provide a device on
> the network that lets the devices retrieve the new one, and everyone is
> supposed to expire the old one a month after the new one is available.
> My PSK identities could then be something like "2016Q2" (or something
> more complicated; it doesn't really matter), but since the devices are
> autonomous and not synchronized, I can't have a "flag day" transition
> from using the 2016Q1 to 2016Q2 key.  At some point, a device will try
> to use the 2016Q2 key as a client against a server device that only has
> the 2016Q1 key, and the handshake fails.  In the rollover scenario I
> describe, the client can then try a new handshake with the 2016Q1 key
> instead of the 2016Q2 key, which should succeed.
>
> Given the benefits of only allowing one PSK identity from the client, I
> am fine with requiring the second hanshake in this (contrived?)
> scenario; I just wanted to mention it so that we know what we're getting
> into.
>
> -Ben


From nobody Fri Sep  9 08:37:17 2016
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In-Reply-To: <57D2E218020000AC0011B17E@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de>
To: Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>
Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 17:29:01 +0200 (CEST)
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/DRpbWCy_LzR59mAjIwHCEYG1ol4>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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My personal take on your questions:


Andreas Walz wrote:
> 
> (1) Several server implementations seem to ignore the list of proposed
> compression methods in a ClientHello and simply select null compression
> even if that has not been in the ClientHello's list.

Sounds like reasonable behaviour (improving interop) which does not cause
any security issues.

>
> The specification is rather clear that null compression MUST be part of
> the list.  However, I'm not aware of any clear statement about what a
> compliant server should do in case it receives a ClientHello without
> null compression. My best guess would have been that in such cases the
> server should abort the handshake (at least if it does not support
> whatever the client proposed).

The requirement is about the Client.  The Server behaviour is un(der)specifed.
The server choosing null compression anyway and continuing looks pretty
reasonable to me (least amount of code, so the safest to implement).

Aborting by the server would be OK with the specification, but not
necessarily reasonable.  Consider that there was a time when compression
within TLS was available and widely used.  A server that wanted and would
use TLS compression when offered would behave sort-of unrational when
complaining about an absence of a compression method it does not intend
to use (in presence of the compression method it wants to use).

The actual problem is the design flaw in TLS that availability of 
null compression is not implied, but rather given a seperate codepoint,
and the server choosing null compression and continuing even when it
is not explicitly asserted by the client, is a server silently making up
for that design flaw in the TLS spec.


> 
> (2) In a ClientHello several server implementations don't ignore data
> following the extension list. That is, they somehow seem to ignore the
> length field of the extension list and simply consider everything
> following the list of compression methods as extensions.  Aside from this
> certainly being a deviation from the specification, I was wondering
> whether a server should silently ignore data following the extension
> list (e.g. for the sake of upward compatibility) or (as one could infer
> from RFC5246, p. 42) send e.g. a "decode_error" alert.

Up to TLSv1.2, TLS extensions were purely optional, so an implementation
that unconditionally ignores everything following compression methods is
at least fully conforming to SSLv3, TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.

For an TLS implementation that parses TLS extensions, the behaviour of
what to do about trailing garbage is a different matter.  Personally
I prefer aborting in case of garbage trailing TLS extensions.

When I looked at OpenSSL's implemenation of the extensions parser a few
years ago, I noticed that it was ignoring (I believe up to 3) trailing bytes.
(the shortest possible TLS extension is 4 bytes).


>
> (3) If a ClientHello contains multiple extensions of the same type,
> several server implementations proceed with the handshake (even if they
> parse these specific extensions). The specification again is clear that
> "there MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type".
> However, what should a server do in case there are? Again, my guess
> would be that it should abort the handshake. Should this also be the
> case for extensions that a server simply ignores (as it e.g. doesn't
> know them)?

What the server does in presence of multiple TLS extensions of the same type
is implementation defined.  I think it would be extremely reasonable for a
server to perform a simple plausibility check on decode whether it is decoding
the same TLS extension more than once, and then abort with a decode_error
alert, in order to have ambiguities caught early.
Recognizing duplicate TLS extensions that the server does not
support/implement does not (yet) create ambiguities (for that server)
and requires more complex code, so I would not implement that check.


-Martin


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "Kaduk, Ben" <bkaduk@akamai.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Pre_shared_key Extension Question
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We don't do cert rollover, we shouldn't do PSK rollver.



From nobody Fri Sep  9 11:07:53 2016
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The discussion about KeyUpdate-related changes has trailed off so it is =
time to begin to bring the discussion to a close.  It appears that there =
as if there is support to land =
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/61.  But, there=E2=80=99s still =
some discussion about how to add both P3 and P4 [0].  In the interest of =
making progress, we're instructing the editor to land PR#61 now.

Keith had argued for a restriction that wouldn't introduce any wire =
changes: i.e., forbid implementations from sending an =
update_not_requested KeyUpdate unless it is triggered by an =
update_requested KeyUpdate.  Ilari has pointed out a limitation with =
this approach, but the question is: does the WG favor the restriction =
proposed by Keith? Please let the WG know by next Wednesday (9/14) so =
that we can come closure on this topic.

Thanks,

J&S

[0] Where Keith suggested:

P3 =3D A side can learn that P1 has been read by the other side.

P4 =3D Neither side can cause the other to accrue an unbounded deferred =
write obligation; in fact the maximum accruable deferred write =
obligation is one KeyUpdate.=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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I made a few notes on the pull request.  Generally, I support the
change, but I get the sense that it may aid the cryptographic properties
if we keep the resumption_context and do not overload the resumption_psk
as much.

I have a slight (i.e., unjustified) preference for doing
ClientHello-with-block-of-zeros rather than prefix-of-ClientHello.  (Is
there a reason to require this extension to be the last one with
block-of-zeros?  Clearly there is for prefix-of-ClientHello.)

-Ben

On 09/06/2016 11:49 PM, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> Hi Folks,
>
> The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.   Please
> respond with comments by Friday so we can make some progress on this
> issue. 
>
> Thanks,
>
> J&S
>
> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org
> <mailto:davidben@chromium.org>> wrote:
>
>     I think this is a good idea. It's kind of weird, but it avoids
>     giving the early Finished such a strange relationship with the
>     handshake transcript. Also a fan of doing away with multiple PSK
>     identities if we don't need it.
>
>     As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase" parameter
>     into the traffic key calculation since we'll never derive more
>     than one epoch off of the same traffic secret. Combine that with
>     the two-ladder KeyUpdate and we no longer need any concatenation
>     or other label-munging at all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv"
>     and the record-layer just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret
>     function which saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives
>     the traffic keys, and engages the new AEAD in one swoop without
>     mucking about with phases, traffic directions, whether we are
>     client or server, etc.
>
>     David
>
>     On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com
>     <mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
>
>         I should also mention that this makes the implementation a
>         fair bit simpler because:
>
>         1. You can make all the decisions on the server side
>         immediately upon receiving the ClientHello
>         without waiting for Finished.
>         2. You don't need to derive early handshake traffic keys.
>
>         From an implementor's perspective, this outweighs the messing
>         around with the ClientHello buffer.
>         -Ekr
>
>
>         On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com
>         <mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
>
>             Folks,
>
>             I have just posted a WIP PR for what I'm calling "Finished
>             Stuffing"
>
>               https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/615
>             <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_tlswg_tls13-2Dspec_pull_615&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=IwfxQnHf5o1ACITZiQQEOKnbhWK40rJ7uWbCfhm0pSE&s=ukqGqua3EOfqImRb0EFPRRxMv7Hgom3t_5Ki4OvDG8M&e=>
>
>             I would welcome comments on this direction and whether I
>             am missing
>             anything important.
>
>
>             OVERVIEW
>             This PR follows on a bunch of discussions we've had about
>             the redundancy
>             of Finished and resumption_ctx. This PR makes the
>             following changes:
>
>             - Replace the 0-RTT Finished with an extension you send in the
>               ClientHello *whenever* you do PSK.
>             - Get rid of resumption context (because it is now replaced by
>               the ClientHello.hello_finished.
>
>
>             RATIONALE
>             The reasoning for this change is:
>
>             - With ordinary PSK you don't get any assurance that the
>             other side
>               knows the PSK.
>
>             - With 0-RTT you get some (subject to the usual anti-replay
>               guarantees) via the Finished message.
>
>             - If we were to include the 0-RTT Finished message in the
>             handshake
>               transcript, then we wouldn't need the resumption context
>             because
>               the transcript would transitively include the PSK via
>             the Finished.
>
>             So the natural thing to do would be to always send 0-RTT
>             Finished
>             but unfortunately:
>
>             1. You can't just send the 0-RTT Finished whenever you do
>             PSK because
>                that causes potential compat problems with mixed
>             1.3/1.2 networks
>                (the same ones we have with 0-RTT, but at least that's
>             opt-in).
>
>             2. You also can't send the 0-RTT Finished with PSK because
>             you can
>                currently offer multiple PSK identities.
>
>             The on-list discussion has suggested we could relax
>             condition #2 and
>             only have one identity. And we can fix condition #1 by
>             stuffing the
>             Finished in an extension (with some hacks to make this
>             easier). This
>             PR enacts that.
>
>
>             FAQS
>             - What gets included in the handshake transcript?
>               The whole ClientHello including the computed
>             hello_finished extension.
>               
>             - Isn't this a hassle to implement?
>               It turns out not to be. The basic reason is that at the
>             point where
>               the client sends the ClientHello and the server
>             processes, it doesn't
>               yet know which Hash will be chosen for HKDF and so NSS
>             (and I believe
>               other stacks) buffers the ClientHello in plaintext, so
>             hashing only
>               part of it is easy. I've done it in NSS and this part is
>             quite easy.
>               
>
>             POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs
>             There are a number of possible variations we might want to
>             look at:
>
>             1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age to its own extension (out of
>                early_data_indication). This provides additional
>             anti-replay
>                for the CH at the 0.5RTT sending point. I believe we should
>                make this change.
>                
>             2. Tweaking the data to be hashed to just hash the ClientHello
>                prefix without the 0-filled verify_data. This is not
>             significantly
>                harder or easier to implement and basically depends on
>             whether
>                you prefer the invariant of "always hash complete
>             messages" or
>                "always hash valid pieces of transcript". See above for
>             notes
>                on buffering.
>
>             3. Allow multiple PSKs. Technically you could make this design
>                work with >1 PSK but stuffing multiple verify_data
>             values in
>                the ClientHello. E.g,,
>
>                   opaque FinishedValue<0..255>;
>                   
>                   struct {
>                      FinishedValue finisheds<0..2^16-1>;
>                   } HelloFinished;
>
>                Based on the list discussion, it seems like nobody
>             wants >1 PSK,
>                so I think one is simpler; I just wanted to note that these
>                changes weren't totally coupled.
>
>             4. External context values. Several people have pointed
>             out that it
>                might be convenient to have an external context value
>             hashed
>                into the transcript. One way to do this would be to include
>                it under the Finished. That's not difficult if people
>             want to,
>                with the default being empty.
>
>             5. Hugo brought up on the list that we need to make very
>             clear that
>                the "hello_finished" is being used to bind the
>             handshakes and
>                that it depends on collision resistance. I have not
>             forgotten this
>                and text on that point would be appreciated.
>
>             Comments welcome.
>             -Ekr
>
>
>         _______________________________________________
>         TLS mailing list
>         TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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>
>
>     _______________________________________________
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    <tt>I made a few notes on the pull request.  Generally, I support
      the change, but I get the sense that it may aid the cryptographic
      properties if we keep the resumption_context and do not overload
      the resumption_psk as much.<br>
      <br>
      I have a slight (i.e., unjustified) preference for doing
      ClientHello-with-block-of-zeros rather than
      prefix-of-ClientHello.  (Is there a reason to require this
      extension to be the last one with block-of-zeros?  Clearly there
      is for prefix-of-ClientHello.)<br>
      <br>
      -Ben<br>
    </tt><br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 09/06/2016 11:49 PM, Joseph Salowey
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAOgPGoD8YEr=+c8eG+YZ=6nSvFB2uk7MiKNgN7Z=wg7ihAUhzg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <div dir="ltr">Hi Folks,
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>The chairs want to make sure this gets some proper review.
            Please respond with comments by Friday so we can make some
          progress on this issue. </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Thanks,</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>J&amp;S</div>
      </div>
      <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
        <div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:57 AM, David
          Benjamin <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target="_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt;</span>
          wrote:<br>
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
            .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
            <div dir="ltr">I think this is a good idea. It's kind of
              weird, but it avoids giving the early Finished such a
              strange relationship with the handshake transcript. Also a
              fan of doing away with multiple PSK identities if we don't
              need it.<br>
              <br>
              As a bonus, this removes the need to route a "phase"
              parameter into the traffic key calculation since we'll
              never derive more than one epoch off of the same traffic
              secret. Combine that with the two-ladder KeyUpdate and we
              no longer need any concatenation or other label-munging at
              all. Simply use labels "key" and "iv" and the record-layer
              just exposes a single UseTrafficSecret function which
              saves the traffic secret (for KeyUpdate), derives the
              traffic keys, and engages the new AEAD in one swoop
              without mucking about with phases, traffic directions,
              whether we are client or server, etc.
              <div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
              </div>
              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <div>David</div>
                </div>
              </div>
              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <div><br>
                    <div class="gmail_quote">
                      <div>
                        <div class="h5">
                          <div dir="ltr">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 6:19 PM
                            Eric Rescorla &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                              href="mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target="_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;
                            wrote:<br>
                          </div>
                        </div>
                      </div>
                      <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
                        0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
                        solid;padding-left:1ex">
                        <div>
                          <div class="h5">
                            <div dir="ltr">I should also mention that
                              this makes the implementation a fair bit
                              simpler because:
                              <div><br>
                              </div>
                              <div>1. You can make all the decisions on
                                the server side immediately upon
                                receiving the ClientHello</div>
                              <div>without waiting for Finished.</div>
                              <div>2. You don't need to derive early
                                handshake traffic keys.</div>
                              <div><br>
                              </div>
                              <div>From an implementor's perspective,
                                this outweighs the messing around with
                                the ClientHello buffer.</div>
                              <div>-Ekr</div>
                              <div><br>
                              </div>
                            </div>
                            <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                              <div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1,
                                2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <span
                                  dir="ltr">&lt;<a
                                    moz-do-not-send="true"
                                    href="mailto:ekr@rtfm.com"
                                    target="_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span>
                                wrote:<br>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                                  style="margin:0 0 0
                                  .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
                                  solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                  <div dir="ltr">
                                    <div>Folks,</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>I have just posted a WIP PR for
                                      what I'm calling "Finished
                                      Stuffing"</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>  <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_tlswg_tls13-2Dspec_pull_615&amp;d=DQMFaQ&amp;c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&amp;r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&amp;m=IwfxQnHf5o1ACITZiQQEOKnbhWK40rJ7uWbCfhm0pSE&amp;s=ukqGqua3EOfqImRb0EFPRRxMv7Hgom3t_5Ki4OvDG8M&amp;e="
                                        target="_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/615</a></div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>I would welcome comments on
                                      this direction and whether I am
                                      missing</div>
                                    <div>anything important.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>OVERVIEW</div>
                                    <div>This PR follows on a bunch of
                                      discussions we've had about the
                                      redundancy</div>
                                    <div>of Finished and resumption_ctx.
                                      This PR makes the following
                                      changes:</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>- Replace the 0-RTT Finished
                                      with an extension you send in the</div>
                                    <div>  ClientHello *whenever* you do
                                      PSK.</div>
                                    <div>- Get rid of resumption context
                                      (because it is now replaced by</div>
                                    <div>  the
                                      ClientHello.hello_finished.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>RATIONALE</div>
                                    <div>The reasoning for this change
                                      is:</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>- With ordinary PSK you don't
                                      get any assurance that the other
                                      side</div>
                                    <div>  knows the PSK.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>- With 0-RTT you get some
                                      (subject to the usual anti-replay</div>
                                    <div>  guarantees) via the Finished
                                      message.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>- If we were to include the
                                      0-RTT Finished message in the
                                      handshake</div>
                                    <div>  transcript, then we wouldn't
                                      need the resumption context
                                      because</div>
                                    <div>  the transcript would
                                      transitively include the PSK via
                                      the Finished.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>So the natural thing to do
                                      would be to always send 0-RTT
                                      Finished</div>
                                    <div>but unfortunately:</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>1. You can't just send the
                                      0-RTT Finished whenever you do PSK
                                      because</div>
                                    <div>   that causes potential compat
                                      problems with mixed 1.3/1.2
                                      networks</div>
                                    <div>   (the same ones we have with
                                      0-RTT, but at least that's
                                      opt-in).</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>2. You also can't send the
                                      0-RTT Finished with PSK because
                                      you can</div>
                                    <div>   currently offer multiple PSK
                                      identities.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>The on-list discussion has
                                      suggested we could relax condition
                                      #2 and</div>
                                    <div>only have one identity. And we
                                      can fix condition #1 by stuffing
                                      the</div>
                                    <div>Finished in an extension (with
                                      some hacks to make this easier).
                                      This</div>
                                    <div>PR enacts that.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>FAQS</div>
                                    <div>- What gets included in the
                                      handshake transcript?</div>
                                    <div>  The whole ClientHello
                                      including the computed
                                      hello_finished extension.</div>
                                    <div>  </div>
                                    <div>- Isn't this a hassle to
                                      implement?</div>
                                    <div>  It turns out not to be. The
                                      basic reason is that at the point
                                      where</div>
                                    <div>  the client sends the
                                      ClientHello and the server
                                      processes, it doesn't</div>
                                    <div>  yet know which Hash will be
                                      chosen for HKDF and so NSS (and I
                                      believe</div>
                                    <div>  other stacks) buffers the
                                      ClientHello in plaintext, so
                                      hashing only</div>
                                    <div>  part of it is easy. I've done
                                      it in NSS and this part is quite
                                      easy.</div>
                                    <div>  </div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>POTENTIAL VARIATIONS/TODOs</div>
                                    <div>There are a number of possible
                                      variations we might want to look
                                      at:</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>1. Moving obfuscated_ticket_age
                                      to its own extension (out of</div>
                                    <div>   early_data_indication). This
                                      provides additional anti-replay</div>
                                    <div>   for the CH at the 0.5RTT
                                      sending point. I believe we should</div>
                                    <div>   make this change.</div>
                                    <div>   </div>
                                    <div>2. Tweaking the data to be
                                      hashed to just hash the
                                      ClientHello</div>
                                    <div>   prefix without the 0-filled
                                      verify_data. This is not
                                      significantly</div>
                                    <div>   harder or easier to
                                      implement and basically depends on
                                      whether</div>
                                    <div>   you prefer the invariant of
                                      "always hash complete messages" or</div>
                                    <div>   "always hash valid pieces of
                                      transcript". See above for notes</div>
                                    <div>   on buffering.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>3. Allow multiple PSKs.
                                      Technically you could make this
                                      design</div>
                                    <div>   work with &gt;1 PSK but
                                      stuffing multiple verify_data
                                      values in</div>
                                    <div>   the ClientHello. E.g,,</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>      opaque
                                      FinishedValue&lt;0..255&gt;;</div>
                                    <div>      </div>
                                    <div>      struct {</div>
                                    <div>         FinishedValue
                                      finisheds&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;</div>
                                    <div>      } HelloFinished;</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>   Based on the list
                                      discussion, it seems like nobody
                                      wants &gt;1 PSK,</div>
                                    <div>   so I think one is simpler; I
                                      just wanted to note that these</div>
                                    <div>   changes weren't totally
                                      coupled.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>4. External context values.
                                      Several people have pointed out
                                      that it</div>
                                    <div>   might be convenient to have
                                      an external context value hashed</div>
                                    <div>   into the transcript. One way
                                      to do this would be to include</div>
                                    <div>   it under the Finished.
                                      That's not difficult if people
                                      want to,</div>
                                    <div>   with the default being
                                      empty.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>5. Hugo brought up on the list
                                      that we need to make very clear
                                      that</div>
                                    <div>   the "hello_finished" is
                                      being used to bind the handshakes
                                      and</div>
                                    <div>   that it depends on collision
                                      resistance. I have not forgotten
                                      this</div>
                                    <div>   and text on that point would
                                      be appreciated.</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                    <div>Comments welcome.</div>
                                    <div>-Ekr</div>
                                    <div><br>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                              </div>
                              <br>
                            </div>
                          </div>
                        </div>
                        ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
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              </div>
            </div>
            <br>
            ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
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            <br>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
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</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 23:19:03 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 02:50:59PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> I made a few notes on the pull request.  Generally, I support the
> change, but I get the sense that it may aid the cryptographic properties
> if we keep the resumption_context and do not overload the resumption_psk
> as much.

One problem with this is that authentication_methods can include
nontrivial methods even for "static" PSKs, and if server takes such
method, you have an attack unless you bind the PSK secret used. And
"static" PSKs don't have resumption_context.
 
And I would expect that someone will be crazy enough to try to
provision "static" PSK with the information required to perform
0-RTT (ALPN (or indication there is none) and associated cipher)...

> I have a slight (i.e., unjustified) preference for doing
> ClientHello-with-block-of-zeros rather than prefix-of-ClientHello.  (Is
> there a reason to require this extension to be the last one with
> block-of-zeros?  Clearly there is for prefix-of-ClientHello.)

What about the case where client tries DHE-PSK and gets attempt
rejected because of missing group (or because address verification)?
0-RTT is gone yes, but the PSK attempt isn't.

What happens to the hash in this case?



-Ilari


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--001a114fe77e0de8e5053c196259
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While there seems to be some support for adding SHA-3 to TLS, we're not
seeing enough support to add it as part of TLS 1.3.  Individual drafts that
specify ciphers suites can always be separately considered though.

Cheers,

J&S

On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:30 AM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 9 September 2016 at 20:02, Gilles Van Assche <gilles.vanassche@st.com>
> wrote:
> > My point was technically how to best use FIPS 202 in RSA PSS, and we (as
> > Keccak team) would be more than happy to help in that area.
>
> And I'm more than happy to have the work happen, but I think that we
> can do things in stages.
>
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>

--001a114fe77e0de8e5053c196259
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">While there seems to be s=
ome support for adding SHA-3 to TLS, we&#39;re not seeing enough support to=
 add it as part of TLS 1.3.=C2=A0 Individual drafts that specify ciphers su=
ites can always be separately considered though.</span><br style=3D"font-si=
ze:12.8px"><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Cheers,</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">J&amp;S<=
/span></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
>On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:30 AM, Martin Thomson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">martin.thomson@gma=
il.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=
=3D"">On 9 September 2016 at 20:02, Gilles Van Assche &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:gilles.vanassche@st.com">gilles.vanassche@st.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; My point was technically how to best use FIPS 202 in RSA PSS, and we (=
as<br>
&gt; Keccak team) would be more than happy to help in that area.<br>
<br>
</span>And I&#39;m more than happy to have the work happen, but I think tha=
t we<br>
can do things in stages.<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 18:13:04 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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I'm happy to make all alerts fatal.

I also like the state in the pull requests where some cases require that
if an alert is sent, it is a specific alert, while leaving flexibility
in other cases (and preventing us from having to exhaustively enumerate
all possible causes for alerts).

It would also be nice to standardize on using "terminate" for
post-handshake issues and "abort" for during the handshake (or, really,
any concrete split).  It looks like the intent of the pull request is to
make that distinction, but I wasn't really reading with a keen eye and
checking all cases for it.

-Ben

On 09/06/2016 04:33 PM, Sean Turner wrote:
> All,
>
> The chairs would like to get some eyes on this PR by this Friday (Sept 9th) so that we can draw it to close.
>
> Thanks,
>
> J&S
>
>> On Sep 05, 2016, at 14:02, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
>>
>> Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under various
>> fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but instead
>> just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we should relax
>> the requirement.
>>
>> At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage
>> sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a specific one.
>> I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link above). This
>> PR:
>>
>> - Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I missed
>>   a couple of places)
>> - Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions to avoid
>>   having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
>> - Relaxes the requirement as listed above.
>>
>> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide to
>> continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one location not
>> scattered around the spec.
>>
>> I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the requirement to
>> send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to handle this PR. 
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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    <tt>I'm happy to make all alerts fatal.<br>
      <br>
      I also like the state in the pull requests where some cases
      require that if an alert is sent, it is a specific alert, while
      leaving flexibility in other cases (and preventing us from having
      to exhaustively enumerate all possible causes for alerts).<br>
      <br>
      It would also be nice to standardize on using "terminate" for
      post-handshake issues and "abort" for during the handshake (or,
      really, any concrete split).  It looks like the intent of the pull
      request is to make that distinction, but I wasn't really reading
      with a keen eye and checking all cases for it.<br>
      <br>
      -Ben<br>
    </tt><br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 09/06/2016 04:33 PM, Sean Turner
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:6EA2A272-FB9F-4E0A-A35E-680E531DD757@sn3rd.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">All,

The chairs would like to get some eyes on this PR by this Friday (Sept 9th) so that we can draw it to close.

Thanks,

J&amp;S

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">On Sep 05, 2016, at 14:02, Eric Rescorla <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">&lt;ekr@rtfm.com&gt;</a> wrote:

PR: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625</a>

Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under various
fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but instead
just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we should relax
the requirement.

At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage
sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a specific one.
I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link above). This
PR:

- Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I missed
  a couple of places)
- Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions to avoid
  having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
- Relaxes the requirement as listed above.

Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide to
continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one location not
scattered around the spec.

I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the requirement to
send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to handle this PR. 

-Ekr

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 08, 2016 at 09:59:22PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 5:29 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 07:43:53PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
> > >
> > > - The hash has output length at most input length (true for all SHA-2
> > > variants)
> > >
> >
> > Just curious: Can you explain the need for this property? Note that if =
a
> > key to HMAC is  =E2=80=8Blarger than the (compression) function output =
size then
> > this key is first hashed into a full output hence preserving CR.
>
> Simply me not bothering to figure out what the heck HMAC does if this
> isn't true (or if it is even well-defined in all cases).
>
> > - HKDF-extract salt length is constant (in current draft, always
> hash_olen)
> > > - HKDF-expand PRK length is constant (in current draft, always
> hash_olen)
> > > - The HKDF-expand output output length is at least hash output length
> > >   (in current draft, hash_olen except in key expansions).
> > >
> >
> > These are a lot of restrictions that no one has spelled out as conditio=
ns
> > on the KDF and they do not follow from the natural properties of KDFs.
> > Collision resistance is never needed as far as I can tell for generatio=
n
> of
> > keys or to compute PRF and/or MAC values (e.g., for the original
> > functionality of Finished that is essentially a MAC/PRF on the
> transcript).
> > The reason we find ourselves considering the CR properties of HKDF is
> that
> > we are using it to derive *strings* that serve as binders/digests of pa=
st
> > transcripts. Luckily, HKDF with the right hash functions can provide th=
at
> > functionality but it is not a native KDF functionality.
>
> So I presume some more text for Security Considerations...
>
> > I do not mean this as an academic discussion (although we could have th=
at
> > too) but as a warning for future (if not present) misuse and an obstacl=
e
> in
> > replacing HKDF in the future.
> > I would be much happier if we had a clear distinction between PRF/MAC
> > =E2=80=8Bcomputations, KDF computations and digest computations., even =
if we
> > currently used HKDF for all these functions.
>
> Unfortunately there are things like exporter outputs, that need to be
> both "secret" (i.e. "keys") and "nonces" (i.e. "binders"). At least if
> application wants so... Dropping either would cause MAJOR security
> problems.
>
> I think those and the dynamically provisioned PSKs are the only ones
> that have that property of being both key and binder.
>

=E2=80=8BI would much prefer to have two elements associated with such keys=
. One is
the key itself and the other is a binder (or whatever other name one
chooses for it) that consists of a context string or digest associated to
that key. Then, you would use the key to key crypto algorithms and use the
descriptor as a binder to the key's original context, usually as input to a
crypto algorithm (and not as a key). This will make the functionality of
each element (key or binder) more explicit and will make it clear when is
that we need collision resistance and when we don't.

Hugo


> > > It is a bit more problematic than that:
> > >
> > > The hello_finished / "PSK Creation Binder" derives from the PSK key.
> > >
> > > Deriving separate value in context of dynamic PSK provisioning does n=
ot
> > > work properly as "static" PSKs lack this value, and if one then tries
> to
> > > use such key with combined authentication, you got an attack[1].
> > >
> >
> > =E2=80=8BI could not follow this argument.
>
> Basically, one can't make a distinction between static ("non-resumption)
> and dynamic ("resumption") PSKs here. Because such distinction would
> run into security problems with some other features.
>
>
>
> -Ilari
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,=
sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <span =
dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex"><span>On Thu, Sep 08, 2016 at 09:59:22PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrot=
e:<br>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 5:29 AM, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 07:43:53PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:<br=
>
&gt; &gt;<br>
</span><span>&gt; &gt; - The hash has output length at most input length (t=
rue for all SHA-2<br>
&gt; &gt; variants)<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Just curious: Can you explain the need for this property? Note that if=
 a<br>
&gt; key to HMAC is=C2=A0 =E2=80=8Blarger than the (compression) function o=
utput size then<br>
&gt; this key is first hashed into a full output hence preserving CR.<br>
<br>
</span>Simply me not bothering to figure out what the heck HMAC does if thi=
s<br>
isn&#39;t true (or if it is even well-defined in all cases).<br>
<span><br>
&gt; - HKDF-extract salt length is constant (in current draft, always hash_=
olen)<br>
&gt; &gt; - HKDF-expand PRK length is constant (in current draft, always ha=
sh_olen)<br>
&gt; &gt; - The HKDF-expand output output length is at least hash output le=
ngth<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0(in current draft, hash_olen except in key expansions=
).<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; These are a lot of restrictions that no one has spelled out as conditi=
ons<br>
&gt; on the KDF and they do not follow from the natural properties of KDFs.=
<br>
&gt; Collision resistance is never needed as far as I can tell for generati=
on of<br>
&gt; keys or to compute PRF and/or MAC values (e.g., for the original<br>
&gt; functionality of Finished that is essentially a MAC/PRF on the transcr=
ipt).<br>
&gt; The reason we find ourselves considering the CR properties of HKDF is =
that<br>
&gt; we are using it to derive *strings* that serve as binders/digests of p=
ast<br>
&gt; transcripts. Luckily, HKDF with the right hash functions can provide t=
hat<br>
&gt; functionality but it is not a native KDF functionality.<br>
<br>
</span>So I presume some more text for Security Considerations...<br>
<span><br>
&gt; I do not mean this as an academic discussion (although we could have t=
hat<br>
&gt; too) but as a warning for future (if not present) misuse and an obstac=
le in<br>
&gt; replacing HKDF in the future.<br>
&gt; I would be much happier if we had a clear distinction between PRF/MAC<=
br>
&gt; =E2=80=8Bcomputations, KDF computations and digest computations., even=
 if we<br>
&gt; currently used HKDF for all these functions.<br>
<br>
</span>Unfortunately there are things like exporter outputs, that need to b=
e<br>
both &quot;secret&quot; (i.e. &quot;keys&quot;) and &quot;nonces&quot; (i.e=
. &quot;binders&quot;). At least if<br>
application wants so... Dropping either would cause MAJOR security<br>
problems.<br>
<br>
I think those and the dynamically provisioned PSKs are the only ones<br>
that have that property of being both key and binder.<br></blockquote><div>=
<br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">=E2=80=8BI would much prefer to ha=
ve two elements associated with such keys. One is the key itself and the ot=
her is a binder (or whatever other name one chooses for it) that consists o=
f a context string or digest associated to that key. Then, you would use th=
e key to key crypto algorithms and use the descriptor as a binder to the ke=
y&#39;s original context, usually as input to a crypto algorithm (and not a=
s a key). This will make the functionality of each element (key or binder) =
more explicit and will make it clear when is that we need collision resista=
nce and when we don&#39;t.=C2=A0</div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_defaul=
t" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">=
<br></div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verd=
ana,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:inline">Hugo</div></div><div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:sma=
ll;display:inline"><br></div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span><br>
&gt; &gt; It is a bit more problematic than that:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The hello_finished / &quot;PSK Creation Binder&quot; derives from=
 the PSK key.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Deriving separate value in context of dynamic PSK provisioning do=
es not<br>
&gt; &gt; work properly as &quot;static&quot; PSKs lack this value, and if =
one then tries to<br>
&gt; &gt; use such key with combined authentication, you got an attack[1].<=
br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</span><span>&gt; =E2=80=8BI could not follow this argument.<br>
<br>
</span>Basically, one can&#39;t make a distinction between static (&quot;no=
n-resumption)<br>
and dynamic (&quot;resumption&quot;) PSKs here. Because such distinction wo=
uld<br>
run into security problems with some other features.<br>
<span><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c191dfa343d06053c1b94b8--


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Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2016 10:35:03 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 07:33:21PM -0400, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:22 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> 
> â€‹I would much prefer to have two elements associated with such keys. One is
> the key itself and the other is a binder (or whatever other name one
> chooses for it) that consists of a context string or digest associated to
> that key. Then, you would use the key to key crypto algorithms and use the
> descriptor as a binder to the key's original context, usually as input to a
> crypto algorithm (and not as a key). This will make the functionality of
> each element (key or binder) more explicit and will make it clear when is
> that we need collision resistance and when we don't.
 
If one can really have PSKs that lack "binders", then one would really
need to ban nontrivial authentication with those PSKs.

That is:
- If the PSK lacks a "binder", then:
  * Client MUST send auth_modes = [psk_ke] (i.e. 0x01, 0x00) with such
    PSK.
  * Server MUST abort with illegal_parameter if anything else is sent.
  * Client MUST abort with insufficient_security if the server tries to
    use any authentication mode except psk_ke.
  * Client MUST NOT send either early_data or hello_finished/hello_binder
  * Server MUST abort with handshake_failure if either extension is
    present.
- If the PSK has a "binder", then:
  * hello_finished/hello_binder extension MUST be present and have the
    correct value.
  * If it is not present, server MUST abort with missing_extension.
  * If it is incorrect, server MUST abort with decrypt_error.


(The point of all those "MUST abort" requirements is to try to weed out
implementation that might do unsafe things to the extent possible).


-Ilari


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2016 20:35:44 +1000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Zero-RTT Data & PSK
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On 9 September 2016 at 23:37, Hannes Tschofenig
<hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
> I am wondering why I cannot use Zero-RTT with just PSK-based authentication
> (without a prior ticket change).

I think that you would need to bind more things to the key in that
case, but I assume that it would be OK if you did so.  You already
need to pair a PSK with a hash, but if you paired it with a whole
cipher suite instead and also the ALPN (which could be null), then I
see no reason not to permit 0-RTT for pure PSK.  (I think that cipher
suite + ALPN is sufficient, but someone can correct me if I missed
anything.)


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2016 20:38:52 +1000
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I think that Martin (R) provided you with the answers I would have.

Have you filed bugs against the servers in question for the issues
that you have seen?

On 10 September 2016 at 00:23, Andreas Walz
<andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> we are working on an approach/framework for testing TLS implementations
> (currently only servers, but clients are planned for the future as well).
> While running our tests against a bunch of different TLS (server)
> implementations, we found several types of suspicious behaviour (see below).
> As the TLS specification left me with doubts on what the correct behaviour
> should be, I'd like to raise this questions here (please let me know if this
> is not the appropriate place or this has been answered before).
>
> (1) Several server implementations seem to ignore the list of proposed
> compression methods in a ClientHello and simply select null compression even
> if that has not been in the ClientHello's list. The specification is rather
> clear that null compression MUST be part of the list. However, I'm not aware
> of any clear statement about what a compliant server should do in case it
> receives a ClientHello without null compression. My best guess would have
> been that in such cases the server should abort the handshake (at least if
> it does not support whatever the client proposed).
>
> (2) In a ClientHello several server implementations don't ignore data
> following the extension list. That is, they somehow seem to ignore the
> length field of the extension list and simply consider everything following
> the list of compression methods as extensions. Aside from this certainly
> being a deviation from the specification, I was wondering whether a server
> should silently ignore data following the extension list (e.g. for the sake
> of upward compatibility) or (as one could infer from RFC5246, p. 42) send
> e.g. a "decode_error" alert.
>
> (3) If a ClientHello contains multiple extensions of the same type, several
> server implementations proceed with the handshake (even if they parse these
> specific extensions). The specification again is clear that "there MUST NOT
> be more than one extension of the same type". However, what should a server
> do in case there are? Again, my guess would be that it should abort the
> handshake. Should this also be the case for extensions that a server simply
> ignores (as it e.g. doesn't know them)?
>
> Thank you very much.
>
> Cheers,
> Andi
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2016 20:43:33 +1000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On 10 September 2016 at 00:35, Hannes Tschofenig
<hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
> I personally would find it more useful to have an alert saying
> "missing_server_name_extension" instead of just returning
> "missing_extension" for a number of different extensions since this gives
> the client no chance to fix the problem without human intervention.


In this case, this is the only use of missing_extension that would be
due to the extension being optional.  In all other cases,
missing_extension is used for a protocol violation: missing
signature_algorithms, for instance, is always a direct result of
problems that are inherent to the ClientHello.  Thus, a well-behaved
implementation can (currently) infer that this is the reason for
missing_extension.

I wouldn't say that this is a great argument, but it's one that could
be made.  Generally, I've given up on TLS error codes being useful, or
even making them useful; we've been stung in the past by being overly
specific about what went wrong.


From nobody Sat Sep 10 07:53:28 2016
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On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 08:43:33PM +1000, Martin Thomson wrote:
> 
> I wouldn't say that this is a great argument, but it's one that could
> be made.  Generally, I've given up on TLS error codes being useful, or
> even making them useful; we've been stung in the past by being overly
> specific about what went wrong.

Well, regarding usefulness of TLS error codes, the error codes don't
even come close to useful-for-debugging. This isn't because of
information leaking (which AFAICT can only happen in very few places),
but because error codes just are not expressive enough.

Also, if you have a place where you worry about alerts leaking 
information to attacker, watch out, you might very well also have a
timing attack.

The places of TLS 1.3 that I can quickly name that are sensitive,
and so one should take care to only send one kind of alert for
each:

- Deprotect failures (bad_record_mac)
- MAC (finished) failures (decrypt_error)
- key agreement failure (???, my code uses illegal_parameter[1])
- signature failures (internal_error)

Also, note that with some bad cryptographic algorithms, one can't
even let the other side know operation failed. So even just
resetting the connection leaks too much information.


[1] Logic being: It is likely provoked by peer sending invalid
share -> invalid field value -> illegal_parameter.


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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PR Merged.

-Ekr


On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> The discussion about KeyUpdate-related changes has trailed off so it is
> time to begin to bring the discussion to a close.  It appears that there =
as
> if there is support to land https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/61.
> But, there=E2=80=99s still some discussion about how to add both P3 and P=
4 [0].  In
> the interest of making progress, we're instructing the editor to land PR#=
61
> now.
>
> Keith had argued for a restriction that wouldn't introduce any wire
> changes: i.e., forbid implementations from sending an update_not_requeste=
d
> KeyUpdate unless it is triggered by an update_requested KeyUpdate.  Ilari
> has pointed out a limitation with this approach, but the question is: doe=
s
> the WG favor the restriction proposed by Keith? Please let the WG know by
> next Wednesday (9/14) so that we can come closure on this topic.
>
> Thanks,
>
> J&S
>
> [0] Where Keith suggested:
>
> P3 =3D A side can learn that P1 has been read by the other side.
>
> P4 =3D Neither side can cause the other to accrue an unbounded deferred
> write obligation; in fact the maximum accruable deferred write obligation
> is one KeyUpdate.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">PR Merged.<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Sep 9,=
 2016 at 11:07 AM, Sean Turner <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean=
@sn3rd.com" target=3D"_blank">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex">The discussion about KeyUpdate-related changes ha=
s trailed off so it is time to begin to bring the discussion to a close.=C2=
=A0 It appears that there as if there is support to land <a href=3D"https:/=
/github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/61" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">=
https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/61</a>.=C2=A0 But, there=E2=
=80=99s still some discussion about how to add both P3 and P4 [0].=C2=A0 In=
 the interest of making progress, we&#39;re instructing the editor to land =
PR#61 now.<br>
<br>
Keith had argued for a restriction that wouldn&#39;t introduce any wire cha=
nges: i.e., forbid implementations from sending an update_not_requested Key=
Update unless it is triggered by an update_requested KeyUpdate.=C2=A0 Ilari=
 has pointed out a limitation with this approach, but the question is: does=
 the WG favor the restriction proposed by Keith? Please let the WG know by =
next Wednesday (9/14) so that we can come closure on this topic.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
J&amp;S<br>
<br>
[0] Where Keith suggested:<br>
<br>
P3 =3D A side can learn that P1 has been read by the other side.<br>
<br>
P4 =3D Neither side can cause the other to accrue an unbounded deferred wri=
te obligation; in fact the maximum accruable deferred write obligation is o=
ne KeyUpdate.<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113e6eb23f313d053c29cf49--


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Subject: [TLS] FW: [Cfrg] ISE needs reviewers/ reviews for	draft-harkins-tls-dragonfly-00
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This may be a more relevant list to try and get reviewers on.  Please think
about doing a review.

Jim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Nevil Brownlee
> Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2016 4:06 PM
> To: cfrg@irtf.org; ISE <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org>
> Subject: [Cfrg] ISE needs reviewers/ reviews for
draft-harkins-tls-dragonfly-00
> 
> 
> Hi CFRG folk:
> 
> Dan Harkins has submitted this draft to the Independent Stream, so now I'm
> looking for reviews of it.  Any comments on this draft, especially in the
form of
> brief reviewers - or offers to do a full review - would be much
appreciated.
> 
> Please send comments, reviews or offers to review to me, that's ISE <rfc-
> ise@rfc-editor.org>
> 
> Cheers, Nevil
> 
> --
> Nevil Brownlee (ISE), rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Hi,




thanks for your detailed answers. Yes, we are in contact with the =
developers of the implementations in question and fixes are going to be =
implemented. I just wanted to get an idea of what is considered the =
correct or at least most appropriate behaviour in each case.




Thanks and Cheers




>>> Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> 10.09.16 12.39 Uhr >>>
I think that Martin (R) provided you with the answers I would have.

Have you filed bugs against the servers in question for the issues
that you have seen?

On 10 September 2016 at 00:23, Andreas Walz
<andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> we are working on an approach/framework for testing TLS implementations
> (currently only servers, but clients are planned for the future as =
well).
> While running our tests against a bunch of different TLS (server)
> implementations, we found several types of suspicious behaviour (see =
below).
> As the TLS specification left me with doubts on what the correct =
behaviour
> should be, I'd like to raise this questions here (please let me know if =
this
> is not the appropriate place or this has been answered before).
>
> (1) Several server implementations seem to ignore the list of proposed
> compression methods in a ClientHello and simply select null compression =
even
> if that has not been in the ClientHello's list. The specification is =
rather
> clear that null compression MUST be part of the list. However, I'm not =
aware
> of any clear statement about what a compliant server should do in case =
it
> receives a ClientHello without null compression. My best guess would =
have
> been that in such cases the server should abort the handshake (at least =
if
> it does not support whatever the client proposed).
>
> (2) In a ClientHello several server implementations don't ignore data
> following the extension list. That is, they somehow seem to ignore the
> length field of the extension list and simply consider everything =
following
> the list of compression methods as extensions. Aside from this certainly
> being a deviation from the specification, I was wondering whether a =
server
> should silently ignore data following the extension list (e.g. for the =
sake
> of upward compatibility) or (as one could infer from RFC5246, p. 42) =
send
> e.g. a "decode_error" alert.
>
> (3) If a ClientHello contains multiple extensions of the same type, =
several
> server implementations proceed with the handshake (even if they parse =
these
> specific extensions). The specification again is clear that "there MUST =
NOT
> be more than one extension of the same type". However, what should a =
server
> do in case there are? Again, my guess would be that it should abort the
> handshake. Should this also be the case for extensions that a server =
simply
> ignores (as it e.g. doesn't know them)?
>
> Thank you very much.
>
> Cheers,
> Andi
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>




--=__Part4375CFE9.3__=
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Content-Description: HTML

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8"><META name=3D"Author" content=3D"GroupWise WebAccess"><sty=
le type=3D"text/css"> =0Abody p =0A{ =0A	margin: 0px; =0A}=0A</style=
></head><body style=3D'font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; =
font-size: 13px; '><div><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1473659766000_andreas.w=
alz@hs-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"GroupWiseMe=
ssageBody"><div>=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A<p class=3D"p1">Hi,</p>=0A<p =
class=3D"p2"><br></p>=0A<p class=3D"p1">thanks for your detailed answers. =
Yes, we are in contact with the developers of the implementations in =
question and fixes are going to be implemented. I just wanted to get an =
idea of what is considered the correct or at least most appropriate =
behaviour in each case.</p>=0A<p class=3D"p2"><br></p>=0A<p class=3D"p1">Th=
anks and Cheers</p></div><span>&nbsp;</span><span class=3D"GroupwiseReplyHe=
ader"><br><br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Martin&nbsp;Thomson&nbsp;&lt;martin.thomson@gmai=
l.com&gt; 10.09.16 12.39 Uhr &gt;&gt;&gt;<br></span>I think that Martin =
(R) provided you with the answers I would have.<br><br>Have you filed bugs =
against the servers in question for the issues<br>that you have seen?<br><b=
r>On 10 September 2016 at 00:23, Andreas Walz<br>&lt;andreas.walz@hs-offenb=
urg.de&gt; wrote:<br>&gt; Dear all,<br>&gt;<br>&gt; we are working on an =
approach/framework for testing TLS implementations<br>&gt; (currently only =
servers, but clients are planned for the future as well).<br>&gt; While =
running our tests against a bunch of different TLS (server)<br>&gt; =
implementations, we found several types of suspicious behaviour (see =
below).<br>&gt; As the TLS specification left me with doubts on what the =
correct behaviour<br>&gt; should be, I'd like to raise this questions here =
(please let me know if this<br>&gt; is not the appropriate place or this =
has been answered before).<br>&gt;<br>&gt; (1) Several server implementatio=
ns seem to ignore the list of proposed<br>&gt; compression methods in a =
ClientHello and simply select null compression even<br>&gt; if that has =
not been in the ClientHello's list. The specification is rather<br>&gt; =
clear that null compression MUST be part of the list. However, I'm not =
aware<br>&gt; of any clear statement about what a compliant server should =
do in case it<br>&gt; receives a ClientHello without null compression. My =
best guess would have<br>&gt; been that in such cases the server should =
abort the handshake (at least if<br>&gt; it does not support whatever the =
client proposed).<br>&gt;<br>&gt; (2) In a ClientHello several server =
implementations don't ignore data<br>&gt; following the extension list. =
That is, they somehow seem to ignore the<br>&gt; length field of the =
extension list and simply consider everything following<br>&gt; the list =
of compression methods as extensions. Aside from this certainly<br>&gt; =
being a deviation from the specification, I was wondering whether a =
server<br>&gt; should silently ignore data following the extension list =
(e.g. for the sake<br>&gt; of upward compatibility) or (as one could infer =
from RFC5246, p. 42) send<br>&gt; e.g. a "decode_error" alert.<br>&gt;<br>&=
gt; (3) If a ClientHello contains multiple extensions of the same type, =
several<br>&gt; server implementations proceed with the handshake (even if =
they parse these<br>&gt; specific extensions). The specification again is =
clear that "there MUST NOT<br>&gt; be more than one extension of the same =
type". However, what should a server<br>&gt; do in case there are? Again, =
my guess would be that it should abort the<br>&gt; handshake. Should this =
also be the case for extensions that a server simply<br>&gt; ignores (as =
it e.g. doesn't know them)?<br>&gt;<br>&gt; Thank you very much.<br>&gt;<br=
>&gt; Cheers,<br>&gt; Andi<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; ________________________=
_______________________<br>&gt; TLS mailing list<br>&gt; TLS@ietf.org<br>&g=
t; https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br>&gt;<br></div></body></html=
>

--=__Part4375CFE9.3__=--

--=__Part4375CFE9.2__=--


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Subject: [TLS] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC4492 (4633)
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The following errata report has been held for document update 
for RFC4492, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4492&eid=4633

--------------------------------------
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial

Reported by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Date Reported: 2016-03-02
Held by: Stephen Farrell (IESG)

Section: 5.1.1

Original Text
-------------
        struct {
            NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^16-1>
        } EllipticCurveList;

Corrected Text
--------------
        struct {
            NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<2..2^16-1>
        } EllipticCurveList;

Notes
-----
The count is in bytes, not items.

--------------------------------------
RFC4492 (draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Publication Date    : May 2006
Author(s)           : S. Blake-Wilson, N. Bolyard, V. Gupta, C. Hawk, B. Moeller
Category            : INFORMATIONAL
Source              : Transport Layer Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/HfqrvPY0ZRlPg9-QVaTOHOjahME>
Cc: 'Daniel Kaiser' <daniel.kaiser@uni-konstanz.de>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Short Authentication Strings for TLS
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On Friday, September 9, 2016 7:28 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> ...
> Hi Christian,
>=20
> could you provide a bit more background why you are working on such a
> solution?

Daniel and are working on "privacy for DNS-SD discovery." Daniel =
presented
in Berlin this draft:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huitema-dnssd-privacy/. The =
private
discovery solution relies on pre-existing pairings, which provide shared
keys between paired devices. The working group consensus was to adopt =
the
work on private discovery, but to separate the pairing work in a =
different
work item.

The pairing algorithms typically combine the establishment of a shared
secret through an [EC]DH exchange, with the verification of that secret
through display and comparisons of "Short Authentication String" (SAS). =
The
secure comparison requires a "commit before disclose" mechanism.

We have three possible designs: create a pairing algorithm from scratch,
specifying our own crypto exchanges; use an [EC]DH version of TLS to
negotiate a shared secret, export the key to the application, and =
implement
the "commit before disclose" and SAS verification as part of the pairing
application; or, use TLS, integrate the "commit before disclose" and SAS
verification as TLS extensions, and export the verified key to the
application.

I would rather not create an algorithm from scratch. We would need to
reinvent a lot of the negotiation capabilities that are part of TLS, not =
to
mention algorithm agility, post quantum, and all that sort of things. =
EKR
pointed me towards the expired draft by Ian Miers, Matthew Green and =
him:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miers-tls-sas-00. It is a very close =
match
to our third design option, full integration of SAS in TLS. Hence the
interest.

Of course, we could also use the middle ground option -- use TLS for =
[EC]DH,
and implement the SAS verification as part of the pairing application. =
We
need to export the key from TLS to the pairing context in any case. The
middle ground option would only require us to implement a couple of =
hashes.
The downside is that we would need to negotiate the hash algorithm, =
unless
maybe we can export that too from the TLS context. And then, there are =
the
typical implementation issues. Application level minimizes the =
dependency on
TLS implementing the extensions, but increases the risk of doing it =
wrong.
And vice versa.

-- Christian Huitema




=09



> On 08/18/2016 07:47 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > Daniel Kaiser and I are working on a =93pairing=94 specification in =
the
> > context of DNS SD. Short Authentication Strings are one of the =
preferred
> > methods for verifying pairings. I would like to use TLS as much as
> > possible in the pairing protocol. EKR pointed me to the expired =
draft by
> > Ian Miers, Matthew Green and him:
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miers-tls-sas-00. I am interested =
in
> > reviving that draft.
> >
> >
> >
> > The draft implements a classic =93coin flipping=94 protocol into =
TLS, using
> > a =93commit before disclose=94 logic to prevent Nessie from hiding =
as an
> > MITM between Alice and Bob. From my superficial reading, this looks
> > fine. I could use a reference to
> > http://people.csail.mit.edu/shaih/pubs/hm96.pdf, both to explain why =
the
> > attack by Halevi and Micali does not apply to this particular =
construct,
> > and also to provide a 20 years old reference to similar algorithms,
> > which may be useful in this day and age.
> >
> >
> >
> > One nit, though. If Nessie has infinite computing resource, she can
> > build a catalog of multiple random values that all hash to the same
> > string, and then use that catalog to work around the commitment
> > protocol. The scheme in the draft prevents that attack by using a =
hash
> > keyed with the master secret, which defeats catalog attacks, and =
also by
> > limiting the length of the nonce to be below the length of the hash,
> > which in theory prevents collision attacks. Explaining that would be
neat.
> >
> >
> >
> > As I said, I am interested in reviving that draft, and adapting it =
to
> > TLS 1.3. Does someone else share the feeling?
> >
> >
> >
> > -- Christian Huitema
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >


From nobody Mon Sep 12 09:56:20 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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On Friday, 9 September 2016 16:23:52 CEST Andreas Walz wrote:
> Dear all,
>=20
> we are working on an approach/framework for testing TLS implementations
> (currently only servers, but clients are planned for the future as well).

are you aware of the tlsfuzzer framework?
https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer

> (2) In a ClientHello several server implementations don't ignore data
> following the extension list. That is, they somehow seem to ignore the
> length field of the extension list and simply consider everything followi=
ng
> the list of compression methods as extensions. Aside from this certainly
> being a deviation from the specification, I was wondering whether a server
> should silently ignore data following the extension list (e.g. for the sa=
ke
> of upward compatibility) or (as one could infer from RFC5246, p. 42) send
> e.g. a "decode_error" alert.

It is explicit in RFC 3546, section 2.1:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3546#section-2.1

   A server that supports the extensions mechanism MUST accept only
   client hello messages in either the original or extended ClientHello
   format, and (as for all other messages) MUST check that the amount of
   data in the message precisely matches one of these formats; if not
   then it MUST send a fatal "decode_error" alert.  This overrides the
   "Forward compatibility note" in [TLS].

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 19:35:47 -0400
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] chacha/poly interop?
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On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 8:02 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> OpenSSL just landed our chacha/poly implementation into master.  We pass the
> RFC test vectors, looking for other implementations to test against.

Sorry to dig up an old thread....

I tested against Bernstein/ECRYPT ChaCha and test vectors from
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-strombergson-chacha-test-vectors.
TLS-ChaCha does not inter-operate with ChaCha.

The name should probably be disambiguated somehow.

Jeff


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 00:10:08 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] chacha/poly interop?
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On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 7:35 PM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 8:02 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> > OpenSSL just landed our chacha/poly implementation into master.  We pass
> the
> > RFC test vectors, looking for other implementations to test against.
>
> Sorry to dig up an old thread....
>
> I tested against Bernstein/ECRYPT ChaCha and test vectors from
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-strombergson-chacha-test-vectors.
> TLS-ChaCha
> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-strombergson-chacha-test-vectors.TLS-ChaCha>
> does not inter-operate with ChaCha.
>
> The name should probably be disambiguated somehow.
>

TLS-ChaCha is actually RFC 7539 which comes with its own test vectors and
isn't TLS-specific.

Our implementation matches RFC 7539 and seems to match the one test vector
I tried too. Note that that draft includes a number of things like 128-bit
keys and 8 or 12 rounds which are not applicable. The test vector whose
answer begins "0x76 0xb8 0xe0 0xad 0xa0" is the one you want.

Were you perhaps using the 128-bit key test vector? RFC 7539 doesn't use
that mode. It doesn't seem even be described in the paper, though it is in
the reference implementation. (Looks like the constants change and you put
two copies of the key in.)

David

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Sep 12=
, 2016 at 7:35 PM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com">=
noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">O=
n Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 8:02 PM, Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akama=
i.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; OpenSSL just landed our chacha/poly implementation into master.=C2=A0 =
We pass the<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; RFC test vectors, looking for other implementations to test against.<b=
r class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Sorry to dig up an old thread....<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
I tested against Bernstein/ECRYPT ChaCha and test vectors from<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-strombergson-chacha-test-vector=
s.TLS-ChaCha" rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">http=
://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-strombergson-chacha-test-vectors.<br class=3D"=
gmail_msg">
TLS-ChaCha</a> does not inter-operate with ChaCha.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
The name should probably be disambiguated somehow.<br class=3D"gmail_msg"><=
/blockquote><div><br></div><div>TLS-ChaCha is actually RFC 7539 which comes=
 with its own test vectors and isn&#39;t TLS-specific.<br></div><div><br></=
div><div>Our implementation matches RFC 7539 and seems to match the one tes=
t vector I tried too. Note that that draft includes a number of things like=
 128-bit keys and 8 or 12 rounds which are not applicable. The test vector =
whose answer begins &quot;0x76 0xb8 0xe0 0xad 0xa0&quot; is the one you wan=
t.</div><div><br></div><div>Were you perhaps using the 128-bit key test vec=
tor? RFC 7539 doesn&#39;t use that mode. It doesn&#39;t seem even be descri=
bed in the paper, though it is in the reference implementation. (Looks like=
 the constants change and you put two copies of the key in.)</div><div><br>=
</div><div>David</div></div></div>

--001a113ac4580f3ff6053c587025--


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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 20:17:35 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] chacha/poly interop?
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On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 8:10 PM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 7:35 PM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 8:02 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>> > OpenSSL just landed our chacha/poly implementation into master.  We pass
>> > the
>> > RFC test vectors, looking for other implementations to test against.
>>
>> Sorry to dig up an old thread....
>>
>> I tested against Bernstein/ECRYPT ChaCha and test vectors from
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-strombergson-chacha-test-vectors.
>> TLS-ChaCha does not inter-operate with ChaCha.
>>
>> The name should probably be disambiguated somehow.
>
>
> TLS-ChaCha is actually RFC 7539 which comes with its own test vectors and
> isn't TLS-specific.

Oh, my bad... I grabbed the 5 vectors from
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305. I used them
because I believe the kernel-crypto is using them.

Let me try with RFC 7539 and see how things react with the 7539 vectors.

Jeff


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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FYI: https://www.java.com/en/jre-jdk-cryptoroadmap.html


--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Oracle's plans for Java crypto (mostly TLS-related)
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Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
 >FYI:  https://www.java.com/en/jre-jdk-cryptoroadmap.html   =0A=
=0A=
>From that page:=0A=
=0A=
  2017-01-17 DSA Increase the minimum key length for DSA certificates to 10=
24 bits.=0A=
=0A=
Will Oracle also be announcing upcoming support for Windows 95, that=0A=
newfangled Linux thing that's just appeared, and 32-bit compilers?=0A=
=0A=
  2017 H2 Diffie-Hellman For SSL/TLS, increase the minimum key length to 10=
24 bits.=0A=
=0A=
They missed out:=0A=
=0A=
  2017 For SSL/TLS, discontinue MSDOS and Windows 3.1 support.=0A=
=0A=
(The first, and weakest, PGP key I generated, quarter of a century ago unde=
r=0A=
DOS, was 1024 bits, same as what Oracle is setting their minimum to next=0A=
year some time).=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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This is the best proposal I've seen given the deployment constraints
imposed by reality.  Perhaps it could be tweaked to improve it slightly,
but I support merging this version.

-Ben

On 09/08/2016 11:04 AM, David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi folks,
>
> I’d like to revisit the question of version negotiation.
>
> EKR wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an extension:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_tlswg_tls13-2Dspec_pull_632&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=aarB3I3r_Kn7FPWJq9AJd1ivPK1niUnkupGujPoRKpk&s=1euqoGMgrdBFwR2KiZey_Du1pzwHcBTJJgTNL0Ynvo0&e=>
>
> I would like us to adopt this proposal.
>
> In Berlin, this really got framed as a pragmatic question: the current
> version negotiation has a lot of intolerance and so let’s work around
> that. So, understandably, this seemed like a “let’s adopt a hack
> forever” proposal. I think that framing is wrong. The intolerance
> situation is serious, but I think there’s also a strong argument that
> the current scheme isn’t very good.
>
> The current scheme is very simple. The client advertises a maximum
> version and the server selects based on that. This is the only piece
> of TLS negotiation which works this way. Elsewhere (extensions, cipher
> suites, signature algorithms), one side offers a list and the other
> side picks out of it. I think it’s clear now that strategy is more
> robust: every time we’ve bumped version numbers, we’ve had intolerance
> problems and this time is no exception (see below). By contrast, we
> regularly introduce new cipher suites, extensions, etc., and while we
> do see the occasional failure, they are much rarer and typically
> within the level of breakage that clients can tolerate and deal with
> by reaching out to affected servers. Moreover, lists lend themselves
> to future-proofing via draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a way the
> current scheme does not.
>
> An additional benefit is lists make it much easier to roll out
> prototype/draft versions. Currently, we are using a hack where the
> client offers {3, 4} but also includes a draft version number in an
> extension. This does work, but requires servers process that extension
> in perpetuity or at least until all draft version clients go away. 
> With a list, it’s trivial to offer a draft version by just including
> it. This is the strategy HTTP/2 used (via ALPN) and it worked well.
>
> Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn’t be worth fixing version
> negotiation in 1.3 except for intolerance. Unfortunately, this fourth
> time, it’s the same story as before. A probe of Alexa top million
> sites with BoringSSL’s TLS 1.3 code (the Go version), shows 1.63% of
> TLS-capable hosts reject a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. Note these are top
> sites and traffic is top-heavy, so we can expect much higher
> usage-weighted numbers. Qualys SSL Pulse reports 3.6%:
> https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-intolerance-in-ssl-pulse
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__blog.qualys.com_ssllabs_2016_08_02_tls-2Dversion-2Dintolerance-2Din-2Dssl-2Dpulse&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=aarB3I3r_Kn7FPWJq9AJd1ivPK1niUnkupGujPoRKpk&s=6ziW12EZ1iGkM2bN_6ooRy7CV9SPp0CVFv4hX7bpYSw&e=>
>
> (Ignore the drop in the graph. We’ve long fixed the ClientHello
> record-layer at {3, 1}. TLS 1.3 only codified existing practice here.)
> If instead we use a TLS 1.3 ClientHello with version TLS 1.2, the
> breakage drops to 0.017%. (Some of this is an NSS signature algorithms
> bug, fixed last year, which we hope to clear by deploying RSA-PSS in
> browsers early. The rest appears to be noise from transient errors
> which crop up in large tests.)
>
> These numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as damage,
> which means that they (at least browsers) will be forced to do
> fallback. This represents a security risk (cf. POODLE) as well as
> hides serious interop problems. The situation is even worse for
> non-browser clients, which may be unable to deploy at all (Ubuntu
> 12.04, despite shipping an OpenSSL release with TLS 1.2, had to
> disable it on the client.
> https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments/4
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__bugs.launchpad.net_ubuntu_-2Bsource_openssl_-2Bbug_1256576_comments_4&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=aarB3I3r_Kn7FPWJq9AJd1ivPK1niUnkupGujPoRKpk&s=tBAuUGE2Q0PBvobD02Z-2PhxBDD1DP7dGKm1M6YxIQM&e=>
> )
>
> The major arguments against this change seem to be:
>
> 1. It’s inelegant to have two mechanisms.
> 2. We should fix broken servers
>
> The first is true, but as with other changes, EKR’s PR replaces the
> 1.2 mechanism with one for 1.3, so we’ll just have one going forward.
> The second would be nice, but as a practical matter, I spend a lot of
> time trying to get those servers fixed and it doesn’t work very well
> here. Better is simply to move to a situation where once those servers
> upgrade they will be correctly behaving forever (instead of just
> handling 1.3 correctly and breaking with 1.4). This change does that.
>
> Thanks,
>
> David
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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    <tt>This is the best proposal I've seen given the deployment
      constraints imposed by reality.  Perhaps it could be tweaked to
      improve it slightly, but I support merging this version.<br>
      <br>
      -Ben<br>
    </tt><br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 09/08/2016 11:04 AM, David Benjamin
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAF8qwaA86yytg29QOD_N7ARimh9QcNGU_nnr_OrxqCrvrk2MBg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>Hi folks,</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>I’d like to revisit the question of version negotiation.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>EKR wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an
          extension:</div>
        <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_tlswg_tls13-2Dspec_pull_632&amp;d=DQMFaQ&amp;c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&amp;r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&amp;m=aarB3I3r_Kn7FPWJq9AJd1ivPK1niUnkupGujPoRKpk&amp;s=1euqoGMgrdBFwR2KiZey_Du1pzwHcBTJJgTNL0Ynvo0&amp;e=">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632</a></div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>I would like us to adopt this proposal.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>In Berlin, this really got framed as a pragmatic question:
          the current version negotiation has a lot of intolerance and
          so let’s work around that. So, understandably, this seemed
          like a “let’s adopt a hack forever” proposal. I think that
          framing is wrong. The intolerance situation is serious, but I
          think there’s also a strong argument that the current scheme
          isn’t very good.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>The current scheme is very simple. The client advertises a
          maximum version and the server selects based on that. This is
          the only piece of TLS negotiation which works this way.
          Elsewhere (extensions, cipher suites, signature algorithms),
          one side offers a list and the other side picks out of it. I
          think it’s clear now that strategy is more robust: every time
          we’ve bumped version numbers, we’ve had intolerance problems
          and this time is no exception (see below). By contrast, we
          regularly introduce new cipher suites, extensions, etc., and
          while we do see the occasional failure, they are much rarer
          and typically within the level of breakage that clients can
          tolerate and deal with by reaching out to affected servers.
          Moreover, lists lend themselves to future-proofing via
          draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a way the current scheme does
          not.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>An additional benefit is lists make it much easier to roll
          out prototype/draft versions. Currently, we are using a hack
          where the client offers {3, 4} but also includes a draft
          version number in an extension. This does work, but requires
          servers process that extension in perpetuity or at least until
          all draft version clients go away.  With a list, it’s trivial
          to offer a draft version by just including it. This is the
          strategy HTTP/2 used (via ALPN) and it worked well.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn’t be worth
          fixing version negotiation in 1.3 except for intolerance.
          Unfortunately, this fourth time, it’s the same story as
          before. A probe of Alexa top million sites with BoringSSL’s
          TLS 1.3 code (the Go version), shows 1.63% of TLS-capable
          hosts reject a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. Note these are top sites
          and traffic is top-heavy, so we can expect much higher
          usage-weighted numbers. Qualys SSL Pulse reports 3.6%:</div>
        <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__blog.qualys.com_ssllabs_2016_08_02_tls-2Dversion-2Dintolerance-2Din-2Dssl-2Dpulse&amp;d=DQMFaQ&amp;c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&amp;r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&amp;m=aarB3I3r_Kn7FPWJq9AJd1ivPK1niUnkupGujPoRKpk&amp;s=6ziW12EZ1iGkM2bN_6ooRy7CV9SPp0CVFv4hX7bpYSw&amp;e=">https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-intolerance-in-ssl-pulse</a></div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>(Ignore the drop in the graph. We’ve long fixed the
          ClientHello record-layer at {3, 1}. TLS 1.3 only codified
          existing practice here.) If instead we use a TLS 1.3
          ClientHello with version TLS 1.2, the breakage drops to
          0.017%. (Some of this is an NSS signature algorithms bug,
          fixed last year, which we hope to clear by deploying RSA-PSS
          in browsers early. The rest appears to be noise from transient
          errors which crop up in large tests.)</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>These numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as
          damage, which means that they (at least browsers) will be
          forced to do fallback. This represents a security risk (cf.
          POODLE) as well as hides serious interop problems. The
          situation is even worse for non-browser clients, which may be
          unable to deploy at all (Ubuntu 12.04, despite shipping an
          OpenSSL release with TLS 1.2, had to disable it on the client.</div>
        <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__bugs.launchpad.net_ubuntu_-2Bsource_openssl_-2Bbug_1256576_comments_4&amp;d=DQMFaQ&amp;c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&amp;r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&amp;m=aarB3I3r_Kn7FPWJq9AJd1ivPK1niUnkupGujPoRKpk&amp;s=tBAuUGE2Q0PBvobD02Z-2PhxBDD1DP7dGKm1M6YxIQM&amp;e=">https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments/4</a>
          )</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>The major arguments against this change seem to be:</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>1. It’s inelegant to have two mechanisms.</div>
        <div>2. We should fix broken servers</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>The first is true, but as with other changes, EKR’s PR
          replaces the 1.2 mechanism with one for 1.3, so we’ll just
          have one going forward. The second would be nice, but as a
          practical matter, I spend a lot of time trying to get those
          servers fixed and it doesn’t work very well here. Better is
          simply to move to a situation where once those servers upgrade
          they will be correctly behaving forever (instead of just
          handling 1.3 correctly and breaking with 1.4). This change
          does that.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Thanks,</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>David</div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 12:30:08 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 12:04 PM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> The major arguments against this change seem to be:
>
> 1. It=E2=80=99s inelegant to have two mechanisms.
> 2. We should fix broken servers
>

There's also:

3. Implementors will find a way to screw this up, too.

But if you follow through with your plan to have Chrome randomly add a
really high version to the list to smoke out servers that fail when they
see unsupported versions, it's plausible version intolerance could be in
the noise next time around.

If you time-limit that behavior for a particular version of Chrome (say, to
a few months), you could even have it randomly add the next version or
current version + 2 to the list to detect and report on selective
next-version intolerance. I'd say this kind of failure mode is unlikely,
but... Murphy's Law.

Kyle

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
hu, Sep 8, 2016 at 12:04 PM, David Benjamin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</=
a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><=
div>The major arguments against this change seem to be:<div><br></div><div>=
1. It=E2=80=99s inelegant to have two mechanisms.</div><div>2. We should fi=
x broken servers=C2=A0</div></div></blockquote><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote">There&#39;s also:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br>3. Imple=
mentors will find a way to screw this up, too.<br><br></div><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">But if you follow through with your plan to have Chrome randoml=
y add a really high version to the list to smoke out servers that fail when=
 they see unsupported versions, it&#39;s plausible version intolerance coul=
d be in the noise next time around.<br><br>If you time-limit that behavior =
for a particular version of Chrome (say, to a few months), you could even h=
ave it randomly add the next version or current version + 2 to the list to =
detect and report on selective next-version intolerance. I&#39;d say this k=
ind of failure mode is unlikely, but... Murphy&#39;s Law.<br><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">Kyle<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><=
/div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On 09/09/2016 03:19 PM, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 02:50:59PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> I made a few notes on the pull request.  Generally, I support the
>> change, but I get the sense that it may aid the cryptographic properties
>> if we keep the resumption_context and do not overload the resumption_psk
>> as much.
> One problem with this is that authentication_methods can include
> nontrivial methods even for "static" PSKs, and if server takes such
> method, you have an attack unless you bind the PSK secret used. And
> "static" PSKs don't have resumption_context.

Agreed.

>  
> And I would expect that someone will be crazy enough to try to
> provision "static" PSK with the information required to perform
> 0-RTT (ALPN (or indication there is none) and associated cipher)...

Wasn't Hannes just asking about that? ;)

>> I have a slight (i.e., unjustified) preference for doing
>> ClientHello-with-block-of-zeros rather than prefix-of-ClientHello.  (Is
>> there a reason to require this extension to be the last one with
>> block-of-zeros?  Clearly there is for prefix-of-ClientHello.)
> What about the case where client tries DHE-PSK and gets attempt
> rejected because of missing group (or because address verification)?
> 0-RTT is gone yes, but the PSK attempt isn't.
>
> What happens to the hash in this case?
>
>

I feel like I must be missing something, but I don't really understand
the question.  (Sadly, waiting in the hope that someone else did
understand and would respond didn't work.)  The 0-RTT failed, so the
full handshake will have an actual Finished message, with a different
hash calculated (including over the "hello_finished" extension).  The
most plausible way I could interpret the question seems to be asking
about the lack of Hash(resumption_context) in the 1-RTT Finished, but
the security properties of that should be the same as for the
hello_finished, so I'm still puzzled.

Sorry for being dense...

-Ben

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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 09/09/2016 03:19 PM, Ilari Liusvaara
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:20160909201903.t726g3tywns2pfuq@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 02:50:59PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">I made a few notes on the pull request.  Generally, I support the
change, but I get the sense that it may aid the cryptographic properties
if we keep the resumption_context and do not overload the resumption_psk
as much.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
One problem with this is that authentication_methods can include
nontrivial methods even for "static" PSKs, and if server takes such
method, you have an attack unless you bind the PSK secret used. And
"static" PSKs don't have resumption_context.
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Agreed.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:20160909201903.t726g3tywns2pfuq@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap=""> 
And I would expect that someone will be crazy enough to try to
provision "static" PSK with the information required to perform
0-RTT (ALPN (or indication there is none) and associated cipher)...
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Wasn't Hannes just asking about that? ;)<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:20160909201903.t726g3tywns2pfuq@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">I have a slight (i.e., unjustified) preference for doing
ClientHello-with-block-of-zeros rather than prefix-of-ClientHello.  (Is
there a reason to require this extension to be the last one with
block-of-zeros?  Clearly there is for prefix-of-ClientHello.)
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
What about the case where client tries DHE-PSK and gets attempt
rejected because of missing group (or because address verification)?
0-RTT is gone yes, but the PSK attempt isn't.

What happens to the hash in this case?


</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I feel like I must be missing something, but I don't really
    understand the question.Â  (Sadly, waiting in the hope that someone
    else did understand and would respond didn't work.)Â  The 0-RTT
    failed, so the full handshake will have an actual Finished message,
    with a different hash calculated (including over the
    "hello_finished" extension).Â  The most plausible way I could
    interpret the question seems to be asking about the lack of
    Hash(resumption_context) in the 1-RTT Finished, but the security
    properties of that should be the same as for the hello_finished, so
    I'm still puzzled.<br>
    <br>
    Sorry for being dense...<br>
    <br>
    -Ben<br>
  </body>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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All,

There appears to be an emerging consensus here to adopt the change =
proposed by this PR.  Please indicate whether you are unwilling (and =
why) to accept this change by September 16th.

J&S

> On Sep 08, 2016, at 12:04, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> =
wrote:
>=20
> Hi folks,
>=20
> I=E2=80=99d like to revisit the question of version negotiation.
>=20
> EKR wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an extension:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632
>=20
> I would like us to adopt this proposal.
>=20
> In Berlin, this really got framed as a pragmatic question: the current =
version negotiation has a lot of intolerance and so let=E2=80=99s work =
around that. So, understandably, this seemed like a =E2=80=9Clet=E2=80=99s=
 adopt a hack forever=E2=80=9D proposal. I think that framing is wrong. =
The intolerance situation is serious, but I think there=E2=80=99s also a =
strong argument that the current scheme isn=E2=80=99t very good.
>=20
> The current scheme is very simple. The client advertises a maximum =
version and the server selects based on that. This is the only piece of =
TLS negotiation which works this way. Elsewhere (extensions, cipher =
suites, signature algorithms), one side offers a list and the other side =
picks out of it. I think it=E2=80=99s clear now that strategy is more =
robust: every time we=E2=80=99ve bumped version numbers, we=E2=80=99ve =
had intolerance problems and this time is no exception (see below). By =
contrast, we regularly introduce new cipher suites, extensions, etc., =
and while we do see the occasional failure, they are much rarer and =
typically within the level of breakage that clients can tolerate and =
deal with by reaching out to affected servers. Moreover, lists lend =
themselves to future-proofing via draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a way =
the current scheme does not.
>=20
> An additional benefit is lists make it much easier to roll out =
prototype/draft versions. Currently, we are using a hack where the =
client offers {3, 4} but also includes a draft version number in an =
extension. This does work, but requires servers process that extension =
in perpetuity or at least until all draft version clients go away.  With =
a list, it=E2=80=99s trivial to offer a draft version by just including =
it. This is the strategy HTTP/2 used (via ALPN) and it worked well.
>=20
> Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn=E2=80=99t be worth fixing =
version negotiation in 1.3 except for intolerance. Unfortunately, this =
fourth time, it=E2=80=99s the same story as before. A probe of Alexa top =
million sites with BoringSSL=E2=80=99s TLS 1.3 code (the Go version), =
shows 1.63% of TLS-capable hosts reject a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. Note =
these are top sites and traffic is top-heavy, so we can expect much =
higher usage-weighted numbers. Qualys SSL Pulse reports 3.6%:
> =
https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-intolerance-in-ssl-=
pulse
>=20
> (Ignore the drop in the graph. We=E2=80=99ve long fixed the =
ClientHello record-layer at {3, 1}. TLS 1.3 only codified existing =
practice here.) If instead we use a TLS 1.3 ClientHello with version TLS =
1.2, the breakage drops to 0.017%. (Some of this is an NSS signature =
algorithms bug, fixed last year, which we hope to clear by deploying =
RSA-PSS in browsers early. The rest appears to be noise from transient =
errors which crop up in large tests.)
>=20
> These numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as damage, =
which means that they (at least browsers) will be forced to do fallback. =
This represents a security risk (cf. POODLE) as well as hides serious =
interop problems. The situation is even worse for non-browser clients, =
which may be unable to deploy at all (Ubuntu 12.04, despite shipping an =
OpenSSL release with TLS 1.2, had to disable it on the client.
> =
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments/4 =
)
>=20
> The major arguments against this change seem to be:
>=20
> 1. It=E2=80=99s inelegant to have two mechanisms.
> 2. We should fix broken servers
>=20
> The first is true, but as with other changes, EKR=E2=80=99s PR =
replaces the 1.2 mechanism with one for 1.3, so we=E2=80=99ll just have =
one going forward. The second would be nice, but as a practical matter, =
I spend a lot of time trying to get those servers fixed and it doesn=E2=80=
=99t work very well here. Better is simply to move to a situation where =
once those servers upgrade they will be correctly behaving forever =
(instead of just handling 1.3 correctly and breaking with 1.4). This =
change does that.
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> David
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Tue Sep 13 10:20:00 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #604 Change "supported_groups" to "supported_kems"
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There appears to be no consensus to adopt the change proposed by this =
PR.

The small condolence here is that the name+semantics for this extension =
has been changed once before and if the extension really needs to be =
renamed in 5-7 years we=E2=80=99ve got precedence for doing so.

spt

> On Aug 29, 2016, at 15:52, Zhenfei Zhang =
<zzhang@securityinnovation.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi list,
>=20
>=20
>=20
> I have created a pull request
>=20
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/604
>=20
>=20
>=20
> I would like to suggest that we change the terminology "NamedGroup" to =
"KeyExchangeMethod".
>=20
>=20
>=20
> In [1], it is suggested that we redefine the syntax, which leads to =
the separation of public key crypto=20
>=20
> and symmetric crypto during a handshake. Because of this separation, =
new terminology was defined
>=20
> for key exchange algorithms and authentication algorithms for public =
key crypto in the key exchange=20
>=20
> extension. "NamedGroup" was used to refer the underlying key exchange =
parameters, which comes=20
>=20
> from the "Supported Elliptic Curves" in previous versions.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> The use of "NamedGroup" implicitly requests the key exchange algorithm =
to be Deffie-Hellman type.=20
>=20
> While it is safe for now, it would be nice to have some crypto =
agility, and future proof. It would make=20
>=20
> the transition to other key exchange primitives (such as lattice based =
key exchange) or methods=20
>=20
> (such as key encapsulation mechanism) easier in the future, if we do =
not restrict the key exchange
>=20
> by certain "Group".
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Knowing that NIST has planned to standardize quantum-safe cryptography =
within 7 years of time=20
>=20
> (which can and should be accelerated), and those algorithms cannot be =
described in terms of "group",
>=20
> the current terminology will due for a redesign by then. So I would =
suggest to change the=20
>=20
> "NamedGroup" now rather than later.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Overall, this will have the following impact
>=20
>=20
>=20
> 1. HelloRetryRequest
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Change HelloRetryRequest structure to
>=20
>=20
>=20
> struct {
>=20
> ProtocolVersion server_version;
>=20
> KeyExchangeMethod selected_kem;
>=20
> Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>=20
> } HelloRetryRequest;
>=20
>=20
>=20
> 2. Negotiated Groups
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Throughout, change "supported_groups" to "supported_kems"; change =
"NamedGroupList" to=20
> "KeyExchangeMethodList"; change "named_group_list" to "kem_list"; =
change NamedGroup to
>=20
> KeyExchangeMethod
>=20
>=20
>=20
> 3. Key Share:
>=20
> Change KeyShareEntry structure to
>=20
>=20
>=20
> struct {
>=20
> KeyExchangeMethod kem;
>=20
> opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
>=20
> } KeyShareEntry;
>=20
>=20
> [1] =
https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec/blob/15126cf5a08c445aeed97c0c25c4f10c2c1=
b8f26/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.md
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Thanks for your time.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Zhenfei Zhang
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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For the 16-bit fields, do we want to leave first-octet-zero values as IETF Consensus and leave 1-254 for Specification Required?

I suspect we'll need to wordsmith the text for the "Recommended" field in the cipher suite registry some; Standards-Track may or may not quite match up exactly with what we want (though it seems like it would be pretty good), but I would maybe say "for cipher suites marked 'No', it is possible that the cryptographic properties are not reviewed, and they may be bad or good".

Should the session_ticket extension also be updated to point to this document (as was done for the new_session_ticket handshake message type)?

I guess the security considerations should probably mention that making it easier for "anyone" to get a codepoint assigned comes with a risk that people will assume that having a codepoint means it's secure.  The "Recommended" column attempts to address that, and software authors are encouraged to read the primary sources to determine the applicability of an entry to their software.



Some minor notes on snippets of the document follow.

The markdown-to-html conversion seems to have left long lines in sections 10 and 12; maybe there are some syntax errors around there?
(Also, "however the value is computed different" should be "differently".)

   o  Change the IANA registry policy [RFC5226 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5226>] for the TLS
      ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher Suite, and TLS
      ClientCertificateType Identifiers registries.  These more relaxes
      rules are more condusive to TBD.

"relaxed".  Huh, and thunderbird is also suggesting "conducive", that I missed.

The TBD seems to be "experimentation and test deployment of draft specifications".


   o  Add the designated expert intructions as a note to the TLS
      ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher Suite, and TLS
      ClientCertificateType Identifiers registries to inform IANA-
      registry-focused, non-RFC-reading what's expected from the
      registry.

"instructions"

The "non-RFC-reading" compound adjective doesn't have an associated
noun.  "Readers" could work, but since "reading" is right there, maybe
"viewers" is better.


   This document proposes no changes to the TLS Alert
   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13>], TLS ContentType [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13>], TLS
   HandshakeType, [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13>] and TLS Certificate Status Types
   [RFC6961 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961>]; Standards Action, for the 1st three, and IETF Review, for
   the last, are appropriate for these one-byte code points because of
   their scarcity.

I think "registries" is missing after the list.


In "The following extensions are only applicable to D/TLS protocol
vesions prior to 1.3: truncated_hmac, srp, encrypt_then_mac,
extended_master_secret, session_ticket, and renegotiation_info are not
applicable to TLS 1.3." (another long line), the "only applicable [...]
prior to 1.3" and "are not applicable to TLS 1.3" are redundant.  Also,
"versions" with an 'r'.

-Ben

On 09/07/2016 01:57 PM, Sean Turner wrote:
> Here is a draft that proposes changes to a number of TLS-related registries, e.g., adding notes to indicate orphaned extensions and registries, adding the missing no_application_protocol alert.  The motivation for this draft was to not have everything that needs to be fixed be done in the TLS1.3 draft.  Weâ€™re positive it needs review.
>
> A repo for the draft can be found at:
> https://github.com/seanturner/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates
> PRs welcome.
>
> spt
>
>> Begin forwarded message:
>>
>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
>> Date: September 07, 2016 at 14:10:25 EDT
>> To: "Joe Salowey" <joe@salowey.net>, "Sean Turner" <sean@sn3rd.com>, <none-chairs@ietf.org>, "Joseph A. Salowey" <joe@salowey.net>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Sean Turner and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name:		draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates
>> Revision:	00
>> Title:		D/TLS IANA Registry Updates
>> Document date:	2016-09-07
>> Group:		Individual Submission
>> Pages:		8
>> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates/
>> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>   This document changes the IANA registry policy for a number of D/TLS-
>>   related registries, renames some of the registries for consistency,
>>   and adds notes to many of the registries.  As a result, this document
>>   updates many RFCs (see updates header).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


--------------70B2623EE12ED1DCDC9690E6
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <pre class="newpage">For the 16-bit fields, do we want to leave first-octet-zero values as IETF Consensus and leave 1-254 for Specification Required?

I suspect we'll need to wordsmith the text for the "Recommended" field in the cipher suite registry some; Standards-Track may or may not quite match up exactly with what we want (though it seems like it would be pretty good), but I would maybe say "for cipher suites marked 'No', it is possible that the cryptographic properties are not reviewed, and they may be bad or good".

Should the session_ticket extension also be updated to point to this document (as was done for the new_session_ticket handshake message type)?

I guess the security considerations should probably mention that making it easier for "anyone" to get a codepoint assigned comes with a risk that people will assume that having a codepoint means it's secure.  The "Recommended" column attempts to address that, and software authors are encouraged to read the primary sources to determine the applicability of an entry to their software.



Some minor notes on snippets of the document follow.

The markdown-to-html conversion seems to have left long lines in sections 10 and 12; maybe there are some syntax errors around there?
(Also, "however the value is computed different" should be "differently".)

   o  Change the IANA registry policy [<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5226" title="&quot;Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs&quot;">RFC5226</a>] for the TLS
      ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher Suite, and TLS
      ClientCertificateType Identifiers registries.  These more relaxes
      rules are more condusive to TBD.

"relaxed".  Huh, and thunderbird is also suggesting "conducive", that I missed.

The TBD seems to be "experimentation and test deployment of draft specifications".
</pre>
    <br>
    <pre class="newpage">   o  Add the designated expert intructions as a note to the TLS
      ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher Suite, and TLS
      ClientCertificateType Identifiers registries to inform IANA-
      registry-focused, non-RFC-reading what's expected from the
      registry.
</pre>
    "instructions"<br>
    <br>
    The "non-RFC-reading" compound adjective doesn't have an associated
    noun.Â  "Readers" could work, but since "reading" is right there,
    maybe "viewers" is better.<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <pre class="newpage">   This document proposes no changes to the TLS Alert
   [<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13">I-D.ietf-tls-tls13</a>], TLS ContentType [<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13">I-D.ietf-tls-tls13</a>], TLS
   HandshakeType, [<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13">I-D.ietf-tls-tls13</a>] and TLS Certificate Status Types
   [<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension&quot;">RFC6961</a>]; Standards Action, for the 1st three, and IETF Review, for
   the last, are appropriate for these one-byte code points because of
   their scarcity.

</pre>
    I think "registries" is missing after the list.<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    In "The following extensions are only applicable to D/TLS protocol
    vesions prior to 1.3: truncated_hmac, srp, encrypt_then_mac,
    extended_master_secret, session_ticket, and renegotiation_info are
    not applicable to TLS 1.3." (another long line), the "only
    applicable [...] prior to 1.3" and "are not applicable to TLS 1.3"
    are redundant.Â  Also, "versions" with an 'r'.<br>
    <br>
    -Ben<br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 09/07/2016 01:57 PM, Sean Turner
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:F8C75EF0-B18A-46FC-BC48-5BF9055500B1@sn3rd.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">Here is a draft that proposes changes to a number of TLS-related registries, e.g., adding notes to indicate orphaned extensions and registries, adding the missing no_application_protocol alert.  The motivation for this draft was to not have everything that needs to be fixed be done in the TLS1.3 draft.  Weâ€™re positive it needs review.

A repo for the draft can be found at:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://github.com/seanturner/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates">https://github.com/seanturner/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates</a>
PRs welcome.

spt

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">Begin forwarded message:

From: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
Date: September 07, 2016 at 14:10:25 EDT
To: "Joe Salowey" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:joe@salowey.net">&lt;joe@salowey.net&gt;</a>, "Sean Turner" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:sean@sn3rd.com">&lt;sean@sn3rd.com&gt;</a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:none-chairs@ietf.org">&lt;none-chairs@ietf.org&gt;</a>, "Joseph A. Salowey" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:joe@salowey.net">&lt;joe@salowey.net&gt;</a>


A new version of I-D, draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Sean Turner and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates
Revision:	00
Title:		D/TLS IANA Registry Updates
Document date:	2016-09-07
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		8
URL:            <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt">https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00.txt</a>
Status:         <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates/</a>
Htmlized:       <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00</a>


Abstract:
  This document changes the IANA registry policy for a number of D/TLS-
  related registries, renames some of the registries for consistency,
  and adds notes to many of the registries.  As a result, this document
  updates many RFCs (see updates header).




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 14:27:09 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #604 Change "supported_groups" to "supported_kems"
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I'd like to just check and see if there are any objections to this PR.
There seems no reason to bake a particular cryptographic family into our
terminology. This is a low-cost change that will save us from looking silly
in a few years time.

Cheers,

William

On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 1:19 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> There appears to be no consensus to adopt the change proposed by this PR.
>
> The small condolence here is that the name+semantics for this extension
> has been changed once before and if the extension really needs to be
> renamed in 5-7 years we=E2=80=99ve got precedence for doing so.
>
> spt
>
> > On Aug 29, 2016, at 15:52, Zhenfei Zhang <zzhang@securityinnovation.com=
>
> wrote:
> >
> > Hi list,
> >
> >
> >
> > I have created a pull request
> >
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/604
> >
> >
> >
> > I would like to suggest that we change the terminology "NamedGroup" to
> "KeyExchangeMethod".
> >
> >
> >
> > In [1], it is suggested that we redefine the syntax, which leads to the
> separation of public key crypto
> >
> > and symmetric crypto during a handshake. Because of this separation, ne=
w
> terminology was defined
> >
> > for key exchange algorithms and authentication algorithms for public ke=
y
> crypto in the key exchange
> >
> > extension. "NamedGroup" was used to refer the underlying key exchange
> parameters, which comes
> >
> > from the "Supported Elliptic Curves" in previous versions.
> >
> >
> >
> > The use of "NamedGroup" implicitly requests the key exchange algorithm
> to be Deffie-Hellman type.
> >
> > While it is safe for now, it would be nice to have some crypto agility,
> and future proof. It would make
> >
> > the transition to other key exchange primitives (such as lattice based
> key exchange) or methods
> >
> > (such as key encapsulation mechanism) easier in the future, if we do no=
t
> restrict the key exchange
> >
> > by certain "Group".
> >
> >
> >
> > Knowing that NIST has planned to standardize quantum-safe cryptography
> within 7 years of time
> >
> > (which can and should be accelerated), and those algorithms cannot be
> described in terms of "group",
> >
> > the current terminology will due for a redesign by then. So I would
> suggest to change the
> >
> > "NamedGroup" now rather than later.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Overall, this will have the following impact
> >
> >
> >
> > 1. HelloRetryRequest
> >
> >
> >
> > Change HelloRetryRequest structure to
> >
> >
> >
> > struct {
> >
> > ProtocolVersion server_version;
> >
> > KeyExchangeMethod selected_kem;
> >
> > Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
> >
> > } HelloRetryRequest;
> >
> >
> >
> > 2. Negotiated Groups
> >
> >
> >
> > Throughout, change "supported_groups" to "supported_kems"; change
> "NamedGroupList" to
> > "KeyExchangeMethodList"; change "named_group_list" to "kem_list"; chang=
e
> NamedGroup to
> >
> > KeyExchangeMethod
> >
> >
> >
> > 3. Key Share:
> >
> > Change KeyShareEntry structure to
> >
> >
> >
> > struct {
> >
> > KeyExchangeMethod kem;
> >
> > opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
> >
> > } KeyShareEntry;
> >
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec/blob/
> 15126cf5a08c445aeed97c0c25c4f10c2c1b8f26/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.md
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks for your time.
> >
> >
> >
> > Zhenfei Zhang
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a113dc21ad38712053c67c25a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to just check and see if there are any object=
ions to this PR. There seems no reason to bake a particular cryptographic f=
amily into our terminology. This is a low-cost change that will save us fro=
m looking silly in a few years time.<div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div><=
br></div><div>William</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 1:19 PM, Sean Turner <span dir=3D"=
ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com" target=3D"_blank">sean@sn3rd.com=
</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">There appears to b=
e no consensus to adopt the change proposed by this PR.<br>
<br>
The small condolence here is that the name+semantics for this extension has=
 been changed once before and if the extension really needs to be renamed i=
n 5-7 years we=E2=80=99ve got precedence for doing so.<br>
<br>
spt<br>
<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; On Aug 29, 2016, at 15:52, Zhenfei Zhang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:zzhang@=
securityinnovation.com">zzhang@securityinnovation.com</a><wbr>&gt; wrote:<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi list,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I have created a pull request<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/604" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/604</=
a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I would like to suggest that we change the terminology &quot;NamedGrou=
p&quot; to &quot;KeyExchangeMethod&quot;.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; In [1], it is suggested that we redefine the syntax, which leads to th=
e separation of public key crypto<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; and symmetric crypto during a handshake. Because of this separation, n=
ew terminology was defined<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; for key exchange algorithms and authentication algorithms for public k=
ey crypto in the key exchange<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; extension. &quot;NamedGroup&quot; was used to refer the underlying key=
 exchange parameters, which comes<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; from the &quot;Supported Elliptic Curves&quot; in previous versions.<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The use of &quot;NamedGroup&quot; implicitly requests the key exchange=
 algorithm to be Deffie-Hellman type.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; While it is safe for now, it would be nice to have some crypto agility=
, and future proof. It would make<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; the transition to other key exchange primitives (such as lattice based=
 key exchange) or methods<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (such as key encapsulation mechanism) easier in the future, if we do n=
ot restrict the key exchange<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; by certain &quot;Group&quot;.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Knowing that NIST has planned to standardize quantum-safe cryptography=
 within 7 years of time<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (which can and should be accelerated), and those algorithms cannot be =
described in terms of &quot;group&quot;,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; the current terminology will due for a redesign by then. So I would su=
ggest to change the<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &quot;NamedGroup&quot; now rather than later.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Overall, this will have the following impact<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1. HelloRetryRequest<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Change HelloRetryRequest structure to<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; struct {<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ProtocolVersion server_version;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; KeyExchangeMethod selected_kem;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Extension extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; } HelloRetryRequest;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2. Negotiated Groups<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Throughout, change &quot;supported_groups&quot; to &quot;supported_kem=
s&quot;; change &quot;NamedGroupList&quot; to<br>
&gt; &quot;KeyExchangeMethodList&quot;; change &quot;named_group_list&quot;=
 to &quot;kem_list&quot;; change NamedGroup to<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; KeyExchangeMethod<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 3. Key Share:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Change KeyShareEntry structure to<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; struct {<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; KeyExchangeMethod kem;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; opaque key_exchange&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; } KeyShareEntry;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec/blob/15126cf5a08c445a=
eed97c0c25c4f10c2c1b8f26/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.md" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://github.com/ekr/tls13-<wbr>spec/blob/<wbr>15126cf5a08c44=
5aeed97c0c25c4f1<wbr>0c2c1b8f26/draft-ietf-tls-<wbr>tls13.md</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks for your time.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Zhenfei Zhang<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113dc21ad38712053c67c25a--


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Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 22:15:10 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:04:40PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> 
> 
> On 09/09/2016 03:19 PM, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 02:50:59PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> 
> >> I have a slight (i.e., unjustified) preference for doing
> >> ClientHello-with-block-of-zeros rather than prefix-of-ClientHello.  (Is
> >> there a reason to require this extension to be the last one with
> >> block-of-zeros?  Clearly there is for prefix-of-ClientHello.)
> > What about the case where client tries DHE-PSK and gets attempt
> > rejected because of missing group (or because address verification)?
> > 0-RTT is gone yes, but the PSK attempt isn't.
> >
> > What happens to the hash in this case?
> >
> >
> 
> I feel like I must be missing something, but I don't really understand
> the question.  (Sadly, waiting in the hope that someone else did
> understand and would respond didn't work.)  The 0-RTT failed, so the
> full handshake will have an actual Finished message, with a different
> hash calculated (including over the "hello_finished" extension).  The
> most plausible way I could interpret the question seems to be asking
> about the lack of Hash(resumption_context) in the 1-RTT Finished, but
> the security properties of that should be the same as for the
> hello_finished, so I'm still puzzled.
> 
> Sorry for being dense...

I mean the following case (perhaps bit misconfigured server):

Client: ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,...,finished=zot)
Server: HelloRetryRequest(group=24)
Client: ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,24:quux,...,finished=???)


What is the finished data calculated over in the second case?


-Ilari


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From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 15:28:49 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #604 Change "supported_groups" to "supported_kems"
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To be honest, the purist in me likes the general idea here, though I think
I prefer "kex" as I'm used to that with SSH.

Then again, that isn't even quite correct, as the most popular mechanism is
DH, which is key agreement based on the exchange of inputs to a formula: no
keys are actually exchanged.

I fear we're bike shedding with this proposal. Across all of computing,
there are plenty of mechanisms that appear to be misnamed for the same
reason: unforeseen but reasonable extension beyond their
originally-intended applications.

The actual name in TLS is "10", so as long as we all agree on that and
understand the history behind "supported_groups", I'm not sure it matters.

Kyle

On Sep 13, 2016 2:27 PM, "William Whyte" <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
wrote:

I'd like to just check and see if there are any objections to this PR.
There seems no reason to bake a particular cryptographic family into our
terminology. This is a low-cost change that will save us from looking silly
in a few years time.

Cheers,

William

On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 1:19 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> There appears to be no consensus to adopt the change proposed by this PR.
>
> The small condolence here is that the name+semantics for this extension
> has been changed once before and if the extension really needs to be
> renamed in 5-7 years we=E2=80=99ve got precedence for doing so.
>
> spt
>
> > On Aug 29, 2016, at 15:52, Zhenfei Zhang <zzhang@securityinnovation.com=
>
> wrote:
> >
> > Hi list,
> >
> >
> >
> > I have created a pull request
> >
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/604
> >
> >
> >
> > I would like to suggest that we change the terminology "NamedGroup" to
> "KeyExchangeMethod".
> >
> >
> >
> > In [1], it is suggested that we redefine the syntax, which leads to the
> separation of public key crypto
> >
> > and symmetric crypto during a handshake. Because of this separation, ne=
w
> terminology was defined
> >
> > for key exchange algorithms and authentication algorithms for public ke=
y
> crypto in the key exchange
> >
> > extension. "NamedGroup" was used to refer the underlying key exchange
> parameters, which comes
> >
> > from the "Supported Elliptic Curves" in previous versions.
> >
> >
> >
> > The use of "NamedGroup" implicitly requests the key exchange algorithm
> to be Deffie-Hellman type.
> >
> > While it is safe for now, it would be nice to have some crypto agility,
> and future proof. It would make
> >
> > the transition to other key exchange primitives (such as lattice based
> key exchange) or methods
> >
> > (such as key encapsulation mechanism) easier in the future, if we do no=
t
> restrict the key exchange
> >
> > by certain "Group".
> >
> >
> >
> > Knowing that NIST has planned to standardize quantum-safe cryptography
> within 7 years of time
> >
> > (which can and should be accelerated), and those algorithms cannot be
> described in terms of "group",
> >
> > the current terminology will due for a redesign by then. So I would
> suggest to change the
> >
> > "NamedGroup" now rather than later.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Overall, this will have the following impact
> >
> >
> >
> > 1. HelloRetryRequest
> >
> >
> >
> > Change HelloRetryRequest structure to
> >
> >
> >
> > struct {
> >
> > ProtocolVersion server_version;
> >
> > KeyExchangeMethod selected_kem;
> >
> > Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
> >
> > } HelloRetryRequest;
> >
> >
> >
> > 2. Negotiated Groups
> >
> >
> >
> > Throughout, change "supported_groups" to "supported_kems"; change
> "NamedGroupList" to
> > "KeyExchangeMethodList"; change "named_group_list" to "kem_list"; chang=
e
> NamedGroup to
> >
> > KeyExchangeMethod
> >
> >
> >
> > 3. Key Share:
> >
> > Change KeyShareEntry structure to
> >
> >
> >
> > struct {
> >
> > KeyExchangeMethod kem;
> >
> > opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
> >
> > } KeyShareEntry;
> >
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec/blob/15126cf5a08c445aeed97
> c0c25c4f10c2c1b8f26/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.md
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks for your time.
> >
> >
> >
> > Zhenfei Zhang
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--001a1142d3704f83da053c689f43
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<p dir=3D"ltr">To be honest, the purist in me likes the general idea here, =
though I think I prefer &quot;kex&quot; as I&#39;m used to that with SSH.</=
p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Then again, that isn&#39;t even quite correct, as the most p=
opular mechanism is DH, which is key agreement based on the exchange of inp=
uts to a formula: no keys are actually exchanged.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">I fear we&#39;re bike shedding with this proposal. Across al=
l of computing, there are plenty of mechanisms that appear to be misnamed f=
or the same reason: unforeseen but reasonable extension beyond their origin=
ally-intended applications.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">The actual name in TLS is &quot;10&quot;, so as long as we a=
ll agree on that and understand the history behind &quot;supported_groups&q=
uot;, I&#39;m not sure it matters.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Kyle</p>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sep 13, 2016 2=
:27 PM, &quot;William Whyte&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wwhyte@securityinno=
vation.com">wwhyte@securityinnovation.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br type=3D"attribu=
tion"><blockquote class=3D"quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to just check =
and see if there are any objections to this PR. There seems no reason to ba=
ke a particular cryptographic family into our terminology. This is a low-co=
st change that will save us from looking silly in a few years time.<div><br=
></div><div>Cheers,</div><div><br></div><div>William</div></div><div class=
=3D"elided-text"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 1:19 PM, Sean Turner <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com" target=3D"_blank">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bord=
er-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">There appears to be no consensus t=
o adopt the change proposed by this PR.<br>
<br>
The small condolence here is that the name+semantics for this extension has=
 been changed once before and if the extension really needs to be renamed i=
n 5-7 years we=E2=80=99ve got precedence for doing so.<br>
<br>
spt<br>
<div><div><br>
&gt; On Aug 29, 2016, at 15:52, Zhenfei Zhang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:zzhang@=
securityinnovation.com" target=3D"_blank">zzhang@securityinnovation.com</a>=
<wbr>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi list,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I have created a pull request<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/604" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/604</=
a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I would like to suggest that we change the terminology &quot;NamedGrou=
p&quot; to &quot;KeyExchangeMethod&quot;.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; In [1], it is suggested that we redefine the syntax, which leads to th=
e separation of public key crypto<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; and symmetric crypto during a handshake. Because of this separation, n=
ew terminology was defined<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; for key exchange algorithms and authentication algorithms for public k=
ey crypto in the key exchange<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; extension. &quot;NamedGroup&quot; was used to refer the underlying key=
 exchange parameters, which comes<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; from the &quot;Supported Elliptic Curves&quot; in previous versions.<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The use of &quot;NamedGroup&quot; implicitly requests the key exchange=
 algorithm to be Deffie-Hellman type.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; While it is safe for now, it would be nice to have some crypto agility=
, and future proof. It would make<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; the transition to other key exchange primitives (such as lattice based=
 key exchange) or methods<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (such as key encapsulation mechanism) easier in the future, if we do n=
ot restrict the key exchange<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; by certain &quot;Group&quot;.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Knowing that NIST has planned to standardize quantum-safe cryptography=
 within 7 years of time<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (which can and should be accelerated), and those algorithms cannot be =
described in terms of &quot;group&quot;,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; the current terminology will due for a redesign by then. So I would su=
ggest to change the<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &quot;NamedGroup&quot; now rather than later.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Overall, this will have the following impact<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1. HelloRetryRequest<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Change HelloRetryRequest structure to<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; struct {<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ProtocolVersion server_version;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; KeyExchangeMethod selected_kem;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Extension extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; } HelloRetryRequest;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2. Negotiated Groups<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Throughout, change &quot;supported_groups&quot; to &quot;supported_kem=
s&quot;; change &quot;NamedGroupList&quot; to<br>
&gt; &quot;KeyExchangeMethodList&quot;; change &quot;named_group_list&quot;=
 to &quot;kem_list&quot;; change NamedGroup to<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; KeyExchangeMethod<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 3. Key Share:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Change KeyShareEntry structure to<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; struct {<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; KeyExchangeMethod kem;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; opaque key_exchange&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; } KeyShareEntry;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec/blob/15126cf5a08c445a=
eed97c0c25c4f10c2c1b8f26/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.md" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://github.com/ekr/tls13-s<wbr>pec/blob/15126cf5a08c445aeed=
97<wbr>c0c25c4f10c2c1b8f26/draft-<wbr>ietf-tls-tls13.md</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks for your time.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Zhenfei Zhang<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a1142d3704f83da053c689f43--


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:56:34 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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=46irst, I don't think that the argument that the current version scheme do=
esn't=20
lend itself to future-proofing is correct. Just as with GREASE, browsers ca=
n=20
send much higher version than they really support if they do that on a time=
=20
limited basis.

Second, while the "joint" which handles new extensions IDs doesn't seem to =
be=20
rusting, it's not the case with lists in particular extensions. SNI being t=
he=20
prime example where sending anything but a single host name value will most=
=20
likely lead to your client hello being either misinterpreted or rejected.

On Tuesday, 13 September 2016 13:18:34 CEST Sean Turner wrote:
> All,
>=20
> There appears to be an emerging consensus here to adopt the change propos=
ed
> by this PR.  Please indicate whether you are unwilling (and why) to accept
> this change by September 16th.
>=20
> J&S
>=20
> > On Sep 08, 2016, at 12:04, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
> >=20
> > Hi folks,
> >=20
> > I=E2=80=99d like to revisit the question of version negotiation.
> >=20
> > EKR wrote up some text for moving version negotiation to an extension:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/632
> >=20
> > I would like us to adopt this proposal.
> >=20
> > In Berlin, this really got framed as a pragmatic question: the current
> > version negotiation has a lot of intolerance and so let=E2=80=99s work =
around
> > that. So, understandably, this seemed like a =E2=80=9Clet=E2=80=99s ado=
pt a hack forever=E2=80=9D
> > proposal. I think that framing is wrong. The intolerance situation is
> > serious, but I think there=E2=80=99s also a strong argument that the cu=
rrent
> > scheme isn=E2=80=99t very good.
> >=20
> > The current scheme is very simple. The client advertises a maximum vers=
ion
> > and the server selects based on that. This is the only piece of TLS
> > negotiation which works this way. Elsewhere (extensions, cipher suites,
> > signature algorithms), one side offers a list and the other side picks
> > out of it. I think it=E2=80=99s clear now that strategy is more robust:=
 every
> > time we=E2=80=99ve bumped version numbers, we=E2=80=99ve had intoleranc=
e problems and
> > this time is no exception (see below). By contrast, we regularly
> > introduce new cipher suites, extensions, etc., and while we do see the
> > occasional failure, they are much rarer and typically within the level =
of
> > breakage that clients can tolerate and deal with by reaching out to
> > affected servers. Moreover, lists lend themselves to future-proofing via
> > draft-davidben-tls-grease-00 in a way the current scheme does not.
> >=20
> > An additional benefit is lists make it much easier to roll out
> > prototype/draft versions. Currently, we are using a hack where the clie=
nt
> > offers {3, 4} but also includes a draft version number in an extension.
> > This does work, but requires servers process that extension in perpetui=
ty
> > or at least until all draft version clients go away.  With a list, it=
=E2=80=99s
> > trivial to offer a draft version by just including it. This is the
> > strategy HTTP/2 used (via ALPN) and it worked well.
> >=20
> > Despite all of the above, it probably wouldn=E2=80=99t be worth fixing =
version
> > negotiation in 1.3 except for intolerance. Unfortunately, this fourth
> > time, it=E2=80=99s the same story as before. A probe of Alexa top milli=
on sites
> > with BoringSSL=E2=80=99s TLS 1.3 code (the Go version), shows 1.63% of
> > TLS-capable hosts reject a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. Note these are top sites
> > and traffic is top-heavy, so we can expect much higher usage-weighted
> > numbers. Qualys SSL Pulse reports 3.6%:
> > https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2016/08/02/tls-version-intolerance-in-s=
sl
> > -pulse
> >=20
> > (Ignore the drop in the graph. We=E2=80=99ve long fixed the ClientHello
> > record-layer at {3, 1}. TLS 1.3 only codified existing practice here.) =
If
> > instead we use a TLS 1.3 ClientHello with version TLS 1.2, the breakage
> > drops to 0.017%. (Some of this is an NSS signature algorithms bug, fixed
> > last year, which we hope to clear by deploying RSA-PSS in browsers earl=
y.
> > The rest appears to be noise from transient errors which crop up in lar=
ge
> > tests.)
> >=20
> > These numbers are *far* too high for clients to accept as damage, which
> > means that they (at least browsers) will be forced to do fallback. This
> > represents a security risk (cf. POODLE) as well as hides serious interop
> > problems. The situation is even worse for non-browser clients, which may
> > be unable to deploy at all (Ubuntu 12.04, despite shipping an OpenSSL
> > release with TLS 1.2, had to disable it on the client.
> > https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/1256576/comments=
/4
> > )
> >=20
> > The major arguments against this change seem to be:
> >=20
> > 1. It=E2=80=99s inelegant to have two mechanisms.
> > 2. We should fix broken servers
> >=20
> > The first is true, but as with other changes, EKR=E2=80=99s PR replaces=
 the 1.2
> > mechanism with one for 1.3, so we=E2=80=99ll just have one going forwar=
d. The
> > second would be nice, but as a practical matter, I spend a lot of time
> > trying to get those servers fixed and it doesn=E2=80=99t work very well=
 here.
> > Better is simply to move to a situation where once those servers upgrade
> > they will be correctly behaving forever (instead of just handling 1.3
> > correctly and breaking with 1.4). This change does that.
> >=20
> > Thanks,
> >=20
> > David
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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To: Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>, "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>The actual problem is the design flaw in TLS that availability of null=0A=
>compression is not implied, but rather given a seperate codepoint, and the=
=0A=
>server choosing null compression and continuing even when it is not=0A=
>explicitly asserted by the client, is a server silently making up for that=
=0A=
>design flaw in the TLS spec.=0A=
=0A=
Yup, and I'd say it's perfectly valid behaviour.  Compression is an optiona=
l=0A=
extra, but you need to explicitly specify that you don't want it, something=
=0A=
that's popular in the PKI world where you have a supposedly optional=0A=
capability that isn't actually optional so you need to fill it with a dummy=
=0A=
value to indicate that you don't care about it.=0A=
=0A=
>Up to TLSv1.2, TLS extensions were purely optional, so an implementation t=
hat=0A=
>unconditionally ignores everything following compression methods is at lea=
st=0A=
>fully conforming to SSLv3, TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.=0A=
>=0A=
>For an TLS implementation that parses TLS extensions, the behaviour of wha=
t=0A=
>to do about trailing garbage is a different matter.  Personally I prefer=
=0A=
>aborting in case of garbage trailing TLS extensions.=0A=
=0A=
My code checks for extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily be=
=0A=
persuaded that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what earlier=
=0A=
versions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some fut=
ure=0A=
RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on finding more data m=
ay=0A=
be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see why it would be a bad thing.=0A=
=0A=
>What the server does in presence of multiple TLS extensions of the same ty=
pe=0A=
>is implementation defined.  I think it would be extremely reasonable for a=
=0A=
>server to perform a simple plausibility check on decode whether it is=0A=
>decoding the same TLS extension more than once, and then abort with a=0A=
>decode_error alert, in order to have ambiguities caught early. Recognizing=
=0A=
>duplicate TLS extensions that the server does not support/implement does n=
ot=0A=
>(yet) create ambiguities (for that server) and requires more complex code,=
 so=0A=
>I would not implement that check.=0A=
=0A=
+1.  Remembering that you've already done a known extension is one thing, b=
ut=0A=
having to track a potentially arbitrary number of extensions that you don't=
=0A=
know what to do with anyway doesn't seem worthwhile.  And then there's the=
=0A=
same problem as with ignoring extra data at the end of the hello, at some=
=0A=
point a future RFC may define an extension where having duplicate copies ma=
kes=0A=
sense or is even required for things to work.  So you don't really gain=0A=
anything by ignoring duplicate unknown extensions, and will potentially bre=
ak=0A=
things in the future if you do reject them.=0A=
=0A=
Having said that, some extensions are purely signalling extensions, like EM=
S=0A=
and EtM.  I'm not sure if there's any problem with accepting doubles of tho=
se,=0A=
it could just be the other side being emphatic.  Consider how you'd need to=
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report this to the user, "shut down the TLS connection because I saw two=0A=
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t a=0A=
user who sees that would think of the anal-retentive &^@#* who added specia=
l=0A=
code to the handshake in order to reject it if this condition is encountere=
d.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 15:35:16 +0200
From: "Andreas Walz" <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>
To: <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>,<hkario@redhat.com>
References: <57D2E218020000AC0011B17E@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de>, <20160909152901.9008C1A552@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <1473853106532.3256@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Hi,

>>> Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> 09/12/16 6:56 PM >>>
> are you aware of the tlsfuzzer framework?
> https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer

@Hubert Kario: Thanks for pointing me to tlsfuzzer. I had a look at the =
repository before and I skimmed through the code. However, I didn't run =
the code and I don't know details about the way it is generating input. Is =
there some paper or presentation about it?=20

>>> Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> 09/14/16 1:39 PM >>>
> My code checks for extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily =
be
> persuaded that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what =
earlier
> versions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some =
future
> RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on finding more =
data may
> be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see why it would be a bad thing.

@Peter Gutmann: Thanks for your take on that. Actually, and I might easily =
be missing something here, I do see some issues with adding new fields to =
the ClientHello in the future (i.e. following the "client_hello_extension_l=
ist"). As far as I can see, there is no way within a ClientHello to convey =
some kind of a version of the ClientHello format itself (as the ClientHello=
's version field is just indicating the highest version the client =
supports). That is, the only mechanism I see here is the same as the one =
that allowed to add extensions to a ClientHello message with RFC3546. =
However, that door has explicitly been closed therein in section 2.1 (as =
Hubert Kario pointed out)

    A server that supports the extensions mechanism MUST accept only
    client hello messages in either the original or extended ClientHello
    format, and (as for all other messages) MUST check that the amount of
    data in the message precisely matches one of these formats; if not
    then it MUST send a fatal "decode_error" alert.  This overrides the
    "Forward compatibility note" in [TLS].

A similar statement is given in RFC5246, section 7.4.1.2.:

    A server MUST accept ClientHello
    messages both with and without the extensions field, and (as for all
    other messages) it MUST check that the amount of data in the message
    precisely matches one of these formats; if not, then it MUST send a
    fatal "decode_error" alert.

Thus, to my understanding, any new field in the ClientHello would =
automatically break backward compatibility (at least with older compliant =
servers or unless everyone explicitly skips a MUST check in the interest =
of forward compatibility).

___________________________________

Andreas Walz
Research Engineer
Institute of reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics =
(ivESK)
Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany





>>> Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> 09/14/16 1:39 PM >>>
Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:

>The actual problem is the design flaw in TLS that availability of null
>compression is not implied, but rather given a seperate codepoint, and =
the
>server choosing null compression and continuing even when it is not
>explicitly asserted by the client, is a server silently making up for =
that
>design flaw in the TLS spec.

Yup, and I'd say it's perfectly valid behaviour.  Compression is an =
optional
extra, but you need to explicitly specify that you don't want it, =
something
that's popular in the PKI world where you have a supposedly optional
capability that isn't actually optional so you need to fill it with a =
dummy
value to indicate that you don't care about it.

>Up to TLSv1.2, TLS extensions were purely optional, so an implementation =
that
>unconditionally ignores everything following compression methods is at =
least
>fully conforming to SSLv3, TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.
>
>For an TLS implementation that parses TLS extensions, the behaviour of =
what
>to do about trailing garbage is a different matter.  Personally I prefer
>aborting in case of garbage trailing TLS extensions.

My code checks for extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily =
be
persuaded that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what earlier
versions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some =
future
RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on finding more data =
may
be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see why it would be a bad thing.

>What the server does in presence of multiple TLS extensions of the same =
type
>is implementation defined.  I think it would be extremely reasonable for =
a
>server to perform a simple plausibility check on decode whether it is
>decoding the same TLS extension more than once, and then abort with a
>decode_error alert, in order to have ambiguities caught early. Recognizing=

>duplicate TLS extensions that the server does not support/implement does =
not
>(yet) create ambiguities (for that server) and requires more complex =
code, so
>I would not implement that check.

+1.  Remembering that you've already done a known extension is one thing, =
but
having to track a potentially arbitrary number of extensions that you =
don't
know what to do with anyway doesn't seem worthwhile.  And then there's the
same problem as with ignoring extra data at the end of the hello, at some
point a future RFC may define an extension where having duplicate copies =
makes
sense or is even required for things to work.  So you don't really gain
anything by ignoring duplicate unknown extensions, and will potentially =
break
things in the future if you do reject them.

Having said that, some extensions are purely signalling extensions, like =
EMS
and EtM.  I'm not sure if there's any problem with accepting doubles of =
those,
it could just be the other side being emphatic.  Consider how you'd need =
to
report this to the user, "shut down the TLS connection because I saw two
copies of some extension you've never heard of before", you can imagine =
what a
user who sees that would think of the anal-retentive &^@#* who added =
special
code to the handshake in order to reject it if this condition is encountere=
d.

Peter.


--=__PartB0863304.3__=
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8"><META name=3D"Author" content=3D"GroupWise WebAccess"><sty=
le type=3D"text/css"> =0Abody p =0A{ =0A	margin: 0px; =0A}=0A</style=
></head><body style=3D'font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; =
font-size: 13px; '><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1473859582000_andreas.walz@h=
s-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"GroupWiseMessage=
Body"><div>Hi,<br><br><span class=3D"GroupwiseReplyHeader">&gt;&gt;&gt; =
Hubert&nbsp;Kario&nbsp;&lt;hkario@redhat.com&gt; 09/12/16 6:56 PM =
&gt;&gt;&gt;</span><br>&gt; are you aware of the tlsfuzzer framework?<br><a=
 class=3D"weblink" href=3D"https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer" =
target=3D"_blank">&gt; https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer</a><br><br>@Hu=
bert Kario: Thanks for pointing me to tlsfuzzer. I had a look at the =
repository before and I skimmed through the code. However, I didn't run =
the code and I don't know details about the way it is generating input. Is =
there some paper or presentation about it? <br><br><span class=3D"Groupwise=
ReplyHeader">&gt;&gt;&gt; Peter&nbsp;Gutmann&nbsp;&lt;pgut001@cs.auckland.a=
c.nz&gt; 09/14/16 1:39 PM &gt;&gt;&gt;</span><br>&gt; My code checks for =
extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily be<br>&gt; persuaded =
that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what earlier<br>&gt; =
versions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some =
future<br>&gt; RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on =
finding more data may<br>&gt; be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see =
why it would be a bad thing.<br><br>@Peter Gutmann: Thanks for your take =
on that. Actually, and I might easily be missing something here, I do see =
some issues with adding new fields to the ClientHello in the future (i.e. =
following the "client_hello_extension_list"). As far as I can see, there =
is no way within a ClientHello to convey some kind of a version of the =
ClientHello format itself (as the ClientHello's version field is just =
indicating the highest version the client supports). That is, the only =
mechanism I see here is the same as the one that allowed to add extensions =
to a ClientHello message with RFC3546. However, that door has explicitly =
been closed therein in section 2.1 (as Hubert Kario pointed out)<br><br>&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A server that supports the extensions mechanism MUST =
accept only<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; client hello messages in either the =
original or extended ClientHello<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; format, and (as for =
all other messages) MUST check that the amount of<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
data in the message precisely matches one of these formats; if not<br>&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; then it MUST send a fatal "decode_error" alert.&nbsp; This =
overrides the<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "Forward compatibility note" in =
[TLS].<br><br>A similar statement is given in RFC5246, section 7.4.1.2.:<br=
><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A server MUST accept ClientHello<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; messages both with and without the extensions field, and (as for =
all<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; other messages) it MUST check that the amount of =
data in the message<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; precisely matches one of these =
formats; if not, then it MUST send a<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; fatal "decode_er=
ror" alert.<br><br>Thus, to my understanding, any new field in the =
ClientHello would automatically break backward compatibility (at least =
with older compliant servers or unless everyone explicitly skips a MUST =
check in the interest of forward compatibility).<br><br>___________________=
________________<br><br>Andreas Walz<br>Research Engineer<br>Institute of =
reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics (ivESK)<br>Offenbur=
g University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany<br><br></div><sp=
an>&nbsp;</span><span class=3D"GroupwiseReplyHeader"><br><br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =
Peter&nbsp;Gutmann&nbsp;&lt;pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz&gt; 09/14/16 1:39 PM =
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br></span>Martin Rex &lt;mrex@sap.com&gt; writes:<br><br>&gt;T=
he actual problem is the design flaw in TLS that availability of null<br>&g=
t;compression is not implied, but rather given a seperate codepoint, and =
the<br>&gt;server choosing null compression and continuing even when it is =
not<br>&gt;explicitly asserted by the client, is a server silently making =
up for that<br>&gt;design flaw in the TLS spec.<br><br>Yup, and I'd say =
it's perfectly valid behaviour.  Compression is an optional<br>extra, but =
you need to explicitly specify that you don't want it, something<br>that's =
popular in the PKI world where you have a supposedly optional<br>capability=
 that isn't actually optional so you need to fill it with a dummy<br>value =
to indicate that you don't care about it.<br><br>&gt;Up to TLSv1.2, TLS =
extensions were purely optional, so an implementation that<br>&gt;unconditi=
onally ignores everything following compression methods is at least<br>&gt;=
fully conforming to SSLv3, TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;For an TLS =
implementation that parses TLS extensions, the behaviour of what<br>&gt;to =
do about trailing garbage is a different matter.  Personally I prefer<br>&g=
t;aborting in case of garbage trailing TLS extensions.<br><br>My code =
checks for extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily be<br>pers=
uaded that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what earlier<br>ve=
rsions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some =
future<br>RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on finding =
more data may<br>be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see why it would be =
a bad thing.<br><br>&gt;What the server does in presence of multiple TLS =
extensions of the same type<br>&gt;is implementation defined.  I think it =
would be extremely reasonable for a<br>&gt;server to perform a simple =
plausibility check on decode whether it is<br>&gt;decoding the same TLS =
extension more than once, and then abort with a<br>&gt;decode_error alert, =
in order to have ambiguities caught early. Recognizing<br>&gt;duplicate =
TLS extensions that the server does not support/implement does not<br>&gt;(=
yet) create ambiguities (for that server) and requires more complex code, =
so<br>&gt;I would not implement that check.<br><br>+1.  Remembering that =
you've already done a known extension is one thing, but<br>having to track =
a potentially arbitrary number of extensions that you don't<br>know what =
to do with anyway doesn't seem worthwhile.  And then there's the<br>same =
problem as with ignoring extra data at the end of the hello, at some<br>poi=
nt a future RFC may define an extension where having duplicate copies =
makes<br>sense or is even required for things to work.  So you don't =
really gain<br>anything by ignoring duplicate unknown extensions, and will =
potentially break<br>things in the future if you do reject them.<br><br>Hav=
ing said that, some extensions are purely signalling extensions, like =
EMS<br>and EtM.  I'm not sure if there's any problem with accepting =
doubles of those,<br>it could just be the other side being emphatic.  =
Consider how you'd need to<br>report this to the user, "shut down the TLS =
connection because I saw two<br>copies of some extension you've never =
heard of before", you can imagine what a<br>user who sees that would think =
of the anal-retentive &amp;^@#* who added special<br>code to the handshake =
in order to reject it if this condition is encountered.<br><br>Peter.</div>=
</body></html>

--=__PartB0863304.3__=--

--=__PartB0863304.2__=--


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On Wednesday, 14 September 2016 15:35:16 CEST Andreas Walz wrote:
> Hi,
>=20
> >>> Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> 09/12/16 6:56 PM >>>
> >=20
> > are you aware of the tlsfuzzer framework?
> > https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer
>=20
> @Hubert Kario: Thanks for pointing me to tlsfuzzer. I had a look at the
> repository before and I skimmed through the code. However, I didn't run t=
he
> code and I don't know details about the way it is generating input. Is
> there some paper or presentation about it?

there are presentation slides in the docs/ directory

Decision which messages are to be generated is done using scenarios that=20
describe conversations between client and server. See in scripts/ for them;=
 a=20
simple example is scripts/test-conversation.py while an example of negative=
=20
test would be scripts/test-early-application-data.py

in tlsfuzzer/messages.py is the code that generates the messages, client he=
llo=20
is here:
https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/blob/master/tlsfuzzer/messages.py#L306

Example of a test case you were asking about (the one with data extending p=
ast=20
extensions) would be scripts/test-truncating-of-client-hello.py

The messages themselves are generated through a combination of sensible=20
defaults and "guessing" expected values by inspecting already exchanged=20
messages (think TLS state machine that explicitly has support for any state=
=20
transitions).

In general, it allows you to both negotiate connections and send arbitrary=
=20
messages (through changing their order, modifying them pre or post encrypti=
on,=20
or sending raw values). In particular, it does support renegotiation despit=
e=20
the the fact that the underlying tls library doesn't.
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 10:21:35 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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On 09/14/2016 04:56 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> First, I don't think that the argument that the current version scheme doesn't 
> lend itself to future-proofing is correct. Just as with GREASE, browsers can 
> send much higher version than they really support if they do that on a time 
> limited basis.

David had previously convinced me that it doesn't actually work very
well, but I forget the reasoning he used to do so. :(

> Second, while the "joint" which handles new extensions IDs doesn't seem to be 
> rusting, it's not the case with lists in particular extensions. SNI being the 
> prime example where sending anything but a single host name value will most 
> likely lead to your client hello being either misinterpreted or rejected.
>

But people will ~always be sending multiple elements in the list in the
version-negotiation extension -- you can't just send TLS 1.3; you also
send 1.2 for the near future.  And if browsers are grease-ing from the
beginning, I don't really see this one rusting.

-Ben

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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
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    On 09/14/2016 04:56 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:4167932.6uUpuY5lVa@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">First, I don't think that the argument that the current version scheme doesn't 
lend itself to future-proofing is correct. Just as with GREASE, browsers can 
send much higher version than they really support if they do that on a time 
limited basis.
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    David had previously convinced me that it doesn't actually work very
    well, but I forget the reasoning he used to do so. :(<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:4167932.6uUpuY5lVa@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">
Second, while the "joint" which handles new extensions IDs doesn't seem to be 
rusting, it's not the case with lists in particular extensions. SNI being the 
prime example where sending anything but a single host name value will most 
likely lead to your client hello being either misinterpreted or rejected.

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    But people will ~always be sending multiple elements in the list in
    the version-negotiation extension -- you can't just send TLS 1.3;
    you also send 1.2 for the near future.  And if browsers are
    grease-ing from the beginning, I don't really see this one rusting.<br>
    <br>
    -Ben<br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 16:17:50 +0000
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On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 11:46 AM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:

> On 09/14/2016 04:56 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
>
> First, I don't think that the argument that the current version scheme doesn't
> lend itself to future-proofing is correct. Just as with GREASE, browsers can
> send much higher version than they really support if they do that on a time
> limited basis.
>
>
> David had previously convinced me that it doesn't actually work very well,
> but I forget the reasoning he used to do so. :(
>

Right, this was suggested at Berlin but is not very realistic.

First it requires that clients do so with very careful precautions
(time-limited, server-side field trials, etc.). There cannot be
fake-TLS-1.4 clients by the time real-TLS-1.4 is to exist. If enough
implementations mess up, we lose. With a list, any library can freely
implement this without depending on extra infrastructure.

Second, even if we were to advertise TLS 1.4 when we really mean TLS 1.3,
we still cannot deploy TLS 1.3 as-is without a TLS 1.2 fallback.
Version-intolerant servers will continue to get deployed unnoticed. We need
to get to a quiet point where the extension point works before we can start
meaningfully applying GREASE. All GREASE does is try to exercise
rarely-exercised extension point.

Because I am unreasonably amused by this metaphor, if the joint has
completely rusted shut already, we won't be able to get the GREASE in
there. It needs to have some mobility left.

Second, while the "joint" which handles new extensions IDs doesn't seem to be
> rusting, it's not the case with lists in particular extensions. SNI being the
> prime example where sending anything but a single host name value will most
> likely lead to your client hello being either misinterpreted or rejected.
>
>
>
> But people will ~always be sending multiple elements in the list in the
> version-negotiation extension -- you can't just send TLS 1.3; you also send
> 1.2 for the near future.  And if browsers are grease-ing from the
> beginning, I don't really see this one rusting.
>

Right, SNI should just never have been an extension point. We have
multi-valued lists elsewhere and they've worked fine. I can only speak to
Chrome's experience, but we add cipher suites without worry. We
successfully deployed X25519. RSA-PSS is going through the release process
now. (We expect breakage from an old NSS bug, but probes of top sites
suggest it will be tolerable.) TLS 1.3 adds even more lists. We're already
assuming lists work.

Yes, we find list intolerance too---servers which only look at the second
byte in a cipher suite, servers which forgot a default in their NamedGroup
switch-case, servers which get confused on unknown HashAlgorithms, servers
which require the final extension non-empty---but this is dramatically less
than version intolerance. It's usually within tolerable levels that we
needn't resort to fallbacks.

The proposal switches from something which we know does not work to
something new. Perhaps this new one will break too, but it is very similar
to things that have worked before, and I am hopeful that GREASE will help.

David

--001a11443b3abd2e05053c7a125d
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Sep 14=
, 2016 at 11:46 AM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bkaduk@akamai.com">=
bkaduk@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><d=
iv bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000" class=3D"gmail_msg">
    On 09/14/2016 04:56 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"gmail_msg">
      <pre class=3D"gmail_msg">First, I don&#39;t think that the argument t=
hat the current version scheme doesn&#39;t=20
lend itself to future-proofing is correct. Just as with GREASE, browsers ca=
n=20
send much higher version than they really support if they do that on a time=
=20
limited basis.
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"=
 class=3D"gmail_msg">
    David had previously convinced me that it doesn&#39;t actually work ver=
y
    well, but I forget the reasoning he used to do so. :(</div></blockquote=
><div><br></div><div>Right, this was suggested at Berlin but is not very re=
alistic.</div><div><br></div><div>First it requires that clients do so with=
 very careful precautions (time-limited, server-side field trials, etc.). T=
here cannot be fake-TLS-1.4 clients by the time real-TLS-1.4 is to exist. I=
f enough implementations mess up, we lose. With a list, any library can fre=
ely implement this without depending on extra infrastructure.</div><div><br=
></div><div>Second, even if we were to advertise TLS 1.4 when we really mea=
n TLS 1.3, we still cannot deploy TLS 1.3 as-is without a TLS 1.2 fallback.=
 Version-intolerant servers will continue to get deployed unnoticed. We nee=
d to get to a quiet point where the extension point works before we can sta=
rt meaningfully applying GREASE. All GREASE does is try to exercise rarely-=
exercised extension point.</div><div><br></div><div>Because I am unreasonab=
ly amused by this metaphor, if the joint has completely rusted shut already=
, we won&#39;t be able to get the GREASE in there. It needs to have some mo=
bility left.<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bg=
color=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000" class=3D"gmail_msg">
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"gmail_msg">
      <pre class=3D"gmail_msg">Second, while the &quot;joint&quot; which ha=
ndles new extensions IDs doesn&#39;t seem to be=20
rusting, it&#39;s not the case with lists in particular extensions. SNI bei=
ng the=20
prime example where sending anything but a single host name value will most=
=20
likely lead to your client hello being either misinterpreted or rejected.

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"=
 class=3D"gmail_msg">
    But people will ~always be sending multiple elements in the list in
    the version-negotiation extension -- you can&#39;t just send TLS 1.3;
    you also send 1.2 for the near future.=C2=A0 And if browsers are
    grease-ing from the beginning, I don&#39;t really see this one rusting.=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Right, SNI s=
hould just never have been an extension point. We have multi-valued lists e=
lsewhere and they&#39;ve worked fine. I can only speak to Chrome&#39;s expe=
rience, but we add cipher suites without worry. We successfully deployed X2=
5519. RSA-PSS is going through the release process now. (We expect breakage=
 from an old NSS bug, but probes of top sites suggest it will be tolerable.=
) TLS 1.3 adds even more lists. We&#39;re already assuming lists work.</div=
><div><br></div><div>Yes, we find list intolerance too---servers which only=
 look at the second byte in a cipher suite, servers which forgot a default =
in their NamedGroup switch-case, servers which get confused on unknown Hash=
Algorithms, servers which require the final extension non-empty---but this =
is dramatically less than version intolerance. It&#39;s usually within tole=
rable levels that we needn&#39;t resort to fallbacks.</div><div><br></div><=
div>The proposal switches from something which we know does not work to som=
ething new. Perhaps this new one will break too, but it is very similar to =
things that have worked before, and I am hopeful that GREASE will help.</di=
v><div><br></div><div>David</div></div></div>

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On Wednesday, 14 September 2016 16:17:50 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> Yes, we find list intolerance too---servers which only look at the second
> byte in a cipher suite, servers which forgot a default in their NamedGroup
> switch-case, servers which get confused on unknown HashAlgorithms, servers
> which require the final extension non-empty---but this is dramatically le=
ss
> than version intolerance. It's usually within tolerable levels that we
> needn't resort to fallbacks.
>=20
> The proposal switches from something which we know does not work to
> something new. Perhaps this new one will break too, but it is very similar
> to things that have worked before, and I am hopeful that GREASE will help.

Was the option to do "one extension point =3D specific TLS version supporte=
d"=20
discussed too? What arguments are there against it?

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 20:02:31 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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On Wednesday, 14 September 2016 17:39:59 CEST Andrei Popov wrote:
> Do you mean a TLS extension code point per TLS version?

yes, e.g. if extension 0x00a0 is present assume TLSv1.3 support, 0x0121,=20
TLSv1.4; same way EMS and MtE works

> One argument against this was that this makes it difficult to express the
> client's prioritization of TLS versions, but IMHO arguably the server
> should not care.

I don't think we should depart from the "highest mutually supported version=
"=20
negotiation algorithm, any kind of preference in the client list is likely =
to=20
cause additional problems - version misnegotiation

if client will want to advertise support for TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.5 but not=20
TLSv1.4 it will still be able to do that
=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hubert Kario
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 9:40 AM
> To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
>=20
> On Wednesday, 14 September 2016 16:17:50 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
>=20
> > Yes, we find list intolerance too---servers which only look at the=20
> > second byte in a cipher suite, servers which forgot a default in their=
=20
> > NamedGroup switch-case, servers which get confused on unknown=20
> > HashAlgorithms, servers which require the final extension=20
> > non-empty---but this is dramatically less than version intolerance.=20
> > It's usually within tolerable levels that we needn't resort to fallback=
s.
> >=20
> > The proposal switches from something which we know does not work to=20
> > something new. Perhaps this new one will break too, but it is very=20
> > similar to things that have worked before, and I am hopeful that GREASE
> > will help.
>=20
> Was the option to do "one extension point =3D specific TLS version suppor=
ted"
>=20
> discussed too? What arguments are there against it?
>=20
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 12:22:03 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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On Wednesday, 14 September 2016 19:02:14 CEST Andrei Popov wrote:
> > I don't think we should depart from the "highest mutually supported
> > version" negotiation algorithm...
> Correct, but it's not clear what represents "the highest" protocol version
> in the world where national TLS "standards" exist. Is country X-TLS (e.g.
> with integrated MITM support) a higher version than TLS 1.3?=20

it means the same when I disable support for TLS 1.2 in current version of=
=20
OpenSSL - it should negotiate TLS 1.1 as it is the highest mutually support=
ed=20
version. We don't care what the server's or client's code can do in absolut=
e,=20
we care what it is configured to do. See also: FALLBACK_SCSV handling.

> The server
> will make a choice based on the server's preferences. In a way, the
> proposed version negotiation mechanism makes it slightly easier to
> implement servers that support country X-TLS alongside IETF TLS versions.

and a list with opaque version identifiers (just int16 values) won't?
=20
> Cheers,
>=20
> Andrei
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hubert Kario [mailto:hkario@redhat.com]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 11:03 AM
> To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
> Cc: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
>=20
> On Wednesday, 14 September 2016 17:39:59 CEST Andrei Popov wrote:
>=20
> > Do you mean a TLS extension code point per TLS version?
>=20
>=20
> yes, e.g. if extension 0x00a0 is present assume TLSv1.3 support, 0x0121,
> TLSv1.4; same way EMS and MtE works
=20
>=20
> > One argument against this was that this makes it difficult to express=20
> > the client's prioritization of TLS versions, but IMHO arguably the=20
> > server should not care.
>=20
>=20
> I don't think we should depart from the "highest mutually supported versi=
on"
>=20
 negotiation algorithm, any kind of preference in the client list is
> likely to cause additional problems - version misnegotiation=20
> if client will want to advertise support for TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.5 but not
> TLSv1.4 it will still be able to do that
> =20
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hubert Kario
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 9:40 AM
> > To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
> > Cc: tls@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
> >=20
> > On Wednesday, 14 September 2016 16:17:50 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> >=20
> >=20
> > > Yes, we find list intolerance too---servers which only look at the=20
> > > second byte in a cipher suite, servers which forgot a default in=20
> > > their NamedGroup switch-case, servers which get confused on unknown=20
> > > HashAlgorithms, servers which require the final extension=20
> > > non-empty---but this is dramatically less than version intolerance.
> > > It's usually within tolerable levels that we needn't resort to
> > > fallbacks.
> > >=20
> > > The proposal switches from something which we know does not work to=20
> > > something new. Perhaps this new one will break too, but it is very=20
> > > similar to things that have worked before, and I am hopeful that=20
> > > GREASE will help.
> >=20
> >=20
> > Was the option to do "one extension point =3D specific TLS version
> > supported"
=20
> > discussed too? What arguments are there against it?
> >=20
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Hubert Kario
> > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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On Thursday, 15 September 2016 12:22:03 CEST Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Wednesday, 14 September 2016 19:02:14 CEST Andrei Popov wrote:
> > > I don't think we should depart from the "highest mutually supported
> > > version" negotiation algorithm...
> >=20
> > Correct, but it's not clear what represents "the highest" protocol vers=
ion
> > in the world where national TLS "standards" exist. Is country X-TLS (e.=
g.
> > with integrated MITM support) a higher version than TLS 1.3?
>=20
> it means the same when I disable support for TLS 1.2 in current version of
> OpenSSL - it should negotiate TLS 1.1 as it is the highest mutually
> supported version. We don't care what the server's or client's code can do
> in absolute, we care what it is configured to do. See also: FALLBACK_SCSV
> handling.
> > The server
> > will make a choice based on the server's preferences. In a way, the
> > proposed version negotiation mechanism makes it slightly easier to
> > implement servers that support country X-TLS alongside IETF TLS version=
s.
>=20
> and a list with opaque version identifiers (just int16 values) won't?

also, I'm not sure if it's really such a bad thing, it's certainly better t=
han=20
some Russian sites selecting TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA but actually usin=
g=20
GOST cipher...

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Friday, 9 September 2016 18:13:04 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> I'm happy to make all alerts fatal.
>=20
> I also like the state in the pull requests where some cases require that
> if an alert is sent, it is a specific alert, while leaving flexibility
> in other cases (and preventing us from having to exhaustively enumerate
> all possible causes for alerts).

I have one scenario in which a the difference in alert type sent is actuall=
y=20
quite crucial for properly testing an implementation.

Say you have a server that implements NPN. In case that extension is=20
negotiated, client will send EncryptedExtensions between CCS and Finished,=
=20
something that is a big no-no in standard TLS.

Now, if client misbehaves and sends the EncryptedExtensions despite NPN not=
=20
being negotiated, server should respond with an unexpected_message alert. B=
ut=20
if a server is expecting some message (by mistake) it won't match what it=20
expects and by standard definition it should then send decode_error.

The end result of detailed specification is not only easier testing, but al=
so=20
higher confidence in test results.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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References: <20160514082717.7997D180004@rfc-editor.org> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4C80CD0@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <CAN8NK9EaDQ-Pugi2j=3KcXrn5G-8mcXVs4O2HGCkH7h7GSKbbA@mail.gmail.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4C80F76@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <CAN8NK9Gn9iK72dBq3opQ2E_HEZyVB+ysCqo5JxMH8vHhy4gEEg@mail.gmail.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4C817BE@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <a05f1e9d02a96721479a0de75e335cc4@esat.kuleuven.be> <A1FEF4A5-AC64-4832-904A-47768E5D5AF9@gmail.com> <54302B87-4730-4B8E-9F55-B33B89425A51@azet.org> <D35F4D97.6C5B2%kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk> <53384A13-5F80-4CF0-BD8F-F68E304ADF15@azet.org> <D35F5460.6C5D0%kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk> <3B2C6D5A-939E-4539-B902-D4502EB9739C@azet.org> <96CBAD0F-0F0A-4095-81FD-09EE804EB7F6@azet.org> <1367F829-067E-4449-AB53-5357945BA9B1@azet.org> <CABtrr-U5tWLmpc_X6J3jpPUTODnPP_UMv24NTgAgEt6UQeVPuw@mail.gmail.com> <3C9FD4F6-DF09-49D9-B800-5D1C38138189@azet.org>
To: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5288 (4694)
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All,

Thank you for your input on this errata report and apologies for the =
delayed reply.

We have updated as requested.  As this thread involved a number of =
responses, please review the text as it currently appears at =
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3D5288&eid=3D4694 and =
let us know if any further updates are necessary.

RFC Editor/mf


On Jun 15, 2016, at 4:11 AM, Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> wrote:

>=20
>> On 14 Jun 2016, at 19:25, Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org> wrote:
>>=20
>> s/it's/its/ in one place in your errata text, Aaron.
>=20
> Thank you. I suggest the RFC Errata editors change text and further =
additions/recommendations by others along the way when publishing (if =
that's the right way to proceed, I'm quite unfamiliar with the errata =
process and the information on it is a bit terse, to be honest).
>=20
> Aaron


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To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
References: <CAF8qwaA86yytg29QOD_N7ARimh9QcNGU_nnr_OrxqCrvrk2MBg@mail.gmail.com> <4707488.xUP5jY4WDA@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CY1PR0301MB0842F99D7A32DFDCD18B3EAB8CF10@CY1PR0301MB0842.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> <2260393.jBGLD1rnRy@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CY1PR0301MB08422C3C4B9B4029C0B423B58CF10@CY1PR0301MB0842.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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On 09/14/2016 02:02 PM, Andrei Popov wrote:
> Basically, I don't feel strongly about the switch to the proposed version negotiation mechanism. But if we are going to make this change based on the theory of having only one extension point and actively defending it, then we should probably follow the theory and send a separate TLS extension per TLS version.
>

To me, the (ordered) list of client supported versions in a single
extension feels more intuitively natural, so I want to try harder to
understand the reasoning that leads you to prefer a separate extension
for each version.  Is it just that doing an additional "negotiation"
within the extension body constitutes another extension point that we
would have to actively defend, or is there something else about what a
TLS extension is philosophically supposed to indicate?

Thanks,

Ben

--------------221CE10A44E4B66D3EEA6FC8
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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
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    On 09/14/2016 02:02 PM, Andrei Popov wrote:<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CY1PR0301MB08422C3C4B9B4029C0B423B58CF10@CY1PR0301MB0842.namprd03.prod.outlook.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">Basically, I don't feel strongly about the switch to the proposed version negotiation mechanism. But if we are going to make this change based on the theory of having only one extension point and actively defending it, then we should probably follow the theory and send a separate TLS extension per TLS version.

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    To me, the (ordered) list of client supported versions in a single
    extension feels more intuitively natural, so I want to try harder to
    understand the reasoning that leads you to prefer a separate
    extension for each version.Â  Is it just that doing an additional
    "negotiation" within the extension body constitutes another
    extension point that we would have to actively defend, or is there
    something else about what a TLS extension is philosophically
    supposed to indicate?<br>
    <br>
    Thanks,<br>
    <br>
    Ben<br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------221CE10A44E4B66D3EEA6FC8--


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On Thursday, 15 September 2016 11:51:31 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On 09/14/2016 02:02 PM, Andrei Popov wrote:
> > Basically, I don't feel strongly about the switch to the proposed versi=
on
> > negotiation mechanism. But if we are going to make this change based on
> > the theory of having only one extension point and actively defending it,
> > then we should probably follow the theory and send a separate TLS
> > extension per TLS version.
> To me, the (ordered) list of client supported versions in a single
> extension feels more intuitively natural, so I want to try harder to
> understand the reasoning that leads you to prefer a separate extension
> for each version.  Is it just that doing an additional "negotiation"
> within the extension body constitutes another extension point that we
> would have to actively defend, or is there something else about what a
> TLS extension is philosophically supposed to indicate?

the extensions joint is well greased and works

the lists inside extensions are a hit and miss, they mostly work, but then =
we=20
have SNI in general, signature methods in past NSS versions, and if you dug=
=20
more I wouldn't be surprised if you found half a dozen other issues just li=
ke=20
it (in late October I may have actual numbers about it)

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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Subject: Re: [TLS] chacha/poly interop?
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Aloha!


David Benjamin wrote:
> TLS-ChaCha is actually RFC 7539 which comes with its own test
> vectors and isn't TLS-specific.
> 
> Our implementation matches RFC 7539 and seems to match the one test 
> vector I tried too. Note that that draft includes a number of things 
> like 128-bit keys and 8 or 12 rounds which are not applicable. The
> test vector whose answer begins "0x76 0xb8 0xe0 0xad 0xa0" is the one
> you want.

Also worth noting is that in RFC 7539, ChaCha has 96 bit IV/nonce and 32
bit counter instead of a 64 bit IV and 64 bit counter. The 32 extra IV
bits are used to initialize the state in the same way as 32 bits in the
counter. So its a simple matter of mapping the IV bits to the counter
bits and chacha will match the test vectors in RFC 7539. It tripped me
up when integrating the ChaCha core into my RFC 7539 ChaCha20_Poly1305 core.

https://github.com/secworks/chacha
https://github.com/secworks/ChaCha20-Poly1305

Note: the chacha-poly1305 core is not completed yet.
- -- 
Med vÃ¤nlig hÃ¤lsning, Yours

Joachim StrÃ¶mbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svÃ¤ngning.
========================================================================
 Joachim StrÃ¶mbergson          Secworks AB          joachim@secworks.se
========================================================================
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From: Vlad Krasnov <vlad@cloudflare.com>
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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I am opposed to this change.

I don=E2=80=99t think that version selection as an extension is such a =
good idea.

Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read the =
first two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code path =
on the spot.

That allows for a very simple and stream-lined parsing of the hello, =
with minimal buffering.

Also note that several fields *preceding* the extensions have special =
values for TLS 1.3.

Delaying this decision until after all the extensions are parsed will =
make implementations that much more complex, memory consuming, and =
slower (HOL blocking), plus potentially leading to new bugs we want to =
avoid.

At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be the =
very first extension advertised.

Cheers,
Vlad

> On 15 Sep 2016, at 11:03, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Thursday, 15 September 2016 11:51:31 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> On 09/14/2016 02:02 PM, Andrei Popov wrote:
>>> Basically, I don't feel strongly about the switch to the proposed =
version
>>> negotiation mechanism. But if we are going to make this change based =
on
>>> the theory of having only one extension point and actively defending =
it,
>>> then we should probably follow the theory and send a separate TLS
>>> extension per TLS version.
>> To me, the (ordered) list of client supported versions in a single
>> extension feels more intuitively natural, so I want to try harder to
>> understand the reasoning that leads you to prefer a separate =
extension
>> for each version.  Is it just that doing an additional "negotiation"
>> within the extension body constitutes another extension point that we
>> would have to actively defend, or is there something else about what =
a
>> TLS extension is philosophically supposed to indicate?
>=20
> the extensions joint is well greased and works
>=20
> the lists inside extensions are a hit and miss, they mostly work, but =
then we=20
> have SNI in general, signature methods in past NSS versions, and if =
you dug=20
> more I wouldn't be surprised if you found half a dozen other issues =
just like=20
> it (in late October I may have actual numbers about it)
>=20
> --=20
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech =
Republic_______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Vlad Krasnov <vlad@cloudflare.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Sat, 17 Sep 2016 01:04:07 +0000
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To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Vlad Krasnov <vlad@cloudflare.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 4:29 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be the
very first extension advertised.
I don't think it's a good idea to impose extension ordering requirements.


Agreed. If we're concerned with the order, I suppose are other options like
smuggling them in the front of the cipher list or hacky things like that.
:-) But using extensions is cleaner, and still perfectly deployable.


> Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read the
first two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code path on
the spot.
Yes, these implementations (Windows TLS stack included) will need to do
more elaborate/slightly slower pre-parsing if we use TLS version
negotiation via TLS extension(s). Not something I like, but can be done.


TLS already does not strictly permit sniff-based implementations like this.
A handshake message may be fragmented pathologically or even interspersed
with warning alerts. It's doable if you reject such fragmentations (no one
would send a ClientHello this way...), but you need to be careful because
this fragmentation does not figure into the handshake transcript. In
particular, you cannot have an else clause in your dispatch. The dispatcher
must reject anything it can't definitively resolve rather than blindly
forward to your pre-TLS-1.3 implementation.

CVE-2014-3511 is an example of OpenSSL's 1.0.x sniff-based implementation
going wrong (OpenSSL 1.1.x is no longer sniff-based). It is a particularly
silly instance, but it's the sort of failure mode you can get.

Further, with the current trajectory, TLS 1.3 servers will need to do
version-negotiation based on extensions anyway. All the various
implementors have been using this "draft_version" extension to experiment
with TLS 1.3. (draft_version is really just a worse version of this
proposal.)
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#version-negotiatio=
n

I don't think anyone has actually enabled client code by default yet, but
once anyone does, servers will need to process extensions for versioning
until draft TLS 1.3 clients are out of the ecosystem. This seems the worst
of both worlds. We'll have extensions in versioning and an undeployable
protocol. I think we should go for the latter and, if we must have the
former, at least do it properly.

David


Cheers,

Andrei

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Vlad Krasnov
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 1:21 PM
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two

I am opposed to this change.

I don=E2=80=99t think that version selection as an extension is such a good=
 idea.

Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read the
first two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code path on
the spot.

That allows for a very simple and stream-lined parsing of the hello, with
minimal buffering.

Also note that several fields *preceding* the extensions have special
values for TLS 1.3.

Delaying this decision until after all the extensions are parsed will make
implementations that much more complex, memory consuming, and slower (HOL
blocking), plus potentially leading to new bugs we want to avoid.

At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be the
very first extension advertised.

Cheers,
Vlad

> On 15 Sep 2016, at 11:03, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Thursday, 15 September 2016 11:51:31 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> On 09/14/2016 02:02 PM, Andrei Popov wrote:
>>> Basically, I don't feel strongly about the switch to the proposed
>>> version negotiation mechanism. But if we are going to make this
>>> change based on the theory of having only one extension point and
>>> actively defending it, then we should probably follow the theory and
>>> send a separate TLS extension per TLS version.
>> To me, the (ordered) list of client supported versions in a single
>> extension feels more intuitively natural, so I want to try harder to
>> understand the reasoning that leads you to prefer a separate
>> extension for each version.  Is it just that doing an additional
"negotiation"
>> within the extension body constitutes another extension point that we
>> would have to actively defend, or is there something else about what
>> a TLS extension is philosophically supposed to indicate?
>
> the extensions joint is well greased and works
>
> the lists inside extensions are a hit and miss, they mostly work, but
> then we have SNI in general, signature methods in past NSS versions,
> and if you dug more I wouldn't be surprised if you found half a dozen
> other issues just like it (in late October I may have actual numbers
> about it)
>
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech
> Republic_______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

_______________________________________________
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--001a114409ac826110053ca9a832
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote gmail_msg"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg">On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 a=
t 4:29 PM Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrot=
e:<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"=
 style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">&g=
t; At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be the =
very first extension advertised.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
I don&#39;t think it&#39;s a good idea to impose extension ordering require=
ments.<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></blockquote><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg"></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><di=
v class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">Agreed. If we&#3=
9;re concerned with the order, I suppose are other options like smuggling t=
hem in the front of the cipher list or hacky things like that. :-) But usin=
g extensions is cleaner, and still perfectly deployable.</div></div></div><=
div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_msg">=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_m=
sg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
>
&gt; Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read the=
 first two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code path on=
 the spot.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Yes, these implementations (Windows TLS stack included) will need to do mor=
e elaborate/slightly slower pre-parsing if we use TLS version negotiation v=
ia TLS extension(s). Not something I like, but can be done.<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg"></blockquote><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div=
></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
 gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">TLS already does not strictly permit s=
niff-based implementations like this. A handshake message may be fragmented=
 pathologically or even interspersed with warning alerts. It&#39;s doable i=
f you reject such fragmentations (no one would send a ClientHello this way.=
..), but you need to be careful because this fragmentation does not figure =
into the handshake transcript. In particular, you cannot have an else claus=
e in your dispatch. The dispatcher must reject anything it can&#39;t defini=
tively resolve rather than blindly forward to your pre-TLS-1.3 implementati=
on.</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_msg">CVE-2014-3511 is an example of OpenSSL&#39;s 1.0.x sniff-bas=
ed implementation going wrong (OpenSSL 1.1.x is no longer sniff-based). It =
is a particularly silly instance, but it&#39;s the sort of failure mode you=
 can get.</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_msg">Further, with the current trajectory, TLS 1.3 servers w=
ill need to do version-negotiation based on extensions anyway. All the vari=
ous implementors have been using this &quot;draft_version&quot; extension t=
o experiment with TLS 1.3. (draft_version is really just a worse version of=
 this proposal.)<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><a h=
ref=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#version-neg=
otiation" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tl=
s13-spec/wiki/Implementations#version-negotiation</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg=
"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_msg">I don&#39;t think anyone has actually enabled client code by=
 default yet, but once anyone does, servers will need to process extensions=
 for versioning until draft TLS 1.3 clients are out of the ecosystem. This =
seems the worst of both worlds. We&#39;ll have extensions in versioning and=
 an undeployable protocol. I think we should go for the latter and, if we m=
ust have the former, at least do it properly.</div></div></div><div dir=3D"=
ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div class=3D=
"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">David</d=
iv></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote gmail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
Cheers,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Andrei<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
-----Original Message-----<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
From: TLS [mailto:<a class=3D"gmail_msg">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behal=
f Of Vlad Krasnov<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 1:21 PM<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
To: Hubert Kario &lt;<a class=3D"gmail_msg">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt;<br cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg">
Cc: <a class=3D"gmail_msg">tls@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
I am opposed to this change.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
I don=E2=80=99t think that version selection as an extension is such a good=
 idea.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read the firs=
t two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code path on the =
spot.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
That allows for a very simple and stream-lined parsing of the hello, with m=
inimal buffering.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Also note that several fields *preceding* the extensions have special value=
s for TLS 1.3.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Delaying this decision until after all the extensions are parsed will make =
implementations that much more complex, memory consuming, and slower (HOL b=
locking), plus potentially leading to new bugs we want to avoid.<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be the ver=
y first extension advertised.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Cheers,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Vlad<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; On 15 Sep 2016, at 11:03, Hubert Kario &lt;<a class=3D"gmail_msg">hkar=
io@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; On Thursday, 15 September 2016 11:51:31 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote:<br =
class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; On 09/14/2016 02:02 PM, Andrei Popov wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg"=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Basically, I don&#39;t feel strongly about the switch to the p=
roposed<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt;&gt; version negotiation mechanism. But if we are going to make thi=
s<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt;&gt; change based on the theory of having only one extension point =
and<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt;&gt; actively defending it, then we should probably follow the theo=
ry and<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt;&gt; send a separate TLS extension per TLS version.<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
&gt;&gt; To me, the (ordered) list of client supported versions in a single=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; extension feels more intuitively natural, so I want to try harder =
to<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; understand the reasoning that leads you to prefer a separate<br cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; extension for each version.=C2=A0 Is it just that doing an additio=
nal &quot;negotiation&quot;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; within the extension body constitutes another extension point that=
 we<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; would have to actively defend, or is there something else about wh=
at<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; a TLS extension is philosophically supposed to indicate?<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; the extensions joint is well greased and works<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; the lists inside extensions are a hit and miss, they mostly work, but<=
br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; then we have SNI in general, signature methods in past NSS versions,<b=
r class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; and if you dug more I wouldn&#39;t be surprised if you found half a do=
zen<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; other issues just like it (in late October I may have actual numbers<b=
r class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; about it)<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; --<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Regards,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Hubert Kario<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br class=3D"gmail_msg=
">
&gt; Web: <a rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg">www.cz.redhat.com</a><b=
r class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Republic_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gm=
ail_msg">
&gt; TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; <a class=3D"gmail_msg">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; <a rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg">https://www.ietf.org/mailman=
/listinfo/tls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a class=3D"gmail_msg">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/list=
info/tls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a class=3D"gmail_msg">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/list=
info/tls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</blockquote></div></div></div>

--001a114409ac826110053ca9a832--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Sat, 17 Sep 2016 20:09:40 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Client certificate alerts
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--001a1146c9de64ad24053cb9a9ac
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Hi folks,

We've run into some problems with client certificate alerts in Chrome that
I'd like to fix going forward.

The first is easy. handshake_failure is an unhelpful alert for server which
required client certs. This confuses users, so we're planning to
heuristically map it to a client certificate error if it's received after
declining to send certs. This seems poor, so I've uploaded this PR which
adds a certificate_required alert:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/640

Second, there is the access_denied alert. This alert has an unfortunate
name. Per spec, it is for:

   access_denied
      A valid certificate [TLS1.3: or PSK] was received, but when access
control was
      applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.  This
      message is always fatal.

Accordingly, Chrome maps it to a client certificate error. But, by the name
alone, it sounds much more general. We're seeing evidence of some kind of
network filtering software mistakenly sending it to block a connection. (I
can't blame them too much, since we ourselves mistook it for an alert to
send in a server-side DoS handler! This has since been fixed.)

>From an unscientific survey of recent Chrome user complaints about this
error, this is twice as prominent as actual client cert errors! So we'll
want to add another heuristic: if we see access_denied without a
CertificateRequest, map it to a more generic TLS error. This also seems
worth fixing going forward.

Does anyone actually send this alert? OpenSSL does not appear to. My best
rename is certificate_denied if we drop 1.3's "or PSK", but perhaps we can
remove the alert completely? You haven't gotten application data yet, so
you don't really have anything to apply access control on, particularly for
PSK. (For certs, there's post-handshake auth, but I would think you'd send
an application-level error there?)

David

--001a1146c9de64ad24053cb9a9ac
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg">Hi folks,<div class=
=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">We&#3=
9;ve run into some problems with client certificate alerts in Chrome that I=
&#39;d like to fix going forward.</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=
=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">The first is easy. handshake_=
failure is an unhelpful alert for server which required client certs. This =
confuses users, so we&#39;re planning to heuristically map it to a client c=
ertificate error if it&#39;s received after declining to send certs. This s=
eems poor, so I&#39;ve uploaded this PR which adds a certificate_required a=
lert:</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls=
13-spec/pull/640" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/640</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">Second, the=
re is the access_denied alert. This alert has an unfortunate name. Per spec=
, it is for:</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_msg">=C2=A0 =C2=A0access_denied</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
msg">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 A valid certificate [TLS1.3: or PSK] was received=
, but when access control was</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.=C2=A0 T=
his</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 message is always fa=
tal.</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_msg">Accordingly, Chrome maps it to a client certificate error. B=
ut, by the name alone, it sounds much more general. We&#39;re seeing eviden=
ce of some kind of network filtering software mistakenly sending it to bloc=
k a connection. (I can&#39;t blame them too much, since we ourselves mistoo=
k it for an alert to send in a server-side DoS handler! This has since been=
 fixed.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">From an unscientific survey of recent Chrome user compla=
ints about this error, this is twice as prominent as actual client cert err=
ors! So we&#39;ll want to add another heuristic: if we see access_denied wi=
thout a CertificateRequest, map it to a more generic TLS error. This also s=
eems worth fixing going forward.</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D=
"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">Does anyone actually send this a=
lert? OpenSSL does not appear to. My best rename is certificate_denied if w=
e drop 1.3&#39;s &quot;or PSK&quot;, but perhaps we can remove the alert co=
mpletely? You haven&#39;t gotten application data yet, so you don&#39;t rea=
lly have anything to apply access control on, particularly for PSK. (For ce=
rts, there&#39;s post-handshake auth, but I would think you&#39;d send an a=
pplication-level error there?)</div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_m=
sg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_msg">David</div></div></div>

--001a1146c9de64ad24053cb9a9ac--


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References: <CABcZeBNqs+6SYsA9SnED8nWkUXifSPuF4gBdRG-gJamtWmxWNw@mail.gmail.com> <CABcZeBP890QrcbpGR9Ht2RkfHShavkkDmvvKPP+81x8Bz+SeDA@mail.gmail.com> <CAF8qwaCVyRrSm-XtL6Jd_VKD9qGmCJNFJW1GZVjmidsr3DnW_Q@mail.gmail.com> <CAOgPGoD8YEr=+c8eG+YZ=6nSvFB2uk7MiKNgN7Z=wg7ihAUhzg@mail.gmail.com> <e1048616-22f9-4f37-ee1c-712f97213e31@akamai.com> <20160909201903.t726g3tywns2pfuq@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi> <599816da-8c60-938d-d6c0-3ec1510e2b96@akamai.com> <20160913191510.hfumchrmzvfplnlm@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi>
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On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:04:40PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 09/09/2016 03:19 PM, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> > > On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 02:50:59PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> >
> > >> I have a slight (i.e., unjustified) preference for doing
> > >> ClientHello-with-block-of-zeros rather than prefix-of-ClientHello.
> (Is
> > >> there a reason to require this extension to be the last one with
> > >> block-of-zeros?  Clearly there is for prefix-of-ClientHello.)
> > > What about the case where client tries DHE-PSK and gets attempt
> > > rejected because of missing group (or because address verification)?
> > > 0-RTT is gone yes, but the PSK attempt isn't.
> > >
> > > What happens to the hash in this case?
> > >
> > >
> >
> > I feel like I must be missing something, but I don't really understand
> > the question.  (Sadly, waiting in the hope that someone else did
> > understand and would respond didn't work.)  The 0-RTT failed, so the
> > full handshake will have an actual Finished message, with a different
> > hash calculated (including over the "hello_finished" extension).  The
> > most plausible way I could interpret the question seems to be asking
> > about the lack of Hash(resumption_context) in the 1-RTT Finished, but
> > the security properties of that should be the same as for the
> > hello_finished, so I'm still puzzled.
> >
> > Sorry for being dense...
>
> I mean the following case (perhaps bit misconfigured server):
>
> Client: ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,.
> ..,finished=zot)
> Server: HelloRetryRequest(group=24)
> Client: ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,
> 24:quux,...,finished=???)
>
>
> What is the finished data calculated over in the second case?
>

In this case, I believe that the finished is computed over
"ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,24:quux,..."

But that the handshake transcript is computed over all of:
"Client: ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,.
..,finished=zot)
Server: HelloRetryRequest(group=24)
Client: ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,
24:quux,...,finished=???)"

-Ekr

-Ilari
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a113e5f58d7a02c053cbafb3e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <sp=
an dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_b=
lank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br></div><div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"gmail-">On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:04:4=
0PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 09/09/2016 03:19 PM, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 02:50:59PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
</span><span class=3D"gmail-">&gt; &gt;&gt; I have a slight (i.e., unjustif=
ied) preference for doing<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; ClientHello-with-block-of-<wbr>zeros rather than prefix-of-Cl=
ientHello.=C2=A0 (Is<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; there a reason to require this extension to be the last one w=
ith<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; block-of-zeros?=C2=A0 Clearly there is for prefix-of-ClientHe=
llo.)<br>
&gt; &gt; What about the case where client tries DHE-PSK and gets attempt<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; rejected because of missing group (or because address verificatio=
n)?<br>
&gt; &gt; 0-RTT is gone yes, but the PSK attempt isn&#39;t.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; What happens to the hash in this case?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I feel like I must be missing something, but I don&#39;t really unders=
tand<br>
&gt; the question.=C2=A0 (Sadly, waiting in the hope that someone else did<=
br>
&gt; understand and would respond didn&#39;t work.)=C2=A0 The 0-RTT failed,=
 so the<br>
&gt; full handshake will have an actual Finished message, with a different<=
br>
&gt; hash calculated (including over the &quot;hello_finished&quot; extensi=
on).=C2=A0 The<br>
&gt; most plausible way I could interpret the question seems to be asking<b=
r>
&gt; about the lack of Hash(resumption_context) in the 1-RTT Finished, but<=
br>
&gt; the security properties of that should be the same as for the<br>
&gt; hello_finished, so I&#39;m still puzzled.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Sorry for being dense...<br>
<br>
</span>I mean the following case (perhaps bit misconfigured server):<br>
<br>
Client: ClientHello(groups=3D23,24,29;<wbr>PSK=3Dfoo;shares=3D23:bar,29:baz=
,.<wbr>..,finished=3Dzot)<br>
Server: HelloRetryRequest(group=3D24)<br>
Client: ClientHello(groups=3D23,24,29;<wbr>PSK=3Dfoo;shares=3D23:bar,29:baz=
,<wbr>24:quux,...,finished=3D???)<br>
<br>
<br>
What is the finished data calculated over in the second case?<br></blockquo=
te><div><br></div><div>In this case, I believe that the finished is compute=
d over=C2=A0</div><div>&quot;ClientHello(groups=3D23,24,29;<wbr>PSK=3Dfoo;s=
hares=3D23:bar,29:baz,<wbr>24:quux,...&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>But t=
hat the handshake transcript is computed over all of:</div><div>&quot;Clien=
t: ClientHello(groups=3D23,24,29;<wbr>PSK=3Dfoo;shares=3D23:bar,29:baz,.<wb=
r>..,finished=3Dzot)<br></div><div>Server: HelloRetryRequest(group=3D24)<br=
>Client: ClientHello(groups=3D23,24,29;<wbr>PSK=3Dfoo;shares=3D23:bar,29:ba=
z,<wbr>24:quux,...,finished=3D???)&quot;<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr<=
/div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div =
class=3D"gmail-HOEnZb"><div class=3D"gmail-h5">
-Ilari<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--001a113e5f58d7a02c053cbafb3e--


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Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 12:54:22 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing
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On Sat, Sep 17, 2016 at 02:43:49PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> In this case, I believe that the finished is computed over
> "ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,24:quux,..."
> 
> But that the handshake transcript is computed over all of:
> "Client: ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,.
> ..,finished=zot)
> Server: HelloRetryRequest(group=24)
> Client: ClientHello(groups=23,24,29;PSK=foo;shares=23:bar,29:baz,
> 24:quux,...,finished=???)"

Well, either way, I think there should be a note about how those
hashes behave with retries.

Also, has that extension been added as an exception to the rule that
extensions must remain the same across retry (since it can change)?
I don't see that being added to such list of exceptions.


-Ilari


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 10:29 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> On Mon, 2016-08-08 at 11:28 +0300, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> > More compact and makes the option where server sends some bad option
> > more clear.

Note that if we really want to be more compact, we might also observe
that there is a redundant length field in the extension as sent by the
client:
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0case clie=
nt_hello:
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;

Each extension has at least four bytes on the wire =E2=80=94 the extension_=
type
itself, and the length field of the extension_data in a uint16.

If I am interpreting the spec correctly, then the data for the
PreSharedKeyIdentity extension in the ClientHello then follows that
with another uint16, which is *always* a value two lower than the one
which immediately precedes it.

e.g.

=C2=A0 0x00 0x29 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// ExtensionType extension_type =3D=3D=
 41
=C2=A0 0x00 0x14 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>
    // This length field is entirely redundant:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 0x00 0x12 =C2=A0   =C2=A0// PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>
=C2=A0              =C2=A0   =C2=A0 // First identity:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 0x00 0x00 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 // PskKeyExchangeMode, P=
skAuthenticationMode
=C2=A0     0x00 0x04      // opaque identity<0..2^16-1>
=C2=A0       0x44 0x61 0x76 0x65 // "Dave"
=C2=A0                    // Second identity:
=C2=A0     0x00 0x00      // PskKeyExchangeMode, PskAuthenticationMode
=C2=A0     0x00 0x06      // opaque identity<0..2^16-1)>
=C2=A0       0x43 0x68 0x6c 0x6f 0xc3 0xab // "Chlo=C3=AB"
=C2=A0
Do we care that the '0x00 0x12' bytes on my third line above are
entirely redundant on the wire? Or have I interpreted it wrong?

I also find it interesting to note that the total permitted length of a
single PskIdentity (65539 bytes) is such that you might not be able to
fit even *one* of them into the PreSharedKeyIdentity extension at all,
let alone multiple such.

> > > 2. Why does the client send multiple identities? In TLS-SRP a single
> > > identity is sent, and the same in the existing TLS-PSK rfc. How is th=
is
> > > envisioned to be used? A client sends: I'm probably one of Bob, Nikos=
,
> > > George, take a look on that list and tell me who I really am? In that
> > > case why not allow the server, to reply with a username outside that
> > > list (i.e., assign a new one to be used at the next session - see poi=
nt
> > > 1).
> > You already need multiple if you try to "resume"[1] DHE-PSK session
> > (since "resumption" shares the PSK space).
>=20
> That's very awkward. That way the protocol mandates code like:
>=20
> if (!id_in_resumption_db()) {
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 if (!valid_ticket())
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 if (!try_find_user_in_psk_userfile())
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 proceed_with_random_psk(); /* hide the fact t=
hat username
> doesn't exist in db */
> }
>=20
> which is not really sane code. Not only that, but servers who would
> like to prevent valid username testing in their PSK key file as above,
> would be forced to make resumption attempts with unknown or long-
> expired tickets fail.
>=20
> A protocol must have clarity on the data sent on the wire and their
> purpose. Cross protocol attacks work by exploiting data which may be
> interpreted in multiple ways and such generic purpose identifiers seem
> to be like a good candidate for that.
>=20
> I think at minimum identities known to the protocol (e.g., resumption)
> should be distinguishable from PSK usernames. The draft leaves that to
> the server implementor to do, but I do think such identifiers should be
> tagged at the protocol level since it affects all implementations.
>=20
> >=20
> > 3. The maximum size of the username is 2^16. Isn't that excessive
> > >=20
> > > for a
> > > user name or a user identifier? Why not set 2^8? That would fit a
> > > uuid
> > > or anything similarly large.
> > If one wants to do the equivalent of tickets in TLS 1.2, one needs
> > pretty large usernames.
>=20
> I find that, as another unfortunate side-effect of combining unrelated
> protocol fields.

Oh, it's more fun than that. RFC4279 =C2=A75.1 currently says that the PSK
identity MUST be a UTF-8 character string. Libraries such as OpenSSL
and GnuTLS already handle identities as NUL-terminated strings.

The current TLSv1.3 draft appears to relax that requirement without any
form of explicit compatibility note about it =E2=80=94 I'd expect to see *s=
ome*
mention in the 'Major Differences from TLS 1.2" section.

Perhaps one way to resolve much of this is to put the traditional PSK
identities into one PreSharedKeyExtension and maintain the UTF-8
requirement there, and to put the "identity" used for session
resumption into a different extension. Perhaps allowing the latter to
appear multiple times in a ClientHello and for their contents to be
concatenated, which partly addresses the problem of their total size.

Is there no way the PSK identities for session resumption could be made
smaller? Of the data which RFC5077 suggests that we put into a session
ticket (and thus the PSK identity), is there *none* of it which could
be sent later in a ClientKeyExchange packet? Does the server need *all*
of it, for every session being offered for resumption by the client, in
the ClientHello?


My final comment on the PSK identities for now... I see the TLSv1.3
draft now contains a PskKeyExchangeMode which is absent from the
(once-)corresponding=C2=A0draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension. It's not
entirely obvious to me how this interacts with the selected cipher
suite, which itself may or may not use (EC)DHE.

Is it permitted, and what is the meaning, to request a cipher suite of
(e.g.) TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA and set PskKeyExchangeMode in the
identity to 'psk_dhe_ke'? Or conversely, to use the cipher suite
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA with PskKeyExchangeMode set to
'psk_ke'?

This seems redundant to me at first glance (unless some combinations
really do mean that you end up doing DHE *twice*) and could probably do
with some clarification.

Or is the intent that when requesting offering both DHE and non-DHE
cipher suites, the client should offer *two* identities, one with each
possible value of PskKeyExchangeMode? In which case do we want a third
value for PskKeyExchangeMode which indicates that a given identity may
be used in either mode?

--=20
David Woodhouse                            Open Source Technology Centre
David.Woodhouse@intel.com                              Intel Corporation
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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On Saturday, 17 September 2016 01:04:07 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 4:29 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
>=20
> wrote:
> > At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be the
>=20
> very first extension advertised.
> I don't think it's a good idea to impose extension ordering requirements.
>=20
>=20
> Agreed. If we're concerned with the order, I suppose are other options li=
ke
> smuggling them in the front of the cipher list or hacky things like that.
>=20
> :-) But using extensions is cleaner, and still perfectly deployable.
> :
> > Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read the
>=20
> first two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code path on
> the spot.
> Yes, these implementations (Windows TLS stack included) will need to do
> more elaborate/slightly slower pre-parsing if we use TLS version
> negotiation via TLS extension(s). Not something I like, but can be done.
>=20
>=20
> TLS already does not strictly permit sniff-based implementations like thi=
s.
> A handshake message may be fragmented pathologically or even interspersed
> with warning alerts. It's doable if you reject such fragmentations (no one
> would send a ClientHello this way...), but you need to be careful because
> this fragmentation does not figure into the handshake transcript. In
> particular, you cannot have an else clause in your dispatch. The dispatch=
er
> must reject anything it can't definitively resolve rather than blindly
> forward to your pre-TLS-1.3 implementation.

I don't see how that prevents streaming implementation - warning alerts is=
=20
something you can handle in the dispatcher (though I'm not sure why it's=20
something you should worry /before/ the first client hello received), then =
to=20
the specific implementation you pass the buffer with current record and the=
=20
socket, the first of which may be empty if the record boundary landed right=
=20
after the client_version
=20
> CVE-2014-3511 is an example of OpenSSL's 1.0.x sniff-based implementation
> going wrong (OpenSSL 1.1.x is no longer sniff-based). It is a particularly
> silly instance, but it's the sort of failure mode you can get.
>=20
> Further, with the current trajectory, TLS 1.3 servers will need to do
> version-negotiation based on extensions anyway. All the various
> implementors have been using this "draft_version" extension to experiment
> with TLS 1.3. (draft_version is really just a worse version of this
> proposal.)
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#version-negotiat=
ion

for experimental implementations memory usage is not such a big problem, it=
's=20
not the case for everybody

> I don't think anyone has actually enabled client code by default yet, but
> once anyone does, servers will need to process extensions for versioning
> until draft TLS 1.3 clients are out of the ecosystem. This seems the worst
> of both worlds. We'll have extensions in versioning and an undeployable
> protocol. I think we should go for the latter and, if we must have the
> former, at least do it properly.

hmm, what if we did define both mechanisms? so that clients that worry abou=
t=20
compatibility with the broken servers can advertise TLSv1.3 through extensi=
on=20
while ones that don't, advertise through client_version?

similar to how secure renegotiation indication works

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 04:41:06 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 2:49 AM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
wrote:

> On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 10:29 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> > On Mon, 2016-08-08 at 11:28 +0300, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> > > More compact and makes the option where server sends some bad option
> > > more clear.
>
> Note that if we really want to be more compact, we might also observe
> that there is a redundant length field in the extension as sent by the
> client:
>            case client_hello:
>                PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;
>
> Each extension has at least four bytes on the wire =E2=80=94 the extensio=
n_type
> itself, and the length field of the extension_data in a uint16.
>
> If I am interpreting the spec correctly, then the data for the
> PreSharedKeyIdentity extension in the ClientHello then follows that
> with another uint16, which is *always* a value two lower than the one
> which immediately precedes it.
>
> e.g.
>
>   0x00 0x29      // ExtensionType extension_type =3D=3D 41
>   0x00 0x14      // opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>
>     // This length field is entirely redundant:
>     0x00 0x12      // PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>
>                      // First identity:
>       0x00 0x00      // PskKeyExchangeMode, PskAuthenticationMode
>       0x00 0x04      // opaque identity<0..2^16-1>
>         0x44 0x61 0x76 0x65 // "Dave"
>                      // Second identity:
>       0x00 0x00      // PskKeyExchangeMode, PskAuthenticationMode
>       0x00 0x06      // opaque identity<0..2^16-1)>
>         0x43 0x68 0x6c 0x6f 0xc3 0xab // "Chlo=C3=AB"
>
> Do we care that the '0x00 0x12' bytes on my third line above are
> entirely redundant on the wire? Or have I interpreted it wrong?
>

Not enough to fix it, this is just the way TLS rolls.



> Is there no way the PSK identities for session resumption could be made
> smaller? Of the data which RFC5077 suggests that we put into a session
> ticket (and thus the PSK identity), is there *none* of it which could
> be sent later in a ClientKeyExchange packet?


No. Also, there isn't a CKE record in TLS 1.3. All information needed to
derive
the key needs to be in the CH.


Is it permitted, and what is the meaning, to request a cipher suite of
> (e.g.) TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA and set PskKeyExchangeMode in the
> identity to 'psk_dhe_ke'? Or conversely, to use the cipher suite
> TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA with PskKeyExchangeMode set to
> 'psk_ke'?
>
> This seems redundant to me at first glance (unless some combinations
> really do mean that you end up doing DHE *twice*) and could probably do
> with some clarification.
>

TLS 1.3 cipher suites do not convey key exchange mode, just AED and KDF. Se=
e
https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#cryptographic-negotiation for an
overview of
negotiation.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 2:49 AM, David Woodhouse <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dwmw2@infradead.org" target=3D"_blank">dwmw2@infradead.or=
g</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><span class=3D"gmail-">On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 10:29 +0200, Nikos Mavrogian=
nopoulos wrote:<br>
&gt; On Mon, 2016-08-08 at 11:28 +0300, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:<br>
</span><span class=3D"gmail-">&gt; &gt; More compact and makes the option w=
here server sends some bad option<br>
&gt; &gt; more clear.<br>
<br>
</span>Note that if we really want to be more compact, we might also observ=
e<br>
that there is a redundant length field in the extension as sent by the<br>
client:<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0case clie=
nt_hello:<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0PskIdentity identities&lt;6..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
<br>
Each extension has at least four bytes on the wire =E2=80=94 the extension_=
type<br>
itself, and the length field of the extension_data in a uint16.<br>
<br>
If I am interpreting the spec correctly, then the data for the<br>
PreSharedKeyIdentity extension in the ClientHello then follows that<br>
with another uint16, which is *always* a value two lower than the one<br>
which immediately precedes it.<br>
<br>
e.g.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 0x00 0x29 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// ExtensionType extension_type =3D=3D=
 41<br>
=C2=A0 0x00 0x14 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// opaque extension_data&lt;0..2^16-1&=
gt;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 // This length field is entirely redundant:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 0x00 0x12 =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0// PskIdentity identities&=
lt;6..2^16-1&gt;<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
=C2=A0 // First identity:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 0x00 0x00 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 // PskKeyExchangeMode, P=
skAuthenticationMode<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A00x00 0x04=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 // opaque identity&=
lt;0..2^16-1&gt;<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A00x44 0x61 0x76 0x65 // &quot;Dave&quot;<br=
>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 // Second identity:<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A00x00 0x00=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 // PskKeyExchangeMo=
de, PskAuthenticationMode<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A00x00 0x06=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 // opaque identity&=
lt;0..2^16-1)&gt;<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A00x43 0x68 0x6c 0x6f 0xc3 0xab // &quot;Chl=
o=C3=AB&quot;<br>
=C2=A0<br>
Do we care that the &#39;0x00 0x12&#39; bytes on my third line above are<br=
>
entirely redundant on the wire? Or have I interpreted it wrong?<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>Not enough to fix it, this is just the way TLS rol=
ls.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex">
Is there no way the PSK identities for session resumption could be made<br>
smaller? Of the data which RFC5077 suggests that we put into a session<br>
ticket (and thus the PSK identity), is there *none* of it which could<br>
be sent later in a ClientKeyExchange packet? </blockquote><div><br></div><d=
iv>No. Also, there isn&#39;t a CKE record in TLS 1.3. All information neede=
d to derive</div><div>the key needs to be in the CH.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Is it permitted, and what is the meaning, to request a cipher suite of<br>
(e.g.) TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA and set PskKeyExchangeMode in the<br>
identity to &#39;psk_dhe_ke&#39;? Or conversely, to use the cipher suite<br=
>
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_<wbr>SHA with PskKeyExchangeMode set to<br>
&#39;psk_ke&#39;?<br>
<br>
This seems redundant to me at first glance (unless some combinations<br>
really do mean that you end up doing DHE *twice*) and could probably do<br>
with some clarification.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>TLS 1.3 cipher=
 suites do not convey key exchange mode, just AED and KDF. See</div><div><a=
 href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#cryptographic-negotiation">htt=
ps://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#cryptographic-negotiation</a> for an overv=
iew of<br></div><div>negotiation.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div></div>=
</div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 04:41 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > Do we care that the '0x00 0x12' bytes on my third line above are
> > entirely redundant on the wire? Or have I interpreted it wrong?
>=20
> Not enough to fix it, this is just the way TLS rolls.

An interesting contrast to Nikos's observation that using the index in
the response is "used nowhere else in TLS" =E2=80=94 which he could have
phrased using similar words. But I suppose in that case you're saving a
*lot* more than two bytes in the ServerHello, so it makes sense to
deviate from "the way TLS rolls" :)
=C2=A0
> > Is there no way the PSK identities for session resumption could be made
> > smaller? Of the data which RFC5077 suggests that we put into a session
> > ticket (and thus the PSK identity), is there *none* of it which could
> > be sent later in a ClientKeyExchange packet?=20
>=20
> No. Also, there isn't a CKE record in TLS 1.3. All information needed to =
derive
> the key needs to be in the CH.

Well, that was kind of my point. Information needed to derive the *key*
needs to be in the ClientHello.

But if it's auxiliary information which isn't actually *needed* to
derive the key or to select which {identity to use,session to resume},
then perhaps the client could be required to supply it afterwards.
And then the client only needs to supply one copy of it for the
identity which the server actually selected, not one for *each*
identity which was being offered by the client.

But OK, if none of the information included by RFC5077 is in that
category then we really do need to cope with PSK identity fields which
can theoretically *each* be larger than the amount you can fit into a
single TLS extension...


I share Nikos's concern about using the PSK identity for two completely
different types of identifiers =E2=80=94 especially given that one type has
historically been defined as UTF-8 text, while the other is binary.

The reason I care about this right now is that we're looking at using
PSK to bootstrap a DTLS connection in the context of an SSL VPN,
currently using DTLS 1.2 and draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension. And
the binary nature of 'session resumption' PSK identities will have an
effect on the crypto library APIs used to manage that =E2=80=94 which as I
said, currently assume that they can use NUL-terminated strings.

So it would be useful to have some clarity on the UTF-8 requirement
from RFC4279, and whether it's being completely abandoned with TLS 1.3.

> > Is it permitted, and what is the meaning, to request a cipher suite of
> > (e.g.) TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA and set PskKeyExchangeMode in the
> > identity to 'psk_dhe_ke'? Or conversely, to use the cipher suite
> > TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA with PskKeyExchangeMode set to
> > 'psk_ke'?
> >=20
> > This seems redundant to me at first glance (unless some combinations
> > really do mean that you end up doing DHE *twice*) and could probably do
> > with some clarification.
>=20
> TLS 1.3 cipher suites do not convey key exchange mode, just AED and KDF. =
See
> https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#cryptographic-negotiation for an over=
view of
> negotiation.

Ah, thanks. That makes more sense now.

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 05:46:09 -0700
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To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 5:26 AM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
wrote:

> On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 04:41 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > Do we care that the '0x00 0x12' bytes on my third line above are
> > > entirely redundant on the wire? Or have I interpreted it wrong?
> >
> > Not enough to fix it, this is just the way TLS rolls.
>
> An interesting contrast to Nikos's observation that using the index in
> the response is "used nowhere else in TLS" =E2=80=94 which he could have
> phrased using similar words. But I suppose in that case you're saving a
> *lot* more than two bytes in the ServerHello, so it makes sense to
> deviate from "the way TLS rolls" :)
>

Yes.


> > Is there no way the PSK identities for session resumption could be made
> > > smaller? Of the data which RFC5077 suggests that we put into a sessio=
n
> > > ticket (and thus the PSK identity), is there *none* of it which could
> > > be sent later in a ClientKeyExchange packet?
> >
> > No. Also, there isn't a CKE record in TLS 1.3. All information needed t=
o
> derive
> > the key needs to be in the CH.
>
> Well, that was kind of my point. Information needed to derive the *key*
> needs to be in the ClientHello.
>
> But if it's auxiliary information which isn't actually *needed* to
> derive the key or to select which {identity to use,session to resume},
> then perhaps the client could be required to supply it afterwards.
>

You need the complete ticket to make sensible decisions.


And then the client only needs to supply one copy of it for the
> identity which the server actually selected, not one for *each*
> identity which was being offered by the client.
>

We're most likely going to allow only on PSK anyway.


I share Nikos's concern about using the PSK identity for two completely
> different types of identifiers =E2=80=94 especially given that one type h=
as
> historically been defined as UTF-8 text, while the other is binary.
>
> The reason I care about this right now is that we're looking at using
> PSK to bootstrap a DTLS connection in the context of an SSL VPN,
> currently using DTLS 1.2 and draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension.


I recommend against this: I very much doubt that we are going to adopt this
draft in TLS.


So it would be useful to have some clarity on the UTF-8 requirement
> from RFC4279, and whether it's being completely abandoned with TLS 1.3.
>

It's being abandoned. PR welcome.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 5:26 AM, David Woodhouse <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dwmw2@infradead.org" target=3D"_blank">dwmw2@infradead.or=
g</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">=
On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 04:41 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; Do we care that the &#39;0x00 0x12&#39; bytes on my third line ab=
ove are<br>
&gt; &gt; entirely redundant on the wire? Or have I interpreted it wrong?<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Not enough to fix it, this is just the way TLS rolls.<br>
<br>
</span>An interesting contrast to Nikos&#39;s observation that using the in=
dex in<br>
the response is &quot;used nowhere else in TLS&quot; =E2=80=94 which he cou=
ld have<br>
phrased using similar words. But I suppose in that case you&#39;re saving a=
<br>
*lot* more than two bytes in the ServerHello, so it makes sense to<br>
deviate from &quot;the way TLS rolls&quot; :)<br></blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>Yes.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x"><span class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; Is there no way the PSK identities for session resumption could b=
e made<br>
&gt; &gt; smaller? Of the data which RFC5077 suggests that we put into a se=
ssion<br>
&gt; &gt; ticket (and thus the PSK identity), is there *none* of it which c=
ould<br>
&gt; &gt; be sent later in a ClientKeyExchange packet?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; No. Also, there isn&#39;t a CKE record in TLS 1.3. All information nee=
ded to derive<br>
&gt; the key needs to be in the CH.<br>
<br>
</span>Well, that was kind of my point. Information needed to derive the *k=
ey*<br>
needs to be in the ClientHello.<br>
<br>
But if it&#39;s auxiliary information which isn&#39;t actually *needed* to<=
br>
derive the key or to select which {identity to use,session to resume},<br>
then perhaps the client could be required to supply it afterwards.<br></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>You need the complete ticket to make sensible d=
ecisions.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
>
And then the client only needs to supply one copy of it for the<br>
identity which the server actually selected, not one for *each*<br>
identity which was being offered by the client.<br></blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>We&#39;re most likely going to allow only on PSK anyway.</div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
I share Nikos&#39;s concern about using the PSK identity for two completely=
<br>
different types of identifiers =E2=80=94 especially given that one type has=
<br>
historically been defined as UTF-8 text, while the other is binary.<br>
<br>
The reason I care about this right now is that we&#39;re looking at using<b=
r>
PSK to bootstrap a DTLS connection in the context of an SSL VPN,<br>
currently using DTLS 1.2 and draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-<wbr>extension.</bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>I recommend against this: I very much doubt th=
at we are going to adopt this</div><div>draft in TLS.</div><div><br></div><=
div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
So it would be useful to have some clarity on the UTF-8 requirement<br>
from RFC4279, and whether it&#39;s being completely abandoned with TLS 1.3.=
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s being abandoned. PR welcome.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr<br></div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Client certificate alerts
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On Saturday, 17 September 2016 20:09:40 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi folks,
>=20
> We've run into some problems with client certificate alerts in Chrome that
> I'd like to fix going forward.
>=20
> The first is easy. handshake_failure is an unhelpful alert for server whi=
ch
> required client certs. This confuses users, so we're planning to
> heuristically map it to a client certificate error if it's received after
> declining to send certs. This seems poor, so I've uploaded this PR which
> adds a certificate_required alert:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/640

+1=20

> Second, there is the access_denied alert. This alert has an unfortunate
> name. Per spec, it is for:
>=20
>    access_denied
>       A valid certificate [TLS1.3: or PSK] was received, but when access
> control was
>       applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.  This
>       message is always fatal.
>=20
> Accordingly, Chrome maps it to a client certificate error. But, by the na=
me
> alone, it sounds much more general. We're seeing evidence of some kind of
> network filtering software mistakenly sending it to block a connection. (I
> can't blame them too much, since we ourselves mistook it for an alert to
> send in a server-side DoS handler! This has since been fixed.)
>=20
> From an unscientific survey of recent Chrome user complaints about this
> error, this is twice as prominent as actual client cert errors! So we'll
> want to add another heuristic: if we see access_denied without a
> CertificateRequest, map it to a more generic TLS error. This also seems
> worth fixing going forward.
>=20
> Does anyone actually send this alert? OpenSSL does not appear to.

I've done a quick survey of about 60 servers, given the different=20
intolerancies and limits they appear to have. Just that 60 servers were=20
handled by at least a dozen different implementations, 2 of which were uniq=
ue=20
and unless people already deployed 1.1.0 in droves, the dominant=20
implementation didn't look like OpenSSL.

So I don't think we should guide ourselves with what OpenSSL does or doesn'=
t=20
do.

> My best
> rename is certificate_denied if we drop 1.3's "or PSK", but perhaps we can
> remove the alert completely? You haven't gotten application data yet, so
> you don't really have anything to apply access control on, particularly f=
or
> PSK. (For certs, there's post-handshake auth, but I would think you'd send
> an application-level error there?)

if it was already misused by multiple people, deprecating it and creating a=
=20
new one probably is a good idea to make it unambiguous.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 05:46 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>=20
> > And then the client only needs to supply one copy of it for the
> > identity which the server actually selected, not one for *each*
> > identity which was being offered by the client.
>=20
> We're most likely going to allow only on PSK anyway.

You mean "only one", I assume?

What if my client authenticates with an actual pre-shared key, and I
also want to resume a session? As it stands, that means I really do
need to offer two PSK identities =E2=80=94 one for the real identity, and o=
ne
for the session resumption attempt. Are you saying that won't be
permitted?

Or do we stop to stop conflating the two types of PSK-identity, so that
we can allow only one of each?

> > I share Nikos's concern about using the PSK identity for two completely
> > different types of identifiers =E2=80=94 especially given that one type=
 has
> > historically been defined as UTF-8 text, while the other is binary.
> >=20
> > The reason I care about this right now is that we're looking at using
> > PSK to bootstrap a DTLS connection in the context of an SSL VPN,
> > currently using DTLS 1.2 and draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension.
>=20
> I recommend against this: I very much doubt that we are going to adopt th=
is
> draft in TLS.

That is useful feedback; thank you. Although I'm slightly confused =E2=80=
=94
although the draft is out of date, I thought the point of it was to
simply document what you *are* adopting in TLS1.3, for use in TLS1.2.
Are you saying that the extension will never be retroactively 'blessed'
for TLS1.2 even when it's part of TLS1.3?

What we're trying to do is move away from the existing model, inherited
from Cisco AnyConnect, where the DTLS ciphersuite is negotiated out-of-
band along with a master secret, and then we 'resume' a DTLS session
that never really existed.

It took us a *long* time to gain support for DTLS1.2 and AEAD cipher
suites because of that, and it would be much better just to let DTLS
negotiate as $DEITY intended.

But the architecture of our server is such that it *really* wants to
know from the very first ClientHello packet which client it's talking
to, so that the packet can be dispatched to the correct worker
process.=C2=A0

The first prototype of this continued to abuse the Session-ID to
identify the client =E2=80=94 making it *look* like a session resume attemp=
t
when in fact we weren't prepared to resume the session at all, and we
rely on the server *not* doing so.

I kind of threw my toys out of the pram at that=C2=A0=E2=80=94 if we're goi=
ng to
attempt to use the protocol properly, then I really do want to do it
*properly*. Hence the interest in draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension.

If that's not going to be viable, then I'm starting to wonder if we
should just wait for DTLS1.3. After all we *already* support the fun
parts of DTLS1.2, and AEAD ciphersuites, so there's no desperate rush
to start using proper negotiation.

--=C2=A0
dwmw2
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On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 7:07 AM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
wrote:

> On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 05:46 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >
> > > And then the client only needs to supply one copy of it for the
> > > identity which the server actually selected, not one for *each*
> > > identity which was being offered by the client.
> >
> > We're most likely going to allow only on PSK anyway.
>
> You mean "only one", I assume?
>

Yes.



> What if my client authenticates with an actual pre-shared key, and I
> also want to resume a session? As it stands, that means I really do
> need to offer two PSK identities =E2=80=94 one for the real identity, and=
 one
> for the session resumption attempt. Are you saying that won't be
> permitted?
>

I should start by saying that it's not entirely clear why this is useful.
Can you elaborate?


Or do we stop to stop conflating the two types of PSK-identity, so that
> we can allow only one of each?


That doesn't address the reasons for only allowing one, unfortunately. See
the thread on Finished stuffing.



> > > I share Nikos's concern about using the PSK identity for two complete=
ly
> > > different types of identifiers =E2=80=94 especially given that one ty=
pe has
> > > historically been defined as UTF-8 text, while the other is binary.
> > >
> > > The reason I care about this right now is that we're looking at using
> > > PSK to bootstrap a DTLS connection in the context of an SSL VPN,
> > > currently using DTLS 1.2 and draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension.
> >
> > I recommend against this: I very much doubt that we are going to adopt
> this
> > draft in TLS.
>
> That is useful feedback; thank you. Although I'm slightly confused =E2=80=
=94
> although the draft is out of date, I thought the point of it was to
> simply document what you *are* adopting in TLS1.3, for use in TLS1.2.
>
Are you saying that the extension will never be retroactively 'blessed'
> for TLS1.2 even when it's part of TLS1.3?
>

I can't speak for the motivations of the authors of this draft. It's not a
WG
item. However, I'm not generally in favor of backporting pieces of TLS 1.3
into 1.2
like this.


What we're trying to do is move away from the existing model, inherited
> from Cisco AnyConnect, where the DTLS ciphersuite is negotiated out-of-
> band along with a master secret, and then we 'resume' a DTLS session
> that never really existed.
>
> It took us a *long* time to gain support for DTLS1.2 and AEAD cipher
> suites because of that, and it would be much better just to let DTLS
> negotiate as $DEITY intended.
>
> But the architecture of our server is such that it *really* wants to
> know from the very first ClientHello packet which client it's talking
> to, so that the packet can be dispatched to the correct worker
> process.
>
> The first prototype of this continued to abuse the Session-ID to
> identify the client =E2=80=94 making it *look* like a session resume atte=
mpt
> when in fact we weren't prepared to resume the session at all, and we
> rely on the server *not* doing so.
>
> I kind of threw my toys out of the pram at that =E2=80=94 if we're going =
to
> attempt to use the protocol properly, then I really do want to do it
> *properly*. Hence the interest in draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension.
>
> If that's not going to be viable, then I'm starting to wonder if we
> should just wait for DTLS1.3. After all we *already* support the fun
> parts of DTLS1.2, and AEAD ciphersuites, so there's no desperate rush
> to start using proper negotiation.


I would address this either by:

1. Registering a new extension which is used to indicate the right worker
process, but using existing TLS 1.2 PSK.
2. Wait for DTLS 1.3.

-Ekr


> --
> dwmw2

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 7:07 AM, David Woodhouse <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dwmw2@infradead.org" target=3D"_blank">dwmw2@infradead.or=
g</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><span class=3D"gmail-">On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 05:46 -0700, Eric Rescorla w=
rote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; And then the client only needs to supply one copy of it for the<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; identity which the server actually selected, not one for *each*<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; identity which was being offered by the client.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; We&#39;re most likely going to allow only on PSK anyway.<br>
<br>
</span>You mean &quot;only one&quot;, I assume?<br></blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Yes.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">
What if my client authenticates with an actual pre-shared key, and I<br>
also want to resume a session? As it stands, that means I really do<br>
need to offer two PSK identities =E2=80=94 one for the real identity, and o=
ne<br>
for the session resumption attempt. Are you saying that won&#39;t be<br>
permitted?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I should start by saying tha=
t it&#39;s not entirely clear why this is useful.</div><div>Can you elabora=
te?</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">
Or do we stop to stop conflating the two types of PSK-identity, so that<br>
we can allow only one of each?</blockquote><div><br></div><div>That doesn&#=
39;t address the reasons for only allowing one, unfortunately. See</div><di=
v>the thread on Finished stuffing.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"gmail-">
&gt; &gt; I share Nikos&#39;s concern about using the PSK identity for two =
completely<br>
&gt; &gt; different types of identifiers =E2=80=94 especially given that on=
e type has<br>
&gt; &gt; historically been defined as UTF-8 text, while the other is binar=
y.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The reason I care about this right now is that we&#39;re looking =
at using<br>
&gt; &gt; PSK to bootstrap a DTLS connection in the context of an SSL VPN,<=
br>
&gt; &gt; currently using DTLS 1.2 and draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-<wbr>exte=
nsion.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I recommend against this: I very much doubt that we are going to adopt=
 this<br>
&gt; draft in TLS.<br>
<br>
</span>That is useful feedback; thank you. Although I&#39;m slightly confus=
ed =E2=80=94<br>
although the draft is out of date, I thought the point of it was to<br>
simply document what you *are* adopting in TLS1.3, for use in TLS1.2.<br></=
blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Are you saying=
 that the extension will never be retroactively &#39;blessed&#39;<br>
for TLS1.2 even when it&#39;s part of TLS1.3?<br></blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>I can&#39;t speak for the motivations of the authors of this draft. =
It&#39;s not a WG</div><div>item. However, I&#39;m not generally in favor o=
f backporting pieces of TLS 1.3 into 1.2</div><div>like this.</div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
What we&#39;re trying to do is move away from the existing model, inherited=
<br>
from Cisco AnyConnect, where the DTLS ciphersuite is negotiated out-of-<br>
band along with a master secret, and then we &#39;resume&#39; a DTLS sessio=
n<br>
that never really existed.<br>
<br>
It took us a *long* time to gain support for DTLS1.2 and AEAD cipher<br>
suites because of that, and it would be much better just to let DTLS<br>
negotiate as $DEITY intended.<br>
<br>
But the architecture of our server is such that it *really* wants to<br>
know from the very first ClientHello packet which client it&#39;s talking<b=
r>
to, so that the packet can be dispatched to the correct worker<br>
process.=C2=A0<br>
<br>
The first prototype of this continued to abuse the Session-ID to<br>
identify the client =E2=80=94 making it *look* like a session resume attemp=
t<br>
when in fact we weren&#39;t prepared to resume the session at all, and we<b=
r>
rely on the server *not* doing so.<br>
<br>
I kind of threw my toys out of the pram at that=C2=A0=E2=80=94 if we&#39;re=
 going to<br>
attempt to use the protocol properly, then I really do want to do it<br>
*properly*. Hence the interest in draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-<wbr>extension=
.<br>
<br>
If that&#39;s not going to be viable, then I&#39;m starting to wonder if we=
<br>
should just wait for DTLS1.3. After all we *already* support the fun<br>
parts of DTLS1.2, and AEAD ciphersuites, so there&#39;s no desperate rush<b=
r>
to start using proper negotiation.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I would =
address this either by:</div><div><br></div><div>1. Registering a new exten=
sion which is used to indicate the right worker</div><div>process, but usin=
g existing TLS 1.2 PSK.</div><div>2. Wait for DTLS 1.3.</div><div><br></div=
><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex"><span class=3D"gmail-HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--=C2=A0<br>
dwmw2</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 07:55 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > What if my client authenticates with an actual pre-shared key, and I
> > also want to resume a session? As it stands, that means I really do
> > need to offer two PSK identities =E2=80=94 one for the real identity, a=
nd one
> > for the session resumption attempt. Are you saying that won't be
> > permitted?
>=20
> I should start by saying that it's not entirely clear why this is useful.
> Can you elaborate?

I should start by pointing out that I have no personal *need* for this;
it just seems strange and wrong to forbid it.

I assume you're not asking why one would use PSK in the first place, in
place of public keys? I think the introduction to RFC4279 fairly much
covers that and is still relevant.

So I interpret your question as asking why it's useful to *resume* a
session which was initiated with PSK?

Even though the cryptographic operations are basically the same =E2=80=94
there's none of the heavyweight asymmetric key operations, it's also
the case that resumed sessions may carry more application-specific
context than a newly-authenticated connection.=C2=A0

Consider IMAP, as an example. It has a large amount of per-connection
state. This *could* be maintained even when the client disconnects =E2=80=
=94
you can imagine a mobile client which resumes an existing TLS session
and is *immediately* presented with all the status updates which have
occurred since it disconnected, without any need for re-building the
application-session state (or using any of the protocol extensions like
QRESYNC which help to reduce the connection startup time).

(Note: I'm not suggesting a *stateless* resume could do that.)

Perhaps I should turn your question round, and ask: if PSK is a first-
class citizen as a key exchange and authentication method, why *should*
we be forbidden from resuming sessions which started that way... just
because you've chosen to conflate PSK identities and session resumption
on the wire? :)

> > Or do we [need] to stop conflating the two types of PSK-identity, so th=
at
> > we can allow only one of each?
>=20
> That doesn't address the reasons for only allowing one, unfortunately. Se=
e
> the thread on Finished stuffing.

OK, I'll read up on that; thanks.

> I would address this either by:
>=20
> 1. Registering a new extension which is used to indicate the right worker
> process, but using existing TLS 1.2 PSK.

OK... except this basically *is* the PSK identity. So the new extension
we'd want to register, if we want to make it something that's useful in
the general case rather than an application-specific hack, *is*
basically draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension :)

If we do anything else, we might as well stick with some of the horrid
hacks we already have (like abusing the session-id and not actually
*resuming* that session).

> 2. Wait for DTLS 1.3.

It's certainly *tempting* to manually add chacha20 to our ever-growing
list and *then* wait for DTLS1.3 :)

--=20
dwmw2
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 09:53:57 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 8:37 AM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
wrote:

> On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 07:55 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > What if my client authenticates with an actual pre-shared key, and I
> > > also want to resume a session? As it stands, that means I really do
> > > need to offer two PSK identities =E2=80=94 one for the real identity,=
 and one
> > > for the session resumption attempt. Are you saying that won't be
> > > permitted?
> >
> > I should start by saying that it's not entirely clear why this is usefu=
l.
> > Can you elaborate?
>
> I should start by pointing out that I have no personal *need* for this;
> it just seems strange and wrong to forbid it
>
> I assume you're not asking why one would use PSK in the first place, in
> place of public keys? I think the introduction to RFC4279 fairly much
> covers that and is still relevant.
>
> So I interpret your question as asking why it's useful to *resume* a
> session which was initiated with PSK?
>

Yes.



Even though the cryptographic operations are basically the same =E2=80=94
> there's none of the heavyweight asymmetric key operations, it's also
> the case that resumed sessions may carry more application-specific
> context than a newly-authenticated connection.
>
> Consider IMAP, as an example. It has a large amount of per-connection
> state. This *could* be maintained even when the client disconnects =E2=80=
=94
> you can imagine a mobile client which resumes an existing TLS session
> and is *immediately* presented with all the status updates which have
> occurred since it disconnected, without any need for re-building the
> application-session state (or using any of the protocol extensions like
> QRESYNC which help to reduce the connection startup time).
>
> (Note: I'm not suggesting a *stateless* resume could do that.)
>

This doesn't seem like the kind of behavior we want to encourage in
applications.


Perhaps I should turn your question round, and ask: if PSK is a first-
> class citizen as a key exchange and authentication method, why *should*

we be forbidden from resuming sessions which started that way...


Well, I'm not saying you can't do that. As I said, you can use HRR if the
resumption
fails.


just
> because you've chosen to conflate PSK identities and session resumption
> on the wire? :)
>

As I said before, that's not the reason to restrict to a single identity.


> I would address this either by:
> >
> > 1. Registering a new extension which is used to indicate the right work=
er
> > process, but using existing TLS 1.2 PSK.
>
> OK... except this basically *is* the PSK identity. So the new extension
> we'd want to register, if we want to make it something that's useful in
> the general case rather than an application-specific hack, *is*
> basically draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension :)
>

No, I don't think that's true. That extension also attempts to actually
negotiate the keys in that layer. I'm just talking about a hint.

-Ekr

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Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 8:37 AM, David Woodhouse <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dwmw2@infradead.org" target=3D"_blank">dwmw2@infradead.or=
g</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">=
On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 07:55 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; What if my client authenticates with an actual pre-shared key, an=
d I<br>
&gt; &gt; also want to resume a session? As it stands, that means I really =
do<br>
&gt; &gt; need to offer two PSK identities =E2=80=94 one for the real ident=
ity, and one<br>
&gt; &gt; for the session resumption attempt. Are you saying that won&#39;t=
 be<br>
&gt; &gt; permitted?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I should start by saying that it&#39;s not entirely clear why this is =
useful.<br>
&gt; Can you elaborate?<br>
<br>
</span>I should start by pointing out that I have no personal *need* for th=
is;<br>
it just seems strange and wrong to forbid it<br>
<br>
I assume you&#39;re not asking why one would use PSK in the first place, in=
<br>
place of public keys? I think the introduction to RFC4279 fairly much<br>
covers that and is still relevant.<br>
<br>
So I interpret your question as asking why it&#39;s useful to *resume* a<br=
>
session which was initiated with PSK?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Y=
es.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex">
Even though the cryptographic operations are basically the same =E2=80=94<b=
r>
there&#39;s none of the heavyweight asymmetric key operations, it&#39;s als=
o<br>
the case that resumed sessions may carry more application-specific<br>
context than a newly-authenticated connection.=C2=A0<br>
<br>
Consider IMAP, as an example. It has a large amount of per-connection<br>
state. This *could* be maintained even when the client disconnects =E2=80=
=94<br>
you can imagine a mobile client which resumes an existing TLS session<br>
and is *immediately* presented with all the status updates which have<br>
occurred since it disconnected, without any need for re-building the<br>
application-session state (or using any of the protocol extensions like<br>
QRESYNC which help to reduce the connection startup time).<br>
<br>
(Note: I&#39;m not suggesting a *stateless* resume could do that.)<br></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>This doesn&#39;t seem like the kind of behavior=
 we want to encourage in applications.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Perhaps I should turn your question round, and ask: if PSK is a first-<br>
class citizen as a key exchange and authentication method, why *should*</bl=
ockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
we be forbidden from resuming sessions which started that way... </blockquo=
te><div><br></div><div>Well, I&#39;m not saying you can&#39;t do that. As I=
 said, you can use HRR if the resumption</div><div>fails.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">just<br>
because you&#39;ve chosen to conflate PSK identities and session resumption=
<br>
on the wire? :)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As I said before, that&=
#39;s not the reason to restrict to a single identity.</div><div><br></div>=
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt; I would address this either by:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1. Registering a new extension which is used to indicate the right wor=
ker<br>
&gt; process, but using existing TLS 1.2 PSK.<br>
<br>
</span>OK... except this basically *is* the PSK identity. So the new extens=
ion<br>
we&#39;d want to register, if we want to make it something that&#39;s usefu=
l in<br>
the general case rather than an application-specific hack, *is*<br>
basically draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-<wbr>extension :)<br></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>No, I don&#39;t think that&#39;s true. That extension also =
attempts to actually</div><div>negotiate the keys in that layer. I&#39;m ju=
st talking about a hint.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div></div><br></div=
></div>

--001a1142153cd57aff053cdf2a3f--


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Thanks for the discussion.  We=E2=80=99re going to ask ekr to merge this =
one (obviously dealing with the additional input provided during the =
discussion).

J&S

> On Sep 06, 2016, at 17:33, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> All,
>=20
> The chairs would like to get some eyes on this PR by this Friday (Sept =
9th) so that we can draw it to close.
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> J&S
>=20
>> On Sep 05, 2016, at 14:02, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
>>=20
>> Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under =
various
>> fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but =
instead
>> just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we =
should relax
>> the requirement.
>>=20
>> At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead =
encourage
>> sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a =
specific one.
>> I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link =
above). This
>> PR:
>>=20
>> - Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I =
missed
>>  a couple of places)
>> - Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert =
descriptions to avoid
>>  having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
>> - Relaxes the requirement as listed above.
>>=20
>> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we =
decide to
>> continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one =
location not
>> scattered around the spec.
>>=20
>> I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the =
requirement to
>> send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to =
handle this PR.=20
>>=20
>> -Ekr
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 09:53 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > Perhaps I should turn your question round, and ask: if PSK is a first-
> > class citizen as a key exchange and authentication method, why *should*
> > we be forbidden from resuming sessions which started that way...=20
>=20
> Well, I'm not saying you can't do that. As I said, you can use HRR if the=
 resumption
> fails.

I suppose that's an answer in the general case too, isn't it? If you
want to try multiple identities, you can just keep trying with HRR
until you find one that the server accepts.

In fact, it doesn't even need to be "keep trying until...".

You could still offer multiple PSK identities in the ClientHello, and
only offer a hello_finished MAC for the *first* (preferred) one. If the
server doesn't want that one, it can send a HRR with a
PreSharedKeyExtension that tells the client which one it *does* want.

You preserve the original behaviour of negotiating which PSK identity
to use, while also fixing the problem that limits you to just one.


 < ...context switching to my actual use case... >

> > > I would address this either by:
> > >
> > > 1. Registering a new extension which is used to indicate the right wo=
rker
> > > process, but using existing TLS 1.2 PSK.
> >=20
> > OK... except this basically *is* the PSK identity. So the new extension
> > we'd want to register, if we want to make it something that's useful in
> > the general case rather than an application-specific hack, *is*
> > basically draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension :)
>=20
> No, I don't think that's true. That extension also attempts to actually
> negotiate the keys in that layer. I'm just talking about a hint.

It's more than just a hint. It is saying precisely which client it is,
which has a 1:1 correspondence with which PSK it's using.

In theory it would work to use the existing identity in the
ClientKeyExchange in TLS1.2. However, in practice it becomes extremely
painful to do so because the ClientKeyExchange comes in too late.

It is purely a matter of software architecture =E2=80=94 the initial incomi=
ng
UDP packets reach a dispatcher that needs to hand the connection off to
the appropriate worker process for that client.... and *really* wants
to make that decision based on the ClientHello alone.

If we *start* the handshake in the main dispatcher and get to the point
of seeing the ClientKeyExchange, we have to hand over the partially-
completed handshake (or keep going and then hand over a fully-completed=20
handshake) to the appropriate worker. And in fact I don't even think
the dispatcher *has* the actual keys; only the identities so that it
knows where to dispatch connections to.

So I really do think that draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension was
*exactly* what I wanted. I don't care about *negotiating* the PSK
identity per se; I'm happy to support only one. It's purely about
*telling* the server, in the ClientHello, which identity I'm using.

I suppose I can just say 'screw it' and continue to abuse the
session-id for this without actually resuming a session :)

--=20
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 14:13:40 -0700
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To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 1:35 PM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
wrote:

> On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 09:53 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> > > > I would address this either by:
> > > >
> > > > 1. Registering a new extension which is used to indicate the right
> worker
> > > > process, but using existing TLS 1.2 PSK.
> > >
> > > OK... except this basically *is* the PSK identity. So the new extensi=
on
> > > we'd want to register, if we want to make it something that's useful =
in
> > > the general case rather than an application-specific hack, *is*
> > > basically draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension :)
> >
> > No, I don't think that's true. That extension also attempts to actually
> > negotiate the keys in that layer. I'm just talking about a hint.
>
> It's more than just a hint. It is saying precisely which client it is,
> which has a 1:1 correspondence with which PSK it's using.
>

Call it a promise, if you prefer. One that you fulfill with the CE.


It is purely a matter of software architecture =E2=80=94 the initial incomi=
ng
> UDP packets reach a dispatcher that needs to hand the connection off to
> the appropriate worker process for that client.... and *really* wants
> to make that decision based on the ClientHello alone.
>
> If we *start* the handshake in the main dispatcher and get to the point
> of seeing the ClientKeyExchange, we have to hand over the partially-
> completed handshake (or keep going and then hand over a fully-completed
> handshake) to the appropriate worker. And in fact I don't even think
> the dispatcher *has* the actual keys; only the identities so that it
> knows where to dispatch connections to.
>

See above. The key advantage of what I am proposing here is that it has
exactly the same cryptographic properties as current TLS-PSK, with the
indicator just serving as a routing-ID.


>
> So I really do think that draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension was
> *exactly* what I wanted. I don't care about *negotiating* the PSK
> identity per se; I'm happy to support only one. It's purely about
> *telling* the server, in the ClientHello, which identity I'm using.
>

See above.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 1:35 PM, David Woodhouse <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dwmw2@infradead.org" target=3D"_blank">dwmw2@infradead.or=
g</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">=
On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 09:53 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br><br></span></blo=
ckquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; &gt; I would address this either by:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; 1. Registering a new extension which is used to indicate the=
 right worker<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; process, but using existing TLS 1.2 PSK.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; OK... except this basically *is* the PSK identity. So the new ext=
ension<br>
&gt; &gt; we&#39;d want to register, if we want to make it something that&#=
39;s useful in<br>
&gt; &gt; the general case rather than an application-specific hack, *is*<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; basically draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-<wbr>extension :)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; No, I don&#39;t think that&#39;s true. That extension also attempts to=
 actually<br>
&gt; negotiate the keys in that layer. I&#39;m just talking about a hint.<b=
r>
<br>
</span>It&#39;s more than just a hint. It is saying precisely which client =
it is,<br>
which has a 1:1 correspondence with which PSK it&#39;s using.<br></blockquo=
te><div><br></div><div>Call it a promise, if you prefer. One that you fulfi=
ll with the CE.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex">
It is purely a matter of software architecture =E2=80=94 the initial incomi=
ng<br>
UDP packets reach a dispatcher that needs to hand the connection off to<br>
the appropriate worker process for that client.... and *really* wants<br>
to make that decision based on the ClientHello alone.<br>
<br>
If we *start* the handshake in the main dispatcher and get to the point<br>
of seeing the ClientKeyExchange, we have to hand over the partially-<br>
completed handshake (or keep going and then hand over a fully-completed<br>
handshake) to the appropriate worker. And in fact I don&#39;t even think<br=
>
the dispatcher *has* the actual keys; only the identities so that it<br>
knows where to dispatch connections to.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>See above. The key advantage of what I am proposing here is that it has</d=
iv><div>exactly the same cryptographic properties as current TLS-PSK, with =
the</div><div>indicator just serving as a routing-ID.</div><div>=C2=A0</div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
So I really do think that draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-<wbr>extension was<br>
*exactly* what I wanted. I don&#39;t care about *negotiating* the PSK<br>
identity per se; I&#39;m happy to support only one. It&#39;s purely about<b=
r>
*telling* the server, in the ClientHello, which identity I&#39;m using.<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>See above.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</=
div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

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From: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Should TLS 1.3 servers send "signature_algorithms" extensions
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/4BbciCpLCPnIFk3UodGFoY7DNPs>
Subject: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 servers send "signature_algorithms" extensions
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Hello,

There seems to be a conflict in the TLS 1.3 spec on whether servers should =
send "signature_algorithms" extension or not. In section 4.2.2 Signature Al=
gorithms<https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#signature-algorithms>, it says=
:
Servers which are authenticating via a certificate MUST indicate so by send=
ing the client an empty "signature_algorithms" extension.

But in section 8.2 MTI Extensions<https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#mti-e=
xtensions>, it says:
Servers MUST NOT send the "signature_algorithms" extension

So should a server send am empty "signature_algorithms" extension or not in=
 ServerHello?

Thank you!
Xiaoyin

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hello,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">There seems to be a conflict in the TLS 1.3 spec on =
whether servers should send &#8220;signature_algorithms&#8221; extension or=
 not. In section 4.2.2
<span lang=3D"EN"><a href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#signature-=
algorithms">Signature Algorithms</a></span>, it says:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><span lang=3D"EN" style=
=3D"color:#333333">Servers which are authenticating via a certificate MUST =
indicate so by sending the client an empty &#8220;signature_algorithms&#822=
1; extension.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"color:#333333"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"color:#333333">But in sec=
tion 8.2 </span>
<span lang=3D"EN"><a href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#mti-extens=
ions">MTI Extensions</a>, it says:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><span lang=3D"EN" style=
=3D"color:#333333">Servers MUST NOT send the &#8220;signature_algorithms&#8=
221; extension<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">So should a server send am empty &=
#8220;signature_algorithms&#8221; extension or not in ServerHello?<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">Thank you!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">Xiaoyin<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 16:12:43 -0700
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To: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 servers send "signature_algorithms" extensions
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On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 3:56 PM, Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com> wrote:

> Hello,
>
>
>
> There seems to be a conflict in the TLS 1.3 spec on whether servers shoul=
d
> send =E2=80=9Csignature_algorithms=E2=80=9D extension or not. In section =
4.2.2 Signature
> Algorithms <https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#signature-algorithms>, it
> says:
>
> Servers which are authenticating via a certificate MUST indicate so by
> sending the client an empty =E2=80=9Csignature_algorithms=E2=80=9D extens=
ion.
>
>
>
> But in section 8.2 MTI Extensions
> <https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#mti-extensions>, it says:
>
> Servers MUST NOT send the =E2=80=9Csignature_algorithms=E2=80=9D extensio=
n
>
>
>
> So should a server send am empty =E2=80=9Csignature_algorithms=E2=80=9D e=
xtension or not
> in ServerHello?
>

Section 8.2 is a bug in the spec. Servers need to send sig_algs if they are
signing.

David Benjamin has suggested an alternative encoding which I may put in a
future draft, but for -15, you need to send it.

-Ekr


>
> Thank you!
>
> Xiaoyin
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 3:56 PM, Xiaoyin Liu <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:xiaoyin.l@outlook.com" target=3D"_blank">xiaoyin.l@outlook.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hello,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">There seems to be a conflict in the TLS 1.3 spec on =
whether servers should send =E2=80=9Csignature_algorithms=E2=80=9D extensio=
n or not. In section 4.2.2
<span lang=3D"EN"><a href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#signature-=
algorithms" target=3D"_blank">Signature Algorithms</a></span>, it says:<u><=
/u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><span lang=3D"EN" style=
=3D"color:#333333">Servers which are authenticating via a certificate MUST =
indicate so by sending the client an empty =E2=80=9Csignature_algorithms=E2=
=80=9D extension.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"color:#333333"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"color:#333333">But in sec=
tion 8.2 </span>
<span lang=3D"EN"><a href=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#mti-extens=
ions" target=3D"_blank">MTI Extensions</a>, it says:<u></u><u></u></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><span lang=3D"EN" style=
=3D"color:#333333">Servers MUST NOT send the =E2=80=9Csignature_algorithms=
=E2=80=9D extension<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">So should a server send am empty =
=E2=80=9Csignature_algorithms=E2=80=9D extension or not in ServerHello?</sp=
an></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Section 8.2 is a bug in=
 the spec. Servers need to send sig_algs if they are signing.</div><div><br=
></div><div>David Benjamin has suggested an alternative encoding which I ma=
y put in a future draft, but for -15, you need to send it.</div><div><br></=
div><div>-Ekr<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div l=
ang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><span lang=3D"EN"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">Thank you!<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><=
font color=3D"#888888"><u></u><u></u></font></span></span></p><span class=
=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">Xiaoyin<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</font></span></div>
</div>

<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 servers send "signature_algorithms" extensions
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 17:53:35 -0700
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Please post a PR for this and see what the WG thinks.

On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:35 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
> wrote:

> Hi Ekr,
>
> I read through the text and I think it is an improvement.
>
> I only had one question that is only slightly related to your edits
> because it came up in the interop testing with the Mint implementation.
>
> "
> Servers requiring this extension SHOULD respond to a ClientHello
> lacking a "server_name" extension by terminating the connection
> with a "missing_extension" alert.
> "
>
> I personally would find it more useful to have an alert saying
> "missing_server_name_extension" instead of just returning
> "missing_extension" for a number of different extensions since this gives
> the client no chance to fix the problem without human intervention.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> On 09/05/2016 08:02 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
>>
>> Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under
>> various
>> fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but
>> instead
>> just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we should
>> relax
>> the requirement.
>>
>> At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage
>> sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a
>> specific one.
>> I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link
>> above). This
>> PR:
>>
>> - Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I
>> missed
>>   a couple of places)
>> - Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions
>> to avoid
>>   having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
>> - Relaxes the requirement as listed above.
>>
>> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide
>> to
>> continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one location
>> not
>> scattered around the spec.
>>
>> I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the requirement
>> to
>> send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to
>> handle this PR.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Please post a PR for this and see what the WG thinks.</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Sep 9, 2=
016 at 7:35 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:h=
annes.tschofenig@gmx.net" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Ekr,<br>
<br>
I read through the text and I think it is an improvement.<br>
<br>
I only had one question that is only slightly related to your edits because=
 it came up in the interop testing with the Mint implementation.<br>
<br>
&quot;<br>
Servers requiring this extension SHOULD respond to a ClientHello<br>
lacking a &quot;server_name&quot; extension by terminating the connection<b=
r>
with a &quot;missing_extension&quot; alert.<br>
&quot;<br>
<br>
I personally would find it more useful to have an alert saying &quot;missin=
g_server_name_extension<wbr>&quot; instead of just returning &quot;missing_=
extension&quot; for a number of different extensions since this gives the c=
lient no chance to fix the problem without human intervention.<br>
<br>
Ciao<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Hannes</font></span><div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
On 09/05/2016 08:02 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5">
PR: <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/625</a=
><br>
<br>
Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under variou=
s<br>
fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don&#39;t send alerts but<b=
r>
instead<br>
just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we should<br=
>
relax<br>
the requirement.<br>
<br>
At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage<br>
sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a<br>
specific one.<br>
I&#39;ve finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link<br>
above). This<br>
PR:<br>
<br>
- Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I missed=
<br>
=C2=A0 a couple of places)<br>
- Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions<br>
to avoid<br>
=C2=A0 having to specify individually how to handle every decision.<br>
- Relaxes the requirement as listed above.<br>
<br>
Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we decide to=
<br>
continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one location no=
t<br>
scattered around the spec.<br>
<br>
I know that there wasn&#39;t universal consensus on relaxing the requiremen=
t to<br>
send, so I&#39;ll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to<br>
handle this PR.<br>
<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
<br>
<br></div></div><span class=3D"">
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
</span></blockquote>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 18:12:22 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Resolutions below.

On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:08 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
>
> Finally found some time to take a look at it.
>
> So in general I like the change to "abort the handshake with a <type>
> alert",
> the "send a fatal <type> alert and close the connection" was a bit clunky=
.
> I
> was actually planning to do something like this myself.
>
> Few other items carried over from my proposed PR[1]:
>
> ---
>
> I still think we should include generic advice for handling parser errors
> in
> the parser (Presentation Language/Vectors and Constructed Types) section;
> something like this:
>
>    Peers that receive a encoding of a vector in a message with a length
> that
>    does not match specification MUST abort the connection with a
>    "decode_error" alert unless more specific section states otherwise.
>
> and this:
>
>    Peers that receive messages that doesn't match the expected constructe=
d
>    type in expected message MUST abort the connection with a "decode_erro=
r"
>    alert unless more specific section states otherwise.
>

I added some text in the syntax section.


> I think it's a bit confusing to have this sentence:
>
>    Servers MUST select the lower of the highest supported server version
> and
>    the version offered by the client in the ClientHello. In particular,
>    servers MUST accept ClientHello messages with versions higher than tho=
se
>    supported and negotiate the highest mutually supported version.
>
> in the Server Hello section. Everything before the very last "and" is mor=
e
> applicable to ClientHello.


I am going to leave this because I anticipate adopting the new version
syntax.


I think that this sentence in Handshake Protocol:

>
>    Sending handshake messages in an unexpected order results in an
>    "unexpected_message" fatal error.
>
> should use a MUST and be prescribed to the receiving side, for example:
>
>    Peer that receives handshake messages in unexpected order MUST abort t=
he
>    handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert.
>

I changed this.



Description what should client do when the ServerHello.cipher_suite is the
> one
> it did not advertise in ClientHello.cipher_suites is missing.
>

Changed..


> So is description of how to handle ServerHello.version being higher than
> ClientHello.max_supported_version.
>
> At least, I don't see it in Server Hello section.
>

See above re: version


missing_extension description in Alert Protocol probably should be extended
> from:
>
>    Sent by endpoints that receive a hello message not containing an
> extension
>    that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version.
>
> to:
>
>    Sent by endpoints that receive a hello message not containing an
> extension
>    that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version or the offered k=
ey
>    exchange mechanisms.
>
> (thinking of handling situations where "key_share" or "pre_shared_key" is
> missing)
>

Updated a bit.


> ---
>
> Hello Extensions section doesn't specify how to handle messages with
> duplicate
> extensions (e.g. second "key_share" extension added in the second
> ClientHello
> message in connection)
>
> ---
>
> Signature Algorithms doesn't say how to handle RSA-SSA signatures with sa=
lt
> length that doesn't match hash size.
>
> ---
>
> Key Share doesn't say how to handle server_share that doesn't match
> client_shares.
>

I'm comfortable leaving these as-is.



> Finished section doesn't describe what to do if the contents don't match
> the
> expected value.
>
> Should it be illegal_parameter or bad_record_mac is more appropriate?
>

This is specified in the decrypt_error section.


> ---
>
> Record Layer doesn't describe what to do if a record with zero-length
> payload
> and handshake or alert type is received.


I'm comfortable leaving these as-is.


> ---
>
> Record Layer includes
>
>    legacy_record_version : (...) This field is deprecated and MUST be
> ignored
>    for all purposes.
>
> Record Layer Protection does not.
>

I don't follow.



>
> ---
>
> 1 - https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/621
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
>

--001a1142154e555f07053ce6215a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Resolutions below.</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote">On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:08 AM, Hubert Kario <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=
<span>On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; PR: <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/6=
25</a><br>
<br>
</span>Finally found some time to take a look at it.<br>
<br>
So in general I like the change to &quot;abort the handshake with a &lt;typ=
e&gt; alert&quot;,<br>
the &quot;send a fatal &lt;type&gt; alert and close the connection&quot; wa=
s a bit clunky. I<br>
was actually planning to do something like this myself.<br>
<br>
Few other items carried over from my proposed PR[1]:<br>
<br>
---<br>
<br>
I still think we should include generic advice for handling parser errors i=
n<br>
the parser (Presentation Language/Vectors and Constructed Types) section;<b=
r>
something like this:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Peers that receive a encoding of a vector in a message with a =
length that<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0does not match specification MUST abort the connection with a<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;decode_error&quot; alert unless more specific section st=
ates otherwise.<br>
<br>
and this:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Peers that receive messages that doesn&#39;t match the expecte=
d constructed<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0type in expected message MUST abort the connection with a &quo=
t;decode_error&quot;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0alert unless more specific section states otherwise.<br></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>I added some text in the syntax section.</div><d=
iv>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0p=
x 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I think it=
&#39;s a bit confusing to have this sentence:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Servers MUST select the lower of the highest supported server =
version and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the version offered by the client in the ClientHello. In parti=
cular,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0servers MUST accept ClientHello messages with versions higher =
than those<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0supported and negotiate the highest mutually supported version=
.<br>
<br>
in the Server Hello section. Everything before the very last &quot;and&quot=
; is more<br>
applicable to ClientHello.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am going to le=
ave this because I anticipate adopting the new version syntax.</div><div>=
=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I think that this sentence in Handshake Pro=
tocol:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Sending handshake messages in an unexpected order results in a=
n<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;unexpected_message&quot; fatal error.<br>
<br>
should use a MUST and be prescribed to the receiving side, for example:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Peer that receives handshake messages in unexpected order MUST=
 abort the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake with an &quot;unexpected_message&quot; alert.<br></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>I changed this.</div><div><br></div><div><br>=
</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Description what should client do when the ServerHello.cipher_suite is the =
one<br>
it did not advertise in ClientHello.cipher_suites is missing.<br></blockquo=
te><div><br></div><div>Changed..</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
So is description of how to handle ServerHello.version being higher than<br=
>
ClientHello.max_supported_vers<wbr>ion.<br>
<br>
At least, I don&#39;t see it in Server Hello section.<br></blockquote><div>=
<br></div><div>See above re: version</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">missing_extension descriptio=
n in Alert Protocol probably should be extended<br>
from:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Sent by endpoints that receive a hello message not containing =
an extension<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version.<br>
<br>
to:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Sent by endpoints that receive a hello message not containing =
an extension<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version or the o=
ffered key<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0exchange mechanisms.<br>
<br>
(thinking of handling situations where &quot;key_share&quot; or &quot;pre_s=
hared_key&quot; is<br>
missing)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Updated a bit.</div><div><br><=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
---<br>
<br>
Hello Extensions section doesn&#39;t specify how to handle messages with du=
plicate<br>
extensions (e.g. second &quot;key_share&quot; extension added in the second=
 ClientHello<br>
message in connection)<br>
<br>
---<br>
<br>
Signature Algorithms doesn&#39;t say how to handle RSA-SSA signatures with =
salt<br>
length that doesn&#39;t match hash size.<br>
<br>
---<br>
<br>
Key Share doesn&#39;t say how to handle server_share that doesn&#39;t match=
<br>
client_shares.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m comfortable leav=
ing these as-is.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Finished section doesn&#39;t describe what to do if the contents don&#39;t =
match the<br>
expected value.<br>
<br>
Should it be illegal_parameter or bad_record_mac is more appropriate?<br></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is specified in the decrypt_error secti=
on.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"=
>
---<br>
<br>
Record Layer doesn&#39;t describe what to do if a record with zero-length p=
ayload<br>
and handshake or alert type is received.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&=
#39;m comfortable leaving these as-is.=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
---<br>
<br>
Record Layer includes<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0legacy_record_version : (...) This field is deprecated and MUS=
T be ignored<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0for all purposes.<br>
<br>
Record Layer Protection does not.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don=
&#39;t follow.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,=
204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
---<br>
<br>
1 - <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/621" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/621</a=
><br>
<div><div>--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</d=
iv></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1142154e555f07053ce6215a--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 18:12:31 -0700
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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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Merged

On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 12:50 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> Thanks for the discussion.  We=E2=80=99re going to ask ekr to merge this =
one
> (obviously dealing with the additional input provided during the
> discussion).
>
> J&S
>
> > On Sep 06, 2016, at 17:33, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >
> > All,
> >
> > The chairs would like to get some eyes on this PR by this Friday (Sept
> 9th) so that we can draw it to close.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > J&S
> >
> >> On Sep 05, 2016, at 14:02, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625
> >>
> >> Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts under
> various
> >> fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don't send alerts but
> instead
> >> just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we
> should relax
> >> the requirement.
> >>
> >> At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encourage
> >> sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a
> specific one.
> >> I've finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (link
> above). This
> >> PR:
> >>
> >> - Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps I
> missed
> >>  a couple of places)
> >> - Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descriptions
> to avoid
> >>  having to specify individually how to handle every decision.
> >> - Relaxes the requirement as listed above.
> >>
> >> Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we
> decide to
> >> continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one
> location not
> >> scattered around the spec.
> >>
> >> I know that there wasn't universal consensus on relaxing the
> requirement to
> >> send, so I'll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on how to
> handle this PR.
> >>
> >> -Ekr
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> TLS mailing list
> >> TLS@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Merged</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 12:50 PM, Sean Turner <span dir=3D"ltr"=
>&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com" target=3D"_blank">sean@sn3rd.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Thanks for the discuss=
ion.=C2=A0 We=E2=80=99re going to ask ekr to merge this one (obviously deal=
ing with the additional input provided during the discussion).<br>
<br>
J&amp;S<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; On Sep 06, 2016, at 17:33, Sean Turner &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean@sn3r=
d.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; All,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The chairs would like to get some eyes on this PR by this Friday (Sept=
 9th) so that we can draw it to close.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; J&amp;S<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Sep 05, 2016, at 14:02, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr=
@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; PR: <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/625" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/=
pull/625</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Currently the TLS spec requires implementations to send alerts und=
er various<br>
&gt;&gt; fatal conditions. However, many stacks actually don&#39;t send ale=
rts but instead<br>
&gt;&gt; just terminate the connection. Several people have argued that we =
should relax<br>
&gt;&gt; the requirement.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; At the September 2015 interim there was consensus to instead encou=
rage<br>
&gt;&gt; sending alerts and require that if you send an alert, you send a s=
pecific one.<br>
&gt;&gt; I&#39;ve finally gotten around to producing a PR that does this (l=
ink above). This<br>
&gt;&gt; PR:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - Harmonizes all the language around alert sending (though perhaps=
 I missed<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 a couple of places)<br>
&gt;&gt; - Tries to make which alerts to send clearer in the alert descript=
ions to avoid<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 having to specify individually how to handle every decision.=
<br>
&gt;&gt; - Relaxes the requirement as listed above.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Note that these are to some extent orthogonal changes; even if we =
decide to<br>
&gt;&gt; continue mandating sending alerts, that should be listed in one lo=
cation not<br>
&gt;&gt; scattered around the spec.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I know that there wasn&#39;t universal consensus on relaxing the r=
equirement to<br>
&gt;&gt; send, so I&#39;ll await WG discussion and the chairs decision on h=
ow to handle this PR.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; -Ekr<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt;&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noref=
errer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a>=
<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Monday, 19 September 2016 18:12:22 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Resolutions below.

Thanks! I'll go over the post-merge text again later.
=20
> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:08 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > Finished section doesn't describe what to do if the contents don't match
> > the
> > expected value.
> >=20
> > Should it be illegal_parameter or bad_record_mac is more appropriate?
>=20
> This is specified in the decrypt_error section.

on one hand, this give a side channel to detect mismatch between decryption=
=20
error and finished value compare, on the other hand, the timing difference=
=20
between those will be huge anyway...
=20
> > ---
> >=20
> > Record Layer doesn't describe what to do if a record with zero-length
> > payload
> > and handshake or alert type is received.
>=20
> I'm comfortable leaving these as-is.

so what would be the expected alert description in such situation?

> > ---
> >=20
> > Record Layer includes
> >=20
> >    legacy_record_version : (...) This field is deprecated and MUST be
> >=20
> > ignored
> >=20
> >    for all purposes.
> >=20
> > Record Layer Protection does not.
>=20
> I don't follow.

in Record Layer there's the following text:

    legacy_record_version : This value MUST be set to { 3, 1 } for all
    records. This field is deprecated and MUST be ignored for all purposes.

in Record Layer Protection there's the following text:

    legacy_record_version : The legacy_record_version field is identical to
    TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and is always { 3, 1 }. Note that the
    handshake protocol including the ClientHello and ServerHello messages
    authenticates the protocol version, so this value is redundant.

which doesn't say if the version can be ignored completely (skipped while=20
parsing) or if it should be verified.

Less error-prone solution would be to have the same behaviour specified for=
=20
encrypted and non-encrypted record layer.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 06:03:52 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#625: Change alert requirements
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On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 3:39 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Monday, 19 September 2016 18:12:22 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > Resolutions below.
>
> Thanks! I'll go over the post-merge text again later.
>
> > On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:08 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote=
:
> > > On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > Finished section doesn't describe what to do if the contents don't
> match
> > > the
> > > expected value.
> > >
> > > Should it be illegal_parameter or bad_record_mac is more appropriate?
> >
> > This is specified in the decrypt_error section.
>
> on one hand, this give a side channel to detect mismatch between decrypti=
on
> error and finished value compare, on the other hand, the timing differenc=
e
> between those will be huge anyway...
>



>
> > > ---
> > >
> > > Record Layer doesn't describe what to do if a record with zero-length
> > > payload
> > > and handshake or alert type is received.
> >
> > I'm comfortable leaving these as-is.
>
> so what would be the expected alert description in such situation?
>

Probably bad_record_mac, because it's a deprotection failure.


> > Record Layer includes
> > >
> > >    legacy_record_version : (...) This field is deprecated and MUST be
> > >
> > > ignored
> > >
> > >    for all purposes.
> > >
> > > Record Layer Protection does not.
> >
> > I don't follow.
>
> in Record Layer there's the following text:
>
>     legacy_record_version : This value MUST be set to { 3, 1 } for all
>     records. This field is deprecated and MUST be ignored for all purpose=
s.
>
> in Record Layer Protection there's the following text:
>
>     legacy_record_version : The legacy_record_version field is identical =
to
>     TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and is always { 3, 1 }. Note that
> the
>     handshake protocol including the ClientHello and ServerHello messages
>     authenticates the protocol version, so this value is redundant.
>
> which doesn't say if the version can be ignored completely (skipped while
> parsing) or if it should be verified.
>

These are different fields.


Less error-prone solution would be to have the same behaviour specified for
> encrypted and non-encrypted record layer.
>

The rationale for this is that we need to allow flexibility for the
plaintext messages
because there are stacks which don't conform already, but not for the
encrypted.

Please feel free to file a PR and start a discussion on the list if you
disagree, but
this is out of scope for this PR.

-Ekr


> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
>

--001a114d6f1cdfb3d5053cf011d9
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 3:39 AM, Hubert Kario <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Monday, 19 September =
2016 18:12:22 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; Resolutions below.<br>
<br>
Thanks! I&#39;ll go over the post-merge text again later.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:08 AM, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hk=
ario@redhat.com">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; On Monday, 5 September 2016 11:02:57 CEST Eric Rescorla wrote:<br=
>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt; Finished section doesn&#39;t describe wha=
t to do if the contents don&#39;t match<br>
&gt; &gt; the<br>
&gt; &gt; expected value.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Should it be illegal_parameter or bad_record_mac is more appropri=
ate?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This is specified in the decrypt_error section.<br>
<br>
</span>on one hand, this give a side channel to detect mismatch between dec=
ryption<br>
error and finished value compare, on the other hand, the timing difference<=
br>
between those will be huge anyway...<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; &gt; ---<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Record Layer doesn&#39;t describe what to do if a record with zer=
o-length<br>
&gt; &gt; payload<br>
&gt; &gt; and handshake or alert type is received.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;m comfortable leaving these as-is.<br>
<br>
</span>so what would be the expected alert description in such situation?<b=
r></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Probably bad_record_mac, because it&#39;=
s a deprotection failure.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; Record Layer includes<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 legacy_record_version : (...) This field is deprecat=
ed and MUST be<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; ignored<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 for all purposes.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Record Layer Protection does not.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I don&#39;t follow.<br>
<br>
</span>in Record Layer there&#39;s the following text:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 legacy_record_version : This value MUST be set to { 3, 1 } fo=
r all<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 records. This field is deprecated and MUST be ignored for all=
 purposes.<br>
<br>
in Record Layer Protection there&#39;s the following text:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 legacy_record_version : The legacy_record_version field is id=
entical to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_<wbr>version and is always { 3, 1 =
}. Note that the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 handshake protocol including the ClientHello and ServerHello =
messages<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 authenticates the protocol version, so this value is redundan=
t.<br>
<br>
which doesn&#39;t say if the version can be ignored completely (skipped whi=
le<br>
parsing) or if it should be verified.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>T=
hese are different fields.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">Less error-prone solution would be to have the same behav=
iour specified for<br>
encrypted and non-encrypted record layer.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><d=
iv>The rationale for this is that we need to allow flexibility for the plai=
ntext messages</div><div>because there are stacks which don&#39;t conform a=
lready, but not for the encrypted.</div><div><br></div><div>Please feel fre=
e to file a PR and start a discussion on the list if you disagree, but</div=
><div>this is out of scope for this PR.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div>=
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</d=
iv></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a114d6f1cdfb3d5053cf011d9--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 15:07:51 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Renumbering the new SignatureSchemes
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Hi folks,

I've just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme numbering:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641

In principle, we should only have needed to burn values starting with known
HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:

   signature
      This field indicates the signature algorithm that may be used.
      The values indicate anonymous signatures, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
      [PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [ECDSA], respectively.  The
      "anonymous" value is meaningless in this context but used in
      Section 7.4.3.  It MUST NOT appear in this extension.

We'd started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in Chrome to get early
warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an implementation which
enforced this MUST NOT. It's a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems prudent to
allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgorithms. Thus,
rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03}. This
has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don't get confused.

(I'm not sure how to express it in the enum syntax or IANA registry, so I
left it a TODO in the PR.)

David

--001a1140e88286caad053cf1cbd0
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks,</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve just uplo=
aded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme numbering:</div><a href=3D"h=
ttps://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13=
-spec/pull/641</a><br><div><br></div><div>In principle, we should only have=
 needed to burn values starting with known HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said=
:</div><div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0signature</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 This field indicates the signature algorithm that may be used.</=
div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 The values indicate anonymous signatures, RSA=
SSA-PKCS1-v1_5</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 [PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and EC=
DSA [ECDSA], respectively.=C2=A0 The</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;a=
nonymous&quot; value is meaningless in this context but used in</div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 7.4.3.=C2=A0 It MUST NOT appear in this extens=
ion.</div></div><div><br></div><div>We&#39;d started RSA-PSS along the trai=
n to get shipped in Chrome to get early warning on any interoperability iss=
ues. We ran into an implementation which enforced this MUST NOT. It&#39;s a=
 MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems prudent to allocate around it and avoid endin=
g in known SignatureAlgorithms. Thus, rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, =
*}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03}. This has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 di=
ssector tools don&#39;t get confused.</div><div><br></div><div>(I&#39;m not=
 sure how to express it in the enum syntax or IANA registry, so I left it a=
 TODO in the PR.)</div><div><br></div><div>David</div></div>

--001a1140e88286caad053cf1cbd0--


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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Renumbering the new SignatureSchemes
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On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:07:51PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi folks,
> 
> I've just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme numbering:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641
> 
> In principle, we should only have needed to burn values starting with known
> HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:
> 
>    signature
>       This field indicates the signature algorithm that may be used.
>       The values indicate anonymous signatures, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
>       [PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [ECDSA], respectively.  The
>       "anonymous" value is meaningless in this context but used in
>       Section 7.4.3.  It MUST NOT appear in this extension.
> 
> We'd started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in Chrome to get early
> warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an implementation which
> enforced this MUST NOT. It's a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems prudent to
> allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgorithms. Thus,
> rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03}. This
> has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don't get confused.

Heck, I think one could put the RSA-PSS ones as 0404, 0504 and 0604,
as those do have the indicated "prehashes".

And one could probably also stick Ed25519/Ed448 in 00xx, as those have
no prehash, which is exactly what "hash #0" is about.

(Of course, this all is pretty pointless bikeshedding).


-Ilari


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 15:56:01 +0000
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Renumbering the new SignatureSchemes
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On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 11:33 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:07:51PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> > Hi folks,
> >
> > I've just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme numbering:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641
> >
> > In principle, we should only have needed to burn values starting with
> known
> > HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:
> >
> >    signature
> >       This field indicates the signature algorithm that may be used.
> >       The values indicate anonymous signatures, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
> >       [PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [ECDSA], respectively.  The
> >       "anonymous" value is meaningless in this context but used in
> >       Section 7.4.3.  It MUST NOT appear in this extension.
> >
> > We'd started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in Chrome to get
> early
> > warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an implementation
> which
> > enforced this MUST NOT. It's a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems prudent to
> > allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgorithms. Thus,
> > rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03}.
> This
> > has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don't get confused.
>
> Heck, I think one could put the RSA-PSS ones as 0404, 0504 and 0604,
> as those do have the indicated "prehashes".
>
> And one could probably also stick Ed25519/Ed448 in 00xx, as those have
> no prehash, which is exactly what "hash #0" is about.
>
> (Of course, this all is pretty pointless bikeshedding).
>

The ecdsa_p256_sha256 business means that the old scheme isn't quite
accurate. And if we are to drop the old scheme, it was intentional on my
part that RSA-PSS did not look like it, even though it still fit. I think
that paid off. No one's going to implement Ed25519 for a while, so RSA-PSS
is our smoke test that this SignatureScheme idea is sane. (Both for interop
and for making sure removing the hash/sig decomposition in implementations
internally is sound.)

David

--001a1140eb44b48e14053cf27797
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Sep 20=
, 2016 at 11:33 AM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@wel=
ho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:07:51PM +0000, David Benjamin wrot=
e:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Hi folks,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; I&#39;ve just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme numbe=
ring:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-=
spec/pull/641</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; In principle, we should only have needed to burn values starting with =
known<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 signature<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0This field indicates the signature algorithm=
 that may be used.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The values indicate anonymous signatures, RS=
ASSA-PKCS1-v1_5<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0[PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [ECDSA], re=
spectively.=C2=A0 The<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;anonymous&quot; value is meaningless i=
n this context but used in<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 7.4.3.=C2=A0 It MUST NOT appear in t=
his extension.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; We&#39;d started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in Chrome to g=
et early<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an implementation =
which<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; enforced this MUST NOT. It&#39;s a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems pruden=
t to<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgorithms. Thus=
,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03}. =
This<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don&#39;t get confu=
sed.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Heck, I think one could put the RSA-PSS ones as 0404, 0504 and 0604,<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
as those do have the indicated &quot;prehashes&quot;.<br class=3D"gmail_msg=
">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
And one could probably also stick Ed25519/Ed448 in 00xx, as those have<br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">
no prehash, which is exactly what &quot;hash #0&quot; is about.<br class=3D=
"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
(Of course, this all is pretty pointless bikeshedding).<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>The ecdsa_p256_sha256 business means that the old scheme i=
sn&#39;t quite accurate. And if we are to drop the old scheme, it was inten=
tional on my part that RSA-PSS did not look like it, even though it still f=
it. I think that paid off. No one&#39;s going to implement Ed25519 for a wh=
ile, so RSA-PSS is our smoke test that this SignatureScheme idea is sane. (=
Both for interop and for making sure removing the hash/sig decomposition in=
 implementations internally is sound.)</div><div><br></div><div>David</div>=
</div></div>

--001a1140eb44b48e14053cf27797--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Renumbering the new SignatureSchemes
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This seems like a good change. I'll merge it before -16 unless someone
objects.

On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 8:56 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 11:33 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:07:51PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
>> > Hi folks,
>> >
>> > I've just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme numbering:
>> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641
>> >
>> > In principle, we should only have needed to burn values starting with
>> known
>> > HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:
>> >
>> >    signature
>> >       This field indicates the signature algorithm that may be used.
>> >       The values indicate anonymous signatures, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
>> >       [PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [ECDSA], respectively.  The
>> >       "anonymous" value is meaningless in this context but used in
>> >       Section 7.4.3.  It MUST NOT appear in this extension.
>> >
>> > We'd started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in Chrome to get
>> early
>> > warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an implementation
>> which
>> > enforced this MUST NOT. It's a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems prudent to
>> > allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgorithms. Thus,
>> > rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03}.
>> This
>> > has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don't get confused.
>>
>> Heck, I think one could put the RSA-PSS ones as 0404, 0504 and 0604,
>> as those do have the indicated "prehashes".
>>
>> And one could probably also stick Ed25519/Ed448 in 00xx, as those have
>> no prehash, which is exactly what "hash #0" is about.
>>
>> (Of course, this all is pretty pointless bikeshedding).
>>
>
> The ecdsa_p256_sha256 business means that the old scheme isn't quite
> accurate. And if we are to drop the old scheme, it was intentional on my
> part that RSA-PSS did not look like it, even though it still fit. I think
> that paid off. No one's going to implement Ed25519 for a while, so RSA-PSS
> is our smoke test that this SignatureScheme idea is sane. (Both for interop
> and for making sure removing the hash/sig decomposition in implementations
> internally is sound.)
>
> David
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">This seems like a good change. I&#39;ll merge it before -1=
6 unless someone objects.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 8:56 AM, David Benjamin <span dir=3D"=
ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidbe=
n@chromium.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr">O=
n Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 11:33 AM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilari=
liusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:07:5=
1PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi folks,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme numbe=
ring:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/641</=
a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; In principle, we should only have needed to burn values starting with =
known<br>
&gt; HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 signature<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0This field indicates the signature algorithm=
 that may be used.<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The values indicate anonymous signatures, RS=
ASSA-PKCS1-v1_5<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0[PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [ECDSA], re=
spectively.=C2=A0 The<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;anonymous&quot; value is meaningless i=
n this context but used in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 7.4.3.=C2=A0 It MUST NOT appear in t=
his extension.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; We&#39;d started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in Chrome to g=
et early<br>
&gt; warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an implementation =
which<br>
&gt; enforced this MUST NOT. It&#39;s a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems pruden=
t to<br>
&gt; allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgorithms. Thus=
,<br>
&gt; rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03}. =
This<br>
&gt; has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don&#39;t get confu=
sed.<br>
<br>
Heck, I think one could put the RSA-PSS ones as 0404, 0504 and 0604,<br>
as those do have the indicated &quot;prehashes&quot;.<br>
<br>
And one could probably also stick Ed25519/Ed448 in 00xx, as those have<br>
no prehash, which is exactly what &quot;hash #0&quot; is about.<br>
<br>
(Of course, this all is pretty pointless bikeshedding).<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div></span><div>The ecdsa_p256_sha256 business means that the old s=
cheme isn&#39;t quite accurate. And if we are to drop the old scheme, it wa=
s intentional on my part that RSA-PSS did not look like it, even though it =
still fit. I think that paid off. No one&#39;s going to implement Ed25519 f=
or a while, so RSA-PSS is our smoke test that this SignatureScheme idea is =
sane. (Both for interop and for making sure removing the hash/sig decomposi=
tion in implementations internally is sound.)</div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><=
font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div><div>David</div></font></span></div><=
/div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 20:14:27 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Renumbering the new SignatureSchemes
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On Tuesday, 20 September 2016 15:56:01 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 11:33 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.co=
m>
>=20
> wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:07:51PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> > > Hi folks,
> > >=20
> > > I've just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme numberin=
g:
> > > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641
> > >=20
> > > In principle, we should only have needed to burn values starting with
> >=20
> > known
> >=20
> > > HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:
> > >    signature
> > >   =20
> > >       This field indicates the signature algorithm that may be used.
> > >       The values indicate anonymous signatures, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
> > >       [PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [ECDSA], respectively.  The
> > >       "anonymous" value is meaningless in this context but used in
> > >       Section 7.4.3.  It MUST NOT appear in this extension.
> > >=20
> > > We'd started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in Chrome to get
> >=20
> > early
> >=20
> > > warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an implementation
> >=20
> > which
> >=20
> > > enforced this MUST NOT. It's a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems prudent to
> > > allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgorithms. Thu=
s,
> > > rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03}.
> >=20
> > This
> >=20
> > > has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don't get confused.
> >=20
> > Heck, I think one could put the RSA-PSS ones as 0404, 0504 and 0604,
> > as those do have the indicated "prehashes".
> >=20
> > And one could probably also stick Ed25519/Ed448 in 00xx, as those have
> > no prehash, which is exactly what "hash #0" is about.
> >=20
> > (Of course, this all is pretty pointless bikeshedding).
>=20
> The ecdsa_p256_sha256 business means that the old scheme isn't quite
> accurate. And if we are to drop the old scheme, it was intentional on my
> part that RSA-PSS did not look like it, even though it still fit. I think
> that paid off. No one's going to implement Ed25519 for a while, so RSA-PSS
> is our smoke test that this SignatureScheme idea is sane. (Both for inter=
op
> and for making sure removing the hash/sig decomposition in implementations
> internally is sound.)

I'll be running test looking for intolerances like this over the Alexa top =
1=20
million next month.

=46or now I have a probe that adds values 0x0003, 0x0004, 0x0700, 0x0703 an=
d=20
0x0704 at the end of the list of algorithms.

Would you suggest doing something more with it?

(I will be looking for key_share extension intolerance as a whole too)
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 18:24:42 +0000
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Renumbering the new SignatureSchemes
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On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 2:14 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Tuesday, 20 September 2016 15:56:01 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 11:33 AM Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> >
> > wrote:
> > > On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:07:51PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> > > > Hi folks,
> > > >
> > > > I've just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureScheme
> numbering:
> > > > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641
> > > >
> > > > In principle, we should only have needed to burn values starting wi=
th
> > >
> > > known
> > >
> > > > HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:
> > > >    signature
> > > >
> > > >       This field indicates the signature algorithm that may be used=
.
> > > >       The values indicate anonymous signatures, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
> > > >       [PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [ECDSA], respectively.  The
> > > >       "anonymous" value is meaningless in this context but used in
> > > >       Section 7.4.3.  It MUST NOT appear in this extension.
> > > >
> > > > We'd started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in Chrome to ge=
t
> > >
> > > early
> > >
> > > > warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an implementati=
on
> > >
> > > which
> > >
> > > > enforced this MUST NOT. It's a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it seems prudent
> to
> > > > allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgorithms.
> Thus,
> > > > rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x00-0x03=
}.
> > >
> > > This
> > >
> > > > has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don't get
> confused.
> > >
> > > Heck, I think one could put the RSA-PSS ones as 0404, 0504 and 0604,
> > > as those do have the indicated "prehashes".
> > >
> > > And one could probably also stick Ed25519/Ed448 in 00xx, as those hav=
e
> > > no prehash, which is exactly what "hash #0" is about.
> > >
> > > (Of course, this all is pretty pointless bikeshedding).
> >
> > The ecdsa_p256_sha256 business means that the old scheme isn't quite
> > accurate. And if we are to drop the old scheme, it was intentional on m=
y
> > part that RSA-PSS did not look like it, even though it still fit. I thi=
nk
> > that paid off. No one's going to implement Ed25519 for a while, so
> RSA-PSS
> > is our smoke test that this SignatureScheme idea is sane. (Both for
> interop
> > and for making sure removing the hash/sig decomposition in
> implementations
> > internally is sound.)
>
> I'll be running test looking for intolerances like this over the Alexa to=
p
> 1
> million next month.
>

(I've already done this, by the way. It's where the numbers in the version
negotiation thread came from.)


> For now I have a probe that adds values 0x0003, 0x0004, 0x0700, 0x0703 an=
d
> 0x0704 at the end of the list of algorithms.
>

At the front is probably more realistic. There is even a MUST-level
requirement in the current TLS 1.3 spec for SHA-1 sigalgs to be at the end,
so the new ones can't be (unless you take SHA-1 out, which is, sadly,
unrealistic today... an upsetting number of 1.2 servers only sign SHA-1).

I was able to find a few instances of an NSS bug (
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1119983), but nothing else.

The offending implementation for this thread was actually a WebRTC stack
(DTLS), not an HTTPS server. We hit it via Chrome's Dev channel. But since
this intolerance comes from a MUST-level requirement in TLS 1.2, I think
it's prudent to renumber.


> Would you suggest doing something more with it?
>
> (I will be looking for key_share extension intolerance as a whole too)
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Sep 20=
, 2016 at 2:14 PM Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com">hka=
rio@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Tu=
esday, 20 September 2016 15:56:01 CEST David Benjamin wrote:<br class=3D"gm=
ail_msg">
&gt; On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 11:33 AM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusv=
aara@welho.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 03:07:51PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:<b=
r class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; Hi folks,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; I&#39;ve just uploaded this PR to slightly tweak SignatureSc=
heme numbering:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/641" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tl=
swg/tls13-spec/pull/641</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; In principle, we should only have needed to burn values star=
ting with<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; known<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; HashAlgorithms, but TLS 1.2 said:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 signature<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0This field indicates the signature=
 algorithm that may be used.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The values indicate anonymous sign=
atures, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0[PKCS1] and DSA [DSS], and ECDSA [=
ECDSA], respectively.=C2=A0 The<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;anonymous&quot; value is mea=
ningless in this context but used in<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 7.4.3.=C2=A0 It MUST NOT a=
ppear in this extension.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; We&#39;d started RSA-PSS along the train to get shipped in C=
hrome to get<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; early<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; warning on any interoperability issues. We ran into an imple=
mentation<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; which<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; enforced this MUST NOT. It&#39;s a MUST NOT in 1.2, so it se=
ems prudent to<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; allocate around it and avoid ending in known SignatureAlgori=
thms. Thus,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; rather than only burning {0x00-0x06, *}, we also burn {*, 0x=
00-0x03}.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; This<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; &gt; has the added benefit that TLS 1.2 dissector tools don&#39;t=
 get confused.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; Heck, I think one could put the RSA-PSS ones as 0404, 0504 and 06=
04,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; as those do have the indicated &quot;prehashes&quot;.<br class=3D=
"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; And one could probably also stick Ed25519/Ed448 in 00xx, as those=
 have<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; no prehash, which is exactly what &quot;hash #0&quot; is about.<b=
r class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; &gt; (Of course, this all is pretty pointless bikeshedding).<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; The ecdsa_p256_sha256 business means that the old scheme isn&#39;t qui=
te<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; accurate. And if we are to drop the old scheme, it was intentional on =
my<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; part that RSA-PSS did not look like it, even though it still fit. I th=
ink<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; that paid off. No one&#39;s going to implement Ed25519 for a while, so=
 RSA-PSS<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; is our smoke test that this SignatureScheme idea is sane. (Both for in=
terop<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; and for making sure removing the hash/sig decomposition in implementat=
ions<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; internally is sound.)<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
I&#39;ll be running test looking for intolerances like this over the Alexa =
top 1<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
million next month.<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>(I&#39;ve already done this, by the way. It&#39;s where the numbers in the=
 version negotiation thread came from.)</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">
For now I have a probe that adds values 0x0003, 0x0004, 0x0700, 0x0703 and<=
br class=3D"gmail_msg">
0x0704 at the end of the list of algorithms.<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>At the front is probably more realistic. There is=
 even a MUST-level requirement in the current TLS 1.3 spec for SHA-1 sigalg=
s to be at the end, so the new ones can&#39;t be (unless you take SHA-1 out=
, which is, sadly, unrealistic today... an upsetting number of 1.2 servers =
only sign SHA-1).</div><div><br></div><div>I was able to find a few instanc=
es of an NSS bug (<a href=3D"https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=
=3D1119983">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1119983</a>), bu=
t nothing else.</div><div><br></div><div>The offending implementation for t=
his thread was actually a WebRTC stack (DTLS), not an HTTPS server. We hit =
it via Chrome&#39;s Dev channel. But since this intolerance comes from a MU=
ST-level requirement in TLS 1.2, I think it&#39;s prudent to renumber.</div=
><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Would you suggest doing something more with it?<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
(I will be looking for key_share extension intolerance as a whole too)<br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">
--<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Regards,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Hubert Kario<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail=
_msg" target=3D"_blank">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</b=
lockquote></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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Another concern here is that in order to reduce memory footprint, some =
implementations will probably introduce bugs by trying to optimize and =
infer the version by observing the cipher-suits in client hello instead =
waiting for the extension.

Cheers,
Vlad

> On 19 Sep 2016, at 03:42, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Saturday, 17 September 2016 01:04:07 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 4:29 PM Andrei Popov =
<Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com <mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>>
>>=20
>> wrote:
>>> At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be =
the
>>=20
>> very first extension advertised.
>> I don't think it's a good idea to impose extension ordering =
requirements.
>>=20
>>=20
>> Agreed. If we're concerned with the order, I suppose are other =
options like
>> smuggling them in the front of the cipher list or hacky things like =
that.
>>=20
>> :-) But using extensions is cleaner, and still perfectly deployable.
>> :
>>> Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read =
the
>>=20
>> first two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code =
path on
>> the spot.
>> Yes, these implementations (Windows TLS stack included) will need to =
do
>> more elaborate/slightly slower pre-parsing if we use TLS version
>> negotiation via TLS extension(s). Not something I like, but can be =
done.
>>=20
>>=20
>> TLS already does not strictly permit sniff-based implementations like =
this.
>> A handshake message may be fragmented pathologically or even =
interspersed
>> with warning alerts. It's doable if you reject such fragmentations =
(no one
>> would send a ClientHello this way...), but you need to be careful =
because
>> this fragmentation does not figure into the handshake transcript. In
>> particular, you cannot have an else clause in your dispatch. The =
dispatcher
>> must reject anything it can't definitively resolve rather than =
blindly
>> forward to your pre-TLS-1.3 implementation.
>=20
> I don't see how that prevents streaming implementation - warning =
alerts is=20
> something you can handle in the dispatcher (though I'm not sure why =
it's=20
> something you should worry /before/ the first client hello received), =
then to=20
> the specific implementation you pass the buffer with current record =
and the=20
> socket, the first of which may be empty if the record boundary landed =
right=20
> after the client_version
>=20
>> CVE-2014-3511 is an example of OpenSSL's 1.0.x sniff-based =
implementation
>> going wrong (OpenSSL 1.1.x is no longer sniff-based). It is a =
particularly
>> silly instance, but it's the sort of failure mode you can get.
>>=20
>> Further, with the current trajectory, TLS 1.3 servers will need to do
>> version-negotiation based on extensions anyway. All the various
>> implementors have been using this "draft_version" extension to =
experiment
>> with TLS 1.3. (draft_version is really just a worse version of this
>> proposal.)
>> =
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#version-negotiati=
on =
<https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#version-negotiat=
ion>
>=20
> for experimental implementations memory usage is not such a big =
problem, it's=20
> not the case for everybody
>=20
>> I don't think anyone has actually enabled client code by default yet, =
but
>> once anyone does, servers will need to process extensions for =
versioning
>> until draft TLS 1.3 clients are out of the ecosystem. This seems the =
worst
>> of both worlds. We'll have extensions in versioning and an =
undeployable
>> protocol. I think we should go for the latter and, if we must have =
the
>> former, at least do it properly.
>=20
> hmm, what if we did define both mechanisms? so that clients that worry =
about=20
> compatibility with the broken servers can advertise TLSv1.3 through =
extension=20
> while ones that don't, advertise through client_version?
>=20
> similar to how secure renegotiation indication works
>=20
> --=20
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com <http://www.cz.redhat.com/>
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech =
Republic


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Another concern here is that in order to reduce memory =
footprint, some implementations will probably introduce bugs by trying =
to optimize and infer the version by observing the cipher-suits in =
client hello instead waiting for the extension.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Cheers,</div><div class=3D"">Vlad<br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On 19 Sep 2016, at 03:42, =
Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" =
class=3D"">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">On Saturday, 17 September 2016 01:04:07 CEST =
David Benjamin wrote:</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 4:29 PM Andrei Popov &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" =
class=3D"">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">wrote:<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">At =
the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be the<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">very first extension =
advertised.<br class=3D"">I don't think it's a good idea to impose =
extension ordering requirements.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Agreed. If we're concerned with the order, I suppose are =
other options like<br class=3D"">smuggling them in the front of the =
cipher list or hacky things like that.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">:-) =
But using extensions is cleaner, and still perfectly deployable.<br =
class=3D"">:<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Some =
implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read the<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">first two bytes of the client =
hello, and take the appropriate code path on<br class=3D"">the spot.<br =
class=3D"">Yes, these implementations (Windows TLS stack included) will =
need to do<br class=3D"">more elaborate/slightly slower pre-parsing if =
we use TLS version<br class=3D"">negotiation via TLS extension(s). Not =
something I like, but can be done.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">TLS already does not strictly permit sniff-based =
implementations like this.<br class=3D"">A handshake message may be =
fragmented pathologically or even interspersed<br class=3D"">with =
warning alerts. It's doable if you reject such fragmentations (no one<br =
class=3D"">would send a ClientHello this way...), but you need to be =
careful because<br class=3D"">this fragmentation does not figure into =
the handshake transcript. In<br class=3D"">particular, you cannot have =
an else clause in your dispatch. The dispatcher<br class=3D"">must =
reject anything it can't definitively resolve rather than blindly<br =
class=3D"">forward to your pre-TLS-1.3 implementation.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: =
auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span=
 style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">I don't see how that prevents streaming =
implementation - warning alerts is<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">something you can =
handle in the dispatcher (though I'm not sure why it's<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">something you =
should worry /before/ the first client hello received), then to<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">the specific =
implementation you pass the buffer with current record and the<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">socket, the first =
of which may be empty if the record boundary landed right<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">after the =
client_version</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: =
auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">CVE-2014-3511 is an example =
of OpenSSL's 1.0.x sniff-based implementation<br class=3D"">going wrong =
(OpenSSL 1.1.x is no longer sniff-based). It is a particularly<br =
class=3D"">silly instance, but it's the sort of failure mode you can =
get.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Further, with the current trajectory, =
TLS 1.3 servers will need to do<br class=3D"">version-negotiation based =
on extensions anyway. All the various<br class=3D"">implementors have =
been using this "draft_version" extension to experiment<br class=3D"">with=
 TLS 1.3. (draft_version is really just a worse version of this<br =
class=3D"">proposal.)<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#version-n=
egotiation" =
class=3D"">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#versio=
n-negotiation</a><br class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">for experimental implementations memory =
usage is not such a big problem, it's<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">not the case for =
everybody</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">I don't think anyone has =
actually enabled client code by default yet, but<br class=3D"">once =
anyone does, servers will need to process extensions for versioning<br =
class=3D"">until draft TLS 1.3 clients are out of the ecosystem. This =
seems the worst<br class=3D"">of both worlds. We'll have extensions in =
versioning and an undeployable<br class=3D"">protocol. I think we should =
go for the latter and, if we must have the<br class=3D"">former, at =
least do it properly.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"font-family:=
 Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">hmm, what if we did define both =
mechanisms? so that clients that worry about<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">compatibility with =
the broken servers can advertise TLSv1.3 through extension<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">while ones that =
don't, advertise through client_version?</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;" class=3D""><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">similar to how secure renegotiation indication =
works</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">--<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">Regards,</span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">Hubert =
Kario</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security =
team</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">Web:<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><a =
href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com/" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova =
99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</span></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Version negotiation, take two
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It looks like we have enough consensus to move to an extension based
version negotiation mechanism so we're asking the author to merge in this
pull request.  We can have further refinement of the details, but its
important for us to get a complete view of the spec at this point.

Cheers,

J&S

On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Saturday, 17 September 2016 01:04:07 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 4:29 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.co=
m
> >
> >
> > wrote:
> > > At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must be t=
he
> >
> > very first extension advertised.
> > I don't think it's a good idea to impose extension ordering requirement=
s.
> >
> >
> > Agreed. If we're concerned with the order, I suppose are other options
> like
> > smuggling them in the front of the cipher list or hacky things like tha=
t.
> >
> > :-) But using extensions is cleaner, and still perfectly deployable.
> > :
> > > Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can read th=
e
> >
> > first two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code path
> on
> > the spot.
> > Yes, these implementations (Windows TLS stack included) will need to do
> > more elaborate/slightly slower pre-parsing if we use TLS version
> > negotiation via TLS extension(s). Not something I like, but can be done=
.
> >
> >
> > TLS already does not strictly permit sniff-based implementations like
> this.
> > A handshake message may be fragmented pathologically or even interspers=
ed
> > with warning alerts. It's doable if you reject such fragmentations (no
> one
> > would send a ClientHello this way...), but you need to be careful becau=
se
> > this fragmentation does not figure into the handshake transcript. In
> > particular, you cannot have an else clause in your dispatch. The
> dispatcher
> > must reject anything it can't definitively resolve rather than blindly
> > forward to your pre-TLS-1.3 implementation.
>
> I don't see how that prevents streaming implementation - warning alerts i=
s
> something you can handle in the dispatcher (though I'm not sure why it's
> something you should worry /before/ the first client hello received), the=
n
> to
> the specific implementation you pass the buffer with current record and t=
he
> socket, the first of which may be empty if the record boundary landed rig=
ht
> after the client_version
>
> > CVE-2014-3511 is an example of OpenSSL's 1.0.x sniff-based implementati=
on
> > going wrong (OpenSSL 1.1.x is no longer sniff-based). It is a
> particularly
> > silly instance, but it's the sort of failure mode you can get.
> >
> > Further, with the current trajectory, TLS 1.3 servers will need to do
> > version-negotiation based on extensions anyway. All the various
> > implementors have been using this "draft_version" extension to experime=
nt
> > with TLS 1.3. (draft_version is really just a worse version of this
> > proposal.)
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#version-
> negotiation
>
> for experimental implementations memory usage is not such a big problem,
> it's
> not the case for everybody
>
> > I don't think anyone has actually enabled client code by default yet, b=
ut
> > once anyone does, servers will need to process extensions for versionin=
g
> > until draft TLS 1.3 clients are out of the ecosystem. This seems the
> worst
> > of both worlds. We'll have extensions in versioning and an undeployable
> > protocol. I think we should go for the latter and, if we must have the
> > former, at least do it properly.
>
> hmm, what if we did define both mechanisms? so that clients that worry
> about
> compatibility with the broken servers can advertise TLSv1.3 through
> extension
> while ones that don't, advertise through client_version?
>
> similar to how secure renegotiation indication works
>
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">It looks like we have enough consensus to move to an exten=
sion based version negotiation mechanism so we&#39;re asking the author to =
merge in this pull request.=C2=A0 We can have further refinement of the det=
ails, but its important for us to get a complete view of the spec at this p=
oint. =C2=A0<div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div><br></div><div>J&amp;S</d=
iv></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, =
Sep 19, 2016 at 3:42 AM, Hubert Kario <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt;</span> wr=
ote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Saturday, 17 Sep=
tember 2016 01:04:07 CEST David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 4:29 PM Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:And=
rei.Popov@microsoft.com">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; At the very least, if version is negotiated as extension it must =
be the<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; very first extension advertised.<br>
&gt; I don&#39;t think it&#39;s a good idea to impose extension ordering re=
quirements.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Agreed. If we&#39;re concerned with the order, I suppose are other opt=
ions like<br>
&gt; smuggling them in the front of the cipher list or hacky things like th=
at.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; :-) But using extensions is cleaner, and still perfectly deployable.<b=
r>
&gt; :<br>
&gt; &gt; Some implementations out there rely on the fact that they can rea=
d the<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; first two bytes of the client hello, and take the appropriate code pat=
h on<br>
&gt; the spot.<br>
&gt; Yes, these implementations (Windows TLS stack included) will need to d=
o<br>
&gt; more elaborate/slightly slower pre-parsing if we use TLS version<br>
&gt; negotiation via TLS extension(s). Not something I like, but can be don=
e.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; TLS already does not strictly permit sniff-based implementations like =
this.<br>
&gt; A handshake message may be fragmented pathologically or even intersper=
sed<br>
&gt; with warning alerts. It&#39;s doable if you reject such fragmentations=
 (no one<br>
&gt; would send a ClientHello this way...), but you need to be careful beca=
use<br>
&gt; this fragmentation does not figure into the handshake transcript. In<b=
r>
&gt; particular, you cannot have an else clause in your dispatch. The dispa=
tcher<br>
&gt; must reject anything it can&#39;t definitively resolve rather than bli=
ndly<br>
&gt; forward to your pre-TLS-1.3 implementation.<br>
<br>
</span>I don&#39;t see how that prevents streaming implementation - warning=
 alerts is<br>
something you can handle in the dispatcher (though I&#39;m not sure why it&=
#39;s<br>
something you should worry /before/ the first client hello received), then =
to<br>
the specific implementation you pass the buffer with current record and the=
<br>
socket, the first of which may be empty if the record boundary landed right=
<br>
after the client_version<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; CVE-2014-3511 is an example of OpenSSL&#39;s 1.0.x sniff-based impleme=
ntation<br>
&gt; going wrong (OpenSSL 1.1.x is no longer sniff-based). It is a particul=
arly<br>
&gt; silly instance, but it&#39;s the sort of failure mode you can get.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Further, with the current trajectory, TLS 1.3 servers will need to do<=
br>
&gt; version-negotiation based on extensions anyway. All the various<br>
&gt; implementors have been using this &quot;draft_version&quot; extension =
to experiment<br>
&gt; with TLS 1.3. (draft_version is really just a worse version of this<br=
>
&gt; proposal.)<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/wiki/Implementations#ve=
rsion-negotiation" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/=
tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/wiki/<wbr>Implementations#version-<wbr>negotiation</a=
><br>
<br>
</span>for experimental implementations memory usage is not such a big prob=
lem, it&#39;s<br>
not the case for everybody<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; I don&#39;t think anyone has actually enabled client code by default y=
et, but<br>
&gt; once anyone does, servers will need to process extensions for versioni=
ng<br>
&gt; until draft TLS 1.3 clients are out of the ecosystem. This seems the w=
orst<br>
&gt; of both worlds. We&#39;ll have extensions in versioning and an undeplo=
yable<br>
&gt; protocol. I think we should go for the latter and, if we must have the=
<br>
&gt; former, at least do it properly.<br>
<br>
</span>hmm, what if we did define both mechanisms? so that clients that wor=
ry about<br>
compatibility with the broken servers can advertise TLSv1.3 through extensi=
on<br>
while ones that don&#39;t, advertise through client_version?<br>
<br>
similar to how secure renegotiation indication works<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic</d=
iv></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113beae22ef559053cf95a12--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Dear all,

sorry for bringing up this thread again. We were doing some further =
studies with TLS implementations (all TLS 1.2) for embedded systems and =
found more cases where, within substructures of handshake messages, =
trailing data without any associated field in the specification is *not* =
rejected. One example is the "Supported Elliptic Curves Extension" =
[RFC4492]:

struct {
    NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^16-1>;
} EllipticCurveList;

which is parsed as if there was an additional field "trailing" absorbing =
all remaining data:

struct {
    NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^16-1>;
    opaque trailing[];
} EllipticCurveList;

(There are various other places where this happens.)

I must say I'm having hard times finding any rationale behind ignoring =
such data rather than rejecting it (and aborting the handshake). In fact, =
most implementations do reject such messages and send a "decode_error" =
alert.

Do you see any argument why ignoring such trailing data would be acceptable=
 (or even desirable)?

Thanks again and Cheers,
Andi Walz


___________________________________

Andreas Walz
Research Engineer
Institute of reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics =
(ivESK)
Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany



>>> "Andreas Walz" <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> 09/14/16 4:20 PM >>>
Hi,

>>> Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> 09/12/16 6:56 PM >>>
> are you aware of the tlsfuzzer framework?
> https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer

@Hubert Kario: Thanks for pointing me to tlsfuzzer. I had a look at the =
repository before and I skimmed through the code. However, I didn't run =
the code and I don't know details about the way it is generating input. Is =
there some paper or presentation about it?=20

>>> Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> 09/14/16 1:39 PM >>>
> My code checks for extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily =
be
> persuaded that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what =
earlier
> versions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some =
future
> RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on finding more =
data may
> be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see why it would be a bad thing.

@Peter Gutmann: Thanks for your take on that. Actually, and I might easily =
be missing something here, I do see some issues with adding new fields to =
the ClientHello in the future (i.e. following the "client_hello_extension_l=
ist"). As far as I can see, there is no way within a ClientHello to convey =
some kind of a version of the ClientHello format itself (as the ClientHello=
's version field is just indicating the highest version the client =
supports). That is, the only mechanism I see here is the same as the one =
that allowed to add extensions to a ClientHello message with RFC3546. =
However, that door has explicitly been closed therein in section 2.1 (as =
Hubert Kario pointed out)

    A server that supports the extensions mechanism MUST accept only
    client hello messages in either the original or extended ClientHello
    format, and (as for all other messages) MUST check that the amount of
    data in the message precisely matches one of these formats; if not
    then it MUST send a fatal "decode_error" alert.  This overrides the
    "Forward compatibility note" in [TLS].

A similar statement is given in RFC5246, section 7.4.1.2.:

    A server MUST accept ClientHello
    messages both with and without the extensions field, and (as for all
    other messages) it MUST check that the amount of data in the message
    precisely matches one of these formats; if not, then it MUST send a
    fatal "decode_error" alert.

Thus, to my understanding, any new field in the ClientHello would =
automatically break backward compatibility (at least with older compliant =
servers or unless everyone explicitly skips a MUST check in the interest =
of forward compatibility).

___________________________________

Andreas Walz
Research Engineer
Institute of reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics =
(ivESK)
Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany





>>> Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> 09/14/16 1:39 PM >>>
Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:

>The actual problem is the design flaw in TLS that availability of null
>compression is not implied, but rather given a seperate codepoint, and =
the
>server choosing null compression and continuing even when it is not
>explicitly asserted by the client, is a server silently making up for =
that
>design flaw in the TLS spec.

Yup, and I'd say it's perfectly valid behaviour.  Compression is an =
optional
extra, but you need to explicitly specify that you don't want it, =
something
that's popular in the PKI world where you have a supposedly optional
capability that isn't actually optional so you need to fill it with a =
dummy
value to indicate that you don't care about it.

>Up to TLSv1.2, TLS extensions were purely optional, so an implementation =
that
>unconditionally ignores everything following compression methods is at =
least
>fully conforming to SSLv3, TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.
>
>For an TLS implementation that parses TLS extensions, the behaviour of =
what
>to do about trailing garbage is a different matter.  Personally I prefer
>aborting in case of garbage trailing TLS extensions.

My code checks for extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily =
be
persuaded that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what earlier
versions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some =
future
RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on finding more data =
may
be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see why it would be a bad thing.

>What the server does in presence of multiple TLS extensions of the same =
type
>is implementation defined.  I think it would be extremely reasonable for =
a
>server to perform a simple plausibility check on decode whether it is
>decoding the same TLS extension more than once, and then abort with a
>decode_error alert, in order to have ambiguities caught early. Recognizing=

>duplicate TLS extensions that the server does not support/implement does =
not
>(yet) create ambiguities (for that server) and requires more complex =
code, so
>I would not implement that check.

+1.  Remembering that you've already done a known extension is one thing, =
but
having to track a potentially arbitrary number of extensions that you =
don't
know what to do with anyway doesn't seem worthwhile.  And then there's the
same problem as with ignoring extra data at the end of the hello, at some
point a future RFC may define an extension where having duplicate copies =
makes
sense or is even required for things to work.  So you don't really gain
anything by ignoring duplicate unknown extensions, and will potentially =
break
things in the future if you do reject them.

Having said that, some extensions are purely signalling extensions, like =
EMS
and EtM.  I'm not sure if there's any problem with accepting doubles of =
those,
it could just be the other side being emphatic.  Consider how you'd need =
to
report this to the user, "shut down the TLS connection because I saw two
copies of some extension you've never heard of before", you can imagine =
what a
user who sees that would think of the anal-retentive &^@#* who added =
special
code to the handshake in order to reject it if this condition is encountere=
d.

Peter.
=20


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charset=3DUTF-8"><META name=3D"Author" content=3D"GroupWise WebAccess"><sty=
le type=3D"text/css"> =0Abody p =0A{ =0A	margin: 0px; =0A}=0A</style=
></head><body style=3D'font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; =
font-size: 13px; '>Dear all,<br><br>sorry for bringing up this thread =
again. We were doing some further studies with TLS implementations (all =
TLS 1.2) for embedded systems and found more cases where, within substructu=
res of handshake messages, trailing data without any associated field in =
the specification is *not* rejected. One example is the "Supported =
Elliptic Curves Extension" [RFC4492]:<br><br>struct {<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;<br>} EllipticCurveList;<b=
r><br>which is parsed as if there was an additional field "trailing" =
absorbing all remaining data:<br><br>struct {<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
opaque trailing[];<br>} EllipticCurveList;<br><br>(There are various other =
places where this happens.)<br><br>I must say I'm having hard times =
finding any rationale behind ignoring such data rather than rejecting it =
(and aborting the handshake). In fact, most implementations do reject such =
messages and send a "decode_error" alert.<br><br>Do you see any argument =
why ignoring such trailing data would be acceptable (or even desirable)?<br=
><br>Thanks again and Cheers,<br>Andi Walz<br><br><br>_____________________=
______________<br><br>Andreas Walz<br>Research Engineer<br>Institute of =
reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics (ivESK)<br>Offenbur=
g University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany<div id=3D"GroupW=
iseSection_1474442174000_andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92=
B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"GroupWiseMessageBody"><div><br></div><span>&nbsp;</s=
pan><span class=3D"GroupwiseReplyHeader"><br><br>&gt;&gt;&gt; "Andreas&nbsp=
;Walz"&nbsp;&lt;andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de&gt; 09/14/16 4:20 PM =
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br></span><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1473859582000_andreas.wa=
lz@hs-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"GroupWiseMes=
sageBody"><div>Hi,<br><br><span class=3D"GroupwiseReplyHeader">&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 Hubert&nbsp;Kario&nbsp;&lt;hkario@redhat.com&gt; 09/12/16 6:56 PM =
&gt;&gt;&gt;</span><br>&gt; are you aware of the tlsfuzzer framework?<br><a=
 class=3D"weblink" href=3D"https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer" =
target=3D"_blank">&gt; https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer</a><br><br>@Hu=
bert Kario: Thanks for pointing me to tlsfuzzer. I had a look at the =
repository before and I skimmed through the code. However, I didn't run =
the code and I don't know details about the way it is generating input. Is =
there some paper or presentation about it? <br><br><span class=3D"Groupwise=
ReplyHeader">&gt;&gt;&gt; Peter&nbsp;Gutmann&nbsp;&lt;pgut001@cs.auckland.a=
c.nz&gt; 09/14/16 1:39 PM &gt;&gt;&gt;</span><br>&gt; My code checks for =
extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily be<br>&gt; persuaded =
that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what earlier<br>&gt; =
versions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some =
future<br>&gt; RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on =
finding more data may<br>&gt; be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see =
why it would be a bad thing.<br><br>@Peter Gutmann: Thanks for your take =
on that. Actually, and I might easily be missing something here, I do see =
some issues with adding new fields to the ClientHello in the future (i.e. =
following the "client_hello_extension_list"). As far as I can see, there =
is no way within a ClientHello to convey some kind of a version of the =
ClientHello format itself (as the ClientHello's version field is just =
indicating the highest version the client supports). That is, the only =
mechanism I see here is the same as the one that allowed to add extensions =
to a ClientHello message with RFC3546. However, that door has explicitly =
been closed therein in section 2.1 (as Hubert Kario pointed out)<br><br>&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A server that supports the extensions mechanism MUST =
accept only<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; client hello messages in either the =
original or extended ClientHello<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; format, and (as for =
all other messages) MUST check that the amount of<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
data in the message precisely matches one of these formats; if not<br>&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; then it MUST send a fatal "decode_error" alert.&nbsp; This =
overrides the<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "Forward compatibility note" in =
[TLS].<br><br>A similar statement is given in RFC5246, section 7.4.1.2.:<br=
><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A server MUST accept ClientHello<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; messages both with and without the extensions field, and (as for =
all<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; other messages) it MUST check that the amount of =
data in the message<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; precisely matches one of these =
formats; if not, then it MUST send a<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; fatal "decode_er=
ror" alert.<br><br>Thus, to my understanding, any new field in the =
ClientHello would automatically break backward compatibility (at least =
with older compliant servers or unless everyone explicitly skips a MUST =
check in the interest of forward compatibility).<br><br>___________________=
________________<br><br>Andreas Walz<br>Research Engineer<br>Institute of =
reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics (ivESK)<br>Offenbur=
g University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany<br><br></div><sp=
an>&nbsp;</span><span class=3D"GroupwiseReplyHeader"><br><br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =
Peter&nbsp;Gutmann&nbsp;&lt;pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz&gt; 09/14/16 1:39 PM =
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br></span>Martin Rex &lt;mrex@sap.com&gt; writes:<br><br>&gt;T=
he actual problem is the design flaw in TLS that availability of null<br>&g=
t;compression is not implied, but rather given a seperate codepoint, and =
the<br>&gt;server choosing null compression and continuing even when it is =
not<br>&gt;explicitly asserted by the client, is a server silently making =
up for that<br>&gt;design flaw in the TLS spec.<br><br>Yup, and I'd say =
it's perfectly valid behaviour.  Compression is an optional<br>extra, but =
you need to explicitly specify that you don't want it, something<br>that's =
popular in the PKI world where you have a supposedly optional<br>capability=
 that isn't actually optional so you need to fill it with a dummy<br>value =
to indicate that you don't care about it.<br><br>&gt;Up to TLSv1.2, TLS =
extensions were purely optional, so an implementation that<br>&gt;unconditi=
onally ignores everything following compression methods is at least<br>&gt;=
fully conforming to SSLv3, TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;For an TLS =
implementation that parses TLS extensions, the behaviour of what<br>&gt;to =
do about trailing garbage is a different matter.  Personally I prefer<br>&g=
t;aborting in case of garbage trailing TLS extensions.<br><br>My code =
checks for extensions all the way down, but I could quite easily be<br>pers=
uaded that ignoring trailing garbage is OK too, based on what earlier<br>ve=
rsions of TLS did.  Like RFC 3546 originally did for extensions, some =
future<br>RFC might add a new field at the end, so not failing on finding =
more data may<br>be a good thing.  Or at least I can't see why it would be =
a bad thing.<br><br>&gt;What the server does in presence of multiple TLS =
extensions of the same type<br>&gt;is implementation defined.  I think it =
would be extremely reasonable for a<br>&gt;server to perform a simple =
plausibility check on decode whether it is<br>&gt;decoding the same TLS =
extension more than once, and then abort with a<br>&gt;decode_error alert, =
in order to have ambiguities caught early. Recognizing<br>&gt;duplicate =
TLS extensions that the server does not support/implement does not<br>&gt;(=
yet) create ambiguities (for that server) and requires more complex code, =
so<br>&gt;I would not implement that check.<br><br>+1.  Remembering that =
you've already done a known extension is one thing, but<br>having to track =
a potentially arbitrary number of extensions that you don't<br>know what =
to do with anyway doesn't seem worthwhile.  And then there's the<br>same =
problem as with ignoring extra data at the end of the hello, at some<br>poi=
nt a future RFC may define an extension where having duplicate copies =
makes<br>sense or is even required for things to work.  So you don't =
really gain<br>anything by ignoring duplicate unknown extensions, and will =
potentially break<br>things in the future if you do reject them.<br><br>Hav=
ing said that, some extensions are purely signalling extensions, like =
EMS<br>and EtM.  I'm not sure if there's any problem with accepting =
doubles of those,<br>it could just be the other side being emphatic.  =
Consider how you'd need to<br>report this to the user, "shut down the TLS =
connection because I saw two<br>copies of some extension you've never =
heard of before", you can imagine what a<br>user who sees that would think =
of the anal-retentive &amp;^@#* who added special<br>code to the handshake =
in order to reject it if this condition is encountered.<br><br>Peter.</div>=
 </div></body></html>

--=__Part1F29A7F6.1__=--

--=__Part1F29A7F6.0__=--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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On 21 September 2016 at 17:21, Andreas Walz
<andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> wrote:
> Do you see any argument why ignoring such trailing data would be acceptable
> (or even desirable)?

No.

Well, we exploited that to add extensions to the protocol once, so I
won't categorically rule it out, but in the case of
supported_groups/supported_curves, no good can come of ignoring
rubbish.  Of course, it's hard to point to this being harmful as well
:)


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Subject: [TLS] application-specific identifier was: TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities
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On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 14:13 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> > It is purely a matter of software architecture â€” the initial
> > incoming
> > UDP packets reach a dispatcher that needs to hand the connection
> > off to
> > the appropriate worker process for that client.... and *really*
> > wants
> > to make that decision based on the ClientHello alone.
> > 
> > If we *start* the handshake in the main dispatcher and get to the
> > point
> > of seeing the ClientKeyExchange, we have to hand over the
> > partially-
> > completed handshake (or keep going and then hand over a fully-
> > completed
> > handshake) to the appropriate worker. And in fact I don't even
> > think
> > the dispatcher *has* the actual keys; only the identities so that
> > it
> > knows where to dispatch connections to.
> 
> See above. The key advantage of what I am proposing here is that it
> has
> exactly the same cryptographic properties as current TLS-PSK, with
> the
> indicator just serving as a routing-ID.

We've decided to take that approach. What we have currently is
described at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mavrogiannopoulos-app-id-00

Comments are welcome.

regards,
Nikos


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Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 11:45:15 +0200
From: "Andreas Walz" <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>
To: <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
References: <57D2E218020000AC0011B17E@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <20160909152901.9008C1A552@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <1473853106532.3256@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <57D96E34020000AC0011B73F@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <57E25106020000AC0011BF3A@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <CABkgnnX7X+21wjChxkW-uhd8WXAMyp5f1F74H5ja=1mui4POiQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Ok, thanks. This is close to my sense of it. Actually, I wasn't aware of =
the fact that
 the TLS 1.3 draft now  explicitly addresses this in the Presentation =
Language section:

     "Peers which receive a message which cannot be parsed according to =
the syntax
     (e.g., have a length extending beyond the message boundary or contain =
an
     out-of-range
length) MUST terminate the connection with a "decoding_error" alert."

Cheers,
Andi


>>> Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> 09/21/16 9:25 AM >>>
On 21 September 2016 at 17:21, Andreas Walz
<andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> wrote:
> Do you see any argument why ignoring such trailing data would be =
acceptable
> (or even desirable)?

No.

Well, we exploited that to add extensions to the protocol once, so I
won't categorically rule it out, but in the case of
supported_groups/supported_curves, no good can come of ignoring
rubbish.  Of course, it's hard to point to this being harmful as well
:)



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Content-Description: HTML

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8"><META name=3D"Author" content=3D"GroupWise WebAccess"><sty=
le type=3D"text/css"> =0Abody p =0A{ =0A	margin: 0px; =0A}=0A</style=
></head><body style=3D'font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; =
font-size: 13px; '>Ok, thanks. This is close to my sense of it. Actually, =
I wasn't aware of the fact that<br> the TLS 1.3 draft now  explicitly =
addresses this in the Presentation Language section:<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; "Peers which receive a message which cannot be parsed according =
to the syntax<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (e.g., have a length extending =
beyond the message boundary or contain an<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
out-of-range=0Alength) MUST terminate the connection with a "decoding_error=
" alert."<br><br>Cheers,<br>Andi<div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1474450680000_a=
ndreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"Gro=
upWiseMessageBody"><span>&nbsp;</span><span class=3D"GroupwiseReplyHeader">=
<br><br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Martin&nbsp;Thomson&nbsp;&lt;martin.thomson@gmail.com&=
gt; 09/21/16 9:25 AM &gt;&gt;&gt;<br></span>On 21 September 2016 at 17:21, =
Andreas Walz<br>&lt;andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de&gt; wrote:<br>&gt; Do you =
see any argument why ignoring such trailing data would be acceptable<br>&gt=
; (or even desirable)?<br><br>No.<br><br>Well, we exploited that to add =
extensions to the protocol once, so I<br>won't categorically rule it out, =
but in the case of<br>supported_groups/supported_curves, no good can come =
of ignoring<br>rubbish.  Of course, it's hard to point to this being =
harmful as well<br>:)<br></div></body></html>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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On Tuesday, 20 September 2016 18:24:42 CEST David Benjamin wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 2:14 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > I'll be running test looking for intolerances like this over the Alexa =
top
> > 1
> > million next month.
>=20
> (I've already done this, by the way. It's where the numbers in the version
> negotiation thread came from.)

even if there is no glory in it, reproducibility studies are important in=20
scientific approach :)

> > For now I have a probe that adds values 0x0003, 0x0004, 0x0700, 0x0703 =
and
> > 0x0704 at the end of the list of algorithms.
>=20
> At the front is probably more realistic.=20

good point

> There is even a MUST-level
> requirement in the current TLS 1.3 spec for SHA-1 sigalgs to be at the en=
d,
> so the new ones can't be (unless you take SHA-1 out, which is, sadly,
> unrealistic today... an upsetting number of 1.2 servers only sign SHA-1).

yes, I see around 5% of servers doing that
=20
> I was able to find a few instances of an NSS bug (
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1119983), but nothing else.
>=20
> The offending implementation for this thread was actually a WebRTC stack
> (DTLS), not an HTTPS server. We hit it via Chrome's Dev channel. But since
> this intolerance comes from a MUST-level requirement in TLS 1.2, I think
> it's prudent to renumber.

True, but then we should check if we don't hit even bigger problems.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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On Wednesday, 21 September 2016 11:45:15 CEST Andreas Walz wrote:
> Ok, thanks. This is close to my sense of it. Actually, I wasn't aware of =
the
> fact that the TLS 1.3 draft now  explicitly addresses this in the
> Presentation Language section:
>=20
>      "Peers which receive a message which cannot be parsed according to t=
he
> syntax (e.g., have a length extending beyond the message boundary or
> contain an out-of-range
> length) MUST terminate the connection with a "decoding_error" alert."

technically TLSv1.2 also is like this, it's just not explicit. All the=20
messages and structures must match their definitions exactly, that means an=
y=20
kind of trailing data is an encoding error and as such should cause connect=
ion=20
abort.

at least in theory if implementation does not reject such malformed fields =
or=20
messages, it may be possible to trick it into talking with a different=20
protocol that just happens to be parseable as TLS. Multiple checks on self-
consistency of messages make that unlikely.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>, "martin.thomson@gmail.com" <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 15:53:33 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Actually, I wasn't aware of the fact that the TLS 1.3 draft now explicitly=
=0A=
>addresses this in the Presentation Language section:=0A=
>=0A=
>=A0 "Peers which receive a message which cannot be parsed according to the=
=0A=
>=A0 syntax (e.g., have a length extending beyond the message boundary or=
=0A=
>=A0 contain an out-of-range length) MUST terminate the connection with a=
=0A=
>=A0 "decoding_error" alert."=0A=
=0A=
And how many implementations are going to do this?=A0 Consider the error-me=
ssage=0A=
litmus test I proposed earlier, reasons for failing to connect to (say)=0A=
amazon.com:=0A=
=0A=
=A0 Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because its certificate isn't valid.=
=0A=
=A0 =0A=
=A0 Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because no suitable encryption was=0A=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 available.=0A=
=0A=
=A0 Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because <explanation for =0A=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 decoding_error alert>.=0A=
=0A=
What would you put for the explanation for this case?=A0 And if you say "de=
code=0A=
error" the user's response will be to switch to some less buggy software th=
at=0A=
doesn't have problems connecting.=0A=
=0A=
If you're writing a strict validating protocol parser than disconnecting in=
=0A=
this case is a valid response, but if it's software that will be used by=0A=
actual humans then failing a connect based on something like this makes no=
=0A=
sense.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


From nobody Wed Sep 21 09:12:51 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 03:53:33PM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:
> 
> Â  Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because <explanation for 
> Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â  decoding_error alert>.
> 
> What would you put for the explanation for this case?Â  And if you say "decode
> error" the user's response will be to switch to some less buggy software that
> doesn't have problems connecting.

Well, valid response...
 
> If you're writing a strict validating protocol parser than disconnecting in
> this case is a valid response, but if it's software that will be used by
> actual humans then failing a connect based on something like this makes no
> sense.

decode_error only happens if either end is buggy (the receiver parsing
can also be buggy), or if data is corrupted in transport.

It is meant for errors where length of something is wrong (and such
errors would likely be non-recoverable anyway)..



-Ilari


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>>> Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> 21.09.16 17.54 Uhr >>>


> If you're writing a strict validating protocol parser than disconnecting =
in
> this case is a valid response, but if it's software that will be used by
> actual humans then failing a connect based on something like this makes =
no
> sense.


Wouldn't this argument apply to any "decode_error"?


Andi


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validating protocol parser than disconnecting in<br>&gt; this case is a =
valid response, but if it's software that will be used by<br>&gt; actual =
humans then failing a connect based on something like this makes no<br>&gt;=
 sense.</div><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1474478547000_andreas.walz@hs-offe=
nburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"GroupWiseMessageBody">=
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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From nobody Wed Sep 21 12:16:38 2016
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To: Raja ashok <raja.ashok@huawei.com>, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <n.mavrogiannopoulos@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 17:46 +0000, Raja ashok wrote:
> [ashok]=C2=A0=C2=A0: PSK Identity extension specified in our extension di=
ffers
> from the extension specified in TLS1.3.=20

Agreed. I suspect it just makes sense to add a sentence to that effect,
to the draft?

> [ashok] : I feel sending the selected ID is better, otherwise while
> process "server hello" msg, client has to maintain the PSK ID list in
> the same order in which it sent. Already there was a discussion in
> TLS1.3 group for sending selected ID instead of index.=C2=A0

Yes, I agree. In TLS1.3 it kind of makes sense, because the PSK
identifiers there can be huge =E2=80=94 they are the full session ticket fr=
om
RFC5077. So it makes some sense to send back only an index. But in
TLS <=3D 1.2 when you're not (ab)using PSK for session resumption, that
motivation goes away and returning the identity itself seems
reasonable. But again, it's just worth calling out the differences
between TLSv1.3 for clarity.

There is also discussion of supporting only a *single* PSK identity in
TLSv1.3. If that happens, is there a real need for the extension to
permit more than one identity in TLS <=3D 1.2.=C2=A0

--=20
dwmw2



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From nobody Wed Sep 21 13:00:31 2016
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Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:00:22 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 08:16:15PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 17:46 +0000, Raja ashok wrote:
> 
> > [ashok] : I feel sending the selected ID is better, otherwise while
> > process "server hello" msg, client has to maintain the PSK ID list in
> > the same order in which it sent. Already there was a discussion in
> > TLS1.3 group for sending selected ID instead of index.Â 
> 
> There is also discussion of supporting only a *single* PSK identity in
> TLSv1.3. If that happens, is there a real need for the extension to
> permit more than one identity in TLS <= 1.2.Â 

Is the intended usecase some "IoT"/"embedded" devices? If so, I think
this is *extremely* bad idea.

Those things tend to have very long lifespans, so one shouldn't put
one out except with cutting-edge stuff. Anything less, and there is
substantial risk of it going bad during lifetime.

It would be possible to retrofit an extension to do multiple identites
at once into TLS 1.3 even if baseline TLS 1.3 allows only one, altough
implementing it probably will not be pleasant.[1]

Also, has anyone done security analysis of doing PSK negotiation that
way in TLS 1.2 (someone has clearly done that for TLS 1.3, given
some of the attacks posted)...


[1] E.g. altering hello_finished to be a list, one entry for each
identity, or omitting it entierely for "implicit finished with the
used 0-RTT key before ServerHello" trick I outlined earlier.

(Neither is probably pleasant to implement... The latter is probably
easier if the library architecture is suitable).



-Ilari


From nobody Wed Sep 21 13:33:23 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 23:00 +0300, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 08:16:15PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
> >=20
> > On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 17:46 +0000, Raja ashok wrote:
> >=20
> > >=20
> > > [ashok] : I feel sending the selected ID is better, otherwise while
> > > process "server hello" msg, client has to maintain the PSK ID list in
> > > the same order in which it sent. Already there was a discussion in
> > > TLS1.3 group for sending selected ID instead of index.=C2=A0
> > There is also discussion of supporting only a *single* PSK identity in
> > TLSv1.3. If that happens, is there a real need for the extension to
> > permit more than one identity in TLS <=3D 1.2.=C2=A0
> Is the intended usecase some "IoT"/"embedded" devices? If so, I think
> this is *extremely* bad idea.
>=20
> Those things tend to have very long lifespans, so one shouldn't put
> one out except with cutting-edge stuff. Anything less, and there is
> substantial risk of it going bad during lifetime.
>=20
> It would be possible to retrofit an extension to do multiple identites
> at once into TLS 1.3 even if baseline TLS 1.3 allows only one, altough
> implementing it probably will not be pleasant.[1]

Typically I would expect that a given IoT client would still support
only one form of PSK, and offer one identifier. The update model would
be that the server accepts *either* the old or the new keys, and
clients are slowly upgraded to offer the latter. But still only one at
a time?

> [1] E.g. altering hello_finished to be a list, one entry for each
> identity, or omitting it entierely for "implicit finished with the
> used 0-RTT key before ServerHello" trick I outlined earlier.
>=20
> (Neither is probably pleasant to implement... The latter is probably
> easier if the library architecture is suitable).

I had also suggested including a hello_finished only for the first
(preferred) PSK identity. If the server doesn't want that one, it can
send a HelloRetryRequest with a PreSharedKeyExtension indicating which
PSK identity it *does* want.

Or did I miss a reason why that wasn't sufficient and *each*
ClientHello needed to be validated? I confess I've only been looking at
this for the last day or so.

--=C2=A0
dwmw2



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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 13:36:29 -0700
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To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 1:33 PM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
wrote:

> On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 23:00 +0300, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 08:16:15PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 17:46 +0000, Raja ashok wrote:
> > >
> > > >
> > > > [ashok] : I feel sending the selected ID is better, otherwise while
> > > > process "server hello" msg, client has to maintain the PSK ID list in
> > > > the same order in which it sent. Already there was a discussion in
> > > > TLS1.3 group for sending selected ID instead of index.
> > > There is also discussion of supporting only a *single* PSK identity in
> > > TLSv1.3. If that happens, is there a real need for the extension to
> > > permit more than one identity in TLS <= 1.2.
> > Is the intended usecase some "IoT"/"embedded" devices? If so, I think
> > this is *extremely* bad idea.
> >
> > Those things tend to have very long lifespans, so one shouldn't put
> > one out except with cutting-edge stuff. Anything less, and there is
> > substantial risk of it going bad during lifetime.
> >
> > It would be possible to retrofit an extension to do multiple identites
> > at once into TLS 1.3 even if baseline TLS 1.3 allows only one, altough
> > implementing it probably will not be pleasant.[1]
>
> Typically I would expect that a given IoT client would still support
> only one form of PSK, and offer one identifier. The update model would
> be that the server accepts *either* the old or the new keys, and
> clients are slowly upgraded to offer the latter. But still only one at
> a time?
>
> > [1] E.g. altering hello_finished to be a list, one entry for each
> > identity, or omitting it entierely for "implicit finished with the
> > used 0-RTT key before ServerHello" trick I outlined earlier.
> >
> > (Neither is probably pleasant to implement... The latter is probably
> > easier if the library architecture is suitable).
>
> I had also suggested including a hello_finished only for the first
> (preferred) PSK identity. If the server doesn't want that one, it can
> send a HelloRetryRequest with a PreSharedKeyExtension indicating which
> PSK identity it *does* want.
>

I don't see how this is appreciably easier than just having the client
offer one and then
the server HRR.

-Ekr


>
> Or did I miss a reason why that wasn't sufficient and *each*
> ClientHello needed to be validated? I confess I've only been looking at
> this for the last day or so.
>
> --
> dwmw2
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 1:33 PM, David Woodhouse <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dwmw2@infradead.org" target=3D"_blank">dwmw2@infradead.or=
g</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">=
On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 23:00 +0300, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:<br>
&gt; On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 08:16:15PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 17:46 +0000, Raja ashok wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; [ashok] : I feel sending the selected ID is better, otherwis=
e while<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; process &quot;server hello&quot; msg, client has to maintain=
 the PSK ID list in<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; the same order in which it sent. Already there was a discuss=
ion in<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; TLS1.3 group for sending selected ID instead of index.=C2=A0=
<br>
&gt; &gt; There is also discussion of supporting only a *single* PSK identi=
ty in<br>
&gt; &gt; TLSv1.3. If that happens, is there a real need for the extension =
to<br>
&gt; &gt; permit more than one identity in TLS &lt;=3D 1.2.=C2=A0<br>
&gt; Is the intended usecase some &quot;IoT&quot;/&quot;embedded&quot; devi=
ces? If so, I think<br>
&gt; this is *extremely* bad idea.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Those things tend to have very long lifespans, so one shouldn&#39;t pu=
t<br>
&gt; one out except with cutting-edge stuff. Anything less, and there is<br=
>
&gt; substantial risk of it going bad during lifetime.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It would be possible to retrofit an extension to do multiple identites=
<br>
&gt; at once into TLS 1.3 even if baseline TLS 1.3 allows only one, altough=
<br>
&gt; implementing it probably will not be pleasant.[1]<br>
<br>
</span>Typically I would expect that a given IoT client would still support=
<br>
only one form of PSK, and offer one identifier. The update model would<br>
be that the server accepts *either* the old or the new keys, and<br>
clients are slowly upgraded to offer the latter. But still only one at<br>
a time?<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; [1] E.g. altering hello_finished to be a list, one entry for each<br>
&gt; identity, or omitting it entierely for &quot;implicit finished with th=
e<br>
&gt; used 0-RTT key before ServerHello&quot; trick I outlined earlier.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (Neither is probably pleasant to implement... The latter is probably<b=
r>
&gt; easier if the library architecture is suitable).<br>
<br>
</span>I had also suggested including a hello_finished only for the first<b=
r>
(preferred) PSK identity. If the server doesn&#39;t want that one, it can<b=
r>
send a HelloRetryRequest with a PreSharedKeyExtension indicating which<br>
PSK identity it *does* want.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;=
t see how this is appreciably easier than just having the client offer one =
and then</div><div>the server HRR.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Or did I miss a reason why that wasn&#39;t sufficient and *each*<br>
ClientHello needed to be validated? I confess I&#39;ve only been looking at=
<br>
this for the last day or so.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--=C2=A0<br>
dwmw2<br>
<br>
<br>
</font></span><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:39:15 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 09:33:11PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 23:00 +0300, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 08:16:15PM +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
> 
> > [1] E.g. altering hello_finished to be a list, one entry for each
> > identity, or omitting it entierely for "implicit finished with the
> > used 0-RTT key before ServerHello" trick I outlined earlier.
> > 
> > (Neither is probably pleasant to implement... The latter is probably
> > easier if the library architecture is suitable).
> 
> I had also suggested including a hello_finished only for the first
> (preferred) PSK identity. If the server doesn't want that one, it can
> send a HelloRetryRequest with a PreSharedKeyExtension indicating which
> PSK identity it *does* want.
> 
> Or did I miss a reason why that wasn't sufficient and *each*
> ClientHello needed to be validated? I confess I've only been looking at
> this for the last day or so.

Basically, you need the binder (finished) for whatever PSK you actually
wind up using, or you have attacks in some cases.

So it would technically be possible to have multiple PSK identites,
and use HRR to change the one used (followed by client signaling
finished for that one in new ClientHello).


-Ilari


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From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 13:36 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >=20
> I don't see how this is appreciably easier than just having the
> client offer one and then the server HRR.

If I have ten PSK identities I can offer, it may take nine round-trips
before I send the one you want.

If I list them all in my first ClientHello and you *tell* me which one
you want, that's only one more round-trip.

--=20
dwmw2



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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 13:49:24 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 1:43 PM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
wrote:

> On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 13:36 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > >
> > I don't see how this is appreciably easier than just having the
> > client offer one and then the server HRR.
>
> If I have ten PSK identities I can offer, it may take nine round-trips
> before I send the one you want.
>
> If I list them all in my first ClientHello and you *tell* me which one
> you want, that's only one more round-trip.


Is there a real-world use-case where this is relevant?

-Ekr

--94eb2c0894149aad21053d0ab098
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 1:43 PM, David Woodhouse <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dwmw2@infradead.org" target=3D"_blank">dwmw2@infradead.or=
g</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">=
On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 13:36 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; I don&#39;t see how this is appreciably easier than just having the<br=
>
&gt; client offer one and then the server HRR.<br>
<br>
</span>If I have ten PSK identities I can offer, it may take nine round-tri=
ps<br>
before I send the one you want.<br>
<br>
If I list them all in my first ClientHello and you *tell* me which one<br>
you want, that&#39;s only one more round-trip.</blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>Is there a real-world use-case where this is relevant?</div><div><br></=
div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

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From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 21:53:11 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01
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On Wed, 2016-09-21 at 13:49 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>=20
> Is there a real-world use-case where this is relevant?

The number ten might be a little excessive. But there is talk of
multiple sessions being simultaneously for resumption, and multiple PSK
identities in the original meaning of that term.

So I suppose there are certainly use cases where a "HRR and let the
client *guess* what we might like instead" model would lead to more
round-trips than an explicit indication from the server.

--=20
dwmw2



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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 09:54:02 +1000
Message-ID: <CABkgnnWUwPeSeLBO8OyvKmb6MBBfNxPWEXw59_Kzkuby-WqDNQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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You describe the observation that leads to Postel's maxim, namely that
if you found the internet in a mess when you got there, then you have
to be tolerant of rubbish.

The advantage with deploying a new protocol is that you can be strict.
If, for example, all of the browsers implement TLS 1.3 and are strict,
then Amazon won't be able to deploy a buggy 1.3 implementation without
noticing pretty quickly.  You might suggest that that's aspiration to
the point of delusion, but in fact it worked out pretty well with
HTTP/2 deployment.  We didn't squash ALL of the nasty bugs, but we got
most of them.


On 22 September 2016 at 01:53, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
> Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:
>
>>Actually, I wasn't aware of the fact that the TLS 1.3 draft now explicitly
>>addresses this in the Presentation Language section:
>>
>>  "Peers which receive a message which cannot be parsed according to the
>>  syntax (e.g., have a length extending beyond the message boundary or
>>  contain an out-of-range length) MUST terminate the connection with a
>>  "decoding_error" alert."
>
> And how many implementations are going to do this?  Consider the error-message
> litmus test I proposed earlier, reasons for failing to connect to (say)
> amazon.com:
>
>   Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because its certificate isn't valid.
>
>   Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because no suitable encryption was
>          available.
>
>   Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because <explanation for
>          decoding_error alert>.
>
> What would you put for the explanation for this case?  And if you say "decode
> error" the user's response will be to switch to some less buggy software that
> doesn't have problems connecting.
>
> If you're writing a strict validating protocol parser than disconnecting in
> this case is a valid response, but if it's software that will be used by
> actual humans then failing a connect based on something like this makes no
> sense.
>
> Peter.


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>, "martin.thomson@gmail.com" <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: Antw: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 05:00:07 +0000
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Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:=0A=
>>>> Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> 21.09.16 17.54 Uhr >>>=0A=
>> If you're writing a strict validating protocol parser than disconnecting=
 in=0A=
>> this case is a valid response, but if it's software that will be used by=
=0A=
>> actual humans then failing a connect based on something like this makes =
no=0A=
>> sense.=0A=
>=0A=
>Wouldn't this argument apply to any "decode_error"?=0A=
=0A=
Nope.  There's a big difference between "I can't continue" and "I can =0A=
continue without any problems but don't want to".  The example I gave of=0A=
"Couldn't connect to Amazon because no suitable encryption was available"=
=0A=
would be the error message to display in the case of a decode error that=0A=
garbled the cipher suites, an "I can't continue" condition.  The current=0A=
thread starter was a case of "I can continue without any problems but don't=
=0A=
want to", which pretty much any user of the product will perceive as a bugg=
y=0A=
product, meaning they'll drop it and switch to something that works.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 05:11:39 +0000
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Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>The advantage with deploying a new protocol is that you can be strict. If,=
 =0A=
>for example, all of the browsers implement TLS 1.3 and are strict, then =
=0A=
>Amazon won't be able to deploy a buggy 1.3 implementation without noticing=
 =0A=
>pretty quickly.  You might suggest that that's aspiration to the point of =
=0A=
>delusion, but in fact it worked out pretty well with HTTP/2 deployment.  W=
e =0A=
>didn't squash ALL of the nasty bugs, but we got most of them.=0A=
=0A=
It also means you're going to be in for a rude shock when you encounter the=
=0A=
ocean of embedded/SCADA/IoT devices with non-mainstream TLS implementations=
.=0A=
The reason why HTTP/2 "works" is that it essentially forked HTTP, HTTP/2 fo=
r=0A=
Google, Amazon, etc, and the browser vendors, and HTTP 1.1 for everything =
=0A=
else that uses HTTP as its universal substrate.  As a result there will be =
=0A=
two versions of HTTP in perpetuity, HTTP 1.1 and HTTP-whatever-the-current-=
=0A=
version-is.=0A=
=0A=
(Should I mention TLS-LTS here? :-).=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] early IANA code point assignment request for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead
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Subject: Re: [TLS] early IANA code point assignment request for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead
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Speaking of early assignments for code points, it'd be about time for one=
=0A=
for TLS-LTS as well, otherwise it'll end up with the de facto 0x42 hard-=0A=
coded into various implementations.  So could I get an IANA early assignmen=
t=0A=
for that?=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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> On 22 Sep 2016, at 8:11 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> =
wrote:
>=20
> Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> writes:
>=20
>> The advantage with deploying a new protocol is that you can be =
strict. If,=20
>> for example, all of the browsers implement TLS 1.3 and are strict, =
then=20
>> Amazon won't be able to deploy a buggy 1.3 implementation without =
noticing=20
>> pretty quickly.  You might suggest that that's aspiration to the =
point of=20
>> delusion, but in fact it worked out pretty well with HTTP/2 =
deployment.  We=20
>> didn't squash ALL of the nasty bugs, but we got most of them.
>=20
> It also means you're going to be in for a rude shock when you =
encounter the
> ocean of embedded/SCADA/IoT devices with non-mainstream TLS =
implementations.
> The reason why HTTP/2 "works" is that it essentially forked HTTP, =
HTTP/2 for
> Google, Amazon, etc, and the browser vendors, and HTTP 1.1 for =
everything=20
> else that uses HTTP as its universal substrate.  As a result there =
will be=20
> two versions of HTTP in perpetuity, HTTP 1.1 and =
HTTP-whatever-the-current-
> version-is.

Perhaps. But if at some point all websites use =
HTTP-whatever-the-current-version-is then maybe browsers can remove =
support for HTTP/1.1 and then your embedded/SCADA/IoT devices won=E2=80=99=
t give us that rude shock.

I honestly don=E2=80=99t think that having two protocols for these two =
radically different use cases is a bad outcome.

Yoav


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 05:11:39AM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> writes:
> 
> >The advantage with deploying a new protocol is that you can be strict. If, 
> >for example, all of the browsers implement TLS 1.3 and are strict, then 
> >Amazon won't be able to deploy a buggy 1.3 implementation without noticing 
> >pretty quickly.  You might suggest that that's aspiration to the point of 
> >delusion, but in fact it worked out pretty well with HTTP/2 deployment.  We 
> >didn't squash ALL of the nasty bugs, but we got most of them.
> 
> It also means you're going to be in for a rude shock when you encounter the
> ocean of embedded/SCADA/IoT devices with non-mainstream TLS implementations.

That did not check for interop with any mainstream TLS library?

Also, code to "recover" tends to introduce security issues if used in
security protocols. Just because I don't have to deal with simple bugs
like buffer overflows leading to RCE or data races does not mean I can
do whatever I want and expect the code to have low number of security
issues. The existing stuff is way more than enough.

(Just fixed a bug where NotBefore/NotAfter of dedicated OCSP responder
certificate were not validated... Not related to recovery in any way,
but still some special code).

> The reason why HTTP/2 "works" is that it essentially forked HTTP, HTTP/2 for
> Google, Amazon, etc, and the browser vendors, and HTTP 1.1 for everything 
> else that uses HTTP as its universal substrate.  As a result there will be 
> two versions of HTTP in perpetuity, HTTP 1.1 and HTTP-whatever-the-current-
> version-is.

Well, the problem you encounter first with HTTP/2 is that it really
dislikes unencrypted operation. Which impiles you pretty much need 
encryption. Which impiles you pretty much need the WebPKI certificate
model... Which tends to be poor match for anything except named servers
on the internet, which tends not be suitable for IoT stuff...

> (Should I mention TLS-LTS here? :-).

Ugh...



-Ilari


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Subject: [TLS] Signature Algorithms Extension Clarification
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Hi all,

I need a clarification regarding the use of the signature algorithms.

Reading Section 4.2.3. "Signature Algorithms" I got the impression that 
there is a new extension being defined called 
'supported_signature_algorithms', which replaces the previous 
'signature_algorithm' extension.

The difference between the 'signature_algorithm' extension in RFC 5246 
and the newly defined 'supported_signature_algorithms' extension is that 
the new extension only contains the digital signature algorithm and not 
the hash function anymore.

If that's indeed the intention I would prefer if the text uses the 
'supported_signature_algorithms' rather than 'signature_algorithms'.
(as it is done in Section 4.4.2. "Certificate Verify"). Unfortunately 
the term 'signature_algorithms' is used in many other places in the 
document itself, including the IANA consideration section that makes a 
reference to RFC 5246.

Is it correct that the 'supported_signature_algorithms' extension 
replaces the 'signature_algorithm' extension from RFC 5246?

Ciao
Hannes


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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On Wednesday, 21 September 2016 15:53:33 CEST Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:
> >Actually, I wasn't aware of the fact that the TLS 1.3 draft now explicit=
ly
> >addresses this in the Presentation Language section:
> >
> >  "Peers which receive a message which cannot be parsed according to the
> >  syntax (e.g., have a length extending beyond the message boundary or
> >  contain an out-of-range length) MUST terminate the connection with a
> >  "decoding_error" alert."
>=20
> And how many implementations are going to do this?  Consider the
> error-message litmus test I proposed earlier, reasons for failing to
> connect to (say) amazon.com:
>=20
>   Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because its certificate isn't valid.
> =20
>   Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because no suitable encryption was
>          available.
>=20
>   Error: Couldn't connect to Amazon because <explanation for
>          decoding_error alert>

"received data was malformed."

> If you're writing a strict validating protocol parser than disconnecting =
in
> this case is a valid response, but if it's software that will be used by
> actual humans then failing a connect based on something like this makes no
> sense.

We are talking about a cryptographic protocol. Being very strict about what=
=20
you receive is the raison d'=C3=AAtre of the whole thing.

POODLE happened because SSL 3 in general and some TLS implementations in=20
particular weren't strict.

Researchers look at protocol itself and only a handful of popular=20
implementations, they won't be analysing if the TLS-as-implemented-by-ACME-
widget-7000 is secure even if it isn't strict.
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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From: "Andreas Walz" <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>
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Subject: [TLS] Antw: Re: Antw: Re: Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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>>> Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> 22.09.16 7.00 Uhr >>>


> Nope.  There's a big difference between "I can't continue" and "I can=20
> continue without any problems but don't want to".  The example I gave of
> "Couldn't connect to Amazon because no suitable encryption was available"=

> would be the error message to display in the case of a decode error that
> garbled the cipher suites, an "I can't continue" condition.  The current
> thread starter was a case of "I can continue without any problems but =
don't
> want to", which pretty much any user of the product will perceive as a =
buggy
> product, meaning they'll drop it and switch to something that works.

> Peter.


I see your point here. However, where would you draw the line between "I =
can't" and "I don't want to"? Think of a cipher suites list with 3 bytes =
in a ClientHello. You can still find one cipher suite that could be ok to =
work with. However, how can you trust the first two bytes if you find that =
third byte telling you something's abnormal?


Andi


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8"><META name=3D"Author" content=3D"GroupWise WebAccess"><sty=
le type=3D"text/css"> =0Abody p =0A{ =0A	margin: 0px; =0A}=0A</style=
></head><body style=3D'font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; =
font-size: 13px; '><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1474545952000_andreas.walz@h=
s-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"GroupWiseMessage=
Body"><div>&gt;&gt;&gt; Peter&nbsp;Gutmann&nbsp;&lt;pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.=
nz&gt; 22.09.16 7.00 Uhr &gt;&gt;&gt;</div><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1474=
545952000_andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" =
class=3D"GroupWiseMessageBody"><br></div>&gt; Nope.  There's a big =
difference between "I can't continue" and "I can <br>&gt;&nbsp;continue =
without any problems but don't want to".  The example I gave of<br>&gt;&nbs=
p;"Couldn't connect to Amazon because no suitable encryption was available"=
<br>&gt;&nbsp;would be the error message to display in the case of a =
decode error that<br>&gt;&nbsp;garbled the cipher suites, an "I can't =
continue" condition.  The current<br>&gt;&nbsp;thread starter was a case =
of "I can continue without any problems but don't<br>&gt;&nbsp;want to", =
which pretty much any user of the product will perceive as a buggy<br>&gt;&=
nbsp;product, meaning they'll drop it and switch to something that =
works.<br><br>&gt;&nbsp;Peter.</div><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_14745459520=
00_andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" =
class=3D"GroupWiseMessageBody"><br></div><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_147454=
5952000_andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" =
class=3D"GroupWiseMessageBody">I see your point here. However, where would =
you draw the line between "I can't" and "I don't want to"? Think of a =
cipher suites list with 3 bytes in a ClientHello. You can still find one =
cipher suite that could be ok to work with. However, how can you trust the =
first two bytes if you find that third byte telling you something's =
abnormal?</div><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1474545952000_andreas.walz@hs-of=
fenburg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"GroupWiseMessageBody=
"><br></div><div id=3D"GroupWiseSection_1474545952000_andreas.walz@hs-offen=
burg.de_FE7C91400D190000B7A92B7A3C89F76A_" class=3D"GroupWiseMessageBody">A=
ndi</div></body></html>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Signature Algorithms Extension Clarification
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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 2:33 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <
hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> I need a clarification regarding the use of the signature algorithms.
>
> Reading Section 4.2.3. "Signature Algorithms" I got the impression that
> there is a new extension being defined called 'supported_signature_algorithms',
> which replaces the previous 'signature_algorithm' extension.
>
> The difference between the 'signature_algorithm' extension in RFC 5246 and
> the newly defined 'supported_signature_algorithms' extension is that the
> new extension only contains the digital signature algorithm and not the
> hash function anymore.
>

> If that's indeed the intention I would prefer if the text uses the
> 'supported_signature_algorithms' rather than 'signature_algorithms'.
> (as it is done in Section 4.4.2. "Certificate Verify"). Unfortunately the
> term 'signature_algorithms' is used in many other places in the document
> itself, including the IANA consideration section that makes a reference to
> RFC 5246.
>
> Is it correct that the 'supported_signature_algorithms' extension
> replaces the 'signature_algorithm' extension from RFC 5246?
>

Yes and no :)

We've redefined the structure to be "signature and hash and curve in one
code point" but we're just
retconning the existing values and extension code point.

-Ekr


> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a114d6f1cfad7f3053d17d67a
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 2:33 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tsc=
hofenig@gmx.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi =
all,<br>
<br>
I need a clarification regarding the use of the signature algorithms.<br>
<br>
Reading Section 4.2.3. &quot;Signature Algorithms&quot; I got the impressio=
n that there is a new extension being defined called &#39;supported_signatu=
re_algorithm<wbr>s&#39;, which replaces the previous &#39;signature_algorit=
hm&#39; extension.<br>
<br>
The difference between the &#39;signature_algorithm&#39; extension in RFC 5=
246 and the newly defined &#39;supported_signature_algorithm<wbr>s&#39; ext=
ension is that the new extension only contains the digital signature algori=
thm and not the hash function anymore.<br></blockquote><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex"><br>
If that&#39;s indeed the intention I would prefer if the text uses the &#39=
;supported_signature_algorithm<wbr>s&#39; rather than &#39;signature_algori=
thms&#39;.<br>
(as it is done in Section 4.4.2. &quot;Certificate Verify&quot;). Unfortuna=
tely the term &#39;signature_algorithms&#39; is used in many other places i=
n the document itself, including the IANA consideration section that makes =
a reference to RFC 5246.<br>
<br>
Is it correct that the &#39;supported_signature_algorithm<wbr>s&#39; extens=
ion replaces the &#39;signature_algorithm&#39; extension from RFC 5246?<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes and no :)</div><div><br></div><div>We&=
#39;ve redefined the structure to be &quot;signature and hash and curve in =
one code point&quot; but we&#39;re just</div><div>retconning the existing v=
alues and extension code point.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a114d6f1cfad7f3053d17d67a--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Antw: Re: Antw: Re: Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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> On Sep 22, 2016, at 8:18 AM, Andreas Walz =
<andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> wrote:
>=20
> I see your point here. However, where would you draw the line between =
"I can't" and "I don't want to"? Think of a cipher suites list with 3 =
bytes in a ClientHello. You can still find one cipher suite that could =
be ok to work with. However, how can you trust the first two bytes if =
you find that third byte telling you something's abnormal?

The server tries that first cipher, if mutually supported, and if it
works, it guessed right.  If the finished message from the server is
valid, the client's handshake as seen by the server was presumably
exactly what the client sent, so the client gets what it paid for...

Servers don't have to be that forgiving, but it is a plausible approach.

--=20
	Viktor.


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To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members

My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits). =
 My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based finan=
cial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and a=
sset management firms. =20

I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.

While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of RSA key exchange=
.

Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.=20
=20
Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely upo=
n TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance of =
supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities will n=
eed to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and loss=
 of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial institut=
ions and their regulators require.

The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial instituti=
ons are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inclu=
ding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved and =
read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The reg=
ulations which require retention of supervised employee communications init=
ially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many other=
 forms of communication including instant message, social media, and collab=
oration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected u=
sing TLS.

The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshooting =
difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple layers=
 of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The pervasive visibility=
 offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastruc=
ture or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of losing this TLS visibility =
will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guesswork on =
difficult problems.

Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of the deskto=
p and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is incre=
asing.=20

Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and regul=
ators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and regulat=
ory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.

At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.  Ther=
e are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the curr=
ently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption arch=
itecture:=20

-  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive netw=
ork visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key excha=
nge.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and fun=
ctioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a network t=
raffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the case of mon=
itoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring functi=
on to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberate circ=
umvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is the po=
ssessor of the endpoint.

-  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and security=
 problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead of =
time which session is going to be the important one.

-  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key manageme=
nt complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring layers.

Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable and =
scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into the=
 standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.

Sincerely,

Andrew Kennedy
Senior Program Manager, BITS





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From: Yuhong Bao <YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188=
657

________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of BITS Security <BITSSecurity@f=
sroundtable.org>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM
To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members

My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits). =
 My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based finan=
cial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and a=
sset management firms.

I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.

While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of RSA key exchange=
.

Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.

Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely upo=
n TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance of =
supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities will n=
eed to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and loss=
 of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial institut=
ions and their regulators require.

The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial instituti=
ons are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inclu=
ding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved and =
read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The reg=
ulations which require retention of supervised employee communications init=
ially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many other=
 forms of communication including instant message, social media, and collab=
oration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected u=
sing TLS.

The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshooting =
difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple layers=
 of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The pervasive visibility=
 offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastruc=
ture or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of losing this TLS visibility =
will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guesswork on =
difficult problems.

Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of the deskto=
p and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is incre=
asing.

Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and regul=
ators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and regulat=
ory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.

At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.  Ther=
e are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the curr=
ently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption arch=
itecture:

-  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive netw=
ork visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key excha=
nge.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and fun=
ctioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a network t=
raffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the case of mon=
itoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring functi=
on to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberate circ=
umvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is the po=
ssessor of the endpoint.

-  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and security=
 problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead of =
time which session is going to be the important one.

-  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key manageme=
nt complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring layers.

Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable and =
scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into the=
 standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.

Sincerely,

Andrew Kennedy
Senior Program Manager, BITS




_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<div id=3D"x_divtagdefaultwrapper" style=3D"font-size:12pt; color:#000000; =
font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif">
<p>This also reminds me of&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/sho=
w_bug.cgi?id=3D1188657" class=3D"x_OWAAutoLink" id=3D"LPlnk691609">https://=
bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188657</a></p>
<br>
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"x_divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" =
color=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces=
@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of BITS Security &lt;BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org&=
gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
</div>
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;">
<div class=3D"PlainText">To:&nbsp; IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members<br>
<br>
My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (<a href=3D"http://www.fsroundtable.=
org/bits">http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits</a>).&nbsp; My organization repr=
esents approximately 100 of the top 150
 US-based financial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer=
 finance, and asset management firms.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.<br>
<br>
While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:&nbsp;
 the deprecation of RSA key exchange.<br>
<br>
Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.
<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.&nbsp; Unlike some other businesses,
 financial institutions also rely upon TLS traffic decryption to implement =
fraud monitoring and surveillance of supervised employees.&nbsp; The produc=
ts which support these capabilities will need to be replaced or substantial=
ly redesigned at significant cost and
 loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial ins=
titutions and their regulators require.<br>
<br>
The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.&nbsp; Financial inst=
itutions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (=
including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved=
 and read in case an investigation into
 improper behavior is initiated.&nbsp; The regulations which require retent=
ion of supervised employee communications initially focused on physical and=
 electronic mail, but now extend to many other forms of communication inclu=
ding instant message, social media, and
 collaboration applications.&nbsp; All of these communications channels are=
 protected using TLS.<br>
<br>
The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
&nbsp; TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshoo=
ting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple l=
ayers of infrastructure and isolate the
 fault domain.&nbsp;&nbsp; The pervasive visibility offered by out-of-band =
TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastructure or by endpoint diag=
nostics.&nbsp; The result of losing this TLS visibility will be unacceptabl=
e outage times as support groups resort to guesswork
 on difficult problems.<br>
<br>
Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.&nbsp; Furthermore,
 as more applications move off of the desktop and into web browsers and mob=
ile applications, dependence on TLS is increasing.
<br>
<br>
Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.&nbsp; It is vital to financial institutions
 and to their customers and regulators that these institutions be able to m=
aintain both security and regulatory compliance during and after the transi=
tion from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.<br>
<br>
At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.&nbsp;=
 There are serious cost, scalability,
 and security concerns with all of the currently proposed alternatives to t=
he existing out-of-band TLS decryption architecture:
<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive=
 network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key =
exchange.&nbsp; Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent install=
ed and functioning at all times is vastly
 more complex than ensuring that a network traffic inspection appliance is =
present and functioning.&nbsp; In the case of monitoring of supervised empl=
oyee communications, moving the monitoring function to the endpoint raises =
new security concerns focusing on deliberate
 circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is t=
he possessor of the endpoint.<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; Exporting of ephemeral keys:&nbsp; This solution has scalability an=
d security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know=
 ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; Man-in-the-middle:&nbsp; This solution adds significant latency, ke=
y management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitori=
ng layers.<br>
<br>
Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group
 to delay Last Call until a workable and scalable solution is identified an=
d vetted, and ultimately adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working G=
roup.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
<br>
Andrew Kennedy<br>
Senior Program Manager, BITS<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div>
</span></font>
</body>
</html>

--_000_CO1PR07MB283F2C414B6478E993675DEC3C90CO1PR07MB283namprd_--


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 12:06:25 -0700
Message-ID: <CACsn0ckuNVNre+8tpvO9HK=emR3NZXPQmiGJ4LNi5KJRkKD+vw@mail.gmail.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 10:19 AM, BITS Security
<BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:
> To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members
>
> My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divis=
ion of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits)=
.  My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based fin=
ancial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and=
 asset management firms.
>
> I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inv=
estigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operatio=
ns; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collabora=
tion.
>
> While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contribut=
ions to internet security this important working group has made in the last=
 few years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many o=
f my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of RSA key exchan=
ge.

You've "recently learned" about a change that was proposed several
*years* ago, starting in the earliest drafts of TLS 1.3. This change
is being made due to substantial security issues with encryption based
key exchanges: while we could redesign the exchange to repair these
issues, the risk of key compromise resulting in decryption of old data
is real.

>
> Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant pro=
blems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS intern=
ally and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS=
 decryption.
>
> Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to =
decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection =
and prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS mi=
tigation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely u=
pon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance o=
f supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities will=
 need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and lo=
ss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial instit=
utions and their regulators require.
>
> The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial institu=
tions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inc=
luding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved an=
d read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The r=
egulations which require retention of supervised employee communications in=
itially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many oth=
er forms of communication including instant message, social media, and coll=
aboration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected=
 using TLS.

Let's get specific about how this works: if an employee of a regulated
institution is logging into a TLS protected social media website, how
do you decrypt the connection without using a MITM device on the
network? I'm sure with large enough checks collaboration application
providers will be happy to implement whatever you need in the way of
logging at the server.

>
> The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be seriou=
s.  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshootin=
g difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple laye=
rs of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The pervasive visibili=
ty offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastr=
ucture or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of losing this TLS visibilit=
y will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guesswork o=
n difficult problems.

This can be solved by logging the entire connection contents at the
endpoint. I don't understand how you say that this is not a
replacement: it's literally the same data as you obtain decrypting the
session. This is a requirement that many of the companies involved in
the TLS 1.3 process have also, and they haven't complained about it.
Maybe I don't understand what architecture you have which makes this
impossible. If you have too much volume, then I don't see how your
network appliance doesn't have the same problem. If it's intermittent,
and you didn't log verbosely on errors, set up the endpoint to log the
next fault, and wait.

>
> Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of=
 the Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensiv=
ely inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are=
 heavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of the desk=
top and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is inc=
reasing.
>
> Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TL=
S 1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will for=
ce these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS=
 1.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and reg=
ulators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and regul=
atory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.

Browsers haven't even succeeded in killing SSL 3.0 yet. I think you
have much more time then you think to stay on TLS 1.2.

>
> At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like D=
LP, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of =
regulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.  Th=
ere are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the cu=
rrently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption ar=
chitecture:
>
> -  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive ne=
twork visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key exc=
hange.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and f=
unctioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a network=
 traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the case of m=
onitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring func=
tion to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberate ci=
rcumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is the =
possessor of the endpoint.

And firing isn't enough of a threat to get people to behave when it
comes to circumventing monitoring?

>
> -  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and securi=
ty problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead o=
f time which session is going to be the important one.
>
> -  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key manage=
ment complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring layer=
s.
>
> Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee sup=
ervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as inter=
net MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, =
are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable an=
d scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into t=
he standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.

Critical to whom? Not me. If you want to propose a solution that works
please do so. But don't pretend your problems are our problems.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

>
> Sincerely,
>
> Andrew Kennedy
> Senior Program Manager, BITS
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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From: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Hi Andrew,

My view concerning your request: no.=20

Rationale: We're trying to build a more secure internet.

Meta-level comment:

You're a bit late to the party. We're metaphorically speaking at the stage =
of emptying the ash trays and hunting for the not quite empty beer cans.=20

More exactly, we are at draft 15 and RSA key transport disappeared from the=
 spec about a dozen drafts ago. I know the banking industry is usually a bi=
t slow off the mark, but this takes the biscuit.=20

Cheers,

Kenny=20

> On 22 Sep 2016, at 20:27, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> w=
rote:
>=20
> To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members
>=20
> My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divis=
ion of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits)=
.  My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based fin=
ancial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and=
 asset management firms. =20
>=20
> I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inv=
estigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operatio=
ns; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collabora=
tion.
>=20
> While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contribut=
ions to internet security this important working group has made in the last=
 few years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many o=
f my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of RSA key exchan=
ge.
>=20
> Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant pro=
blems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS intern=
ally and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS=
 decryption.=20
>=20
> Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to =
decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection =
and prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS mi=
tigation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely u=
pon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance o=
f supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities will=
 need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and lo=
ss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial instit=
utions and their regulators require.
>=20
> The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial institu=
tions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inc=
luding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved an=
d read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The r=
egulations which require retention of supervised employee communications in=
itially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many oth=
er forms of communication including instant message, social media, and coll=
aboration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected=
 using TLS.
>=20
> The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be seriou=
s.  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshootin=
g difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple laye=
rs of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The pervasive visibili=
ty offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastr=
ucture or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of losing this TLS visibilit=
y will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guesswork o=
n difficult problems.
>=20
> Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of=
 the Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensiv=
ely inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are=
 heavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of the desk=
top and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is inc=
reasing.=20
>=20
> Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TL=
S 1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will for=
ce these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS=
 1.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and reg=
ulators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and regul=
atory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.
>=20
> At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like D=
LP, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of =
regulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.  Th=
ere are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the cu=
rrently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption ar=
chitecture:=20
>=20
> -  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive ne=
twork visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key exc=
hange.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and f=
unctioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a network=
 traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the case of m=
onitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring func=
tion to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberate ci=
rcumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is the =
possessor of the endpoint.
>=20
> -  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and securi=
ty problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead o=
f time which session is going to be the important one.
>=20
> -  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key manage=
ment complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring layer=
s.
>=20
> Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee sup=
ervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as inter=
net MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, =
are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable an=
d scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into t=
he standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.
>=20
> Sincerely,
>=20
> Andrew Kennedy
> Senior Program Manager, BITS
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 15:17:23 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 1:19 PM, BITS Security <
BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:

> Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to
> decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection
> and prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS
> mitigation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely
> upon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance
> of supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities
> will need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost
> and loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial
> institutions and their regulators require.
>

I do not think this difficulty should be a consideration for TLS. These
capabilities can be enabled by the endpoint.

Kyle

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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 1:19 PM, BITS Security <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org" target=3D"_bl=
ank">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the=
 ability to decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusio=
n detection and prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis,=
 and DDoS mitigation.=C2=A0 Unlike some other businesses, financial institu=
tions also rely upon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring a=
nd surveillance of supervised employees.=C2=A0 The products which support t=
hese capabilities will need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at s=
ignificant cost and loss of scalability to continue to support the function=
ality financial institutions and their regulators require.<br></blockquote>=
<div><br><div>I do not think this difficulty should be a consideration for =
TLS. These capabilities can be enabled by the endpoint.<br><br></div>
Kyle<br></div></div></div></div>

--94eb2c065474f78712053d1d82cd--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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+1 to what Kenny said.

-- =20
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz


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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Mandating forward secrecy for TLS 1.3+ has been a strong consensus of this working group, so there's no point in myself or any other contributors just mass-replying with a big "no" here. That said, there is one puzzling thing I'm curious about:

On Thursday, September 22, 2016 01:19:48 pm BITS Security wrote:
> The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial institutions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved and read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The regulations which require retention of supervised employee communications initially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many other forms of communication including instant message, social media, and collaboration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected using TLS.

Yes, all of these other channels are protected using TLS... which you do not control in any way. Also, many sites/services already prioritize FS cipher suites, so the deprecation of plain RSA key exchange doesn't actually affect the vast majority of people. (e.g. Facebook & Twitter both prefer ECDHE with NIST P-256) Within this very argument is already the argument that supervision at endpoints is required here. The security on the pipe is irrelevant. I don't see how you can make a point to bring this up but think keeping plain RSA KE suites is a useful solution.


Dave


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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
To: Yuhong Bao <YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/DTXF9e7cshNaQZVGoau2HGQNXFg>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Yuhong-Thank you for the response. =20

Our thinking here is that enterprises who use content delivery networks wil=
l have the end-user session hidden from them.=20

The session from the end user to the edge of the content delivery network w=
ill be a different session than the one from the enterprise sees.  The IP's=
 and ports will be different, the TCP layer activity like retransmissions w=
ill be different, and because of caching the application layer will be some=
what different.  There will be times when we need packet level data from th=
e End User and TLS decryption of this packet level data for troubleshooting=
.=20

With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then dec=
rypt it with the RSA private key.  With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely on the=
 SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be available=
.  Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a p=
roblem in a TLS 1.3 only environment. =20

-Andrew


From: Yuhong Bao [mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com]=20
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 2:36 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

This also reminds me of=A0https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D11=
88657

________________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of BITS Security <BITSSecurity@f=
sroundtable.org>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM
To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3=20
=A0
To:=A0 IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members

My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits).=
=A0 My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based fi=
nancial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, an=
d asset management firms.=A0=20

I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.

While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:=A0 the deprecation of RSA key exchan=
ge.

Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.=20
=A0
Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.=A0 Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely u=
pon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance o=
f supervised employees.=A0 The products which support these capabilities wi=
ll need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and =
loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial inst=
itutions and their regulators require.

The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.=A0 Financial institu=
tions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inc=
luding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved an=
d read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.=A0 The=
 regulations which require retention of supervised employee communications =
initially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many o=
ther forms of communication including instant message, social media, and co=
llaboration applications.=A0 All of these communications channels are prote=
cted using TLS.

The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
=A0 TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshootin=
g difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple laye=
rs of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.=A0=A0 The pervasive visi=
bility offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infr=
astructure or by endpoint diagnostics.=A0 The result of losing this TLS vis=
ibility will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guess=
work on difficult problems.

Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.=A0 Furthermore, as more applications move off of the desk=
top and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is inc=
reasing.=20

Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.=A0 It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and reg=
ulators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and regul=
atory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.

At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.=A0 Th=
ere are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the cu=
rrently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption ar=
chitecture:=20

-=A0 End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive ne=
twork visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key exc=
hange.=A0 Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and=
 functioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a netwo=
rk traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.=A0 In the case =
of monitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring =
function to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberat=
e circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is =
the possessor of the endpoint.

-=A0 Exporting of ephemeral keys:=A0 This solution has scalability and secu=
rity problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead=
 of time which session is going to be the important one.

-=A0 Man-in-the-middle:=A0 This solution adds significant latency, key mana=
gement complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring lay=
ers.

Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable and =
scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into the=
 standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.

Sincerely,

Andrew Kennedy
Senior Program Manager, BITS




_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Hi, Andrew.

Thank you for bringing these concerns to the list. I agree with Kenny =
that this is rather late, but it=E2=80=99s also true that I don=E2=80=99t =
think it would change the outcome of the consensus in this working =
group.

The quest to mandate FS in TLS-using applications goes back longer than =
this effort:
 - HTTP/2 (RFC 7540) has mandated it since draft -10 from February 2014.
 - The TLS BCP (RFC 7525) has mandating a preference for FS since =
version -00 or the individual submission (September 2013) and version =
-10 of the draft (February 2015) made the RSA key exchange a SHOULD NOT.

The latter is very significant, because that RFC is a bunch of =
recommendations for legacy applications.

I=E2=80=99m sympathetic to the argument about trouble-shooting the =
network, but not so much to the argument about keeping records.  I=E2=80=99=
ve taken the liberty of snipping most of your message, and interspersing =
my remarks with the parts where you shoot down proposed solutions.

> On 22 Sep 2016, at 8:19 PM, BITS Security =
<BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:

<snip />

> At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems =
like DLP, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and =
monitoring of regulated employee communications appear to be immature or =
nonexistent.  There are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns =
with all of the currently proposed alternatives to the existing =
out-of-band TLS decryption architecture:=20
>=20
> -  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive =
network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA =
key exchange.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent =
installed and functioning at all times is vastly more complex than =
ensuring that a network traffic inspection appliance is present and =
functioning.  In the case of monitoring of supervised employee =
communications, moving the monitoring function to the endpoint raises =
new security concerns focusing on deliberate circumvention - because in =
the supervision use case the threat vector is the possessor of the =
endpoint.

That is true, but from my admittedly limited exposure to financial =
institutions, the employees there then to be given extremely locked-down =
workstations where they have practically no ability to install or =
uninstall anything. The mobile phone revolution actually helps to make =
this palatable, as employees get to do their personal business on their =
personal phones using the cellular rather than the employer=E2=80=99s =
network.=20

> -  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and =
security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to =
know ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.

This seems like a strange claim to me. On the one hand, you=E2=80=99re =
storing away the entire (encrypted) content of the TLS session. On the =
other hand you can=E2=80=99t scale the storage of a few dozen bytes of =
keys for each of those sessions?

> -  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key =
management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed =
monitoring layers.

And yet many content providers use such solutions as part of their =
production network. I=E2=80=99m not even talking about TLS proxy =
firewalls. I=E2=80=99m talking about so-called =E2=80=9CSSL offload=E2=80=9D=
 gateways such as F5=E2=80=99s big-ip. They decrypt everything on the =
gateway and forward the requests to back-end servers. It does add =
complexity, but so does your regular monitoring hardware.

> Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee =
supervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as =
internet MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our =
members, are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a =
workable and scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately =
adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.

If you can come up with something that will do all that without giving =
up on forward secrecy, I=E2=80=99ll be happy to help you write a draft.

Yoav


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From: Yuhong Bao <YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
Thread-Topic: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Adding Andrei Popov.

________________________________
From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:13:45 PM
To: Yuhong Bao; tls@ietf.org
Subject: RE: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Yuhong-Thank you for the response.

Our thinking here is that enterprises who use content delivery networks wil=
l have the end-user session hidden from them.

The session from the end user to the edge of the content delivery network w=
ill be a different session than the one from the enterprise sees.  The IP's=
 and ports will be different, the TCP layer activity like retransmissions w=
ill be different, and because of caching the application layer will be some=
what different.  There will be times when we need packet level data from th=
e End User and TLS decryption of this packet level data for troubleshooting=
.

With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then dec=
rypt it with the RSA private key.  With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely on the=
 SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be available=
.  Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a p=
roblem in a TLS 1.3 only environment.

-Andrew


From: Yuhong Bao [mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 2:36 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188=
657

________________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of BITS Security <BITSSecurity@f=
sroundtable.org>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM
To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members

My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits). =
 My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based finan=
cial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and a=
sset management firms.

I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.

While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of RSA key exchange=
.

Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.

Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely upo=
n TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance of =
supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities will n=
eed to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and loss=
 of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial institut=
ions and their regulators require.

The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial instituti=
ons are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inclu=
ding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved and =
read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The reg=
ulations which require retention of supervised employee communications init=
ially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many other=
 forms of communication including instant message, social media, and collab=
oration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected u=
sing TLS.

The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshooting =
difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple layers=
 of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The pervasive visibility=
 offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastruc=
ture or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of losing this TLS visibility =
will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guesswork on =
difficult problems.

Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of the deskto=
p and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is incre=
asing.

Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and regul=
ators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and regulat=
ory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.

At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.  Ther=
e are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the curr=
ently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption arch=
itecture:

-  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive netw=
ork visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key excha=
nge.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and fun=
ctioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a network t=
raffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the case of mon=
itoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring functi=
on to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberate circ=
umvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is the po=
ssessor of the endpoint.

-  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and security=
 problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead of =
time which session is going to be the important one.

-  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key manageme=
nt complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring layers.

Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable and =
scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into the=
 standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.

Sincerely,

Andrew Kennedy
Senior Program Manager, BITS




_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif">
<p>Adding Andrei Popov.</p>
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"x_divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" =
color=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>From:</b> BITS Security &lt;B=
ITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:13:45 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Yuhong Bao; tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
</div>
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;">
<div class=3D"PlainText">Yuhong-Thank you for the response.&nbsp; <br>
<br>
Our thinking here is that enterprises who use content delivery networks wil=
l have the end-user session hidden from them.
<br>
<br>
The session from the end user to the edge of the content delivery network w=
ill be a different session than the one from the enterprise sees.&nbsp; The=
 IP's and ports will be different, the TCP layer activity like retransmissi=
ons will be different, and because of
 caching the application layer will be somewhat different.&nbsp; There will=
 be times when we need packet level data from the End User and TLS decrypti=
on of this packet level data for troubleshooting.
<br>
<br>
With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then dec=
rypt it with the RSA private key.&nbsp; With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely o=
n the SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be avai=
lable.&nbsp; Unfortunately, Microsoft does
 not allow this functionality, which is a problem in a TLS 1.3 only environ=
ment.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
-Andrew<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Yuhong Bao [<a href=3D"mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com">mailto:Yuhon=
gBao_386@hotmail.com</a>]
<br>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 2:36 PM<br>
To: BITS Security &lt;BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org&gt;; tls@ietf.org<br>
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
This also reminds me of&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_b=
ug.cgi?id=3D1188657">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188657=
</a><br>
<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: TLS &lt;tls-bounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of BITS Security &lt;BITSS=
ecurity@fsroundtable.org&gt;<br>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM<br>
To: tls@ietf.org<br>
Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 <br>
&nbsp;<br>
To:&nbsp; IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members<br>
<br>
My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (<a href=3D"http://www.fsroundtable.=
org/bits">http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits</a>).&nbsp; My organization repr=
esents approximately 100 of the top 150
 US-based financial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer=
 finance, and asset management firms.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.<br>
<br>
While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:&nbsp;
 the deprecation of RSA key exchange.<br>
<br>
Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.
<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.&nbsp; Unlike some other businesses,
 financial institutions also rely upon TLS traffic decryption to implement =
fraud monitoring and surveillance of supervised employees.&nbsp; The produc=
ts which support these capabilities will need to be replaced or substantial=
ly redesigned at significant cost and
 loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial ins=
titutions and their regulators require.<br>
<br>
The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.&nbsp; Financial inst=
itutions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (=
including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved=
 and read in case an investigation into
 improper behavior is initiated.&nbsp; The regulations which require retent=
ion of supervised employee communications initially focused on physical and=
 electronic mail, but now extend to many other forms of communication inclu=
ding instant message, social media, and
 collaboration applications.&nbsp; All of these communications channels are=
 protected using TLS.<br>
<br>
The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
&nbsp; TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshoo=
ting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple l=
ayers of infrastructure and isolate the
 fault domain.&nbsp;&nbsp; The pervasive visibility offered by out-of-band =
TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastructure or by endpoint diag=
nostics.&nbsp; The result of losing this TLS visibility will be unacceptabl=
e outage times as support groups resort to guesswork
 on difficult problems.<br>
<br>
Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.&nbsp; Furthermore,
 as more applications move off of the desktop and into web browsers and mob=
ile applications, dependence on TLS is increasing.
<br>
<br>
Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.&nbsp; It is vital to financial institutions
 and to their customers and regulators that these institutions be able to m=
aintain both security and regulatory compliance during and after the transi=
tion from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.<br>
<br>
At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.&nbsp;=
 There are serious cost, scalability,
 and security concerns with all of the currently proposed alternatives to t=
he existing out-of-band TLS decryption architecture:
<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive=
 network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key =
exchange.&nbsp; Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent install=
ed and functioning at all times is vastly
 more complex than ensuring that a network traffic inspection appliance is =
present and functioning.&nbsp; In the case of monitoring of supervised empl=
oyee communications, moving the monitoring function to the endpoint raises =
new security concerns focusing on deliberate
 circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is t=
he possessor of the endpoint.<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; Exporting of ephemeral keys:&nbsp; This solution has scalability an=
d security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know=
 ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; Man-in-the-middle:&nbsp; This solution adds significant latency, ke=
y management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitori=
ng layers.<br>
<br>
Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group
 to delay Last Call until a workable and scalable solution is identified an=
d vetted, and ultimately adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working G=
roup.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
<br>
Andrew Kennedy<br>
Senior Program Manager, BITS<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div>
</span></font>
</body>
</html>

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Yuhong Bao <YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 21:22:11 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Hi Andrew,


?  Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a p=
roblem in a TLS 1.3 only environment.
The best approach would be for Microsoft customers to make a feature reques=
t through their support channel.

Cheers,

Andrei

From: Yuhong Bao [mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:58 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org; Andrei Pop=
ov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3


Adding Andrei Popov.

________________________________
From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsro=
undtable.org>>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:13:45 PM
To: Yuhong Bao; tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Yuhong-Thank you for the response.

Our thinking here is that enterprises who use content delivery networks wil=
l have the end-user session hidden from them.

The session from the end user to the edge of the content delivery network w=
ill be a different session than the one from the enterprise sees.  The IP's=
 and ports will be different, the TCP layer activity like retransmissions w=
ill be different, and because of caching the application layer will be some=
what different.  There will be times when we need packet level data from th=
e End User and TLS decryption of this packet level data for troubleshooting=
.

With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then dec=
rypt it with the RSA private key.  With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely on the=
 SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be available=
.  Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a p=
roblem in a TLS 1.3 only environment.

-Andrew


From: Yuhong Bao [mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 2:36 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroun=
dtable.org>>; tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188=
657

________________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of =
BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtab=
le.org>>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM
To: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members

My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits). =
 My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based finan=
cial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and a=
sset management firms.

I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.

While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of RSA key exchange=
.

Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.

Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely upo=
n TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance of =
supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities will n=
eed to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and loss=
 of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial institut=
ions and their regulators require.

The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial instituti=
ons are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inclu=
ding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved and =
read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The reg=
ulations which require retention of supervised employee communications init=
ially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many other=
 forms of communication including instant message, social media, and collab=
oration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected u=
sing TLS.

The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshooting =
difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple layers=
 of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The pervasive visibility=
 offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastruc=
ture or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of losing this TLS visibility =
will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guesswork on =
difficult problems.

Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of the deskto=
p and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is incre=
asing.

Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and regul=
ators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and regulat=
ory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.

At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.  Ther=
e are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the curr=
ently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption arch=
itecture:

-  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive netw=
ork visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key excha=
nge.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and fun=
ctioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a network t=
raffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the case of mon=
itoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring functi=
on to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberate circ=
umvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is the po=
ssessor of the endpoint.

-  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and security=
 problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead of =
time which session is going to be the important one.

-  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key manageme=
nt complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring layers.

Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable and =
scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into the=
 standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.

Sincerely,

Andrew Kennedy
Senior Program Manager, BITS




_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Hi Andrew,<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level=
1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wi=
ngdings"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&Oslash;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Unfortunate=
ly, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a problem in a TL=
S 1.3 only environment.</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&=
quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">The best approach would be for Microsoft customers =
to make a feature request through their support channel.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Andrei<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;=
font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif"> Yuhong Bao [mailto:YuhongBao_3=
86@hotmail.com]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:58 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> BITS Security &lt;BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org&gt;; tls@ietf.or=
g; Andrei Popov &lt;Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div id=3D"x_divtagdefaultwrapper">
<p><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:black">A=
dding Andrei Popov.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center">
<hr size=3D"2" width=3D"98%" align=3D"center">
</div>
<div id=3D"x_divRplyFwdMsg">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:black">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-=
size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:black"> BITS S=
ecurity &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITSSecurity@f=
sroundtable.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:13:45 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Yuhong Bao; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3</span> <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Yuhong-Thank you fo=
r the response.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
Our thinking here is that enterprises who use content delivery networks wil=
l have the end-user session hidden from them.
<br>
<br>
The session from the end user to the edge of the content delivery network w=
ill be a different session than the one from the enterprise sees.&nbsp; The=
 IP's and ports will be different, the TCP layer activity like retransmissi=
ons will be different, and because of
 caching the application layer will be somewhat different.&nbsp; There will=
 be times when we need packet level data from the End User and TLS decrypti=
on of this packet level data for troubleshooting.
<br>
<br>
With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then dec=
rypt it with the RSA private key.&nbsp; With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely o=
n the SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be avai=
lable.&nbsp; Unfortunately, Microsoft does
 not allow this functionality, which is a problem in a TLS 1.3 only environ=
ment.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
-Andrew<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Yuhong Bao [<a href=3D"mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com">mailto:Yuhon=
gBao_386@hotmail.com</a>]
<br>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 2:36 PM<br>
To: BITS Security &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITS=
Security@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;;
<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
This also reminds me of&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_b=
ug.cgi?id=3D1188657">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188657=
</a><br>
<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: TLS &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">tls-bounces@ietf.org<=
/a>&gt; on behalf of BITS Security &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsrou=
ndtable.org">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;<br>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 <br>
&nbsp;<br>
To:&nbsp; IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members<br>
<br>
My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (<a href=3D"http://www.fsroundtable.=
org/bits">http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits</a>).&nbsp; My organization repr=
esents approximately 100 of the top 150
 US-based financial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer=
 finance, and asset management firms.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.<br>
<br>
While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:&nbsp;
 the deprecation of RSA key exchange.<br>
<br>
Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.
<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.&nbsp; Unlike some other businesses,
 financial institutions also rely upon TLS traffic decryption to implement =
fraud monitoring and surveillance of supervised employees.&nbsp; The produc=
ts which support these capabilities will need to be replaced or substantial=
ly redesigned at significant cost and
 loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial ins=
titutions and their regulators require.<br>
<br>
The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.&nbsp; Financial inst=
itutions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (=
including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved=
 and read in case an investigation into
 improper behavior is initiated.&nbsp; The regulations which require retent=
ion of supervised employee communications initially focused on physical and=
 electronic mail, but now extend to many other forms of communication inclu=
ding instant message, social media, and
 collaboration applications.&nbsp; All of these communications channels are=
 protected using TLS.<br>
<br>
The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
&nbsp; TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshoo=
ting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple l=
ayers of infrastructure and isolate the
 fault domain.&nbsp;&nbsp; The pervasive visibility offered by out-of-band =
TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastructure or by endpoint diag=
nostics.&nbsp; The result of losing this TLS visibility will be unacceptabl=
e outage times as support groups resort to guesswork
 on difficult problems.<br>
<br>
Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.&nbsp; Furthermore,
 as more applications move off of the desktop and into web browsers and mob=
ile applications, dependence on TLS is increasing.
<br>
<br>
Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.&nbsp; It is vital to financial institutions
 and to their customers and regulators that these institutions be able to m=
aintain both security and regulatory compliance during and after the transi=
tion from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.<br>
<br>
At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.&nbsp;=
 There are serious cost, scalability,
 and security concerns with all of the currently proposed alternatives to t=
he existing out-of-band TLS decryption architecture:
<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive=
 network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key =
exchange.&nbsp; Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent install=
ed and functioning at all times is vastly
 more complex than ensuring that a network traffic inspection appliance is =
present and functioning.&nbsp; In the case of monitoring of supervised empl=
oyee communications, moving the monitoring function to the endpoint raises =
new security concerns focusing on deliberate
 circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is t=
he possessor of the endpoint.<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; Exporting of ephemeral keys:&nbsp; This solution has scalability an=
d security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know=
 ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; Man-in-the-middle:&nbsp; This solution adds significant latency, ke=
y management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitori=
ng layers.<br>
<br>
Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group
 to delay Last Call until a workable and scalable solution is identified an=
d vetted, and ultimately adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working G=
roup.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
<br>
Andrew Kennedy<br>
Senior Program Manager, BITS<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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From: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Yuhong Bao <YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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I created a feature request on Microsoft Edge UserVoice: https://wpdev.user=
voice.com/forums/257854-microsoft-edge-developer/suggestions/16310230-ssl-k=
ey-logging-aka-sslkeylogfile


Best,
Xiaoyin

________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@mi=
crosoft.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Yuhong Bao; BITS Security; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3


Hi Andrew,



>  Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a p=
roblem in a TLS 1.3 only environment.

The best approach would be for Microsoft customers to make a feature reques=
t through their support channel.



Cheers,



Andrei



From: Yuhong Bao [mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:58 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org; Andrei Pop=
ov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3



Adding Andrei Popov.

________________________________

From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsro=
undtable.org>>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:13:45 PM
To: Yuhong Bao; tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3



Yuhong-Thank you for the response.

Our thinking here is that enterprises who use content delivery networks wil=
l have the end-user session hidden from them.

The session from the end user to the edge of the content delivery network w=
ill be a different session than the one from the enterprise sees.  The IP's=
 and ports will be different, the TCP layer activity like retransmissions w=
ill be different, and because of caching the application layer will be some=
what different.  There will be times when we need packet level data from th=
e End User and TLS decryption of this packet level data for troubleshooting=
.

With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then dec=
rypt it with the RSA private key.  With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely on the=
 SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be available=
.  Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a p=
roblem in a TLS 1.3 only environment.

-Andrew


From: Yuhong Bao [mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 2:36 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroun=
dtable.org>>; tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188=
657

________________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of =
BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtab=
le.org>>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM
To: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members

My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits). =
 My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based finan=
cial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and a=
sset management firms.

I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.

While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of RSA key exchange=
.

Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.

Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely upo=
n TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance of =
supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities will n=
eed to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and loss=
 of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial institut=
ions and their regulators require.

The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial instituti=
ons are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inclu=
ding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved and =
read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The reg=
ulations which require retention of supervised employee communications init=
ially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many other=
 forms of communication including instant message, social media, and collab=
oration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected u=
sing TLS.

The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshooting =
difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple layers=
 of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The pervasive visibility=
 offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastruc=
ture or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of losing this TLS visibility =
will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guesswork on =
difficult problems.

Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of the deskto=
p and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is incre=
asing.

Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and regul=
ators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and regulat=
ory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.

At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.  Ther=
e are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the curr=
ently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption arch=
itecture:

-  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive netw=
ork visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key excha=
nge.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and fun=
ctioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a network t=
raffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the case of mon=
itoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring functi=
on to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberate circ=
umvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is the po=
ssessor of the endpoint.

-  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and security=
 problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead of =
time which session is going to be the important one.

-  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key manageme=
nt complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring layers.

Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable and =
scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into the=
 standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.

Sincerely,

Andrew Kennedy
Senior Program Manager, BITS




_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--_000_CY1PR15MB0778F36EDBBD93D58668DCC2FFC90CY1PR15MB0778namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"><!-- P {margin-top:0;margi=
n-bottom:0;} --></style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div id=3D"divtagdefaultwrapper" style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:#000000;back=
ground-color:#FFFFFF;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">
<p style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-=
serif; font-size: 12pt; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
I created a feature request on Microsoft Edge UserVoice: <a class=3D"OWAAut=
oLink" id=3D"LPlnk415901" href=3D"https://wpdev.uservoice.com/forums/257854=
-microsoft-edge-developer/suggestions/16310230-ssl-key-logging-aka-sslkeylo=
gfile">
https://wpdev.uservoice.com/forums/257854-microsoft-edge-developer/suggesti=
ons/16310230-ssl-key-logging-aka-sslkeylogfile</a><br>
<br>
</p>
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,san=
s-serif; font-size: 12pt; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
Best,</div>
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,san=
s-serif; font-size: 12pt; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
Xiaoyin<br>
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,san=
s-serif; font-size: 12pt; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"width: 98%; display: inline-block;">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font color=3D"#000000" face=3D"Calib=
ri, sans-serif" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces=
@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Andrei Popov &lt;Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com&gt;<=
br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 22, 2016 5:22 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Yuhong Bao; BITS Security; tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">Hi Andrew,</span></p>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.25in; font-family: &=
quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-family: Wingdings; font-size: 11pt;"><span>=D8<span sty=
le=3D"font: 7pt/normal &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; font-size-adjust: none;=
 font-stretch: normal;">&nbsp;
</span></span></span><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">Unfortunately, Micros=
oft does not allow this functionality, which is a problem in a TLS 1.3 only=
 environment.</span><span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-se=
rif; font-size: 11pt;"></span></p>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt=
;">The best approach would be for Microsoft customers to make a feature req=
uest through their support channel.</span></p>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt=
;">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt=
;">Cheers,</span></p>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt=
;">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt=
;">Andrei</span></p>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt=
;">&nbsp;</span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border-width: 1pt medium medium; border-style: solid none non=
e; border-color: rgb(225, 225, 225) currentColor currentColor; padding: 3pt=
 0in 0in; border-image: none;">
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<b><span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; font-size: 1=
1pt;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-=
serif; font-size: 11pt;"> Yuhong Bao [mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:58 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> BITS Security &lt;BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org&gt;; tls@ietf.or=
g; Andrei Popov &lt;Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
&nbsp;</p>
<div>
<div id=3D"x_divtagdefaultwrapper">
<p><span style=3D"color: black; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif=
;">Adding Andrei Popov.</span></p>
</div>
<div align=3D"center" style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center; fon=
t-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif; font-size: 12pt;">
<hr width=3D"98%" size=3D"2" align=3D"center">
</div>
<div id=3D"x_divRplyFwdMsg">
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<b><span style=3D"color: black; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif=
; font-size: 11pt;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"color: black; font-famil=
y: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;"> BITS Security &lt;<a =
style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" href=3D"mailto:BITSSecur=
ity@fsroundtable.org">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 22, 2016 1:13:45 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Yuhong Bao; <a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;=
" href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3</span> </p>
<div>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,s=
erif; font-size: 12pt;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">Yuhong-Thank you for the response.&nbsp; <=
br>
<br>
Our thinking here is that enterprises who use content delivery networks wil=
l have the end-user session hidden from them.
<br>
<br>
The session from the end user to the edge of the content delivery network w=
ill be a different session than the one from the enterprise sees.&nbsp; The=
 IP's and ports will be different, the TCP layer activity like retransmissi=
ons will be different, and because of
 caching the application layer will be somewhat different.&nbsp; There will=
 be times when we need packet level data from the End User and TLS decrypti=
on of this packet level data for troubleshooting.
<br>
<br>
With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then dec=
rypt it with the RSA private key.&nbsp; With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely o=
n the SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be avai=
lable.&nbsp; Unfortunately, Microsoft does
 not allow this functionality, which is a problem in a TLS 1.3 only environ=
ment.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
-Andrew<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Yuhong Bao [<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" hre=
f=3D"mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com">mailto:YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com</a>=
]
<br>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 2:36 PM<br>
To: BITS Security &lt;<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;"=
 href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.or=
g</a>&gt;;
<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" href=3D"mailto:tls@ie=
tf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
This also reminds me of&nbsp;<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: unde=
rline;" href=3D"https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188657">htt=
ps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188657</a><br>
<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: TLS &lt;<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" href=3D=
"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of BIT=
S Security &lt;<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" href=
=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>=
&gt;<br>
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM<br>
To: <a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" href=3D"mailto:tl=
s@ietf.org">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 <br>
&nbsp;<br>
To:&nbsp; IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members<br>
<br>
My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decor=
ation: underline;" href=3D"http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits">http://www.fsr=
oundtable.org/bits</a>).&nbsp; My organization
 represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based financial services co=
mpanies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and asset management =
firms.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.<br>
<br>
While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization's member institutions:&nbsp;
 the deprecation of RSA key exchange.<br>
<br>
Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.
<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.&nbsp; Unlike some other businesses,
 financial institutions also rely upon TLS traffic decryption to implement =
fraud monitoring and surveillance of supervised employees.&nbsp; The produc=
ts which support these capabilities will need to be replaced or substantial=
ly redesigned at significant cost and
 loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial ins=
titutions and their regulators require.<br>
<br>
The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.&nbsp; Financial inst=
itutions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (=
including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved=
 and read in case an investigation into
 improper behavior is initiated.&nbsp; The regulations which require retent=
ion of supervised employee communications initially focused on physical and=
 electronic mail, but now extend to many other forms of communication inclu=
ding instant message, social media, and
 collaboration applications.&nbsp; All of these communications channels are=
 protected using TLS.<br>
<br>
The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
&nbsp; TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshoo=
ting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple l=
ayers of infrastructure and isolate the
 fault domain.&nbsp;&nbsp; The pervasive visibility offered by out-of-band =
TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastructure or by endpoint diag=
nostics.&nbsp; The result of losing this TLS visibility will be unacceptabl=
e outage times as support groups resort to guesswork
 on difficult problems.<br>
<br>
Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.&nbsp; Furthermore,
 as more applications move off of the desktop and into web browsers and mob=
ile applications, dependence on TLS is increasing.
<br>
<br>
Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.&nbsp; It is vital to financial institutions
 and to their customers and regulators that these institutions be able to m=
aintain both security and regulatory compliance during and after the transi=
tion from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.<br>
<br>
At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.&nbsp;=
 There are serious cost, scalability,
 and security concerns with all of the currently proposed alternatives to t=
he existing out-of-band TLS decryption architecture:
<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive=
 network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key =
exchange.&nbsp; Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent install=
ed and functioning at all times is vastly
 more complex than ensuring that a network traffic inspection appliance is =
present and functioning.&nbsp; In the case of monitoring of supervised empl=
oyee communications, moving the monitoring function to the endpoint raises =
new security concerns focusing on deliberate
 circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is t=
he possessor of the endpoint.<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; Exporting of ephemeral keys:&nbsp; This solution has scalability an=
d security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know=
 ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.<br>
<br>
-&nbsp; Man-in-the-middle:&nbsp; This solution adds significant latency, ke=
y management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitori=
ng layers.<br>
<br>
Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group
 to delay Last Call until a workable and scalable solution is identified an=
d vetted, and ultimately adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working G=
roup.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
<br>
Andrew Kennedy<br>
Senior Program Manager, BITS<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" href=3D"mailto:TLS@ie=
tf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" href=3D"https://www.i=
etf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>=
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From nobody Thu Sep 22 16:38:32 2016
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security of the IETF.

        Title           : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Author          : Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16.txt
	Pages           : 117
	Date            : 2016-09-22

Abstract:
   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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--94eb2c1855a2886baa053d213316
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple
solution, don't use it.
That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the secret
exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It does
require some careful analysis, though.

But maybe I misunderstood the problem and maybe I should not be putting
these surveillance-friendly ideas in people's minds...

Hugo




On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 1:19 PM, BITS Security <
BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:

> To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members
>
> My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy
> division of the Financial Services Roundtable (
> http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits).  My organization represents
> approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based financial services companies
> including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and asset management firms.
>
> I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to
> investigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member
> operations; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public
> collaboration.
>
> While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant
> contributions to internet security this important working group has made in
> the last few years I recently learned of a proposed change that would
> affect many of my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of
> RSA key exchange.
>
> Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant
> problems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS
> internally and have significant, security-critical investments in
> out-of-band TLS decryption.
>
> Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to
> decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection
> and prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS
> mitigation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rely
> upon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillance
> of supervised employees.  The products which support these capabilities
> will need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost
> and loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financial
> institutions and their regulators require.
>
> The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial
> institutions are required by law to store communications of certain
> employees (including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can
> be retrieved and read in case an investigation into improper behavior is
> initiated.  The regulations which require retention of supervised employee
> communications initially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now
> extend to many other forms of communication including instant message,
> social media, and collaboration applications.  All of these communications
> channels are protected using TLS.
>
> The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be
> serious.  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when
> troubleshooting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through
> multiple layers of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The
> pervasive visibility offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be
> replaced by MITM infrastructure or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of
> losing this TLS visibility will be unacceptable outage times as support
> groups resort to guesswork on difficult problems.
>
> Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of
> the Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run
> extensively inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those
> that are heavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of
> the desktop and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on
> TLS is increasing.
>
> Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS
> 1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force
> these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS
> 1.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and
> regulators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and
> regulatory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS
> 1.3.
>
> At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like
> DLP, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of
> regulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.
> There are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the
> currently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption
> architecture:
>
> -  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive
> network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key
> exchange.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed
> and functioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a
> network traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the
> case of monitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the
> monitoring function to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing
> on deliberate circumvention - because in the supervision use case the
> threat vector is the possessor of the endpoint.
>
> -  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and
> security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know
> ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.
>
> -  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key
> management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring
> layers.
>
> Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee
> supervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as
> internet MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our
> members, are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a
> workable and scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately
> adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Andrew Kennedy
> Senior Program Manager, BITS
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--94eb2c1855a2886baa053d213316
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,=
sans-serif;font-size:small">If the problem is the use of forward secrecy th=
en there is a simple solution, don&#39;t use it.</div><div class=3D"gmail_d=
efault" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">That is, y=
ou can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the secret exponent b=
ecomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It does require some car=
eful analysis, though.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fami=
ly:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defaul=
t" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">But maybe I mis=
understood the problem and maybe I should not be putting these surveillance=
-friendly ideas in people&#39;s minds...</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:smal=
l">Hugo</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans=
-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Se=
p 22, 2016 at 1:19 PM, BITS Security <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org" target=3D"_blank">BITSSecurity@fsroundtabl=
e.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">To:=C2=A0 IET=
F TLS 1.3 Working Group Members<br>
<br>
My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divisio=
n of the Financial Services Roundtable (<a href=3D"http://www.fsroundtable.=
org/bits" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">http://www.fsroundtable.org/=
<wbr>bits</a>).=C2=A0 My organization represents approximately 100 of the t=
op 150 US-based financial services companies including banks, insurance, co=
nsumer finance, and asset management firms.<br>
<br>
I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inves=
tigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operations=
; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collaborati=
on.<br>
<br>
While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributio=
ns to internet security this important working group has made in the last f=
ew years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of =
my organization&#39;s member institutions:=C2=A0 the deprecation of RSA key=
 exchange.<br>
<br>
Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant probl=
ems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS internal=
ly and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption.<br>
<br>
Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to de=
crypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection an=
d prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS miti=
gation.=C2=A0 Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also rel=
y upon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveillanc=
e of supervised employees.=C2=A0 The products which support these capabilit=
ies will need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cos=
t and loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financia=
l institutions and their regulators require.<br>
<br>
The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.=C2=A0 Financial inst=
itutions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (=
including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved=
 and read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.=C2=
=A0 The regulations which require retention of supervised employee communic=
ations initially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to=
 many other forms of communication including instant message, social media,=
 and collaboration applications.=C2=A0 All of these communications channels=
 are protected using TLS.<br>
<br>
The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be serious.=
=C2=A0 TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troubleshoo=
ting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple l=
ayers of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.=C2=A0 =C2=A0The perva=
sive visibility offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can&#39;t be replaced=
 by MITM infrastructure or by endpoint diagnostics.=C2=A0 The result of los=
ing this TLS visibility will be unacceptable outage times as support groups=
 resort to guesswork on difficult problems.<br>
<br>
Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of t=
he Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensivel=
y inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are h=
eavily regulated.=C2=A0 Furthermore, as more applications move off of the d=
esktop and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is =
increasing.<br>
<br>
Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS =
1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will force=
 these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1=
.3.=C2=A0 It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers and =
regulators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and re=
gulatory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3=
.<br>
<br>
At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like DLP=
, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of re=
gulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.=C2=A0=
 There are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of the=
 currently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decryption=
 architecture:<br>
<br>
-=C2=A0 End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive=
 network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key =
exchange.=C2=A0 Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent install=
ed and functioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a=
 network traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.=C2=A0 In =
the case of monitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the mo=
nitoring function to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on =
deliberate circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat v=
ector is the possessor of the endpoint.<br>
<br>
-=C2=A0 Exporting of ephemeral keys:=C2=A0 This solution has scalability an=
d security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know=
 ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.<br>
<br>
-=C2=A0 Man-in-the-middle:=C2=A0 This solution adds significant latency, ke=
y management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitori=
ng layers.<br>
<br>
Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee super=
vision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as interne=
t MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, ar=
e asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable and =
scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into the=
 standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
<br>
Andrew Kennedy<br>
Senior Program Manager, BITS<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--94eb2c1855a2886baa053d213316--


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Subject: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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I just uploaded draft-16.

   https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16

The primary changes are listed below.

- New version negotiation format (*) [IMPORTANT: this got lost in the
ChangeLog]

- Change RSASSA-PSS and EdDSA SignatureScheme codepoints for better
backwards compatibility (*)

- Move HelloRetryRequest.selected_group to an extension (*)

- Clarify the behavior of no exporter context and make it the same
  as an empty context.(*)

- New KeyUpdate format that allows for requesting/not-requesting an
  answer (*)

- New certificate_required alert (*)

- Forbid CertificateRequest with 0-RTT and PSK.

- Relax requirement to check SNI for 0-RTT.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I just uploaded draft-16.<div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16">https://too=
ls.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16</a></div><div><br></div><div><div>=
The primary changes are listed below.<br></div><div><div><br></div><div><di=
v>- New version negotiation format (*) [IMPORTANT: this got lost in the Cha=
ngeLog]</div><div><br></div><div><div>- Change RSASSA-PSS and EdDSA Signatu=
reScheme codepoints for better backwards compatibility (*)</div><div><br></=
div><div>- Move HelloRetryRequest.selected_group to an extension (*)</div><=
div><br></div><div>- Clarify the behavior of no exporter context and make i=
t the same</div><div>=C2=A0 as an empty context.(*)</div><div><br></div><di=
v>- New KeyUpdate format that allows for requesting/not-requesting an</div>=
<div>=C2=A0 answer (*)</div><div><br></div><div>- New certificate_required =
alert (*)</div><div><br></div><div>- Forbid CertificateRequest with 0-RTT a=
nd PSK.</div><div><br></div><div>- Relax requirement to check SNI for 0-RTT=
.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr<br></div><div><br></div></div></div></div><=
/div></div>

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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
wrote:

> If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple
> solution, don't use it.
> That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the secret
> exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It does
> require some careful analysis, though.
>

I think that this may be possible for TLS1.3 0-RTT data, but not for other
data where an ephemeral key will be generated based also on a parameter
that the client chooses.

-- 
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il" target=3D"_blank">hugo@ee.technion.=
ac.il</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">If the pr=
oblem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple solution, don&#3=
9;t use it.</div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:sma=
ll">That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the sec=
ret exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It does re=
quire some careful analysis, though.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>I think that this may be possible for TLS1.3 0-RTT data, but not for =
other data where an ephemeral key will be generated based also on a paramet=
er that the client chooses.=C2=A0</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</div></div>

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One of the most interesting chapters in the ultra-interesting history of
public key cryptography is that all of the Fathers of Public Key
Cryptography,  Diffie, Hellman, Rivest, Shamir and Adelman missed the
observation that from a (unauthenticated) DH key exchange you can get an
encryption scheme just by fixing one of the exponents. It was Taher
ElGamal, a few years later that made that observation and that is why this
encryption is known as ElGamal encryption.

As for the comment below:


On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:50 PM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
> wrote:
>
>> If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple
>> solution, don't use it.
>> That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the
>> secret exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It d=
oes
>> require some careful analysis, though.
>>
>
> I think that this may be possible for TLS1.3 0-RTT data, but not for othe=
r
> data where an ephemeral key will be generated based also on a parameter
> that the client chooses.
>

The key_share contributed by the client is indeed ephemeral and it replaces
the random key chosen by the client in the RSA-based scheme.

Hugo=E2=80=8B



> --
> Colm
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,=
sans-serif;font-size:small">One of the most interesting chapters in the ult=
ra-interesting history of public key cryptography is that all of the Father=
s of Public Key Cryptography, =C2=A0Diffie, Hellman, Rivest, Shamir and Ade=
lman missed the observation that from a (unauthenticated) DH key exchange y=
ou can get an encryption scheme just by fixing one of the exponents. It was=
 Taher ElGamal, a few years later that made that observation and that is wh=
y this encryption is known as ElGamal encryption.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif=
;font-size:small">As for the comment below:</div><div class=3D"gmail_defaul=
t" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 a=
t 7:50 PM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:c=
olm@allcosts.net" target=3D"_blank">colm@allcosts.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:=
<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D"gm=
ail-">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il" target=3D"_blank">hugo@ee.technio=
n.ac.il</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-=
size:small">If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a si=
mple solution, don&#39;t use it.</div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,san=
s-serif;font-size:small">That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_sh=
are for which the secret exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the=
 RSA case. It does require some careful analysis, though.</div></div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div></span><div>I think that this may be possible for TLS=
1.3 0-RTT data, but not for other data where an ephemeral key will be gener=
ated based also on a parameter that the client chooses.=C2=A0</div></div></=
div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:verda=
na,sans-serif">The key_share contributed by the client is indeed ephemeral =
and it replaces the random key chosen by the client in the RSA-based scheme=
.</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><br></spa=
n></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif"></span><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;display:inline=
">Hugo=E2=80=8B</div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,=
204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><span cl=
ass=3D"gmail-HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div>-- <br><div>Col=
m</div>
</font></span></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a114fd8127ab03a053d2176a3--


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From: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 00:42:09 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654

Hello,

I'd like to propose a small to the Certificate message format to allow for
future extensibility of the protocol.

This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate message. With this
change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension messages that
are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). This change
also resolves the anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in
the handshake.

Reasoning:
I've come to the conclusion that the current mechanism in TLS 1.3 for OCSP
and SCT is lacking forsight. OCSP and SCT are per-certificate metadata, not
per-connection metadata. By putting these responses in the
EncryptedExtensions, you limit these extensions to being shown once per
connection. This restricts future protocol extensions from using multiple
Certificate messages to support multiple certificates on the same
connection. An example of this is the post-handshake authentication
proposal (
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sullivan-tls-post-handshake-auth-00),
which currently requires a modified post-handshake Certificate message.
This proposed change would simplify the post-handshake auth proposal
significantly and generally make more sense as more certificate-specific
extensions are created.

Nick

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-fam=
ily:&quot;helvetica neue&quot;,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font=
-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-=
transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255=
,255,255);display:inline;float:none">PR:<span class=3D"inbox-inbox-Apple-co=
nverted-space">=C2=A0</span></span><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls1=
3-spec/pull/654">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654</a><br><br></=
div>Hello,<br><br></div><div>I&#39;d like to propose a small to the Certifi=
cate message format to allow for future extensibility of the protocol.<br><=
/div><div><br>This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate messa=
ge. With=20
this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension=20
messages that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). T=
his change also resolves the=20
anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in the handshake.<br=
><br></div>Reasoning: <br>I&#39;ve come to the conclusion that the current =
mechanism in TLS 1.3 for OCSP and SCT is lacking forsight. OCSP and SCT are=
 per-certificate metadata, not per-connection metadata. By putting these re=
sponses in the EncryptedExtensions, you limit these extensions to being sho=
wn once per connection. This restricts future protocol extensions from usin=
g multiple Certificate messages to support multiple certificates on the sam=
e connection. An example of this is the post-handshake authentication propo=
sal (<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sullivan-tls-post-handsha=
ke-auth-00">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sullivan-tls-post-handshake-a=
uth-00</a>), which currently requires a modified post-handshake Certificate=
 message. This proposed change would simplify the post-handshake auth propo=
sal significantly and generally make more sense as more certificate-specifi=
c extensions are created.<br><br></div>Nick<br></div>

--94eb2c19d5800bf2c5053d220da6--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 01:26:03 +0000
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To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>,  Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>,  Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 1:03 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> But it's OID-specific how the matching works, isn't it?
Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the
OIDs I've got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want to
define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This new
proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which
certainly increases flexibility.

David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that we
can discuss the specifics?


Apologies for the delay. Been a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I was
thinking:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656

What do you think?

Again, I don't actually care about this, so if you and others who would use
this mechanism prefer it as it is, I have no qualms. This is a "pull
suggestion", not a "pull request". :-)

David


Thanks,

Andrei

-----Original Message-----
From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; David Benjamin <
davidben@chromium.org>; Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>; Ilari
Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding

On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes:
>
>> Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I
>> don't feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I
>> thought I'd suggest this.
>
> I ignore it too.  Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy,
> that I'm not going to make things harder on users by adding complex
> and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.  My approach is to
> specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever
> certificate it has, and it's then decided based on a whitelist for
> which the server can very clearly report "not on the whitelist" when
> it rejects it.  The design seems to be based on the idea that each
> client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in
> precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each
> client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just
want the one they've got to work.

May I add some nuances here?

Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box
communication.
Existing selection methods suffice (there's usually none on the client
side).

Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a
small and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors
dropping support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use
case which make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.

Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through
proprietary ("FIDO like") application level protocols is fairly big.  Half
of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government and bank
access.  It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it "Web
compatible".  This use-case is (of course) not of an issue for the TLS WG
but may be of some interest for people currently using client certificates
for Web authentication.

Anders


>
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote gmail_msg"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg">On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at=
 1:03 PM Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote=
:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8=
ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
&gt; But it&#39;s OID-specific how the matching works, isn&#39;t it?<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the OID=
s I&#39;ve got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want t=
o define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This n=
ew proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which cert=
ainly increases flexibility.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that we c=
an discuss the specifics?<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></blockquote><div class=3D=
"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_ms=
g">Apologies for the delay. Been a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I w=
as thinking:<br><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656">ht=
tps://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656</a></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">What do you think?</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_msg"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">Again, I don&#39;t actually c=
are about this, so if you and others who would use this mechanism prefer it=
 as it is, I have no qualms. This is a &quot;pull suggestion&quot;, not a &=
quot;pull request&quot;. :-)</div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gma=
il_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">David</div></div></div><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><di=
v class=3D"gmail_msg">=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_ms=
g" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Thanks,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Andrei<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
-----Original Message-----<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.c=
om" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com</a>=
]<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
To: Peter Gutmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" class=3D=
"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;; David Benj=
amin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" targe=
t=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt;; Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">Andre=
i.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt;; Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilaril=
iusvaara@welho.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@we=
lho.com</a>&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=
=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding<br class=3D"gmail_m=
sg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; David Benjamin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" class=3D"g=
mail_msg" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; writes:<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; don&#39;t feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up =
so I<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; thought I&#39;d suggest this.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; I ignore it too.=C2=A0 Client certs are so rare, and so painful to dep=
loy,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; that I&#39;m not going to make things harder on users by adding comple=
x<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.=C2=A0 My approach i=
s to<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever<br=
 class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; certificate it has, and it&#39;s then decided based on a whitelist for=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; which the server can very clearly report &quot;not on the whitelist&qu=
ot; when<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; it rejects it.=C2=A0 The design seems to be based on the idea that eac=
h<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each<br =
class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just=
 want the one they&#39;ve got to work.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
May I add some nuances here?<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box communicat=
ion.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Existing selection methods suffice (there&#39;s usually none on the client =
side).<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a s=
mall and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors dropping=
 support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use case wh=
ich make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through prop=
rietary (&quot;FIDO like&quot;) application level protocols is fairly big.=
=C2=A0 Half of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government an=
d bank access.=C2=A0 It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it=
 &quot;Web compatible&quot;.=C2=A0 This use-case is (of course) not of an i=
ssue for the TLS WG but may be of some interest for people currently using =
client certificates for Web authentication.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Anders<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Peter.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; _______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg"=
>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">=
TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listi=
nfo/tls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</blockquote></div></div></div>

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From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 18:52:16 -0700
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>
> The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial institu=
tions are required by law to store communications of certain employees (inc=
luding broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrieved an=
d read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.  The r=
egulations which require retention of supervised employee communications in=
itially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to many oth=
er forms of communication including instant message, social media, and coll=
aboration applications.  All of these communications channels are protected=
 using TLS.
>
>
In the past ten years, we have seen botnets, root kit trojans, root kit
DRM, NSA TAO implants, OpenSSL heartbleed, heartbleed-style attack against
Cisco routers, cold boot attacks against expanded subkeys from a linear key
schedule, etc, etc...

I do not think encryption to be an obstacle of any kind.

Just use a forward proxy and move encryption from the browser to a
dedicated appliance? https://github.com/joshdick/miniProxy <- just from
Googling "php proxy"

And I think the only way to protect against heartbleed is require private
keys larger than than the MTU. But private keys are kind of pointless
nowadays when google has their private keys on thousands of machines around
the world.

Although DH depends on both parties generating a high entropy secret.
Personally I think the observation by an NTRU employee on NTRU-KE is better
than DH: https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/NTRUEncrypt/issues/7 "We
probably won't implement this exact idea -- this is basically each side
encrypts a secret, sends to the other, and puts the result through a KDF,
but with the slightly artificial choice that the encrypted secret is also
the private key and the KDF involves multiplication. Currently you can get
the properties that NTRU-KE gives (i.e. that both sides contribute secret
randomness) simply by using standard NTRU in each direction to send two
secrets and it's not clear what advantages NTRU-KE would have over that.
There may be room for a custom key exchange scheme in the future, but we'd
want to make sure it had advantages over the obvious way of doing it.


This shouldn't be a problem, but in the internet of things, DH is actually
less secure than normal public key exchange. Servers are more likely to
have entropy than embedded devices.

Ultimately, the world is insane.

--001a1146eef89387ef053d230959
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><pre cla=
ss=3D"gmail-wordwrap" style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;padding:0px=
;border:0px;font-variant-numeric:inherit;font-stretch:inherit;font-size:12p=
x;line-height:inherit;font-family:courier,&quot;courier new&quot;,monospace=
;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;word-wrap:break-word;color:rg=
b(0,0,0)">The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial=
 institutions are required by law to store communications of certain employ=
ees (including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retr=
ieved and read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated=
.  The regulations which require retention of supervised employee communica=
tions initially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend to =
many other forms of communication including instant message, social media, =
and collaboration applications.  All of these communications channels are p=
rotected using TLS.</pre></blockquote><div><br></div><div>In the past ten y=
ears, we have seen botnets, root kit trojans, root kit DRM, NSA TAO implant=
s, OpenSSL heartbleed, heartbleed-style attack against Cisco routers, cold =
boot attacks against expanded subkeys from a linear key schedule, etc, etc.=
..</div><div><br></div><div>I do not think encryption to be an obstacle of =
any kind.</div><div><br></div><div>Just use a forward proxy and move encryp=
tion from the browser to a dedicated appliance?=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://git=
hub.com/joshdick/miniProxy">https://github.com/joshdick/miniProxy</a> &lt;-=
 just from Googling &quot;php proxy&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>And I th=
ink the only way to protect against heartbleed is require private keys larg=
er than than the MTU. But private keys are kind of pointless nowadays when =
google has their private keys on thousands of machines around the world.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Although DH depends on both parties generating a hig=
h entropy secret. Personally I think the observation by an NTRU employee on=
 NTRU-KE is better than DH:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/NTRUOpenSour=
ceProject/NTRUEncrypt/issues/7">https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/NT=
RUEncrypt/issues/7</a> &quot;We probably won&#39;t implement this exact ide=
a -- this is basically each side encrypts a secret, sends to the other, and=
 puts the result through a KDF, but with the slightly artificial choice tha=
t the encrypted secret is also the private key and the KDF involves multipl=
ication. Currently you can get the properties that NTRU-KE gives (i.e. that=
 both sides contribute secret randomness) simply by using standard NTRU in =
each direction to send two secrets and it&#39;s not clear what advantages N=
TRU-KE would have over that. There may be room for a custom key exchange sc=
heme in the future, but we&#39;d want to make sure it had advantages over t=
he obvious way of doing it.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>This sh=
ouldn&#39;t be a problem, but in the internet of things, DH is actually les=
s secure than normal public key exchange. Servers are more likely to have e=
ntropy than embedded devices.</div><div><br></div><div>Ultimately, the worl=
d is insane.</div></div>

--001a1146eef89387ef053d230959--


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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 4:59 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:50 PM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.ne=
t>
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple
>>> solution, don't use it.
>>> That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the
>>> secret exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It =
does
>>> require some careful analysis, though.
>>>
>>
>> I think that this may be possible for TLS1.3 0-RTT data, but not for
>> other data where an ephemeral key will be generated based also on a
>> parameter that the client chooses.
>>
>
> The key_share contributed by the client is indeed ephemeral and it
> replaces the random key chosen by the client in the RSA-based scheme.
>

Yep, you're right, now I get it. I also now wonder if clients should make a
best effort of detecting duplicate parameters and rejecting them.

--=20
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 4:59 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il" target=3D"_blank">hugo@ee.technion.=
ac.il</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small"><span sty=
le=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:50 PM, Colm M=
acC=C3=A1rthaigh </span><span dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-s=
erif">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:colm@allcosts.net" target=3D"_blank">colm@allco=
sts.net</a>&gt;</span><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif"> wrote:<=
/span></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span cla=
ss=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span>On Thu, Sep 22,=
 2016 at 4:41 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hug=
o@ee.technion.ac.il" target=3D"_blank">hugo@ee.technion.ac.il</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">If the pr=
oblem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple solution, don&#3=
9;t use it.</div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:sma=
ll">That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the sec=
ret exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It does re=
quire some careful analysis, though.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div=
></span><div>I think that this may be possible for TLS1.3 0-RTT data, but n=
ot for other data where an ephemeral key will be generated based also on a =
parameter that the client chooses.=C2=A0</div></div></div></div></blockquot=
e><div><br></div></span><div><span style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif"=
>The key_share contributed by the client is indeed ephemeral and it replace=
s the random key chosen by the client in the RSA-based scheme.</span></div>=
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yep, you&#39;re right, n=
ow I get it. I also now wonder if clients should make a best effort of dete=
cting duplicate parameters and rejecting them. =C2=A0</div></div><div><br><=
/div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signatur=
e">Colm</div>
</div></div>

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From: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 16:17:02 -1000
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To: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> wrote:

> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654
>
> This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate message. With this
> change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension messages that
> are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). This change
> also resolves the anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in
> the handshake.
>

There are two ways that such a thing could be done. How your proposal
suggests:

    opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
    struct {
        opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
        ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
        Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
    } Certificate;

or:

    opaque ASN1CertData<1..2^24-1>;
    struct {
        ASN1CertData cert_data;
        Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
    }

    struct {
        opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
        ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
    } Certificate;

I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP response are
per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chain, so to
me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its own
extension list, makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing the
proposal to the second form?

Cheers,
Brian
-- 
https://briansmith.org/

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Nick=
 Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding=
-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-l=
eft-style:solid"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(3=
3,33,33);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-fam=
ily:&quot;helvetica neue&quot;,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-weight:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-sp=
ace:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">PR:<span>=C2=A0</s=
pan></span><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654" target=
=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/t<wbr>ls13-spec/pull/654</a><br></div>=
</div><div><br>This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate mess=
age. With=20
this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension=20
messages that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). T=
his change also resolves the=20
anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in the handshake.<br=
></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There are two ways that=
 such a thing could be done. How your proposal suggests:</div><div><br></di=
v><div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1Cert&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;</div>=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0<wbr>struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 opaque certificate_request_context&lt;0.<wbr>.2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1=
&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&l=
t;0..2^16-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>or:</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1CertDa=
ta&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1CertData cert_data;</div><div>=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&g=
t;; </div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 }</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0<wbr>struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 op=
aque certificate_request_context&lt;0.<wbr>.2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1&gt;;=C2=
=A0<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><b></b><i></i><u></u><su=
b></sub><sup></sup><strike></strike></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">I think you are right that the SCT and the O=
CSP response are per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certifica=
te-chain, so to me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain get=
s its own extension list,=C2=A0makes more sense to me. Would you consider c=
hanging the proposal to the second form?<br clear=3D"all"></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Cheers,</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote">Brian<br>-- <br></div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><a href=3D"https://briansmith.org/" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://briansmith.org/</a></div><div><br></div></div></div=
></div></div></div></div>
</div></div>

--94eb2c05bce8c25af0053d235f8c--


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From: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 02:26:38 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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This suggestion makes sense to me.

Both the SCT and OCSP v2 extension allow for multiple objects in order to
cover multiple certificates in a chain, but your suggestion makes the
grouping much more explicit and obviates the need for OCSPv2. I'd
definitely consider a modification like this.

Nick
On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:17 PM Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:

> Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654
>>
>
>> This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate message. With
>> this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension messages
>> that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). This
>> change also resolves the anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before
>> certificates in the handshake.
>>
>
> There are two ways that such a thing could be done. How your proposal
> suggests:
>
>     opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
>     struct {
>         opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
>         ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
>         Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>     } Certificate;
>
> or:
>
>     opaque ASN1CertData<1..2^24-1>;
>     struct {
>         ASN1CertData cert_data;
>         Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>     }
>
>     struct {
>         opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
>         ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
>     } Certificate;
>
> I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP response are
> per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chain, so to
> me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its own
> extension list, makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing the
> proposal to the second form?
>
> Cheers,
> Brian
> --
> https://briansmith.org/
>
>

--001a113f6ad2abb9fa053d2382b5
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

This suggestion makes sense to me.<br><br>Both the SCT and OCSP v2 extensio=
n allow for multiple objects in order to cover multiple certificates in a c=
hain, but your suggestion makes the grouping much more explicit and obviate=
s the need for OCSPv2. I&#39;d definitely consider a modification like this=
.<br><br>Nick<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 22=
, 2016 at 7:17 PM Brian Smith &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:brian@briansmith.org">b=
rian@briansmith.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Nick=
 Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding=
-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-l=
eft-style:solid"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(3=
3,33,33);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-fam=
ily:&quot;helvetica neue&quot;,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-weight:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-sp=
ace:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">PR:<span>=C2=A0</s=
pan></span><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654" target=
=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654</a><br></div></div=
></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204=
,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
div><div><br>This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate messag=
e. With=20
this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension=20
messages that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). T=
his change also resolves the=20
anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in the handshake.<br=
></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:r=
gb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There are two ways t=
hat such a thing could be done. How your proposal suggests:</div><div><br><=
/div><div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1Cert&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;</div>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 opaque certificate_request_context&lt;0..2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1&gt;; =
<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&lt;0..2=
^16-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><div><br></div><=
div>or:</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1CertData&lt;=
1..2^24-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1CertData cert_data;</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;; </=
div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 }</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque certif=
icate_request_context&lt;0..2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1&gt;;=C2=A0<br>=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></s=
up><strike></strike></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP response a=
re per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chain, so t=
o me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its own exte=
nsion list,=C2=A0makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing the pr=
oposal to the second form?<br clear=3D"all"></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Cheers,</div><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">Brian<br>-- <br></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><a href=3D"https://briansmith.org/" target=3D"_blank">https://briansmith=
.org/</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div>

--001a113f6ad2abb9fa053d2382b5--


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Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> writes:

> in the internet of things, DH is actually
> less secure than normal public key exchange. Servers are more likely to
> have entropy than embedded devices.

I think that's backwards; in a 'normal' public key exchange, it is the
client that generates the secret key, the server contributes no
randomness.


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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 8:53 PM, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> wrote:

> Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> writes:
>
> > in the internet of things, DH is actually
> > less secure than normal public key exchange. Servers are more likely to
> > have entropy than embedded devices.
>
> I think that's backwards; in a 'normal' public key exchange, it is the
> client that generates the secret key, the server contributes no
> randomness.
>

Nit: no private randomness. It provides freshness in the form of
ServerRandom and in
TLS that's specified as random.

-Ekr


>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 8:53 PM, Geoffrey Keating <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:geoffk@geoffk.org" target=3D"_blank">geoffk@geoffk.org</=
a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">Rya=
n Carboni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ryacko@gmail.com">ryacko@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
writes:<br>
<br>
&gt; in the internet of things, DH is actually<br>
&gt; less secure than normal public key exchange. Servers are more likely t=
o<br>
&gt; have entropy than embedded devices.<br>
<br>
</span>I think that&#39;s backwards; in a &#39;normal&#39; public key excha=
nge, it is the<br>
client that generates the secret key, the server contributes no<br>
randomness.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Nit: no private randomness.=
 It provides freshness in the form of ServerRandom and in</div><div>TLS tha=
t&#39;s specified as random.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c0a91d617c033053d254668--


From nobody Thu Sep 22 21:59:18 2016
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 14:59:12 +1000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Antw: Re: Antw: Re: Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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On 23 September 2016 at 00:47, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wro=
te:
>> I see your point here. However, where would you draw the line between "I=
 can't" and "I don't want to"? Think of a cipher suites list with 3 bytes i=
n a ClientHello. You can still find one cipher suite that could be ok to wo=
rk with. However, how can you trust the first two bytes if you find that th=
ird byte telling you something's abnormal?
>
> The server tries that first cipher, if mutually supported, and if it
> works, it guessed right.  If the finished message from the server is
> valid, the client's handshake as seen by the server was presumably
> exactly what the client sent, so the client gets what it paid for...
>
> Servers don't have to be that forgiving, but it is a plausible approach.

Another view on this (web view):
https://annevankesteren.nl/2016/05/client-server

Why a server would tolerate rubbish and all the associated complexity,
when none of the users it cares about produce that sort of drivel is
beyond me.


From nobody Fri Sep 23 00:35:32 2016
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From: Thijs van Dijk <schnabbel@inurbanus.nl>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 09:35:27 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On 23 September 2016 at 04:04, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> w=
rote:

> If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple
>>>> solution, don't use it.
>>>> That is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the
>>>> secret exponent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It=
 does
>>>> require some careful analysis, though.
>>>>
>>>
>> The key_share contributed by the client is indeed ephemeral and it
>> replaces the random key chosen by the client in the RSA-based scheme.
>>
>
> Yep, you're right, now I get it. I also now wonder if clients should make
> a best effort of detecting duplicate parameters and rejecting them.
>

Regular clients, no.
But this would be a useful addition to debugging / scanning suites (e.g.
Qualys), or browser extensions for the security conscious (e.g. CertPatrol)=
.

-Thijs

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On 23 September 2016 at 04:04, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:colm@allcosts.net" target=3D"_blank">colm@allcosts.net</=
a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D""><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"=
><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><sp=
an><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div =
style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">If the problem is =
the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple solution, don&#39;t use i=
t.</div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;font-size:small">That =
is, you can, as a server, have a fixed key_share for which the secret expon=
ent becomes the private key exactly as in the RSA case. It does require som=
e careful analysis, though.</div></div></blockquote></span></div></div></di=
v></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div><span style=3D"font-family:verdan=
a,sans-serif">The key_share contributed by the client is indeed ephemeral a=
nd it replaces the random key chosen by the client in the RSA-based scheme.=
</span></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Yep,=
 you&#39;re right, now I get it. I also now wonder if clients should make a=
 best effort of detecting duplicate parameters and rejecting them. =C2=A0</=
div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Regular clients, no.=
</div><div>But this would be a useful addition to debugging / scanning suit=
es (e.g. Qualys), or browser extensions for the security conscious (e.g. Ce=
rtPatrol).</div></div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">-Thijs</div></di=
v>

--001a113ac906879838053d27d26b--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On 22/09/16 19:36, Yuhong Bao wrote:
> This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D=
1188657

Yuk. Prioritising the needs of those debugging networks
over the maybe 5-6 orders of magnitude more folks using
them is ass-backwards IMO. That result looks to me like
a very bad decision if I'm following it correctly.

S.

>=20
> ________________________________
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of BITS Security <BITSSecuri=
ty@fsroundtable.org>
> Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>=20
> To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members
>=20
> My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy div=
ision of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/b=
its).  My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-bas=
ed financial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer fina=
nce, and asset management firms.
>=20
> I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to i=
nvestigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member oper=
ations; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public col=
laboration.
>=20
> While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contrib=
utions to internet security this important working group has made in the =
last few years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect =
many of my organization's member institutions:  the deprecation of RSA ke=
y exchange.
>=20
> Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant p=
roblems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS in=
ternally and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-ba=
nd TLS decryption.
>=20
> Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability t=
o decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detect=
ion and prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and D=
DoS mitigation.  Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions als=
o rely upon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surv=
eillance of supervised employees.  The products which support these capab=
ilities will need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significa=
nt cost and loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality =
financial institutions and their regulators require.
>=20
> The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial insti=
tutions are required by law to store communications of certain employees =
(including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retrie=
ved and read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated=
=2E  The regulations which require retention of supervised employee commu=
nications initially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now exte=
nd to many other forms of communication including instant message, social=
 media, and collaboration applications.  All of these communications chan=
nels are protected using TLS.
>=20
> The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be seri=
ous.  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troublesho=
oting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multipl=
e layers of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.   The pervasive =
visibility offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MIT=
M infrastructure or by endpoint diagnostics.  The result of losing this T=
LS visibility will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort =
to guesswork on difficult problems.
>=20
> Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs =
of the Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run exte=
nsively inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those th=
at are heavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more applications move off of =
the desktop and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on =
TLS is increasing.
>=20
> Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of =
TLS 1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will=
 force these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade =
to TLS 1.3.  It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers=
 and regulators that these institutions be able to maintain both security=
 and regulatory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 t=
o TLS 1.3.
>=20
> At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like=
 DLP, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring=
 of regulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexisten=
t.  There are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all o=
f the currently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS dec=
ryption architecture:
>=20
> -  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive =
network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key=
 exchange.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed=
 and functioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a=
 network traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the=
 case of monitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the mon=
itoring function to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on=
 deliberate circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threa=
t vector is the possessor of the endpoint.
>=20
> -  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and secu=
rity problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahe=
ad of time which session is going to be the important one.
>=20
> -  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key mana=
gement complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monitoring l=
ayers.
>=20
> Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee s=
upervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as i=
nternet MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our mem=
bers, are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a wor=
kable and scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adop=
ted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.
>=20
> Sincerely,
>=20
> Andrew Kennedy
> Senior Program Manager, BITS
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20


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From nobody Fri Sep 23 01:15:05 2016
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>But if at some point all websites use HTTP-whatever-the-current-version-is=
=0A=
>then maybe browsers can remove support for HTTP/1.1 and then your=0A=
>embedded/SCADA/IoT devices won=92t give us that rude shock.=0A=
=0A=
Since HTTP/2 pretty much guarantees that SCADA/IoT/etc will keep using HTTP=
=0A=
1.1 forever, browsers are going to have to keep supporting both versions=0A=
forever.  Either that or there'll be custom forks of browsers sold as "SCAD=
A=0A=
administration clients" or something similar.=0A=
=0A=
>I honestly don=92t think that having two protocols for these two radically=
=0A=
>different use cases is a bad outcome.=0A=
=0A=
Neither do I.  The problem is that we're supposed to pretend that HTTP 1.1=
=0A=
will go away and everything will only talk HTTP/2, rather than accepting th=
at=0A=
both will be with us for a long time, if not forever.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


From nobody Fri Sep 23 01:24:17 2016
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 08:24:09 +0000
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References: <57D2E218020000AC0011B17E@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <20160909152901.9008C1A552@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <1473853106532.3256@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <57D96E34020000AC0011B73F@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <57E25106020000AC0011BF3A@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <CABkgnnX7X+21wjChxkW-uhd8WXAMyp5f1F74H5ja=1mui4POiQ@mail.gmail.com> <57E272CB020000AC0011BF63@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <1474473207998.35647@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CABkgnnWUwPeSeLBO8OyvKmb6MBBfNxPWEXw59_Kzkuby-WqDNQ@mail.gmail.com> <1474521100084.53938@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <20160922065441.GA26434@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> writes:=0A=
>On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 05:11:39AM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:=0A=
>> It also means you're going to be in for a rude shock when you encounter =
the=0A=
>> ocean of embedded/SCADA/IoT devices with non-mainstream TLS implementati=
ons.=0A=
>=0A=
>That did not check for interop with any mainstream TLS library?=0A=
=0A=
Mainstream TLS 1.3 libraries?  Since the spec is still subject to weekly=0A=
changes, I doubt there's anything to interop test with.  =0A=
=0A=
(It's actually a bit of a rhetorical question, since I've seen little to no=
=0A=
evidence that embedded/SCADA/etc has any intention of throwing away their=
=0A=
existing investment and starting again with 1.3 or 2.0 or whatever it'll be=
=0A=
called, I doubt there'll be much to non-interop with.=0A=
=0A=
>Also, code to "recover" tends to introduce security issues if used in=0A=
>security protocols. =0A=
=0A=
This isn't "code to recover", it's just normal code.  If anything, it's add=
ing=0A=
additional code to check for problems that aren't really problems that'll l=
ead=0A=
to security issues.=0A=
=0A=
>Well, the problem you encounter first with HTTP/2 is that it really dislik=
es=0A=
>unencrypted operation. Which impiles you pretty much need encryption. Whic=
h=0A=
>impiles you pretty much need the WebPKI certificate model... Which tends t=
o=0A=
>be poor match for anything except named servers on the internet, which ten=
ds=0A=
>not be suitable for IoT stuff...=0A=
=0A=
Yup.  The HTTP/2 folks' response to this at the time was "let them eat 1.1"=
,=0A=
pretty much guaranteeing a fork of the HTTP protocol, with two different=0A=
versions being maintained in perpetuity.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de>
Thread-Topic: Antw: Re: Antw: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 08:38:44 +0000
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References: <57D2E218020000AC0011B17E@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <20160909152901.9008C1A552@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <1473853106532.3256@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <57D96E34020000AC0011B73F@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <57E25106020000AC0011BF3A@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <CABkgnnX7X+21wjChxkW-uhd8WXAMyp5f1F74H5ja=1mui4POiQ@mail.gmail.com>, <57E272CB020000AC0011BF63@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <1474473207998.35647@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <57E2E068020000AC0011BFD4@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <1474520407230.85774@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <57E3E821020000AC0011C0DC@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Antw: Re: Antw: Re: Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>However, where would you draw the line between "I can't" and "I don't want=
=0A=
>to"?=0A=
=0A=
It's one of those judgement-call things, I don't know if you can strictly=
=0A=
define it but as a rule of thumb I'd say that if you encounter it during=0A=
normal processing it's an I-can't problem while if you have to add special-=
=0A=
case checks to identify it and refuse to continue it's an I-don't-want-to=
=0A=
problem.=0A=
=0A=
Using again the example of "Couldn't connect to Amazon because no suitable=
=0A=
encryption was available", if the server or client accidentally memset()s t=
he=0A=
cipher suite block to 0xDEADBEEF then you've run into an I-can't-continue=
=0A=
problem, while if the length fields don't quite match up (the MUST NOT that=
=0A=
was cited at the start of this thread), something that you wouldn't even=0A=
notice unless you added special-case code to check for it, then it's an I-=
=0A=
don't-want-to-continue problem.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


From nobody Fri Sep 23 03:46:44 2016
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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 12:46:37 +0200
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Subject: [TLS] debugging tools [was:  Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3]
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On Fri, 2016-09-23 at 09:05 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> On 22/09/16 19:36, Yuhong Bao wrote:
> > 
> > This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?i
> > d=1188657
> 
> Yuk. Prioritising the needs of those debugging networks
> over the maybe 5-6 orders of magnitude more folks using
> them is ass-backwards IMO. That result looks to me like
> a very bad decision if I'm following it correctly.

That's a very different concern than the one asked by BITS security,
and is IMO a very valid one. Running any protocol under TLS wouldn't
mean that debugging is very hard or impossible for the one running the
protocol. Administrators debug and trace protocols every day to figure
out failures (that's why we have advanced tools like wireshark). Making
it hard for them to use these tools isn't increasing security; it is
only making their life harder.

regards,
Nikos


From nobody Fri Sep 23 03:59:39 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] debugging tools [was:  Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3]
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On 23/09/16 11:46, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-09-23 at 09:05 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>
>> On 22/09/16 19:36, Yuhong Bao wrote:
>>>
>>> This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?i
>>> d=3D1188657
>>
>> Yuk. Prioritising the needs of those debugging networks
>> over the maybe 5-6 orders of magnitude more folks using
>> them is ass-backwards IMO. That result looks to me like
>> a very bad decision if I'm following it correctly.
>=20
> That's a very different concern than the one asked by BITS security,
> and is IMO a very valid one. Running any protocol under TLS wouldn't
> mean that debugging is very hard or impossible for the one running the
> protocol. Administrators debug and trace protocols every day to figure
> out failures (that's why we have advanced tools like wireshark). Making=

> it hard for them to use these tools isn't increasing security; it is
> only making their life harder.

Sure. But their/our lives sometimes should be a bit harder
to make things safer for the vast bulk of people using the
networks/applications we're developing. As with everything,
there's a balance needed. In this case, I think the wrong
decision was reached.

S.



>=20
> regards,
> Nikos
>=20
>=20


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 14:16:43 +0200
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On Friday, 23 September 2016 08:38:44 CEST Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:
> >However, where would you draw the line between "I can't" and "I don't wa=
nt
> >to"?
>=20
> It's one of those judgement-call things, I don't know if you can strictly
> define it but as a rule of thumb I'd say that if you encounter it during
> normal processing it's an I-can't problem while if you have to add specia=
l-
> case checks to identify it and refuse to continue it's an I-don't-want-to
> problem.

So it comes down how the code just happens to be written? I don't think tha=
t's=20
a good approach for security critical code...=20

I mean if you do a

while not is_empty(buffer):
   c_id =3D get_two_bytes_with_overflow_check(buffer)
   list_of_cipher_ids.append(c_id)

you won't need to do additional checks to see if the length is even or not.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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Subject: Re: [TLS] debugging tools [was:  Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3]
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On Friday, 23 September 2016 11:59:31 CEST Stephen Farrell wrote:
> On 23/09/16 11:46, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> > On Fri, 2016-09-23 at 09:05 +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> >> On 22/09/16 19:36, Yuhong Bao wrote:
> >>> This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?i
> >>> d=3D1188657
> >>=20
> >> Yuk. Prioritising the needs of those debugging networks
> >> over the maybe 5-6 orders of magnitude more folks using
> >> them is ass-backwards IMO. That result looks to me like
> >> a very bad decision if I'm following it correctly.
> >=20
> > That's a very different concern than the one asked by BITS security,
> > and is IMO a very valid one. Running any protocol under TLS wouldn't
> > mean that debugging is very hard or impossible for the one running the
> > protocol. Administrators debug and trace protocols every day to figure
> > out failures (that's why we have advanced tools like wireshark). Making
> > it hard for them to use these tools isn't increasing security; it is
> > only making their life harder.
>=20
> Sure. But their/our lives sometimes should be a bit harder
> to make things safer for the vast bulk of people using the
> networks/applications we're developing. As with everything,
> there's a balance needed. In this case, I think the wrong
> decision was reached.

those secret keys are on the client machines and they will stay on client=20
machines

making it hard to extract master key from process memory is just security=20
through obscurity, not something that will stop a determined attacker

*cough*LD_PRELOAD*cough*
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 14:09:36 +0000 (UTC)
From: <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>,  Yuhong Bao <YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com>,  BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>,  "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On 22/09/16 19:36, Yuhong Bao wrote:
> This also reminds me of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D11=
88657

>Yuk. Prioritising the needs of those debugging networks
>over the maybe 5-6 orders of magnitude more folks using
>them is ass-backwards IMO. That result looks to me like
>a very bad decision if I'm following it correctly.
Brings to mind the story about the people who were so concerned about havin=
g the engine stolen out of the car that they bolted the hood shut so you co=
uld never get in. =C2=A0 So, of course, if there was any maintenance to be =
done to the engine, if was impossible.
I wonder if there is some need for balancing of requirements.
Nalini

>=20
> ________________________________
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of BITS Security <BITSSecurity=
@fsroundtable.org>
> Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>=20
> To:=C2=A0 IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members
>=20
> My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy divis=
ion of the Financial Services Roundtable (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits)=
.=C2=A0 My organization represents approximately 100 of the top 150 US-base=
d financial services companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance=
, and asset management firms.
>=20
> I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to inv=
estigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member operatio=
ns; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-public collabora=
tion.
>=20
> While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contribut=
ions to internet security this important working group has made in the last=
 few years I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many o=
f my organization's member institutions:=C2=A0 the deprecation of RSA key e=
xchange.
>=20
> Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant pro=
blems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running TLS intern=
ally and have significant, security-critical investments in out-of-band TLS=
 decryption.
>=20
> Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability to =
decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion detection =
and prevention, malware detection, packet capture and analysis, and DDoS mi=
tigation.=C2=A0 Unlike some other businesses, financial institutions also r=
ely upon TLS traffic decryption to implement fraud monitoring and surveilla=
nce of supervised employees.=C2=A0 The products which support these capabil=
ities will need to be replaced or substantially redesigned at significant c=
ost and loss of scalability to continue to support the functionality financ=
ial institutions and their regulators require.
>=20
> The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.=C2=A0 Financial in=
stitutions are required by law to store communications of certain employees=
 (including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they can be retriev=
ed and read in case an investigation into improper behavior is initiated.=
=C2=A0 The regulations which require retention of supervised employee commu=
nications initially focused on physical and electronic mail, but now extend=
 to many other forms of communication including instant message, social med=
ia, and collaboration applications.=C2=A0 All of these communications chann=
els are protected using TLS.
>=20
> The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be seriou=
s.=C2=A0 TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when troublesh=
ooting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction through multiple=
 layers of infrastructure and isolate the fault domain.=C2=A0 The pervasive=
 visibility offered by out-of-band TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM=
 infrastructure or by endpoint diagnostics.=C2=A0 The result of losing this=
 TLS visibility will be unacceptable outage times as support groups resort =
to guesswork on difficult problems.
>=20
> Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security needs of=
 the Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also being run extensiv=
ely inside the firewall by private enterprises, particularly those that are=
 heavily regulated.=C2=A0 Furthermore, as more applications move off of the=
 desktop and into web browsers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS i=
s increasing.
>=20
> Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TL=
S 1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory standards will for=
ce these enterprises - including financial institutions - to upgrade to TLS=
 1.3.=C2=A0 It is vital to financial institutions and to their customers an=
d regulators that these institutions be able to maintain both security and =
regulatory compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1=
.3.
>=20
> At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems like D=
LP, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitoring of =
regulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexistent.=C2=
=A0 There are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with all of =
the currently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS decrypt=
ion architecture:
>=20
> -=C2=A0 End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasi=
ve network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA ke=
y exchange.=C2=A0 Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent insta=
lled and functioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that=
 a network traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.=C2=A0 I=
n the case of monitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the =
monitoring function to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing o=
n deliberate circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat=
 vector is the possessor of the endpoint.
>=20
> -=C2=A0 Exporting of ephemeral keys:=C2=A0 This solution has scalability =
and security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to kn=
ow ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.
>=20
> -=C2=A0 Man-in-the-middle:=C2=A0 This solution adds significant latency, =
key management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed monito=
ring layers.
>=20
> Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee sup=
ervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as inter=
net MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our members, =
are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a workable an=
d scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately adopted into t=
he standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.
>=20
> Sincerely,
>=20
> Andrew Kennedy
> Senior Program Manager, BITS
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


  =20
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<html><head></head><body><div style=3D"color:#000; background-color:#fff; f=
ont-family:HelveticaNeue-Light, Helvetica Neue Light, Helvetica Neue, Helve=
tica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px"><div id=3D"yui_3_16_=
0_ym19_1_1474639151861_26318"><br></div><div class=3D"qtdSeparateBR"><br><b=
r></div><div class=3D"yahoo_quoted" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474639151861_2=
6272" style=3D"display: block;"><div style=3D"font-family: HelveticaNeue-Li=
ght, Helvetica Neue Light, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 16px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474639151861_26271"=
><div style=3D"font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial=
, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474=
639151861_26270"><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_147=
4639151861_26269">On 22/09/16 19:36, Yuhong Bao wrote:<br clear=3D"none">&g=
t; This also reminds me of <a shape=3D"rect" href=3D"https://bugzilla.mozil=
la.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1188657" target=3D"_blank" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1=
_1474639151861_26642">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D118865=
7</a><br clear=3D"none"><br clear=3D"none">&gt;Yuk. Prioritising the needs =
of those debugging networks<br clear=3D"none">&gt;over the maybe 5-6 orders=
 of magnitude more folks using<br clear=3D"none">&gt;them is ass-backwards =
IMO. That result looks to me like<br clear=3D"none">&gt;a very bad decision=
 if I'm following it correctly.</div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"y=
ui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474639151861_26269"><br></div><div class=3D"y_msg_contain=
er" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474639151861_26269">Brings to mind the story a=
bout the people who were so concerned about having the engine stolen out of=
 the car that they bolted the hood shut so you could never get in. &nbsp; S=
o, of course, if there was any maintenance to be done to the engine, if was=
 impossible.</div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_14=
74639151861_26269"><br></div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_=
0_ym19_1_1474639151861_26269">I wonder if there is some need for balancing =
of requirements.</div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_=
1_1474639151861_26269"><br clear=3D"none">Nalini<div class=3D"yqt9418087608=
" id=3D"yqtfd41834"><br clear=3D"none"><br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D=
"none">&gt; ________________________________<br clear=3D"none">&gt; From: T=
LS &lt;<a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org" href=3D"ma=
ilto:tls-bounces@ietf.org" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474639151861_26672">tls=
-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of BITS Security &lt;<a shape=3D"rect" =
ymailto=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org" href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurit=
y@fsroundtable.org">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;<br clear=3D"none"=
>&gt; Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 10:19:48 AM<br clear=3D"none">&gt;=
 To: <a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" href=3D"mailto:tls@i=
etf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br clear=3D"none">&gt; Subject: [TLS] Industry Co=
ncerns about TLS 1.3<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; To:&nbs=
p; IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"n=
one">&gt; My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology poli=
cy division of the Financial Services Roundtable (<a shape=3D"rect" href=3D=
"http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits" target=3D"_blank">http://www.fsroundtabl=
e.org/bits</a>).&nbsp; My organization represents approximately 100 of the =
top 150 US-based financial services companies including banks, insurance, c=
onsumer finance, and asset management firms.<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br cle=
ar=3D"none">&gt; I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driv=
en forum to investigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into =
member operations; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and private-p=
ublic collaboration.<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; While I=
 am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant contributions to i=
nternet security this important working group has made in the last few year=
s I recently learned of a proposed change that would affect many of my orga=
nization's member institutions:&nbsp; the deprecation of RSA key exchange.<=
br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; Deprecation of the RSA key e=
xchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant problems for financial institutio=
ns, almost all of whom are running TLS internally and have significant, sec=
urity-critical investments in out-of-band TLS decryption.<br clear=3D"none"=
>&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; Like many enterprises, financial institutions=
 depend upon the ability to decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss prot=
ection, intrusion detection and prevention, malware detection, packet captu=
re and analysis, and DDoS mitigation.&nbsp; Unlike some other businesses, f=
inancial institutions also rely upon TLS traffic decryption to implement fr=
aud monitoring and surveillance of supervised employees.&nbsp; The products=
 which support these capabilities will need to be replaced or substantially=
 redesigned at significant cost and loss of scalability to continue to supp=
ort the functionality financial institutions and their regulators require.<=
br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; The impact on supervision wi=
ll be particularly severe.&nbsp; Financial institutions are required by law=
 to store communications of certain employees (including broker/dealers) in=
 a form that ensures that they can be retrieved and read in case an investi=
gation into improper behavior is initiated.&nbsp; The regulations which req=
uire retention of supervised employee communications initially focused on p=
hysical and electronic mail, but now extend to many other forms of communic=
ation including instant message, social media, and collaboration applicatio=
ns.&nbsp; All of these communications channels are protected using TLS.<br =
clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; The impact on network diagnosti=
cs and troubleshooting will also be serious.&nbsp; TLS decryption of networ=
k packet traces is required when troubleshooting difficult problems in orde=
r to follow a transaction through multiple layers of infrastructure and iso=
late the fault domain.&nbsp;  The pervasive visibility offered by out-of-ba=
nd TLS decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastructure or by endpoint d=
iagnostics.&nbsp; The result of losing this TLS visibility will be unaccept=
able outage times as support groups resort to guesswork on difficult proble=
ms.<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; Although TLS 1.3 has bee=
n designed to meet the evolving security needs of the Internet, it is vital=
 to recognize that TLS is also being run extensively inside the firewall by=
 private enterprises, particularly those that are heavily regulated.&nbsp; =
Furthermore, as more applications move off of the desktop and into web brow=
sers and mobile applications, dependence on TLS is increasing.<br clear=3D"=
none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; Eventually, either security vulnerabilit=
ies in TLS 1.2, deprecation of TLS 1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes=
 to regulatory standards will force these enterprises - including financial=
 institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1.3.&nbsp; It is vital to financial insti=
tutions and to their customers and regulators that these institutions be ab=
le to maintain both security and regulatory compliance during and after the=
 transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"no=
ne">&gt; At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems=
 like DLP, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and monitor=
ing of regulated employee communications appear to be immature or nonexiste=
nt.&nbsp; There are serious cost, scalability, and security concerns with a=
ll of the currently proposed alternatives to the existing out-of-band TLS d=
ecryption architecture:<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; -&nb=
sp; End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive net=
work visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key exch=
ange.&nbsp; Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed a=
nd functioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a net=
work traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.&nbsp; In the =
case of monitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monito=
ring function to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deli=
berate circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vecto=
r is the possessor of the endpoint.<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"non=
e">&gt; -&nbsp; Exporting of ephemeral keys:&nbsp; This solution has scalab=
ility and security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible=
 to know ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.<br c=
lear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; -&nbsp; Man-in-the-middle:&nbsp;=
 This solution adds significant latency, key management complexity, and pro=
duction risk at each of the needed monitoring layers.<br clear=3D"none">&gt=
; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; Until the critical concerns surrounding enterpris=
e security, employee supervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed=
 as effectively as internet MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on=
 behalf of our members, are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last =
Call until a workable and scalable solution is identified and vetted, and u=
ltimately adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.<br clear=
=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; Sincerely,<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <b=
r clear=3D"none">&gt; Andrew Kennedy<br clear=3D"none">&gt; Senior Program =
Manager, BITS<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"n=
one">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; _________________=
______________________________<br clear=3D"none">&gt; TLS mailing list<br c=
lear=3D"none">&gt; <a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" href=
=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br clear=3D"none">&gt; <a shape=
=3D"rect" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br clear=3D"none">&gt; <b=
r clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; <br clear=3D"none">&gt; _____=
__________________________________________<br clear=3D"none">&gt; TLS maili=
ng list<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf=
.org" href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br clear=3D"none">&gt; =
<a shape=3D"rect" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br clear=3D"none"=
>&gt; <br clear=3D"none"></div><br><div class=3D"yqt9418087608" id=3D"yqtfd=
23723">_______________________________________________<br clear=3D"none">TL=
S mailing list<br clear=3D"none"><a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:TLS@ie=
tf.org" href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br clear=3D"none"><a =
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From: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Yuhong Bao <YuhongBao_386@hotmail.com>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
Thread-Index: AQHSFXFM47cmA/iFbUeqweJ91YYuHKCHJUIQ
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 14:46:57 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 10:55:27 -0400
Message-ID: <CAH8yC8kgYzYXwJ01NkK7WYxD-diponWEQOd+MNHssm+bLHE54w@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael
<MAckermann@bcbsm.com> wrote:
> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and has i=
nvested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>
> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order of m=
agnitude of folks using them"  will have good service.   If they do not,  t=
hey will consider competitors and/or generate a litany service calls or com=
plaints.        I.E.     When these "Folks"  are slow or not working they a=
re just as unhappy as we are.
>

Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a
stable product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who
fail to deliver or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand
waiving).

If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product,
then it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I
don't think that's the case here.

Jeff


From nobody Fri Sep 23 08:14:43 2016
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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: 'Hugo Krawczyk' <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
To: "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 08:43:46 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Ackermann, Michael
<MAckermann@bcbsm.com> wrote:
>  I am not sure I understand what your reply means?
>
> Is it that we should create or even allow an environment to develop,  whe=
re all providers of service cannot  provide effective diagnostics and suppo=
rt?   And then see the constituents of these industries collapse together. =
    And only then realize we have an issue?
> I hope I am  not understanding correctly.     IETF is supposed to be look=
ing ahead to provide better answers and circumvent predictable problems.   =
 Not ignoring,  waiting and then reacting to negative situations that can a=
nd should be avoided.

What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed
out previously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.
What information does this not get you that you need on the network?

>
> What I am saying,  in relation to your "Delivering a stable product"  com=
ment is that over time various industries have learned what it takes to "De=
liver a stable product".    We did not want to invest millions in these deb=
ugging networks.   But  we learned the hard way,  that it was necessary.
> I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,  no=
r of the banking industry at all,  but I certainly understand their perspec=
tive and am concerned about  the same unmanageable future they described.

Do  Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
>
> Thanks
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:noloader@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
> Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.co=
m> wrote:
>> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and has =
invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>>
>> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order of =
magnitude of folks using them"  will have good service.   If they do not,  =
they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany service calls or co=
mplaints.        I.E.     When these "Folks"  are slow or not working they =
are just as unhappy as we are.
>>
>
> Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stable p=
roduct at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to deliver=
 or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
>
> If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, then=
 it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't think t=
hat's the case here.
>
> Jeff
>
>
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential an=
d is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communic=
ation is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby no=
tified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this inform=
ation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or teleph=
one, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without maki=
ng any copies.
>
>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are=
 nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Blu=
e Shield Association.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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From: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>,  "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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>>
>> What I am saying,=C2=A0 in relation to your "Delivering a stable product=
"=C2=A0 comment is that over time various industries have learned what it t=
akes to "Deliver a stable product".=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We did not >>want to inves=
t millions in these debugging networks.=C2=A0 But=C2=A0 we learned the hard=
 way,=C2=A0 that it was necessary.
>> I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,=C2=
=A0 nor of the banking industry at all,=C2=A0 but I certainly understand th=
eir perspective and am concerned about=C2=A0 the same >>unmanageable future=
 they described.

>Do=C2=A0 Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
It would be very interesting to get the network diagnostic and operations p=
eople (rather than the architects) of the above companies involved in this =
conversation.
Also, you know, companies don't really enjoy spending money on network diag=
nostic products which might be considered overhead. =C2=A0 So, if they are,=
 we might do them the courtesy of not thinking that they are foolish to do =
so. =C2=A0=C2=A0
Why don't we listen to each other? =C2=A0 I know at IETF, I often hear that=
 we don't get enough operators to comment and give feedback. =C2=A0Well, he=
re you have some. =C2=A0It may be that these companies have problems that a=
re different from Google's (just as an example).
Isn't our goal to have the best standards possible? =C2=A0 Any organism (in=
cluding the IETF), needs feedback to thrive.
Nalini
>
> Thanks
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:noloader@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
> Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.co=
m> wrote:
>> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and has =
invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>>
>> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order of =
magnitude of folks using them"=C2=A0 will have good service.=C2=A0 If they =
do not,=C2=A0 they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany servi=
ce calls or complaints.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 I.E.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 When t=
hese "Folks"=C2=A0 are slow or not working they are just as unhappy as we a=
re.
>>
>
> Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stable p=
roduct at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to deliver=
 or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
>
> If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, then=
 it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't think t=
hat's the case here.
>
> Jeff
>
>
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential an=
d is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communic=
ation is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby no=
tified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this inform=
ation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or teleph=
one, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without maki=
ng any copies.
>
>=C2=A0 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michiga=
n are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross an=
d Blue Shield Association.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


  =20
------=_Part_413502_266268368.1474650126968
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html><head></head><body><div style=3D"color:#000; background-color:#fff; f=
ont-family:HelveticaNeue-Light, Helvetica Neue Light, Helvetica Neue, Helve=
tica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px"><div id=3D"yui_3_16_=
0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9763"><br></div><div class=3D"qtdSeparateBR"><br><br=
></div><div class=3D"yahoo_quoted" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_97=
72" style=3D"display: block;"><div style=3D"font-family: HelveticaNeue-Ligh=
t, Helvetica Neue Light, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, s=
ans-serif; font-size: 16px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9771"><d=
iv style=3D"font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, L=
ucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649=
067756_9770"><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649=
067756_9774">&gt;&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt;&gt; What I am saying,&nbsp; in=
 relation to your "Delivering a stable product"&nbsp; comment is that over =
time various industries have learned what it takes to "Deliver a stable pro=
duct".&nbsp; &nbsp; We did not &gt;&gt;want to invest millions in these deb=
ugging networks.&nbsp;  But&nbsp; we learned the hard way,&nbsp; that it wa=
s necessary.<br clear=3D"none">&gt;&gt; I am not a member of the banking co=
alition that started this subject,&nbsp; nor of the banking industry at all=
,&nbsp; but I certainly understand their perspective and am concerned about=
&nbsp; the same &gt;&gt;unmanageable future they described.<br clear=3D"non=
e"><br clear=3D"none">&gt;Do&nbsp; Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically =
not have these problems?</div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16=
_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774"><br></div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=
=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774">It would be very interesting to g=
et the network diagnostic and operations people (rather than the architects=
) of the above companies involved in this conversation.</div><div class=3D"=
y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774">Also=
, you know, companies don't really enjoy spending money on network diagnost=
ic products which might be considered overhead. &nbsp; So, if they are, we =
might do them the courtesy of not thinking that they are foolish to do so. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_14=
74649067756_9774"><br></div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0=
_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774" dir=3D"ltr">Why don't we listen to each other? =
&nbsp; I know at IETF, I often hear that we don't get enough operators to c=
omment and give feedback. &nbsp;Well, here you have some. &nbsp;It may be t=
hat these companies have problems that are different from Google's (just as=
 an example).</div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1=
474649067756_9774" dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=
=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774" dir=3D"ltr">Isn't our goal to hav=
e the best standards possible? &nbsp; Any organism (including the IETF), ne=
eds feedback to thrive.</div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_=
0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774" dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div class=3D"y_msg_cont=
ainer" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774" dir=3D"ltr">Nalini</div>=
<div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067756_9774">=
<br></div><div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1474649067=
756_9774">&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt; Thanks<br clear=3D"none">&gt;<br clea=
r=3D"none">&gt; Mike<br clear=3D"none">&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt;<br clear=
=3D"none">&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt; -----Original Message-----<br clear=
=3D"none">&gt; From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:<a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"ma=
ilto:noloader@gmail.com" href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com">noloader@gmail.=
com</a>]<br clear=3D"none">&gt; Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM<b=
r clear=3D"none">&gt; To: Ackermann, Michael &lt;<a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=
=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com" href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com">MAcke=
rmann@bcbsm.com</a>&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt; Cc: BITS Security &lt;<a sha=
pe=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org" href=3D"mailto=
:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;; <a s=
hape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">=
tls@ietf.org</a><br clear=3D"none">&gt; Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concern=
s about TLS 1.3<br clear=3D"none">&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt; On Fri, Sep 2=
3, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael &lt;<a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"ma=
ilto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com" href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com">MAckermann@=
bcbsm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br clear=3D"none">&gt;&gt; From the perspective an=
 Enterprise that runs these applications and has invested HEAVILY in the de=
bugging networks.........<br clear=3D"none">&gt;&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt;=
&gt; The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order o=
f magnitude of folks using them"&nbsp; will have good service.&nbsp;  If th=
ey do not,&nbsp; they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany se=
rvice calls or complaints.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; I.E.&nbsp; &nbsp;  Wh=
en these "Folks"&nbsp; are slow or not working they are just as unhappy as =
we are.<br clear=3D"none">&gt;&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt;<br clear=3D"none"=
>&gt; Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stab=
le product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to del=
iver or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).<br cl=
ear=3D"none">&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt; If all providers failed to deliver=
 or delivered an inferior product, then it might indicate a major course co=
rrection is needed. But I don't think that's the case here.<br clear=3D"non=
e">&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt; Jeff<br clear=3D"none">&gt;<br clear=3D"none=
">&gt;<br clear=3D"none">&gt; The information contained in this communicati=
on is highly confidential and is intended solely for the use of the individ=
ual(s) to whom this communication is directed. If you are not the intended =
recipient, you are hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or=
 distribution of this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, =
by electronic mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the o=
riginal message without making any copies.<br clear=3D"none">&gt;<br clear=
=3D"none">&gt;&nbsp; Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Netwo=
rk of Michigan are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the =
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association.<br clear=3D"none">&gt; ____________=
___________________________________<br clear=3D"none">&gt; TLS mailing list=
<br clear=3D"none">&gt; <a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" h=
ref=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br clear=3D"none">&gt; <a shap=
e=3D"rect" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br clear=3D"none"><br cl=
ear=3D"none"><br clear=3D"none"><br clear=3D"none">-- <br clear=3D"none">"M=
an is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".<br clear=3D"none">--Rouss=
eau.<div class=3D"yqt1576761033" id=3D"yqtfd52350"><br clear=3D"none"><br c=
lear=3D"none">_______________________________________________<br clear=3D"n=
one">TLS mailing list<br clear=3D"none"><a shape=3D"rect" ymailto=3D"mailto=
:TLS@ietf.org" href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br clear=3D"no=
ne"><a shape=3D"rect" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br clear=3D"n=
one"></div><br><br></div> </div> </div>  </div></div></body></html>
------=_Part_413502_266268368.1474650126968--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 10:37:43 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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--001a114d6f1cbe82e9053d303e84
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

A few observations:

+ TLS 1.3 is designed around the assumption that we are doing DH-style
  key establishment. There are good reasons for this, both in terms of
  protocol simplicity and in terms of establishing a baseline of
  strong modes (PFS, compatibility with standard uses of EC,
  etc.). Re-adding a key transport mode like TLS 1.2 static RSA would
  be extremely disruptive, even if it weren't being raised so late in
  the process. It's certainly not just a matter of changing some
  RFC 2119 language forbidding static RSA.

+ As several people have observed, there are several potential ways to
  build an equivalent capability that's compatible with TLS 1.3 as it
  currently is designed (see for instance Hugo Krawczyk's email [0])
  They would of course require a different interface between the
  monitoring appliance and the server (i.e., you would need to export
  a different kind of key and use it somewhat differently on the
  monitoring system), but it's not significantly less efficient.

-Ekr

[0] As well as his caveat about analysis being needed here.


On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 9:49 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
wrote:

> Without re stating the original message from the bank coalition,  which
> states this better than I could,   the client and MITM solutions are not
> practical in many situations.    Also they do not provide the scope, depth
> or detail that is utilized with today's solutions.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 11:44 AM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
> Cc: noloader@gmail.com; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
> wrote:
> >  I am not sure I understand what your reply means?
> >
> > Is it that we should create or even allow an environment to develop,
> where all providers of service cannot  provide effective diagnostics and
> support?   And then see the constituents of these industries collapse
> together.     And only then realize we have an issue?
> > I hope I am  not understanding correctly.     IETF is supposed to be
> looking ahead to provide better answers and circumvent predictable
> problems.    Not ignoring,  waiting and then reacting to negative
> situations that can and should be avoided.
>
> What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed out
> previously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
> connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.
> What information does this not get you that you need on the network?
>
> >
> > What I am saying,  in relation to your "Delivering a stable product"
> comment is that over time various industries have learned what it takes to
> "Deliver a stable product".    We did not want to invest millions in these
> debugging networks.   But  we learned the hard way,  that it was necessary.
> > I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,
> nor of the banking industry at all,  but I certainly understand their
> perspective and am concerned about  the same unmanageable future they
> described.
>
> Do  Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > Mike
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:noloader@gmail.com]
> > Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
> > To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
> > Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
> >
> > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael <
> MAckermann@bcbsm.com> wrote:
> >> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and has
> invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
> >>
> >> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order of
> magnitude of folks using them"  will have good service.   If they do not,
> they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany service calls or
> complaints.        I.E.     When these "Folks"  are slow or not working
> they are just as unhappy as we are.
> >>
> >
> > Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stable
> product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to
> deliver or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
> >
> > If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product,
> then it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't
> think that's the case here.
> >
> > Jeff
> >
> >
> > The information contained in this communication is highly confidential
> and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this
> communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are
> hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of
> this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic
> mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original
> message without making any copies.
> >
> >  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan
> are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and
> Blue Shield Association.
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
> --
> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
> --Rousseau.
>
>
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential and
> is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this
> communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are
> hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of
> this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic
> mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original
> message without making any copies.
>
>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are
> nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue
> Shield Association.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a114d6f1cbe82e9053d303e84
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>A few observations:</div><div><br></div><div>+ TLS 1.=
3 is designed around the assumption that we are doing DH-style</div><div>=
=C2=A0 key establishment. There are good reasons for this, both in terms of=
</div><div>=C2=A0 protocol simplicity and in terms of establishing a baseli=
ne of</div><div>=C2=A0 strong modes (PFS, compatibility with standard uses =
of EC,</div><div>=C2=A0 etc.). Re-adding a key transport mode like TLS 1.2 =
static RSA would</div><div>=C2=A0 be extremely disruptive, even if it weren=
&#39;t being raised so late in</div><div>=C2=A0 the process. It&#39;s certa=
inly not just a matter of changing some</div><div>=C2=A0 RFC 2119 language =
forbidding static RSA.</div><div><br></div><div>+ As several people have ob=
served, there are several potential ways to</div><div>=C2=A0 build an equiv=
alent capability that&#39;s compatible with TLS 1.3 as it</div><div>=C2=A0 =
currently is designed (see for instance Hugo Krawczyk&#39;s email [0])</div=
><div>=C2=A0 They would of course require a different interface between the=
</div><div>=C2=A0 monitoring appliance and the server (i.e., you would need=
 to export</div><div>=C2=A0 a different kind of key and use it somewhat dif=
ferently on the</div><div>=C2=A0 monitoring system), but it&#39;s not signi=
ficantly less efficient.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div>=
<div>[0] As well as his caveat about analysis being needed here.</div><div>=
<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">O=
n Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 9:49 AM, Ackermann, Michael <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com" target=3D"_blank">MAckermann@bcbsm.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Without re statin=
g the original message from the bank coalition,=C2=A0 which states this bet=
ter than I could,=C2=A0 =C2=A0the client and MITM solutions are not practic=
al in many situations.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Also they do not provide the scope, dep=
th or detail that is utilized with today&#39;s solutions.<br>
<span class=3D"im HOEnZb"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Watson Ladd [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com">watsonbl=
add@gmail.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 11:44 AM<br>
To: Ackermann, Michael &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com">MAckerma=
nn@bcbsm.com</a>&gt;<br>
</span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:noload=
er@gmail.com">noloader@gmail.com</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@i=
etf.org</a><br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Ackermann, Michael &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:M=
Ackermann@bcbsm.com">MAckermann@bcbsm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 I am not sure I understand what your reply means?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Is it that we should create or even allow an environment to develop,=
=C2=A0 where all providers of service cannot=C2=A0 provide effective diagno=
stics and support?=C2=A0 =C2=A0And then see the constituents of these indus=
tries collapse together.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0And only then realize we have a=
n issue?<br>
&gt; I hope I am=C2=A0 not understanding correctly.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0IETF=
 is supposed to be looking ahead to provide better answers and circumvent p=
redictable problems.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Not ignoring,=C2=A0 waiting and then reac=
ting to negative situations that can and should be avoided.<br>
<br>
What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I&#39;ve pointed out=
 previously one can still log the contents of TLS protected<br>
connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.<br>
What information does this not get you that you need on the network?<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; What I am saying,=C2=A0 in relation to your &quot;Delivering a stable =
product&quot;=C2=A0 comment is that over time various industries have learn=
ed what it takes to &quot;Deliver a stable product&quot;.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We d=
id not want to invest millions in these debugging networks.=C2=A0 =C2=A0But=
=C2=A0 we learned the hard way,=C2=A0 that it was necessary.<br>
&gt; I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,=
=C2=A0 nor of the banking industry at all,=C2=A0 but I certainly understand=
 their perspective and am concerned about=C2=A0 the same unmanageable futur=
e they described.<br>
<br>
Do=C2=A0 Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Mike<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com">nol=
oader@gmail.com</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM<br>
&gt; To: Ackermann, Michael &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com">MAc=
kermann@bcbsm.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Cc: BITS Security &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org"=
>BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a><wbr>&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org=
">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com">MAckermann@bcbsm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications an=
d has invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; The reason we are debugging these networks is so that &quot;The 5-=
6 order of magnitude of folks using them&quot;=C2=A0 will have good service=
.=C2=A0 =C2=A0If they do not,=C2=A0 they will consider competitors and/or g=
enerate a litany service calls or complaints.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 I.=
E.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0When these &quot;Folks&quot;=C2=A0 are slow or not wo=
rking they are just as unhappy as we are.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Isn&#39;t that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a s=
table product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to =
deliver or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).<br=
>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, t=
hen it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don&#39;t =
think that&#39;s the case here.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Jeff<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The information contained in this communication is highly confidential=
 and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this commu=
nication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby=
 notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this inf=
ormation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or tel=
ephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without m=
aking any copies.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Mich=
igan are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross=
 and Blue Shield Association.<br>
&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
--<br>
&quot;Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains&quot;.<br>
--Rousseau.<br>
<br>
<br>
The information contained in this communication is highly confidential and =
is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communicat=
ion is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby noti=
fied that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this informat=
ion is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or telephon=
e, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without making=
 any copies.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan =
are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and =
Blue Shield Association.<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114d6f1cbe82e9053d303e84--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com" <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed out p=
reviously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
> connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.
> What information does this not get you that you need on the network?

For enterprises using Content Delivery Networks, the TLS session from the b=
rowser ends at the edge server in the Content Delivery Network.  The sessio=
n that the enterprise sees is completely different: different IP's and port=
s, different TLS session, different application layer content because of ca=
ching, different network behavior (like packet drops and retransmissions). =
 If some infrastructure component in the data center is causing a problem, =
a trace on the browser side is blind to that.  An additional problem is tha=
t Microsoft does not allow logging of ephemeral keys in their browser.=20

Likewise endpoint logging in the data center often does not provide adequat=
e data to isolate the fault domain and/or the root cause of a problem.  Log=
s tell you that an event happened but not why it happened or which infrastr=
ucture component was the cause of the problem. For example, a log may indic=
ate that a call was made that either didn't get answered or received a slow=
 answer, but there could be ten infrastructure components between the serve=
r that made the call and the destination server that is supposed to answer.=
  =20

>From the time a packet enters a data center, it is travelling through route=
rs, switches, firewalls, load balancers, web servers, app servers, middlewa=
re servers, and possibly hitting a mainframe, all TLS encrypted for many en=
terprises.  Frequently, source and destination IP's are NAT'ed multiple tim=
es, so there is no visible relationship between the packet that enters the =
data center and the same call at deeper layers of the infrastructure.  Any =
one of these infrastructure nodes could be the cause of a problem.  The way=
 to isolate the fault domain of a problem is to take a packet trace at each=
 tier of the application infrastructure and look at the application layer d=
ata in a decrypted trace in order to find the transaction that is failing.=
=20

Large enterprises have built up robust out-of-band packet capture infrastru=
ctures in order to provide better network and application layer visibility =
than what logs provide.  Packet brokers and sniffers can handle 10 Gbits/se=
c. line rate or more of traffic, including write to disk at 20 Gbits/sec. o=
r more.  This is needed because when IP's are NAT'ed, you have to trace eve=
rything in and out of a particular server and then decrypt in order to find=
 the transaction of interest.  Some endpoints and/or infrastructure compone=
nts have packet capture capability, but most are not robust enough to handl=
e this kind of packet capture load in a busy production environment.=20

There can be twenty or more layers to a large application, all TLS encrypte=
d, that need to be inspected for troubleshooting, and replacing this with M=
ITM infrastructure is not scalable.  Likewise, there can be hundreds of phy=
sical network taps feeding security monitoring tools like IDS/IPS, malware =
detection, and fraud monitoring.  Threats are coming not just from the Inte=
rnet, but also from internal or 3rd party machines that have been compromis=
ed and then start reconnaissance from a wide variety of locations.  Large e=
nterprises also have complex virtual environments which can be running TLS =
between VM's.  There is no scalable way to intercept VM to VM TLS that neve=
r leaves the virtual server.

--Andrew


-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 11:44 AM
To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com> =
wrote:
>  I am not sure I understand what your reply means?
>
> Is it that we should create or even allow an environment to develop,  whe=
re all providers of service cannot  provide effective diagnostics and suppo=
rt?   And then see the constituents of these industries collapse together. =
    And only then realize we have an issue?
> I hope I am  not understanding correctly.     IETF is supposed to be look=
ing ahead to provide better answers and circumvent predictable problems.   =
 Not ignoring,  waiting and then reacting to negative situations that can a=
nd should be avoided.

What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed out pre=
viously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.
What information does this not get you that you need on the network?

>
> What I am saying,  in relation to your "Delivering a stable product"  com=
ment is that over time various industries have learned what it takes to "De=
liver a stable product".    We did not want to invest millions in these deb=
ugging networks.   But  we learned the hard way,  that it was necessary.
> I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,  no=
r of the banking industry at all,  but I certainly understand their perspec=
tive and am concerned about  the same unmanageable future they described.

Do  Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
>
> Thanks
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:noloader@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
> Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.co=
m> wrote:
>> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and has =
invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>>
>> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order of =
magnitude of folks using them"  will have good service.   If they do not,  =
they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany service calls or co=
mplaints.        I.E.     When these "Folks"  are slow or not working they =
are just as unhappy as we are.
>>
>
> Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stable p=
roduct at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to deliver=
 or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
>
> If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, then=
 it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't think t=
hat's the case here.
>
> Jeff
>
>
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential an=
d is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communic=
ation is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby no=
tified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this inform=
ation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or teleph=
one, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without maki=
ng any copies.
>
>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are=
 nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Blu=
e Shield Association.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 15:37:05 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> Look, pretty much the entire world is being spied on by national-scale ad=
versaries who are recording all traffic for eventual decryption and correla=
tion.  *Almost everyone* is having their traffic surveilled. The problems o=
f debugging a set of enterprise apps doesn=E2=80=99t amount to a hill of be=
ans in that world. It just doesn't. Same for a particular industry's regula=
tory requirements.
>

+1, this and what follows is why its important to me.

Years ago I worked with a Vietnamese fellow named Say Ok. We had a
shared locker room, and I noticed Say had six or eight scars on his
chest and abdomen, so I asked what they were. They were the scars from
the bullet holes when the North Vietnamese tried to murder him because
he wanted a democracy and better life for his children.

I can't even talk about some of the obscene things I know are going on
in some US DoD programs. I'm hoping/waiting for Glenn Greenwald, Laura
Poitras and Ewen MacAskill to break those stories.

Jeff


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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 22:43:46 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:42:09AM +0000, Nick Sullivan wrote:
> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I'd like to propose a small to the Certificate message format to allow for
> future extensibility of the protocol.
> 
> This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate message. With this
> change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension messages that
> are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). This change
> also resolves the anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in
> the handshake.
> 
> Reasoning:
> I've come to the conclusion that the current mechanism in TLS 1.3 for OCSP
> and SCT is lacking forsight. OCSP and SCT are per-certificate metadata, not
> per-connection metadata. By putting these responses in the
> EncryptedExtensions, you limit these extensions to being shown once per
> connection. This restricts future protocol extensions from using multiple
> Certificate messages to support multiple certificates on the same
> connection. An example of this is the post-handshake authentication
> proposal (
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sullivan-tls-post-handshake-auth-00),
> which currently requires a modified post-handshake Certificate message.
> This proposed change would simplify the post-handshake auth proposal
> significantly and generally make more sense as more certificate-specific
> extensions are created.

Also, this would presumably solve the user_mapping problem without
introducing a new handshake message. Basically, there is extension
user_mapping, that wants to send some certificate-associated auxillary
data from client to server. Currnently, there is no place to put such
data.

And yeah, with post-handshake auth, it looks like one would want a lot
more flexibility than currently exists.


BTW: I would rather dump the current post-handshake auth for such
extension proposal. The current post-handshake authentication is just
plain annoying to implement in contexts where the client has no
intention of ever supporting it.

And the current post-handshake auth mechanism seems to be insufficient
for real-world uses too...

I recently got an idea of implementing freezing session state into
octet stream and being able to thaw such. I quickly discovered I
can't implement that without either having freezable hashes (which I
don't have available) or just saying screw it with post-handshake auth
and never responding to the requests, even to reject them.



-Ilari


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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This seems like a reasonable direction.

-Ekr


On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
wrote:

> This suggestion makes sense to me.
>
> Both the SCT and OCSP v2 extension allow for multiple objects in order to
> cover multiple certificates in a chain, but your suggestion makes the
> grouping much more explicit and obviates the need for OCSPv2. I'd
> definitely consider a modification like this.
>
> Nick
>
> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:17 PM Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:
>
>> Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654
>>>
>>
>>> This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate message. With
>>> this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension messages
>>> that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). This
>>> change also resolves the anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before
>>> certificates in the handshake.
>>>
>>
>> There are two ways that such a thing could be done. How your proposal
>> suggests:
>>
>>     opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
>>     struct {
>>         opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
>>         ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
>>         Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>>     } Certificate;
>>
>> or:
>>
>>     opaque ASN1CertData<1..2^24-1>;
>>     struct {
>>         ASN1CertData cert_data;
>>         Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>>     }
>>
>>     struct {
>>         opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
>>         ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
>>     } Certificate;
>>
>> I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP response are
>> per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chain, so to
>> me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its own
>> extension list, makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing the
>> proposal to the second form?
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Brian
>> --
>> https://briansmith.org/
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">This seems like a reasonable direction.<div><br></div><div=
>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Nick Sullivan <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">This suggestion makes sense to me.<br><br>Both the SCT and OC=
SP v2 extension allow for multiple objects in order to cover multiple certi=
ficates in a chain, but your suggestion makes the grouping much more explic=
it and obviates the need for OCSPv2. I&#39;d definitely consider a modifica=
tion like this.<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br><br>Nick<=
/font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:17 PM Brian Smith &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:brian@briansmith.org" target=3D"_blank">brian@briansmith.o=
rg</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Nick Sullivan <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com" target=3D"_bl=
ank">nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-=
left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid">=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);text-tra=
nsform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:&quot;helveti=
ca neue&quot;,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;font-style:normal;f=
ont-weight:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">PR:<span>=C2=A0</span></span><a hre=
f=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//github.com/tlswg/<wbr>tls13-spec/pull/654</a><br></div></div></div></div>=
</blockquote></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);bor=
der-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><br>=
This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate message. With=20
this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension=20
messages that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). T=
his change also resolves the=20
anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in the handshake.<br=
></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:r=
gb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There are two ways t=
hat such a thing could be done. How your proposal suggests:</div><div><br><=
/div><div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1Cert&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;</div>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 opaque certificate_request_context&lt;0.<wbr>.2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1=
&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&l=
t;0..2^16-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>or:</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1CertDa=
ta&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1CertData cert_data;</div><div>=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&g=
t;; </div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 }</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque =
certificate_request_context&lt;0.<wbr>.2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1&gt;;=C2=A0<br>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub=
><sup></sup><strike></strike></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_quote">I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP res=
ponse are per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chai=
n, so to me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its o=
wn extension list,=C2=A0makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing=
 the proposal to the second form?<br clear=3D"all"></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Cheers,</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote">Brian<br>-- <br></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div><a href=3D"https://briansmith.org/" target=3D"_blank">https://bri=
ansmith.org/</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div>
</div></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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>> What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed
>> out previously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
>> connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting
>> proxy. What information does this not get you that you need on the
>> network?
>
> For enterprises using Content Delivery Networks, the TLS session from
> the browser ends at the edge server in the Content Delivery Network.
> The session that the enterprise sees is completely different:
> different IP's and ports, different TLS session, different
> application layer content because of caching, different network
> behavior (like packet drops and retransmissions).  If some
> infrastructure component in the data center is causing a problem, a
> trace on the browser side is blind to that.  An additional problem is
> that Microsoft does not allow logging of ephemeral keys in their
> browser.
>
[...]
>> From the time a packet enters a data center, it is travelling
>> through routers, switches, firewalls, load balancers, web servers,
>> app servers, middleware servers, and possibly hitting a mainframe,
>> all TLS encrypted for many enterprises.  Frequently, source and
>> destination IP's are NAT'ed multiple times, so there is no visible
>> relationship between the packet that enters the data center and the
>> same call at deeper layers of the infrastructure.  Any one of these
>> infrastructure nodes could be the cause of a problem.  The way to
>> isolate the fault domain of a problem is to take a packet trace at
>> each tier of the application infrastructure and look at the
>> application layer data in a decrypted trace in order to find the
>> transaction that is failing.
>

You are implicitly suggesting to remove perfect-forward-secrecy as soon 
as a TLS flow is created by the CDN. However these packets will still be 
traveling over the public Internet and/or "private" (leased, not really 
private) MPLS VPNs, where we KNOW that government agencies are 
eavesdropping and recording network flows to keep for years ahead. In 
other words, even when the TLS flow enters "your" network, you and your 
customer are still at risk from pervasive monitoring.

Thanks,
	Yaron


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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 13:14:42 -0700
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To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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--001a113ef4bef8667e053d326e24
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

I work in the payments industry, but I am not speaking on behalf of my
employer.

I would like to note that if the approaches outlined in the "BITS Security"
post are the preferred ones for the companies they represent, those
companies have made a huge strategic blunder and should correct those
strategic blunders rather than requiring last-minute major design overhauls
to TLS 1.3 which would weaken its security.

+1000 Kenny Patterson's comments.

On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 10:19 AM, BITS Security <
BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:

> -  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive
> network visibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key
> exchange.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed
> and functioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a
> network traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.  In the
> case of monitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the
> monitoring function to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing
> on deliberate circumvention - because in the supervision use case the
> threat vector is the possessor of the endpoint.
>

I strongly disagree. Endpoint security is paramount, and some sort of
network MitM system is absolutely not a replacement for endpoint agents. I
would highly suggest deploying agents on your endpoints. If you don't have
endpoint security, all is lost. I would suggest performing multiple
security checks regularly on all endpoints throughout your enterprise.

Modern endpoint agents can work at a level much higher than TLS network
packets (i.e. total memory inspection with kernel-level agents). MitMing
traffic in lieu of deploying an endpoint agent only provides monitoring of
"compliant" packet streams, which are unlikely to be used by either
attackers or insider threats. I'm not saying it's bad to run NIDS or a
rolling packet capture system, these are both great, but again, neither are
a replacement for an endpoint agent.

Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee
> supervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively as
> internet MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of our
> members, are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call until a
> workable and scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultimately
> adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.


If you're relying on MitMing S2S traffic for debugging a payment stack, it
sounds like your payment stack is opaque to you, which is not only a
concern for security, but the general reliable operation of your payment
stack as a whole. As a general recommendation, I would suggest building out
debugging facilities for your payment stack so you know it actually works,
and don't have to lean on crutches like MitMing traffic for debugging
purposes.

While such a crutch may in the short-term make debugging appear easier, it
also assists a patient attacker with internal network access who is
passively capturing traffic before attempting to obtain a decryption key
which would expose payment credentials e.g. cardholder info/PANs, ACH
account numbers, etc.

tl;dr: your suggestions would harm the security of more "forward thinking"
payments companies. Again, my personal opinion, not that of my employer.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

--001a113ef4bef8667e053d326e24
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">I wo=
rk in the payments industry, but I am not speaking on behalf of my employer=
.</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">I wo=
uld like to note that if the approaches outlined in the &quot;BITS Security=
&quot; post are the preferred ones for the companies they represent, those =
companies have made a huge strategic blunder and should correct those strat=
egic blunders rather than requiring last-minute major design overhauls to T=
LS 1.3 which would weaken its security.</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">+1000 Kenny Patterson&#39;s comments.</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, S=
ep 22, 2016 at 10:19 AM, BITS Security <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org" target=3D"_blank">BITSSecurity@fsroundta=
ble.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">-=C2=A0 End=
 point monitoring: This technique does not replace the pervasive network vi=
sibility that private enterprises will lose without the RSA key exchange.=
=C2=A0 Ensuring that every endpoint has a monitoring agent installed and fu=
nctioning at all times is vastly more complex than ensuring that a network =
traffic inspection appliance is present and functioning.=C2=A0 In the case =
of monitoring of supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring =
function to the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberat=
e circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector is =
the possessor of the endpoint.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I strong=
ly disagree. Endpoint security is paramount, and some sort of network MitM =
system is absolutely not a replacement for endpoint agents. I would highly =
suggest deploying agents on your endpoints. If you don&#39;t have endpoint =
security, all is lost. I would suggest performing multiple security checks =
regularly on all endpoints throughout your enterprise.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>Modern endpoint agents can work at a level much higher than TLS networ=
k packets (i.e. total memory inspection with kernel-level agents). MitMing =
traffic in lieu of deploying an endpoint agent only provides monitoring of =
&quot;compliant&quot; packet streams, which are unlikely to be used by eith=
er attackers or insider threats. I&#39;m not saying it&#39;s bad to run NID=
S or a rolling packet capture system, these are both great, but again, neit=
her are a replacement for an endpoint agent.</div><div><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex">Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise sec=
urity, employee supervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as e=
ffectively as internet MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on beha=
lf of our members, are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call =
until a workable and scalable solution is identified and vetted, and ultima=
tely adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.</blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>If you&#39;re relying on MitMing S2S traffic for debuggin=
g a payment stack, it sounds like your payment stack is opaque to you, whic=
h is not only a concern for security, but the general reliable operation of=
 your payment stack as a whole. As a general recommendation, I would sugges=
t building out debugging facilities for your payment stack so you know it a=
ctually works, and don&#39;t have to lean on crutches like MitMing traffic =
for debugging purposes.</div><div><br></div><div>While such a crutch may in=
 the short-term make debugging appear easier, it also assists a patient att=
acker with internal network access who is passively capturing traffic befor=
e attempting to obtain a decryption key which would expose payment credenti=
als e.g. cardholder info/PANs, ACH account numbers, etc.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>tl;dr: your suggestions would harm the security of more &quot;forwar=
d thinking&quot; payments companies. Again, my personal opinion, not that o=
f my employer.</div><div><br></div></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signatu=
re" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div>
</div></div>

--001a113ef4bef8667e053d326e24--


From nobody Fri Sep 23 13:24:33 2016
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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 23:24:24 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 05:19:48PM +0000, BITS Security wrote:
> To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members
>
> Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant
> problems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running
> TLS internally and have significant, security-critical investments in
> out-of-band TLS decryption. 

It is not merely deprecated, the whole TLS 1.3 design assumes DH-like
key exchange, which RSA key exchange isn't. It has been this way from
the earliest designs, which were over 2 years ago.

If you are thinking you can have static RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3, you
are just plain wasting your time. There will not be static RSA in TLS
1.3. No matter how much "inconvience" you claim that causes.



Also, security protocol design is hard enough without backdoors. Try to
add those and everything will just come apart. In way that lets the "bad
guys" (however you define those) to waltz in.


-Ilari


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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com" <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 23:40:22 +0300
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References: <DM5PR11MB1419B782D2BEF0E0A35E420DF4C90@DM5PR11MB1419.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> <CO1PR07MB283F2C414B6478E993675DEC3C90@CO1PR07MB283.namprd07.prod.outlook.com> <394611bf-208f-03d3-620c-79aaf169645b@cs.tcd.ie> <4FC37E442D05A748896589E468752CAA0DBC66AE@PWN401EA120.ent.corp.bcbsm.com> <CAH8yC8kgYzYXwJ01NkK7WYxD-diponWEQOd+MNHssm+bLHE54w@mail.gmail.com> <4FC37E442D05A748896589E468752CAA0DBC699B@PWN401EA120.ent.corp.bcbsm.com> <CACsn0c=5vjzQmr=ah6sH1JzTj3peaKad7aCPertcqD4B2DLKiA@mail.gmail.com> <72011214.413503.1474650126973@mail.yahoo.com> <e24a06b8d0d04ccc80b9a55d83bf5606@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
To: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> On 23 Sep 2016, at 10:08 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Look, pretty much the entire world is being spied on by national-scale =
adversaries who are recording all traffic for eventual decryption and =
correlation.  *Almost everyone* is having their traffic surveilled. The =
problems of debugging a set of enterprise apps doesn=E2=80=99t amount to =
a hill of beans in that world. It just doesn't. Same for a particular =
industry's regulatory requirements.=20

+1

And if almost everyone is having the traffic surveilled, you can bet =
that the financial industry in every country is definitely being =
surveilled. Probably by multiple agencies from multiple countries.

Yoav=


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 13:43:15 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBNCoB6hd-c-x8tzT3k7ZFKs85NS04Fs-_CO+U4YZ-WjQg@mail.gmail.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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--001a113eac7c428ab6053d32d600
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Andrew,

What would probably be most helpful here would be if you tried to describe
what you think your requirements are in some sort of protocol-neutral
fashion.

-Ekr


On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 1:31 PM, BITS Security <
BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:

> Rich (et al.) -- I understand where you are coming from but I will poke a
> little bit at this portrayal.
>
> We are not here hat-in-hand asking for a return to RSA key exchange to th=
e
> proposed standard.  We do however want to raise our concern (and hopefull=
y
> your awareness) of what appears to be an unintended consequence of the mo=
ve
> to PFS-only choices.
>
> What is happening from our perspective is choice is being removed and an
> adequate replacement has (seemingly) not been identified.  This lack of
> choice may not affect everyone and every use-case but it will predictably
> affect large, complex, highly regulated enterprises in a serious manner.
> This is a classic case of security requirement being in conflict with a
> different security requirement.
>
> IETF protocols are run extensively both on the public Internet and within
> private enterprises.  Any decisions made by the TLS Working Group will
> affect both environments, and the needs and requirements of both
> environments should be considered.
>
> -Andrew
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:08 PM
> To: nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
>
> > It would be very interesting to get the network diagnostic and
> operations people (rather than the architects) of the above companies
> involved in this conversation.
>
> Nothing has ever stopped them.  Never. Participation is as simple as
> joining a mailing list.  The IETF has been doing SSL and TLS for nearly 2=
0
> years.  It is not a secret.  It was incumbent on them to reach out and ge=
t
> involved.
>
> > Why don't we listen to each other?   I know at IETF, I often hear that
> we don't get enough operators to comment and give feedback.  Well, here y=
ou
> have some.  It may be that these companies have problems that are differe=
nt
> from Google's (just as an example).
>
> Don't try to equate "listen to each other" with "meet my requirement."
> The message has been stated, very clearly, from individuals, WG members,
> through document editors and WG chairs and up to Security Directors:
> static RSA is not coming back to TLS 1.3 .  Since before the last IETF th=
is
> was the message, consistently.  So perhaps you should answer the question
> first -- why aren't *you* listening? :)
>
> PFS is also possible in TLS 1.1 and later.  What does, say USBank, do to
> prevent PFS in their existing deployment?  Why won't additional controls =
to
> prevent TLS 1.3 and its mandatory PFS be expected to work here as well?  =
So
> far all I've seen is "maybe there's bugs in TLS 1.2 and we'll be forced t=
o
> move to TLS 1.3"  Shrug.  There are bugs everywhere.   Maybe there's bugs
> in TLS 1.3 too.
>
> Look, pretty much the entire world is being spied on by national-scale
> adversaries who are recording all traffic for eventual decryption and
> correlation.  *Almost everyone* is having their traffic surveilled. The
> problems of debugging a set of enterprise apps doesn=E2=80=99t amount to =
a hill of
> beans in that world. It just doesn't. Same for a particular industry's
> regulatory requirements.
>
> > Isn't our goal to have the best standards possible?   Any organism
> (including the IETF), needs feedback to thrive.
>
> Oxygen, coke, and cookies too.
>
> --
> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
> IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz ______________________________
> _________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a113eac7c428ab6053d32d600
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Andrew,<div><br></div><div>What would probably be most hel=
pful here would be if you tried to describe what you think your requirement=
s are in some sort of protocol-neutral fashion.</div><div><br></div><div>-E=
kr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 1:31 PM, BITS Security <span dir=3D"ltr=
">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org" target=3D"_blank">BI=
TSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex">Rich (et al.) -- I understand where you are coming from but I will=
 poke a little bit at this portrayal.<br>
<br>
We are not here hat-in-hand asking for a return to RSA key exchange to the =
proposed standard.=C2=A0 We do however want to raise our concern (and hopef=
ully your awareness) of what appears to be an unintended consequence of the=
 move to PFS-only choices.<br>
<br>
What is happening from our perspective is choice is being removed and an ad=
equate replacement has (seemingly) not been identified.=C2=A0 This lack of =
choice may not affect everyone and every use-case but it will predictably a=
ffect large, complex, highly regulated enterprises in a serious manner.=C2=
=A0 This is a classic case of security requirement being in conflict with a=
 different security requirement.<br>
<br>
IETF protocols are run extensively both on the public Internet and within p=
rivate enterprises.=C2=A0 Any decisions made by the TLS Working Group will =
affect both environments, and the needs and requirements of both environmen=
ts should be considered.<br>
<br>
-Andrew<br>
<span class=3D"im HOEnZb"><br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: TLS [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">tls-bounces@ietf.=
org</a>] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich<br>
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:08 PM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com">nalini.elkins@insid=
ethestack.<wbr>com</a><br>
Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
<br>
</span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">&gt; It would be very intere=
sting to get the network diagnostic and operations people (rather than the =
architects) of the above companies involved in this conversation.<br>
<br>
Nothing has ever stopped them.=C2=A0 Never. Participation is as simple as j=
oining a mailing list.=C2=A0 The IETF has been doing SSL and TLS for nearly=
 20 years.=C2=A0 It is not a secret.=C2=A0 It was incumbent on them to reac=
h out and get involved.<br>
<br>
&gt; Why don&#39;t we listen to each other? =C2=A0 I know at IETF, I often =
hear that we don&#39;t get enough operators to comment and give feedback.=
=C2=A0 Well, here you have some.=C2=A0 It may be that these companies have =
problems that are different from Google&#39;s (just as an example).<br>
<br>
Don&#39;t try to equate &quot;listen to each other&quot; with &quot;meet my=
 requirement.&quot;=C2=A0 The message has been stated, very clearly, from i=
ndividuals, WG members, through document editors and WG chairs and up to Se=
curity Directors:=C2=A0 static RSA is not coming back to TLS 1.3 .=C2=A0 Si=
nce before the last IETF this was the message, consistently.=C2=A0 So perha=
ps you should answer the question first -- why aren&#39;t *you* listening? =
:)<br>
<br>
PFS is also possible in TLS 1.1 and later.=C2=A0 What does, say USBank, do =
to prevent PFS in their existing deployment?=C2=A0 Why won&#39;t additional=
 controls to prevent TLS 1.3 and its mandatory PFS be expected to work here=
 as well?=C2=A0 So far all I&#39;ve seen is &quot;maybe there&#39;s bugs in=
 TLS 1.2 and we&#39;ll be forced to move to TLS 1.3&quot;=C2=A0 Shrug.=C2=
=A0 There are bugs everywhere.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Maybe there&#39;s bugs in TLS 1.=
3 too.<br>
<br>
Look, pretty much the entire world is being spied on by national-scale adve=
rsaries who are recording all traffic for eventual decryption and correlati=
on.=C2=A0 *Almost everyone* is having their traffic surveilled. The problem=
s of debugging a set of enterprise apps doesn=E2=80=99t amount to a hill of=
 beans in that world. It just doesn&#39;t. Same for a particular industry&#=
39;s regulatory requirements.<br>
<br>
&gt; Isn&#39;t our goal to have the best standards possible? =C2=A0 Any org=
anism (including the IETF), needs feedback to thrive.<br>
<br>
Oxygen, coke, and cookies too.<br>
<br>
--<br>
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies<br>
IM: <a href=3D"mailto:richsalz@jabber.at">richsalz@jabber.at</a> Twitter: R=
ichSalz ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113eac7c428ab6053d32d600--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com" <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
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From: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com" <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Andrew,



I don=92t understand why your =93choice is being removed=94, because you ca=
n keep using TLS1.2 in your internal network, can=92t you?



Best,

Xiaoyin



From: BITS Security<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Salz, Rich<mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>; nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com<m=
ailto:nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3



Rich (et al.) -- I understand where you are coming from but I will poke a l=
ittle bit at this portrayal.

We are not here hat-in-hand asking for a return to RSA key exchange to the =
proposed standard.  We do however want to raise our concern (and hopefully =
your awareness) of what appears to be an unintended consequence of the move=
 to PFS-only choices.

What is happening from our perspective is choice is being removed and an ad=
equate replacement has (seemingly) not been identified.  This lack of choic=
e may not affect everyone and every use-case but it will predictably affect=
 large, complex, highly regulated enterprises in a serious manner.  This is=
 a classic case of security requirement being in conflict with a different =
security requirement.

IETF protocols are run extensively both on the public Internet and within p=
rivate enterprises.  Any decisions made by the TLS Working Group will affec=
t both environments, and the needs and requirements of both environments sh=
ould be considered.

-Andrew


-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:08 PM
To: nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3


> It would be very interesting to get the network diagnostic and operations=
 people (rather than the architects) of the above companies involved in thi=
s conversation.

Nothing has ever stopped them.  Never. Participation is as simple as joinin=
g a mailing list.  The IETF has been doing SSL and TLS for nearly 20 years.=
  It is not a secret.  It was incumbent on them to reach out and get involv=
ed.

> Why don't we listen to each other?   I know at IETF, I often hear that we=
 don't get enough operators to comment and give feedback.  Well, here you h=
ave some.  It may be that these companies have problems that are different =
from Google's (just as an example).

Don't try to equate "listen to each other" with "meet my requirement."  The=
 message has been stated, very clearly, from individuals, WG members, throu=
gh document editors and WG chairs and up to Security Directors:  static RSA=
 is not coming back to TLS 1.3 .  Since before the last IETF this was the m=
essage, consistently.  So perhaps you should answer the question first -- w=
hy aren't *you* listening? :)

PFS is also possible in TLS 1.1 and later.  What does, say USBank, do to pr=
event PFS in their existing deployment?  Why won't additional controls to p=
revent TLS 1.3 and its mandatory PFS be expected to work here as well?  So =
far all I've seen is "maybe there's bugs in TLS 1.2 and we'll be forced to =
move to TLS 1.3"  Shrug.  There are bugs everywhere.   Maybe there's bugs i=
n TLS 1.3 too.

Look, pretty much the entire world is being spied on by national-scale adve=
rsaries who are recording all traffic for eventual decryption and correlati=
on.  *Almost everyone* is having their traffic surveilled. The problems of =
debugging a set of enterprise apps doesn=92t amount to a hill of beans in t=
hat world. It just doesn't. Same for a particular industry's regulatory req=
uirements.

> Isn't our goal to have the best standards possible?   Any organism (inclu=
ding the IETF), needs feedback to thrive.

Oxygen, coke, and cookies too.

--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz __________________________________=
_____________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Andrew,</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">I don=92t understand why your =93choice is being r=
emoved=94, because you can keep using TLS1.2 in your internal network, can=
=92t you?</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Best,</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Xiaoyin</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">&nbsp;</span></p>
<div style=3D"border:none; border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt; padding:3.0pt 0i=
n 0in 0in">
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal" style=3D"border:none; padding:0in"><b>From: </b><a=
 href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITS Security</a><br>
<b>Sent: </b>Friday, September 23, 2016 4:31 PM<br>
<b>To: </b><a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">Salz, Rich</a>; <a href=3D"m=
ailto:nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com">
nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com</a><br>
<b>Cc: </b><a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3</p>
</div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">&nbsp;</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;">
<div class=3D"PlainText">Rich (et al.) -- I understand where you are coming=
 from but I will poke a little bit at this portrayal.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
We are not here hat-in-hand asking for a return to RSA key exchange to the =
proposed standard.&nbsp; We do however want to raise our concern (and hopef=
ully your awareness) of what appears to be an unintended consequence of the=
 move to PFS-only choices.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
What is happening from our perspective is choice is being removed and an ad=
equate replacement has (seemingly) not been identified.&nbsp; This lack of =
choice may not affect everyone and every use-case but it will predictably a=
ffect large, complex, highly regulated
 enterprises in a serious manner.&nbsp; This is a classic case of security =
requirement being in conflict with a different security requirement.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
IETF protocols are run extensively both on the public Internet and within p=
rivate enterprises.&nbsp; Any decisions made by the TLS Working Group will =
affect both environments, and the needs and requirements of both environmen=
ts should be considered.<br>
<br>
-Andrew<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: TLS [<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.=
org</a>] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich<br>
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:08 PM<br>
To: nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com<br>
Cc: tls@ietf.org<br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; It would be very interesting to get the network diagnostic and operati=
ons people (rather than the architects) of the above companies involved in =
this conversation.<br>
<br>
Nothing has ever stopped them.&nbsp; Never. Participation is as simple as j=
oining a mailing list.&nbsp; The IETF has been doing SSL and TLS for nearly=
 20 years.&nbsp; It is not a secret.&nbsp; It was incumbent on them to reac=
h out and get involved.&nbsp;&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
&gt; Why don't we listen to each other? &nbsp; I know at IETF, I often hear=
 that we don't get enough operators to comment and give feedback. &nbsp;Wel=
l, here you have some. &nbsp;It may be that these companies have problems t=
hat are different from Google's (just as an example).<br>
<br>
Don't try to equate &quot;listen to each other&quot; with &quot;meet my req=
uirement.&quot;&nbsp; The message has been stated, very clearly, from indiv=
iduals, WG members, through document editors and WG chairs and up to Securi=
ty Directors:&nbsp; static RSA is not coming back to TLS 1.3 .&nbsp;
 Since before the last IETF this was the message, consistently.&nbsp; So pe=
rhaps you should answer the question first -- why aren't *you* listening? :=
)<br>
<br>
PFS is also possible in TLS 1.1 and later.&nbsp; What does, say USBank, do =
to prevent PFS in their existing deployment?&nbsp; Why won't additional con=
trols to prevent TLS 1.3 and its mandatory PFS be expected to work here as =
well?&nbsp; So far all I've seen is &quot;maybe there's
 bugs in TLS 1.2 and we'll be forced to move to TLS 1.3&quot;&nbsp; Shrug.&=
nbsp; There are bugs everywhere.&nbsp;&nbsp; Maybe there's bugs in TLS 1.3 =
too.<br>
<br>
Look, pretty much the entire world is being spied on by national-scale adve=
rsaries who are recording all traffic for eventual decryption and correlati=
on.&nbsp; *Almost everyone* is having their traffic surveilled. The problem=
s of debugging a set of enterprise apps
 doesn=92t amount to a hill of beans in that world. It just doesn't. Same f=
or a particular industry's regulatory requirements.
<br>
<br>
&gt; Isn't our goal to have the best standards possible? &nbsp; Any organis=
m (including the IETF), needs feedback to thrive.<br>
<br>
Oxygen, coke, and cookies too.<br>
<br>
--<br>
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies<br>
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz __________________________________=
_____________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kSuunr_b7VX2s4uGxscM8Lk9iLA>
Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com" <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Andrew,

On 23/09/16 21:31, BITS Security wrote:
> We do however want to raise our concern (and hopefully your
> awareness) of what appears to be an unintended consequence of the
> move to PFS-only choices.

I don't believe I've heard anything in this discussion so far
that wasn't well-known and discussed when the WG decided to
remove static RSA key transport a couple of years ago but I've
not gone back and checked the list archive and meeting minutes.

Given what you say above, am I right in assuming that you
yourself went back and reviewed those in order to reach the
conclusion that these are unintended consequences and not just
the result of a well-considered analysis? If so, can you say
exactly what was not considered before? If not, then maybe
you could consult the archive and minutes, as that's the usual
expectation in the IETF.

S.



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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 14:28:36 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:31 PM, BITS Security
<BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:
>> What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed out =
previously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
>> connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.
>> What information does this not get you that you need on the network?
>
> For enterprises using Content Delivery Networks, the TLS session from the=
 browser ends at the edge server in the Content Delivery Network.  The sess=
ion that the enterprise sees is completely different: different IP's and po=
rts, different TLS session, different application layer content because of =
caching, different network behavior (like packet drops and retransmissions)=
.  If some infrastructure component in the data center is causing a problem=
, a trace on the browser side is blind to that.  An additional problem is t=
hat Microsoft does not allow logging of ephemeral keys in their browser.
>
> Likewise endpoint logging in the data center often does not provide adequ=
ate data to isolate the fault domain and/or the root cause of a problem.  L=
ogs tell you that an event happened but not why it happened or which infras=
tructure component was the cause of the problem. For example, a log may ind=
icate that a call was made that either didn't get answered or received a sl=
ow answer, but there could be ten infrastructure components between the ser=
ver that made the call and the destination server that is supposed to answe=
r.

I think you are confused about endpoints. Either these middleboxes
terminate a TLS connection or they do not. If they do, you can log the
application layer traffic at that box in and out. If they do not, then
IP level captures tell you what they are doing.  That some of these
endpoints are middleboxes from the standpoint of a higher layer of the
stack doesn't change that they are endpoints from the TLS layer's
perspective. I don't see what the barrier is.

>
> From the time a packet enters a data center, it is travelling through rou=
ters, switches, firewalls, load balancers, web servers, app servers, middle=
ware servers, and possibly hitting a mainframe, all TLS encrypted for many =
enterprises.  Frequently, source and destination IP's are NAT'ed multiple t=
imes, so there is no visible relationship between the packet that enters th=
e data center and the same call at deeper layers of the infrastructure.  An=
y one of these infrastructure nodes could be the cause of a problem.  The w=
ay to isolate the fault domain of a problem is to take a packet trace at ea=
ch tier of the application infrastructure and look at the application layer=
 data in a decrypted trace in order to find the transaction that is failing=
.

I do not want to be the person who has to figure out which SQL query
came from which HTTP request. Much easier to have the webserver tell
me (and maybe even add standard headers to permit RPC tracebacks).
Even better is it can track only those ensuing requests that
ultimately result in a failure.

>
> Large enterprises have built up robust out-of-band packet capture infrast=
ructures in order to provide better network and application layer visibilit=
y than what logs provide.  Packet brokers and sniffers can handle 10 Gbits/=
sec. line rate or more of traffic, including write to disk at 20 Gbits/sec.=
 or more.  This is needed because when IP's are NAT'ed, you have to trace e=
verything in and out of a particular server and then decrypt in order to fi=
nd the transaction of interest.  Some endpoints and/or infrastructure compo=
nents have packet capture capability, but most are not robust enough to han=
dle this kind of packet capture load in a busy production environment.

You do not need to capture every exchange, just the interesting ones.
What this sounds like is an environment where you have deployed dozens
of boxes with fast stripes on the side, with no real ability to ensure
that they are able to properly log, or administrative insight into
what black magic they might be doing, and have tried to make up with
it with dirty, labor-intensive hacks.

>
> There can be twenty or more layers to a large application, all TLS encryp=
ted, that need to be inspected for troubleshooting, and replacing this with=
 MITM infrastructure is not scalable.  Likewise, there can be hundreds of p=
hysical network taps feeding security monitoring tools like IDS/IPS, malwar=
e detection, and fraud monitoring.  Threats are coming not just from the In=
ternet, but also from internal or 3rd party machines that have been comprom=
ised and then start reconnaissance from a wide variety of locations.  Large=
 enterprises also have complex virtual environments which can be running TL=
S between VM's.  There is no scalable way to intercept VM to VM TLS that ne=
ver leaves the virtual server.

The word scalable has a meaning. MITM scales linearly.
> --Andrew
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 11:44 AM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com=
> wrote:
>>  I am not sure I understand what your reply means?
>>
>> Is it that we should create or even allow an environment to develop,  wh=
ere all providers of service cannot  provide effective diagnostics and supp=
ort?   And then see the constituents of these industries collapse together.=
     And only then realize we have an issue?
>> I hope I am  not understanding correctly.     IETF is supposed to be loo=
king ahead to provide better answers and circumvent predictable problems.  =
  Not ignoring,  waiting and then reacting to negative situations that can =
and should be avoided.
>
> What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed out p=
reviously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
> connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.
> What information does this not get you that you need on the network?
>
>>
>> What I am saying,  in relation to your "Delivering a stable product"  co=
mment is that over time various industries have learned what it takes to "D=
eliver a stable product".    We did not want to invest millions in these de=
bugging networks.   But  we learned the hard way,  that it was necessary.
>> I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,  n=
or of the banking industry at all,  but I certainly understand their perspe=
ctive and am concerned about  the same unmanageable future they described.
>
> Do  Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
>>
>> Thanks
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:noloader@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
>> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
>> Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.c=
om> wrote:
>>> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and has=
 invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>>>
>>> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order of=
 magnitude of folks using them"  will have good service.   If they do not, =
 they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany service calls or c=
omplaints.        I.E.     When these "Folks"  are slow or not working they=
 are just as unhappy as we are.
>>>
>>
>> Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stable =
product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to delive=
r or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
>>
>> If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, the=
n it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't think =
that's the case here.
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>>
>> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential a=
nd is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communi=
cation is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby n=
otified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this infor=
mation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or telep=
hone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without mak=
ing any copies.
>>
>>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan ar=
e nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Bl=
ue Shield Association.
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
> --
> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
> --Rousseau.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
To: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> you can keep using TLS1.2 in your internal network, can't you?

There are both public and private sector regulators arcing towards being mo=
re prescriptive in this area.  It is possible, if not likely, in the not to=
o distant future that my member companies will not have the choice to "down=
grade" to "obsolete" TLS versions. =20

Note: the standards track document says it "Obsoletes: RFC 5246" which is T=
LS 1.2.  That's a signal that may prove difficult to divert in this rapidly=
 evolving threat and regulatory environment.

- Andrew=20



From: Xiaoyin Liu [mailto:xiaoyin.l@outlook.com]=20
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 5:00 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai=
.com>; nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Andrew,
=A0
I don't understand why your "choice is being removed", because you can keep=
 using TLS1.2 in your internal network, can't you?
=A0
Best,
Xiaoyin
=A0
From: BITS Security
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Salz, Rich; nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
=A0
Rich (et al.) -- I understand where you are coming from but I will poke a l=
ittle bit at this portrayal.=A0=20

We are not here hat-in-hand asking for a return to RSA key exchange to the =
proposed standard.=A0 We do however want to raise our concern (and hopefull=
y your awareness) of what appears to be an unintended consequence of the mo=
ve to PFS-only choices.=A0=20

What is happening from our perspective is choice is being removed and an ad=
equate replacement has (seemingly) not been identified.=A0 This lack of cho=
ice may not affect everyone and every use-case but it will predictably affe=
ct large, complex, highly regulated enterprises in a serious manner.=A0 Thi=
s is a classic case of security requirement being in conflict with a differ=
ent security requirement.=A0=20

IETF protocols are run extensively both on the public Internet and within p=
rivate enterprises.=A0 Any decisions made by the TLS Working Group will aff=
ect both environments, and the needs and requirements of both environments =
should be considered.

-Andrew


-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:08 PM
To: nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3


> It would be very interesting to get the network diagnostic and operations=
 people (rather than the architects) of the above companies involved in thi=
s conversation.

Nothing has ever stopped them.=A0 Never. Participation is as simple as join=
ing a mailing list.=A0 The IETF has been doing SSL and TLS for nearly 20 ye=
ars.=A0 It is not a secret.=A0 It was incumbent on them to reach out and ge=
t involved.=A0=A0=20

> Why don't we listen to each other? =A0 I know at IETF, I often hear that =
we don't get enough operators to comment and give feedback. =A0Well, here y=
ou have some. =A0It may be that these companies have problems that are diff=
erent from Google's (just as an example).

Don't try to equate "listen to each other" with "meet my requirement."=A0 T=
he message has been stated, very clearly, from individuals, WG members, thr=
ough document editors and WG chairs and up to Security Directors:=A0 static=
 RSA is not coming back to TLS 1.3 .=A0 Since before the last IETF this was=
 the message, consistently.=A0 So perhaps you should answer the question fi=
rst -- why aren't *you* listening? :)

PFS is also possible in TLS 1.1 and later.=A0 What does, say USBank, do to =
prevent PFS in their existing deployment?=A0 Why won't additional controls =
to prevent TLS 1.3 and its mandatory PFS be expected to work here as well?=
=A0 So far all I've seen is "maybe there's bugs in TLS 1.2 and we'll be for=
ced to move to TLS 1.3"=A0 Shrug.=A0 There are bugs everywhere.=A0=A0 Maybe=
 there's bugs in TLS 1.3 too.

Look, pretty much the entire world is being spied on by national-scale adve=
rsaries who are recording all traffic for eventual decryption and correlati=
on.=A0 *Almost everyone* is having their traffic surveilled. The problems o=
f debugging a set of enterprise apps doesn't amount to a hill of beans in t=
hat world. It just doesn't. Same for a particular industry's regulatory req=
uirements.=20

> Isn't our goal to have the best standards possible? =A0 Any organism (inc=
luding the IETF), needs feedback to thrive.

Oxygen, coke, and cookies too.

--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz __________________________________=
_____________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 17:44:47 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 5:34 PM, BITS Security
<BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:
>> you can keep using TLS1.2 in your internal network, can't you?
>
> There are both public and private sector regulators arcing towards being =
more prescriptive in this area.  It is possible, if not likely, in the not =
too distant future that my member companies will not have the choice to "do=
wngrade" to "obsolete" TLS versions.

Its not the first time C&A has worked against security.

Password complexity and rotation policies come to mind; they cause the
security in the system to drop as users are forced to comply.

Would a KMIP/KeyServer help? Hosts can ask the key server server for
its random key or seed material, and then use them key derivation and
for protocol execution. I built a proof of concept interception proxy
to do it a few years ago to help understand the intersection a service
like CipherCloud with C&A.

Jeff


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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The version where each certificate gets its own extension sounds like a
step in the right direction.

One concern I have is the way this would interact with cached_info
extension.  Currently, it allows the entire Certificate message to be
cached -- which just meant the entire chain in 1.2.  With the suggested
change, this makes less sense: while you still want to cache SCTs, this
might be much less desirable for OCSP responses.

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 3:49 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> This seems like a reasonable direction.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Nick Sullivan <
> nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> This suggestion makes sense to me.
>>
>> Both the SCT and OCSP v2 extension allow for multiple objects in order to
>> cover multiple certificates in a chain, but your suggestion makes the
>> grouping much more explicit and obviates the need for OCSPv2. I'd
>> definitely consider a modification like this.
>>
>> Nick
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:17 PM Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654
>>>>
>>>
>>>> This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate message. With
>>>> this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension messages
>>>> that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). This
>>>> change also resolves the anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before
>>>> certificates in the handshake.
>>>>
>>>
>>> There are two ways that such a thing could be done. How your proposal
>>> suggests:
>>>
>>>     opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
>>>     struct {
>>>         opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
>>>         ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
>>>         Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>>>     } Certificate;
>>>
>>> or:
>>>
>>>     opaque ASN1CertData<1..2^24-1>;
>>>     struct {
>>>         ASN1CertData cert_data;
>>>         Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>>>     }
>>>
>>>     struct {
>>>         opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
>>>         ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
>>>     } Certificate;
>>>
>>> I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP response are
>>> per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chain, so to
>>> me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its own
>>> extension list, makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing the
>>> proposal to the second form?
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Brian
>>> --
>>> https://briansmith.org/
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">The version where each certificate gets its own extension =
sounds like a step in the right direction.<div><br></div><div>One concern I=
 have is the way this would interact with=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0=
,0);font-size:13.3333px">cached_info extension.=C2=A0 Currently, it allows =
the entire Certificate message to be cached -- which just meant the entire =
chain in 1.2.=C2=A0 With the suggested change, this makes less sense: while=
 you still want to cache SCTs, this might be much less desirable for OCSP r=
esponses.</span></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote">On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 3:49 PM, Eric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr"=
>&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;=
</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">This seem=
s like a reasonable direction.<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div>=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><div c=
lass=3D"h5">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Nick Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr=
">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">nich=
olas.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br></div></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5">This suggestion makes sense to me.<=
br><br>Both the SCT and OCSP v2 extension allow for multiple objects in ord=
er to cover multiple certificates in a chain, but your suggestion makes the=
 grouping much more explicit and obviates the need for OCSPv2. I&#39;d defi=
nitely consider a modification like this.<span class=3D"m_-6363062504864727=
817HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br><br>Nick</font></span><div class=3D"=
m_-6363062504864727817HOEnZb"><div class=3D"m_-6363062504864727817h5"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:17 PM =
Brian Smith &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:brian@briansmith.org" target=3D"_blank">b=
rian@briansmith.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Nick=
 Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding=
-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-l=
eft-style:solid"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(3=
3,33,33);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-fam=
ily:&quot;helvetica neue&quot;,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-weight:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-sp=
ace:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">PR:<span>=C2=A0</s=
pan></span><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654" target=
=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/t<wbr>ls13-spec/pull/654</a><br></div>=
</div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rg=
b(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div><div><br>This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate m=
essage. With=20
this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension=20
messages that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). T=
his change also resolves the=20
anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in the handshake.<br=
></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:r=
gb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There are two ways t=
hat such a thing could be done. How your proposal suggests:</div><div><br><=
/div><div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1Cert&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;</div>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 opaque certificate_request_context&lt;0.<wbr>.2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1=
&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&l=
t;0..2^16-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>or:</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1CertDa=
ta&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1CertData cert_data;</div><div>=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&g=
t;; </div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 }</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque =
certificate_request_context&lt;0.<wbr>.2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1&gt;;=C2=A0<br>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub=
><sup></sup><strike></strike></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_quote">I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP res=
ponse are per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chai=
n, so to me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its o=
wn extension list,=C2=A0makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing=
 the proposal to the second form?<br clear=3D"all"></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Cheers,</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote">Brian<br>-- <br></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div><a href=3D"https://briansmith.org/" target=3D"_blank">https://bri=
ansmith.org/</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div>
</div></div><br></div></div><span class=3D"">______________________________=
<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></span></blockquote></div><br></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Andrew,

You are requesting a major design change at the last minute, to restore =
a problematic feature that was removed due to its negative security =
impact. You should understand from the beginning that this is an extreme =
request. Moreso, you should understand that others in your industry have =
no problem complying with US and international regulations, while using =
PFS cipher suites.

I am personally aware of two of the largest financial organizations in =
the US that actually require PFS suites for all internal and external =
applications, and use endpoint security applications to handle this =
issue. It may not be as convenient as what you are doing now, but it is =
a problem that has already been solved, and solved effectively.

Before claiming that the IETF is eliminating your choice, you may want =
to take a closer look at how those your industry have already dealt with =
this. There are effective solutions that have already been mentioned, =
that don=E2=80=99t involve reducing the security of every TLS user =
around the globe.

Personally, I agree completely with Kenny=E2=80=99s response - the =
answer is simply no. It=E2=80=99s too large of a change, it has too =
large of a security impact, and there are established solutions to =
address your issues.

--
Adam Caudill
adam@adamcaudill.com
http://adamcaudill.com/


> On Sep 23, 2016, at 5:34 PM, BITS Security =
<BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:
>=20
>> you can keep using TLS1.2 in your internal network, can't you?
>=20
> There are both public and private sector regulators arcing towards =
being more prescriptive in this area.  It is possible, if not likely, in =
the not too distant future that my member companies will not have the =
choice to "downgrade" to "obsolete" TLS versions.
>=20
> Note: the standards track document says it "Obsoletes: RFC 5246" which =
is TLS 1.2.  That's a signal that may prove difficult to divert in this =
rapidly evolving threat and regulatory environment.
>=20
> - Andrew
>=20

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From: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 23:05:10 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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Thanks for the suggestions. I've restructured my PR to include an array of
SingleCertificate objects in the Certificate structure.

Ilari: I agree that the post-hanshake auth mechanism as currently described
is a bit lacking, but I'd like to sort this out first.

Victor: For cached_info, OCSP responses are relatively long-lived and the
server should know whether or not a cached OCSP is close to expiration, so
cached_info is still useful, but I agree that this makes it less useful.


On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:53 PM Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com> wrote:

> The version where each certificate gets its own extension sounds like a
> step in the right direction.
>
> One concern I have is the way this would interact with cached_info
> extension.  Currently, it allows the entire Certificate message to be
> cached -- which just meant the entire chain in 1.2.  With the suggested
> change, this makes less sense: while you still want to cache SCTs, this
> might be much less desirable for OCSP responses.
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 3:49 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> This seems like a reasonable direction.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Nick Sullivan <
>> nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> This suggestion makes sense to me.
>>>
>>> Both the SCT and OCSP v2 extension allow for multiple objects in order
>>> to cover multiple certificates in a chain, but your suggestion makes the
>>> grouping much more explicit and obviates the need for OCSPv2. I'd
>>> definitely consider a modification like this.
>>>
>>> Nick
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:17 PM Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/654
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> This change adds a set of extensions to the Certificate message. With
>>>>> this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension messages
>>>>> that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). This
>>>>> change also resolves the anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before
>>>>> certificates in the handshake.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are two ways that such a thing could be done. How your proposal
>>>> suggests:
>>>>
>>>>     opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
>>>>     struct {
>>>>         opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
>>>>         ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
>>>>         Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>>>>     } Certificate;
>>>>
>>>> or:
>>>>
>>>>     opaque ASN1CertData<1..2^24-1>;
>>>>     struct {
>>>>         ASN1CertData cert_data;
>>>>         Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>>>>     }
>>>>
>>>>     struct {
>>>>         opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
>>>>         ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
>>>>     } Certificate;
>>>>
>>>> I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP response are
>>>> per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chain, so to
>>>> me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its own
>>>> extension list, makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing the
>>>> proposal to the second form?
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Brian
>>>> --
>>>> https://briansmith.org/
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for the suggestions. I&#39;ve restructured my PR to=
 include an array of SingleCertificate objects in the Certificate structure=
.<br><br>Ilari: I agree that the post-hanshake auth mechanism as currently =
described is a bit lacking, but I&#39;d like to sort this out first.<br><br=
><div>Victor: For cached_info, OCSP responses are relatively long-lived and=
 the server should know whether or not a cached OCSP is close to expiration=
, so cached_info is still useful, but I agree that this makes it less usefu=
l.<br></div><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fr=
i, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:53 PM Victor Vasiliev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:vasilvv@go=
ogle.com">vasilvv@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">The version where each certificate gets its own e=
xtension sounds like a step in the right direction.<div><br></div><div>One =
concern I have is the way this would interact with=C2=A0<span style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">cached_info extension.=C2=A0 Currently, i=
t allows the entire Certificate message to be cached -- which just meant th=
e entire chain in 1.2.=C2=A0 With the suggested change, this makes less sen=
se: while you still want to cache SCTs, this might be much less desirable f=
or OCSP responses.</span></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 3:49 PM, Eric Rescorla <span di=
r=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
This seems like a reasonable direction.<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><=
br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv><div>On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Nick Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">nicholas=
.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br></div></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div><div>This suggestion makes sense to me.<br><br>Both the =
SCT and OCSP v2 extension allow for multiple objects in order to cover mult=
iple certificates in a chain, but your suggestion makes the grouping much m=
ore explicit and obviates the need for OCSPv2. I&#39;d definitely consider =
a modification like this.<span><font color=3D"#888888"><br><br>Nick</font><=
/span><div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep=
 22, 2016 at 7:17 PM Brian Smith &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:brian@briansmith.org=
" target=3D"_blank">brian@briansmith.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">Nick Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nich=
olas.sullivan@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&=
gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-le=
ft-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><span=
 style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-sp=
acing:normal;font-family:&quot;helvetica neue&quot;,helvetica,arial,sans-se=
rif;font-size:13px;font-style:normal;font-weight:normal;word-spacing:0px;di=
splay:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255=
)">PR:<span>=C2=A0</span></span><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-s=
pec/pull/654" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/65=
4</a><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;borde=
r-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid=
"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><br>This change adds a set of extensions to th=
e Certificate message. With=20
this change, the Certificate message can now hold all extension=20
messages that are certificate-specific (rather than connection-specific). T=
his change also resolves the=20
anomaly of OCSP messages appearing before certificates in the handshake.<br=
></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:r=
gb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There are two ways t=
hat such a thing could be done. How your proposal suggests:</div><div><br><=
/div><div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1Cert&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;</div>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 opaque certificate_request_context&lt;0..2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1&gt;; =
<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&lt;0..2=
^16-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><div><br></div><=
div>or:</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque ASN1CertData&lt;=
1..2^24-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1CertData cert_data;</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Extension extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;; </=
div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 }</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0struct { <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 opaque certif=
icate_request_context&lt;0..2^8-1&gt;; <br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0 ASN1Cert certificate_list&lt;0..2^24-1&gt;;=C2=A0<br>=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0 } Certificate; <br></div><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></s=
up><strike></strike></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">I think you are right that the SCT and the OCSP response a=
re per-certificate. In particular, they are not per-certificate-chain, so t=
o me the latter form, where each certificate in the chain gets its own exte=
nsion list,=C2=A0makes more sense to me. Would you consider changing the pr=
oposal to the second form?<br clear=3D"all"></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Cheers,</div><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">Brian<br>-- <br></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><a href=3D"https://briansmith.org/" target=3D"_blank">https://briansmith=
.org/</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div>
</div></div><br></div></div><span>_________________________________________=
______<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></span></blockquote></div><br></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 16:08:38 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Application layer interactions and API guidance
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Dear all,
We've got API guidance and application layer interactions on the TODO
list, and both of these are important and don't show up yet. I can't
credibly commit to taking a big stab at them, but hopefully this email
is detailed enough that it serves as a starting point.

The problems with the application layer interaction center around
0-RTT and client post-authentication. 0-RTT data is replayable, and
furthermore does not authenticate SNI or other extensions that might
affect its interpretation at the server. I smell possible bugs where
extension data isn't properly treated with 0-RTT vs. 1-RTT fallback:
the current draft probably should include something like "any
extensions which influence the interpretation of this data must be the
same".

The difference between received 0-RTT data and other data doesn't
necessarily line up with connection state while processing, as the TLS
stack could have transitioned to normal 1-RTT operation while 0-RTT
data is still sitting around waiting to be processed.  This is really
an API problem, but can also be caused by application layer choices:
if the 0-RTT data can't be cleanly parsed, and some leaks into 1-RTT,
life gets a bit weird.

API guidance is generally pretty easy, even if most implementations
have massively failed at being reasonable. I do not want to point
fingers, but someone thought having true and false values mean exactly
opposite things was a good idea in a C API at one point.

Post-handshake auth is an ugly one for both. It can complete
asynchronously with respect to data exchange, which is not what the
desired semantics usually are. Generally we want each request to have
a single authentication context. Designing APIs to handle this is
hard, and applications will have to be aware of how TLS authentication
works to have rules for it. Add in the ability to stream data in both
directions, and life gets interesting. I'm really not sure what this
should look like.

Sincerely,
Watson


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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 16:17:35 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:10 PM, BITS Security
<BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:
>  we need a better option than TLS 1.2 that will, perhaps sooner than we might expect, be deprecated.

I'm somewhat confused here.  The concern over RSA for key exchange
versus DH for key exchange would only seem to apply when the network
tapping system has access to the RSA key, right?  So the part of this
about monitoring the network for external chat and such doesn't really
change if the client is using TLS 1.1 or 1.3, as you still can't
decrypt the connection just from monitoring, right?

If that is true, then it implies that the server is at least somewhat
under control of the monitor, so it can support TLS 1.2 as long as
needed.  TLS 1.0 came out in 1999 and is still now (in 2016) widely
deployed.  While I hope TLS 1.3 deployment is speedy, I don't forsee
browsers dropping TLS 1.2 and earlier support any time soon.

Thanks,
Peter


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From: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 00:35:30 +0000
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>,  Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>,  Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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David,

If we're changing this structure of CertificateRequest, I have two
suggestions.

1) Move DistinguishedName out of the structure and define it as a TLS-style
extension. It's not a required field.
2) Remove SignatureScheme from structure, and instead change the behavior
of the the "signature_algorithms" extension to include all server-supported
SignatureSchemes in the ServerHello in descending order of preference.

This will result in a much more compact message structure that can easily
be re-purposed for post-handshake server auth and other optional extensions
to TLS 1.3:

     struct {
         opaque certificate_request_context<1..2^8-1>;
         CertificateRequestExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
     } CertificateRequest;


Nick


On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 6:26 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 1:03 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
> wrote:
>
>> > But it's OID-specific how the matching works, isn't it?
>> Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the
>> OIDs I've got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want to
>> define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This new
>> proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which
>> certainly increases flexibility.
>>
>> David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that we
>> can discuss the specifics?
>>
>
> Apologies for the delay. Been a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I was
> thinking:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656
>
> What do you think?
>
> Again, I don't actually care about this, so if you and others who would
> use this mechanism prefer it as it is, I have no qualms. This is a "pull
> suggestion", not a "pull request". :-)
>
> David
>
>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Andrei
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM
>> To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; David Benjamin <
>> davidben@chromium.org>; Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>; Ilari
>> Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>; tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
>>
>> On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> > David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes:
>> >
>> >> Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I
>> >> don't feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I
>> >> thought I'd suggest this.
>> >
>> > I ignore it too.  Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy,
>> > that I'm not going to make things harder on users by adding complex
>> > and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.  My approach is to
>> > specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever
>> > certificate it has, and it's then decided based on a whitelist for
>> > which the server can very clearly report "not on the whitelist" when
>> > it rejects it.  The design seems to be based on the idea that each
>> > client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in
>> > precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each
>> > client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just
>> want the one they've got to work.
>>
>> May I add some nuances here?
>>
>> Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box
>> communication.
>> Existing selection methods suffice (there's usually none on the client
>> side).
>>
>> Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a
>> small and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors
>> dropping support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use
>> case which make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.
>>
>> Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through
>> proprietary ("FIDO like") application level protocols is fairly big.  Half
>> of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government and bank
>> access.  It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it "Web
>> compatible".  This use-case is (of course) not of an issue for the TLS WG
>> but may be of some interest for people currently using client certificates
>> for Web authentication.
>>
>> Anders
>>
>>
>> >
>> > Peter.
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > TLS mailing list
>> > TLS@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>> >
>>
>> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--94eb2c19c4cc12e590053d361307
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>David,<br><br></div>If we&#39;re changing this s=
tructure of CertificateRequest, I have two suggestions.<br><br>1) Move Dist=
inguishedName out of the structure and define it as a TLS-style extension. =
It&#39;s not a required field.<br></div><div><div><div><div>2) Remove Signa=
tureScheme from structure, and instead change the behavior of the the &quot=
;signature_algorithms&quot; extension to include all server-supported Signa=
tureSchemes in the ServerHello in descending order of preference.<br></div>=
<div><br></div><div>This will result in a much more compact message structu=
re that can easily be re-purposed for post-handshake server auth and other =
optional extensions to TLS 1.3:<br></div><div><pre class=3D"inbox-inbox-new=
page" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:r=
gb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps=
:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inde=
nt:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px">     struct {
         opaque certificate_request_context&lt;1..2^8-1&gt;;
         CertificateRequestExtension certificate_extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt=
;;
     } CertificateRequest;
</pre><br>Nick<br></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 6:26 PM David B=
enjamin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org">davidben@chromium.org<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Sep 6, 20=
16 at 1:03 PM Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com=
" target=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc s=
olid;padding-left:1ex">
&gt; But it&#39;s OID-specific how the matching works, isn&#39;t it?<br>
Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the OID=
s I&#39;ve got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want t=
o define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This n=
ew proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which cert=
ainly increases flexibility.<br>
<br>
David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that we c=
an discuss the specifics?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Apologies=
 for the delay. Been a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I was thinking:=
<br><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656</a></div><div><br></div><d=
iv>What do you think?</div><div><br></div><div>Again, I don&#39;t actually =
care about this, so if you and others who would use this mechanism prefer i=
t as it is, I have no qualms. This is a &quot;pull suggestion&quot;, not a =
&quot;pull request&quot;. :-)</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>David</div></div=
></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Thanks,<br>
<br>
Andrei<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM<br>
To: Peter Gutmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=
=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;; David Benjamin &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</=
a>&gt;; Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt;; Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@wel=
ho.com</a>&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.=
org</a><br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding<br>
<br>
On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:<br>
&gt; David Benjamin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"=
_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; writes:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I=
<br>
&gt;&gt; don&#39;t feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up =
so I<br>
&gt;&gt; thought I&#39;d suggest this.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I ignore it too.=C2=A0 Client certs are so rare, and so painful to dep=
loy,<br>
&gt; that I&#39;m not going to make things harder on users by adding comple=
x<br>
&gt; and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.=C2=A0 My approach i=
s to<br>
&gt; specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever<br=
>
&gt; certificate it has, and it&#39;s then decided based on a whitelist for=
<br>
&gt; which the server can very clearly report &quot;not on the whitelist&qu=
ot; when<br>
&gt; it rejects it.=C2=A0 The design seems to be based on the idea that eac=
h<br>
&gt; client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in<br>
&gt; precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each<br>
&gt; client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just=
 want the one they&#39;ve got to work.<br>
<br>
May I add some nuances here?<br>
<br>
Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box communicat=
ion.<br>
Existing selection methods suffice (there&#39;s usually none on the client =
side).<br>
<br>
Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a s=
mall and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors dropping=
 support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use case wh=
ich make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.<br>
<br>
Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through prop=
rietary (&quot;FIDO like&quot;) application level protocols is fairly big.=
=C2=A0 Half of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government an=
d bank access.=C2=A0 It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it=
 &quot;Web compatible&quot;.=C2=A0 This use-case is (of course) not of an i=
ssue for the TLS WG but may be of some interest for people currently using =
client certificates for Web authentication.<br>
<br>
Anders<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Peter.<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--94eb2c19c4cc12e590053d361307--


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On Friday, September 23, 2016 1:39 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:
>
>>However, where would you draw the line between "I can't" and "I don't want
>>to"?
> 
> It's one of those judgement-call things, I don't know if you can strictly
> define it but as a rule of thumb I'd say that if you encounter it during
> normal processing it's an I-can't problem while if you have to add
special-
> case checks to identify it and refuse to continue it's an I-don't-want-to
> problem.

Yes of course, but there is another aspect to it, the general health of the
ecosystem. Postel's rule is nice, but it removes the pressure on broken
implementations to fix their code. Pushed to the extreme, the result is a
sort of protocol drift, in which buggy variants get first tolerated, and
then accepted as de-facto standards. This tends to hinder future evolutions,
not to mention adding complexity. We often hear that "the IETF has no
protocol police," but in fact it does. Each implementation that takes a
strict view of standard compliance contributes to this policing.

-- Christian Huitema




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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 00:56:36 +0000
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To: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>,  Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>,  Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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--001a113986a08f3b99053d365e82
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

(1) seems reasonable. I don't have strong views there. I even jokingly
suggested it in the PR description.

I do not like (2). This requires implementations stash a copy of the
signature algorithms without known a priori whether it will be used or not.
And it means when receiving a CertificateRequest, you have to go check that
the extension was provided at all. I think that should stay bound to the
CertificateRequest and as a required field.

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:35 PM Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
wrote:

David,

If we're changing this structure of CertificateRequest, I have two
suggestions.

1) Move DistinguishedName out of the structure and define it as a TLS-style
extension. It's not a required field.
2) Remove SignatureScheme from structure, and instead change the behavior
of the the "signature_algorithms" extension to include all server-supported
SignatureSchemes in the ServerHello in descending order of preference.

This will result in a much more compact message structure that can easily
be re-purposed for post-handshake server auth and other optional extensions
to TLS 1.3:

     struct {
         opaque certificate_request_context<1..2^8-1>;
         CertificateRequestExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
     } CertificateRequest;


Nick


On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 6:26 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 1:03 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> But it's OID-specific how the matching works, isn't it?
Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the
OIDs I've got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want to
define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This new
proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which
certainly increases flexibility.

David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that we
can discuss the specifics?


Apologies for the delay. Been a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I was
thinking:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656

What do you think?

Again, I don't actually care about this, so if you and others who would use
this mechanism prefer it as it is, I have no qualms. This is a "pull
suggestion", not a "pull request". :-)

David


Thanks,

Andrei

-----Original Message-----
From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; David Benjamin <
davidben@chromium.org>; Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>; Ilari
Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding

On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes:
>
>> Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I
>> don't feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I
>> thought I'd suggest this.
>
> I ignore it too.  Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy,
> that I'm not going to make things harder on users by adding complex
> and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.  My approach is to
> specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever
> certificate it has, and it's then decided based on a whitelist for
> which the server can very clearly report "not on the whitelist" when
> it rejects it.  The design seems to be based on the idea that each
> client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in
> precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each
> client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just
want the one they've got to work.

May I add some nuances here?

Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box
communication.
Existing selection methods suffice (there's usually none on the client
side).

Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a
small and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors
dropping support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use
case which make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.

Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through
proprietary ("FIDO like") application level protocols is fairly big.  Half
of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government and bank
access.  It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it "Web
compatible".  This use-case is (of course) not of an issue for the TLS WG
but may be of some interest for people currently using client certificates
for Web authentication.

Anders


>
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--001a113986a08f3b99053d365e82
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg">(1) seems reasonable.=
 I don&#39;t have strong views there. I even jokingly suggested it in the P=
R description.<div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">I do not like (2). This requires implementations stash a=
 copy of the signature algorithms without known a priori whether it will be=
 used or not. And it means when receiving a CertificateRequest, you have to=
 go check that the extension was provided at all. I think that should stay =
bound to the CertificateRequest and as a required field.</div></div><br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:35 PM Nick Sullivan &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blan=
k">nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bord=
er-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_ms=
g"><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">David,<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div>If we&#39;re changing this structure =
of CertificateRequest, I have two suggestions.<br class=3D"gmail_msg"><br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">1) Move DistinguishedName out of the structure and defin=
e it as a TLS-style extension. It&#39;s not a required field.<br class=3D"g=
mail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">2) Remove SignatureScheme from str=
ucture, and instead change the behavior of the the &quot;signature_algorith=
ms&quot; extension to include all server-supported SignatureSchemes in the =
ServerHello in descending order of preference.<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div=
><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_msg">This will result in a much more compact message structure that can ea=
sily be re-purposed for post-handshake server auth and other optional exten=
sions to TLS 1.3:<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><pr=
e class=3D"m_5511311502306719626m_-7561106270041329298inbox-inbox-newpage g=
mail_msg" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;col=
or:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-=
caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-=
indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px">     struct {
         opaque certificate_request_context&lt;1..2^8-1&gt;;
         CertificateRequestExtension certificate_extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt=
;;
     } CertificateRequest;
</pre><br class=3D"gmail_msg">Nick<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div></div></div></div></div><br cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div dir=3D"ltr" cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 6:26 PM David Benjamin &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">dav=
idben@chromium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg">On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 1:03 PM Andrei Popov &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=
=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc=
 solid;padding-left:1ex">
&gt; But it&#39;s OID-specific how the matching works, isn&#39;t it?<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the OID=
s I&#39;ve got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want t=
o define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This n=
ew proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which cert=
ainly increases flexibility.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that we c=
an discuss the specifics?<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></blockquote><div class=3D=
"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg">Apologies for the delay. Been=
 a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I was thinking:<br class=3D"gmail_m=
sg"><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656" class=3D"gmail=
_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656</a></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_msg">What do you think?</div><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail=
_msg"></div><div class=3D"gmail_msg">Again, I don&#39;t actually care about=
 this, so if you and others who would use this mechanism prefer it as it is=
, I have no qualms. This is a &quot;pull suggestion&quot;, not a &quot;pull=
 request&quot;. :-)</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_=
msg"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_m=
sg"><div class=3D"gmail_msg"><br class=3D"gmail_msg"></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_msg">David</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_msg"><div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_msg"><=
div class=3D"gmail_msg">=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_=
msg" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex=
">
Thanks,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Andrei<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
-----Original Message-----<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.c=
om" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com</a>=
]<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
To: Peter Gutmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" class=3D=
"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;; David Benj=
amin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" targe=
t=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt;; Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">Andre=
i.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt;; Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilaril=
iusvaara@welho.com" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@we=
lho.com</a>&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=
=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding<br class=3D"gmail_m=
sg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; David Benjamin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" class=3D"g=
mail_msg" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; writes:<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; don&#39;t feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up =
so I<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;&gt; thought I&#39;d suggest this.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; I ignore it too.=C2=A0 Client certs are so rare, and so painful to dep=
loy,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; that I&#39;m not going to make things harder on users by adding comple=
x<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.=C2=A0 My approach i=
s to<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever<br=
 class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; certificate it has, and it&#39;s then decided based on a whitelist for=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; which the server can very clearly report &quot;not on the whitelist&qu=
ot; when<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; it rejects it.=C2=A0 The design seems to be based on the idea that eac=
h<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each<br =
class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just=
 want the one they&#39;ve got to work.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
May I add some nuances here?<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box communicat=
ion.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Existing selection methods suffice (there&#39;s usually none on the client =
side).<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a s=
mall and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors dropping=
 support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use case wh=
ich make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through prop=
rietary (&quot;FIDO like&quot;) application level protocols is fairly big.=
=C2=A0 Half of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government an=
d bank access.=C2=A0 It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it=
 &quot;Web compatible&quot;.=C2=A0 This use-case is (of course) not of an i=
ssue for the TLS WG but may be of some interest for people currently using =
client certificates for Web authentication.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Anders<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Peter.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; _______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg"=
>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">=
TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listi=
nfo/tls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</blockquote></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">TLS@i=
etf.org</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/t=
ls</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div></div>

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--94eb2c0481bed39ad2053d36a88d
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Signature algorithm support is typically per-connection, not per
certificate request. If you're doing multiple post-handshake
authentications then (2) reduces the amount of redundant data sent on
subsequent authentications. Furthermore, it opens the door for unsolicited
post-handshake authentication in future extensions to the protocol.

Clients only need to stash a copy of it if they support client
authentication, which in my opinion should be optional. Perhaps support for
post-handshake authentication should be signaled with an extension. That
way the server SignatureSchemes could be carried in that extension, rather
than overloading the "signature_algorithms" extension.




On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 5:56 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> (1) seems reasonable. I don't have strong views there. I even jokingly
> suggested it in the PR description.
>
> I do not like (2). This requires implementations stash a copy of the
> signature algorithms without known a priori whether it will be used or not.
> And it means when receiving a CertificateRequest, you have to go check that
> the extension was provided at all. I think that should stay bound to the
> CertificateRequest and as a required field.
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:35 PM Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> David,
>>
>> If we're changing this structure of CertificateRequest, I have two
>> suggestions.
>>
>> 1) Move DistinguishedName out of the structure and define it as a
>> TLS-style extension. It's not a required field.
>> 2) Remove SignatureScheme from structure, and instead change the behavior
>> of the the "signature_algorithms" extension to include all server-supported
>> SignatureSchemes in the ServerHello in descending order of preference.
>>
>> This will result in a much more compact message structure that can easily
>> be re-purposed for post-handshake server auth and other optional extensions
>> to TLS 1.3:
>>
>>      struct {
>>          opaque certificate_request_context<1..2^8-1>;
>>          CertificateRequestExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
>>      } CertificateRequest;
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 6:26 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 1:03 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> > But it's OID-specific how the matching works, isn't it?
>>>> Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the
>>>> OIDs I've got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want to
>>>> define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This new
>>>> proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which
>>>> certainly increases flexibility.
>>>>
>>>> David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that
>>>> we can discuss the specifics?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Apologies for the delay. Been a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I
>>> was thinking:
>>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656
>>>
>>> What do you think?
>>>
>>> Again, I don't actually care about this, so if you and others who would
>>> use this mechanism prefer it as it is, I have no qualms. This is a "pull
>>> suggestion", not a "pull request". :-)
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>>
>>>> Andrei
>>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com]
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM
>>>> To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; David Benjamin <
>>>> davidben@chromium.org>; Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>;
>>>> Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>; tls@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
>>>>
>>>> On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>>>> > David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes:
>>>> >
>>>> >> Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I
>>>> >> don't feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I
>>>> >> thought I'd suggest this.
>>>> >
>>>> > I ignore it too.  Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy,
>>>> > that I'm not going to make things harder on users by adding complex
>>>> > and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.  My approach is to
>>>> > specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever
>>>> > certificate it has, and it's then decided based on a whitelist for
>>>> > which the server can very clearly report "not on the whitelist" when
>>>> > it rejects it.  The design seems to be based on the idea that each
>>>> > client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in
>>>> > precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each
>>>> > client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one
>>>> just want the one they've got to work.
>>>>
>>>> May I add some nuances here?
>>>>
>>>> Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box
>>>> communication.
>>>> Existing selection methods suffice (there's usually none on the client
>>>> side).
>>>>
>>>> Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is
>>>> a small and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors
>>>> dropping support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use
>>>> case which make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.
>>>>
>>>> Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through
>>>> proprietary ("FIDO like") application level protocols is fairly big.  Half
>>>> of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government and bank
>>>> access.  It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it "Web
>>>> compatible".  This use-case is (of course) not of an issue for the TLS WG
>>>> but may be of some interest for people currently using client certificates
>>>> for Web authentication.
>>>>
>>>> Anders
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>> > Peter.
>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>> > TLS mailing list
>>>> > TLS@ietf.org
>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>

--94eb2c0481bed39ad2053d36a88d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Signature algorithm support is typically per-connection, n=
ot per certificate request. If you&#39;re doing multiple post-handshake aut=
hentications then (2) reduces the amount of redundant data sent on subseque=
nt authentications. Furthermore, it opens the door for unsolicited post-han=
dshake authentication in future extensions to the protocol.<br><div><br>Cli=
ents only need to stash a copy of it if they support client authentication,=
 which in my opinion should be optional. Perhaps support for post-handshake=
 authentication should be signaled with an extension. That way the server S=
ignatureSchemes could be carried in that extension, rather than overloading=
 the &quot;signature_algorithms&quot; extension.<br><div><div><div><br><br>=
=C2=A0<br></div></div></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 5:56 PM David Benjamin &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:davidben@chromium.org">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">(1) seems=
 reasonable. I don&#39;t have strong views there. I even jokingly suggested=
 it in the PR description.<div><br></div><div>I do not like (2). This requi=
res implementations stash a copy of the signature algorithms without known =
a priori whether it will be used or not. And it means when receiving a Cert=
ificateRequest, you have to go check that the extension was provided at all=
. I think that should stay bound to the CertificateRequest and as a require=
d field.</div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:35 PM Nick Sullivan &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">nicholas.sullivan=
@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div><div>David,<br><br></div>If we&#39;re changing this structure=
 of CertificateRequest, I have two suggestions.<br><br>1) Move Distinguishe=
dName out of the structure and define it as a TLS-style extension. It&#39;s=
 not a required field.<br></div><div><div><div><div>2) Remove SignatureSche=
me from structure, and instead change the behavior of the the &quot;signatu=
re_algorithms&quot; extension to include all server-supported SignatureSche=
mes in the ServerHello in descending order of preference.<br></div><div><br=
></div><div>This will result in a much more compact message structure that =
can easily be re-purposed for post-handshake server auth and other optional=
 extensions to TLS 1.3:<br></div><div><pre style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;mar=
gin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-weigh=
t:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transf=
orm:none;word-spacing:0px">     struct {
         opaque certificate_request_context&lt;1..2^8-1&gt;;
         CertificateRequestExtension certificate_extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt=
;;
     } CertificateRequest;
</pre><br>Nick<br></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 6:26 PM David B=
enjamin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davi=
dben@chromium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
>On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 1:03 PM Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.P=
opov@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wr=
ote:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bord=
er-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
&gt; But it&#39;s OID-specific how the matching works, isn&#39;t it?<br>
Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the OID=
s I&#39;ve got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want t=
o define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This n=
ew proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which cert=
ainly increases flexibility.<br>
<br>
David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that we c=
an discuss the specifics?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div></div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Apologies=
 for the delay. Been a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I was thinking:=
<br><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656</a></div><div><br></div><d=
iv>What do you think?</div><div><br></div><div>Again, I don&#39;t actually =
care about this, so if you and others who would use this mechanism prefer i=
t as it is, I have no qualms. This is a &quot;pull suggestion&quot;, not a =
&quot;pull request&quot;. :-)</div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>David</div></div=
></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Thanks,<br>
<br>
Andrei<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM<br>
To: Peter Gutmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=
=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;; David Benjamin &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</=
a>&gt;; Andrei Popov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt;; Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@wel=
ho.com</a>&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.=
org</a><br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding<br>
<br>
On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote:<br>
&gt; David Benjamin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"=
_blank">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; writes:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I=
<br>
&gt;&gt; don&#39;t feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up =
so I<br>
&gt;&gt; thought I&#39;d suggest this.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I ignore it too.=C2=A0 Client certs are so rare, and so painful to dep=
loy,<br>
&gt; that I&#39;m not going to make things harder on users by adding comple=
x<br>
&gt; and opaque filtering to prevent them from working.=C2=A0 My approach i=
s to<br>
&gt; specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever<br=
>
&gt; certificate it has, and it&#39;s then decided based on a whitelist for=
<br>
&gt; which the server can very clearly report &quot;not on the whitelist&qu=
ot; when<br>
&gt; it rejects it.=C2=A0 The design seems to be based on the idea that eac=
h<br>
&gt; client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in<br>
&gt; precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each<br>
&gt; client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one just=
 want the one they&#39;ve got to work.<br>
<br>
May I add some nuances here?<br>
<br>
Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box communicat=
ion.<br>
Existing selection methods suffice (there&#39;s usually none on the client =
side).<br>
<br>
Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is a s=
mall and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors dropping=
 support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use case wh=
ich make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting.<br>
<br>
Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through prop=
rietary (&quot;FIDO like&quot;) application level protocols is fairly big.=
=C2=A0 Half of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government an=
d bank access.=C2=A0 It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it=
 &quot;Web compatible&quot;.=C2=A0 This use-case is (of course) not of an i=
ssue for the TLS WG but may be of some interest for people currently using =
client certificates for Web authentication.<br>
<br>
Anders<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Peter.<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div>

--94eb2c0481bed39ad2053d36a88d--


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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 18:30:38 -0700
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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On 9/23/16 at 2:24 PM, BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org (BITS=20
Security) wrote:

>But general-purpose messaging services (and other collaboration=20
>services) which don=E2=80=99t have an explicit man-in-the-middle (and=20
>don=E2=80=99t permit server-side access to user plaintext and can=E2=80=99=
t=20
>be observed by other means) can=E2=80=99t be used in supervised=20
>environments. This rules out many cloud-hosted services today.

I see a train wreck coming and it looks like this:

The public internet, Google, Cloud services, Facebook, Twitter,=20
etc. etc. move in the direction of improving security using=20
things like PFS, because the idea of protecting human rights=20
advocates in the parts of the world where people are routinely=20
tortured sells well to the general public, people like me, and=20
others on this list.

On the other hand, some major enterprises continue to depend on=20
being able to break the security of their employees to monitor=20
their networks in ways that the bad guys can easily use, as=20
opposed to installing endpoint or gateway monitoring.

This train wreck results in fewer and fewer public internet=20
services being available to users within these enterprises.=20
Eventually, employees give up on the corporate network and start=20
using their cell phones to communicate with customers, research=20
investments etc., completely bypassing the regulatory required monitoring.

This scenario says it doesn't matter whether TLS 1.3 and=20
successors allows RSA. If they have any PFS modes, these will be=20
the only ones public internet servers will accept. If they are=20
turned off in enterprise clients, they will not be able to=20
connect without going through a gateway which turns them on.

My conclusion is that enterprises that depend on being able to=20
decrypt traffic without involving the endpoints should start=20
moving to systems that do involve the endpoints.

Cheers - Bill

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz        | Ham radio contesting is a    | Periwinkle
(408)356-8506      | contact sport.               | 16345=20
Englewood Ave
www.pwpconsult.com |  - Ken Widelitz K6LA / VY2TT | Los Gatos,=20
CA 95032


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 11:38:53 +1000
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To: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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On 24 September 2016 at 10:35, Nick Sullivan
<nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> wrote:
> 1) Move DistinguishedName out of the structure and define it as a TLS-style
> extension. It's not a required field.
> 2) Remove SignatureScheme from structure, and instead change the behavior of
> the the "signature_algorithms" extension to include all server-supported
> SignatureSchemes in the ServerHello in descending order of preference.

This is my preference too.  I get that this means that you have to
remember more if you might support client authentication, but it
removes yet another bespoke parser and extension point.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> we need a better option than TLS 1.2 that will,
> perhaps sooner than we might expect, be deprecated.

Why?


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> There are both public and private sector regulators arcing towards being
> more prescriptive in this area.  It is possible, if not likely, in the no=
t too distant
> future that my member companies will not have the choice to "downgrade"
> to "obsolete" TLS versions.
>=20
> Note: the standards track document says it "Obsoletes: RFC 5246" which is
> TLS 1.2.  That's a signal that may prove difficult to divert in this rapi=
dly
> evolving threat and regulatory environment.

Then the industry will have to explain to its regulators that the latest ve=
rsion of the standard prevents them from doing what is required, in the way=
 that it was, apparently, traditionally done.  You can intercept and monito=
r TLS 1.3, but it mus be done at one of the endpoints, not via a passive in=
termediary watch traffic.   We removed that capability because of the threa=
t of national-scale actors doing such things on a global basis.=20


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Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 07:23:20 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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On Sat, Sep 24, 2016 at 01:17:22AM +0000, Nick Sullivan wrote:
> Signature algorithm support is typically per-connection, not per
> certificate request. If you're doing multiple post-handshake
> authentications then (2) reduces the amount of redundant data sent on
> subsequent authentications. Furthermore, it opens the door for unsolicited
> post-handshake authentication in future extensions to the protocol.
> 
> Clients only need to stash a copy of it if they support client
> authentication, which in my opinion should be optional. Perhaps support for
> post-handshake authentication should be signaled with an extension. That
> way the server SignatureSchemes could be carried in that extension, rather
> than overloading the "signature_algorithms" extension.
 
But the client requires that signature list to perform authentication.
It is not optional for the in-handshake authentication.

Also, I think the post-handshake auth is just annoying (and it comes
with security problems currently), so I would like to be able to just
not implement it.


-Ilari


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From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Application layer interactions and API guidance
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 04:08:38PM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear all,
> We've got API guidance and application layer interactions on the TODO
> list, and both of these are important and don't show up yet. I can't
> credibly commit to taking a big stab at them, but hopefully this email
> is detailed enough that it serves as a starting point.
> 
> The problems with the application layer interaction center around
> 0-RTT and client post-authentication. 0-RTT data is replayable, and
> furthermore does not authenticate SNI or other extensions that might
> affect its interpretation at the server. I smell possible bugs where
> extension data isn't properly treated with 0-RTT vs. 1-RTT fallback:
> the current draft probably should include something like "any
> extensions which influence the interpretation of this data must be the
> same".

In composing my list of extensions to pay attention when doing 0-RTT
(SNI and ALPN), I considered matters like:

- Does this seem like it would affect 0-RTT interpretation.
- What are the TLS 1.2 rules on it?
- Is it even meaningful with PSK?
- Is it just low-level connection control?

ALPN was included because it definitely affects 0-RTT interpretation
(even against TLS 1.2 rules) and SNI because of TLS 1.2 rules (SNI
was later removed from the list).

There might be future extensions that do have an effect on 0-RTT
(some proposed extensions to Token Binding perhaps?). And it is of
course theoretically possible that TLS stack implements some extension
in a very odd way.
 
> The difference between received 0-RTT data and other data doesn't
> necessarily line up with connection state while processing, as the TLS
> stack could have transitioned to normal 1-RTT operation while 0-RTT
> data is still sitting around waiting to be processed.  This is really
> an API problem, but can also be caused by application layer choices:
> if the 0-RTT data can't be cleanly parsed, and some leaks into 1-RTT,
> life gets a bit weird.

Is "life gets a bit weird" an euphemism for "there will likely be
security issues here"? :-)

Also, it is very likely that 0-RTT would need its own read API, because
it is pretty unlikely that existing API could be safely retrofitted
or even purpose-built unified API be designed that isn't just asking
for security problems via mixing 0-RTT and 1-RTT data.


It gets even more fun in DTLS, where 0-RTT packets can be reordered
after Client Finished, so more 0-RTT data arrives when the connection
has already transitioned to 1-RTT.

Perhaps the last one could be solved by requiring the library to
discard any such packets and not pass them forward.


> Post-handshake auth is an ugly one for both. It can complete
> asynchronously with respect to data exchange, which is not what the
> desired semantics usually are. Generally we want each request to have
> a single authentication context. Designing APIs to handle this is
> hard, and applications will have to be aware of how TLS authentication
> works to have rules for it. Add in the ability to stream data in both
> directions, and life gets interesting. I'm really not sure what this
> should look like.

At least you must have client and server agree on authentication
context of every given request. If they don't, vulernabilities WILL
result.

And then there have been multiple CVEs due to applications using
wrong authentication context in some situation.

(This is the reason one needs to be especially careful when combining
dynamic client certificates with HTTP/2... Basically, it can not be
done safely without coordination on application layer).

One likely wants application protocol to be able to specify part of
or the entiere request context and to extract that part in the other
end when requesting a certificate selection. This is to allow putting
part of coordination data into the request itself. However, this is not
sufficient for e.g. HTTP/2 signaling, so more needs to be exchanged at
application layer.

E.g. HTTP/2 would want to signal which stream triggered the client
certificate request, in order to enable the client to not be completely
dumb in certificate selection.

And then upon completion of the authentication (either successful or
explicitly rejected), signal the application with the new certificate
chain and the context the request had.


-Ilari


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From: Pawel Jakub Dawidek <p.dawidek@wheelsystems.com>
Organization: Wheel Systems
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Hello.

As a vendor of one of those MITM proxy solutions for TLS inspection I'd
be grateful if you could be more specific about the "scope, depth and
detail" that is not delivered by such solutions, so we can have
discussion whether this is something we can address or not and if not,
maybe we can come up with some alternative solutions before we give up.

By doing MITM we increase latency, even if very little, that's
inevitable. But can you really avoid doing MITM TLS inspection?
In my opinion, no. Let me elaborate.

Of course the amount of TLS traffic is growing rapidly (which is a good
thing) thanks to many "contributions":
- Server Name Indication extenstion,
- Edward Snowden,
- Free certificates (eg. Let's Encrypt),
- HTTP 2.0.

Because of that, every corporate network needs visibility inside TLS
traffic not only incoming, but also outgoing, so they can not only
debug, but also look for data leaks, malware, etc.

Customers are increasingly aware of all this and it is not a question of
MITM incresing latency, because it has to be done, the more important is
to make it in a decrypt-once-feed-many fashion, as they have multiple
solutions in place to analyze the traffic for different reasons.

And when you do data leak prevention or malware detection you want to be
in the middle so you can terminate the session as quickly as possible.

I don't want to say that Forward Secrecy comes at no price. It makes
observabilty harder (not impossible), it has higher CPU demands, it
increases handshake times. This is the price we pay for a better
security and in my opinion it is acceptable.

W dniu 9/23/16 o 09:49, Ackermann, Michael pisze:
> Without re stating the original message from the bank coalition,  which=
 states this better than I could,   the client and MITM solutions are not=
 practical in many situations.    Also they do not provide the scope, dep=
th or detail that is utilized with today's solutions.  =20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]=20
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 11:44 AM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
> Cc: noloader@gmail.com; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>=20
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.c=
om> wrote:
>>  I am not sure I understand what your reply means?
>>
>> Is it that we should create or even allow an environment to develop,  =
where all providers of service cannot  provide effective diagnostics and =
support?   And then see the constituents of these industries collapse tog=
ether.     And only then realize we have an issue?
>> I hope I am  not understanding correctly.     IETF is supposed to be l=
ooking ahead to provide better answers and circumvent predictable problem=
s.    Not ignoring,  waiting and then reacting to negative situations tha=
t can and should be avoided.
>=20
> What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed out=
 previously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
> connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.
> What information does this not get you that you need on the network?
>=20
>>
>> What I am saying,  in relation to your "Delivering a stable product"  =
comment is that over time various industries have learned what it takes t=
o "Deliver a stable product".    We did not want to invest millions in th=
ese debugging networks.   But  we learned the hard way,  that it was nece=
ssary.
>> I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject, =
 nor of the banking industry at all,  but I certainly understand their pe=
rspective and am concerned about  the same unmanageable future they descr=
ibed.
>=20
> Do  Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
>>
>> Thanks
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:noloader@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
>> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
>> Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm=
=2Ecom> wrote:
>>> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and h=
as invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>>>
>>> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order =
of magnitude of folks using them"  will have good service.   If they do n=
ot,  they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany service call=
s or complaints.        I.E.     When these "Folks"  are slow or not work=
ing they are just as unhappy as we are.
>>>
>>
>> Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stabl=
e product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to de=
liver or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
>>
>> If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, t=
hen it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't th=
ink that's the case here.
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>>
>> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential=
 and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this com=
munication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are he=
reby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of th=
is information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mai=
l or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message=
 without making any copies.
>>
>>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan =
are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross an=
d Blue Shield Association.
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --
> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
> --Rousseau.
>=20
>=20
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential =
and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this comm=
unication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are her=
eby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of thi=
s information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail=
 or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message =
without making any copies.
> =20
>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan a=
re nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and=
 Blue Shield Association.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

--=20
Pawel Jakub Dawidek
Chief Technology Officer
Wheel Systems / http://www.wheelsystems.com


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 11:05:10PM +0000, Nick Sullivan wrote:
> Thanks for the suggestions. I've restructured my PR to include an array of
> SingleCertificate objects in the Certificate structure.

It occured to me that certain extensions might be considered to be per-
chain. Like e.g. type of the certificate. Where do extensions like that
go? Always to the extension block of the first certificate (except that
might cause somewhat of a cyclic dependency in parsing)?

And then there is the user_mapping. I presume mechanism like this is to
be used to transport it (avoiding need to mess with new handshake
messages and such.
 
> Ilari: I agree that the post-hanshake auth mechanism as currently described
> is a bit lacking, but I'd like to sort this out first.

Well, more like I was annoyed at having to implement that at all and the
fact that it requires remembering a hash state (which may be a quite
harsh requirement in some cases).


-Ilari


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 21:31:51 +1000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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On 24 September 2016 at 19:17, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> It occured to me that certain extensions might be considered to be per-
> chain. Like e.g. type of the certificate. Where do extensions like that
> go? Always to the extension block of the first certificate (except that
> might cause somewhat of a cyclic dependency in parsing)?

The type of which certificate?  The end-entity?  Seems like that
belongs with the end-entity cert then.


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Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 15:08:57 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Change to Certificate message (#654)
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On Sat, Sep 24, 2016 at 09:31:51PM +1000, Martin Thomson wrote:
> On 24 September 2016 at 19:17, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> > It occured to me that certain extensions might be considered to be per-
> > chain. Like e.g. type of the certificate. Where do extensions like that
> > go? Always to the extension block of the first certificate (except that
> > might cause somewhat of a cyclic dependency in parsing)?
> 
> The type of which certificate?  The end-entity?  Seems like that
> belongs with the end-entity cert then.

I mean equivalent of the client_certificate_type/server_certificate_type
extensions.

And the way those extensions are defined, those scope the entiere chain.

E.g. There was some discussion about "subcerts"[1]. One way to add those
would be as a new certificate type.

... Or are new certificate types like new CLASSes in DNS: Heavy objects
dropped by bad idea fairy? :->


But in the future, there might very well be new extensions that are
scoped to certificate chain and not and individual certificate. And
those can't be put into EncryptedExtensions if server can send multiple
certificates (like it can in post-handshake auth extension) or if
client needs to send one.


[1] The usecases can't be practically accomplished today: The mode of
operation is just plain alien to X.509.


-Ilari


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What I mean is that we have Many MITM solutions today and they are able to =
be a good source for troubleshooting/diagnostics, in limited situations or =
perspectives.    This lack of scope, depth and detail are what drove us to =
install the packet collection infrastructures (debugging networks I think =
some are saying).   =20

Some of the issues we have found include:=20
* Level of detail is not sufficient.
* Inherent tools are not sophisticated. =20
* Data is difficult to share.  =20
* MITM management systems frequently do not =22Play well=22 with overall =
management frameworks and other tools. =20
* Problems take longer to resolve. =20
* Depending upon the level of information logged on an MITM platform,  the =
inherent  processing can (and frequently does), create performance =
problems on the MITM and can change conditions,  obfuscating the original =
issue.=20
* MITMs are not usually configured to record, retain, archive or manage =
large amounts of diagnostic data. =20
* A MITM platform frequently has a very limited vision of the overall =
session path.   Or,  there may be multiple MITM's involved in a session =
path.    Which one has the best view?  Which one(s) should you focus on? =20
* AND,  as you said,  the more MITMs you add, the more latency and =
complexity you are forced to deal with.    As a network diagnostic person =
this approach can actually make your responsibilities more difficult and  =
less achievable.=20
* The information collected is usually not granular enough to perform =
network diagnostics for those situations that require it.=20
* One key initial piece of information in troubleshooting is to determine =
if the source of the problem is in: the Client, the Network or the Server. =
  MITM's are rarely able to provide insight into this critical and time =
sensitive determination. =20
* in general diagnostics are made more difficult with this approach.  =
Multiple sessions and possibly interfaces may need to be traced and the =
MITM can further confuse things by acting as a router and/or a nat and/or =
a Load Balancer.   As someone who deals with these types of additional =
complexities every day,  I would like to see fewer MITMs  rather than =
more.     =20


My organization uses the MITM diagnostics and management systems, and like =
most point solutions they are a valuable facet of our diagnostic arsenal,  =
but because of the manifold shortcomings (some of which are listed above), =
 they are not a central focus and are not a viable initial focal point or  =
suitable overall point of triage.     Triage may dictate the use of the =
MITM diagnostics,  but MITM troubleshooting/diagnostics would not be an =
effective method on its own,  for most situations/issues that exist in =
today's complex multi-tier applications. =20

My job is to make things work and fix them ASAP when they don't.   While I =
fully understand the need for effective security,  I hope those on the =
security side  would conversely understand the need to make things work, =
perform well,  and quickly diagnose problems when they do not.      I am =
often reminded of a colleague who states (jokingly I think)   =22The =
ultimate security is where no data flows and nothing works=22.     I hope =
this is not the direction we are heading and that some form of compromise =
will be forthcoming between these two discrete factions with differing =
perspectives. =20





-----Original Message-----
From: TLS =5Bmailto:tls-bounces=40ietf.org=5D On Behalf Of Pawel Jakub =
Dawidek
Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2016 2:54 AM
To: tls=40ietf.org
Subject: Re: =5BTLS=5D Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Hello.

As a vendor of one of those MITM proxy solutions for TLS inspection I'd be =
grateful if you could be more specific about the =22scope, depth and =
detail=22 that is not delivered by such solutions, so we can have =
discussion whether this is something we can address or not and if not, =
maybe we can come up with some alternative solutions before we give up.

By doing MITM we increase latency, even if very little, that's inevitable. =
But can you really avoid doing MITM TLS inspection?
In my opinion, no. Let me elaborate.

Of course the amount of TLS traffic is growing rapidly (which is a good
thing) thanks to many =22contributions=22:
- Server Name Indication extenstion,
- Edward Snowden,
- Free certificates (eg. Let's Encrypt),
- HTTP 2.0.

Because of that, every corporate network needs visibility inside TLS =
traffic not only incoming, but also outgoing, so they can not only debug, =
but also look for data leaks, malware, etc.

Customers are increasingly aware of all this and it is not a question of =
MITM incresing latency, because it has to be done, the more important is =
to make it in a decrypt-once-feed-many fashion, as they have multiple =
solutions in place to analyze the traffic for different reasons.

And when you do data leak prevention or malware detection you want to be =
in the middle so you can terminate the session as quickly as possible.

I don't want to say that Forward Secrecy comes at no price. It makes =
observabilty harder (not impossible), it has higher CPU demands, it =
increases handshake times. This is the price we pay for a better security =
and in my opinion it is acceptable.

W dniu 9/23/16 o 09:49, Ackermann, Michael pisze:
> Without re stating the original message from the bank coalition,  which =
states this better than I could,   the client and MITM solutions are not =
practical in many situations.    Also they do not provide the scope, depth =
or detail that is utilized with today's solutions.  =20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Watson Ladd =5Bmailto:watsonbladd=40gmail.com=5D
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 11:44 AM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann=40bcbsm.com>
> Cc: noloader=40gmail.com; tls=40ietf.org
> Subject: Re: =5BTLS=5D Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>=20
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Ackermann, Michael =
<MAckermann=40bcbsm.com> wrote:
>>  I am not sure I understand what your reply means?
>>
>> Is it that we should create or even allow an environment to develop,  =
where all providers of service cannot  provide effective diagnostics and =
support?   And then see the constituents of these industries collapse =
together.     And only then realize we have an issue?
>> I hope I am  not understanding correctly.     IETF is supposed to be =
looking ahead to provide better answers and circumvent predictable =
problems.    Not ignoring,  waiting and then reacting to negative =
situations that can and should be avoided.
>=20
> What exactly is the problem you are concerned with? As I've pointed=20
> out previously one can still log the contents of TLS protected
> connections: you do this at the client, or with an intercepting proxy.
> What information does this not get you that you need on the network?
>=20
>>
>> What I am saying,  in relation to your =22Delivering a stable =
product=22  comment is that over time various industries have learned what =
it takes to =22Deliver a stable product=22.    We did not want to invest =
millions in these debugging networks.   But  we learned the hard way,  =
that it was necessary.
>> I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,  =
nor of the banking industry at all,  but I certainly understand their =
perspective and am concerned about  the same unmanageable future they =
described.
>=20
> Do  Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
>>
>> Thanks
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Jeffrey Walton =5Bmailto:noloader=40gmail.com=5D
>> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
>> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann=40bcbsm.com>
>> Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity=40fsroundtable.org>; tls=40ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: =5BTLS=5D Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael =
<MAckermann=40bcbsm.com> wrote:
>>> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and =
has invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>>>
>>> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that =22The 5-6 order =
of magnitude of folks using them=22  will have good service.   If they do =
not,  they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany service =
calls or complaints.        I.E.     When these =22Folks=22  are slow or =
not working they are just as unhappy as we are.
>>>
>>
>> Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stable =
product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to =
deliver or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
>>
>> If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, =
then it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't =
think that's the case here.
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>>
>> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential =
and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this =
communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are =
hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of =
this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic =
mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original =
message without making any copies.
>>
>>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan =
are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and =
Blue Shield Association.
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS=40ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --
> =22Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains=22.
> --Rousseau.
>=20
>=20
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential =
and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this =
communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are =
hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of =
this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic =
mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original =
message without making any copies.
> =20
>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan =
are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and =
Blue Shield Association.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS=40ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

--
Pawel Jakub Dawidek
Chief Technology Officer
Wheel Systems / http://www.wheelsystems.com



The information contained in this communication is highly confidential and =
is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this =
communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are =
hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of =
this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic =
mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original =
message without making any copies.
=20
 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are =
nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and =
Blue Shield Association.


From nobody Sat Sep 24 14:45:30 2016
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Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 00:45:19 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 03:29:42PM -0400, Dave Garrett wrote:
> 
> Yes, all of these other channels are protected using TLS... which you
> do not control in any way. Also, many sites/services already prioritize
> FS cipher suites, so the deprecation of plain RSA key exchange doesn't
> actually affect the vast majority of people. (e.g. Facebook & Twitter
> both prefer ECDHE with NIST P-256) Within this very argument is
> already the argument that supervision at endpoints is required here.
> he security on the pipe is irrelevant. I don't see how you can make a
> point to bring this up but think keeping plain RSA KE suites is a
> useful solution.

Well, if you have client and server that both have RSA KE enabled
(even if not preferred), you can do something like this:

- Intercept ClientHello. Strip any FPS ciphersuites and any associated
  extensions, strip EMS and ALPN but keep client_version and
  client_random the same.
- The server will select RSA KE.
- Intercept Certificate message and replace it with MITM cert.
- Intercept ClientKeyExchange decrypt the key and re-encrypt with the
  original server key.
- Compute the session key and log it.
- Intercept the ClientFinished message and replace it with fixed
  version.
- Intercept the ServerFinished message and replace it with fixed
  version.
- Get off the active path, becoming passive.
- Log the data transfer on the connection, and later decrypt it if
  desired.

The keys will match, because they only depend on randoms (which
were preserved) and the encrypted secret (which was preserved too).
The EMS was stripped because it would break this.

The MITM proxy knows the secrets needed to fix the Finished messages.

Preferring FS won't help, because MITM proxy can downgrade the
crypto negotiation.


(And it is not like one can easily get the keys without either
replacing the cert or knowing the RSA private key corresponding to
it).




-Ilari


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>, Pawel Jakub Dawidek <p.dawidek@wheelsystems.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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>   This lack of scope, depth and detail [in MITM infrastructures] are what=
 drove us to
> install the packet collection infrastructures (debugging networks I think=
 some
> are saying).

At the risk of repeating myself and flogging this dead horse...  What you a=
re doing is exactly what the nation-state actors are doing.  I bet that som=
e even use that exact phrase of "packet collection infrastructure."=20

I understand that if you want to use TLS 1.3, it is going to be expensive a=
nd/or inconvenient; you're going to have to educate regulators and get besp=
oke TLS endpoint solutions from vendors. Perhaps you can get the NSA's to s=
top collecting everyone's Internet traffic for future decoding?

Less flippantly, what specifically would you have us do? What do you want i=
n the protocol that enables your needs, but doesn't make it possible for ev=
eryone in the world to be surveilled?  Please, make some specific suggestio=
ns.
=20


From nobody Sat Sep 24 20:31:28 2016
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To: nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "Ackermann\, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
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Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 23:31:22 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com writes:

> [ Unknown encryption status ]
> [ Unknown signature status ]
>
>
>
>>>
>>> What I am saying,=C2=A0 in relation to your "Delivering a stable produc=
t"=C2=A0 comment is that over time various industries have learned what it =
takes to "Deliver a stable product".=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We did not >>want to inve=
st millions in these debugging networks.=C2=A0 But=C2=A0 we learned the har=
d way,=C2=A0 that it was necessary.
>>> I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,=
=C2=A0 nor of the banking industry at all,=C2=A0 but I certainly understand=
 their perspective and am concerned about=C2=A0 the same >>unmanageable fut=
ure they described.
>
>>Do=C2=A0 Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
> It would be very interesting to get the network diagnostic and
> operations people (rather than the architects) of the above companies
> involved in this conversation.

Hi, technical person most directly responsible for incident response and
urgent debugging here.  We modify endpoints to get what we need.  We did
have taps that relied on knowing the RSA Kx secret... but haven't used
them in about a decade.

I think the banks have an answer not available to the global passive
adversaries: modify the server or client to use a fixed ECDH share, then
use tech much like their current choices.  It'll take a while to
develop, but nobody in that environment plans to move to TLS 1.3 for
operational systems any time soon anyway.

-Brian


> Also, you know, companies don't really enjoy spending money on network di=
agnostic products which might be considered overhead. =C2=A0 So, if they ar=
e, we might do them the courtesy of not thinking that they are foolish to d=
o so. =C2=A0=C2=A0
> Why don't we listen to each other? =C2=A0 I know at IETF, I often hear th=
at we don't get enough operators to comment and give feedback. =C2=A0Well, =
here you have some. =C2=A0It may be that these companies have problems that=
 are different from Google's (just as an example).
> Isn't our goal to have the best standards possible? =C2=A0 Any organism (=
including the IETF), needs feedback to thrive.
> Nalini
>>
>> Thanks
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:noloader@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
>> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
>> Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.c=
om> wrote:
>>> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and has=
 invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>>>
>>> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order of=
 magnitude of folks using them"=C2=A0 will have good service.=C2=A0 If they=
 do not,=C2=A0 they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany serv=
ice calls or complaints.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 I.E.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 When =
these "Folks"=C2=A0 are slow or not working they are just as unhappy as we =
are.
>>>
>>
>> Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stable =
product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to delive=
r or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
>>
>> If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, the=
n it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't think =
that's the case here.
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>>
>> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential a=
nd is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communi=
cation is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby n=
otified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this infor=
mation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or telep=
hone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without mak=
ing any copies.
>>
>>=C2=A0 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michig=
an are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross a=
nd Blue Shield Association.
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
> --=20
> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
> --Rousseau.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>=20=20=20=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
>>>
>>> What I am saying,=C2=A0 in relation to your "Delivering a stable produc=
t"=C2=A0 comment is that over time various industries have learned what it =
takes to "Deliver a stable product".=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We did not >>want to inve=
st millions in these debugging networks.=C2=A0 But=C2=A0 we learned the har=
d way,=C2=A0 that it was necessary.
>>> I am not a member of the banking coalition that started this subject,=
=C2=A0 nor of the banking industry at all,=C2=A0 but I certainly understand=
 their perspective and am concerned about=C2=A0 the same >>unmanageable fut=
ure they described.
>
>>Do=C2=A0 Akami, Cloudlflare and Google magically not have these problems?
> It would be very interesting to get the network diagnostic and operations=
 people (rather than the architects) of the above companies involved in thi=
s conversation.
> Also, you know, companies don't really enjoy spending money on network di=
agnostic products which might be considered overhead. =C2=A0 So, if they ar=
e, we might do them the courtesy of not thinking that they are foolish to d=
o so. =C2=A0=C2=A0
> Why don't we listen to each other? =C2=A0 I know at IETF, I often hear th=
at we don't get enough operators to comment and give feedback. =C2=A0Well, =
here you have some. =C2=A0It may be that these companies have problems that=
 are different from Google's (just as an example).
> Isn't our goal to have the best standards possible? =C2=A0 Any organism (=
including the IETF), needs feedback to thrive.
> Nalini
>>
>> Thanks
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Jeffrey Walton [mailto:noloader@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:55 AM
>> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
>> Cc: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.c=
om> wrote:
>>> From the perspective an Enterprise that runs these applications and has=
 invested HEAVILY in the debugging networks.........
>>>
>>> The reason we are debugging these networks is so that "The 5-6 order of=
 magnitude of folks using them"=C2=A0 will have good service.=C2=A0 If they=
 do not,=C2=A0 they will consider competitors and/or generate a litany serv=
ice calls or complaints.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 I.E.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 When =
these "Folks"=C2=A0 are slow or not working they are just as unhappy as we =
are.
>>>
>>
>> Isn't that the market operating as expected? Those who deliver a stable =
product at a competitive price are rewarded, while those who fail to delive=
r or deliver at an unreasonable cost are not? (Some hand waiving).
>>
>> If all providers failed to deliver or delivered an inferior product, the=
n it might indicate a major course correction is needed. But I don't think =
that's the case here.
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>>
>> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential a=
nd is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communi=
cation is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby n=
otified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this infor=
mation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or telep=
hone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without mak=
ing any copies.
>>
>>=C2=A0 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michig=
an are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross a=
nd Blue Shield Association.
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--=20
Brian Sniffen
Akamai Technologies


From nobody Sun Sep 25 14:07:16 2016
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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Henrick_Hellstr=c3=b6m?= <henrick@streamsec.se>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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Have you noticed that BoringSSL seems to abort handshakes with an 
illegal_parameter alert, if the server certificate uses the standard 
compliant (albeit highly unusual) DER encoding of NULL OPTIONAL as the 
empty string, instead of the non-standard but ubiquitous 0x05 0x00 encoding?

Is this just a regression bug in BoringSSL, or is it an intentional 
restriction of the TLS protocol that should be propagated to other 
implementations as well?

On 2016-08-16 20:08, David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi folks,
>
> BoringSSL has developed a test harness[1] that consists of a fork of
> Goâ€™s crypto/tls package (recently dubbed â€œBoGo" at the Berlin hackathon)
> plus a test runner that allows BoGo to be run against the TLS stack
> under test. BoGo can be configured to behave in a number of unexpected
> ways that violate the TLS standard, thus enabling the testing of many
> scenarios that would be otherwise difficult to obtain with a standard
> stack. We (David Benjamin and Eric Rescorla) have been getting it to
> work with NSS and wanted to let others know in case they might find it
> useful.
>
> This system was initially designed to work with BoringSSL, but in
> principle can be used with any stack. The portability is still a little
> rough, and we'll likely make changes as we get more experience here, but
> it has already been used to test NSS[2] and OpenSSL[3]. We've written up
> some notes at [4].
>
> The test suite should be fairly extensive for DTLS and TLS 1.2 (giving
> around 75% line coverage in BoringSSLâ€™s TLS code at last count). It
> tests TLS 1.3 as well, though those tests are still in progress. They
> track BoringSSLâ€™s in-progress TLS 1.3 implementation.
>
> David and Eric
>
> [1] https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/ssl/test/
> [2] https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/file/tip/external_tests/nss_bogo_shim
> [3] https://github.com/google/openssl-tests
> [4] https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/ssl/test/PORTING.md
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


From nobody Sun Sep 25 14:19:47 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:06 PM, Henrick Hellstr=C3=B6m <henrick@streamsec.=
se> wrote:
> Have you noticed that BoringSSL seems to abort handshakes with an
> illegal_parameter alert, if the server certificate uses the standard
> compliant (albeit highly unusual) DER encoding of NULL OPTIONAL as the em=
pty
> string, instead of the non-standard but ubiquitous 0x05 0x00 encoding?

In what location do you have an omitted NULL? (I suspect that
BoringSSL's behaviour is deliberate, but I can't say for sure without
knowing which case it is.)


Cheers

AGL


From nobody Sun Sep 25 14:20:12 2016
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From: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Pawel Jakub Dawidek <p.dawidek@wheelsystems.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
Thread-Index: AQHSFXFM47cmA/iFbUeqweJ91YYuHKCHJUIQgABH84D//8NPsIAASjEA///OLFCAATAygIAAaEiggADal4CAAPeiEA==
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 21:20:04 +0000
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References: <DM5PR11MB1419B782D2BEF0E0A35E420DF4C90@DM5PR11MB1419.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> <CO1PR07MB283F2C414B6478E993675DEC3C90@CO1PR07MB283.namprd07.prod.outlook.com> <394611bf-208f-03d3-620c-79aaf169645b@cs.tcd.ie> <4FC37E442D05A748896589E468752CAA0DBC66AE@PWN401EA120.ent.corp.bcbsm.com> <CAH8yC8kgYzYXwJ01NkK7WYxD-diponWEQOd+MNHssm+bLHE54w@mail.gmail.com> <4FC37E442D05A748896589E468752CAA0DBC699B@PWN401EA120.ent.corp.bcbsm.com> <CACsn0c=5vjzQmr=ah6sH1JzTj3peaKad7aCPertcqD4B2DLKiA@mail.gmail.com> <4FC37E442D05A748896589E468752CAA0DBC6CAC@PWN401EA120.ent.corp.bcbsm.com> <fd4ad423-3614-5330-b687-1b5848e839f0@wheelsystems.com> <4FC37E442D05A748896589E468752CAA0DBC9732@PWN401EA120.ent.corp.bcbsm.com> <b24efbbb594040e794f7513b7e62b3c7@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/jGYRyXmOzEfqacUFCiA6sAC7dsI>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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I understand your concern over what the nation-state actors are doing but =
it is not the same as what Enterprises do to manage their private servers, =
networks and clients.       =20
=20
Your final paragraph is quite a constructive question.   =22What =
specifically would you have us do? What do you want in the protocol that =
enables your needs, but doesn't make it possible for everyone in the world =
to be surveilled?  Please, make some specific suggestions.=22

My personal perspective would be, that the approach to achieving an answer =
to that important question, would start with:

1.  Gathering  protocol neutral requirements from all involved factions,  =
(with help and suggestions from people on the TLS list)

2.   Brainstorming session(s) with people on the TLS list as well =
potential users/operators, with objectives that include the design of a =
solution that meets (hopefully) all known requirements. =20

What I would like to see come out of the debate we seem to be currently =
involved in,  is the realization that significant operational/management  =
issues exist with TLS 1.3 and that the IETF is taking them seriously =
enough to at least begin dialogue intended to address these issues, and =
potentially work together to craft related solution(s).   In my view this =
issue is far too complex &  pervasive to believe that any one person or =
group's perspective would produce a viable overall solution. =20

Again, let me restate,  I don't think anyone is saying that we MUST have =
RSA.    But, we, as the clients of the IETF TLS protocol, would like to =
work with you to assure we have workable, manageable  and affordable =
solutions,  that meets our needs as well as the needs of others.

-----Original Message-----
From: Salz, Rich =5Bmailto:rsalz=40akamai.com=5D=20
Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2016 10:10 PM
To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann=40bcbsm.com>; Pawel Jakub Dawidek =
<p.dawidek=40wheelsystems.com>; tls=40ietf.org
Subject: RE: =5BTLS=5D Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

>   This lack of scope, depth and detail =5Bin MITM infrastructures=5D =
are=20
> what drove us to install the packet collection infrastructures=20
> (debugging networks I think some are saying).

At the risk of repeating myself and flogging this dead horse...  What you =
are doing is exactly what the nation-state actors are doing.  I bet that =
some even use that exact phrase of =22packet collection =
infrastructure.=22=20

I understand that if you want to use TLS 1.3, it is going to be expensive =
and/or inconvenient; you're going to have to educate regulators and get =
bespoke TLS endpoint solutions from vendors. Perhaps you can get the NSA's =
to stop collecting everyone's Internet traffic for future decoding?

Less flippantly, what specifically would you have us do? What do you want =
in the protocol that enables your needs, but doesn't make it possible for =
everyone in the world to be surveilled?  Please, make some specific =
suggestions.
=20



The information contained in this communication is highly confidential and =
is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this =
communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are =
hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of =
this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic =
mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original =
message without making any copies.
=20
 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are =
nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and =
Blue Shield Association.


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 21:23:09 +0000
Message-ID: <CAF8qwaAQYwW9s0E_V-TqHhTqL9sBhobzsGUch5TDQynK2VNfEw@mail.gmail.com>
To: henrick@streamsec.se, tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/uBj2TeMBIJzs9QkkXj9jRrufGfg>
Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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Do you mean in RSA SubjectPublicKeyInfos? For those, such encodings are not
actually standards-compliant. Per RFC 3279, 2.3.1:

   The rsaEncryption OID is intended to be used in the algorithm field
   of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier.  The parameters field MUST
   have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1

RFC 4055, section 1.2 also says:

   The rsaEncryption object identifier continues to identify the subject
   public key when the RSA private key owner does not wish to limit the
   use of the public key exclusively to either RSASSA-PSS or RSAES-OAEP.
   In this case, the rsaEncryption object identifier MUST be used in the
   algorithm field within the subject public key information, and the
   parameters field MUST contain NULL.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4055#section-1.2

There are other contexts where (due to historical mistakes) specs declared
both are acceptable, but amazingly not RSA SPKIs. BoringSSL has enforced it
for quite some time now, so it seems this part of the specification matches
reality. If I recall, mozilla::pkix enforces this as well?

David

On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 5:07 PM Henrick Hellstr=C3=B6m <henrick@streamsec.s=
e>
wrote:

> Have you noticed that BoringSSL seems to abort handshakes with an
> illegal_parameter alert, if the server certificate uses the standard
> compliant (albeit highly unusual) DER encoding of NULL OPTIONAL as the
> empty string, instead of the non-standard but ubiquitous 0x05 0x00
> encoding?
>
> Is this just a regression bug in BoringSSL, or is it an intentional
> restriction of the TLS protocol that should be propagated to other
> implementations as well?
>
> On 2016-08-16 20:08, David Benjamin wrote:
> > Hi folks,
> >
> > BoringSSL has developed a test harness[1] that consists of a fork of
> > Go=E2=80=99s crypto/tls package (recently dubbed =E2=80=9CBoGo" at the =
Berlin hackathon)
> > plus a test runner that allows BoGo to be run against the TLS stack
> > under test. BoGo can be configured to behave in a number of unexpected
> > ways that violate the TLS standard, thus enabling the testing of many
> > scenarios that would be otherwise difficult to obtain with a standard
> > stack. We (David Benjamin and Eric Rescorla) have been getting it to
> > work with NSS and wanted to let others know in case they might find it
> > useful.
> >
> > This system was initially designed to work with BoringSSL, but in
> > principle can be used with any stack. The portability is still a little
> > rough, and we'll likely make changes as we get more experience here, bu=
t
> > it has already been used to test NSS[2] and OpenSSL[3]. We've written u=
p
> > some notes at [4].
> >
> > The test suite should be fairly extensive for DTLS and TLS 1.2 (giving
> > around 75% line coverage in BoringSSL=E2=80=99s TLS code at last count)=
. It
> > tests TLS 1.3 as well, though those tests are still in progress. They
> > track BoringSSL=E2=80=99s in-progress TLS 1.3 implementation.
> >
> > David and Eric
> >
> > [1] https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/ssl/test/
> > [2]
> https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/file/tip/external_tests/nss_bogo_shim
> > [3] https://github.com/google/openssl-tests
> > [4]
> https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/ssl/test/PORTING.md
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Do you mean in RSA SubjectPublicKeyInfos? For those, =
such encodings are not actually standards-compliant. Per RFC 3279, 2.3.1:</=
div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0The rsaEncryption OID is intended to b=
e used in the algorithm field</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0of a value of type Alg=
orithmIdentifier.=C2=A0 The parameters field MUST</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0ha=
ve ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier.</div><div><br></div><div>=
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1">https://tools=
.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1</a></div><div><br></div><div>RFC 4055,=
 section 1.2 also says:</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0The rsaEncryp=
tion object identifier continues to identify the subject</div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0public key when the RSA private key owner does not wish to limit the<=
/div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0use of the public key exclusively to either RSASSA-P=
SS or RSAES-OAEP.</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0In this case, the rsaEncryption ob=
ject identifier MUST be used in the</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithm field =
within the subject public key information, and the</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0p=
arameters field MUST contain NULL.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http=
s://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4055#section-1.2">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rf=
c4055#section-1.2</a></div><div><br></div><div>There are other contexts whe=
re (due to historical mistakes) specs declared both are acceptable, but ama=
zingly not RSA SPKIs. BoringSSL has enforced it for quite some time now, so=
 it seems this part of the specification matches reality. If I recall, mozi=
lla::pkix enforces this as well?</div><div><br></div><div>David</div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 5:07 PM H=
enrick Hellstr=C3=B6m &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:henrick@streamsec.se">henrick@s=
treamsec.se</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Have you=
 noticed that BoringSSL seems to abort handshakes with an<br class=3D"gmail=
_msg">
illegal_parameter alert, if the server certificate uses the standard<br cla=
ss=3D"gmail_msg">
compliant (albeit highly unusual) DER encoding of NULL OPTIONAL as the<br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">
empty string, instead of the non-standard but ubiquitous 0x05 0x00 encoding=
?<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
Is this just a regression bug in BoringSSL, or is it an intentional<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
restriction of the TLS protocol that should be propagated to other<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
implementations as well?<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
On 2016-08-16 20:08, David Benjamin wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Hi folks,<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; BoringSSL has developed a test harness[1] that consists of a fork of<b=
r class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Go=E2=80=99s crypto/tls package (recently dubbed =E2=80=9CBoGo&quot; a=
t the Berlin hackathon)<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; plus a test runner that allows BoGo to be run against the TLS stack<br=
 class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; under test. BoGo can be configured to behave in a number of unexpected=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; ways that violate the TLS standard, thus enabling the testing of many<=
br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; scenarios that would be otherwise difficult to obtain with a standard<=
br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; stack. We (David Benjamin and Eric Rescorla) have been getting it to<b=
r class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; work with NSS and wanted to let others know in case they might find it=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; useful.<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; This system was initially designed to work with BoringSSL, but in<br c=
lass=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; principle can be used with any stack. The portability is still a littl=
e<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; rough, and we&#39;ll likely make changes as we get more experience her=
e, but<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; it has already been used to test NSS[2] and OpenSSL[3]. We&#39;ve writ=
ten up<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; some notes at [4].<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; The test suite should be fairly extensive for DTLS and TLS 1.2 (giving=
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; around 75% line coverage in BoringSSL=E2=80=99s TLS code at last count=
). It<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; tests TLS 1.3 as well, though those tests are still in progress. They<=
br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; track BoringSSL=E2=80=99s in-progress TLS 1.3 implementation.<br class=
=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; David and Eric<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/s=
sl/test/" rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://=
boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/ssl/test/</a><br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
&gt; [2] <a href=3D"https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/file/tip/external_t=
ests/nss_bogo_shim" rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank=
">https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/file/tip/external_tests/nss_bogo_shim=
</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; [3] <a href=3D"https://github.com/google/openssl-tests" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/google/openss=
l-tests</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; [4] <a href=3D"https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/s=
sl/test/PORTING.md" rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank=
">https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/ssl/test/PORTING.md=
</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; _______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg"=
>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">=
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&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listi=
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&gt;<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">TLS@i=
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ass=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/t=
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</blockquote></div></div>

--001a113986a0e48fed053d5b9e62--


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To: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
From: =?UTF-8?Q?Henrick_Hellstr=c3=b6m?= <henrick@streamsec.se>
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On 2016-09-25 23:19, Adam Langley wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:06 PM, Henrick HellstrÃ¶m <henrick@streamsec.se> wrote:
>> Have you noticed that BoringSSL seems to abort handshakes with an
>> illegal_parameter alert, if the server certificate uses the standard
>> compliant (albeit highly unusual) DER encoding of NULL OPTIONAL as the empty
>> string, instead of the non-standard but ubiquitous 0x05 0x00 encoding?
>
> In what location do you have an omitted NULL? (I suspect that
> BoringSSL's behaviour is deliberate, but I can't say for sure without
> knowing which case it is.)

I am referring to the OPTIONAL parameter of AlgorithmIdentifier, which 
is set to NULL e.g. when algorithm is rsaEncryption, 
sha256WithRsaEncryption or id-sha256.


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 14:34:59 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael
<MAckermann@bcbsm.com> wrote:
> I understand your concern over what the nation-state actors are doing but=
 it is not the same as what Enterprises do to manage their private servers,=
 networks and clients.

It totally is. You record the traces, then use the private key to
decrypt them. The packets are stupid, they don't know the difference!

>
> Your final paragraph is quite a constructive question.   "What specifical=
ly would you have us do? What do you want in the protocol that enables your=
 needs, but doesn't make it possible for everyone in the world to be survei=
lled?  Please, make some specific suggestions."
>
> My personal perspective would be, that the approach to achieving an answe=
r to that important question, would start with:
>
> 1.  Gathering  protocol neutral requirements from all involved factions, =
 (with help and suggestions from people on the TLS list)

You know, you could have made those requirements known to us in this
email. How many months extra do you want us to take?

>
> 2.   Brainstorming session(s) with people on the TLS list as well potenti=
al users/operators, with objectives that include the design of a solution t=
hat meets (hopefully) all known requirements.

Let me point out that there was a rechartering debate in 2013 which
included lots of discussion about requirements, and about 16 drafts in
between then and now. What you want is to go back to the drawing board
because you weren't aware of what the IETF was discussing instead of
describing your requirements and what would meet them. Huge amounts of
protocol analysis will need to be redone as a result: might be good
for some people, but we're already far behind schedule and with lots
of unresolved issues.

>
> What I would like to see come out of the debate we seem to be currently i=
nvolved in,  is the realization that significant operational/management  is=
sues exist with TLS 1.3 and that the IETF is taking them seriously enough t=
o at least begin dialogue intended to address these issues, and potentially=
 work together to craft related solution(s).   In my view this issue is far=
 too complex &  pervasive to believe that any one person or group's perspec=
tive would produce a viable overall solution.
>
> Again, let me restate,  I don't think anyone is saying that we MUST have =
RSA.    But, we, as the clients of the IETF TLS protocol, would like to wor=
k with you to assure we have workable, manageable  and affordable solutions=
,  that meets our needs as well as the needs of others.

You can use static ephemeral shares on the server side if you want. Is
that good enough? You can do what Brian Sniffen described above, and
you have 1.5 decades to shift or so.


>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Salz, Rich [mailto:rsalz@akamai.com]
> Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2016 10:10 PM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>; Pawel Jakub Dawidek <p.daw=
idek@wheelsystems.com>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
>>   This lack of scope, depth and detail [in MITM infrastructures] are
>> what drove us to install the packet collection infrastructures
>> (debugging networks I think some are saying).
>
> At the risk of repeating myself and flogging this dead horse...  What you=
 are doing is exactly what the nation-state actors are doing.  I bet that s=
ome even use that exact phrase of "packet collection infrastructure."
>
> I understand that if you want to use TLS 1.3, it is going to be expensive=
 and/or inconvenient; you're going to have to educate regulators and get be=
spoke TLS endpoint solutions from vendors. Perhaps you can get the NSA's to=
 stop collecting everyone's Internet traffic for future decoding?
>
> Less flippantly, what specifically would you have us do? What do you want=
 in the protocol that enables your needs, but doesn't make it possible for =
everyone in the world to be surveilled?  Please, make some specific suggest=
ions.
>
>
>
>
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential an=
d is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communic=
ation is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby no=
tified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this inform=
ation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or teleph=
one, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without maki=
ng any copies.
>
>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are=
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e Shield Association.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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On 2016-09-25 23:23, David Benjamin wrote:
> Do you mean in RSA SubjectPublicKeyInfos? For those, such encodings are
> not actually standards-compliant. Per RFC 3279, 2.3.1:
>
>    The rsaEncryption OID is intended to be used in the algorithm field
>    of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier.  The parameters field MUST
>    have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier.
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1

Then again, the ASN.1 module in 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5280/ says differently. Strictly 
speaking, RFC 3279 does not override the PKIX specification when it 
comes to X.509 certificates; only for formats such as RSA PUBLIC KEY 
that rely solely on the ASN.1 module in RFC 3279.


> There are other contexts where (due to historical mistakes) specs
> declared both are acceptable, but amazingly not RSA SPKIs. BoringSSL has
> enforced it for quite some time now, so it seems this part of the
> specification matches reality. If I recall, mozilla::pkix enforces this
> as well?

Actually no, just tested Chrome v53 and Firefox v49 for the Windows 
platform. Only Chrome fails when connecting to a server that presents a 
server certificate with the NULL parameters omitted from the DER encoding.


From nobody Sun Sep 25 14:49:32 2016
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Cc: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Henrick Hellstr=C3=B6m <henrick@streamsec.=
se> wrote:
> Then again, the ASN.1 module in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5280/
> says differently. Strictly speaking, RFC 3279 does not override the PKIX
> specification when it comes to X.509 certificates; only for formats such =
as
> RSA PUBLIC KEY that rely solely on the ASN.1 module in RFC 3279.

To answer your original question then, this is intentional.

While there are certainly differences of opinion about the
applicability of Postel's law in this space, in practical terms
requiring a NULL in this location empirically has very good
compatibility and we don't like adding flexibility without good
reason.


Cheers

AGL

--=20
Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org https://www.imperialviolet.org


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 21:55:36 +0000
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--001a1146c9def272f3053d5c124e
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On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 5:49 PM Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org> wrote=
:

> On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Henrick Hellstr=C3=B6m <henrick@streamse=
c.se>
> wrote:
> > Then again, the ASN.1 module in
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5280/
> > says differently. Strictly speaking, RFC 3279 does not override the PKI=
X
> > specification when it comes to X.509 certificates; only for formats suc=
h
> as
> > RSA PUBLIC KEY that rely solely on the ASN.1 module in RFC 3279.
>
> To answer your original question then, this is intentional.
>
> While there are certainly differences of opinion about the
> applicability of Postel's law in this space, in practical terms
> requiring a NULL in this location empirically has very good
> compatibility and we don't like adding flexibility without good
> reason.
>

I believe we are also correct per spec. My interpretation of these
documents is that the general AlgorithmIdentifier structure may or may not
include parameters. However, whether a given parameter value or omitting
parameters altogether is legal is a question for the particular algorithm.
It's not overriding but plugging into the general framework. Specifications
for individual algorithm OIDs say what to put in the parameters field:

For id-rsaEncryption, RFC 3279 (previously cited) says it is not optional
and the only legal value is NULL.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1

For id-RSASSAS-PSS, RFC 4055 says the parameters are not optional and
specifies the structure.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4055#section-3.1

For id-ecPublicKey, RFC 5480 says something similar and gives the structure=
.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5480#section-2.1.1

For id-dsa, RFC 3279 says they are actually optional. (Although this was a
pretty bad idea since it's used in this bizarre parameter inheritance
thing...)
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.2

None of these can be talking about standalone structures like RSAPublicKey.
Those structures usually don't even include AlgorithmIdentifiers (no need
when you already know the key type) and are usually specified in other
documents like RFC 3447.

David

--001a1146c9def272f3053d5c124e
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Sep 25=
, 2016 at 5:49 PM Adam Langley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:agl@imperialviolet.org=
">agl@imperialviolet.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex">On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Henrick Hellstr=C3=B6m &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:henrick@streamsec.se" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">henrick=
@streamsec.se</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; Then again, the ASN.1 module in <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.or=
g/doc/rfc5280/" rel=3D"noreferrer" class=3D"gmail_msg" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5280/</a><br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; says differently. Strictly speaking, RFC 3279 does not override the PK=
IX<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; specification when it comes to X.509 certificates; only for formats su=
ch as<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
&gt; RSA PUBLIC KEY that rely solely on the ASN.1 module in RFC 3279.<br cl=
ass=3D"gmail_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
To answer your original question then, this is intentional.<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
<br class=3D"gmail_msg">
While there are certainly differences of opinion about the<br class=3D"gmai=
l_msg">
applicability of Postel&#39;s law in this space, in practical terms<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
requiring a NULL in this location empirically has very good<br class=3D"gma=
il_msg">
compatibility and we don&#39;t like adding flexibility without good<br clas=
s=3D"gmail_msg">
reason.<br class=3D"gmail_msg"></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I believe w=
e are also correct per spec. My interpretation of these documents is that t=
he general AlgorithmIdentifier structure may or may not include parameters.=
 However, whether a given parameter value or omitting parameters altogether=
 is legal is a question for the particular algorithm. It&#39;s not overridi=
ng but plugging into the general framework. Specifications for individual a=
lgorithm OIDs say what to put in the parameters field:</div><div><br></div>=
<div>For id-rsaEncryption, RFC 3279 (previously cited) says it is not optio=
nal and the only legal value is NULL.</div><div><a href=3D"https://tools.ie=
tf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#sect=
ion-2.3.1</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>For id-RSASSAS-PSS, RFC 4055 say=
s the parameters are not optional and specifies the structure.</div><div><a=
 href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4055#section-3.1">https://tools.iet=
f.org/html/rfc4055#section-3.1</a></div><div><br></div><div>For id-ecPublic=
Key, RFC 5480 says something similar and gives the structure.</div><div><a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5480#section-2.1.1">https://tools.ie=
tf.org/html/rfc5480#section-2.1.1</a></div><div><br></div><div>For id-dsa, =
RFC 3279 says they are actually optional. (Although this was a pretty bad i=
dea since it&#39;s used in this bizarre parameter inheritance thing...)</di=
v><div><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.2">https:=
//tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.2</a></div><div><br></div><div>No=
ne of these can be talking about standalone structures like RSAPublicKey. T=
hose structures usually don&#39;t even include AlgorithmIdentifiers (no nee=
d when you already know the key type) and are usually specified in other do=
cuments like RFC 3447.</div><div><br></div><div>David</div></div></div>

--001a1146c9def272f3053d5c124e--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Henrick =
Hellstr=F6m
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 2:35 PM
> To: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
>=20
> On 2016-09-25 23:23, David Benjamin wrote:
> > Do you mean in RSA SubjectPublicKeyInfos? For those, such encodings
> > are not actually standards-compliant. Per RFC 3279, 2.3.1:
> >
> >    The rsaEncryption OID is intended to be used in the algorithm =
field
> >    of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier.  The parameters field =
MUST
> >    have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier.
> >
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1
>=20
> Then again, the ASN.1 module in
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5280/ says differently. Strictly
speaking, RFC
> 3279 does not override the PKIX specification when it comes to X.509
> certificates; only for formats such as RSA PUBLIC KEY that rely solely =
on
the
> ASN.1 module in RFC 3279.

The ASN.1 module in RFC 5280 does not say anything about if the field is
optional for any specific algorithm.  The ASN.1 for algorithm identifier =
is

AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=3D  SEQUENCE  {
        algorithm               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        parameters              ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL =20

This very explicitly says that the value (and hence presence) of the
parameters fields is strictly defined by the algorithm identifier.  The
algorithm identifiers for RSA with the SHA2 algorithms explicitly say =
they
are required.


RFC 5912 shows that this is required with the way it defines the same
information

  sa-sha256WithRSAEncryption SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=3D {
       IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption
       PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
       HASHES { mda-sha256 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
       SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY sha256WithRSAEncryption }
   }

You can see that the parameters are required and not optional.

Jim


>=20
>=20
> > There are other contexts where (due to historical mistakes) specs
> > declared both are acceptable, but amazingly not RSA SPKIs. BoringSSL
> > has enforced it for quite some time now, so it seems this part of =
the
> > specification matches reality. If I recall, mozilla::pkix enforces
> > this as well?
>=20
> Actually no, just tested Chrome v53 and Firefox v49 for the Windows
platform.
> Only Chrome fails when connecting to a server that presents a server
certificate
> with the NULL parameters omitted from the DER encoding.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Sun Sep 25 16:35:35 2016
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
From: =?UTF-8?Q?Henrick_Hellstr=c3=b6m?= <henrick@streamsec.se>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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On 2016-09-25 23:55, David Benjamin wrote:
> I believe we are also correct per spec. My interpretation of these
> documents is that the general AlgorithmIdentifier structure may or may
> not include parameters. However, whether a given parameter value or
> omitting parameters altogether is legal is a question for the particular
> algorithm. It's not overriding but plugging into the general framework.

THe ITU-T X.690 standard for DER might require some close reading to 
interpret, and this is obviously a topic for debate. I would presume 
that the use of "default" in lower caps in section 11.5, refers to both 
the DEFAULT and the OPTIONAL keyword:

   11.5	Set and sequence components with default value
   The encoding of a set value or sequence value shall not include an
   encoding for any component value which is equal to its default value.

After all, this is the only interpretation that is consistent with the 
description in section 12.5 of DER as unambiguous.

Since NULL is always empty, it should be omitted when OPTIONAL, given 
the above interpretation. But is it optional? The 1988 syntax did not 
feature information objects and classes, hence the use of the ANY keyword.

Luckily the ASN.1 modules were updated in RFC 5912 to modern ASN.1 
syntax. There you have these declarations:

--  SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a signature algorithm
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the signature algorithm
--  &Value - contains a type definition for the value structure of
--              the signature; if absent, implies that no ASN.1
--              encoding is performed on the value
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &HashSet - The set of hash algorithms used with this
--                  signature algorithm
--  &PublicKeySet - the set of public key algorithms for this
--                  signature algorithm
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  Example:
--  sig-RSA-PSS SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
--     IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS
--     PARAMS TYPE RSASSA-PSS-params ARE required
--     HASHES { mda-sha1 | mda-md5, ... }
--     PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsa-pss }
-- }


SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
     &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
     &Value          OPTIONAL,
     &Params         OPTIONAL,
     &paramPresence  ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
     &HashSet        DIGEST-ALGORITHM OPTIONAL,
     &PublicKeySet   PUBLIC-KEY OPTIONAL,
     &smimeCaps      SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
     IDENTIFIER &id
     [VALUE &Value]
     [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence ]
     [HASHES &HashSet]
     [PUBLIC-KEYS &PublicKeySet]

AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::=
         SEQUENCE {
             algorithm   ALGORITHM-TYPE.&id({AlgorithmSet}),
             parameters  ALGORITHM-TYPE.
                    &Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
         }

    pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
     IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
     KEY RSAPublicKey
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
     -- Private key format not in this module --
     CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
     keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
    }

Hence, the correct encoding is for NULL to be absent.


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To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, 'David Benjamin' <davidben@google.com>, tls@ietf.org
From: =?UTF-8?Q?Henrick_Hellstr=c3=b6m?= <henrick@streamsec.se>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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On 2016-09-26 01:29, Jim Schaad wrote:
> The ASN.1 module in RFC 5280 does not say anything about if the field is
> optional for any specific algorithm.  The ASN.1 for algorithm identifier is
>
> AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
>         algorithm               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>         parameters              ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
>
> This very explicitly says that the value (and hence presence) of the
> parameters fields is strictly defined by the algorithm identifier.  The
> algorithm identifiers for RSA with the SHA2 algorithms explicitly say they
> are required.
>
>
> RFC 5912 shows that this is required with the way it defines the same
> information
>
>   sa-sha256WithRSAEncryption SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
>        IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption
>        PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
>        HASHES { mda-sha256 }
>        PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
>        SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY sha256WithRSAEncryption }
>    }
>
> You can see that the parameters are required and not optional.

Thanks, you are absolutely correct about this, and this crucial for 
getting PKCS #1 v1.5 signatures right (since the algorithm identifier 
encoding is part of the data to be signed), but at the same time, NULL 
should be absent from the RSA public key:

    pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
     IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
     KEY RSAPublicKey
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
     -- Private key format not in this module --
     CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
     keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
    }

and this is definitely not common practice.


From nobody Sun Sep 25 17:03:09 2016
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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: <henrick@streamsec.se>, 'David Benjamin' <davidben@chromium.org>, 'Adam Langley' <agl@imperialviolet.org>
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Henrick =
Hellstr=F6m
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 4:35 PM
> To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>; Adam Langley
> <agl@imperialviolet.org>
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
>=20
> On 2016-09-25 23:55, David Benjamin wrote:
> > I believe we are also correct per spec. My interpretation of these
> > documents is that the general AlgorithmIdentifier structure may or =
may
> > not include parameters. However, whether a given parameter value or
> > omitting parameters altogether is legal is a question for the
> > particular algorithm. It's not overriding but plugging into the =
general
> framework.
>=20
> THe ITU-T X.690 standard for DER might require some close reading to
interpret,
> and this is obviously a topic for debate. I would presume that the use =
of
> "default" in lower caps in section 11.5, refers to both the DEFAULT =
and
the
> OPTIONAL keyword:

OPTIONAL and DEFAULT are not the same things.  A DEFAULT value is =
omitted
but not an OPTIONAL value.  A single field cannot be both OPTIONAL and
DEFAULT.

Jim

>=20
>    11.5	Set and sequence components with default value
>    The encoding of a set value or sequence value shall not include an
>    encoding for any component value which is equal to its default =
value.
>=20
> After all, this is the only interpretation that is consistent with the
description in
> section 12.5 of DER as unambiguous.
>=20
> Since NULL is always empty, it should be omitted when OPTIONAL, given =
the
> above interpretation. But is it optional? The 1988 syntax did not =
feature
> information objects and classes, hence the use of the ANY keyword.
>=20
> Luckily the ASN.1 modules were updated in RFC 5912 to modern ASN.1 =
syntax.
> There you have these declarations:
>=20
> --  SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
> --
> --  Describes the basic properties of a signature algorithm
> --
> --  &id - contains the OID identifying the signature algorithm
> --  &Value - contains a type definition for the value structure of
> --              the signature; if absent, implies that no ASN.1
> --              encoding is performed on the value
> --  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
> --               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
> --  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
> --  &HashSet - The set of hash algorithms used with this
> --                  signature algorithm
> --  &PublicKeySet - the set of public key algorithms for this
> --                  signature algorithm
> --  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
> --              capabilities are presented.
> --
> --  Example:
> --  sig-RSA-PSS SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=3D {
> --     IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS
> --     PARAMS TYPE RSASSA-PSS-params ARE required
> --     HASHES { mda-sha1 | mda-md5, ... }
> --     PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsa-pss }
> -- }
>=20
>=20
> SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=3D CLASS {
>      &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
>      &Value          OPTIONAL,
>      &Params         OPTIONAL,
>      &paramPresence  ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
>      &HashSet        DIGEST-ALGORITHM OPTIONAL,
>      &PublicKeySet   PUBLIC-KEY OPTIONAL,
>      &smimeCaps      SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
> } WITH SYNTAX {
>      IDENTIFIER &id
>      [VALUE &Value]
>      [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence ]
>      [HASHES &HashSet]
>      [PUBLIC-KEYS &PublicKeySet]
>=20
> AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::=3D
>          SEQUENCE {
>              algorithm   ALGORITHM-TYPE.&id({AlgorithmSet}),
>              parameters  ALGORITHM-TYPE.
>                     &Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
>          }
>=20
>     pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::=3D {
>      IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
>      KEY RSAPublicKey
>      PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
>      -- Private key format not in this module --
>      CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
>      keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
>     }
>=20
> Hence, the correct encoding is for NULL to be absent.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Sun Sep 25 17:11:26 2016
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To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, 'David Benjamin' <davidben@chromium.org>, 'Adam Langley' <agl@imperialviolet.org>
From: =?UTF-8?Q?Henrick_Hellstr=c3=b6m?= <henrick@streamsec.se>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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On 2016-09-26 02:02, Jim Schaad wrote:
> OPTIONAL and DEFAULT are not the same things.  A DEFAULT value is omitted
> but not an OPTIONAL value.  A single field cannot be both OPTIONAL and
> DEFAULT.

My point was that "DEFAULT" is not the same as "default" either, but 
let's leave it there.

You were listed as a co-author on RTC 5912, so maybe you could clarify 
whether the declaration of pk-rsa should still be considered to be correct:

    pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
     IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
     KEY RSAPublicKey
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
     -- Private key format not in this module --
     CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
     keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
    }



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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: <henrick@streamsec.se>, 'David Benjamin' <davidben@google.com>, <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Henrick Hellstr=C3=B6m [mailto:henrick@streamsec.se]
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 4:42 PM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; 'David Benjamin'
> <davidben@google.com>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
>=20
> On 2016-09-26 01:29, Jim Schaad wrote:
> > The ASN.1 module in RFC 5280 does not say anything about if the =
field
> > is optional for any specific algorithm.  The ASN.1 for algorithm
> > identifier is
> >
> > AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=3D  SEQUENCE  {
> >         algorithm               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
> >         parameters              ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
> >
> > This very explicitly says that the value (and hence presence) of the
> > parameters fields is strictly defined by the algorithm identifier.
> > The algorithm identifiers for RSA with the SHA2 algorithms =
explicitly
> > say they are required.
> >
> >
> > RFC 5912 shows that this is required with the way it defines the =
same
> > information
> >
> >   sa-sha256WithRSAEncryption SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=3D {
> >        IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption
> >        PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
> >        HASHES { mda-sha256 }
> >        PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
> >        SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY sha256WithRSAEncryption }
> >    }
> >
> > You can see that the parameters are required and not optional.
>=20
> Thanks, you are absolutely correct about this, and this crucial for =
getting PKCS
> #1 v1.5 signatures right (since the algorithm identifier encoding is =
part of the
> data to be signed), but at the same time, NULL should be absent from =
the RSA
> public key:
>=20
>     pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::=3D {
>      IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
>      KEY RSAPublicKey
>      PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
>      -- Private key format not in this module --
>      CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
>      keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
>     }
>=20
> and this is definitely not common practice.

No, it appears that I messed this up. (:  It should be required and not =
absent.

The text in RFC3279 says

The parameters field MUST have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm =
identifier.

Unhappiness.




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To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, 'David Benjamin' <davidben@google.com>, tls@ietf.org
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On 2016-09-26 02:34, Jim Schaad wrote:
> No, it appears that I messed this up. (:  It should be required and not absent.

OK, but it is strange. There are older implementations that predate RFC 
5912 by more than a decade that did omit NULL parameters. I know that 
because I encountered them and had to account for them back in 2002, 
iirc. If this is indeed a mistake, you were not the first to make it.


From nobody Sun Sep 25 18:01:34 2016
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Henrick =
Hellstr=F6m
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 5:46 PM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; 'David Benjamin'
> <davidben@google.com>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
>=20
> On 2016-09-26 02:34, Jim Schaad wrote:
> > No, it appears that I messed this up. (:  It should be required and =
not
absent.
>=20
> OK, but it is strange. There are older implementations that predate =
RFC
> 5912 by more than a decade that did omit NULL parameters. I know that
> because I encountered them and had to account for them back in 2002, =
iirc.
If
> this is indeed a mistake, you were not the first to make it.

Unfortunately true.  The correct value to put at this point is going to =
be
preferedAbsent or preferedPresent and live with the results because =
people
and standards have done it both ways for years.

Jim

>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
wrote:

>
> Again, let me restate,  I don't think anyone is saying that we MUST have
> RSA.    But, we, as the clients of the IETF TLS protocol, would like to
> work with you to assure we have workable, manageable  and affordable
> solutions,  that meets our needs as well as the needs of others.
>

I think TLS 1.3 as it is might actually be compatible with your
requirements.  The technology you need, Dual EC, was developed by the US
Government and has already been standardized by ANSI X9.  Here's a
whitepaper on how it would work:

    http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf

There are some organizations that would no doubt be happy to lend their
expertise, including RSA-the-company.

-hs.

--001a114f38a8d381a8053d5eec66
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On S=
un, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com" target=3D"_blank">MAckermann@bcbsm.com</=
a>&gt;</span> wrote:</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=C2=A0<blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Again, let me restate,=C2=A0 I don&#39;t think anyone is saying that we MUS=
T have RSA.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 But, we, as the clients of the IETF TLS protocol, =
would like to work with you to assure we have workable, manageable=C2=A0 an=
d affordable solutions,=C2=A0 that meets our needs as well as the needs of =
others.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think TLS 1.3 as it is might =
actually be compatible with your requirements.=C2=A0 The technology you nee=
d, Dual EC, was developed by the US Government and has already been standar=
dized by ANSI X9.=C2=A0 Here&#39;s a whitepaper on how it would work:</div>=
<div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0<a href=3D"http://dualec.org/DualECT=
LS.pdf">http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf</a></div><div><br></div><div>There =
are some organizations that would no doubt be happy to lend their expertise=
, including RSA-the-company.</div><div><br></div><div>-hs.</div></div></div=
></div>

--001a114f38a8d381a8053d5eec66--


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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Thijs van Dijk wrote:
> 
> Regular clients, no.
> But this would be a useful addition to debugging / scanning suites (e.g.
> Qualys), or browser extensions for the security conscious (e.g. CertPatrol).

With FREAK and LOGJAM attacks, there is a significant difference in
effort between servers using a static private (DH or temporary RSA) key
vs. truely ephemeral key.  But security checks of "vulnerability scanners"
do not seem to do any checks on whether the server is presenting the
same public key on multiple handshakes.

Generation of truely ephemeral DH keys for every full handshake is IMO
quite expensive for 2048+ bits DH.  The reason why I like Curve25519
is that generation of ephemeral keys is cheap.

-Martin


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From: Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 10:28:29 +0200
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To: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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--001a1141b674b8b4a3053d64e94b
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Hi All

There is a smart way to recover DH secret by a third party

It is DH tripartite base on EC paring

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-dh-tripartite-00

Rgs

Pascal



2016-09-25 23:20 GMT+02:00 Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>:

> I understand your concern over what the nation-state actors are doing but
> it is not the same as what Enterprises do to manage their private servers,
> networks and clients.
>
> Your final paragraph is quite a constructive question.   "What
> specifically would you have us do? What do you want in the protocol that
> enables your needs, but doesn't make it possible for everyone in the world
> to be surveilled?  Please, make some specific suggestions."
>
> My personal perspective would be, that the approach to achieving an answer
> to that important question, would start with:
>
> 1.  Gathering  protocol neutral requirements from all involved factions,
> (with help and suggestions from people on the TLS list)
>
> 2.   Brainstorming session(s) with people on the TLS list as well
> potential users/operators, with objectives that include the design of a
> solution that meets (hopefully) all known requirements.
>
> What I would like to see come out of the debate we seem to be currently
> involved in,  is the realization that significant operational/management
> issues exist with TLS 1.3 and that the IETF is taking them seriously enough
> to at least begin dialogue intended to address these issues, and
> potentially work together to craft related solution(s).   In my view this
> issue is far too complex &  pervasive to believe that any one person or
> group's perspective would produce a viable overall solution.
>
> Again, let me restate,  I don't think anyone is saying that we MUST have
> RSA.    But, we, as the clients of the IETF TLS protocol, would like to
> work with you to assure we have workable, manageable  and affordable
> solutions,  that meets our needs as well as the needs of others.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Salz, Rich [mailto:rsalz@akamai.com]
> Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2016 10:10 PM
> To: Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>; Pawel Jakub Dawidek <
> p.dawidek@wheelsystems.com>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
> >   This lack of scope, depth and detail [in MITM infrastructures] are
> > what drove us to install the packet collection infrastructures
> > (debugging networks I think some are saying).
>
> At the risk of repeating myself and flogging this dead horse...  What you
> are doing is exactly what the nation-state actors are doing.  I bet that
> some even use that exact phrase of "packet collection infrastructure."
>
> I understand that if you want to use TLS 1.3, it is going to be expensive
> and/or inconvenient; you're going to have to educate regulators and get
> bespoke TLS endpoint solutions from vendors. Perhaps you can get the NSA's
> to stop collecting everyone's Internet traffic for future decoding?
>
> Less flippantly, what specifically would you have us do? What do you want
> in the protocol that enables your needs, but doesn't make it possible for
> everyone in the world to be surveilled?  Please, make some specific
> suggestions.
>
>
>
>
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential and
> is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this
> communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are
> hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of
> this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic
> mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original
> message without making any copies.
>
>  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are
> nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue
> Shield Association.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a1141b674b8b4a3053d64e94b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi All<div><br></div><div>There is a smart way to recover =
DH secret by a third party</div><div><br></div><div>It is DH tripartite bas=
e on EC paring</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/h=
tml/draft-urien-tls-dh-tripartite-00">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-uri=
en-tls-dh-tripartite-00</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Rgs</div><div><br>=
</div><div>Pascal</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2016-09-25 23:20 GMT+02:00 Ackerm=
ann, Michael <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com" =
target=3D"_blank">MAckermann@bcbsm.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">I understand your concern over what the nation-state actors a=
re doing but it is not the same as what Enterprises do to manage their priv=
ate servers, networks and clients.<br>
<br>
Your final paragraph is quite a constructive question.=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;Wh=
at specifically would you have us do? What do you want in the protocol that=
 enables your needs, but doesn&#39;t make it possible for everyone in the w=
orld to be surveilled?=C2=A0 Please, make some specific suggestions.&quot;<=
br>
<br>
My personal perspective would be, that the approach to achieving an answer =
to that important question, would start with:<br>
<br>
1.=C2=A0 Gathering=C2=A0 protocol neutral requirements from all involved fa=
ctions,=C2=A0 (with help and suggestions from people on the TLS list)<br>
<br>
2.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Brainstorming session(s) with people on the TLS list as well=
 potential users/operators, with objectives that include the design of a so=
lution that meets (hopefully) all known requirements.<br>
<br>
What I would like to see come out of the debate we seem to be currently inv=
olved in,=C2=A0 is the realization that significant operational/management=
=C2=A0 issues exist with TLS 1.3 and that the IETF is taking them seriously=
 enough to at least begin dialogue intended to address these issues, and po=
tentially work together to craft related solution(s).=C2=A0 =C2=A0In my vie=
w this issue is far too complex &amp;=C2=A0 pervasive to believe that any o=
ne person or group&#39;s perspective would produce a viable overall solutio=
n.<br>
<br>
Again, let me restate,=C2=A0 I don&#39;t think anyone is saying that we MUS=
T have RSA.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 But, we, as the clients of the IETF TLS protocol, =
would like to work with you to assure we have workable, manageable=C2=A0 an=
d affordable solutions,=C2=A0 that meets our needs as well as the needs of =
others.<br>
<span class=3D"im HOEnZb"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Salz, Rich [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">rsalz@akamai.c=
om</a>]<br>
Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2016 10:10 PM<br>
To: Ackermann, Michael &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com">MAckerma=
nn@bcbsm.com</a>&gt;; Pawel Jakub Dawidek &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:p.dawidek@w=
heelsystems.com">p.dawidek@wheelsystems.com</a>&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@=
ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: RE: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0This lack of scope, depth and detail [in MITM infrastructu=
res] are<br>
&gt; what drove us to install the packet collection infrastructures<br>
&gt; (debugging networks I think some are saying).<br>
<br>
At the risk of repeating myself and flogging this dead horse...=C2=A0 What =
you are doing is exactly what the nation-state actors are doing.=C2=A0 I be=
t that some even use that exact phrase of &quot;packet collection infrastru=
cture.&quot;<br>
<br>
I understand that if you want to use TLS 1.3, it is going to be expensive a=
nd/or inconvenient; you&#39;re going to have to educate regulators and get =
bespoke TLS endpoint solutions from vendors. Perhaps you can get the NSA&#3=
9;s to stop collecting everyone&#39;s Internet traffic for future decoding?=
<br>
<br>
Less flippantly, what specifically would you have us do? What do you want i=
n the protocol that enables your needs, but doesn&#39;t make it possible fo=
r everyone in the world to be surveilled?=C2=A0 Please, make some specific =
suggestions.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</span><span class=3D"im HOEnZb">The information contained in this communic=
ation is highly confidential and is intended solely for the use of the indi=
vidual(s) to whom this communication is directed. If you are not the intend=
ed recipient, you are hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure=
 or distribution of this information is prohibited. Please notify the sende=
r, by electronic mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete th=
e original message without making any copies.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan =
are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and =
Blue Shield Association.<br>
<br>
</span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">____________________________=
__<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a1141b674b8b4a3053d64e94b--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 12:33:02 +0000
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> I understand your concern over what the nation-state actors are doing but=
 it
> is not the same as what Enterprises do to manage their private servers,
> networks and clients.

Okay, in technical terms only, what is the difference?
=20
> My personal perspective would be, that the approach to achieving an answe=
r
> to that important question, would start with:

It's too late for that.  We're at the end-game, not the start.  I'm only a =
WG member, not editor, chair, or Area Director, but I would be extremely su=
rprised if there was any consensus to delay things. =20

> What I would like to see come out of the debate we seem to be currently
> involved in,  is the realization that significant operational/management

I hope you don't take this the wrong way, but I don't see that we're having=
 a debate. I see a couple of new WG members re-raising an issue that the WG=
 decided years ago.  And that the rest of the WG is pretty consistently exp=
ressing their, shall we call it, lack of interest?  And some people have of=
fered TLS 1.2, end-point-based interception, and static key shares as ways =
to address it.  And I haven=92t seen a response to those suggestions.

Your most effective course of action is to come up with a specific proposal=
, and probably within a week or two.=20


From nobody Mon Sep 26 07:55:40 2016
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To: Pawel Jakub Dawidek <p.dawidek@wheelsystems.com>
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Pawel Jakub Dawidek wrote:
> 
> Because of that, every corporate network needs visibility inside TLS
> traffic not only incoming, but also outgoing, so they can not only
> debug, but also look for data leaks, malware, etc.

There may be a some countries with poor civil liberty protections
where such activies (employee communication surveillance) has
not been criminalized yet, but at least in the European Union,
there is EU Directive 2002/58/EC which requires member states to
criminalize such surveillance.  In Germany, this was criminalized
with the 2004 update of the TKG (Telekommunikationsgesetz) and
will get every employer up to 5 years prison term for doing this.

And no, there can not be any valid regulations to require such
monitoring, because _every_ to the secrecy provisions and criminalization
requires an explicit law from the parlamentarian legislator.

"regulations" are issued by parts of the government (executive power),
and the German national law (TKG) and the German constitution (GG)
formally excludes the executive power from defining/creating exceptions
to telecommunication secrecy.


-Martin


From nobody Mon Sep 26 09:56:09 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Antw: Re: Antw: Re: Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
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> Pushed to the extreme, the result is a sort of protocol drift, in which b=
uggy variants get first tolerated, and then accepted as de-facto standards.
Indeed, we're seeing several instances of this protocol drift in TLS 1.3 (2=
.0? 4.0?), e.g. the relaxed rules around the signature_algorithms extension=
 and the version negotiation workaround that just got adopted...

Cheers,

Andrei

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Christian Huitema
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 5:52 PM
To: 'Peter Gutmann' <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; 'Andreas Walz' <andreas.wa=
lz@hs-offenburg.de>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Antw: Re: Antw: Re: Suspicious behaviour of TLS server i=
mplementations

On Friday, September 23, 2016 1:39 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:
>
>>However, where would you draw the line between "I can't" and "I don't=20
>>want to"?
>=20
> It's one of those judgement-call things, I don't know if you can=20
> strictly define it but as a rule of thumb I'd say that if you=20
> encounter it during normal processing it's an I-can't problem while if=20
> you have to add
special-
> case checks to identify it and refuse to continue it's an=20
> I-don't-want-to problem.

Yes of course, but there is another aspect to it, the general health of the=
 ecosystem. Postel's rule is nice, but it removes the pressure on broken im=
plementations to fix their code. Pushed to the extreme, the result is a sor=
t of protocol drift, in which buggy variants get first tolerated, and then =
accepted as de-facto standards. This tends to hinder future evolutions, not=
 to mention adding complexity. We often hear that "the IETF has no protocol=
 police," but in fact it does. Each implementation that takes a strict view=
 of standard compliance contributes to this policing.

-- Christian Huitema



_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
To: Brian Sniffen <bsniffen@akamai.com>, "nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com" <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From nobody Mon Sep 26 13:12:12 2016
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From: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Andrew,



Then I think your option is to persuade the regulators not to require TLS 1=
.3 for internal networks. Also, unlike SSL 3.0 =96 TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 is not =
currently known to be weak or insecure, if properly implemented and not usi=
ng insecure cipher suites. So in my opinion, it makes sense to keep using T=
LS 1.2 internally.



Best,

Xiaoyin



From: BITS Security<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 3:02 PM
To: Peter Bowen<mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3



Peter-

Outbound TLS connections require MITM for decryption.  Inbound or internal =
TLS connections can be decrypted with an RSA private key under TLS 1.2.

The PCI DSS is already requiring TLS 1.2 for financial institutions that pa=
rticipate in the Payment Card Industry.  .BANK (exclusive top level banking=
 domain) is also planning to require TLS 1.2.   We're anticipating that a r=
egulatory body like these will require TLS 1.3 at some point in the future.=
  Financial institutions then have to comply if they want to continue to do=
 business with the companies represented by the regulatory body (like large=
 credit card companies in the case of PCI).

-Andrew




-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 7:18 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:10 PM, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.o=
rg> wrote:
>  we need a better option than TLS 1.2 that will, perhaps sooner than we m=
ight expect, be deprecated.

I'm somewhat confused here.  The concern over RSA for key exchange versus D=
H for key exchange would only seem to apply when the network tapping system=
 has access to the RSA key, right?  So the part of this about monitoring th=
e network for external chat and such doesn't really change if the client is=
 using TLS 1.1 or 1.3, as you still can't decrypt the connection just from =
monitoring, right?

If that is true, then it implies that the server is at least somewhat under=
 control of the monitor, so it can support TLS 1.2 as long as needed.  TLS =
1.0 came out in 1999 and is still now (in 2016) widely deployed.  While I h=
ope TLS 1.3 deployment is speedy, I don't forsee browsers dropping TLS 1.2 =
and earlier support any time soon.

Thanks,
Peter
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Andrew,</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Then I think your option is to persuade the regula=
tors not to require TLS 1.3 for
<b>internal</b> networks. Also, unlike SSL 3.0 =96 TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 is not =
currently known to be weak or insecure, if properly implemented and not usi=
ng insecure cipher suites. So in my opinion, it makes sense to keep using T=
LS 1.2 internally.</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Best,</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Xiaoyin</p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">&nbsp;</span></p>
<div style=3D"border:none; border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt; padding:3.0pt 0i=
n 0in 0in">
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal" style=3D"border:none; padding:0in"><b>From: </b><a=
 href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITS Security</a><br>
<b>Sent: </b>Monday, September 26, 2016 3:02 PM<br>
<b>To: </b><a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">Peter Bowen</a><br>
<b>Cc: </b><a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3</p>
</div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">&nbsp;</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;">
<div class=3D"PlainText">Peter- <br>
<br>
Outbound TLS connections require MITM for decryption.&nbsp; Inbound or inte=
rnal TLS connections can be decrypted with an RSA private key under TLS 1.2=
.
<br>
<br>
The PCI DSS is already requiring TLS 1.2 for financial institutions that pa=
rticipate in the Payment Card Industry.&nbsp; .BANK (exclusive top level ba=
nking domain) is also planning to require TLS 1.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; We're antici=
pating that a regulatory body like these will require
 TLS 1.3 at some point in the future.&nbsp; Financial institutions then hav=
e to comply if they want to continue to do business with the companies repr=
esented by the regulatory body (like large credit card companies in the cas=
e of PCI).<br>
<br>
-Andrew<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Peter Bowen [<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">mailto:pzbowen@gmai=
l.com</a>]
<br>
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 7:18 PM<br>
To: BITS Security &lt;BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org&gt;<br>
Cc: Yaron Sheffer &lt;yaronf.ietf@gmail.com&gt;; tls@ietf.org<br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:10 PM, BITS Security &lt;BITSSecurity@fsroundtabl=
e.org&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&nbsp; we need a better option than TLS 1.2 that will, perhaps sooner t=
han we might expect, be deprecated.<br>
<br>
I'm somewhat confused here.&nbsp; The concern over RSA for key exchange ver=
sus DH for key exchange would only seem to apply when the network tapping s=
ystem has access to the RSA key, right?&nbsp; So the part of this about mon=
itoring the network for external chat and
 such doesn't really change if the client is using TLS 1.1 or 1.3, as you s=
till can't decrypt the connection just from monitoring, right?<br>
<br>
If that is true, then it implies that the server is at least somewhat under=
 control of the monitor, so it can support TLS 1.2 as long as needed.&nbsp;=
 TLS 1.0 came out in 1999 and is still now (in 2016) widely deployed.&nbsp;=
 While I hope TLS 1.3 deployment is speedy,
 I don't forsee browsers dropping TLS 1.2 and earlier support any time soon=
.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Peter<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div>
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</body>
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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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?  Then I think your option is to persuade the regulators not to require TL=
S 1.3 for internal networks.

?  So in my opinion, it makes sense to keep using TLS 1.2 internally.
Won't the TLS WG stop addressing newly found protocol-level security issues=
 in TLS 1.2 at some point in the future? I don't think financial institutio=
ns' internal networks can stay on TLS 1.2 indefinitely.

Cheers,

Andrei

From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Xiaoyin Liu
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 1:12 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>; Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gma=
il.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3


Andrew,



Then I think your option is to persuade the regulators not to require TLS 1=
.3 for internal networks. Also, unlike SSL 3.0 - TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 is not cu=
rrently known to be weak or insecure, if properly implemented and not using=
 insecure cipher suites. So in my opinion, it makes sense to keep using TLS=
 1.2 internally.



Best,

Xiaoyin



From: BITS Security<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 3:02 PM
To: Peter Bowen<mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3


Peter-

Outbound TLS connections require MITM for decryption.  Inbound or internal =
TLS connections can be decrypted with an RSA private key under TLS 1.2.

The PCI DSS is already requiring TLS 1.2 for financial institutions that pa=
rticipate in the Payment Card Industry.  .BANK (exclusive top level banking=
 domain) is also planning to require TLS 1.2.   We're anticipating that a r=
egulatory body like these will require TLS 1.3 at some point in the future.=
  Financial institutions then have to comply if they want to continue to do=
 business with the companies represented by the regulatory body (like large=
 credit card companies in the case of PCI).

-Andrew




-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 7:18 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroun=
dtable.org>>
Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com<mailto:yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>>; tl=
s@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:10 PM, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.o=
rg<mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>> wrote:
>  we need a better option than TLS 1.2 that will, perhaps sooner than we m=
ight expect, be deprecated.

I'm somewhat confused here.  The concern over RSA for key exchange versus D=
H for key exchange would only seem to apply when the network tapping system=
 has access to the RSA key, right?  So the part of this about monitoring th=
e network for external chat and such doesn't really change if the client is=
 using TLS 1.1 or 1.3, as you still can't decrypt the connection just from =
monitoring, right?

If that is true, then it implies that the server is at least somewhat under=
 control of the monitor, so it can support TLS 1.2 as long as needed.  TLS =
1.0 came out in 1999 and is still now (in 2016) widely deployed.  While I h=
ope TLS 1.3 deployment is speedy, I don't forsee browsers dropping TLS 1.2 =
and earlier support any time soon.

Thanks,
Peter
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level=
1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-family:Wingdings"><span st=
yle=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&Oslash;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New R=
oman&quot;">&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]>Then I think your option is to persuade the =
regulators not to require TLS 1.3 for
<b>internal</b> networks.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level=
1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wi=
ngdings"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&Oslash;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]>So in my opinion, it makes sense to keep usi=
ng TLS 1.2 internally.<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Won&#8217;t the TLS WG stop addressing newly found =
protocol-level security issues in TLS 1.2 at some point in the future? I do=
n&#8217;t think financial institutions&#8217; internal networks
 can stay on TLS 1.2 indefinitely.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Andrei<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;=
font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif"> TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.o=
rg]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Xiaoyin Liu<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, September 26, 2016 1:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> BITS Security &lt;BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org&gt;; Peter Bowen=
 &lt;pzbowen@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"xmsonormal">Andrew,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"xmsonormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"xmsonormal">Then I think your option is to persuade the regulat=
ors not to require TLS 1.3 for
<b>internal</b> networks. Also, unlike SSL 3.0 &#8211; TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 is =
not currently known to be weak or insecure, if properly implemented and not=
 using insecure cipher suites. So in my opinion, it makes sense to keep usi=
ng TLS 1.2 internally.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"xmsonormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"xmsonormal">Best,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"xmsonormal">Xiaoyin<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"xmsonormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;,serif">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"xmsonormal"><b>From: </b><a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsround=
table.org">BITS Security</a><br>
<b>Sent: </b>Monday, September 26, 2016 3:02 PM<br>
<b>To: </b><a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">Peter Bowen</a><br>
<b>Cc: </b><a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"xmsonormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;,serif">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Peter- <br>
<br>
Outbound TLS connections require MITM for decryption.&nbsp; Inbound or inte=
rnal TLS connections can be decrypted with an RSA private key under TLS 1.2=
.
<br>
<br>
The PCI DSS is already requiring TLS 1.2 for financial institutions that pa=
rticipate in the Payment Card Industry.&nbsp; .BANK (exclusive top level ba=
nking domain) is also planning to require TLS 1.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; We're antici=
pating that a regulatory body like these will require
 TLS 1.3 at some point in the future.&nbsp; Financial institutions then hav=
e to comply if they want to continue to do business with the companies repr=
esented by the regulatory body (like large credit card companies in the cas=
e of PCI).<br>
<br>
-Andrew<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Peter Bowen [<a href=3D"mailto:pzbowen@gmail.com">mailto:pzbowen@gmai=
l.com</a>]
<br>
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 7:18 PM<br>
To: BITS Security &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITS=
Security@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;<br>
Cc: Yaron Sheffer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:yaronf.ietf@gmail.com">yaronf.ietf@=
gmail.com</a>&gt;;
<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
<br>
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:10 PM, BITS Security &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSe=
curity@fsroundtable.org">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&nbsp; we need a better option than TLS 1.2 that will, perhaps sooner t=
han we might expect, be deprecated.<br>
<br>
I'm somewhat confused here.&nbsp; The concern over RSA for key exchange ver=
sus DH for key exchange would only seem to apply when the network tapping s=
ystem has access to the RSA key, right?&nbsp; So the part of this about mon=
itoring the network for external chat and
 such doesn't really change if the client is using TLS 1.1 or 1.3, as you s=
till can't decrypt the connection just from monitoring, right?<br>
<br>
If that is true, then it implies that the server is at least somewhat under=
 control of the monitor, so it can support TLS 1.2 as long as needed.&nbsp;=
 TLS 1.0 came out in 1999 and is still now (in 2016) widely deployed.&nbsp;=
 While I hope TLS 1.3 deployment is speedy,
 I don't forsee browsers dropping TLS 1.2 and earlier support any time soon=
.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Peter<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_CY1PR0301MB0842D6846E280D155833F20E8CCD0CY1PR0301MB0842_--


From nobody Mon Sep 26 14:45:22 2016
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> writes:

> Outbound TLS connections require MITM for decryption.  Inbound or
> internal TLS connections can be decrypted with an RSA private key
> under TLS 1.2.

It would be unwise to build a security or regulatory structure on the
principle that MITM will always be possible.  This is especially true
for the kinds of popular and frequently attacked services for which
DLP might be important, like Facebook, Twitter, Google, Apple,
Dropbox, Github.


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> On Sep 26, 2016, at 3:23 PM, BITS Security =
<BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:
>=20
> That said, at least one of the sites you mentioned was known to have =
an APT inside their perimeter (Operation Aurora) for about a month and =
part of the tactics within that attack which was publicly reported was =
the use of "SSL" to mask C&C communications. That's the type of threat =
we are concerned about inside of the enterprise network and we need =
visibility (and flexibility appropriate to our network design and risk =
tolerance) to solve for these issues in way that protects people like =
the ones you mentioned. =20

I very much doubt that the APT C&C traffic went out of its way to use
RSA key exchange to make the traffic enterprise-friendly, or even if
it happened to use RSA key exchange that the private keys were available
to the victim site...

All that RSA key exchange gives you is the ability to use long-term
keys of servers you control to decrypt past traffic through that server
if the private keys are still (or for better or worse become) available.

There are other ways to accomplish this.  For example, the server might
use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a
suitable escrow key.  If clients always enable session tickets, then
every handshake will result in the server returning a session ticket,
in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session ticket
keys are available.

There's no need to change to the TLS protocol to make such things
possible, it is sufficient to purchase server devices that in one
way or another record session master secrets for later recovery.

There will surely be vendors who'll be more than happy to be paid
to fulfill any business needs in this space.

Having worked in IT security in the financial services industry for
more than a couple of decades now, I am rather surprised and somewhat
appalled by this thread.  I don't believe that the concerns raised
should in any way influence protocol design.  Products that offer less
forward-secrecy than the protocol would otherwise deliver will be
available to those who control either or both end-points and need
to be able to be able to produce after-the-fact plaintext.

The good news about doing key escrow deliberately, rather than
as an unintended side-effect of RSA key exchange, is that it
can be both more reliable and more secure, since the escrow
private keys need not be the same as the server long-term
authentication keys, and are therefor less vulnerable.

RSA key exchange has a long history of problems, and it is time to
move on.  We should not be overly attached to one particular way of
doing key escrow.

--=20
--=20
	Viktor.


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 16:21:53 -0700
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On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:09 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:
>
> There are other ways to accomplish this.  For example, the server might
> use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a
> suitable escrow key.  If clients always enable session tickets, then
> every handshake will result in the server returning a session ticket,
> in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session ticket
> keys are available.
>

This actually doesn't work in TLS 1.3 because the resumption master secret
is not sufficient to decrypt the connection in which it was established.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:09 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.org" target=3D"_blank">ietf-dane@dukho=
vni.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
There are other ways to accomplish this.=C2=A0 For example, the server migh=
t<br>
use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a<br>
suitable escrow key.=C2=A0 If clients always enable session tickets, then<b=
r>
every handshake will result in the server returning a session ticket,<br>
in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session ticket<br>
keys are available.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This actually doesn=
&#39;t work in TLS 1.3 because the resumption master secret</div><div>is no=
t sufficient to decrypt the connection in which it was established.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>-Ekr</div></div><br></div></div>

--001a113e5f5822a87d053d7167f8--


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> On Sep 26, 2016, at 7:21 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> There are other ways to accomplish this.  For example, the server =
might
> use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a
> suitable escrow key.  If clients always enable session tickets, then
> every handshake will result in the server returning a session ticket,
> in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session ticket
> keys are available.
>=20
> This actually doesn't work in TLS 1.3 because the resumption master =
secret
> is not sufficient to decrypt the connection in which it was =
established.

Yes, I know that changed.  It was an example of something that works =
with
TLS 1.2 even when PFS is used.  With TLS 1.3 server or client =
implementations
can find other ways to retain long-term records of session keys.  The =
capability
to do that is not a requisite or desirable protocol feature.  Different =
user
communities will have different needs, and the best solution is to =
provide
security by default, and cede control of the result to the endpoints.

--=20
	Viktor.


From nobody Tue Sep 27 01:33:13 2016
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>
> Yes, I know that changed.  It was an example of something that works with
> TLS 1.2 even when PFS is used.  With TLS 1.3 server or client
> implementations
> can find other ways to retain long-term records of session keys.  The
> capability
> to do that is not a requisite or desirable protocol feature.  Different
> user
> communities will have different needs, and the best solution is to provide
> security by default, and cede control of the result to the endpoints.



I don't believe that storing this information on the endpoints is a great
idea, simply because the monitoring equipment will have a difficult time
ensuring that the information exists when it is needed. It also increases
the number of sites that are risks to compromising past data.

I think this challenge is best solved by putting the information on the
wire in some way, possibly as a special industry-specific extension (used
only by those who are bent on shooting themselves in the foot). The benefit
being that if the TLS channel is alive, the session information is
available to the monitor.  Just as a strawman, the client could transmit
session info in special records, encrypted by a public key, and the
monitoring equipment could scoop these up. For compatibility with servers
outside the network, a middlebox could somehow filter out these records.

It sounds like the need is large enough that such an effort is feasible,
and it would be good to keep normal TLS 1.3 unambiguously forward secure.
(There IS still the question of how to make sure that the extension is not
enabled in endpoints it shouldn't be.)

On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

>
> > On Sep 26, 2016, at 7:21 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> > There are other ways to accomplish this.  For example, the server might
> > use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a
> > suitable escrow key.  If clients always enable session tickets, then
> > every handshake will result in the server returning a session ticket,
> > in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session ticket
> > keys are available.
> >
> > This actually doesn't work in TLS 1.3 because the resumption master
> secret
> > is not sufficient to decrypt the connection in which it was established.
>
> Yes, I know that changed.  It was an example of something that works with
> TLS 1.2 even when PFS is used.  With TLS 1.3 server or client
> implementations
> can find other ways to retain long-term records of session keys.  The
> capability
> to do that is not a requisite or desirable protocol feature.  Different
> user
> communities will have different needs, and the best solution is to provide
> security by default, and cede control of the result to the endpoints.
>
> --
>         Viktor.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a11444a28fa7c9d053d79173d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"gmail-"><br></span>Yes, I know that changed.=C2=A0 It was an example=
 of something that works with<br>TLS 1.2 even when PFS is used.=C2=A0 With =
TLS 1.3 server or client implementations<br>can find other ways to retain l=
ong-term records of session keys.=C2=A0 The capability<br>to do that is not=
 a requisite or desirable protocol feature.=C2=A0 Different user<br>communi=
ties will have different needs, and the best solution is to provide<br>secu=
rity by default, and cede control of the result to the endpoints.</blockquo=
te></div></div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t believe=
 that storing this information on the endpoints is a great idea, simply bec=
ause the monitoring equipment will have a difficult time ensuring that the =
information exists when it is needed. It also increases the number of sites=
 that are risks to compromising past data.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I=
 think this challenge is best solved by putting the information on the wire=
 in some way, possibly as a special industry-specific extension (used only =
by those who are bent on shooting themselves in the foot). The benefit bein=
g that if the TLS channel is alive, the session information is available to=
 the monitor.=C2=A0 Just as a strawman, the client could transmit session i=
nfo in special records, encrypted by a public key, and the monitoring equip=
ment could scoop these up. For compatibility with servers outside the netwo=
rk, a middlebox could somehow filter out these records.</div><div><br></div=
><div>It sounds like the need is large enough that such an effort is feasib=
le, and it would be good to keep normal TLS 1.3 unambiguously forward secur=
e. (There IS still the question of how to make sure that the extension is n=
ot enabled in endpoints it shouldn&#39;t be.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Viktor D=
ukhovni <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.org" tar=
get=3D"_blank">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"gmail-"><br>
&gt; On Sep 26, 2016, at 7:21 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@r=
tfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There are other ways to accomplish this.=C2=A0 For example, the server=
 might<br>
&gt; use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a<br=
>
&gt; suitable escrow key.=C2=A0 If clients always enable session tickets, t=
hen<br>
&gt; every handshake will result in the server returning a session ticket,<=
br>
&gt; in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session ticket=
<br>
&gt; keys are available.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This actually doesn&#39;t work in TLS 1.3 because the resumption maste=
r secret<br>
&gt; is not sufficient to decrypt the connection in which it was establishe=
d.<br>
<br>
</span>Yes, I know that changed.=C2=A0 It was an example of something that =
works with<br>
TLS 1.2 even when PFS is used.=C2=A0 With TLS 1.3 server or client implemen=
tations<br>
can find other ways to retain long-term records of session keys.=C2=A0 The =
capability<br>
to do that is not a requisite or desirable protocol feature.=C2=A0 Differen=
t user<br>
communities will have different needs, and the best solution is to provide<=
br>
security by default, and cede control of the result to the endpoints.<br>
<div class=3D"gmail-HOEnZb"><div class=3D"gmail-h5"><br>
--<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Viktor.<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a11444a28fa7c9d053d79173d--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "Peter Bowen" <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Won=92t the TLS WG stop addressing newly found protocol-level security iss=
ues=0A=
>in TLS 1.2 at some point in the future?=0A=
=0A=
They already have, which is the point of TLS-LTS.=A0 Since that fixes all k=
nown=0A=
issues (and that also includes long-standing generic problems like use of M=
tE=0A=
that's led to a string of vulns stretching over years), it could well be th=
e=0A=
last updated needed for 1.2.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=
     =


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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 18:20:54 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 06:07:28PM +0000, BITS Security wrote:
> Hi Eric--Thank you for the prompt.  
> 
> Our requirements are for the same capabilities we have today with TLS
> 1.2, namely to be able to take a trace anywhere in our enterprise and
> decrypt it out of band (assuming that we own the TLS server).  This
> includes traces taken from physical taps, traces from span or mirror
> ports, traces from the virtual environment, and/or traces from agents
> on workstations.  We need to be able to apply a key to sniffer 
> devices, security and fraud monitoring tools, APM devices, and/or TLS
> decryption appliances.  

No changes to standards are going to happen to make that any easier.
Don't waste your time.


-Ilari


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To: Judson Wilson <wilson.judson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> On 27 Sep 2016, at 11:33 AM, Judson Wilson <wilson.judson@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Yes, I know that changed.  It was an example of something that works =
with
> TLS 1.2 even when PFS is used.  With TLS 1.3 server or client =
implementations
> can find other ways to retain long-term records of session keys.  The =
capability
> to do that is not a requisite or desirable protocol feature.  =
Different user
> communities will have different needs, and the best solution is to =
provide
> security by default, and cede control of the result to the endpoints.
>=20
>=20
> I don't believe that storing this information on the endpoints is a =
great idea, simply because the monitoring equipment will have a =
difficult time ensuring that the information exists when it is needed. =
It also increases the number of sites that are risks to compromising =
past data.=20

Assuming clients are browsers for the most part, storing information =
there is not robust. The servers or load balancers OTOH are small in =
number and controllable. If they store a static or time-limited server =
keyshare or even actual session keys it can be made to work. As for =
ensuring that the information is stored, that is true regardless of what =
regulations require to be stored.

> I think this challenge is best solved by putting the information on =
the wire in some way, possibly as a special industry-specific extension =
(used only by those who are bent on shooting themselves in the foot).

Like this?
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-tls-keyshare-02

But this doesn=E2=80=99t work if you=E2=80=99re using a standard =
browser. This draft was a strawman proposal for some argument. Even if =
we liked this and wanted to make this an RFC, I can=E2=80=99t see the =
likes of Google or Mozilla implementing this in their browsers. Or =
you=E2=80=99d need a fork of some server-side library. =
OpenSSL-with-keyshare?  Because I don=E2=80=99t see it popping up in the =
regular OpenSSL.  That=E2=80=99s a good thing.

> The benefit being that if the TLS channel is alive, the session =
information is available to the monitor.  Just as a strawman, the client =
could transmit session info in special records, encrypted by a public =
key, and the monitoring equipment could scoop these up. For =
compatibility with servers outside the network, a middlebox could =
somehow filter out these records.
>=20
> It sounds like the need is large enough that such an effort is =
feasible, and it would be good to keep normal TLS 1.3 unambiguously =
forward secure. (There IS still the question of how to make sure that =
the extension is not enabled in endpoints it shouldn't be.)
>=20
> On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Viktor Dukhovni =
<ietf-dane@dukhovni.org <mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>> wrote:
>=20
> > On Sep 26, 2016, at 7:21 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com =
<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
> >
> > There are other ways to accomplish this.  For example, the server =
might
> > use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a
> > suitable escrow key.  If clients always enable session tickets, then
> > every handshake will result in the server returning a session =
ticket,
> > in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session =
ticket
> > keys are available.
> >
> > This actually doesn't work in TLS 1.3 because the resumption master =
secret
> > is not sufficient to decrypt the connection in which it was =
established.
>=20
> Yes, I know that changed.  It was an example of something that works =
with
> TLS 1.2 even when PFS is used.  With TLS 1.3 server or client =
implementations
> can find other ways to retain long-term records of session keys.  The =
capability
> to do that is not a requisite or desirable protocol feature.  =
Different user
> communities will have different needs, and the best solution is to =
provide
> security by default, and cede control of the result to the endpoints.
>=20
> --
>         Viktor.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 27 Sep 2016, at 11:33 AM, Judson Wilson &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:wilson.judson@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">wilson.judson@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"gmail-"><br =
class=3D""></span>Yes, I know that changed.&nbsp; It was an example of =
something that works with<br class=3D"">TLS 1.2 even when PFS is =
used.&nbsp; With TLS 1.3 server or client implementations<br =
class=3D"">can find other ways to retain long-term records of session =
keys.&nbsp; The capability<br class=3D"">to do that is not a requisite =
or desirable protocol feature.&nbsp; Different user<br =
class=3D"">communities will have different needs, and the best solution =
is to provide<br class=3D"">security by default, and cede control of the =
result to the endpoints.</blockquote></div></div></div><div class=3D""><br=
 class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I =
don't believe that storing this information on the endpoints is a great =
idea, simply because the monitoring equipment will have a difficult time =
ensuring that the information exists when it is needed. It also =
increases the number of sites that are risks to compromising past =
data.&nbsp;</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>Assuming clients are browsers for the most part, =
storing information there is not robust. The servers or load balancers =
OTOH are small in number and controllable. If they store a static or =
time-limited server keyshare or even actual session keys it can be made =
to work. As for ensuring that the information is stored, that is true =
regardless of what regulations require to be stored.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">I think this challenge is best =
solved by putting the information on the wire in some way, possibly as a =
special industry-specific extension (used only by those who are bent on =
shooting themselves in the foot). =
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Like =
this?</div><div><a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-tls-keyshare-02" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-tls-keyshare-02</a></div>=
<div><br class=3D""></div><div>But this doesn=E2=80=99t work if you=E2=80=99=
re using a standard browser. This draft was a strawman proposal for some =
argument. Even if we liked this and wanted to make this an RFC, I =
can=E2=80=99t see the likes of Google or Mozilla implementing this in =
their browsers. Or you=E2=80=99d need a fork of some server-side =
library. OpenSSL-with-keyshare? &nbsp;Because I don=E2=80=99t see it =
popping up in the regular OpenSSL. &nbsp;That=E2=80=99s a good =
thing.</div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">The benefit being =
that if the TLS channel is alive, the session information is available =
to the monitor.&nbsp; Just as a strawman, the client could transmit =
session info in special records, encrypted by a public key, and the =
monitoring equipment could scoop these up. For compatibility with =
servers outside the network, a middlebox could somehow filter out these =
records.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It =
sounds like the need is large enough that such an effort is feasible, =
and it would be good to keep normal TLS 1.3 unambiguously forward =
secure. (There IS still the question of how to make sure that the =
extension is not enabled in endpoints it shouldn't be.)</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, =
Sep 26, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <span dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.org" target=3D"_blank"=
 class=3D"">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span =
class=3D"gmail-"><br class=3D"">
&gt; On Sep 26, 2016, at 7:21 PM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D"">
&gt;<br class=3D"">
&gt; There are other ways to accomplish this.&nbsp; For example, the =
server might<br class=3D"">
&gt; use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under =
a<br class=3D"">
&gt; suitable escrow key.&nbsp; If clients always enable session =
tickets, then<br class=3D"">
&gt; every handshake will result in the server returning a session =
ticket,<br class=3D"">
&gt; in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session =
ticket<br class=3D"">
&gt; keys are available.<br class=3D"">
&gt;<br class=3D"">
&gt; This actually doesn't work in TLS 1.3 because the resumption master =
secret<br class=3D"">
&gt; is not sufficient to decrypt the connection in which it was =
established.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</span>Yes, I know that changed.&nbsp; It was an example of something =
that works with<br class=3D"">
TLS 1.2 even when PFS is used.&nbsp; With TLS 1.3 server or client =
implementations<br class=3D"">
can find other ways to retain long-term records of session keys.&nbsp; =
The capability<br class=3D"">
to do that is not a requisite or desirable protocol feature.&nbsp; =
Different user<br class=3D"">
communities will have different needs, and the best solution is to =
provide<br class=3D"">
security by default, and cede control of the result to the endpoints.<br =
class=3D"">
<div class=3D"gmail-HOEnZb"><div class=3D"gmail-h5"><br class=3D"">
--<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Viktor.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
______________________________<wbr class=3D"">_________________<br =
class=3D"">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">=

<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr =
class=3D"">listinfo/tls</a><br class=3D"">
</div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">TLS =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
To: "ilariliusvaara@welho.com" <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From nobody Tue Sep 27 11:37:56 2016
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Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 11:30:22 -0700
From: Seth David Schoen <schoen@eff.org>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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BITS Security writes:

> The various suggestions for creating fixed/static Diffie Hellman keys raise interesting possibilities.  We would like to understand these ideas better at a technical level and are initiating research into this potential solution.  We need to understand the potential ramifications and other implementation details.  This solution would have to be implemented in servers, firewalls, load balancers, Internet proxies, and mainframes.  If vendors broadly refuse to support then it is not much a solution but at this point looks like it is worth exploring.  

Bear in mind that, if you do that, anyone who gets a copy of that secret
will be able to retrospectively decrypt all of your organization's
TLS traffic.  However, that's presumably true of any solution that
satisfies the requirement that you describe: there will always be _some_
secret that the organization possesses that, if obtained by an adversary,
would let the adversary retrospectively decrypt traffic.

This configuration might be a bit dangerous because it means that
"servers, firewalls, load balancers, Internet proxies, and mainframes"
would all possess the information needed to decrypt _each other's_
traffic, so someone inside or outside the organization who can steal
that information can then read all of the traffic, even traffic that was
originated by devices they don't know about or have a relationship to.
So organizational unit X can read the traffic of organizational unit Y,
even if X wasn't meant to be in a supervisory or audit relationship
over Y, because the ability to emit decryptable traffic of this kind
also implies the ability to decrypt others' sessions.

It also provides a way that other parties outside of the organization can,
even through passive eavesdropping, recognize the organization's traffic
as associated with that organization -- kind of like a global cookie
inside the TLS handshake.  People could use that to target surveillance
or advertising even if they didn't know or recognize the organization's
IP address ranges.

-- 
Seth Schoen  <schoen@eff.org>
Senior Staff Technologist                       https://www.eff.org/
Electronic Frontier Foundation                  https://www.eff.org/join
815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA  94109       +1 415 436 9333 x107


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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Micha=C5=82_Staruch?= <m.staruch@cinkciarz.pl>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 10:36:27 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:55 PM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> And no, there can not be any valid regulations to require such
> monitoring, because _every_ to the secrecy provisions and criminalization
> requires an explicit law from the parlamentarian legislator.

GDPR Article 88 leaves rules of processing employees' personal data
in the employment context up to the Member States - so regulations
in Germany may be different than ones in let's say Poland.


About the main topic: TLS main task is to protect privacy and data
integrity - essentially to prevent the MitM. Requests that are in
direct conflict with that can't be treated seriously.

TLS needs to provide secure connections, and PFS cipher suites are
better choice than non-PFS ones. If anyone wants (or needs) to monitor
the data, he should set proper trust boundaries, and do the monitoring
between TLS terminators.


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 12:49:59 -0700
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To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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--001a1142d3c4dbf45d053d828c9a
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On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 11:34 AM, BITS Security <
BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:
> Ilari - I understand yours (and others) view on this but there is no
technical reason why this couldn't be part of the standard. A potential
solution, like many cipher suite *choices* in past versions of TLS, would
be optional and up to both clients and servers to configure what they are
willing to support (or not support). You appear to be assuming everyone is
running off the same set of requirements (one-size-fits-all) and we are
here to tell you that isn't necessarily true.

Why does the TLS 1.3 document need to include this, as opposed to a
separate extension? I do think you are ignoring the very real weaknesses
your network architecture has: any user account with the ability to decrypt
TLS sessions networkwide can easily be a jumping off point for total
ownage. Many authentication solutions depend on TLS traffic being secure.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> - Andrew
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ilariliusvaara@welho.com [mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2016 2:24 PM
> To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>
> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 06:07:28PM +0000, BITS Security wrote:
>> Hi Eric--Thank you for the prompt.
>>
>> Our requirements are for the same capabilities we have today with TLS
>> 1.2, namely to be able to take a trace anywhere in our enterprise and
>> decrypt it out of band (assuming that we own the TLS server). This
>> includes traces taken from physical taps, traces from span or mirror
>> ports, traces from the virtual environment, and/or traces from agents
>> on workstations. We need to be able to apply a key to sniffer
>> devices, security and fraud monitoring tools, APM devices, and/or TLS
>> decryption appliances.
>
> No changes to standards are going to happen to make that any easier.
> Don't waste your time.
>
>
> -Ilari
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

-- 
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.

--001a1142d3c4dbf45d053d828c9a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<p dir=3D"ltr"></p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 11:34 AM, BITS Security &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org">BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Ilari - I understand yours (and others) view on this but there is no t=
echnical reason why this couldn&#39;t be part of the standard. A potential =
solution, like many cipher suite *choices* in past versions of TLS, would b=
e optional and up to both clients and servers to configure what they are wi=
lling to support (or not support). You appear to be assuming everyone is ru=
nning off the same set of requirements (one-size-fits-all) and we are here =
to tell you that isn&#39;t necessarily true.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Why does the TLS 1.3 document need to include this, as oppos=
ed to a separate extension? I do think you are ignoring the very real weakn=
esses your network architecture has: any user account with the ability to d=
ecrypt TLS sessions networkwide can easily be a jumping off point for total=
 ownage. Many authentication solutions depend on TLS traffic being secure.<=
/p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Sincerely,<br>
Watson Ladd <br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - Andrew<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho=
.com</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com">ilariliusvaara=
@welho.com</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2016 2:24 PM<br>
&gt; To: BITS Security &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org"=
>BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Cc: Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>=
&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 06:07:28PM +0000, BITS Security wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; Hi Eric--Thank you for the prompt.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Our requirements are for the same capabilities we have today with =
TLS<br>
&gt;&gt; 1.2, namely to be able to take a trace anywhere in our enterprise =
and<br>
&gt;&gt; decrypt it out of band (assuming that we own the TLS server). This=
<br>
&gt;&gt; includes traces taken from physical taps, traces from span or mirr=
or<br>
&gt;&gt; ports, traces from the virtual environment, and/or traces from age=
nts<br>
&gt;&gt; on workstations. We need to be able to apply a key to sniffer<br>
&gt;&gt; devices, security and fraud monitoring tools, APM devices, and/or =
TLS<br>
&gt;&gt; decryption appliances.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; No changes to standards are going to happen to make that any easier.<b=
r>
&gt; Don&#39;t waste your time.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -Ilari<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf=
.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br><br></p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">-- <br>
&quot;Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains&quot;.<br>
--Rousseau.</p>

--001a1142d3c4dbf45d053d828c9a--


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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 13:17:15 -0700
Message-ID: <CAHOTMVLv7F3-ZuKM+35eL-tOtr8ee-1gqwYy+9zQu2GKrsXkjQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:01 PM, BITS Security <
BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote:

> The PCI DSS is already requiring TLS 1.2 for financial institutions that
> participate in the Payment Card Industry.  .BANK (exclusive top level
> banking domain) is also planning to require TLS 1.2.   We're anticipating
> that a regulatory body like these will require TLS 1.3 at some point in the
> future.  Financial institutions then have to comply if they want to
> continue to do business with the companies represented by the regulatory
> body (like large credit card companies in the case of PCI).


Hello again,

I work firsthand enforcing these requirements at a payments company. Again,
I do not speak on behalf of my employer.

It wasn't until last year that PCI decided to deprecate TLS 1.0, at the
time a 16 year old standard. I think your sense of emergency is highly
over-exaggerated.

I find it highly unlikely that any group such as the PCI Council will begin
mandating TLS 1.3 any time soon. I would go as far as to call your concerns
"imaginary".

If you are worried about such an eventuality, the IETF is the wrong place
to complain. It is far, far too late in the TLS 1.3 process to be voicing
these concerns. Where were you 2+ years ago when it was the appropriate
time in the TLS development cycle to voice such concerns? I think the view
of more "forward thinking" payments companies is TLS 1.3 has taken too long
already, and they would like to start deploying it in its current form and
would prefer unnecessary holdups/distractions which have already occurred
throughout the process.

That said, there is still plenty of time to ensure that groups like the PCI
Council do not put in place requirements which would affect the centralized
traffic-decrypting MitM-capability on your payments stack. Perhaps you
should be voicing your concerns there? If you are worried about a TLS 1.3
mandate preventing your MitM capability, the onus is on you to convince the
relevant payments standards bodies that mandating TLS 1.3 is a bad idea for
the payments industry. I think those organizations are better poised to
judge whether such an approach reflects on necessary requirements versus
pervasive antipatterns among complacent companies unprepared for the future
and ripe for a data breach.

In the meantime, you have disclosed a veritable treasure map to a
traffic-decrypting single point of failure which ostensibly exists at all
of the companies you represent which attackers could leverage to recover
all payment credentials. That sounds like a huge security threat.

Would you mind disclosing which companies you represent, so I can ensure
for the safety of my own money that I do not use them?

-- 
Tony Arcieri

--94eb2c1b0fca7d68de053d82efcb
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:01 PM, BITS Security <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org" target=3D"_blank">BITSSecurity@fs=
roundtable.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pad=
ding-left:1ex">The PCI DSS is already requiring TLS 1.2 for financial insti=
tutions that participate in the Payment Card Industry.=C2=A0 .BANK (exclusi=
ve top level banking domain) is also planning to require TLS 1.2.=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0We&#39;re anticipating that a regulatory body like these will require TL=
S 1.3 at some point in the future.=C2=A0 Financial institutions then have t=
o comply if they want to continue to do business with the companies represe=
nted by the regulatory body (like large credit card companies in the case o=
f PCI).</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Hello again,</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>I work firsthand enforcing these requirements at a payments company. Aga=
in, I do not speak on behalf of my employer.</div><div><br></div><div>It wa=
sn&#39;t until last year that PCI decided to deprecate TLS 1.0, at the time=
 a 16 year old standard. I think your sense of emergency is highly over-exa=
ggerated.</div><div><br></div><div>I find it highly unlikely that any group=
 such as the PCI Council will begin mandating TLS 1.3 any time soon. I woul=
d go as far as to call your concerns &quot;imaginary&quot;.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>If you are worried about such an eventuality, the IETF is the wro=
ng place to complain. It is far, far too late in the TLS 1.3 process to be =
voicing these concerns. Where were you 2+ years ago when it was the appropr=
iate time in the TLS development cycle to voice such concerns? I think the =
view of more &quot;forward thinking&quot; payments companies is TLS 1.3 has=
 taken too long already, and they would like to start deploying it in its c=
urrent form and would prefer unnecessary holdups/distractions which have al=
ready occurred throughout the process.</div><div><br></div><div>That said, =
there is still plenty of time to ensure that groups like the PCI Council do=
 not put in place requirements which would affect the centralized traffic-d=
ecrypting MitM-capability on your payments stack. Perhaps you should be voi=
cing your concerns there? If you are worried about a TLS 1.3 mandate preven=
ting your MitM capability, the onus is on you to convince the relevant paym=
ents standards bodies that mandating TLS 1.3 is a bad idea for the payments=
 industry. I think those organizations are better poised to judge whether s=
uch an approach reflects on necessary requirements versus pervasive antipat=
terns among complacent companies unprepared for the future and ripe for a d=
ata breach.</div><div><br></div><div>In the meantime, you have disclosed a =
veritable treasure map to a traffic-decrypting single point of failure whic=
h ostensibly exists at all of the companies you represent which attackers c=
ould leverage to recover all payment credentials. That sounds like a huge s=
ecurity threat.</div><div><br></div><div>Would you mind disclosing which co=
mpanies you represent, so I can ensure for the safety of my own money that =
I do not use them?</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_sig=
nature">Tony Arcieri<br></div>
</div></div>

--94eb2c1b0fca7d68de053d82efcb--


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From: Ronald del Rosario <rrosario@five9.com>
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From nobody Tue Sep 27 17:17:16 2016
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Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 17:17:11 -0700
From: Seth David Schoen <schoen@eff.org>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Seth David Schoen writes:

> This configuration might be a bit dangerous because it means that
> "servers, firewalls, load balancers, Internet proxies, and mainframes"
> would all possess the information needed to decrypt _each other's_
> traffic, so someone inside or outside the organization who can steal
> that information can then read all of the traffic, even traffic that was
> originated by devices they don't know about or have a relationship to.

Existing tools may not support this very well out of the box, but a
somewhat safer technique if you want to decrypt sessions of devices that
you administer would be to have the devices produce their DH parameters
using device-specific or at least organizational unit-specific secrets,
ideally ones that change regularly over time.

People with audit authority can then know all of the secrets, but they
don't have to be known to everyone in the entire organization, and a
device doesn't need to have the information necessary to decrypt all
the prior traffic that it generated.

It's still hard for the audit unit to be confident that it's destroyed all
the copies of old secrets, and the audit unit is still a juicy target for
an attacker who wants to compromise a lot of traffic, but at least there
wouldn't be extremely valuable long-term organization-wide cryptographic
secrets on nearly every device in the organization!

-- 
Seth Schoen  <schoen@eff.org>
Senior Staff Technologist                       https://www.eff.org/
Electronic Frontier Foundation                  https://www.eff.org/join
815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA  94109       +1 415 436 9333 x107


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On 28/09/16 01:17, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> People with audit authority can then know all of the secrets,

How well does that whole audit thing work in the financial services
industry?  (Sorry, couldn't resist:-)

S.


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Subject: [TLS] How to contribute to TLS RFC
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Hello,

I have just joined a new company and have been asked to contribute to TLS
RFC within two years. I request you to guide me how to go about it. What
books etc will you recommend ? Please also advise if I should also join a
TLS implementation group. If yes, which one ?

Thanks and Regards,

Ranjana

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>Hello,<br></div><div><br></div>I have just =
joined a new company and have been asked to contribute to TLS RFC within tw=
o years. I request you to guide me how to go about it. What books etc will =
you recommend ? Please also advise if I should also join a TLS implementati=
on group. If yes, which one ?<br><br></div>Thanks and Regards,<br><br></div=
>Ranjana<br></div>

--94eb2c08e518efc68c053d8bf6c3--


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From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Hi Andrew,

I am coming from a different industry, the embedded industry, and for us
at ARM the development of TLS 1.3 will help us to increase the security
of Internet of Things devices as well as to improve the performance of
the handshake. We are reaching out to developers and our partners to
tell them about the importance of randomness and keys generated on on
low end microcontrollers.

=46rom reading your text it feels that you have been relying on technolog=
y
that intercepts security protocols in a way that follows an
architectural model that wasn't necessarily sound to begin with. Maybe
it is time to rethink the architectural choices you have made or at
least challenge your favorite deep packet inspection vendors a bit more.

Ciao
Hannes

On 09/22/2016 07:19 PM, BITS Security wrote:
> To:  IETF TLS 1.3 Working Group Members
>
> My name is Andrew Kennedy and I work at BITS, the technology policy
> division of the Financial Services Roundtable
> (http://www.fsroundtable.org/bits).  My organization represents
> approximately 100 of the top 150 US-based financial services
> companies including banks, insurance, consumer finance, and asset
> management firms.
>
> I manage the Technology Cybersecurity Program, a CISO-driven forum to
> investigate emerging technologies; integrate capabilities into member
> operations; and advocate member, sector, cross-sector, and
> private-public collaboration.
>
> While I am aware and on the whole supportive of the significant
> contributions to internet security this important working group has
> made in the last few years I recently learned of a proposed change
> that would affect many of my organization's member institutions:  the
> deprecation of RSA key exchange.
>
> Deprecation of the RSA key exchange in TLS 1.3 will cause significant
> problems for financial institutions, almost all of whom are running
> TLS internally and have significant, security-critical investments in
> out-of-band TLS decryption.
>
> Like many enterprises, financial institutions depend upon the ability
> to decrypt TLS traffic to implement data loss protection, intrusion
> detection and prevention, malware detection, packet capture and
> analysis, and DDoS mitigation.  Unlike some other businesses,
> financial institutions also rely upon TLS traffic decryption to
> implement fraud monitoring and surveillance of supervised employees.
> The products which support these capabilities will need to be
> replaced or substantially redesigned at significant cost and loss of
> scalability to continue to support the functionality financial
> institutions and their regulators require.
>
> The impact on supervision will be particularly severe.  Financial
> institutions are required by law to store communications of certain
> employees (including broker/dealers) in a form that ensures that they
> can be retrieved and read in case an investigation into improper
> behavior is initiated.  The regulations which require retention of
> supervised employee communications initially focused on physical and
> electronic mail, but now extend to many other forms of communication
> including instant message, social media, and collaboration
> applications.  All of these communications channels are protected
> using TLS.
>
> The impact on network diagnostics and troubleshooting will also be
> serious.  TLS decryption of network packet traces is required when
> troubleshooting difficult problems in order to follow a transaction
> through multiple layers of infrastructure and isolate the fault
> domain.   The pervasive visibility offered by out-of-band TLS
> decryption can't be replaced by MITM infrastructure or by endpoint
> diagnostics.  The result of losing this TLS visibility will be
> unacceptable outage times as support groups resort to guesswork on
> difficult problems.
>
> Although TLS 1.3 has been designed to meet the evolving security
> needs of the Internet, it is vital to recognize that TLS is also
> being run extensively inside the firewall by private enterprises,
> particularly those that are heavily regulated.  Furthermore, as more
> applications move off of the desktop and into web browsers and mobile
> applications, dependence on TLS is increasing.
>
> Eventually, either security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2, deprecation
> of TLS 1.2 by major browser vendors, or changes to regulatory
> standards will force these enterprises - including financial
> institutions - to upgrade to TLS 1.3.  It is vital to financial
> institutions and to their customers and regulators that these
> institutions be able to maintain both security and regulatory
> compliance during and after the transition from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3.
>
> At the current time viable TLS 1.3-compliant solutions to problems
> like DLP, NIDS/NIPS, PCAP, DDoS mitigation, malware detection, and
> monitoring of regulated employee communications appear to be immature
> or nonexistent.  There are serious cost, scalability, and security
> concerns with all of the currently proposed alternatives to the
> existing out-of-band TLS decryption architecture:
>
> -  End point monitoring: This technique does not replace the
> pervasive network visibility that private enterprises will lose
> without the RSA key exchange.  Ensuring that every endpoint has a
> monitoring agent installed and functioning at all times is vastly
> more complex than ensuring that a network traffic inspection
> appliance is present and functioning.  In the case of monitoring of
> supervised employee communications, moving the monitoring function to
> the endpoint raises new security concerns focusing on deliberate
> circumvention - because in the supervision use case the threat vector
> is the possessor of the endpoint.
>
> -  Exporting of ephemeral keys:  This solution has scalability and
> security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to
> know ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.
>
> -  Man-in-the-middle:  This solution adds significant latency, key
> management complexity, and production risk at each of the needed
> monitoring layers.
>
> Until the critical concerns surrounding enterprise security, employee
> supervision, and network troubleshooting are addressed as effectively
> as internet MITM and surveillance threats have been, we, on behalf of
> our members, are asking the TLS 1.3 Working Group to delay Last Call
> until a workable and scalable solution is identified and vetted, and
> ultimately adopted into the standard by the TLS 1.3 Working Group.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Andrew Kennedy Senior Program Manager, BITS
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Judson Wilson wrote:
> 
> I think this challenge is best solved by putting the information on the
> wire in some way, possibly as a special industry-specific extension (used
> only by those who are bent on shooting themselves in the foot). The benefit
> being that if the TLS channel is alive, the session information is
> available to the monitor.  Just as a strawman, the client could transmit
> session info in special records, encrypted by a public key, and the
> monitoring equipment could scoop these up. For compatibility with servers
> outside the network, a middlebox could somehow filter out these records.
> 
> It sounds like the need is large enough that such an effort is feasible,
> and it would be good to keep normal TLS 1.3 unambiguously forward secure.
> (There IS still the question of how to make sure that the extension is not
> enabled in endpoints it shouldn't be.)


Whoa there.  What you're describing is essentially the
Clipper-Chip & Skipjack encryption

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skipjack_(cipher)


I'm sorry, but the IETF decided back then that it doesn't want
to standardize such technology:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1984


I'm sorry, but I'm still violently opposed to the IETF endorsing
backdooring of security protocols.


-Martin


From nobody Wed Sep 28 02:34:59 2016
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Aloha!

Salz, Rich wrote:
>> I understand your concern over what the nation-state actors are
>> doing but it is not the same as what Enterprises do to manage their
>> private servers, networks and clients.
> 
> Okay, in technical terms only, what is the difference?
> 
>> My personal perspective would be, that the approach to achieving an
>> answer to that important question, would start with:
> 
> It's too late for that.  We're at the end-game, not the start.  I'm
> only a WG member, not editor, chair, or Area Director, but I would be
> extremely surprised if there was any consensus to delay things.

This whole thread looks scarily close to an attempt at throwing a
spanner into the machinery.

- -- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
========================================================================
 Joachim Strömbergson          Secworks AB          joachim@secworks.se
========================================================================
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Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> On 28/09/16 01:17, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> > People with audit authority can then know all of the secrets,
> 
> How well does that whole audit thing work in the financial services
> industry?  (Sorry, couldn't resist:-)

I am actually having serious doubts that it works at all.

Consider a scenario that uses TLSv1.2 with static-RSA key exchange,
plain old session caching and Microsoft style renego-client-cert-auth
on a subset of the urlspace.

(1) first TLS session, full handshake, request to public area.

(2) TLS session resume, request to non-public area -> renego

(3) TLS session resume for renego'ed session to non-public area.


To obtain the cleartext of session (3), you'll need the master secret
of the renego'ed session from (2), for which you'll first have to locate
and decrypt (2), for which you need the master secret from (1), so you'll
have to locate (1), and only at (1) you can start opening the encryption
with the longterm private RSA key of the server.

It is impossible to open (3) directly, and the ClientKeyExchange
handshake message (and client&server randoms) that created the master secret
of session (3) is encrypted during renegotiation, so one can not
directly recover that with the longterm private RSA key of the server,
but has to open (2) first.


-Martin


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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Martin Rex wrote:
> Stephen Farrell wrote:
> > 
> > On 28/09/16 01:17, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> > > People with audit authority can then know all of the secrets,
> > 
> > How well does that whole audit thing work in the financial services
> > industry?  (Sorry, couldn't resist:-)
> 
> I am actually having serious doubts that it works at all.
> 
> Consider a scenario that uses TLSv1.2 with static-RSA key exchange,
> plain old session caching and Microsoft style renego-client-cert-auth
> on a subset of the urlspace.
> 
> (1) first TLS session, full handshake, request to public area.
> 
> (2) TLS session resume, request to non-public area -> renego
> 
> (3) TLS session resume for renego'ed session to non-public area.
> 
> 
> To obtain the cleartext of session (3), you'll need the master secret
> of the renego'ed session from (2), for which you'll first have to locate
> and decrypt (2), for which you need the master secret from (1), so you'll
> have to locate (1), and only at (1) you can start opening the encryption
> with the longterm private RSA key of the server.
> 
> It is impossible to open (3) directly, and the ClientKeyExchange
> handshake message (and client&server randoms) that created the master secret
> of session (3) is encrypted during renegotiation, so one can not
> directly recover that with the longterm private RSA key of the server,
> but has to open (2) first.

And it might even be more difficult than that.

Because the Server Hello (with the server-issued new session_id)
is encrypted during renegotiation, one can not see which renegotiation
created the session that is resumed in (3), and may have to decrypt
several renegotiation handshakes in order to find the correct one
which created the session_id (3).

-Martin


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From: Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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> On Sep 22, 2016, at 6:42 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> - New version negotiation format (*) [IMPORTANT: this got lost in the =
ChangeLog]

4.2.1 Supported Versions says, "The extension contains a list of
   supported versions in preference order, with the most preferred
   version first."

C.2 Negotiating with an older client says, "If the
   "supported_versions" extension is present, the server MUST negotiate
   the highest server-supported version found in that extension."

I'm skeptical of the server respecting client preferences in any =
situation*, but if servers are required to negotiate the highest =
supported version (which I think is sensible), then there's no point to =
the client giving preference order.

I propose moving the text about which version a server must negotiate =
out of the appendix to 4.2.1 and replacing the text mentioning client =
preference order with arbitrary order. (We could mandate descending =
version order, but it seems silly for the server to reject 0304, 0302, =
0303=20
if it's willing to negotiate 0304, for example.)



* The only time to take the client's preference into account is if the =
server really has no opinion on an option--e.g., two equivalent-strength =
cipher suites--but the client can specify a preference for an option =
that requires less computation/power for it. But I'm not entirely =
convinced that's worth the implementation cost.

--=20
Stephen Checkoway




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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 02:08:12 +1000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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On 29 September 2016 at 02:02, Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org> wrote:
> * The only time to take the client's preference into account is if the se=
rver really has no opinion on an option--e.g., two equivalent-strength ciph=
er suites--but the client can specify a preference for an option that requi=
res less computation/power for it. But I'm not entirely convinced that's wo=
rth the implementation cost.

I generally agree, though we just added one small exception to NSS,
and have been discussing another for a while now:  Respecting client
preference for ChaCha over GCM makes a real difference for clients
that don't have AES-NI.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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> C.2 Negotiating with an older client says, "If the
>    "supported_versions" extension is present, the server MUST negotiate
>    the highest server-supported version found in that extension."

I agree that an appendix is the wrong place to put this.  And that specifyi=
ng the client order is pointless.

But I disagree with this being a MUST.  There may be times when the server =
knows more than the client and will know that a lower version is more appro=
priate.  E.g., interfering middleboxes or regulatory regimes.
=20
-- =20
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
Member, OpenSSL Dev Team
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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> I generally agree, though we just added one small exception to NSS, and
> have been discussing another for a while now:  Respecting client preferen=
ce
> for ChaCha over GCM makes a real difference for clients that don't have A=
ES-
> NI.

Yes, a number of net companies do this (Google, CloudFlare, Akamai and no d=
oubt others).  OpenSSL will support something like this in a future release=
 (boringSSL has "equivalence classes" but the syntax and limitations aren't=
 great).

But it doesn't matter -- it's still the server choosing what to do :)
-- =20
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
Member, OpenSSL Dev Team
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz


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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: Hovav Shacham <hovav@cs.ucsd.edu>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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--_000_810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF50102182DXMB116CNCrimnet_
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As I understand the concern, the worry is that Bud is compromising Bob's (T=
LS) server, to somehow send Bob's plaintext to the wrong place.



The proposed (existing?) strategy has Bob compromising his own forward-secr=
ecy to stop Bud, but only after the cat is out of the bag. This seems a hig=
h price (no forward-secrecy) to pay for little gain (cat-out-of-bag).



It seems wiser for Bob to somehow monitor or log what is being done with hi=
s own plaintexts at his own server. I know little about existing products t=
o do this, but from my theoretical perspective, it ought to be easier than =
compromising forward-secrecy (logging ciphertexts).



If proper plaintext monitoring or logging is somehow too costly, then yes, =
as Hovav Shacham mentions, it seems possible that Bob can try to escrow eph=
emeral keys instead, by logging them (or their ultimate source, e.g. OS RNG=
), or by deriving them from say HMAC-DRBG, with prediction-resistance turne=
d off, and just logging the DRBG seed (far out of reach of Bud, etc.).  Thi=
s is still only a cat-out-of-bag solution, and also jeopardizes forward-sec=
recy.



Does TLS 1.3 already have a countermeasure to something like that?



If not, then maybe a future TLS 1.4, could go a step further to boost forwa=
rd-secrecy, in partially thwarting Bob from escrowing himself (as outlined =
above).  For example:



http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/876



the gist of which, as I recall, is deriving ephemeral keys from both a rand=
omness source and the plaintext to be sent.  If the plaintext has enough en=
tropy (and Bob does not keep a copy), then even escrowed keys are not enoug=
h to recover the plaintext.



In my limited understanding, this would be infeasible in the TLS setting, b=
ecause it seems to require during a TLS handshake, collecting entropy from =
the message queue to derive keys, which might be violation of network layer=
ing, etc.  (there's no way for a TLS implementation, to know what's in the =
message pipeline).  I also doubt that most TLS server would have plaintexts=
 with enough secret entropy waiting in the pipeline before the handshake.  =
But, again, I could be wrong: maybe TLS 1.3 is doing this in its 0-RTT mode=
 (I haven't followed the details enough to know).



Finally, a historical note: ANSI X9.63 was developed in the late 90's withi=
n X9, a committee ostensibly of the financial services industry. ANSI X9.63=
 specifies some forward-secure forms key agreement. I don't recall any obje=
ctions to forward-secrecy being raised (but maybe because these forward-sec=
ure key agreement were optional, or not just not being adopted.)



Best regards,



Dan





________________________________
From: TLS [tls-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Hovav Shacham [hovav@cs.ucsd.=
edu]
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:19 PM
To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com<m=
ailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com>> wrote:

Again, let me restate,  I don't think anyone is saying that we MUST have RS=
A.    But, we, as the clients of the IETF TLS protocol, would like to work =
with you to assure we have workable, manageable  and affordable solutions, =
 that meets our needs as well as the needs of others.

I think TLS 1.3 as it is might actually be compatible with your requirement=
s.  The technology you need, Dual EC, was developed by the US Government an=
d has already been standardized by ANSI X9.  Here's a whitepaper on how it =
would work:

    http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf

There are some organizations that would no doubt be happy to lend their exp=
ertise, including RSA-the-company.

-hs.

--_000_810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF50102182DXMB116CNCrimnet_
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<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style id=3D"owaParaStyle">P {=0A=
	MARGIN-BOTTOM: 0px; MARGIN-TOP: 0px=0A=
}=0A=
</style>
</head>
<body ocsi=3D"0" fpstyle=3D"1">
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 10pt; di=
rection: ltr;">
<p>As I understand the&nbsp;concern,&nbsp;the worry is that&nbsp;Bud is&nbs=
p;compromising Bob's (TLS) server, to&nbsp;somehow send Bob's plaintext to =
the wrong place.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The proposed (existing?) strategy&nbsp;has Bob compromising his own forw=
ard-secrecy to stop Bud, but only&nbsp;after the cat is out of the bag.&nbs=
p;This seems a high price (no forward-secrecy)&nbsp;to pay for little gain =
(cat-out-of-bag).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>It seems wiser for Bob to somehow monitor or log what&nbsp;is being done=
&nbsp;with his own plaintexts at his own server.&nbsp;I know&nbsp;little ab=
out existing products to do this, but from&nbsp;my theoretical perspective,=
 it&nbsp;ought to be&nbsp;easier than compromising forward-secrecy
 (logging ciphertexts).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>If proper plaintext monitoring or logging is somehow too costly, then ye=
s, as Hovav Shacham mentions, it seems possible that Bob can try to escrow =
ephemeral keys instead, by logging them (or their ultimate source, e.g. OS =
RNG), or by deriving them from say
 HMAC-DRBG, with prediction-resistance&nbsp;turned off, and&nbsp;just loggi=
ng&nbsp;the DRBG seed (far out of reach of Bud, etc.).&nbsp; This is still =
only a cat-out-of-bag solution, and also jeopardizes forward-secrecy.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Does TLS 1.3 already have a countermeasure to something like that?</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>If not, then maybe a future TLS 1.4, could go a step further to boost fo=
rward-secrecy, in partially thwarting Bob from escrowing himself (as outlin=
ed above).&nbsp; For example:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href=3D"http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/876" target=3D"_blank">http://epr=
int.iacr.org/2014/876</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>the gist of which, as I recall, is deriving ephemeral keys from both a r=
andomness source and the plaintext to be sent.&nbsp; If the plaintext has e=
nough entropy (and Bob does not keep a copy), then even escrowed keys are n=
ot enough to recover the plaintext.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In my limited understanding, this would&nbsp;be infeasible in the&nbsp;T=
LS setting, because it&nbsp;seems to&nbsp;require during a TLS handshake, c=
ollecting entropy from the message queue to derive keys, which might be vio=
lation of network layering, etc.&nbsp; (there's no way for
 a TLS implementation, to know what's in the message pipeline).&nbsp; I als=
o doubt that most TLS server would have&nbsp;plaintexts with enough secret =
entropy waiting in the pipeline before the handshake.&nbsp; But, again,&nbs=
p;I could be wrong: maybe TLS 1.3 is doing this in its
 0-RTT mode (I haven't followed the details enough to know).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Finally, a historical note: ANSI X9.63 was developed in the late 90's&nb=
sp;within X9, a committee ostensibly of the financial services industry.&nb=
sp;ANSI X9.63&nbsp;specifies some forward-secure forms key agreement. I don=
't recall any objections to forward-secrecy being
 raised (but maybe because&nbsp;these forward-secure key agreement&nbsp;wer=
e optional, or not just not being adopted.)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Best regards,</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Dan</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRpF12184" style=3D"direction: ltr;"><font color=3D"#000000" f=
ace=3D"Tahoma" size=3D"2"><b>From:</b> TLS [tls-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf=
 of Hovav Shacham [hovav@cs.ucsd.edu]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:19 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Ackermann, Mich=
ael <span dir=3D"ltr">
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com" target=3D"_blank">MAckermann@bc=
bsm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:</div>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">&nbsp;
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; paddi=
ng-left: 1ex; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-width: 1px=
; border-left-style: solid;">
Again, let me restate,&nbsp; I don't think anyone is saying that we MUST ha=
ve RSA.&nbsp; &nbsp; But, we, as the clients of the IETF TLS protocol, woul=
d like to work with you to assure we have workable, manageable&nbsp; and af=
fordable solutions,&nbsp; that meets our needs as well as
 the needs of others.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I think TLS 1.3 as it is might actually be compatible with your requir=
ements.&nbsp; The technology you need, Dual EC, was developed by the US Gov=
ernment and has already been standardized by ANSI X9.&nbsp; Here's a whitep=
aper on how it would work:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf" target=
=3D"_blank">http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There are some organizations that would no doubt be happy to lend thei=
r expertise, including RSA-the-company.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-hs.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF50102182DXMB116CNCrimnet_--


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From: Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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> On Sep 28, 2016, at 11:08 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>> C.2 Negotiating with an older client says, "If the
>>   "supported_versions" extension is present, the server MUST =
negotiate
>>   the highest server-supported version found in that extension."
>=20
> I agree that an appendix is the wrong place to put this.  And that =
specifying the client order is pointless.
>=20
> But I disagree with this being a MUST.  There may be times when the =
server knows more than the client and will know that a lower version is =
more appropriate.  E.g., interfering middleboxes or regulatory regimes.

Seems reasonable. How about making selection from the list (if the =
extension is present) a MUST and selecting the highest server-supported =
version is RECOMMENDED? Perhaps the second part is unnecessary.

--=20
Stephen Checkoway




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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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Salz, Rich wrote:
> > I generally agree, though we just added one small exception to NSS, and
> > have been discussing another for a while now:  Respecting client preference
> > for ChaCha over GCM makes a real difference for clients that don't have AES-
> > NI.
> 
> Yes, a number of net companies do this (Google, CloudFlare, Akamai and no doubt others).  OpenSSL will support something like this in a future release (boringSSL has "equivalence classes" but the syntax and limitations aren't great).
> 
> But it doesn't matter -- it's still the server choosing what to do :)

For all TLS protocol parameters where the client presents a list
and the server selects one element from that list, it is a
server-local (policy) decision which one element it chooses.

Describing the order of elements in such lists as "client preference order" 
has led to numerous bogus server implementations, which erroneously
default to "do what the client proposes", rather than "do what the server
admin has configured".

Out-of-curiosity, is the ChaCha-over-GCM to be configurable for the
server admin, or is it hidden black magic?

-Martin


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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 12:29:03 -0400
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To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> It seems wiser for Bob to somehow monitor or log what is being done with his
> own plaintexts at his own server. I know little about existing products to
> do this, but from my theoretical perspective, it ought to be easier than
> compromising forward-secrecy (logging ciphertexts).

+1. I worked on two separate projects where all messages were
effectively duplicated - one was sent as expected and the other was
sent to a logging server. It did not matter what the message was. It
could have been email, chat a pdf or a word doc. Everything was logged
by order of the auditor.

One project was for the state department, and the other was diplomatic
security service. They did not care about efficiency. After the
Manning breach and some other classified leaks, they cared very much
about exactly what was egressed.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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> Out-of-curiosity, is the ChaCha-over-GCM to be configurable for the serve=
r
> admin, or is it hidden black magic?

On the server-side, I think most of them work the same way:  if the client =
puts ChaCha at the start of its list, and the server is configured with Cha=
Cha as one of its ciphers, then the server "moves" Chacha to the front of i=
ts list and proceeds as normal.  I think the CloudFlare patches just implem=
ented that policy in code, based on patches they posted. I'm not going to s=
ay how Akamai did it except that no animal sacrifice is involved. I don't k=
now how Google did it, but see next paragraph.

On the crypto-library side, boringSSL had equivalence classes so you could =
specify that by configuring the CIPHER list. If running in a server, and th=
e configured ciphers were like "[AES:CHACHA]:3DES:RC4" for example, then ei=
ther AES or ChaCha would be picked.  I don't know if Google servers use tha=
t, but I'd be a bit surprised if they didn't.

As for OpenSSL, we need to figure out something.  The "ciphers" syntax is s=
howing its age.

-- =20
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
Member, OpenSSL Dev Team
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz



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On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:37 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> On the crypto-library side, boringSSL had equivalence classes so you coul=
d specify that by configuring the CIPHER list. If running in a server, and =
the configured ciphers were like "[AES:CHACHA]:3DES:RC4" for example, then =
either AES or ChaCha would be picked.  I don't know if Google servers use t=
hat, but I'd be a bit surprised if they didn't.
>
> As for OpenSSL, we need to figure out something.  The "ciphers" syntax is=
 showing its age.

The equal-preference groupings have worked pretty well for us in terms
of making the right thing happen and being understandable to
non-experts. I certainly agree that the ciphers mini-language could do
with some renewal overall.

But I think a lot of the need for it is also going away. We've spent
years worrying about should we do forward security? Do we put RC4
ahead of AES-CBC because of BEAST / POODLE / etc? What about the poor
performance of AES-GCM with Java (for a while)?

But since we've now drastically reduced the number of options, and
those options are (fingers crossed) less shitty than before, I'd hope
that a default would work for the vast majority of TLS 1.3 users.


Cheers

AGL

--=20
Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org https://www.imperialviolet.org


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--001a114baee063b6d4053d948242
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I don't really agree that we shouldn't specify client order. We do that
everywhere else in TLS.

Rather, I think we should relax the requirement to pick the highest one,
which is just a holdover from a less expressive negotiation mechanism.


-Ekr


On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:18 AM, Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org> wrote:

>
> > On Sep 28, 2016, at 11:08 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> C.2 Negotiating with an older client says, "If the
> >>   "supported_versions" extension is present, the server MUST negotiate
> >>   the highest server-supported version found in that extension."
> >
> > I agree that an appendix is the wrong place to put this.  And that
> specifying the client order is pointless.
> >
> > But I disagree with this being a MUST.  There may be times when the
> server knows more than the client and will know that a lower version is
> more appropriate.  E.g., interfering middleboxes or regulatory regimes.
>
> Seems reasonable. How about making selection from the list (if the
> extension is present) a MUST and selecting the highest server-supported
> version is RECOMMENDED? Perhaps the second part is unnecessary.
>
> --
> Stephen Checkoway
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I don&#39;t really agree that we shouldn&#39;t specify cli=
ent order. We do that everywhere else in TLS.<div><br></div><div>Rather, I =
think we should relax the requirement to pick the highest one, which is jus=
t a holdover from a less expressive negotiation mechanism.</div><div><br></=
div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:18 AM, Step=
hen Checkoway <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:s@pahtak.org" target=
=3D"_blank">s@pahtak.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex"><span class=3D""><br>
&gt; On Sep 28, 2016, at 11:08 AM, Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@a=
kamai.com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; C.2 Negotiating with an older client says, &quot;If the<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;supported_versions&quot; extension is present, t=
he server MUST negotiate<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the highest server-supported version found in that ext=
ension.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I agree that an appendix is the wrong place to put this.=C2=A0 And tha=
t specifying the client order is pointless.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; But I disagree with this being a MUST.=C2=A0 There may be times when t=
he server knows more than the client and will know that a lower version is =
more appropriate.=C2=A0 E.g., interfering middleboxes or regulatory regimes=
.<br>
<br>
</span>Seems reasonable. How about making selection from the list (if the e=
xtension is present) a MUST and selecting the highest server-supported vers=
ion is RECOMMENDED? Perhaps the second part is unnecessary.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--<br>
Stephen Checkoway<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114baee063b6d4053d948242--


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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> On 28 Sep 2016, at 7:16 PM, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> As I understand the concern, the worry is that Bud is compromising =
Bob's (TLS) server, to somehow send Bob's plaintext to the wrong place.
> =20
> The proposed (existing?) strategy has Bob compromising his own =
forward-secrecy to stop Bud, but only after the cat is out of the bag. =
This seems a high price (no forward-secrecy) to pay for little gain =
(cat-out-of-bag).
> =20
> It seems wiser for Bob to somehow monitor or log what is being done =
with his own plaintexts at his own server. I know little about existing =
products to do this, but from my theoretical perspective, it ought to be =
easier than compromising forward-secrecy (logging ciphertexts).
> =20
> If proper plaintext monitoring or logging is somehow too costly, then =
yes...

I don=E2=80=99t really understand under what circumstances logging, =
monitoring or storing the plaintext is not feasible, while storing the =
ciphertext is. Because if you don=E2=80=99t store the ciphertext, then =
keeping static or ephemeral keys around doesn=E2=80=99t buy you much.  =
It=E2=80=99s true that current server products don=E2=80=99t log or =
store the plaintext, but they could easily be modified to do that. There =
are extensions to browsers that store the plaintext if you want.

Maybe if the good folks at the Bluffdale facility are willing to let you =
download their copy of your captured ciphertexts, then it makes sense to =
store only ephemeral or static keys. Otherwise it seems cheaper to store =
the plaintext than to store both ciphertext and keys.

Yoav=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 28 Sep 2016, at 7:16 PM, Dan Brown &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:danibrown@blackberry.com" =
class=3D"">danibrown@blackberry.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: =
auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; font-family: =
Tahoma; font-size: 10pt; direction: ltr;" class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" class=3D"">As I =
understand the&nbsp;concern,&nbsp;the worry is that&nbsp;Bud =
is&nbsp;compromising Bob's (TLS) server, to&nbsp;somehow send Bob's =
plaintext to the wrong place.</div><p style=3D"margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-top: 0px;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</p><div style=3D"margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-top: 0px;" class=3D"">The proposed (existing?) strategy&nbsp;has =
Bob compromising his own forward-secrecy to stop Bud, but =
only&nbsp;after the cat is out of the bag.&nbsp;This seems a high price =
(no forward-secrecy)&nbsp;to pay for little gain =
(cat-out-of-bag).</div><p style=3D"margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</p><div style=3D"margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" =
class=3D"">It seems wiser for Bob to somehow monitor or log what&nbsp;is =
being done&nbsp;with his own plaintexts at his own server.&nbsp;I =
know&nbsp;little about existing products to do this, but from&nbsp;my =
theoretical perspective, it&nbsp;ought to be&nbsp;easier than =
compromising forward-secrecy (logging ciphertexts).</div><p =
style=3D"margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</p><div =
style=3D"margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" class=3D"">If proper =
plaintext monitoring or logging is somehow too costly, then =
yes...</div></div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">I don=E2=80=99t really understand under what circumstances =
logging, monitoring or storing the plaintext is not feasible, while =
storing the ciphertext is. Because if you don=E2=80=99t store the =
ciphertext, then keeping static or ephemeral keys around doesn=E2=80=99t =
buy you much. &nbsp;It=E2=80=99s true that current server products =
don=E2=80=99t log or store the plaintext, but they could easily be =
modified to do that. There are extensions to browsers that store the =
plaintext if you want.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Maybe if the good folks at the Bluffdale facility are willing =
to let you download their copy of your captured ciphertexts, then it =
makes sense to store only ephemeral or static keys. Otherwise it seems =
cheaper to store the plaintext than to store both ciphertext and =
keys.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Yoav</div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_F948D0E9-554F-49B9-BE94-783E0F947713--


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>
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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: 'Yoav Nir' <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From nobody Wed Sep 28 16:09:08 2016
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Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 16:08:37 -0700
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
To: mrex@sap.com
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On 9/28/16 at 2:01 AM, mrex@sap.com wrote:

>I'm sorry, but I'm still violently opposed to the IETF endorsing
>backdooring of security protocols.

I find myself in violent agreement with Martin, and many others=20
in the IETF.

The last major backdoored encryption protocol I can remember=20
came from the National Security Agency. After a few years of=20
examination, serious flaws were found in the backdoor mechanism=20
which would allow attackers to open the backdoors and read the=20
plaintext. When the best in the business can't get these=20
protocols right, I don't think we can either.

Cheers - Bill

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz        | Since the IBM Selectric, keyboards have gotten
408-356-8506       | steadily worse. Now we have touchscreen keyboards.
www.pwpconsult.com | Can we make something even worse?


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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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On 9/28/16 3:08 PM, Bill Frantz wrote:
> On 9/28/16 at 2:01 AM, mrex@sap.com wrote:
>> I'm sorry, but I'm still violently opposed to the IETF endorsing
>> backdooring of security protocols.
> I find myself in violent agreement with Martin, and many others in the
> IETF.

This seems uncontroversial and frankly somewhat low-information.
Yay, crypto backdoors are bad.

That said, IETF participation is dominated by large equipment and
software vendors and the problem space, at least until recently
(there's been a crop of data center-related problems coming up in
OPS and routing), has tended to cover service provider-related
questions.  We have poor participation and representation from
enterprise networks.  So now we've got someone showing up from
the enterprise space and saying "I have this problem related to
protocol changes."  And yeah, he's very, very late in this
process, although it's worth pointing out that it's in the best
tradition of the IETF to deal with technical problems that crop
up with documents at any point in their development.

It seems to me that the discussions of alternatives to modifying
the protocol to meet his needs has been extremely helpful, and it
also seems to me that in some sense this ought to be an object
lesson to large enterprises dealing with fairly sophisticated
protocol problems that they really need to get involved and make
their requirements known.  If there's a need here for a new
monitoring framework that doesn't involve compromising the
security of IETF protocols, that strikes me as an interesting
question.  In the meantime I'd hate to see this level of hectoring
continue - we need more participation from other kinds of network
operators, not less.

Melinda



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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 17:36:44 -0700
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On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 4:27 PM, Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net
> wrote:

> We have poor participation and representation from
> enterprise networks.  So now we've got someone showing up from
> the enterprise space and saying "I have this problem related to
> protocol changes."  And yeah, he's very, very late in this
> process, although it's worth pointing out that it's in the best
> tradition of the IETF to deal with technical problems that crop
> up with documents at any point in their development.


"BITS Security" is representing *some* companies in the payments space,
namely these ones: http://fsroundtable.org/members/

Their concerns are not representative of "the enterprise", "the industry",
"the payments space", etc. In fact some of the companies in the
aforementioned link have personally contacted me to note they disagree with
"BITS Security". Even among their cabal, their opinion is contentious.

My personal opinion, as a security professional directly working on
implementing TLS for a payments company, is their last-minute proposed
changes would harm the security of our payments platform. I want to deploy
TLS 1.3 in its current form. I also think the reasoning for their proposed
changes is based on flawed premises.

There are relevant industry groups BITS Security seems actually concerned
with, such as the PCI Council. BITS Security should be voicing their
concerns there, and the PCI Council should be working with the IETF to
implement such changes if they're actually deemed necessary.

I do not think this is a case of the IETF failing to understand "industry
requirements". I strongly disagree the proposal represents "industry
requirements" at all. I think they are trying to subvert the IETF process
because they have inadequate security processes and they do not want to see
their inadequate processes disturbed by security improvements to TLS.

As a payments professional, my personal opinion is improving the security
of TLS is *paramount*. The voiced concerns are not representative of
"enterprise", "industry", or "payments" as a whole, but an last-minute
opinion of companies who haven't been paying attention to the process who
do not want to invest in upgrading their security practices.

The IETF is doing great work. This entire thread is a distraction, and I
hope it does not result in changes which weaken TLS 1.3's security.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On W=
ed, Sep 28, 2016 at 4:27 PM, Melinda Shore <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:melinda.shore@nomountain.net" target=3D"_blank">melinda.shore@nomou=
ntain.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">We have poor participation and representation from<br>
enterprise networks.=C2=A0 So now we&#39;ve got someone showing up from<br>
the enterprise space and saying &quot;I have this problem related to<br>
protocol changes.&quot;=C2=A0 And yeah, he&#39;s very, very late in this<br=
>
process, although it&#39;s worth pointing out that it&#39;s in the best<br>
tradition of the IETF to deal with technical problems that crop<br>
up with documents at any point in their development.</blockquote><div><br><=
/div><div>&quot;BITS Security&quot; is representing *some* companies in the=
 payments space, namely these ones:=C2=A0<a href=3D"http://fsroundtable.org=
/members/">http://fsroundtable.org/members/</a></div><div><br></div><div>Th=
eir concerns are not representative of &quot;the enterprise&quot;, &quot;th=
e industry&quot;, &quot;the payments space&quot;, etc. In fact some of the =
companies in the aforementioned link have personally contacted me to note t=
hey disagree with &quot;BITS Security&quot;. Even among their cabal, their =
opinion is contentious.</div><div><br></div><div>My personal opinion, as a =
security professional directly working on implementing TLS for a payments c=
ompany, is their last-minute proposed changes would harm the security of ou=
r payments platform. I want to deploy TLS 1.3 in its current form. I also t=
hink the reasoning for their proposed changes is based on flawed premises.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>There are relevant industry groups BITS Security s=
eems actually concerned with, such as the PCI Council. BITS Security should=
 be voicing their concerns there, and the PCI Council should be working wit=
h the IETF to implement such changes if they&#39;re actually deemed necessa=
ry.</div><div><br></div><div>I do not think this is a case of the IETF fail=
ing to understand &quot;industry requirements&quot;. I strongly disagree th=
e proposal represents &quot;industry requirements&quot; at all. I think the=
y are trying to subvert the IETF process because they have inadequate secur=
ity processes and they do not want to see their inadequate processes distur=
bed by security improvements to TLS.</div><div><br></div><div>As a payments=
 professional, my personal opinion is improving the security of TLS is *par=
amount*. The voiced concerns are not representative of &quot;enterprise&quo=
t;, &quot;industry&quot;, or &quot;payments&quot; as a whole, but an last-m=
inute opinion of companies who haven&#39;t been paying attention to the pro=
cess who do not want to invest in upgrading their security practices.</div>=
<div><br></div><div>The IETF is doing great work. This entire thread is a d=
istraction, and I hope it does not result in changes which weaken TLS 1.3&#=
39;s security.</div><div><br></div></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signatu=
re">Tony Arcieri<br></div>
</div></div>

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To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On 9/28/16 4:36 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> The IETF is doing great work. This entire thread is a distraction, and =
I
> hope it does not result in changes which weaken TLS 1.3's security.

I think it's quite clearly the case that that is not going to happen.
But, that doesn't mean that these guys don't have a problem worth
addressing, even if they're asking for a crap solution to it.  The
IETF is an insular organization and I tend to think that leads to
poorer outcomes in some cases than we might otherwise have produced.

I am not suggesting that his request for a protocol that he
can break needs serious consideration, but that the fact that he's
come up with an unacceptable solution to a problem that he's
identified doesn't mean that the problem either doesn't exist or
is completely outside the IETF's scope.

All that's going to come out of discussion here is unhelpful
and largely redundant finger-wagging.  I think these guys ought
to write up the problem they've got and post a draft.

Melinda



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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 5:49 PM, Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net
> wrote:

> I think it's quite clearly the case that that is not going to happen.
> But, that doesn't mean that these guys don't have a problem worth
> addressing, even if they're asking for a crap solution to it.  The
> IETF is an insular organization and I tend to think that leads to
> poorer outcomes in some cases than we might otherwise have produced.


Their argument is the PCI council will mandate TLS 1.3 soon. This is not
the case. A TLS *1.1* mandate by the PCI council has been delayed until
2018.

I work for a company that directly participates in the PCI council, and
have been participating in the TLS and CFRG process for several years
(again, I do not directly represent either in this discussion).

I do not think that TLS 1.3 in its current form will cause them any
practical real-world problems for these companies, rather they seem to be
attempting to futureproof their current bad practices.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On W=
ed, Sep 28, 2016 at 5:49 PM, Melinda Shore <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:melinda.shore@nomountain.net" target=3D"_blank">melinda.shore@nomou=
ntain.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I think =
it&#39;s quite clearly the case that that is not going to happen.<br>
But, that doesn&#39;t mean that these guys don&#39;t have a problem worth<b=
r>
addressing, even if they&#39;re asking for a crap solution to it.=C2=A0 The=
<br>
IETF is an insular organization and I tend to think that leads to<br>
poorer outcomes in some cases than we might otherwise have produced.</block=
quote><div><br></div><div>Their argument is the PCI council will mandate TL=
S 1.3 soon. This is not the case. A TLS *1.1* mandate by the PCI council ha=
s been delayed until 2018.</div><div><br></div><div>I work for a company th=
at directly participates in the PCI council, and have been participating in=
 the TLS and CFRG process for several years (again, I do not directly repre=
sent either in this discussion).</div><div><br></div><div>I do not think th=
at TLS 1.3 in its current form will cause them any practical real-world pro=
blems for these companies, rather they seem to be attempting to futureproof=
 their current bad practices.</div><div><br></div></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></d=
iv>
</div></div>

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Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 22:27:54 -0700
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
To: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On 9/28/16 at 4:27 PM, melinda.shore@nomountain.net (Melinda=20
Shore) wrote:

>That said, IETF participation is dominated by large equipment and
>software vendors and the problem space, at least until recently
>(there's been a crop of data center-related problems coming up in
>OPS and routing), has tended to cover service provider-related
>questions.  We have poor participation and representation from
>enterprise networks.  So now we've got someone showing up from
>the enterprise space and saying "I have this problem related to
>protocol changes."  And yeah, he's very, very late in this
>process, although it's worth pointing out that it's in the best
>tradition of the IETF to deal with technical problems that crop
>up with documents at any point in their development.

While I fully support trying to design protocols so applications=20
and networks can be managed by enterprises (and indeed home=20
users), I do not want to see IETF security protocols become more=20
complex as a result. That will only make them easy targets for=20
attackers. The Clipper chip shows what happens when even experts=20
design key recovery systems.

I hope one outcome of this thread is that industry groups which=20
use IETF protocols will realize that the best way to have their=20
needs recognized is to be active in the relevant groups from the=20
beginning and for the long term. I know of no other way to make=20
the proper tradeoffs except to have all the issues in front of=20
the working group from the beginning of their process. That=20
involvement will strengthen the IETF while making sure=20
enterprise issues are addressed.

Even as late comers to the process, BITS Security has gotten a=20
number of suggestions for ways forward which do not change the=20
emerging TLS 1.3 standard. Given that it will be several years=20
before regulators require TLS 1.3, vendors will be able step=20
forward to fill this need with endpoint logging as well as other=20
techniques embedded in "install and run" products. Given the=20
list of companies that Tony linked, these products should enjoy=20
a profitable market.

Cheers - Bill

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz        | Concurrency is hard. 12 out  | Periwinkle
(408)356-8506      | 10 programmers get it wrong. | 16345=20
Englewood Ave
www.pwpconsult.com |                - Jeff Frantz | Los Gatos,=20
CA 95032


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From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 00:01:27 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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I've never quite understood what TLS was supposed to be protecting against,
and whether or not it has done so successfully, or has the potential to do
so successfully.

Well, I don't think anyone here even knows how to protect a mailing list
from multi-billion dollar threat actors so...???

Let me quote RFC 3526:
"The
   strengths of the groups defined here are always estimates and there
   are as many methods to estimate them as there are cryptographers."

But whatever. You people aren't even willing to do what the Germans did...
twice.

Personally I think TLS should be scrapped, replaced with a protocol without
negotiation, replace PKI with trusted notaries (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) ), etc.

But, no one has been able to program anything correctly, not even
certificate authorities:

https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an-ssl-certificate-for-github-com

I'm not paying you people anyway. At least the protocol is theoretically
secure.

--001a114b86964e6764053da00e90
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;ve never quite understood what TLS was supposed to b=
e protecting against, and whether or not it has done so successfully, or ha=
s the potential to do so successfully.<div><br></div><div>Well, I don&#39;t=
 think anyone here even knows how to protect a mailing list from multi-bill=
ion dollar threat actors so...???</div><div><br></div><div>Let me quote RFC=
=C2=A03526:=C2=A0</div><div>&quot;The</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0strengths of t=
he groups defined here are always estimates and there</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0are as many methods to estimate them as there are cryptographers.&quot;<=
/div><div><br></div><div>But whatever. You people aren&#39;t even willing t=
o do what the Germans did... twice.</div><div><br></div><div>Personally I t=
hink TLS should be scrapped, replaced with a protocol without negotiation, =
replace PKI with trusted notaries (=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://en.wikipedia.or=
g/wiki/Convergence_(SSL)">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL)</=
a> ), etc.</div><div><br></div><div>But, no one has been able to program an=
ything correctly, not even certificate authorities:=C2=A0</div><div><br></d=
iv><div><a href=3D"https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-m=
e-an-ssl-certificate-for-github-com">https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of=
-how-wosign-gave-me-an-ssl-certificate-for-github-com</a><br></div><div><br=
></div><div>I&#39;m not paying you people anyway. At least the protocol is =
theoretically secure.</div></div>

--001a114b86964e6764053da00e90--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
To: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Hi Ryan,

people working in the security field know what features TLS provides and
those are highly valued since otherwise it wouldn't be used so widely.

I prefer to finalize the work on TLS 1.3 as planned. There are various
groups successfully working on their implementations and I am looking
forward to a well-attended Hackathon at the next IETF meeting.

Ciao
Hannes


On 09/29/2016 09:01 AM, Ryan Carboni wrote:
> I've never quite understood what TLS was supposed to be protecting
> against, and whether or not it has done so successfully, or has the
> potential to do so successfully.
>=20
> Well, I don't think anyone here even knows how to protect a mailing lis=
t
> from multi-billion dollar threat actors so...???
>=20
> Let me quote RFC 3526:=20
> "The
>    strengths of the groups defined here are always estimates and there
>    are as many methods to estimate them as there are cryptographers."
>=20
> But whatever. You people aren't even willing to do what the Germans
> did... twice.
>=20
> Personally I think TLS should be scrapped, replaced with a protocol
> without negotiation, replace PKI with trusted notaries
> ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) ), etc.
>=20
> But, no one has been able to program anything correctly, not even
> certificate authorities:=20
>=20
> https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an-ssl-certif=
icate-for-github-com
>=20
> I'm not paying you people anyway. At least the protocol is theoreticall=
y
> secure.
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 13:38:16 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Tuesday, 27 September 2016 18:34:30 CEST BITS Security wrote:
> Ilari - I understand yours (and others) view on this but there is no
> technical reason why this couldn't be part of the standard.  A potential
> solution, like many cipher suite *choices* in past versions of TLS, would
> be optional and up to both clients and servers to configure what they are
> willing to support (or not support).  You appear to be assuming everyone =
is
> running off the same set of requirements (one-size-fits-all) and we are
> here to tell you that isn't necessarily true.

if you're willing to forge One Ring to rule them all, using static server k=
ey=20
shares in TLSv1.3 doesn't change anything in your ability to compromise=20
security of all the connections in your network. It also doesn't require an=
y=20
changes to TLSv1.3 to work. Yes, it will require changes to MitM boxes and=
=20
decryption software, but that's the case for any new protocol version, isn'=
t=20
it?

>=20
> - Andrew
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ilariliusvaara@welho.com [mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2016 2:24 PM
> To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
> Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
>=20
> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 06:07:28PM +0000, BITS Security wrote:
> > Hi Eric--Thank you for the prompt.
> >=20
> > Our requirements are for the same capabilities we have today with TLS
> > 1.2, namely to be able to take a trace anywhere in our enterprise and
> > decrypt it out of band (assuming that we own the TLS server).  This
> > includes traces taken from physical taps, traces from span or mirror
> > ports, traces from the virtual environment, and/or traces from agents
> > on workstations.  We need to be able to apply a key to sniffer
> > devices, security and fraud monitoring tools, APM devices, and/or TLS
> > decryption appliances.
>=20
> No changes to standards are going to happen to make that any easier.
> Don't waste your time.
>=20
>=20
> -Ilari
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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A new meeting session request has just been submitted by Sean Turner, a Chair of the tls working group.


---------------------------------------------------------
Working Group Name: Transport Layer Security
Area Name: Security Area
Session Requester: Sean Turner

Number of Sessions: 1
Length of Session(s):  2.5 Hours
Number of Attendees: 120
Conflicts to Avoid: 
 First Priority: curdle uta acme cose cfrg dane httpbis httpauth rtcweb saag stir tcpinc tokbind perc quic
 Second Priority: sacm oauth



Special Requests:
  
---------------------------------------------------------


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From: "Gonzalo Salgueiro (gsalguei)" <gsalguei@cisco.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, tram mailing list <tram@ietf.org>, "mmusic (E-mail)" <mmusic@ietf.org>, "ice@ietf.org" <ice@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [rfc-dist] RFC 7983 on Multiplexing Scheme Updates for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Extension for Datagram	Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
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Forwarding for awareness to the other relevant WGs. Thanks to all who helpe=
d get this done.

Cheers,

Gonzalo

Begin forwarded message:

From: <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org<mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>>
Subject: [rfc-dist] RFC 7983 on Multiplexing Scheme Updates for Secure Real=
-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Extension for Datagram Transport Layer Secu=
rity (DTLS)
Date: September 29, 2016 at 7:40:41 PM EDT
To: <ietf-announce@ietf.org<mailto:ietf-announce@ietf.org>>, <rfc-dist@rfc-=
editor.org<mailto:rfc-dist@rfc-editor.org>>
Cc: <drafts-update-ref@iana.org<mailto:drafts-update-ref@iana.org>>, <avt@i=
etf.org<mailto:avt@ietf.org>>, <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org<mailto:rfc-editor=
@rfc-editor.org>>

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


       RFC 7983

       Title:      Multiplexing Scheme Updates for Secure
                   Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Extension for
                   Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
       Author:     M. Petit-Huguenin, G. Salgueiro
       Status:     Standards Track
       Stream:     IETF
       Date:       September 2016
       Mailbox:    marc@petit-huguenin.org<mailto:marc@petit-huguenin.org>,
                   gsalguei@cisco.com<mailto:gsalguei@cisco.com>
       Pages:      13
       Characters: 24894
       Updates:    RFC 5764

       I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-avtcore-rfc5764-mux-fixes-11.txt

       URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7983

       DOI:        http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7983

This document defines how Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS),
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), RTP Control Protocol (RTCP),
Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN), Traversal Using Relays
around NAT (TURN), and ZRTP packets are multiplexed on a single
receiving socket.  It overrides the guidance from RFC 5764 ("SRTP
Extension for DTLS"), which suffered from four issues described and
fixed in this document.

This document updates RFC 5764.

This document is a product of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance Wo=
rking Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestion=
s
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official
Internet Protocol Standards (https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards) for the
standardization state and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.

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The RFC Editor Team
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<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
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<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">
<div dir=3D"auto" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space;=
 -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">
Forwarding for awareness to the other relevant WGs. Thanks to all who helpe=
d get this done.
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">Cheers,</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">Gonzalo<br class=3D"">
<div><br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">Begin forwarded message:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,=
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</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue,=
 Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-ed=
itor.org" class=3D"">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Subject:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue,=
 Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">[rfc-dist] RFC 7983 on Mu=
ltiplexing Scheme Updates for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Ex=
tension for Datagram Transport Layer Security
 (DTLS)</b><br class=3D"">
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Date:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue,=
 Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">September 29, 2016 at 7:40:41 PM EDT<br=
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</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">To:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue,=
 Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-announce@iet=
f.org" class=3D"">ietf-announce@ietf.org</a>&gt;, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rfc=
-dist@rfc-editor.org" class=3D"">rfc-dist@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt;<br class=
=3D"">
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;" class=3D"">
<span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Cc:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue,=
 Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:drafts-update-ref=
@iana.org" class=3D"">drafts-update-ref@iana.org</a>&gt;, &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:avt@ietf.org" class=3D"">avt@ietf.org</a>&gt;, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:r=
fc-editor@rfc-editor.org" class=3D"">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt;<br c=
lass=3D"">
</span></div>
<br class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC l=
ibraries.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;RFC 7983<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Title: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;Multiplexing Scheme Updates for Secure <br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) =
Extension for <br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Datagram Transport Layer Security (D=
TLS) <br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Author: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;M=
. Petit-Huguenin, G. Salgueiro<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Status: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;S=
tandards Track<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Stream: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I=
ETF<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Date: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;September 2016<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Mailbox: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:marc@petit-huguenin.org" class=3D"">marc@petit-huguenin.org</a>=
,
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:gsalguei@cisco.com=
" class=3D"">gsalguei@cisco.com</a><br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Pages: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;13<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Characters: 24894<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Updates: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;RFC 57=
64<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I-D Tag: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;draft-=
ietf-avtcore-rfc5764-mux-fixes-11.txt<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;URL: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7983" class=3D"=
">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7983</a><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;DOI: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7983" class=3D"">htt=
p://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7983</a><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
This document defines how Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS),<br clas=
s=3D"">
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), RTP Control Protocol (RTCP),<br class=
=3D"">
Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN), Traversal Using Relays<br class=
=3D"">
around NAT (TURN), and ZRTP packets are multiplexed on a single<br class=3D=
"">
receiving socket. &nbsp;It overrides the guidance from RFC 5764 (&quot;SRTP=
<br class=3D"">
Extension for DTLS&quot;), which suffered from four issues described and<br=
 class=3D"">
fixed in this document.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
This document updates RFC 5764.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
This document is a product of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance Wo=
rking Group of the IETF.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
This is now a Proposed Standard.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track<br cla=
ss=3D"">
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestion=
s<br class=3D"">
for improvements. &nbsp;Please refer to the current edition of the Official=
<br class=3D"">
Internet Protocol Standards (<a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/standard=
s" class=3D"">https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards</a>) for the
<br class=3D"">
standardization state and status of this protocol. &nbsp;Distribution of th=
is <br class=3D"">
memo is unlimited.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
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</blockquote>
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